


ENDING 1851 APR 1 1922

4083

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

VOL. XIX.—1920-1921




Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

Philos
H

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY



EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

VOLUME XIX

OCTOBER 1920—JULY 1921

171497
18.4.22

LONDON
WILLIAMS AND NORGATE

BL
1
H5
v19



THE

HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW
RELIGION, THEOLOGY,
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

A. F. JAMES, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., LL.D.

FOUNDED BY

DOCTOR HIBBERT, 1823

LONDON

WILLIAMS AND NORWICH

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE PRICE OF PROGRESS.

THE REV. S. H. MELLONE, D.Sc.

A WELL-KNOWN writer of our own day has worked out in highly imaginative form a scientific romance based on the idea that this earth was invaded by creatures from another planet—beings who were possessed of scientific and mechanical resources incomparably greater than ours, who were able by means of these resources to project themselves through space on to our planet to find fields for further development here, and who were prepared to treat the human race as so much dust to be cleared out of their way. The closing scenes reveal a genuine touch of genius on the writer's part. One thing these invaders, great as their knowledge was, had not reckoned with—those invisible germs of disease which have taken toll of humanity, and of our pre-human ancestors, since life began. By virtue of the natural selection of our kind, we have developed resisting power: to no germs do we succumb without a struggle: to many, our human frames are altogether immune. But directly the invaders from another world arrived, these microscopic allies began to work their overthrow. The moment they entered our atmosphere they were doomed; and at length they perished miserably through a death to them utterly mysterious and inexplicable. "Thus," says Mr Wells, "by the toll of a million million deaths, man has bought his birthright of this earth, and it is his against all comers. For neither do men live nor die in vain."¹

This struggle for bodily immunity is a parable. The Dean of St Paul's observed in his recent Romanes Lecture that the microbe which had the honour of killing Alexander the Great at the age of thirty-two, and so changing the course of history,

¹ H. G. Wells, *The War of the Worlds*, London, 1906, chapter viii.
Vol. XIX.—No. 1.

still survives and flourishes. That may be so ; none the less, the struggle for bodily immunity has not been in vain. It has always been going on ; it is in process now. And "by the toll of a million million deaths" partial success has been secured. It is, I repeat, a parable of the upward struggle of man in all things, and not least in the things of the mind and the spirit. Our race has achieved plain and tangible moral and spiritual as well as material gains. The problem lies not in the admission of the fact, but in the consciousness of what it implies. The consciousness of the immeasurable hardship and suffering, through which these things have been secured, has penetrated the thought and feeling of humanity to-day as it never did before.

We have said in effect that the fact of Progress is beyond dispute. It is necessary, however, to indicate precisely what is affirmed and what is denied by this statement ; and we have referred to a powerful address given by a brilliant thinker and keen critic of his age, in which *The Idea of Progress* is subjected to a merciless analysis which was much needed.¹

The aspect of the question raised by Dr Inge is not the same when we look at it from the point of view which faces the future, and when we look at it from the point of view which faces the past. If we accept as sufficient an ideal of progress which makes it consist of a gradual accumulation of small increments of advance through the ages, completing itself in a certain form of specifically earthly life, then we are not only untrue to the mind of the Founder of Christianity, but also untrue to the inexorable logic of history and fact. History tells of victories that were defeats, of defeats that were victories. The Cross on Calvary, the death-agony of the secular power of Rome, the fierce life begotten by the young Northern nations over the ruins of the ancient world, the resurrection, as from the grave, of the spirit of that old world with power to mould in countless ways the mind and heart of the new,—these things are not exceptional, but typical of the stuff of which "progress" is made. And through it all there sounds the message of the Master, that the issue of all these ages of storm and stress cannot be found on the field of time.

The various Utopias, from the pictorial visions of the sixteenth century to the ideal constructions characteristic of some kinds of nineteenth-century socialism, are indications of a conviction that a perfect state and a perfect social order

¹ Romanes Lecture, Oxford, 27th May 1920, by W. R. Inge, C.V.O., D.D., Hon. Fellow of Hertford College.

are conceivable, that their general structure can be imagined, and that they are consistent with human nature as realised on this earth. The goal is an earthly civilisation, based on scientific knowledge, and secured by perfect political institutions. Crudely conceived, as it often is, this becomes a purblind faith in man as a "progressive animal" whose progress is essentially a thing of years. In a thousand years, for example, he will have made a great advance over his present state. And in a million years, mental and physical facts will be so organised that no one will have any experience of pain or evil. It may be freely admitted that in such ideas there is something which calls for sympathy; at the same time it must be affirmed that they are destitute of any basis in our knowledge of the actual or the possible. But what exactly does this admission imply?

We admit that the reformer may be defined as one who creates the problems of the future by endeavouring to solve the problems of the present. We may even admit that every reform undertaken by man is a desperate venture: that the future of mankind on this earth is encumbered with darkness: that no faculty of calculation we possess, no instrument we are likely to invent, will enable us to map out its course or penetrate the secret of its destiny. But these seemingly gloomy admissions are only another way of stating the obvious fact that our human powers of insight and foresight are limited. And legislation and political action, even when moving in the light of the most assured results of sociological investigation, must necessarily move largely in theoretical uncertainty and deal with the practical problems one by one as they arise.

The main force of Dr Inge's argument confessedly relates to the past; and the importance of his warning seems to us to lie in its emphasis on the fundamental fact, namely, that the *things* by which men usually estimate Progress are at once *the creation and the tools* of the spirit which uses them, and therefore that real progress must be spiritual progress.

The secular tendency—weakened, indeed, by the experiences of the war—to identify Progress with the advance of Science, is a dangerous delusion. Science consists in the discovery of what exists; she seeks to go on adding fact to fact for ever, connecting them into a vast system to which no limit can be imagined or conceived. What, then, can Science do for us? The answer is threefold. She can, and she actually has, set the human mind free from an accumulation

of superstition (though even this, if done too hastily, may be a doubtful benefit);¹ she can also proceed to an ever more victorious ascertainment of fact upon fact; and above all she can provide mankind with the means of realising all kinds of human purposes. But she can supply no clue for estimating the value of the purposes which she may serve.

Hence the fallacy of assuming as "scientific facts" that, for example, the process of natural evolution is good, or the stability of society good, or the increase of human life good, or the happiness of the greatest number good. Good means good for some kind of human purpose. Science is limited to the ascertainment of what *is*; and human purposes deal with what *is to be*, and introduce us to the world of what *ought to be*. If we widen the meaning of the word "Science"—or rather, change its meaning—and make it mean systematic knowledge in the widest sense, then we may inquire into the possibility of gaining "systematic knowledge" of what ought to be; but that would be quite a different question.

When all this is said, however, and due allowance made for whatever truth it may contain, there remains a question which does not appear to be adequately met by Dr Inge's argument. Let us turn to Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte Roms*, allowing for the occasional tendency, even in this classical work, to blacken what was dark and darken what was grey. We are shown an appalling panorama of a dying civilisation. Outwardly, there is wealth and power, splendour and greatness; inwardly, there is emptiness and desolation. Along with increasingly successful achievements in the externals of the structure of civilisation—political organisation, public finance, criminal justice, roads and transport, and the like—we find a deep disillusionment and despondency taking hold of the mind of the Empire. All thoughtful men were labouring to find a remedy for what seemed like a mortal sickness. With a true diagnosis, men turned to the problems which arise immediately out of the two great primary instincts—self-preservation and reproduction. The old civilisation had been recklessly wasteful in both these matters, attaching very little value to human life, and permitting every kind of abuse in the indulgence of appetite. The result was a gradual depopulation of the Empire—on the one hand by infanticide, suicide, gladiatorial shows, military massacres; on the other, by the discovery of unnatural means of satisfying natural instincts.

¹ Cp. Sir J. G. Frazer in *Psyche's Task*.

Now, when we compare the civilisation, say, of the second century after Christ, with the civilisation of to-day, including all its tragedies and dangers, is it true to say that "neither science nor history gives us any warrant for believing that humanity has advanced except by accumulating knowledge and experience and the instruments of living"?¹ I venture to think that it is a mistake to make too sharp a distinction between the two things. Knowledge and experience and the instruments of living cannot be accumulated without changing human nature, because their very accumulation is the work of the mind and spirit of man. Just so far as these accumulated results are of value—and Dr Inge affirms that they are of great value—human nature has changed for the better in the making of them.

The relation between a progressive accumulation of results achieved and a progressive improvement in the human nature which achieves them, is seen to be extremely close and intimate when we refer it to those historic achievements of the human spirit which result in *the development and deepening of moral ideas*. One of the most suggestive and valuable chapters in Thomas Hill Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* is that in which he shows—in the case of the most prominent personal virtues recognised by the Greeks, courage and "temperance" (self-mastery or self-control)—that in modern times both the range of their application has been extended and the conception of the principle on which they rest deepened.² With regard to self-mastery, says Green, "we present to ourselves the objects of moral loyalty which we should be ashamed to forsake for our pleasures, in a far greater variety of forms than did the Greek, and it is a much larger self-denial which loyalty to these objects demands of us. It is no longer the State alone that represents to us the *melior natura* before whose claims our animal inclinations sink abashed. Other forms of association put restraints and make demands upon us which the Greek knew not." We are moved by ideas of common good which could not have been made intelligible in the ancient world. "Society was not in a state in which the principle that humanity in the person of everyone is to be treated always as an end and never merely as a means, could be apprehended in its full universality; and it is this principle alone, however it may be stated, which affords a rational ground for the virtue of

¹ Romanes Lecture, p. 24.

² Cp. Mackenzie, *Manual of Ethics*, 1915, III. vii. § 5; Muirhead, *Elements of Ethics*, 1910, v. ii. § 98; Green, *Prolegomena*, III. v., especially §§ 258 ff.

chastity as we understand it. The society of modern Christendom is far enough from acting upon it; but in its conscience it recognises the principle as it was not recognised in the ancient world.”¹

We may, however, admit that there has been a development and deepening of moral ideas, and yet leave a serious consideration to be met. We must distinguish the two questions: (i.) Are our ideas of duty wider, deeper, and truer than those of previous generations? (ii.) Do we live up to our ideas of duty better than the men of previous ages lived up to their (possibly inferior) ideas? I answer that the distinction is most true and important. Our last quotation from Green suggests it. I admit, further, that the second question is the really vital question about progress; and that it is very difficult (from the nature of the case) to verify, in the detail of history, the improvement in human nature which an affirmative answer to the second question implies. Yet, even so, I urge that while we must not confuse the two questions, we cannot separate them. The wider, deeper, and truer ideas of duty are not simply dropped into human nature like meteorites falling from the sky to the earth beneath. They are the product at once of divine inspiration and human activity. In a real sense of the word they are our *creation*; and in the process of creating a new and true moral idea our nature does itself change for the better.

There is no need to question the fact of the “ascent of man,” properly understood. The trouble is that to see it we have to take very broad views of life and history; we have to detach ourselves from our own world—sometimes even from our own age altogether. And then we see the pathway of advance; but as we discern it, we see also how painfully slow the movement has been, and at what a cost it was achieved. We see it as we see on a distant mountain-side the silver lines made by a stream, but not its troubled progress in the channel wrought out by itself through thousands of years; or we see it as Tennyson’s eagle saw the wild fury of ocean waves beating out their never-ending battle with the rocks: to the eagle, gazing down from a summit thousands of feet above, it was a *wrinkled sea* beneath him crawling. We are in the storm. It is no “wrinkled sea” that surrounds us now.

Before the war, there was hardly anything which many of us seemed to think about less than the price at which the material and moral gains were won which have come to us

¹ Green, *op. cit.*

without any effort or personal sacrifice of our own. Not many had the insight which enables one to realise the almost immeasurable hardship and suffering through which nearly all these material and moral gains have come. The result was a prevalent temper to accept as its legitimate due the result of ages of toil and sacrifice; or to take it as a matter of course, as we take the light of the sun or the air we breathe. Men did not deny the mysterious background, dark, sinister, unexplored, against which the path, by which the human race has slowly moved onwards, stands out in the twilight. But it passed out of notice. It was best forgotten. So most men seemed to think: until some quite concrete event or personal experience awakened imagination to it.

What this event or experience would be, seemed, very often, a matter of personal temperament, or even of accident. In one case, it might be the sufferings of a single child, awakening as it were suddenly, a consciousness of the age-long burden that bears hardest on the innocent, and threatening with shipwreck a man's faith. In other cases, it might be such calamities as those at Martinique and St Vincent in May 1902, or at Messina in December 1908.¹ Or it might be something of a totally different kind, as in the case of the man who brooded over the sufferings of rabbits which he had observed caught alive in wire gins, until he was moved to go and break the windows of some Government offices in Downing Street, as a protest against the civilisation which sanctioned such cruelties. And the present writer well remembers a conversation, in a great Government Department in Whitehall, between himself and a level-headed man of the world, who had not appeared to be much affected by the sufferings caused by the war, but who was now profoundly moved by his personal knowledge of the position of a mother who had had four sons fighting on four different fronts: they all perished in action, and the four messages all reached her on the same day. "It's too cruel," he said; "*it's too cruel.*"

The war has appealed to the imagination of all. This is no matter of temperament, mood, or accident. The dark back-

¹ Cp. the striking contributions in vol. i. of this JOURNAL (pp. 114 ff., 360, 570) in reference to the West Indian catastrophes, and the argument of the late Richard Armstrong that "the problem of catastrophes is not a separate problem loaded with special difficulties, but only one small part of a universal and enduring problem" (*ibid.*, p. 124). The disaster at Messina led to a correspondence of several weeks' duration in the London *Nation*, under the title "Why?" Some of the contributors wrote as if such a question had never occurred to them before. *The Nation*, Jan. 9 to Feb. 16, 1919.

ground can pass out of notice no more. We see all the epochs of human development full of gloomy and horrible passages of suffering and strife. Just as every coral island lifts its head above the sea because countless myriads of creatures have laid down their lives and left their remains unnoticed below, so, by the toll of a million million deaths, mankind has achieved his foothold on this earth and begun to be conscious of what he really is. What is to be the reaction of the modern spirit to the vision of this background? That is the question of questions for us all.

Our first reaction is inevitably to ask once more the ancient question, at bottom the same question which the child asks at his mother's knee: "Why did God *let* it happen?" Why this fearful price to be paid, not only for the great victories of the spirit—their very greatness throws a sombre glory on the agonies through which they were achieved,—but even for the smallest gains? To what purpose is this waste? We know that such questions can be and have been answered, in part: and the answers are accessible to all thoughtful people. It is not my purpose now to dwell upon these. But the force of the child's question "Why?" is unexhausted, for the answers are only in part.

Let us be willing to learn something more from the same child. When he is really suffering or in trouble, all such questions vanish. There is no longer any thought of why anyone let it happen. All the longing of his little soul is concentrated in the one cry: "Mother!" It is the cry for *some one who cares*. This is the elemental hunger of the human soul. This created all religions throughout the ages. And when all that the historian and the student of religion knows has been told, this remains: we hear it, rising from the great deep from which humanity came, penetrating every stage of historic culture; the cry for *Some One who cares*: the feeling after a Great Heart to respond to the moving of our hearts: the listening for that word, "It is I; be not afraid!" borne by a deeper voice across the storm: the longing for a Love so wide yet so intimate that all our love is only part of it—even your love for your child only a part of the love with which God loves that child, now and for ever.

Let there be no mention of "proof" or "demonstration" here. This thing is far too high, too deep, to be measured in such terms. That from which the soul and its deepest hunger came can and will satisfy it to the uttermost in the end. A great Scottish preacher has spoken of "the unit of Power in

the world." Even so we may speak of the "unit of Love in the world": it is "not God isolated from man, and not man isolated from God; but God and man united, working purposely and continuously together: God quickening and inspiring man, and man opening his life to be part of the Divine Life of the world."¹

All our questions are concentrated in the Cross of Christ. *Ecce Homo!* There was a being pure and true in body and soul, unique in moral power and insight, suffering the worst shame and agony at the hands of a few scheming priests and Roman executioners. The very things that were best in him they took advantage of, in order to wreak upon him their worst. It might indeed seem as if the worst things in the world were there, working unrestrained, and doing their worst. And as men watched that scene in imagination, they might have said—as they have said of many lesser Calvaries of human suffering and sacrifice,—“There is no God, there is only the devil,” only a malignant or a blind and purposeless power. Yet an instinct in the heart of the world has judged otherwise. As men have watched that scene in imagination, they have said, “There is no devil, there is only God.” They have perceived something more than the shame and agony, more than the short triumph of policy and priestly intrigue; they have perceived the highest thing in humanity, gaining through seeming defeat its perfect victory: the Love which means the entire willingness of a human soul to give the uttermost for the whole. The priests, the executioners, and the wondering crowd have gone; but that Cross dominates the ages still, because Love, thus triumphant, is the divinest thing the world has known. And now, the Cross has become a symbol, a type—no longer of some mysterious interchange of pain for mercy, between the Victim and the Almighty; but a symbol of something universally ennobling in human life; an elemental thing, at once human and divine—the unit of Power in the world.

It is related of Saint Thomas Aquinas that, towards the end of his life, worn out with study and thought, and with labour in practical affairs, he was seen contemplating the familiar Figure on the Crucifix, and was heard to murmur to himself—“Thou hast done all this for me: what have I done for Thee?” And we, as there rises before us a vision of the price which mankind has paid for progress—and above all else in this hour, as we contemplate, in reality or in imagination, those fields in France with their lines upon lines of still white

¹ John Hunter, *De Profundis Clamavi*, p. 234.

stones,—we, too, will say, deepening the meaning of the old Latin hymn, *Tantus labor non sit cassus!* All this suffering and sacrifice shall not fall to the ground in vain. For now we see, in the dark background of our human story, a vision of the fidelities and sacrifices of men and generations of men—a vision which is no longer a problem but an inspiration, even a consecration, that we too may give ourselves to the creation of the life and light, the liberty and joy, which mark the dawn of the kingdom of God.

S. H. MELLONE.

MANCHESTER.

MALTHUS'S DEVIL.

JOHN LAIRD,

Professor of Logic, Queen's University, Belfast.

"BEFORE the eighteenth century mankind entertained no false hopes. To lay the illusions which grew popular at that age's latter end, Malthus disclosed a devil. For half a century all serious economical writings held that devil in clear prospect. For the next half century he was chained up and out of sight. Now perhaps we have loosed him again."

With these words Mr Keynes prepares his readers to meditate on the calamities of the peace, and sets himself to dispel the perfumed optimism which fondly supposed that a war-stricken continent would shortly blossom as the rose and smilingly transform itself into a garden fit for heroes to dwell in. And it is not surprising that Malthus's sombre note should seem very near and very menacing to the present generation. Malthus wrote at a time when mouths were very difficult to feed. "The way in which we are going on at present, and the enormous increase in the price of provisions"—to choose a phrase almost at random—makes very modish reading in these days, when even a trivial fall in the price of wool is written in scarlet letters on the hoardings, and when every American magazine is stuffed with advice concerning the H.C.L. The high cost of living, and the actual and prospective scarcity of fuel and foodstuffs, have kept us thinking in these islands more than we like doing; and the horrors in Austria show Malthusian principles at their devilish work. Now that want and misery have put the Emperor Tuberculosis on the empty throne of the Habsburgs, it is time to ask whether our ideas in the later nineteenth century were more than foolish dreams, the spawn of a temporary surfeit.

As most people know, Malthus set out to prove to the

world that Godwin's ideal of the perfectibility of mankind and Condorcet's triumphant optimism were only a will-o'-the-wisp. The poor, he argued, *must* always be with us, because population always presses upon the means of subsistence. The few who are powerful may be able to obtain enough, and more than enough, for themselves and their retainers; but the many who are weak must live from hand to mouth in every age. In any conceivable state of society, therefore, it is quite certain that most human beings must live miserably; for misery is only another name for want, together with the prospect and consequences of want. Precisely because the population always grows too fast for its food, vice and misery step in to check it. And this is a law of Nature as ruthless and inevitable as an earthquake, though not so spectacular.

In the later editions of his essay Malthus modified his pessimism to some extent, because he laid emphasis upon the "preventive check" of moral restraint. Indeed he suggested that if marriages were delayed until the prospective parents were able to support a family in comfort, and if celibacy were endured in default of this ability, poverty would be enormously reduced, if not abolished altogether. And he hoped that the spread of education might achieve this desirable result. "I indulged," he said, "in the contemplation of a considerable degree of *possible* improvement, that I might not absolutely shut out that prime cheerer hope." It was this part of Malthusianism that appealed most strongly to those "serious economical writings" of which Mr Keynes speaks. Mill, for example, presses this lesson home in his *Political Economy*, maintaining that incontinence in the size of families should be detested and punished in the same way as any other dangerous and reprehensible incontinence; and he hoped, like Malthus, that education would provide the remedy.

This ameliorative addendum to the theory, however, only permitted what Malthus called a very "chastised optimism." Malthus supposed, it is true, that the postponement of marriage, and even celibacy for the few, were slight evils in comparison with the certain and monstrous evils of overpopulation, but his "moral restraint" was only prudence based on the fear of misery, and it would be intolerable for those who practised it if any considerable portion of mankind refused to be educated out of its zeal for begetting. Even Mill, therefore, must have felt relieved when he, in his turn, came to revise his opinions in later editions of his book. "I have left the preceding paragraphs as they were written," he says, "since they remain true in principle, though it is no longer urgent to

apply their specific recommendations to the present state of this country."

That is the point. The matter was urgent when Malthus wrote, and it did not seem to be urgent in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The discovery of new lands to plough and of new berries to eat seemed to have banished the devil, and to have left him to gibber with other nightmares. The population of America and Australia, and in a lesser degree that of England and Germany, was able to increase prodigiously without any obvious and imminent peril of bare cupboards and fireless hearths. Indeed, the other party had its innings. Prelates and imperialists thundered anathema on race suicide, and a distinguished American President, his hands dyed with the blood of lions, came over to Europe in order to advise the young men and maidens of that decadent continent of their duty in this important matter.

The motives of these crusaders, to be sure, were very mixed. Some felt the need of large white armies to preserve the balance of power, or to hold the yellow races to ransom. Some were anxious that the proletariat should be kept in check by a reasonably large number of superior persons. Some argued, on moral and æsthetic grounds, that small families were the worst kind of selfishness, forbearing to test womankind in the salutary discipline of nursery and childbed, and resorting to the ugliest devices for gratifying unruly appetites without undertaking the duties of Nature. These arguments were answered by socialists, pacifists, humanitarians, and decadent æsthetes, sometimes well and sometimes ill. But nobody quoted Malthusian principles, because no one felt them to be really serious.

To-day the question is urgent again, and the tone of controversy has changed. Malthus's devil has returned, and has gracefully taken his seat in outspoken essays. He seemed to be toothless, and now he looks stronger than ever. Indeed, the Dean of St Paul's is more Malthusian than Malthus. He might find authority in Malthus, it is true, for his assertion that "if our physicians desire more maternity cases, they must make more work for the undertaker," but he makes short work of Malthus's "preventive check" by arguing that conscious intention has very little to do with the matter, and that "children will come somehow" (by the storks, perhaps!) "wherever there is room for them, and go when there is none." If that were true indeed, there would be no room for Malthus's "chastised optimism," and there would be no hope whatever, according to Malthusian principles, of defeating

want and misery in the long run, although fresh fields and new inventions might delay the evil hour for a few centuries beyond the limits which Malthus foresaw.

It is timely, therefore, to consider Malthus's principles closely; and no one can deny the enormous importance of his problem from the larger standpoint of social philosophy.

Malthus's essay is disappointing in many ways. It makes a great parade of exactitude, and it is laboriously lucid; but its lucidity and its exactitude are often more pretentious than solid; and many of its arguments beg the question most flagrantly, especially at the critical points where Godwin and Condorcet are supposed to be finally vanquished.

His general thesis is that population, if unchecked, increases in geometrical ratio, while "the means of subsistence, under circumstances the most favourable to human industry, could not possibly be made to increase faster than in an arithmetical ratio." It follows, therefore, that population has been checked, and must always continue to be checked, since the numbers of the human race at any time are manifestly reduced to the level of subsistence available at that time. These checks to population are either preventive (moral restraint) or else positive; and the positive checks are vice and misery. "Under this head may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine."

The several parts of this argument have very different degrees of cogency. Everyone, of course, admits that men cannot live if they cannot be fed, but a cheap and hasty optimism may easily forget to inquire how many calories a healthy man consumes and how much food is available for him. Malthus, therefore, deserved a hearing precisely because he refused to believe with Godwin or Condorcet that this practical problem had only a remote and speculative bearing on the chances of human progress. Again, his detailed and systematic account of Nature's methods in this work of prevention is painstaking and, on the whole, informing, although it cannot claim to be exceptionally original or overwhelmingly acute. It may be doubted, however, whether these portions of Malthus's essay (and they comprise the bulk of it) would have impressed his contemporaries so profoundly as they did if they had not been prefaced by the celebrated formula concerning the geometrical and the arithmetical ratio, and this mathematical argument is obviously untenable in the form in which Malthus stated it.

The means of human subsistence consist ultimately of food, fuel, clothing, and shelter; and fish and fowl, cattle and grain, *if unchecked*, also increase in geometrical ratio. Coal and stone, it is true, do not, but there is no question of an arithmetical ratio of increase in their case. From one point of view, the supply of these commodities is gradually exhausted (or, at least, diminished) without any possibility of increase. From another point of view, the available supplies of them depend upon machinery and transport; and these may advance much more rapidly than the lingering generations of men.

The abstract argument, therefore, which Malthus dangled carrotwise before his readers, is only a mathematical figment. His "arithmetical ratio" was a mere guess, and, as it happened, it was a bad one, at least for the time being. Believing, as he did, that the wealth of a country is found in its agricultural produce, Malthus was naturally afraid of the legions of manufacturing parasites that were springing up; and he did not see any reasonable prospect of a great advance in agriculture. He could not foresee the day in which a poor harvest in Britain would become indifferent to the British people, and although there was waste land in these islands at the time when he wrote, the law of diminishing return robbed him of much hope from that quarter. Moreover, he thought that cow's dung was the only suitable manure for farmers, and grazing is obviously more wasteful than ploughing. Malthus, therefore, saw nothing better in prospect than the law of nature and economics, according to which the demand for labour attracts a stream of labour which, in its turn, is sustained, for the time being, by intensive cultivation and by reclaiming waste lands. From this narrow watch-tower he concluded, reasonably enough, that if manufacturing England doubled her agricultural output within a generation she would succeed excellently well, and that a further doubling in the next generation would be utterly impossible. That is the whole of the "arithmetical ratio." It is a beautiful instance of pretentious reasoning which seems precise and is not.

Even the "geometrical ratio" of organic reproduction has not precisely the significance which many writers suppose. Given eternity to breed in, any living species would find the world too small for its needs if it continued to increase in any ratio, or, for that matter, in no determinate or periodic ratio. The importance of an increase in geometrical ratio is really a question of time. It shows that rat or rabbit, mammoth or chickweed, would overrun the earth and finally choke for want of air in quite a short time if their populating tendencies were

never checked. The human race, therefore, has to face a prospect of disaster which is uncomfortably near; and we might even *feel* it to be near if we cared for posterity half as much as we pretend. That is the first lesson we can learn from Malthus, and we should not forget it simply because it is so very obvious. Moreover, we should do well to reflect on some other truisms which he labours for our benefit. Although his "arithmetical ratio" is a figment, it is clear that if the impulse to procreate retains its present strength and is not drastically controlled, population, in the long run, would overtake any conceivable increase in food supply, and, in the short run, is perpetually encroaching upon the available means of subsistence. Nature steps in *whenever* there is too little food and fuel, and misery comes with her. The dream of a smokeless rural England, "after London," seems kindly only when the prelude is forgotten. Our novelists may hide the prelude by devising some sudden catastrophe and burying it in antiquity, but Nature is cruel and slow. The restriction of the race by preventive methods might have been a crime ten years ago, and it might be a duty to-day. Accordingly, whether we take a long or a short view of this complicated and fundamental problem, the vital question at issue is whether the human race can control the growth of population, relatively to the available supply of the means of subsistence, by some kindlier and more rational agency than poverty, famine, or pestilence.

It would be utterly unreasonable to expect that accident will abolish the need for design by weakening the force of the reproductive impulse. All the evidence is against this supposition. These appetites need to be controlled. Even hunger and disease do not quench them, and they can bear the enervating atmosphere of luxury. They are so stubborn that they suggest the truth of the theory that the race is the enduring root, and the individual only the ephemeral leaf. This reflection may bring comfort to some of those who deplore a decline in the birthrate. Even if a deluge engulfed the human race, a few stragglers, male and female, might emerge from some ark or crevice and people the earth once again within a period that geologists would consider short. The decline of a nation or of an aristocracy, to be sure, is quite another thing, for the nation or the aristocracy must keep pace with their neighbours if they are to retain their power; but the human race itself can recuperate so rapidly, that a stationary or declining birthrate during many centuries need not alarm anyone who reckons values by counting heads.

We are faced, then, with the problem of control, and surely it is possible that the world might be a very much better place if the human race learned to govern itself in this fundamental affair. I do not mean, of course, that *any* sort of deliberate control is necessarily better than Nature's method. The world's population would be controlled for a time if a conquering people exterminated its competitors, and enslaved those races which could work where it could not, with periodic shootings to temper their fecundity; and when the conquerors, in their turn, became too numerous, a faction among them might repeat the cure. This devil would be worse than Malthus's, and some other possibilities might not be better. Those who object to the eugenists' ideals do not usually reason very clearly. They dislike the methods of the stud-farm and prefer the methods of the prairie. That is not an argument, and if it were, there would be no romance in the methods of a hungry, overcrowded Babylon, although there might be a pardonable, if sightless, romance about the prairie. Eugenic control, therefore, might be the best thing for mankind, but it might also be very bad indeed. Our knowledge of these affairs, it is true, is so flimsy at the present time, that eugenists could scarcely venture to go further than to advise the sterilisation of a few imbeciles and degenerates; but if they had the power and a little more knowledge, they might be very dangerous indeed. Human beings are so marvellously complex that scientific breeders would have learned a very great deal if they discovered how to eradicate a few palpable defects and to strengthen a few desirable tendencies. If the eugenists took control armed with this knowledge only, they might easily do infinite harm. They would breed according to the demand of the time, and so perpetuate the time's inequalities, and they might permanently destroy many human capacities just because they could not appreciate their value or discern them in the germ. Nature's methods might be far better than these.

On the other hand, rational control of the population might be a worthy province of man's dominion. True, it would not be a perfect thing, for it would have to impose much restraint; and we know that evils lurk in this restraint. The psycho-analysts, indeed, are sure to open their chamber of horrors at the bare suggestion, but then they assume that man is as lecherous as the ape, and they may be wrong in this, since, if they were right, every human being would be a hopeless neuropath long before reaching man's estate. In any case, the lesser evil must often be chosen that good may come;

and the evils of restraint may be endured. I would gladly avoid unsavoury matters if I could, but it is clear, I suppose, that artificial restraint does the same work as moral; and its wickedness is a matter of opinion. To be sure, the morality of infanticide or the procuring of abortion can scarcely be defended, but artificial prevention is another thing, and it is debatable. The chief argument against it is, that it would completely separate the sexual appetite from the desire for offspring if it were universally practised; and the consequence might be that the desire for offspring would, by itself, be too weak for the welfare of the human race. Our repugnance towards this alternative, then, may have an excellent basis in human nature. On the other hand, the desire for offspring, by itself, may really be very strong, and nobody knows precisely how strong it is.

The prospects of an immediate change in the voluntary control of the birthrate are, of course, exceedingly poor. From the nature of the case, the determining circumstance is the general practice of mankind; and the majority of mankind, at the present time, are impervious to argument in this matter. I do not mean merely that we might as well expect to find Tamerlane in the Salvation Army as expect to affect the practice of Bantus and Berbers, negrillos and pre-Dravidians. I mean that public opinion and private practice in civilised countries are not likely to alter suddenly and profoundly even if every elementary teacher were armed with a diploma in civics. The more prudent and thrifty portions of civilised folk, to be sure, ponder this problem quite as much as is good for them, wondering whether they can afford to marry and, if they marry, whether they can support more than a very few children. These grave and prudent persons, however, form quite a small minority in the community, and it is the number of mouths that counts, not the motives which have created the mouths. During the immediate future, then, poor men will continue to be rich in children; and they will continue to look for support from the State and from private charity.

The principal hope for the moment, therefore, is that vastly increased supplies may be found. If they are not found, Nature will restrict the populace by her clumsiest and most brutal methods, and medical devices for increasing longevity will be counteracted by new diseases attacking a weakened people. Moreover, as long as economic conditions remain as they now are, the poor will suffer more than the rich, and the scarcity of foodstuffs will drive those whose economic power is least to work at a miserable wage in order to delay the hour

of their miserable death. Even if economic power were transferred from the capitalists to powerful combinations of skilled labour, it is very unlikely, at present, that the proletariat would cease to be the slave of the most grinding and the bitterest necessity. The composition of the proletariat would change, and there would be no other change.

It is quite possible, of course, that greatly increased supplies may be procured in the near future. We seem to be living in an ugly epoch, just as Malthus did, but these appearances may be as deceptive now as they were then. The war has exhausted our margins and imperilled many sources of supply, but, on the whole, it is reasonable to suppose that the supplies and the possibilities of increased supply which were available before the war will shortly be available after it. The earth is rich enough, and there is enough labour. Perhaps, even, Governments may be more likely to undertake extensive irrigations than they were before. It is arguable, of course, that the smiling plenty of the later nineteenth and of the early twentieth century was very largely illusory. The enormous growth of population in some of the new countries and in the new manufacturing towns was not a world-phenomenon. The huddled millions in India and China did not quadruple themselves, and the old Tasmanians and the Guanches disappeared altogether. Still, on the whole, there was great abundance, and in many ways the prospect of greater.

The problem changes if we look some centuries ahead, but, even then, it need not be utterly transformed. As we have seen, the ultimate necessities of life are food, fuel, clothing, and shelter, and there is no proof that supplies of these, sufficient for a vastly larger population, are beyond the limits of reasonable possibility. As long as a man has standing room on the earth the materials for shelter are beneath his feet, and if he is driven into catacombs the problem of shelter solves itself. The materials for clothing, again, are so much less bulky and perishable than foodstuffs, that the problem of supplying them is really a minor one. Fuel, to be sure, is a much more serious difficulty, and if coal and oil and wood were the only possible fuel, the collapse of our present civilisation would not linger. For coal and oil are exhaustible, and timber is wasteful and bulky, even granting that a good climate often depends upon afforestation. These deficiencies, however, might be remedied by electrical and other discoveries; and pessimism consequently cannot prove its case. The present generation, it is true, is making a huge gamble in these matters, and it is running appalling risks. It is gambling on the mere chance

of future discoveries of other fuel, instead of cutting its coat according to the cloth which it knows to exist. The gamble may succeed, however, and, if it does, food is the only critical problem for the future. Here also the omens are not wholly unfavourable. As long as frost-bound lands can grow wheat in a short summer, as long as Africa and South America luxuriate, as long as Mesopotamia is feebly irrigated, it is possible to point to new fields for agriculture; and the possibilities of intensive cultivation, as Kropotkin has shown, have scarcely been tapped in the present year of grace. The land needs dressing to be sure, but the science of chemistry is alert, and will probably find the means.

On the other hand, a few centuries, or even a millennium or two, are a very short time in comparison with the habitable future of the earth, and population cannot continue to increase without limit, even on the rosiest hypothesis. Mankind, at the best, can hope for a respite only. Ultimately it has to face the alternative of controlling these matters for itself or of letting Nature control them for it, and the problem of human wellbeing, from this larger standpoint, depends upon the possibility of a general control of its numbers on the part of society. Human foresight cannot take the helm at the present time, but it may come to see the necessity, and to act upon it. If it does so, it will be able to supplant Nature's methods.

Those who maintain that conscious foresight has little or nothing to do with the matter are bound, of course, to deny that there is any possibility of this kind. Their arguments, however, are singularly unconvincing. It is indisputable, surely, that some parents restrict the number of their children, and that some customs like late marriages, monogamy, or systems of inheritance play a very important part in determining what children shall be born. If, then, it is true that, speaking broadly, there are always as many mouths as there is food for them, the only reasonable inference is that the effects of conscious restriction on the part of the few have always been counteracted hitherto by the heedless swarming of the many. In that case the problem is whether the motives which have affected the minority up to the present may come to actuate the majority.

It is clear, I think, that these motives are really very strong, and that conditions of society are conceivable in which they might operate generally.

These motives, so far as the fathers of each generation are concerned, are principally pride and pity. This statement, no doubt, seems frankly absurd to those who are in the habit of

speaking of prudence and selfishness. But it is not absurd. Even if reckless propagation were unselfish (and that is nonsense), there would be neither prudence nor selfishness in the case if the fathers were not personally responsible for their children; and this responsibility implies pride and self-respect. If every child came on the parish, and if every prospective father were utterly careless whether his children came on the parish or not, there would be nothing to prevent indiscriminate paternity except abstract Malthusianism, and no one can seriously believe that Malthus is directly responsible for the small size of the families of the middle classes or of skilled artisans. Pride, then, plays its part, and so does pity; for maternity is a heavy burden, and any reasonable man desires to make it as light as possible unless his own judgment and his wife's are warped by custom and mystical imperatives. Those who regard women as slaves naturally regard them as child-bearing slaves, and the women will acquiesce so long as they feel enslaved. Otherwise they will not.

Pride and pity are very strong motives, and they are highly educable motives. They depend upon ideas. The pride which induced the Hebrew or the Bedouin to glory in the number of his offspring induces the middle classes, nowadays, to be cautious. This change is no stranger than any other variation in the code of honour, and although this kind of education is neither very general nor very powerful at the present time, it might easily become so. Social psychology is not fixed. It is plastic; and it is even possible that a change in our ideas on this matter might come to work very rapidly indeed once it had outgrown its early impotence. The war has shown us that the habits of great communities may be changed very profoundly, or, at any rate, that it is impossible to distinguish sharply between the customs that cannot be shaken and the customs that can. As things are, a man who is prudent in other things is also prudent in this matter of paternity, and, speaking broadly, most people are prudent if they have good reason to be prudent. Prudence is foolish when there is nothing at stake. It happens when a man has something at stake. It would seem, therefore, that if social conditions can be improved so that the majority comes to have some reason for prudence there will be a prudent and general control of the population. No one can foretell, of course, how quickly this change could come about, and it would affect different peoples unequally. Perhaps there is little hope for the savage. His ideas may move too slowly, and he may have to succumb because he follows Nature where others are able to control her.

It may be argued, to be sure, that the majority in any community are born to be shiftless and imprudent, and that nothing can alter this circumstance. If so, the case is hopeless in the end; but this lugubrious theory is very far from being certain. Or, again, it may be argued that Malthus himself has conclusively shut out this ray of hope. Did he not prove that the population always increases so fast that the majority of mankind must always miss starvation by a hair, or, in other words, that the masses must always be in such a hopeless plight that it can never be worth their while to attempt to better themselves? And have we not always this rod in pickle for the optimists? This argument undoubtedly is very weighty, but it is scarcely conclusive. A comparatively short period of abundance might be long enough to alter the distribution of power in the community in such a way that the majority could dig themselves in against the future. Malthus's reply to Godwin begs the whole question, because he assumes that selfishness in times of scarcity will always leave the rich where they were and grind the faces of the poor. Even rationing in war-time was not so bad as that, and our trades unions may be expected to see to it that the faces of the workers shall not be ground. If the poor must suffer, the question is, *Who* will be poor when scarcity comes? and the answer to that question lies on the knees of the gods.

Pride, therefore, may come to play a preponderating part in the future, and there is good hope for the influence of pity. Again, the world has much to expect from the emancipation of women, for power comes with emancipation, and the commonsense of womankind may surely be expected to reinforce the pity of the men and to destroy the absurd notion that a maximum fecundity is the duty of woman. Why should anyone bow down before this monstrous fetish? Maternity is indeed a glory and a privilege partly because of and partly in spite of its perils, pangs, and malaise; but it is little better than a curse if women are expected to bear child after child for twenty or thirty years without even the three years' interval which American science recommends. Such a life is only an alternation of weakness, toil, and dread. It would kill wifely culture, wifely leisure, and wifely companionship.

It would seem, then, that the optimists need not strike their flag, and no one ought to manufacture dismalness by weeping over the countless multitude of the unborn which a stationary population implies. There would be too many myriads of billions of them if there were twenty children in every family instead of two or three, and we trench on

insoluble ethical problems whenever we begin to ask how far mere numbers are important for human welfare. Those orthodox utilitarians who believe that the ideal of society is the greatest happiness of the greatest number are bound, of course, to maintain that twenty happy persons are twice as valuable as ten who are equally happy. I do not believe a word of it, and I never heard of anyone who applied this argument to the millions of China, except for consistency's sake. *Per contra*, the usual constructors of Utopias desire quite a small population for their cities of felicity. They are literary men who make a garden of their imagination and distrust the jungle; and they tell us that they prefer quality to quantity, a kind of life to the size of it. This idea, however, is quite as hard to accept as its opposite. There cannot be too much literature or art when the quality is the best, and it is better to have much of it than to have little. Or, again, if quantity does not count, why should length of days be important? Multiplication in this dimension is logically on the same footing as multiplication in any other. But enough of these disputes. The ethical merits of the question are at least very evenly divided, and therefore it is rash to think that human beings should deplore the fact that there must always be limits to their numbers.

JOHN LAIRD.

BELFAST.

HAS JUDAISM A FUTURE?

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

HAS Judaism a future?

In what sense shall the question be put?

There is a sense in which the triumphs of Christianity are also the triumphs of Judaism. For just as Christianity is not Judaism at its lowest, but at its best, so also with Judaism. And between the two religions at their best there is a kinship and a harmony. Christianity is not, "Narrow is the gate that leads unto life, and few there be that find it," but it is, "If any one would come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me." It is not, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into the eternal fire which is prepared for the devil and his angels," but it is, "Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these my brethren, even these least, ye did it unto me." It is not, "I pray not for the world," but it is, "Pray for them that persecute you." It is not, "Ye serpents, ye offspring of vipers," but it is, "Love your enemies."

So, too, with Judaism. Even if, for the sake of the reader, I limit myself to Old Testament quotations, Judaism is not, "Happy shall he be who takes and dashes thy little ones against the rock," but it is, "The alien that dwells with you shall be unto you as the homeborn among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were aliens in the land of Egypt." It is not, "Thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed," but it is, "I desire love and not sacrifice." It is not, "Do I not hate them that hate thee?" but it is, "Should I not have pity upon Nineveh?" It is not, "If Yahweh has stirred thee up against me, let him smell an offering," but it is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart." It is not, "The Ammonite shall not enter into the congregation of the Lord," but it is, "My house shall be called a house of prayer for all nations."

In respect of the true kinship between the higher Judaism

and the higher Christianity, the victory of the one is the victory of the other. In *that* sense, for the believer, the future of both is equally assured.

In what other senses, then, can the question "Has Judaism a Future?" be propounded? It might be interpreted to mean: Has it any future at all? Is it likely that three, four or five hundred years hence there will be a living religion called Judaism existent upon the earth? Or, again, the question might mean: Has Judaism before it a future of power, a future of influence, a future of importance? And this second meaning of the question is the only one which is of any real interest. For religions are tenacious of life, and Judaism has shown more than average tenacity. There is, therefore, it would be reasonable to think, every likelihood that five hundred years hence there will still exist a group of persons who will call themselves Jews by religion, and that consequently Judaism will still be a living religion. But the only interesting point about which to speculate is as to what *sort* of religion Judaism will then be. Will it be the religion of more people than it is now, or of fewer? Will it still be the religion of a single race? What sort of religious purpose will it serve? Will non-Jews still think of it, as they mostly think of it now, as a museum or curiosity religion, a survival, obsolescent, and spiritually negligible? Assuming that the ordinary judgment of outsiders is true, and that Judaism, as a spiritual or religious force, is negligible to-day, is it likely to be no less negligible in a distant to-morrow?

To attempt a categoric answer to such questions would be presumptuous and absurd. How can any of us predict the future? And if anybody is to indulge in profitable speculations about Judaism, it ought, perhaps, to be a Hindoo or a Confucian rather than a Christian or a Jew. But the following tentative suggestions may, nevertheless, be permitted. There is a certain interest, and even a certain value, in the one-sided observations of those who speak from within. Lacking impartiality, they possess sympathy. If they show prejudice, they may also reveal fragments of knowledge.

One may justly leave on one side the problem whether all the world will ultimately become of one religion. It is legitimate to believe that a future of influence lies before a particular religion, without at the same time believing either that that religion, or any other religion, will become the one and only living religion throughout the globe. Turning back to the future of Judaism with this proviso in mind, it has also to be asked of what kind of Judaism is the question raised?

For it may well be that one kind of Judaism *has* a future, another kind *not*. Now, there are two main kinds or divisions of Judaism: Orthodox Judaism and Liberal Judaism. There are, indeed, certain varieties of these two main divisions: there are even some Jews in England to-day who say that they object to adjectives, or to labels, as they prefer to call the adjectives, altogether. They say that their religion is Judaism, neither more nor less. Are there people who say that they are Christians without label or adjective? I rather doubt it. At any rate, I propose to ignore that central, balanced, and exquisitely perfect Judaism which claims to dispense with, and to rise superior to, qualification and label. It has thus far produced no justification for its claim either in theory or in life. It has neither theology nor embodiment. I shall only consider Orthodox Judaism and Liberal Judaism, and I shall assume that Judaism can be divided up into these *two* sections, with little remaining over. For, assuredly, if neither Liberal Judaism nor Orthodox Judaism has any future before it, we may safely neglect the claims and chances of Judaism without an adjective.

Orthodox Judaism possesses a certain massive strength in that it is not always thinking about the future, and is not, more especially, always thinking about its own future. The future, and its own future, are both guaranteed by God. *He* will look after the future: all that the orthodox Jew need do is to be faithful in the present. But there is a special reason also, in addition to its perfect faith in God, why Orthodox Judaism is not troubled about its own future; why it is not concerned or worried by such a question as: "Has Judaism a future?"—a future, that is, of influence or of power. For, as regards its diffusion in the world without, the important things to Orthodox Judaism are its fundamental ideas and conceptions, not the mere *word* Judaism, or even the organisation or the group called by that name.

Orthodox Judaism is concerned about the world-diffusion of a few fundamental doctrines, of which the Existence, Unity, and Righteousness of One God, Maker of heaven and earth, are the chief. These doctrines, which are very broad and universal in character, will, according to its belief, be ultimately accepted by all the inhabitants of the earth. Any nation, or any group, society or community, will give such ritual or embodiment as it chooses to these doctrines, provided that the embodiment is in no way antagonistic to the doctrines, but reflects and expresses them. It would not really matter what names the various groups might choose to give to their various religions.

They would all alike confess and worship the God of Israel, and believe in the Divine Unity. As regards the form and character of Judaism itself in this distant Messianic age, the orthodox view has not been unanimous. Some Orthodox Jews, especially in the post-Talmudic period, maintained (and still maintain) the eternal validity of the existing law. Israelites, in other words, will always observe the injunctions of the Pentateuch and the Rabbis. But other, no less Orthodox Jews (especially in the Talmudic age) have upheld the view that even for Israel the Messianic Era will mark the time when the need and the domination of the ceremonial Law will cease. In either case, whether the Law is to cease or to continue, it is not to become a universal rule of life. All men are to believe in the One God of Israel, but not all men, or even many men, are to practise the religious rites, or observe the religious ordinances, of the Law. Each nation will clothe the great dogma of the Unity in its own fashion. There will be various embodiments of the one fundamental idea.

Thus Judaism will, in one sense, never become a religion of power; not even in the Messianic Age. But in another sense it is, and, still more, it will be, a religion of power, because its fundamental ideas and conceptions will become the religious ideas and conceptions common to all the world, to whatever varying rites, ceremonies, and institutions these ideas and conceptions may be united and wed.

Such, then, I take it, would be the answer of Orthodox Judaism to the question, "Has Judaism a future?" It looks forward to the victory of its ideas, and in no wise to an expansion of its own body of members, till, at last, all the world should become Orthodox Jews. Hence it is that, as a preparation for the triumph of its fundamental conceptions, the victories of Islam and of Christianity, however strange the statement may appear, are steps and stages in the final victory of Judaism. For to turn Polytheists or Pantheists or Atheists into Theists is, in itself, a victory for Judaism, and this is what the expansion of Christianity and Islam may be said to mean. Nor does it matter if these two daughter religions call their parent bad names, or are a bit contemptuous. *Nothing* matters, so long as the purposes of God prevail; the growth and increase of Christianity and Islam are moments in the march of the monotheistic idea. In the end, that idea will conquer everywhere, and it will conquer in its purest, that is, of course, in its Jewish, form.

With an ill-concealed smile a critic might reasonably ask: "Assuming that all this be so, how far has Judaism helped to

the diffusion and triumph of this monotheistic idea?" The question is quite legitimate. But Orthodox Judaism is not disconcerted. It is perfectly content to let God achieve the result in His own way: to Him be the glory, and to Him alone. Jews have only to play a sort of passive part in the evolution of the drama. They must bear witness to the truth of the Idea by faithfulness in belief and faithfulness in observance, whether amid the allurements of prosperity or amid the horrors of pogroms and persecutions. That is *their* duty, and the rest they must leave to Him who entrusted to them their charge.

Thus if we consider the future of Orthodox Judaism as a distinct and separate religious organisation, we perceive that, according to its own wishes and belief, this future will be much on the lines of its past. It seeks no proselytes. It does not *want* to be more than a "national" religion, if by the word "religion" we understand a system which is made up both of doctrine and embodiment, of inward and outward, of theory and practice. It is therefore content with both the present and the future. God will never desert His witnesses. His own cause is wrapped up with the cause of Israel, and there must always be Jews and Judaism till the purposes of their existence are accomplished and fulfilled.

The Liberal Jew views the prospects of Orthodox Judaism with a less trustful and favourable eye. For him the future of Judaism seems dark, unless Liberal Judaism prospers and expands. He is inclined to think poorly of the future of Orthodox Judaism, and for some of the same reasons as an outside Christian critic. First, he too would be disposed to hold that a national religion not only cannot have a future of power before it, but is not likely, in the long run, to maintain its hold upon its own adherents. Secondly, he would argue that Orthodox Judaism is bound up with a view of the Old Testament, and more especially of the Law, which Biblical criticism and comparative religion have made it increasingly impossible for any educated person to believe or to defend. Thirdly, the Liberal Jew would maintain that, as a necessary sequitur from the second consideration, the stress which Orthodox Judaism lays on the practice of ceremonial minutiae, and especially of dietary laws, has become out of harmony with modern conceptions of religion, as well as with the conditions of modern life. And Orthodox Judaism is a combination of doctrine and practice, in which, for its adherents, the emphasis, to say the least of it, is rather on the practice than on the doctrine. If the practice is given up, the religion as a whole

will gradually, though very slowly, crumble away and disappear. The proviso "though very slowly" is important. The process may well be indefinitely delayed. For let us consider what is likely to happen as regards religion to the thirteen or fourteen million Jews existing in the world. There are about six possibilities for them, and a certain number will doubtless fulfil each possibility. Some, for many generations, will remain Orthodox Jews in belief and in practice. Some, through race loyalty and national enthusiasm, will maintain an inconsistent position: they will observe the ceremonial law, without believing the doctrines upon which that law is based. A third class will remain nominally orthodox, but will actually present a flabby combination of partial belief and still more partial practice. Some will become indifferent or agnostic, and of this class—itsself, I fear, fairly numerous—a considerable proportion will marry wives or husbands outside the Jewish pale, and their children will be brought up as Christians. Some, for various reasons, partly honest and partly dishonest, will become baptized, and leave the brotherhood themselves. And, lastly, some will join the ranks, and become adherents, of Liberal Judaism. There are likely to be for long quite enough Jews to fill all these various classes, though I doubt whether, in spite of the enormous sums which amiable old ladies provide for, and which the missions spend on, the conversion of doubtful Jews into not less doubtful Christians, the fifth class will ever be very large. But what about the sixth possibility? Here, then, we pass from Orthodox Judaism to Liberal Judaism. Has this phase of the Jewish religion any future before it?

At the outset I must observe that part, or even much, of the hope or belief which is cherished by Orthodox Judaism as regards the religious future of the world is cherished by Liberal Judaism also. Orthodox Jews and Liberal Jews have certain fundamental beliefs in common, and therefore their vision of the future has certain common traits, though even here, as we may have occasion to see, Ophelia's words apply: we Liberals wear our rue with a difference.

But before touching further upon visions and anticipations of the world's future, something must be said as to the possible future of Liberal Judaism as a distinct and separate religious community. I will begin by quoting the adverse opinion of a very distinguished Jew, and one of the finest minds of our own time, Arthur Cohen, who, in the opinion of all his greatest legal contemporaries, ought to have been, though he never was, raised to the highest judicial rank. Writing to his

daughter in 1897, when he was sixty-eight years old, he says: "I sometimes think that when I retire from my profession, I may do something for Judaism, but it will be on lines very different from those of Claude Montefiore, for I am convinced that Judaism will never be the future religion of a monotheism which is to supplant Christianity. It is essentially a religion for a particular race; deprive it of this characteristic and of its historic garment, and you make it cool, lifeless, and insipid." Most Christians, I think, would agree with the verdict and the view of this distinguished man. They would say that Liberal Judaism was too thin and superfine a creed, too flimsy and extenuated, too lacking in body, on the one hand, and in emotional capacity, on the other, to attract and satisfy any large masses of men, whether Jewish or non-Jewish. Liberal Judaism is on the horns of a dilemma. Universalise it, and it becomes more and more flaccid and flimsy, with little to distinguish it from a certain type of Unitarianism, while even that little would not be to its advantage. For if it denudes itself of every nationalistic Jewish feature, it becomes very unattractive to the Jew; and yet it is none the more attractive to the Gentile, who can get all he wants out of some form of Unitarianism or Theism. Even if Liberal Judaism adopts a more reasonable attitude towards Jesus and the New Testament, that will help it none the more, for the nearer its attitude to that of moderate Unitarianism, the more it will alienate the Jews, and the less it will be needed as a distinct religious organisation over and above Unitarianism, or some form of Christian or semi-Christian Theism.

These are formidable objections. It would be impossible to deal with them adequately within the limits of this article, and therefore I prefer to leave them, so far as direct reply goes, untouched and unanswered. Indirectly, however, what there is still space to say may show the lines on which I should wish to combat them. Here I would only add that the objections, though strong, are by no means invincible. They can be answered and overcome (as I believe) both in theory and in practice. But one thing is, I admit, quite clear. Liberal Judaism must first make large headway among Jews before it can attempt to make any headway among Gentiles. Time is, however, long. There will be many centuries still before the ice age returns. Judaism has been for many ages very patient and very believing; it must be, and I hope that it will continue to remain, very patient and very believing for a long while to come.

Let me, then, now mention certain strong points about

Liberal Judaism, which are not, perhaps, immediately apparent to the outsider. I do not, however, deny that it shares several of these strong points with Unitarianism.

First may be named its freedom as regards the results of criticism and history. Whether there are two Isaiahs or twenty, whether the Pentateuch is composed of four sources or of fourteen, whether Moses had a hand in the Ten Commandments or no, whether any of the Biblical miracles took place or not, Liberal Judaism is lifted above all these things, and is quit of them. Again, it is free to take the good and reject the bad. It has not to swear to the words of any Master, for one only is its Master, and that Master is no *man*, but God. It has not to hope intensely that sentence A may be authentic and sentence B spurious. It has not to say to criticism, "Thus far and no farther." This jade or that may wince; *its* withers are unwrung.

Secondly, I would mention the capacity of Liberal Judaism to expand and absorb. Do some critics allege that Liberal Judaism, unconsciously to itself, has adopted many a product or creation of Christian thought or Christian philosophy? Be it so. I have no objection, so long as these adoptions are not inconsistent with our Jewish fundamentals. Have we learnt from Christianity a deeper appreciation of the divine immanence? But Christians themselves are emphatic that immanence, rightly understood, is complementary, and not antagonistic, to transcendence. Has Christianity taught us to lay more stress upon vicarious suffering, or upon self-sacrifice, or upon the redemption of the sinner? It may be so. But there are many parallels to such teaching in purely Jewish sources, and the doctrine fits on harmoniously to the purest Judaism. The Daughter learnt much from the Mother; why should not the Mother learn also from the Daughter? A living religion is both old and young. It is never too old to learn. From the Greeks, too, we can learn, and I daresay we can learn from India also, and yet be true to ourselves.

Thirdly, I see no reason why Liberal Judaism cannot adopt a more intelligent and less parochial attitude towards Jesus, Paul, and the New Testament as a whole. Nor can I agree with the critics who say that the more we do this, the less will Liberal Judaism be Jewish, and the less will it attract Jews. The clock will tick for many a long hour. If Christendom abandons the folly and the wickedness of anti-Semitism, Jews will be willing to think more accurately and more wisely about the founders and the sacred books of Christianity. And whatever may be said about Paul, I think Jesus, at any

rate, would have been quite astonished at the idea that any amount of appreciation of his teaching would have made a man any less fitly describe himself as a Jew and as an adherent of Judaism.

Fourthly and fifthly, I come to two very important points, both of which are contentious, both of which would be denied, but both of which I believe to be true, and on both of which I lay very great stress. The first of these two points is the connection of Liberal Judaism with the past. It is still an historical religion, and has all the advantages which an historical religion brings. It is the heir of many ancestors, and is organically connected with, and affiliated to, all the long history of Judaism. Because we call our religion Liberal Judaism, we do not any the less feel ourselves to be Jews; the teachers, the saints, and the martyrs of Judaism still belong to us, and we to them. It is true we are separated from them in some things, but we are united with them in others, greater, deeper, and more fundamental, than those in which we are separated. And if we, existing Liberal Jews, feel this connection very keenly, why should not others feel it too? Why should not masses of Jews feel it? There is something grand and majestic about Judaism as an old historical religion, and by this grandeur and majesty we too can be moved and stirred. Moreover, though this remark lies outside my immediate purpose, it is a curious fact that there are outsiders to whom this aspect of Judaism and of Liberal Judaism makes strong appeal. Two or three people who have become Liberal Jews have said to me: "I had lost my belief in the Divinity of Christ long before I became a Jew, but I never cared to join Unitarianism; it did not attract me; it was not historical enough for me; it made no appeal to my imagination." And I have also heard one or two others say: "If I were to lose my belief in the Incarnation, which God forbid, I should prefer to become a Jew rather than a Unitarian." But what has to be added, in order to make this point about history and the links with the past reveal its full force, is this. It is not merely a matter of imagination or of interest or of picturesqueness; it is not merely a question of loyalty and pride; these may come in; but it is, above all, *a matter of faith*. And this matter of faith may appeal both to the insider and the outsider. Upon it, more almost than upon any other doctrine or article, rests the speciality of Judaism. Without it, you might believe all the other doctrines, and you could hardly be a Jew. With it, and with the belief in God which it implies, and you *are* a Jew. This matter of faith which illumines the past, sanctifies the

present, and guarantees the future, is the belief that, be the date of the Ten Commandments what it may, Israel has been entrusted by God with a certain mission or charge, and that this charge has never been cancelled. "Thou, Israel, art my Servant. Ye are my Witnesses." Interpret history with *that* belief, and the historical character of Liberal Judaism may be justly claimed as a point of the greatest influence and importance; for upon Liberal Judaism, as the one and only form of Judaism with any promise of life and of development, there then falls a tremendous, and yet inspiring responsibility.

The last of my six points seems to run counter to, and to weaken, the fifth. A critic may be inclined to say: "For heaven's sake be more modest, and make your claim either for one or for the other, but not for both." But it is no good. The advocate of a religion is never afraid of putting forward what apparently are the most inconsistent claims. The sixth excellence, then, is the capacity of Liberal Judaism to universalise and spiritualise what is particularist and national. It can gradually make its embodiment, as well as its doctrine, purely religious and purely human. Israel, for most Liberal Jews, is no longer a race or a people, but a religious community, the borders of which are not limited by ties of kinship or of blood. Such a statement will evoke three distinct doubts. First, whether the thing is feasible; secondly, whether, if feasible, it would not choke off and chill the Jews; thirdly, whether it could conceivably impose upon any Gentile. As regards the first, there is really no such great difficulty. More and more do Liberal Jews, and all the children who are brought up in Liberal Judaism, regard Judaism as a universal religion, for the adherents of which race is accidental, and not inherent or essential. Israel means the community of believers; he who ceases to *believe* has ceased to *belong* to it. Again, the embodiment of Liberal Judaism can be, and is being, successfully universalised. Of the five Pentateuchal festivals four present no problem. The Day of Memorial and the Day of Atonement are purely general. Indeed, no religion can boast of a sacred day more spiritual and more catholic than the great Day of Atonement. Tabernacles is a harvest festival, which is dedicated to the relation of God and man to the natural world. Pentecost celebrates the place of Law in religion, and more especially the relation of the Moral Law to man and to God. There remains the Passover, a national festival in origin, but capable of being transfigured into a festival of Liberty, and of the relation of freedom to man's nature and to God's. I fully admit that the proselytes

to Liberal Judaism are as yet only a few individuals here and there, and that one must not base much argument upon individual instances. But for what it is worth I would mention that I have not found that these few proselytes experience any particular difficulty in joining with us in the celebration of these festivals, or that they feel in any way "out of it" because they are not of Jewish race or parentage. That is all that here and now I can say in reply to the third doubt; the second, the most serious and urgent of the three, demands a somewhat longer consideration. I admit that many Jews still cling to their nationally-coloured religion, and to the curious inconsistency and misfit of a universal God and universal doctrines combined with a particularist and national cult. But I believe that they will gradually become more acutely aware of the misfit or the inconsistency, and that they will gradually learn to dislike it; then, as the universal God and the universal doctrines must be maintained, they will gradually realise that if Judaism is to be saved at all, Liberal Judaism is the only way out. All the more will this tend to happen if, and when, anti-Semitism disappears. I have too much faith in human nature, and I was going to add in Christianity, to believe that anti-Semitism is a permanent quality of the European nature. But what, some may say, about Zionism and the present chauvinistically national attitude and movement among thousands, if not millions, of Jews? I recognise that these things have delayed the diffusion of Liberal Judaism very considerably, but he who has faith will be content to wait. Moreover, let me throw out a whimsical paradox which is, nevertheless, not quite so whimsical as it sounds. Let us imagine Zionism an accomplished fact. Let us imagine that, in forty or fifty years from now, there are two million Jews in Palestine, and that these Jews constitute a Jewish nation, even a Jewish State, and that all the Christians and all the Mahomedans have voluntarily departed. There is the Jewish nation re-born; two millions of Jews, all to themselves, in their own ancestral home. Well, to begin with, they will be only a sixth of the total Jewish population of the world, and I hope that the five-sixths will have some say and some influence in the development of Judaism. But there is something more. When those two million Jews are comfortably established in Palestine, and a new generation grows up there, I think that many of them will soon begin to say: "I am a Jew by nationality right enough, just as *you* may be an Englishman or a Dane, but I do not want a national religion any more than you. I want a universal religion.

My religion is one thing, my nationality another." Liberal Judaism may *then* become the religion of many Palestinian Jews, who will feel united to Englishmen and Danes of the Jewish faith, not by belonging to a common nationality, but by belonging to a common faith. Meanwhile, I fancy that Christians hardly realise how entirely the word Jew denotes for a large majority of educated Jewish men and women (and not for Liberal Jews only), a member of the Jewish religion; how completely for us a non-Jew has become a Jew, if he *adopts* Judaism, and how completely for us a born Jew has ceased to be a Jew, if he *abandons* it.

Even, however, if it be admitted that my six points have some force in them, it may, nevertheless, quite fitly be asked: "Have they had any effect? What about Liberal Judaism in *practice*?" Well, to reply to these questions would take too long. Liberal Judaism is not more than a hundred years old, and it has had to contend with many difficulties. Yet it is a not unimportant religious force in the United States, and before the war it was making considerable strides in Germany, and it has begun to take some root in England. The Nationalist movement has acted as a certain check, but I do not anticipate that this check will be more than temporary. There is no cause for alarm.

Meanwhile, Liberal Judaism does not, and need not, put forward any claim to become the *one* religion of the future, which will swallow up, or substitute itself for, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, and all the other religions of the world. But a Liberal Jew, without making any such wild demands upon human credulity, may yet argue and believe that, alongside of Unitarianism, or alongside of Liberal Christianity, there may be a place, if a modest place, for Liberal Judaism as well. Nor is it, I trust, too presumptuous to say (and I believe that certain facts in the United States give some basis or justification for the remark) that these two forms of Liberal Religion, with so many points of contact and resemblance, may exercise upon each other a certain influence, and may even very slowly, very gradually, converge towards each other without actually meeting. Each may emphasise more fully, and perhaps with a touch of one-sidedness, particular aspects of a fuller and highly complicated truth. Neither may feel itself constrained to say, "We possess, and believe in its fullness, the exact mixture and balance of complete, final, and perfect truth." Liberal Judaism, at any rate, as a great Liberal Jewish scholar has just finely said, will only seek to be "a religion ever progressive, on lines

of historical continuity, but never finished and final." I can imagine, for instance, that Liberal Judaism might still continue to lay stress upon its own somewhat stern and uncompromising Monotheism, its lofty doctrine of the relation of God to man, its high ethical teaching of the Moral Law and of its perpetual obligation. Both Liberal Judaism and Liberal Christianity may claim, in their conception of the divine, to find a due place for Transcendence and Immanence, for faith and for works, for man's likeness to God and man's difference from God, for Grace and for Law, for commandment and for redemption, for man the "servant," and for man the "son." Dr. Rashdall has finely shown how these oppositions and distinctions are never absolute, and are often exaggerated.¹ Yet can we imagine Liberal Judaism and Liberal Christianity as two sentinels or rallying places for the one aspect of Truth and for the other. Such a sentinel or rallying place, at any rate, would Liberal Judaism seek and claim to be for the purest and most austere monotheism, and for the purest and most austere relation of man to God and to the Moral Law. And yet neither religion need be one-sided, and perhaps both religions may become increasingly less so. Nor does it much matter if the Christian thinks that any modern Jewish advance is partly due to the unconscious adoption of Christian teaching and of the spirit of Christ, or if the Jew thinks that Liberal Christianity is tending in the direction of Judaism, with a veneer of varying thinness made up of old Christian ideas and phraseology. Perhaps both views are not without their justification. I, at least, am ready to allow that Judaism had become too one-sided, and that it needed a complementary dash of doctrine, which may, if you please, be loosely called Christian, but which was yet by no means absent from the Rabbinical literature. Is it too outrageous to suppose that Judaism may have had some unconscious influence in helping Trinitarianism (which, when philosophically interpreted, I fully acknowledge to be far more monotheistic than any form of Arian, though not of Unitarian, teaching) to keep clear and free of all Tritheistic heresies and perversions?² Theism is so big and grand a thing that it may well be content with more than one expression of it, and more than one servant. Over and above that section of Christianity

¹ *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, pp. 491, 492.

² Dr. Rashdall, in his new and deeply interesting book, gives an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity of which it is hardly too much to say that, with some little reserve, it could be accepted by any Jew. (*The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, pp. 444-446.)

which is definitely Unitarian, there may long and fitly continue in existence a Liberal Jewish form of Theism and a Liberal Christian form; and though their conceptions of the Divine Nature may be represented in different language and symbols, yet both because, or in spite, of these differences, may guard and may teach various complementary aspects of the fuller monotheistic truth, and, conceivably, some men may be more drawn towards the one teaching about God, and some towards the other.

We Liberal Jews, at any rate, whatever the future may have in store, cannot doff our armour or renounce our charge. Others too may bear their witness, and it may be, according to its measure, a witness of truth. For here, we see, as we believe, more clearly than the prophets of old. But not idly or falsely were we called to bear our witness, and witnesses, with our separate camp, and separate language—I do not mean Hebrew!—and separate nomenclature, we must remain. And of Liberal Judaism, our spiritual Mother, paraphrasing the words of a certain Pharisee from olden times, we feel inclined to say: “If this faith have grown up according to the purpose and will of God, time and chance will not be able to overthrow it.”

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

LONDON.

THE PARABLE OF THE WICKED HUSBANDMEN.

(Matthew xxi. 33-41 ; Mark xii. 1-9 ; Luke xx. 9-16.)

ARTHUR GRAY, M.A.,

Master of Jesus College, Cambridge.

THE versions of the story of the Wicked Husbandmen in Matthew and Luke are clearly derived exclusively from a Marcan source. So also are the sections preceding the Parable (Mt. xxi. 12, 13, 23-27 ; Lk. xix. 45, 46 ; xx. 1-8) and those which follow it (Mt. xxi. 42, 45, 46 ; Lk. xix. 17-19). In attempting to arrive at the significance of the story, we shall not leave out of sight the parables told by Matthew alone, viz. The Two Sons and The Marriage Feast, and placed by him in the same context ; but in the main Mark must explain his own meaning. We shall not go to Matthew and Luke for an interpretation which may be remote from Mark's intention. Still less shall we confuse issues by importing developed Christological ideas from John or the Epistles into a narrative intended for the ears of priests and scribes. Nor shall we expect to find in the vocabulary of Mark's tale the specialised meanings which are attached to words in the later Gospels or by Paul. It is important to make these points clear when we consider expressions used in Mark's parable such as "son," "heir," "beloved."

The application of these expressions to the speaker as the Divine Son has never, I think, been contested. It is consecrated by long usage beginning with the first century. Nevertheless, Mark furnishes weighty reasons for thinking that such was not his intention. Later we shall see grounds for the belief that Matthew was in agreement with Mark. In Luke there is an inconsistency.

Taking the words above mentioned, we may consider the probability that Mark understood them as applying in an exceptional sense to Jesus.

1. "Son." The Vineyard Lord is, of course, the Lord of Hosts (Isaiah v. 7). The Divine Sonship has no part in Mark's account of the teaching of Jesus. He never calls himself "the Son of God": he is never so called by his disciples. In some texts of Mk. i. 1 he is "a son of God," without the definite article; and so again in the centurion's exclamation at the Cross (xv. 39). Twice demoniacs give him the title of "the Son of God," and once that of "the Holy of God," and on two of these occasions the cry calls forth rebuke. Even when Jesus gives assent to the High Priest's question (xiv. 61) he immediately reverts to his accustomed phrase, "the Son of Man." "My Father"—an expression constantly used in Matthew's Gospel—is altogether absent from Mark's. The sole indication in Mark that Jesus recognised himself as standing in the unique relationship of the Son to the Father is in the strange passage (xiii. 32) where the Son holds intermediate rank between the angels and the Father.

2. "Heir," ὁ κληρονόμος. The word is not used elsewhere by Mark. In the story it is a natural and simple expression: it gives a motive for the murder of the son. To attach to it the theological significance which it has in Hebrews i. 2 is unreasonable. The word is of frequent occurrence both in Hebrews and the Pauline Epistles, but is not in any way limited in its application to Jesus.

3. "The beloved," ἀγαπητός. Mark's words are, "he had yet one, a beloved son." Matthew writes simply, "he sent his own son": Luke, "I will send my beloved son." It is possible that Mark used the expression with a conscious recollection of the utterances of the Heavenly Voice at the Baptism and the Transfiguration.¹ The form of these utterances is perhaps suggested by Psalm ii. 7, but if so, the citation is not verbally accurate. "Beloved" is lacking in the Psalm, and in the passage, Acts xiii. 33, the quotation is given more accurately from the LXX., "Thou art my Son: this day have I begotten thee." There is no evidence that Jesus based any claim on either utterance. After the second he immediately reverts to his wonted description of himself as Son of Man (Mt. xvii. 12; Mk. ix. 12).

Though the expression is so simple in Mark's story that it would be superfluous to look for a parallel in the exceptional use of "the Beloved" with reference to Christ in Ephesians i. 6, or of "the Son of his love" in Colossians i. 13, yet it is possible that Mark found the suggestion for it in the Parable of the

¹ In Luke's version of the utterance at the Transfiguration the word is not ἀγαπητός but ὁ ἐκλεκτός.

Vineyard (Isaiah v.), the phrases of which he almost literally reproduces from the LXX. in describing the operations of the Vineyard Lord. That parable begins, "I will sing to the Beloved a song of my Beloved (τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ μου) for his vineyard. A vineyard was made by the Beloved," etc. "The Beloved" there is Jehovah. The strikingly picturesque use of the expression in the original of Mark's Vineyard story may well have been present in his mind when he wrote his own version.

Using Mark to explain his own story, I see no justification for the belief that he used such ordinary words as "son," "heir," "beloved" with any theological connotation, or so interpreted the thought of Jesus. If there is theology in the tale it is of the Eocene order, and the superimposed strata of later and developed Christian thought belong to an altogether different system.

If we take Mark's narrative of the circumstances in which the Parable was spoken, there are obvious difficulties in reconciling them with the belief that the speaker intended to represent himself as exceptionally distinguished by the title of God's Son, and that his hearers, the priests and scribes, so understood him. Jesus has come to Jerusalem, two days before he utters the Parable, with a premonition that he will share the fate of the Baptist (viii. 31; ix. 12), and that the chief priests and scribes will condemn him to death, the Gentile power merely carrying out their sentence (x. 33). But Mark's story does not lead us to suppose that he would needlessly court death by a gratuitous assertion of superhuman authority. On hearing of John's death he retires with the apostles to the desert (vi. 30, 31). He avoids the dominions of Herod Antipas, and carries on his ministry at one time at Tyre and Sidon (vii. 24), at another at Cæsarea Philippi (viii. 27), avoiding towns (viii. 23) and making secret travels in Galilee (ix. 30). On one occasion, which Mark places at the beginning of his ministry (iii. 6), he tells us that the Pharisees and Herodians took counsel to destroy him; but nothing came of it, and the Pharisees and Herodians were neither the anticipated nor the actual contrivers of the plot which ended in the Crucifixion. The purging of the Temple took place on the day following the Entry, and then, apparently for the first time, the scribes and chief priests sought how they might destroy him (xi. 18). Next day they put the, to them, not unreasonable demand about "authority," and they got no answer. Then Jesus tells them the story of the Wicked Husbandmen.

If we accept the traditional view that the son of the Parable

is meant to stand for the speaker's self, difficulties at once suggest themselves. Is it credible that he who has just refused to state his authority should now claim for himself an authority above the scribes', above that of Elijah and the prophets—the commission of God to His Son as His final representative? Is it credible that to his enemies he should make an avowal which he has never made to his most intimate followers? And *they*—whose hostility he foreknew, whose murderous designs were exposed in the Parable—what a weapon was this that was put in their hands! It was the damnatory charge at the Trial: "What need have we of further witnesses?" And yet the evidence *then* came from Jesus' answer to the High Priest—not from the avowal made in the Parable, an avowal which his accusers had heard with their own ears a few days before.

Observe that Jesus, if he was alluding to his own death, was speaking of an event yet future. Elsewhere (xiii. 9) he foretells another future event—that his apostles would be beaten in synagogues, etc., very much as the servants were beaten in the Parable. Therefore it could not be said with strict accuracy and knowledge of futurity that the son in the Parable was "last" in the succession of God's maltreated messengers. But if the allusion of Jesus, recognised at once by his hearers, was to a past event, ἔσχατον means obviously "last at the time of speaking."

And in the comment which follows there is striking evidence that the event referred to was past, not future. The passage from Psalm cxviii. 22 is quoted verbally from the LXX. by all the Synoptists:

The stone which the builders rejected,
The same was made (ἐγενήθη) the head of the corner.
This was (ἐγένετο) from the Lord,
And it is marvellous in our eyes.

Do not the aorists make it plain that the event alluded to as the rejection of the stone was past, and not to come? It may be said that the passage was cited in the Hebrew; but the case is not altered. The O.T. Revisers translate, "The same is become" and "This is from the Lord." The event is past: its consequence remains and *is* (not "will be") marvellous. If certainty could be made more certain, Luke in his citation of the passage has made it so. In Acts iv. 11 the first of the two verses is brought in—but only in loose paraphrase—and it is applied to Jesus. When Luke, if he were the author of the Acts, wrote, Jesus had incontestably

become the corner stone of the Church. "Christ himself" is the chief corner stone in Ephesians ii. 20. In the Acts passage the verse is perfectly suitable in its application to a past event. It was otherwise in the Gospel. Jesus being the speaker, his death, if that were typified by the rejection of the stone, could only be referred to as future, and the past tense was awkward. What does Luke, or his recensor, do? The text, cited again in 1 Peter ii. 7, and referred to in Ephesians, was familiar: he could not tamper with the tenses. He simply omits the second verse with its compromising ἐγένετο. The omission is deliberate, for the rest of the context shows a close verbal correspondence with Matthew and Mark, who retain the past tense.

But it may be said that the rejection of the stone typified, not the death of Jesus, but the already manifested refusal of the priests and scribes to accept his teaching, and that God's marvellous work is the progress which Jesus' gospel was then making among the people. In that sense, though it would require a perfect tense, γέγνε, Luke perhaps understood the first of the two verses. In the second verse this interpretation would seem to demand a present tense, "This *is* from the Lord." But, no doubt, this view of the matter has been popularised by the A.V. rendering of Isaiah liii. 3, "He was despised and rejected of men," a passage understood to be Messianic. But the connection fails if we turn to the LXX. The word for "reject" in the LXX. passage from the Psalm is ἀποδοκιμάζειν, and all the Synoptists reproduce it. But in Isaiah the Greek runs τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ ἄτιμον καὶ ἐκλιπὸν παρὰ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, where there is no verb corresponding to ἀποδοκιμάζειν, and the second adjective may be better rendered, as in the margin of the R.V., "forsaken," or, as I venture to suggest, "eclipsed."

But Luke is a witness against himself. The Parable has been introduced by talk about John, and the priests and scribes at once recognise its meaning and plot the death of Jesus. Was the motive that Jesus taunted them with rejection of his doctrine? It was something far more serious to them. They had rejected in a very conspicuous and flagrant way, not Jesus, but John. "The Pharisees and the lawyers," says Luke (vii. 30), "rejected for themselves the counsel of God, being not baptized of John." Let it be granted that in that passage the rejection was that of John's baptismal teaching, and that the verb is ἀθετεῖν, "to put aside," not ἀποδοκιμάζειν: there is no question of the accurate citation of a text. But the rejection of the teaching, as will presently be shown, led to

more violent measures: they did to John whatsoever they listed. True, Jesus had foretold to his disciples his own rejection: but in what connection? Luke (ix. 18-22) tells us that it was immediately after a reference to John. "Whom say the people that I am? They answering said, John the Baptist, but some say Elias. . . . The Son of Man must suffer many things and be rejected (*ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι*) by the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be slain." Mark (viii. 31) gives the saying in the same words as Luke, and again after a reference to the Baptist. In Luke xvii. 25 the rejection of Jesus (*ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι*) is foretold without any reference to John: coupled with *παθεῖν*, "to suffer," the allusion is clearly to his death, not to the rejection of his teaching.

With the passages in which "reject," *ἀποδοκιμάζειν*, is the word we must consider those in which "to set at nought," *ἐξουθενεῖν*, is used as its equivalent. It is so used in Acts iv. 11, the passage already mentioned, in which the set-at-nought or rejected stone stands for Jesus. In Luke xxiii. 11 it is used of the setting at nought of Jesus by Herod and his "armies": coupled with *ἐμπαίζειν*, it is manifest that it represents physical violence. Mark ix. 12 is a curious passage. As it is translated in the A.V. and R.V. it suggests that there has been compression in the text, possibly the omission of a clause: Matthew's version is clear enough. As it stands, the best solution of the passage from Mark is that of Professor Swete, who takes vv. 11, 12, 13 as two questions and their answers. "They asked him saying, The scribes say that Elijah must first come. He said unto them, Elijah indeed cometh first and restoreth all things. (They asked) How is it written of the Son of Man, that he should suffer many things and be set at nought? (He answered) I say unto you that Elijah is come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed." Notice that the setting at nought is coupled with a reference to John. Apart from the quotations of Psalm cxviii. about the rejection of the stone, *ἀποδοκιμάζειν* is used three times and *ἐξουθενεῖν* twice in the Gospels, and the latter once in Acts. Whether they be applied to Jesus or to John, both of them refer to the final rejection, "the suffering," or "the killing," or "the physical mistreating" with which in every case they are coupled. It is evident that the Evangelists understood the metaphor of the rejected stone in this sense, not as the mere rejection of teaching.

What then was this past event involving physical suffering to which Jesus alluded, and which the priests and scribes

at once recognised as an indictment of themselves? Mark's narrative is amplified and explained by Matthew. Between the question as to authority and the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen Matthew interposes the Parable of the Two Sons (xxi. 28-31), and after the former parable he adds that of the Kingly Wedding Feast. The three parables in question bear the plainest impress of the Master's hand; and it is equally plain that they were delivered to the same audience, the priests and scribes, on the same or following days, and that their theme is identical. They differ from the parables addressed to the people in that they have an allegorical reference to a particular class, and their moral is driven home by comment—which was not the practice of Jesus when his audience was a popular one. They can only be understood as a connected series, a dramatic trilogy. In two of them the scene is laid in the Vineyard: in all of them father and son are more or less conspicuous *dramatis personæ*. The father is the Universal Father, God. Who then is the son, the heir, the beloved, the stone rejected by the builders? The plain answer which I read in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark is—John the Baptist.

The conclusion is startling. It runs counter to preconceptions which are at least eighteen centuries old; and it will not commend itself to those whom—in the classical sense—I may call the “contaminators” of Gospel tradition, *i.e.* those whose literary sense is insufficient to distinguish between picturesque story and systematised theology. But it is no paradox. Let us take the three parables in the setting which Matthew gives them.

Jesus expels the Temple traffickers, and next day the chief priests and elders (Mark adds the scribes) raise the question of authority. The reply is another question—John (xxi. 23-27). Then immediately follows the Parable of the Two Sons (vv. 28-30); and that brings in John again—“John came unto you in the way of righteousness.” Publicans and harlots repent, as the son in the Parable repents: the priestly caste, with lip-service, rejects his message. Then follows the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, and the hearers recognise that the parables (plural) have reference to themselves. Then immediately follows the Parable of the Kingly Wedding Feast. The sonship is little emphasised, but the moral is identical with that of the preceding parables. The feast is John's message. The King's table is furnished with guests by violence—“Compel them to come in,” “From the days of John the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence.” From

highways and hedges publicans and harlots are pressed in : the murderers who refuse the invitation are destroyed like the Husbandmen. The murder of the servants by the invited guests is altogether motiveless in the story ; but the reference to John's murder could not be missed by the scribes to whom the tale is addressed. Jesus was not alone in his assurance that the divine vengeance attended John's murderers. When Herod Antipas dismissed his wife, daughter of Aretas, Aretas made war upon him, and defeated him in a great battle. The Jews, says Josephus, were convinced that the disaster was due to God's vengeance on John's murderer.

I have already remarked Luke's editorial methods in dealing with the passage from the Psalm about the rejected stone. In his day the star of John was occulted in the superior radiance of Jesus : in the estimation of the Christian community John had decreased and Jesus had vastly increased. He did not understand the reference to John, and appropriated the text to Jesus. In the same way he ignores John in his story of the Great Supper (xiv. 15-24). He is blind to the reference to the scribes, and he transfers the Parable to a time before the Jerusalem visit. He brings it in on a certain occasion when Jesus "sat at meat" with those who had bidden him, and connects it with monitions, drawn from the Book of Proverbs, about conduct at feasts. His Parable has no king and no son : there are no "murderers," and the excusing guests are not destroyed : the incident of the wedding garment is omitted. In Matthew's story the guest in the inappropriate garment has the same rôle as the son who made profession of obedience to the father's bidding but did not perform it, *i.e.* the priestly caste. Luke strangely distorts the lesson of the story into a precept about hospitality to "the poor, the maimed, the lame and the blind" (vv. 13 and 21).

"There was a tendency in early Christian literature to re-write the story of John the Baptist so as to bring him into conscious subordination to Jesus."¹ Luke's account of the

¹ Foakes-Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, *The Beginnings of Christianity*, part i., vol. i. p. 109. The authors quote an instructive parallel from the story of the Bâb in modern Islam. "The Bâb, whose name was Mirza Ali Muhammad, was a Persian reformer who was put to death in 1850. Fortunately Count Gobineau, the French Minister in Persia, was interested in him, and wrote an admirable account in his *Les religions et les philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale*. He also brought back and deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris a MS. copy of the life of the Bâb by Haji Mirza Jani, his friend and contemporary. The Bâb appointed Mirza Yahia, under the title of Subh-i-Ezel, as his successor, but foretold "One who should come." When Beha, the brother of Subh-i-Ezel, claimed to fulfil this prophecy, the text of Gobineau's MS. was re-edited in a manner which reminds the student of the New Testament of the relation of

family ties which connected the Master with his great Fore-runner may be legendary, but it seems to point to an earlier acquaintance than the Baptism; and the teachings of Jesus have so many points in common with the little knowledge that we possess of the Baptist's missionary work, that it would be a reasonable surmise that Jesus in the wilderness learnt from John the Gospel of the Kingdom and of Repentance which was the characteristic of his first discourses. Whatever their relations may have been, the abounding veneration of Jesus for John is patent in the pages of all the Synoptists. "Among men that are born of women, there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist." "Much more than a prophet." Greater than that first *Ἐλίας* with whom he was associated in Jesus' thoughts at the Transfiguration. Nobler than all that came from God before him, as the heir is nobler than the bond-servant. Not to be classed with God's *δοῦλοι*, the prophets, but rather unique, the inaugurator of a new epoch. "The law and the prophets were until John: from that time the gospel of the kingdom is preached." What place shall Jesus assign him in the family of the Vineyard Lord? Might he not say, as Jonson said in his splendid testimony to Shakespeare, "I loved the man, and do honour his memory on this side idolatry," or in Shakespeare's phrase about Coriolanus, "He loved him above the measure of a father, nay, godded him indeed"?

Yet neither is it wise to insist on the degree of honour which Jesus would confer on him. The story is a story. Its purpose is fulfilled if the hearers understand its allegorical significance. Tropically, John is son of the Vineyard Lord—not, by necessary consequence, Son of God. It will be said, and I agree, that in the parables of Jesus it is unwise to seek for a too literal application, a minute correspondence between the thing said and the thing signified. But, as the priests and scribes recognised in the Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen an allusion to themselves, we must suppose that it contained pointed references to their doings. So I think that I am entitled to draw attention to the peculiar expression, common to all the Synoptists, "They took him and cast him forth out of the vineyard." In Mark, the casting forth is made to follow the killing; in Matthew and Luke, to precede it. In the

Matthew and Luke to Mark; and finally an entirely new story was written, showing about as much trace of the original narrative as the Fourth Gospel does of the Synoptic account. There are thousands of Behais now, many of them in America, and it is safe to say that few of them know the story of the origin of their cult, or would believe it if they were told."

traditionally accepted interpretation of the Parable the incident seems to be without special significance; it gives colour and no more. The preceding messengers, if we take the versions of Matthew and Mark, were not so treated; but Luke, editing and spoiling the story, relates that the third servant was wounded and cast forth. The point in the story of Matthew and Mark is that this indignity was uniquely offered to the son of the proprietor of the Vineyard. What did the priests and scribes recognise in the casting forth? The Vineyard is the house of Israel, either the people or the land. To Jesus, whose expulsion was not contemplated, it could not be referred by his hearers. The Evangelists could not so refer it: Jesus died and was buried close to the Holy City, But John was first imprisoned and afterwards slain at Machaerus, a place technically in the district originally assigned to the tribe of Reuben, but in the days of the kings occupied by Moabites, who owned the faintest allegiance to Israel, and whose savage fetishism was a special abomination of the Jewish race. To the pious Hebrew it was additionally hateful as the fortress-palace of Herod Antipas, and its remains show that it was given over to pagan worship.

But it will be said that there is no evidence that the scribes had any part in the destruction of John. Both the Gospels and Josephus lay the crime on Herod Antipas. Let it be granted that direct evidence respecting John does not suffice to prove the complicity of the scribes. But the Gospels furnish a clear presumption of their partnership in the crime. Matthew (iv. 12) and Mark (i. 14) state that John was "delivered up" (*παράδουναι*), exactly as they say that the Sanhedrin "delivered up" Jesus to Pilate (Mt. xxvii. 2; Mk. xv. 1). In Acts vii. 52 (Stephen's speech to the Sanhedrin) there is a hardly doubtful reference to John: "Which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? and they killed them which showed before the coming of the Righteous One." In Mark ix. 13 the reference seems to be the same: "I say unto you that Elijah is come, and they have also done unto him whatsoever they listed": "they" are apparently the scribes, mentioned just before. In the parallel passage in Matthew (xvii. 12) it is said: "Even so shall the Son of Man suffer of them." As neither Matthew nor Mark records the arraignment before Herod and "his armies," there can be no allusion to Herod. Nor can it be to the Jewish people generally, of whom it is said that *all* counted John as a prophet (Mt. xxi. 26; Mk. xi. 32).¹ In

¹ The murderers of John did not know him (Mt. xvii. 12): Herod at least knew that he was a righteous man and a holy (Mk. vi. 20).

Matthew xxiii. 31 Jesus, addressing the scribes and Pharisees, implies that they share the guilt of their fathers in shedding the blood of the prophets, and indignantly flashes on them the very words of John, "generation of vipers." The language of that passage is closely modelled on John's denunciation in Matthew iii. 7-9. The scribes profess themselves sons of Abraham. Be it so, replies Jesus; Abraham's sons, deader than the stones, have stained their hands with righteous blood.

So the trilogy of the Father and the Son is worked to its end with thunders of denunciation of the prophet-slayers. As the drama of the Husbandmen is unfolded to them they, "like guilty creatures sitting at a play," are "struck to the soul," and, like the murderer, Claudius, they instantly plot to rid themselves of their accuser: "in the same hour they sought to lay hands on him." The entangling questions with which they sought to incriminate Jesus were a cloak to their real motive of fear: "they feared the people." The people "hung upon him, listening," and doubtless sympathising with his denunciations of John's murderers. He spoke daily in the Temple, and no hand was raised against him. If teaching only were Jesus' offence, the Sanhedrin might have threatened him, as Gamaliel on another occasion advised. It is fairly clear that they would not have proceeded to extremities. When Peter and John were asked the question put to Jesus, "By what power, or in what name have ye done this?" they did not parry it, as Jesus did: they gave a plain answer. But in his address in the Temple preceding that trial, Peter had gone far to condone the crime of the priests and scribes, as an act due to misunderstanding: "I wot that in ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers." So the council decided to let them go. It was otherwise with Stephen: he was outspoken in his denunciation of the betrayers and murderers of the Righteous One and of his precursor, John. The Passion was of the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. But the basest human motives were the engine. Looking only into the guilty minds of his judges, we may say that if Jesus had held his peace about John there would have been no Crucifixion.

ARTHUR GRAY.

CAMBRIDGE.

JAMES HINTON'S MESSAGE FOR OUR TIMES.

REV. THE HON. E. LYTTTELTON, D.D.

IT seems as if the writings of the very remarkable thinker James Hinton the aurist (1822-1875) are no longer read. Yet there is no question that his philosophy of life has a message full of the highest encouragement for a generation like the present, and for the peculiarly harassing kind of bewilderment which has taken possession of innumerable minds since the war began. By way of justifying this statement his experience as a youth of sixteen on first coming to London may be given in the words of his biographer, Miss Ellice Hopkins. "Brought up as he had been in a pure country home, and drinking in from his mother a reverence for women which in him was always akin to worship, he was suddenly thrust into rudest contact with our worst social evils." (This was in White-chapel.)

The weary and the heavy weight
Of all this unintelligible world.

came crushing down on his young heart with a most cruel force, and the degradation of women possessed him with a divine despair . . . at last, as he once said, "it crushed and crushed me till it crushed 'The Mystery of Pain' out of me."

In other words, Hinton early in life, marvellously sensitive in heart, and with a mind furiously eager to know, set himself to reconcile the most heartrending facts of life with his undying conviction of the Love of God. That is exactly the problem before which many thoughtful minds are quailing to-day.

Briefly, it may be said that popular Christianity at the present time has proved itself unable to interpret such an experience as the great war. Men have been asking in every direction how can a belief in an All-powerful and All-loving God stand when confronted by unparalleled horrors

inflicted on innocent and guilty alike, on a scale never dreamt of before in the history of mankind? At first English people threw themselves into the gigantic and long-sustained effort demanded by the war, buoyed up by the hope that on its conclusion the world would be a different place. But the answer to the question, "Why are such things permitted?" namely, that war is and always has been a purifying or regenerating influence, has been nullified and sneered out of court by observers of events since the Armistice. Far as the eye can reach, of the foremost nations of the earth those who are not fighting still are either starving in sullen despair, or amid unspeakably baffling internal disorders are labouring to restore the *status quo ante bellum*: though all agree that the days of peace were days of moral degeneracy, and that moral degeneracy was, in varying degree, the real cause of strife. In short, the war not only caused the most ghastly havoc and irremediable loss, but has already shown that as a trainer of character it has failed; it has not raised the tone of society in Europe by a single point. It has made this life nearly intolerable, and wholly failed to prepare men for the next.

Now, what has the popular teaching of Christianity to say to this? Its utterances have been halting, uncertain, and obscure. Some exponents have insisted "God's ways are not as our ways," and have explained the primeval maxim to mean that they are wholly unintelligible. The world has angrily rejoined that they ought to be intelligible, and the ministers of religion are challenged to make them clear: for what else are these men paid? Or if it is more definitely urged that the Almighty has seen fit, for reasons beyond our ken, to punish man for his sins, the answer promptly comes that that is no justification for the slow wasting away of half a million German children, or the unutterable miseries of the Armenians, or the hopeless obstacles in the way of peace which are reducing the stoutest reformers to despair. Less often one hears cautious reminders that these anomalies will be set right in another world. But with more disgust than ever the rejoinder is flung back that a creed which has no message for this world is not worth a moment's attention. God no doubt showed wonders in the Creation, and may again after æons of ages rescue it from decay: meantime, however, things are going from bad to worse. It is clear that He will not interpose; and the reason must be that He cannot, so all talk of His Omnipotence and Love is clearly but "sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal." It speaks of a God who looks on at the collapse of His own handiwork, and such a God is not to be

worshipped by men who love their fellow-men, and the less account is taken of Him the better.

Nevertheless the age-long hunger for a religion which will satisfy and give something like peace of mind in the midst of the cosmic turmoil has never been so insistent or more acute than it is to-day. And who can wonder? Let us turn, then, to the passionately convinced sage who fifty years ago brought comfort to his own torn heart and to many thousands of others, James Hinton, the ear-doctor, the sufferer, the prophet.

The present article is only an introduction to an examination of Hinton's teaching, and it will deal mainly with the simpler elements, that is to say, the theory of Pain. The philosophical basis on which it rests will be indicated, but requires a separate investigation on its own merits.¹

Hinton started with a rich equipment for his life's work. First and foremost he had a singularly compassionate heart. His words of consolation are never those of the shallow optimist whose cheerfulness may be ascribed to a sanely balanced temperament or to a good digestion. He was one of the chosen few who have been martyrs for others' woes. Most utterly Christlike and selfless was his sorrow for the wreckage of human life, and quite as a young man he grasped with a burning conviction the fact of his own peculiar vocation, viz. that he was to show mankind the source of their misery as being not in the Universe, not in God, nor in Satan, nor in objective evil, but in themselves; in the universal disposition to treat suffering as worse than sin; in short, as the one wholly intolerable horror in life. That we may regard as Hinton's second qualification for his work, his insight into the psychological basis of man's unrest.

But with all this, encompassing it, enfolding it, irradiating it, was his passionate and unalterable conviction of the Love of God. The inquiry on which he started as a very young man was simply how to reconcile the tragedies of Creation with the Love of the Creator. If his feeling for the misery on the one hand and for God's Love on the other had been less passionate and sincere, his words would have rung less true. To this we may ascribe the furious zeal of his thinking. No sooner did he discern that the Light was before him than he

¹ The books which I have examined at present are: (1) *The Mystery of Pain*; (2) *The Philosophy of Religion*; (3) *Man and his Dwelling-Place*; (4) *Life and Letters of James Hinton*, by Miss Ellice Hopkins. Of these (1) is simple and popular, (2) the most suggestive, (3) the most systematic exposition of the scientific basis of the writer's view of Pain.

burned with eagerness to spread far and wide the wonder of its appearing, that all who were wandering in the vast shadows of death might rejoice with him at that which was a veritable demonstration of the purpose and method of evil: the clue to the working of all tragedies: the grand principle of Creation; its intention: its tranquil and victorious conversion of every bad element in life into the purest and eternal good.

What, then, was the keynote of his doctrine?

It started with the perception that the same grim phenomena presented themselves in an entirely different light to different minds: to some as a warrant for the blackest despair; to others as painful, but yet as an ingredient in the highest joy; and that the difference in the two views was not owing to changeableness in the phenomena, but to varying degrees of vitality in the minds of those interpreting the phenomena. The facts were facts, and the same facts to all. But the difference in the minds of those who experienced them made them either unspeakably hellish or the beginnings of the kingdom of heaven.

Thus, beginning from a homely personal experience, he found that the discomfort involved in a slight service done to another was actually not only overborne, and outweighed, by the joy of service, but was a necessary ingredient in the joy, a condition of it, but that it was felt as joy only according to the spiritual vitality of the mind experiencing it. If that vitality is defective, the pain is treated as an objective and irremediable evil, and the inference is despair. If, however, there is a certain robustness of thought and feeling in him who undergoes the pain, it is felt not as pain but as joy. In short, pain is what it is relatively; unless human beings were sick and labouring under a defective vitality, all pain would be an uplifting condition of the highest life, a necessary ingredient in all happiness.

If that is so, then the Universe is "all glorious within"; the only really staggering mystery is man's pertinacious misinterpretation of what he sees, based as it is not on reason but on sensation. Pain is to us an objective evil because we *feel* it so; but all advance in knowledge is a setting aside of feeling and a following of the intuitions of the "moral consciousness," which are gradually confirmed by the reason, the two faculties together correcting always the evidence of the senses.

Anyone can verify this teaching in its rudiments. We all know that the welcoming of fatigue is a sure symptom of vitality. But if that is true of fatigue why not of sharper pain, once granted that the right feeling depends on there being

some lofty objective in view. As the contusions in a football match are unnoticed because of the eagerness for victory, so why should not all pain, privation, failure, and perplexity be likewise an ingredient in the highest joy, in the life of self-sacrifice, the only life worthy of the name? For Hinton had a firm grip of the psychological truth that the essence of all misinterpretation of experience is simply self-regard. The moment man pursues that which he *feels* to be desirable, he is pursuing a phantom and striving to feed on deadly poison.

Supremely interesting and suggestive is Hinton's philosophical basis for this ethical doctrine; but it is advisable to lay hold first of the moral principles, and if, as I hold, they are self-evident, we can approach the philosophy with a greatly quickened interest. Let it now be noticed that, proceeding from the facts of every healthy experience, we reach the perception that *all* suffering is only evil to us relatively, not absolutely; that in the ideal life we call Heaven it is not true that there will be no more pain, but that it will not be felt as pain; and if that is true of so dark an element in human life as suffering, how can we help hoping that we may come to see sin and all evil in the same way, as a good disguised by our own wrong thinking?

Naturally Hinton was profoundly optimistic in his views as to the end of things: the coming of the Kingdom and the Redemption of mankind. Misery is no longer misery when it is understood as the working out of Divine Love; for Love works by Law—that is, uniformly; and it is the Divine Law that Sin—that is, wrong notions about Creation—should uniformly work misery, not as an arbitrary punishment sent by God and to be averted by supplication, but as the eternally appointed sequel of Sin, and its purge. If we understood it rightly, we should welcome the misery produced by man's selfishness as the one grand cleansing influence which nothing in the long run can resist. Sin, in short, is the only remedy of Sin.

Space forbids further explanation of this most robust and virile doctrine. Let us conclude by an application of it to our present distresses.

Perhaps the most harassing of all the perplexities by which we are beset to-day is that the horrors of the war have failed to purify the hearts of men. The hope in which we were just enabled to endure the piteous loss of life, the havoc, the desolation, the insolence of brutality, the triumphs of cunning and the feebleness of human foresight, has been most woefully

disappointed. Men are apparently as selfish as before. A vast amount of "reconstructive" endeavour is merely an effort to hark back to the deadly miasma of money-making and amusement in which we were plunged in 1913, and which every right-minded citizen recognises as a veritable walking into the lion's mouth, a slipping into the jaws of Hell. If this is so, the image of the dog returning to his own vomit is tame and feeble as a statement of the fact; and if it be a fact, could any tragedy be more ghastly?

Now, Hinton was penetrated through and through with the conviction that owing to "inertia" of spirit in ourselves we necessarily feel suffering as supremely evil, though all the time it is a good. It is impossible to dispose of his doctrine by the cheap theory that he was a thick-skinned man and knew not what real suffering meant. No one as far as we know has ever dared to suppose that Christ was insensible to pain. Yet He bade the sympathetic women not to weep for Him, warning them against the universal delusion that suffering *in itself* is an intolerable evil, an inexplicable blot on creation.

But universal though the delusion be, the true disciples of Christ have in all ages escaped it. The New Testament writers never give in to it for a moment. St Paul often insists on the blessedness of suffering. What would he have said of this war and its failure to cleanse? Something doubtless sublime, profound, and illuminating. But Hinton's teaching, coloured by the scientific movement of 1840-1870, was simply an application to life's enigma of the eternal supremacy of God. Certainly St Paul's teaching would have been the same.

Thus open-eyed observation of Nature teaches us that there is a tendency to the uniform sequence of things which we call Law. So we connect, though reluctantly and very partially, the outcrop of strife with the previous sowing of the seed of selfishness. Belief in God means not only the perception that He ordains this particular sequence, but the conviction that it is ordained in love (uniformity being, according to Hinton, the unvarying action of unchanging love). If this is so, a Christian, or rather any honest Theist, approaches the consideration of war strongly predisposed, however great his abhorrence, to see in it a blessing, and more than that, *a blessing in proportion to its pain*. Reflection teaches him before long that whatever else war may be, it is a revealer of the connection between sin and misery. If selfishness has been on a vast scale, the strife that follows it must be on a vast scale too. The awfulness of the misery involved is something of a measure

of the hideousness and malignity of sin ; of the peculiar form of selfishness which each separate nation develops according to its own temperament, much as it elaborates its own cookery to suit its own taste. But however congenial won to its predilections the dish may be, nothing can alter the fact that mankind has been feeding on the deadliest poison.

Now, it is difficult for many not to suppose that the first thing a loving Creator would do in presence of a problem on this scale would be to ensure that the poison should be purged out of the social system as speedily as possible by the misery that attends its cure. It is exactly on this point that we spoil our obedience by bargaining with God and clamouring that His Law should be modified to suit our blindness. Hence many of us have been saying, "I can endure the pain and can see that it is the outcome of sin, and so is all right ; but the one thing that I cannot brook is that it should fail in making things better." But that is just where the terrible agony brings salvation. Suppose we grant that as the Bible insists from the first page to the last, the grand object of the Redemption of the World is the correcting of man's *thought*, the winning him to Truth, the enlargement of his mental horizon, then surely it is to be expected that just where his vision is most blurred, and his prejudices most stubborn, there the corrective will be most drastic. Now, in what department of experience is man most certain to be blind ? It is, of course, in the estimate of his own sin. He is born to believe that if he follows his own inclinations things will go pretty well. "And the serpent said to the woman, 'Ye shall not surely die.'" Especially true is this where the nation is concerned, not only the individual ; for the course of conduct which results is bound to be congenial to the collective temperament ; that is, it has the approval of a multitude and to it we are accordingly impelled by the strongest influence possible, the "herd instinct." Thus we are all besotted by admiration for our national qualities even when they take the form of disloyalty to the Divine Law, that "a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things he possesseth." There is only one conceivable way of waking man out of his dream, viz. by letting the Law work its effect upon those very feelings which he has chosen as his god. Supposing the delusion is really strong, the resulting pain must be indeed searching like a two-edged sword. That is why the failure of war to cleanse society makes it so powerful a revealer of the deadliness of sin. It is a measure of the depth of our slumber that the awakening proves to be so difficult. In other words, if war

were plainly and invariably successful in bringing peace to mankind, there would be no chance of our being freed from the spell under which we have been sinking into Gehenna. It would be a remedy wholly inefficacious for the disease. As it is, the one fact which makes war really awful is that it fails to purge. How awful, then, must be the sin that caused it! and how urgent the need that the truth of it should be burnt into the inmost heart of each one of us! For there are times when the "unspeakable gift" of the Holy Spirit of God to man must either be withheld altogether, or be imparted in the form of "the everlasting burnings."

This is only one among many applications to present-day necessities of the teaching of James Hinton, doctor, saint, and seer.

E. LYTTTELTON.

LONDON.

MY TWO PASTORS.

DAVID GORDON,

Cleveland, Ohio.

WHEN, after thirty years of his mild episcopate, the pastor of my church retired to private life, to be succeeded by the young, ardent, and cocksure Rev. Mr Jones, my thoughts wandered upon an unfamiliar subject—theology and theologic institution. Ordinarily, I don't bother much about my soul nor any of the apparatus catering to the subsistence of that organ. I am that typical individual of the time whose church is simply one, quite minor, department in the well-constituted world of everyday. I go to church, not for spiritual refreshment, but because the church deserves the support of a good citizen. It is a healthy influence against the Bolshevik and the liquor interests. It keeps before men the *practical* utility, the advantage in your business or on your job, of the godly life.

It was Sunday, and I was just home after hearing the new minister deliver a spirited fulmination entitled, "The Cigarette Evil: A Sermon for Young Men." I sat on the porch musing on the character of my new heavenly usher: his ferocious certitude, his theology centred upon a rockbound conviction that a heaven on earth could be established in about twenty-five years, his dramatic appeal to his audience, giving it, I malevolently suspected, the same sort of psychological thrill as a closely contested ball-game. And I knew that, on most of his flock, he would have more of an effect than his predecessor. For he would modify their daily conduct in their offices and their homes; a greater share of a sort of justice would be meted out to employees and servants. He has already converted a good half-dozen of his parishioners to Woman Suffrage and the Minimum Wage.

And this, I reflected, was good. Mr Jones, who is fast

becoming the typical American sacerdos, is affecting the lives and the opinion of many, where his predecessor appealed to but a few. I am malicious enough to harbour the opinion that Mr Jones' religion is not essentially religious, but, whatever it is, he is "putting it across," and that is the important thing in this pragmatic, democratic day.

Falling into a vein of unfamiliar sentiment, I mused upon the profound difference in the character and effect of the retired pastor: his unobtrusiveness, the esoteric quality of his appeal: something Rosicrucian, implying that his spiritual elixirs could only be tasted after a patient and privileged novitiate, the great prize of a great effort; above all, something about him suggesting a deep and fragrant placidity; a quality of passion static, but nevertheless passion of the deepest sort, in the nature of an exalted reverie. The passionate element in religion, I thought, the love of God, which was for Dante a companion sentiment to the love of woman, is dead in our day. Men no longer conceive religious frenzies and found churches upon pillars, as did good St Simeon, but become pillars of the church, wearing white neckties bought at the ten-cent store. The retired cleric, however, seemed to display a recreant reluctance to impart his spiritual treasures widely to others; one got the impression that he felt his message was caviare to many. He is not one who cries in the wilderness, but one who broods in retired places. I was fortunate in being one of his chosen ones, and his effect upon me was deep.

I don't know how most aptly to illustrate this delicate but mighty difference between the two clerics. The older man always gave me an impression of resemblance to St Francis of Assisi—he who blended his sainthood with an æsthetic delight in natural things, "my brother the wind and my sister the rain," and who, in his youth, was a great gallant and duellist, carrying a sort of negative and hardly repressed consciousness of the gay life through his days of sackcloth. Mr Jones, on the contrary, is Savonarola, the reformer. And I thought that this comparison of prototypes could effectively be carried out into the works of both men. For Mr Jones achieves reformatations (which are, alas! only too often, in turn reformed), while my friend (let us call him Mr Francis) communicates a personal spiritual potency. Mr Jones has published a book called *Christianity and Social Service*, which had a very wide circulation. Mr Francis published a brochure on *Meleager and the Greek Poetry of Alexandria* (a beautiful and half-pedantic scholarliness is one of his central

characteristics), which found its delighted way into the libraries of a hundred poetic faddists throughout the world.

A whim intruded itself upon me that Mr Francis' personality suggested to me some visual physical sensation, and I suddenly realised that I was thinking of the flower-bordered hedges of Devon, as I once saw them through a train window, and the placidly spiritual atmosphere of the shires of Britain, which I find wafted to me with a particular pungence through the poetry of Wordsworth. And I thought that Mr Francis' spirituality was of the same quality as Wordsworth's: quiet and untrumpeted, but deep and awful as Nature herself—and, like the pleasant mysteries of Nature, hard to apprehend and non-existent to the gross, distracted vision of the many. I don't know why, but I find something essentially English in Mr Francis' genius (the strange conglomerate, often coming at odds, of a simultaneous love of plum pudding, the green country, and Divine Grace). And I shall show, further on, that English history especially has been rife with this type of character.

But here I must make an abrupt stop and divert my path. For I have been giving the impression that my Reverend Francis is a dreamy, unworldly sort of a person. He isn't; he is very much a man of the world—and therein lies that essential and wonderful duality of his nature. He is versed in the ways of the world and moves in a homelike manner through its avenues, but with a sort of sense of displacement, an aspect of dreamy acquaintance with more Elysian territories; like one of Heine's gods in exile, making an excellent wood-chopper, or some truly *spirituel* Jesuit, participating efficiently in thumb-screwings, knowing them to be for the ultimate benefit of the victim and the world. Such as these seem to emphasise their consciousness of superior elements by living emphatically in inferior ones, as one longs all the more for meat after an intensive vegetarian diet. These rare souls live on something like a Platonic philosophy, finding in the plethora of matter recurrent flashes of the Idea, like glints of gold in the lump of ore. And their lives seem to be one long search for these evasive glints. These fine moments—moments, as he once explained to me, of a "deeper quality of consciousness"—Mr Francis finds in various aspects of this kaleidoscopic world: the first tuft of violets of the spring, the yellow hair of his little daughter; most of all in the graceful fancies of the Greek and Latin poets and philosophers. He finds in these undying artists, he once told me, that quality of universality (being the reason for their durability) which is the chief element

in the Beautiful, because it is a momentary inlet into the universal which is God. Now, religion for him is the science of discovering and communicating the Divine in the purest form possible. Knowing him for a generation, I have noted in him manifestations of this strange heavenliness in earthliness. Mr Francis loves a good game of golf, a glass of champagne—and I remember how, twenty-five years ago, he married the most beautiful girl in the neighbourhood.

And here, perhaps, in the course of this desultory causerie, I have come upon the nature of the difference between our two divines. For Mr Jones, Heaven is something like a suburb or model village bordering on the metropolis of our earthly existence, and to this suburb he would have us go for edification. It seems to me that Mr Jones is quite too myopic to see that his Heaven is one he has created with earthly materials, with which he is familiar—a pale adumbration of his earth. On the other hand, Mr Francis, in spite of his thorough living in the world, gives, to those intimately acquainted with him, the impression of an almost physical consciousness of the Divine and the Inscrutable. To him, this life, real as it is, is but an island in a sea of peopled shadow, and his thirst for apprehension of this infinite boundary is intense. He is consecrated in the true sense that he devotes his days to peering into this void, and communicating to those who are not too blind to see some of his mystical discoveries. Thus is he a true priest. We may see that his Heaven is too sacrosanct to be degraded to the service of the trivial life of everyday. Unto Cæsar what is Cæsar's indeed, but Cæsar is the ruler of but a minor kingdom. Believing that his soul is a fragment of the ethereal of which he is so profoundly conscious, he considers it uninfluenced by the pigmy sins and virtues of this speck of an earth.

And so, accepting, somewhat reluctantly, the inevitable conditions of this mortal existence, he plunges into it with a relish, as befits one whose faculties are all quick and keen. A very good explanation, perhaps, of this strange duality of my spiritual mentor and his type, often to be observed in the history of the world, is this: Their capacity of feeling is extraordinarily intense. This makes them partake, with especial avidity, both of the visible and the invisible worlds. Their inordinate love of the cup is often the measure of their love of the Holy Ghost. It is the greatest sinners who make the greatest saints. Mr Jones is the opposite type: his sentiments are as the wind in the wheat, gusty but light and transitory, substituting loudness for power; deluding itself

with a great noise. Mr Francis is a great deal of an idealist (in the Platonic sense), and, believing this life, minor as it is, to be an incarnation of the grand Idea, enters with content into its activities. And this does not at all detract from his consciousness of the supernal.

This then, I think, is the quality of the difference, as well as I can analyse my sentiment, between the two clerics. The younger minister, his faculties being naturally more obtuse, propounds a spirituality which is a mere addendum to what he actually sees. The elder man is soaked with a consciousness of the Divine, and finds it everywhere. Knowing that everything, however gross it may appear, is an incarnation of the spirit, in a more or less perfect degree, he is afraid of nothing. This world is a dwelling-place provided for us according to our needs. Let us not neglect this dwelling, says my friend, although we are conscious of the bountiful spaces without.

.

Sitting on my porch awaiting my Sunday dinner, my temper became melancholy because I knew that Mr Francis is not an isolated individual, but the obsolescent representative of a great race and a great tradition. He is an excellent type of the poetic clergyman, and reminiscent of the time hitherto when most clergymen were poetic, in the sense that they preserved the knack of appreciating and rendering the invisible in visible form. What a sweet confusion this was: that of the graces of the inapprehensible with the graces of the world! how interesting it is to study the shifting of the balances of these qualities in some historic personalities of the clerical profession!

It would be too obvious to call attention to Fra Angelico, who was a devout and stainless monk, and, at the same time, used for his models in painting the Holy Virgin, Florentine belles with supple figures and glittering golden hair. It would surely be overstressing the subject to refer to Rabelais, who was certainly a true believer and yet succumbed to his torrential delight in the obscene.

I thought of Fénelon, keeping his regal episcopate at Cambrai during the reign of Louis le Grand, administering a firm, practical authority—and of the same Fénelon striving to blend in the gorgeous rhetoric of his time, which he employed so beautifully, his Platonist Hellenism with his intense love of God: this mighty priest of France, who dared not acknowledge to himself that his attraction to Madame Guyon

contained within it an admixture of the quality of the attraction of his sovereign for La Pompadour. They are a lovable species, these magnificent French ecclesiastics, stemming as they do from the sweetest figure in all legend, the dainty young Abelard, who read St Augustine to the canon's beautiful niece on the steps of the cathedral.

More intimate yet to me are the exquisite race of the English clerical bards of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Donne and Herbert and Vaughan—and, most beloved of all, the golden-tongued Herrick, this gracious child of his time who, from the remote quarters of his rustic parsonage, has given to the world for ever those gossamer lyrics of youths and maidens and daffodils; not neglecting, at the same time, Noble Numbers for the spiritual edification of his audiences. It has always been a pleasant thought to me that it was a clergyman who wrote:

TO LIVE MERRILY AND TO TRUST TO GOOD VERSES.

Now is the time for mirth,
Nor cheek, or tongue be dumbe;
For with the flowrie earth,
The golden pomp is come.

This interfusion of the worldly and the divine, as manifested especially in a love of rural Nature, seems to be a peculiarly English characteristic. The sentiment found its apotheosis in Wordsworth.

And here I must be unfashionable and tilt a spear in defence of the most abused character of all time—the English tea-party curate. This person is The Demon incarnate to the young Socialist publicists of our day. I look at him with entirely different spectacles. Whether he believes in the Inheritance Tax or not, I do not care. I like him, this youth fresh from Cambridge, with his well-tailored blacks, his acquaintance with Ovid, his placid mode of life. Perhaps he doesn't really exist, but the conception itself is graceful. He is the legatee of a fine spiritual tradition, and I am sure my soul would derive more benefit from him than from any clerico-sociologist in all the Middle West.

I will mention a particular favourite of mine in English literature—an almost forgotten sonneteer of the Victorian era, who belonged to the race of curates: Edward Cracroft Lefroy. He was born in 1855 and, fated to ill health, died in 1891. I treasure (as have John Addington Symonds and a few other poetry-lovers throughout the English-speaking world) a copy of his *Airs from Theocritus*, published in

1858. I have always had my own, individual darlings in literature, and this curate-poet is one of them. By some unerring instinct, springing from the beautiful English tradition, he conceived a deep attachment to the most pagan of the pagan poets, Theocritus. It was Theocritus, you know, who sang, not of gods or heroes, nor yet of ideals, but of sweet familiar things: the threshers of wheat, the daisies in the field, and the Eternal Girl, "Bombica, the Honey Pale." And so, his themes being those commonplaces which are universal and primordial, he has retained his freshness and his fame for two thousand years. Lefroy seems to have found something sympathetic in Theocritus. He too, while a sincere communicant of the Church of England, took delight in the cricketers in the mead and the girls picking hepaticas for the May Day. He says, in one of his diaries: "Art, Nature, and Youth have yielded to me 'the harvest of a quiet eye.' It would be affectation to pretend that I am weary of existence, . . . but I have faith enough in my Lord to follow Him willingly where He has gone before." How perfectly this expresses the personality I have been trying to portray! Surely, he was not less a true priest than a true poet, who could write like this:

Then count me not, O yearning hearts, to blame
Because at Beauty's call mine eyes respond,
Nor soon convict me of ignoble aim,
Who in the schools of life am frankly fond,
For out of earth's delightful things we frame
Our only visions of the world beyond.

DAVID GORDON.

CLEVELAND, OHIO.

DR FELIX ADLER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.¹

J. A. HOBSON.

PROFESSOR FELIX ADLER of New York stands in a unique position as a moral teacher. Bred in the austerities and depths of the Hebrew faith, and falling in early youth under the spell of the Kantian ethics softened and sweetened by the teaching of Jesus, he has devoted the whole energy of a long life to discovering for himself and communicating to others the secret of a good life. For upwards of forty years he has been speaking Sunday after Sunday on the platform of his Society for Ethical Culture. On weekdays he has taught in the classes of Columbia University, and has taken leadership in various experiments for educational and social reform. Everywhere he has brought the steady and persistent pressure of the ethical ideal.

In this endeavour to state "a philosophy of life growing out of the experience of a lifetime" Dr Adler necessarily begins with a personal confession. I say necessarily, because the essence of his system is the uniqueness of personality as acquired by and expressed through concrete experience. The high worth attaching to his exposition comes from the richness of his experience. No chamber or class-room philosopher could do what is done here to test the principles of an ethical philosophy by application to so many spheres of human conduct. The family, the school, the vocation, the State, international relations, the varieties of voluntary organisation for political, economic, and spiritual reforms, present to-day in a new intensity problems of conduct for which every thinker must attempt to find some coherent solution, unless he is prepared to sink to the acceptance of a moral multiverse.

¹ *An Ethical Philosophy of Life.* By Felix Adler. (Appleton, New York and London.)

I lay stress on Dr Adler's personal qualifications, because it is no easy matter to get serious attention to-day for a work which claims to make a new statement of the theory of human relations, and to apply it as the basis of a radical reconstruction of society. Beginning by a reasoned rejection of the Christian system and of others, on the ground that they furnish no sufficient guidance to those who must live in the world we know, and affirm their ethical personality in dealing with it, Dr Adler builds up a system of his own of which the conception of "the ethical manifold" is the corner-stone. It is an able and sincere attempt to restate the relations of the One and the Many, so as to bring out in clear relief the passionate conviction of the supreme worth of the unique personality. The degree of its success will depend upon the extent to which readers will find what I may term a satisfactory substance in a system of related personalities, stripped of all their empirical trappings and viewed *sub specie æternitatis*. The ethical manifold is the ideal of the whole, each member of that manifold preserving his singularity, that singularity being essential to the singularity of every other member, so as to display the infinite variety of the pattern. Each member thus finds his reality and significance in the unique contribution his personality makes to this manifold whole. Here it is claimed that the demand for every person to be treated as an end, not as a means, is reconciled with the demand for a moral whole, in which each lives and moves and has his being. Thus we get the reformulation of a Golden Rule on a categorical imperative, dictated by the principle "that the unique difference of each shall be such as to render possible the correlated unique differences of all the rest," and the following three formulas of conduct emerge:—

- "A. Act as a member of the ethical manifold (the infinite spiritual universe).
- "B. Act so as to achieve uniqueness (complete individualisation—the most completely individualised act is the most ethical).
- "C. Act so as to elicit in another the distinctive, unique quality characteristic of him as a fellow-member of the infinite whole."

This doctrine claims to transcend Egoism and Altruism. The moral life of the whole is lived in and through the individual members. There is no common consciousness, no directly collective life, such as can be got by raising into ethics the biological concept of organism. But, since every-

one's achievement of his place in the "pattern" is dependent upon the similar achievement of his place by each of the others, a genuine moral harmony is attained. When we ask, "How far shall each person keep his mind on his own part, how far set himself consciously to help others?" we seem to pass from theory to policy or tactics. The best energising for the whole, and so for our part in it, is obtained by directing as much effort as we can to helping others to fulfil their parts, for our own particular end will otherwise obtrude its claim too prominently. "So act as to elicit the unique personality in others and thereby in thyself."

Dr Adler claims that this policy of mutual aid is removed, on the one hand, from any empirical utilitarianism by placing its ends outside this world. His pattern, like Plato's, is "laid up in Heaven." On the other hand, it escapes the charge of emptiness which is brought against the Kantian ends. His final formulation of the principle of conduct runs thus: "So act as to raise up in others the ideal of the relation of give and take, of universal interdependence in which they stand with an infinity of beings like themselves, members of the infinite universe, irreducible, like and unlike themselves in their respective uniqueness" (119).

Now the mutualism, the interdependence, of this doctrine is common ground to most modern operative systems of ethics. But while the others usually dwell upon what is common, or like, in the members of humanity, Dr Adler dwells upon the diverse or unlike. In fact, the ultimate and absolute worth of a person resides in this difference, his particular contribution. Of the significance of specialisation in this world's work we have general recognition. But to Dr Adler this is only serviceable as feeding the specialisation in the spiritual universe. In order to realise the important question thus posed, we must mention the constant stress laid by Dr Adler upon the instrumentalism of our activities in "the world." The finite nature of man is sometimes described as "a clog and screen"; the struggles of man in this world, not merely on the material plane, but in the intellectual and moral, are only significant as means or instruments for ripening spiritual differences or "worth."

What is this spiritual universe, this ideal pattern and the spiritual nature in individuals? Sometimes Dr Adler presses the contrast between "the world" and this "spiritual universe," so as almost to reach the familiar theological antinomy. All immediate ends in this life, health, wealth, education, friendship, etc., are instrumental. So are all human relations. "I

must have the courage and the truthfulness to look upon neighbour, friend, wife, husband, son, daughter, *sub specie æternitatis*; that is, as primarily spiritual beings, and estimate any physical, intellectual, or emotional help I can give them by the consideration whether it does or does not advance them towards the master end of their being" (229). Now the instrumentalism of all activities in "the world" enables Dr Adler to give some novelty of shape to "the problem of evil" in its triple aspect of sickness, sorrow, and sin, by stress upon the spiritual use of the feeling of "frustration" in every department of human activity which follows from the refractory material in which man works. This feeling of frustration is the quickening element in spiritual life. The artist, the statesman, the reformer, have an intense appreciation of the struggle which finds its highest significance in "the agonising consciousness of tangled relations with one's fellow-beings and the inexpressible longing to come into right relations with them" (351).

So strongly does Dr Adler press home this instrumentalism that the doctrine almost turns upon him with the question, "Have you any ultimate right to distinguish thus sharply means from end, the life of this world from your spiritual universe?" Can this or any other dualism be regarded in any other way than as a provisional hypothesis, in fact itself an instrument? Or, to come more closely to a concrete case, "If we exclude the 'physical, intellectual, or emotional' relations which we have with our friends from the essence of the relations we hold with them as members of 'the ethical manifold,' what substance or reality will remain in the latter relations? Will they be *persons* to us, or we to them, in any way that gives emotional interest or moral meaning?" Dr Adler claims they will. It is a question of the definiteness of the beings that constitute the spiritual universe, *i.e.* the spiritual value. Dr Adler faces this issue. How far will his answer satisfy? "I have frequently urged that the lack of a definite description of the spiritual value is the chief defect in ethics up to the present time. This defect I endeavour to supply. The spiritual nature is the unique nature conceived as interrelated with an infinity of natures unique as itself. The spiritual nature in another is the fair quality distinctive of the other raised to the Nth degree. We are to paint ideal portraits of our spiritual associates. We are to see them in the light of what is better in them as it would be if it were transfigured into the best" (231).

But if we are to exclude all those empirical traits in which

our earthly relations with them are mingled, what sort of reality attaches to the spiritual relations? Emerson perhaps posed most ambitiously for modern men this question of the intercourse of souls, stripped of all that was earthly or accidental, and assuredly failed, I will not say to make it acceptable, but to make it really conceivable. By removing all taints of the empirical from the nature of the ethical manifold, we seem to have for our leavings a spiritual absolute to which no intelligible or emotional significance attaches. This evidently is not what Dr Adler intends. For though he is careful to insist that this ethical whole is not a personal Deity (in either a centralised or a diffused sense of personality) the diverse spiritual ends which compose the manifold are personal ends, and its reality claims to be a complexus of uniquely differentiated personal units. By excluding from all participation in spiritual reality all those "instrumentalities by which we are to become aware" of it, we are landed in a sharp dualism, the logical difficulties of which appear to most minds insuperable. All that gives intellectual and emotional concreteness to our experience lies on one side of the fence, and, on the other, what? No doubt Dr Adler would reply, "All that constitutes ethical significance, the substance of true personality." But that leaves most of us in the perplexity of being totally unable, composed as we are of intimately interacting corporeal and spiritual elements, to envisage any world, or condition of being, from which the corporeal is entirely absent, but which claims for us an emotional interest. I choose the word "emotional" because it contains the gist of our difficulty. For it is in what we call "emotion" that the physical and spiritual urges, which are the "go" of life, are somehow inextricably merged. In short, to most persons a heaven of wholly non-corporeal ethical beings is as inconceivable and as uninteresting as the orthodox theological heaven turns out to be to those who seek to realise it as a "going concern." Even if it be a pattern, a pattern palls.

It may, however, well be true that in thus stressing Dr Adler's dualism, I am failing to do justice to his theory. I am the more disposed to think this may be so, because of the value and fertility I find in the application of his principles to the great practical problems of conduct in our times. The later chapters of his book, containing this application, are devoted to that revaluation of human institutions, the family, the vocation, the State, religion, international relations, which

is so urgent in our age of reconstruction. For, if we are undertaking to rebuild the entire social fabric, from home to human race, we must try to realise, first, what we are "after," and, secondly, by what "criterion" of "rightness" we may proceed. The bold and clear proposals set forth by Dr Adler for handling the central problems of the age, so as to use "the world" as a great field of experience for the creation of a spiritual universe, certainly go far towards the vindication of his general philosophy. Particularly interesting is the support given to the new reformation of industry and politics by stress upon the determinant value of special functions in their spiritual bearing. Here, for instance, is his summary of industrial reconstruction in the light of his principle of a spiritual manifold. "1. The idea of service to be pre-eminent, instead of the gain, the wage or salary to be apportioned as the means of sustaining the worker in the best possible performance of the service. 2. The work done by the workers to be the means of developing them mentally, æsthetically, and volitionally, the educational features therefore to be pre-eminent. 3. The industrial group to be transformed into a social sub-organism (in the ethical sense a sub-organ of the larger organism of the nation). By this is meant that the employers cease to be employers and become functionaries, while each worker in his place and in his degree likewise becomes a functionary." The central point of this "socialism," however, is not the abolition of private gain, or even the cultivation of a sense of social service, but the liberation and enlightenment of the will of the individual worker, so that he may best develop his unique personality.

This end or significance of industry is, of course, commonly recognised in those fine modes of production which we term Art. It is there acknowledged that this freedom of self-expression of the artist is his best contribution to the wider human end, "the ultimate purpose of human existence." But to apply the same criticism to the general body of useful occupations, to insist in redeeming them from the slavery which most of them have hitherto imposed upon their workers, and to convert them into positive instruments for raising human personality—there is the supreme economic issue. It cannot be done by making all or most industrial work directly interesting or pleasurable to the worker in its detailed actions. The liberation must rather come jointly in three ways: first, by a shortening of the work-day for routine labour; secondly, by such variation of routine labour as will extract what interest such variety can give; thirdly, by educating workers into

some recognition that, by taking their share in the dull or heavy work of the world, they are acting not only as servants but as masters and makers of human society. Regarded from this standpoint, the reformation of industry requires that each industrial worker shall take a sort of moral exercise in doing his share of this dull work. Such exercise is contributable to a morally healthy personality, just as physical exercise (often equally dull) contribute to physical well-being. But the participation of each worker in the self-government of his industry is quite essential to this moral redemption, giving as it does a positive content to his free agency. To personalise each individual is the chief aim of all reconstruction, and reformed industry is valued in terms of its contribution to this task. Sometimes his intense sense of this end leads Dr Adler to appear to ignore or disparage the supply of the common character from which this flowering of unique personality must grow. This issue is brought out by the new conception of a State founded upon vocational representation alone. This is advocated as the true basis of political organisation. Representation by geographical areas Dr Adler considers to be "the logical outcome of the individualistic conception of democracy." By that he means that "the State is supposed to take account only of the common interests, those in which all individuals are alike, such as security of life and property, those interests being ignored in respect to which the groups that constitute society, the farmers, the merchants, the industrial labourers, etc., differ." Now here, as is natural, Dr Adler's mind is dominated by the conception of a "political manifold" corresponding, and indeed contributing, to his "ethical manifold." And he has an exceedingly strong case for functional representation as an important factor in political self-government. But why should it displace, instead of supplementing, local representation? Is the State to take no cognisance of the interests that are common to all its members? If so, must not the basis of that community, *i.e.* locality or neighbourhood, be retained? A certain over-stress of the special as against the common, the many as against the one, appears in Dr Adler's neat account of social institutions, where he tells us, "The family prepares for the vocation, the vocation for the State or nation, the nation for the international society, and all the successive terms receive their ultimate definition for the infinite spiritual universe which includes them and broods over them and dwells in each." Now, though there is a literal truth in this statement, it is not true that the sole meaning and purpose of

the family is to prepare for the vocation, or of the vocation to prepare for the nation. The State, or organised nation, concerns itself with other matters than the vocational, and therefore demands other modes of representation. By making the State a manifold or a federation of vocations, there is not only the obvious danger of depreciating the interests of the consumer. Dr Adler, of course, recognises that there are important functions for the State quite outside the economic sphere. Then it follows that purely vocational representation will not yield a State suitable for their performance.

On the important topic of sovereignty Dr Adler takes the liberal view. The State recognises and enforces certain rights, but does not in any sense, except a legal one, create rights. Nor does the State purposely claim to define or to override the rights of the individual, the family, or the vocation. The ethical purpose within each area constitutes its rights, and gives an element of sovereignty that is indefeasible. The State in this respect stands on a level with other social institutions, its sovereignty being measured by its contribution to the spiritual end of citizenship. Dr Adler justly denounces the doctrine of arbitrary and absolute State sovereignty as a doubly dangerous stumbling-block. For while, upon the one hand, it oppresses individual freedom within the borders of the State, upon the other it obstructs the formation of an international society. In his powerful plea for a society of nations Dr Adler makes the finest application of his ethical principle. For he appeals, primarily, not to community of interests in matters of trade, health, science, or communications, not even to the cause of peace, but to the development of national character. As within the smaller social groupings the individual not only finds his proper place but realises his personality, so with nations. Living in splendid isolation their characters remain inchoate: only in society do they find those special tasks for humanity which discover and educate their special powers. As with individuals, so it is to the unique quality of a nation that he looks for his *Vinculum Societatis Humanæ*. This great society is composed of different nations, each representing a significant type of humanity, and therefore capable of rendering a separate contribution to the pattern of the whole. But the crucial task and test of such a society he finds in the performance of the duty of the forward towards the backward peoples. "No single nation is really competent to undertake the great task of awaking the stationary peoples of India and China, of educating the primitive peoples of Africa. A union of the civilised nations should be formed in

order that together they may jointly accomplish *the pedagogy of the less developed.*" Lip service to this ethical ideal is furnished in the mandatory policy of the Covenant of the League of Nations. But the hard crusts of national selfishness and State absolutism must be dissolved before the genuine co-operation for the realisation of the ideal is practicable. Dr Adler is surely right when he urges that for the performance of such common service for humanity "peace must come incidentally." This spiritual co-operation of nations, however, is not attainable by mere appeals to community of interests, or by any territorial settlements, or by political alliances. There must be the spiritual undergrowth of a common purpose realised in the willingness of each nation to make its unique contribution to the character of humanity. Internationalism is a larger pattern of the "ethical manifold." But though the stress throughout is upon human character and human relations, and there are passages which seem to identify the spiritual universe with humanity, this is not Dr Adler's final philosophy. For "even mankind itself is but a province of the ideal spiritual commonwealth that extends beyond it."

This short presentation, overstressing, as it must, the formal aspects of his teaching, does no justice to the intensity of Dr Adler's passion for righteousness, or to the richness of the spiritual gleanings from a wide experience of life that are scattered over these chapters. The Ethical Movement has produced no other book so worthily fulfilling the high claims it makes of devotion to "the good life."

J. A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

THE PILGRIMS' MOTIVE AND CONTRIBUTION.

CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING, D.D., LL.D., LIT.D.,

President, Western Reserve University.

INDISCRIMINATE eulogy is as irrational to the judgment as it is unpleasant to the trained emotion. The *Mayflower* Company is the victim, on its 300th anniversary year, of general commendations which are quite as true to the emotional eulogist as they are false to the discriminating historian. For in all the significances of the Pilgrim emigration—significances which one of their sons in the ninth generation would be the last to undervalue—there does appear at least one element which deserves special consideration and which is in peril of not receiving proper proportional emphasis.

This element is the fact that the little company of one hundred and two souls, with a single or partial exception, contained no man of liberal education. Searches made in the matriculation registers of Cambridge and of Oxford have failed to reveal a single name of a family or individual of the *Mayflower* Company, with the exception of that of Elder Brewster. Brewster matriculated at that most ancient college, Peterhouse, at Cambridge, in the year 1580; but he left without receiving a degree. For nine years following the landing he was the only man of university training in the Plymouth Colony. In 1629 Ralph Smith, a matriculant of Christ's College, Cambridge, in or about the year 1612, became the first settled minister and the second member of the Company of liberal education. It was not, be it added, until another period of eight years, in all seventeen years after the landing, that a third addition was made to the duet of so-called "educated" men.

This fact becomes the more important when it is remembered that to the one hundred and two members of the

Mayflower Company were added, in the course of the remaining years of the decade, thirty-five arriving in 1621, sixty arriving in 1623, thirty-five with their families arriving also in the *Mayflower* in 1629, and sixty who arrived in 1630, making a total of nearly three hundred.

Intellectual relationships and motives were in fact lacking in the Plymouth Colony. It was not until the first generation had passed away that public schools were formally established. It is also significant that among the graduates of Harvard College from 1642, when the first degrees were conferred, down to the year 1658, comprising no less than ninety-seven men, are found the names of only one native and two residents of Plymouth Colony.

This interpretation of the lack of liberally educated men and of educational motives among the citizens of the Plymouth Colony, an interpretation at once so simple and so significant, becomes yet more impressive when it is brought into comparative contrast with a corresponding interpretation of the presence of liberally educated men and the support of liberal education in the neighbouring colony of Massachusetts Bay. In the Bay Colony there were resident about ninety graduates of Cambridge and of Oxford,¹ the larger number coming from Cambridge, and for a reason which will be presently touched upon. Of the Cambridge colleges Emmanuel furnished the larger share, about a score being credited to this Puritan foundation. Among the Emmanuel names I find Thomas Hooker, John Cotton, Nathaniel Ward, Thomas Shepard, and John Harvard; Trinity, Cambridge, furnished the next larger number. In the list I find the names of Charles Chauncey, Hugh Peters, and John Winthrop—Winthrop, however, not taking a degree.

Oxford, at the same time, was credited with about a score of matriculants who finally came to New England. But the list fails to contain names so outstanding as the Cambridge registers offer. About a third of the names belong to Magdalen and to Magdalen Hall. Christ Church, New College, Queen's, Wadham, and All Souls are credited with one name each.

The reason of the contrast between seventy matriculants of Cambridge and only twenty of Oxford is not far to seek.

¹ For these facts I am indebted to a most weighty and informing tract, *The Influence of the English Universities in the Development of New England*, by Franklin B. Dexter, Professor in Yale University. Professor Dexter's paper was originally read, February 12, 1880, before the Massachusetts Historical Society.

Cambridge, and especially Emmanuel, was a Puritan seed-plot, and this plot received an ecclesiastical and even a clerical cultivation. Sir Walter Mildmay, who founded the College in 1584, said in his nineteenth statute he desired it to be known that the study of theology was to be made the chief subject in his College, in order to raise up preachers, and not administration of the sacraments. The Puritanism of Cambridge stands out in deepest contrast to the Tory tenets of Oxford. In the year 1603 the Vice-Chancellor, the Doctors and the Heads of houses of Oxford made answer to a "humble petition" of Puritan ministers of the Church of England desiring reformation of certain ceremonies and abuses of the Church. These ministers had made a petition to the King for ecclesiastical reforms. The answer of Oxford stigmatised the petitioners as "absurd Brownists," as having "a self-conceited confidence," and as holding "pestilent and blasphemous conclusions." Such an academic condition would not attract the sons of Puritan families.

The cause of the presence of learned men in the Bay Colony—and their number was as great in proportion to the whole population as could be found in any similar number of people in the world—and of the absence of such men at Plymouth is also not far to seek.

The most obvious of the reasons is found in the fact that the Pilgrim Company were of a lowly and humble origin. In his farewell letter John Robinson says that "you are not furnished with any persons of special eminency above the rest." Their employments at Leyden indicate their social condition. They were of the order of weavers, hat-makers, journeymen masons and carpenters. A few became known as "merchants." They were not of the classes which furnished matriculants to university registers. In fact, only three of the Pilgrim families can be traced to English homes. The Pilgrims belonged to the great body of the commonalty whence have come no small share of the brawn and the sinew of the English stock.

Be it also said, the Pilgrims were what is known as Separatists. Their presence at either university, even if they had desired to attend, would not have been allowed, and it is apparent that they did not desire to attend. Being Separatists from the Church of England, they were also Separatists from the English universities. Those, however, who came to Massachusetts Bay were not, on leaving England, Separatists. They came bearing university degrees; and among them were found the great men who ultimately led that colony to noblest achievements in a new civilisation.

The primary and the ultimate truth, moreover, seems to be that it was not education as certainly as it was not trade, that it was not government any more than it was "worldly prosperity," which formed the moving impulse in the Pilgrims' bosom. The fact is that RELIGION was that impulse and motive. The history of the Separatists in England in the closing years of the sixteenth and the first years of the seventeenth century makes plain the fact that the Christian faith as they interpreted it was to them more than life. For this faith they suffered manifold persecutions. They were deprived of their property; they were cast into prison; and for it six of them died. The martyrs were: Dennis, Copping, Thacker, Barrowe, Greenwood, and Penry. In allegiance to their faith they moved to Holland. The annals of the Church at Leyden also give proof of a similar and deepest religious conviction. They endured residence in Holland—though the citizens gave them ample opportunities in freedom of living and of work—"as seeing Him who is invisible." Their preparation for emigration to the New World offers similar evidence of the fundamental character of their religious constitution. They emigrated as a Church, or as a part of a Church, containing the "youngest and strongest members." Their farewell was a Church farewell; their good-byes were ecclesiastical benedictions. Robinson's farewell letter is filled with invocations and prayers for divine blessings to rest upon them. Of the four reasons which Bradford in his immortal *History* gives for the emigration, the last is by far the most important:—

"Lastly, (and which was not least,) a great hope & inward zeall they had of laying some good foundation, or at least to make some way thereunto, for ye propagating & advancing ye gospell of ye kingdom of Christ in those remote parts of ye world; yea, though they should be but even as stepping-stones unto others for ye performing of so great a work."¹

The life of the Pilgrims, once arrived in Plymouth, was also the religious life. Lacking certain of the specifically religious requirements laid down by the citizens of the Bay Colony, it was yet in atmosphere and influence, in belief and practice, in family and individual, in principle and application, in purpose, programme, and achievement, religious. Defining religion as primarily an interpretation of the relation which man holds to God, the Pilgrim believed that this relation was constant, intimate, all-pervasive, and all-important. The

¹ *History of Plymouth Plantation*, by William Bradford (the second Governor of the Colony), p. 24.

Pilgrim was not God-intoxicated, like Spinoza; he was rather God-fearing, like Jonathan Edwards. His was not the rationalist's system, which found a God at the end of a syllogism. His point of view was not intellectual. It was rather that of a servant of the Lord of Hosts, willing to be damned for the glory of his Creator, Preserver, and bountiful Benefactor. His possessions, though he gained them by a racial energy and held them by a racial prudence and sagacity, represented a trusteeship which he sought to fulfil well. His Master's name was on his forehead; and his Master's sake was his abiding motive. Prayer was to him not a vain petition, but an act of faith which could move mountains. He was, here and now, a citizen of God's kingdom.

Bradford's precious *History* is filled with incidents and allusions which prove and illustrate the primarily religious character of the little settlement. As its members were in trouble and in danger, seeking their way to the shelter of an unknown harbour, they found a gift of God in "a morning of comforte & refreshing (as usually he doth to his children)."¹ When sickness was afflicting others the Lord upheld them, so that "they were not at all infected either with sickness or lamnes."² When famine was upon them and "begane now to pinch them sore, they not knowing what to doe, the Lord, (who never fails his,) presents them with an occasion, beyond all expectation."³ It was declared, too, that "it has pleased God to stirre up ye harts of our adventurers"⁴ to give them sorely needed aid. Upon another occasion it was plain that "the eminent hand of God was with them, and his blessing upon them."⁵ The Pilgrim did not write of the immanence of God; but the indwelling of God in his spirit and the presence of God in his environment was to him vital, constant, comprehensive, fundamental, inspiring, and directive.

Religion may exist without the Bible, but the Christian religion which the Pilgrims possessed and which possessed them is a religion founded on the Bible. They received the book as their ecclesiastical creed and as a sailing-chart for the voyage of each day and of every year. Its Ten Commandments were to be obeyed implicitly and explicitly. Its Levitical laws were to be observed, and the penalties of the violation of these laws were to be, and were, applied. The application of these laws in capital punishment, a punishment which was recognised as befitting as many as eight crimes, was strictly observed.

¹ Bradford's *History of Plymouth Plantation*, p. 87.

² *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

The Christian religion is founded not only upon a belief in God and in the Bible as a revelation of His will and mind, but also on the derivation from the Bible of the observance of the Sabbath as a day of rest and of worship. The Sabbath *was* made a day of rest in the field and the home, and a day of worship in the "meeting-house." But far more important than the observance of the Sabbath as a part of the Biblical and Christian economy was the doctrine of the Church. The Church, according to the Pilgrim conception, was fundamental to the individual and to society. That doctrine taught that a church was a complete entity or unity in itself. It was a body segregated from constitutional or vital relationships with other bodies or churches. It had complete power unto, and in, and of, itself. It was not governed by bishops, it was not controlled by an oligarchy; it was a democracy, sufficient for its own existence, present and future. It was, in and of itself, an individual divine and human corporation. When coming to hold relationships to similar bodies, it would have been denominated, in modern phrase, a Congregational church in the United States, or an Independent one in England. But in the *Mayflower* time the Pilgrim Church was an individual religious unit. Such a unit incarnated and illustrated the religious belief and practice of the Pilgrim Company.

After two generations the Plymouth Colony ceased to exist as a civil and political unit and agency. Its fortunes became joined with the interests of the more prosperous Bay Colony, of richer soil, of deeper harbours, of greater numbers, and of nobler intellectual interests. But while it lasted as a distinct unit it stood for the power of religion. The Bay Colony also stood for the power and place of religion, of education too, and of other great civil and personal elements as well. Henceforth the two settlements, Pilgrim and Puritan, were to be united.

For two and a half centuries these two bodies have formed, and still continue to form, a river of influence which has served and has determined American life to a degree greater than any historical prophet or prophetic historian would have dared to predict. From the 21,000 persons who came to New England between 1620 and 1640, when emigration in large numbers ceased—because of the calling of the Long Parliament,—have sprung, directly or indirectly, not far from 4,000,000 persons. In the four millions, at least a strain of English blood may be found. From this number also have come forth the great personalities which have so largely dominated American life, made American achieve-

ment, inspired American thought, and formed national character. Of course there are outstanding exceptions. George Washington of Virginia is one whose immigrant ancestor came to Virginia. Abraham Lincoln of Kentucky is only an apparent exception, for his immigrant ancestor settled in Hingham of Massachusetts. But in general this number of 21,000 persons, or 4000 families, have given birth and being to the men and women who have served to keep and to transmit the Anglo-Saxon ideals of the commonwealth, of the family, of liberty supported by law, of law inspired by liberty, of pure morality, of the worth of the individual, of education, and of religion, as the regnant forces in American life and character.

As I close, I desire to call attention to one, and to only one, inference among the many which might be drawn from this survey. It is the inference that religion separated from education is in peril of becoming narrow, unhuman, dogmatic, severe in tone, reactionary in statement and act, uninteresting, self-destructive. It nurtures man as a citizen of one world only, and that not chiefly the present. It builds the church; it erects the altar; it reads the Holy Scriptures. It does not build the all-comprehensive and eternal city of God. Education without religion, it may be added, also becomes narrow, tends to become technical, over-intellectual, over-individualistic, unsympathetic, radical, lacking highest motives, materialistic. Education alone and unaided interprets man as a citizen of one world only, and that not of the world to which religion inspires and points him. The Pilgrims' motive, nobly religious and ecclesiastical in its origin and staying power, was obliged to unite itself, though unconsciously to itself, with the intellectual, educated, and educating forces of its neighbouring Colony. It thus not only saved itself, but also helped to save New England and the new world beyond the western seas in the successive generations.

CHARLES FRANKLIN THWING.

CLEVELAND, U.S.A.

THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN ROBINSON AND OF THE PILGRIM FATHERS.

PROFESSOR H. H. SCULLARD, M.A., D.D.

JUST now when England, Holland, and America are uniting to honour the memory of the Pilgrim Fathers, it is natural to ask again concerning the faith that was in them. How came they to be what they were? What were the things most surely believed among them, and, believing which, they were empowered so to act and suffer that three hundred years after they left these shores millions of their fellows should wish to recall their deeds? The best answer is to be found in the writings of their great teacher, John Robinson.

It is hard for some of us to appreciate the theology of the Pilgrims. We have travelled so far away from their standpoint, and the temper of the times in which we live is different. Some of us wonder how the passengers of the *Mayflower* succeeded in getting to the other side of the Atlantic with so much theological lumber on board. Yet, lumber or ballast, hindrance or help, they arrived at their desired haven, and became the founders of a new world. Shall we? Is our faith adequate to a venture equally heroic and to a work equally enduring?

I.

They believed in God. Do we? We may claim to have a larger faith, but is it as firm a faith as theirs? In the things of the spirit it is quality rather than size that counts. We have a pathetic confidence in numbers and rejoice in big demonstrations. But the Pilgrims had read their New Testaments, and arrived at another conception of the methods of the Divine operation. They believed in small churches and individual effort, in the weak things of the world, which God had chosen. It sometimes seems as if we believed in big organisations and

a fair show in the flesh. They were Separatists. We are Unionists. They bore witness to the world. We try to govern it. Is it the one and the same Spirit working in them and in us?

And as to the God we believe in—how different are our conceptions from theirs! There is quite enough in popular theological writing to make us doubt whether the God of the Pilgrims is our God. John Robinson's idea of God was that of the great Egoist of the Universe. One can imagine the horror and resentment of those who have been brought up on a diet of Spencerian altruism and mistaken it for the Gospel of Jesus Christ. "That is not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," they will exclaim, "but the teaching of Antichrist—selfishness, brute-force, Nietzscheism, diabolism, anything but a truly ethical conception of Deity." To worship a self-centred God is in their opinion to hand over the world to perdition, so far at least as man can do so. Nevertheless such was the God in whom these strong, patient, self-sacrificing Pilgrims believed. "God loveth himself first and most, as the chiefest Good." Were they right, or are we? or is it a matter of indifference what conception we form? Are we always something better or other than our creed? A gentle and pure-minded Indian, we are told, will often take a strange delight in the savage and repulsive images of Siva.

Unlike Luther and some other of the sixteenth-century reformers, Robinson was a lover of philosophy. To him the universe was a rational order, and "nothing true in right reason, and sound philosophy, is, or can be, false in divinity." There was little of the mystic about him, except in the sense that vital religion is always mystical, and still less of the fanatic. Every doctrine must justify itself in the court of Reason, or at least be accepted on rationally approved authority. And from this point of view is there not much to be said for his conception of God? If God be the first and ultimate reality, must He not be self-contained? "Of Him and through Him and unto Him are all things." God does not exist for any end outside Himself: He is Himself the Creator of ends. He does not exist primarily for the good of the creature: the creature exists for Him. The modern humanitarian notion that the goal of the universe is the well-being of man would have seemed to Robinson an impious inversion of the truth. God is Supreme in His own dominions or He is not God. A finite God is no God at all, but a pale projection of man's fancy, creating a God in the image of self, or, as Robinson might have put it, "making a

bridge of his own shadow only to fall into the water." The glory of God is infinitely more than the good of men. It is the cause and ground and substance of all good. How, then, can a rational God love men more than He loves Himself? The love of God for men is the love of His own work in them. God loves all good things, "as he communicates with them, less or more, the effects of his own goodness."

And why should we deny to God what we wish to secure for the lowliest of men, the privilege of self-realisation and self-expression? If God were not always realising Himself in the creature He would cease to be God and become as one of us. Unlimited self-realisation is the prerogative of Deity, a prerogative not laid aside at the Incarnation, but finding its supreme vindication in the Cross. But is not the essence of the Divine character self-sacrifice? I do not think Robinson would have said so. He would have scrutinised the word much more closely than we are in the habit of doing before applying it to a holy and omnipotent God. Sacrifice is a dangerous word to use of Deity without qualification or comment. There are meanings of the word which we have no right to accept in thinking about God. "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son." But love is more than sacrifice, and giving cannot impoverish God. The "sacrifice" of God might have meant not simply the condemnation of the world, which according to Christian theology it did, but the ruin of the world, which it was meant to avert. God loved Himself before He loved the world. Creation and redemption are alike the consequence of the Divine self-love. So the same Evangelist, who speaks of the love of God for the world, records the prayer of Jesus, which looks beyond all sacrifice and all redemption to a far-off Divine event, which is neither primarily the salvation of the world nor the perfecting of the Church, but the revelation of the glory of God—"That they may behold my glory which Thou hast given me, for Thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world." The glory of God and not the salvation of the race was the prime object of the Incarnation and the Cross.

So at least it seemed to Robinson. This was the determinative thought in all that he wrote—a God glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing whatsoever He pleased in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. There were no limits to His power. The wills of men He turned whithersoever He would, but always, whether in renewing or in hardening, without doing violence to human freedom. Even sin was no obstacle, but only an occasion for

the manifestation of the Divine glory. With relentless logic, shattering the distinction between "permitting" and "ordering" —for how can God "permit" what He is powerless to prevent? —he boldly asserts that "God orders both the sin and the sinner to His own supernatural ends." Limitations of knowledge or of power, whether proceeding from the Divine nature or from the Divine will, were derogatory to the glory of God. The Moral Governor of the Universe never for one moment, through lack of power or lack of knowledge, lost control of the vast system of discordant and conflicting wills of men. It was His all-seeing eye and all-embracing purpose which directed the whole course of human history. Nothing was done without Him. Even a limited atonement appeared to the Pilgrims more tolerable than the conception of a God powerless to achieve His ends. They believed in a strong God, and so were strong. They believed that God was free, and so became the advocates of human freedom.

II.

But the God who was strong enough to achieve His own ends was able also to reveal His will to men. This had been done once for all in the Bible, which was a convenient summary, but not a complete transcript, of all the oracles of God. Many of the words of men inspired by the Spirit of God had not been committed to writing. What the Canonical Scriptures contained was all that was necessary for "salvation" and "obedience." And these oracles are living oracles, and so, though none may add to them, they have the power of revealing more of the will of God, as men may be prepared to receive it. There is no more frequently quoted sentence in Robinson's works than the words of his parting address to the Pilgrims on leaving Holland, "The Lord has more truth and light yet to break forth out of His holy Word." The Lutherans and the Calvinists had alike forgotten this, and so come to "a period" in religion. Everything was being stereotyped. In England the laxer Church party was turning the Gospel into "an easier law," and the Puritan party into a harder law, both forgetting that the Gospel is not a law of commandments contained in ordinances, but a law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus. Against this perversion of the truth Robinson protested. There were no final and infallible interpreters of the Word of God. Let every man remember that "the Word of God neither came from him nor to him alone." Least of all were his own interpretations a law to the Church he served.

He urged the Pilgrims "to follow him no further than he followed Christ, and if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of His to be as ready to receive it as ever we were to receive any truth by his ministry."

As compared with some of the utterances of his Puritan contemporaries and successors this is the language of liberalism and of liberty. Moreover, Robinson was prepared to allow that all parts of the Bible itself were not of equal value. No word of Scripture should be neglected, but there were "main truths," and "the Gospel is the more principal part of the Word." Yet Robinson has not the boldness of some of the earlier Reformers—Luther, for example, and Tyndale—in his treatment of Scripture. The hand of Cartwright was heavy upon the men of his generation. He never worked out his idea of progressive revelation or distinguished sufficiently between the Eternal Spirit and the changing forms. The New Testament was too much of a copy-book even to Robinson. But then it is given to very few, if any, of the enunciators of great principles to apply them consistently and completely in every particular. How far some of us still are, in spite of all that our New Testament scholars have done for us, from realising the progressive character of New Testament revelation, and from laying hold of the Gospel beyond the gospels. We are not as advanced as Tyndale was, and the battle of the Reformation is still being fought on the field of New Testament scholarship.

But if Robinson had not the spiritual genius of Tyndale, he had great openness of mind, wide knowledge of Scripture, and much common sense in applying it. He had discovered in it the true note of inspiration, which is certitude—"The truth of God goes not by peradventures, neither needs it any such paper-shot as likelihoods are to assault the adversary withal." Probability was not for him the very guide of life. The will of God could be known, "To the law and to the testimony: if they do not speak according to this word surely there is no morning for them." But the morning had come for the Pilgrims, and theirs was the confidence of those who were walking in the light of the Lord.

III.

It was also a great advantage to these pioneers in religion that they knew what they meant by the Church. In the Church of England, from which they sorrowfully withdrew, they found conflicting views as to what constituted the visible

Church, and none of these seemed to them to agree with Scripture. It has always been the misfortune of the Church of England that it has had no consistent teaching regarding the visible Church, and the lack of it is one of the barriers to the reunion so many desire. Is it not possible for Christian people, who to-day, by a curious coincidence, are honouring one of the greatest of the Separatists, and thanking the Archbishops and Bishops of the Church of England for their attempts to reunite the Churches, to tell us plainly what the visible Church really is? The Bishops have certainly not made it easier for us to get at the real doctrine of the Church of England by distinguishing the "universal" from the "Catholic" Church and assuring us that the latter does not yet exist.

The idea of the visible Church, which the Pilgrims had, may seem to some narrow, unpractical, and insufficient for the needs of our time, but it meant much to them and may not be without instruction for us. "Many men have written much about the notes and marks of the true Church, by which it is differenced and discerned from all other assemblies: and many others have sought for it, as Joseph and Mary did for Christ, with heavy hearts, Luke ii. 48, that they might there rest under the shadow of the wings of the Almighty, enjoying the promises of his presence and power." . . . "I had thought the Churches and people of God should have been known by His dwelling among them, and walking there, and by Christ's presence in the midst of them." If that sign of the visible Church is present, what other sign is necessary? If it is absent, what other will suffice? The visible Church becomes recognised by all just in the same way as an individual Christian. Labels are no more necessary in the one case than in the other.

The unity of the Church according to Robinson, perhaps with the High-priestly prayer of Christ in mind, was qualitative and not quantitative. The visible Church was "one" because it was one in "kind" and one in "nature," not because it had one visible head or one common external organisation. "All true Churches from the beginning to the end of the world are one in nature and essential constitution"; and that which constitutes a Church is the meeting of Christian men in the name of Christ, the actual fellowship of those who have made a public covenant with Christ to do all things to the glory of God. The people are the Church, because they have become, in this sense of definite practical fellowship with one another and with Christ, the people of God. Officers do not make the

Church, for the Church existed before it had any officers. Sacraments do not make the Church, for the Church must have been in existence before it could receive any sacraments. Even the Apostles, extraordinary ministers of Christ, as Robinson regards them, were God's gift to the Church and not the creators of it. There were Churches which were not apostolic foundations, and Churches before there were any elders to govern them. None of these things can be of the essence of the Church. They are added to it, but they are not constitutive of it.

It is the Divine fellowship of Christian persons that constitutes the Church, and "we are fully persuaded that the Church constitution in which we are set, is cast in the apostolical mould, and not one day nor hour younger, in the nature and form of it than the first Church of the New Testament."

From this point of view it seemed to Robinson that the Church of England was not the visible Church. It was not constituted as the visible Church of the New Testament was constituted. And so, though there were real Christians within its borders, there were no Churchmen. Members of the invisible Church there were, but members of the visible Church there were none, because they were not united in any "true Church-state." There was no "Church" of England. The visible Church of England was a national Church and received all comers. It not only received them, but compelled them to come, and penalised them for not coming. It was not a society of spiritual persons, but "clapped and clouted together of all persons, of all sorts." Though Robinson says nothing quite so bad of the English Church as Hooker's terrible indictment—"full of liars, dissemblers, whoremongers, and drunkards," he knew that it was not composed of spiritual persons, but contained many to whom it would have been sacrilege to offer the Communion of the Body of Christ. "Let a man but hire a house within the precincts of your parish, and he is a joined member in your Church, *ipso facto*, though he cannot manifest the least kernel of faith, or repentance, yea, though he profess himself an atheist, heretic, sorcerer, blasphemer, or that which is worse, if worse can be." Such an assembly, however it might be organised or officered, had not the constitution of the visible Church of Christ. It was not "a spiritual politic body" partaking of an apostolical constitution, such, for example, as that of the Church of Corinth, "unto which do appertain the oracles of God, sacraments, censures, government, and ministry ecclesiastical," . . .

and he continues, "I cannot but confess and profess, though with great grief, that it is to us a matter of scruple, which we cannot overcome, to give that honour unto it which is due from the servants of Christ to the Church of Christ, rightly collected and constituted."

The apostolical constitution of the Church was the essential thing for Robinson, but he also judged as very important the apostolical organisation or government. "It is to me a matter of great scruple, and conscience to depart one hair's-breadth (extraordinary accidents ever excepted) from their (the Apostles') practice and institution, in anything truly ecclesiastical, though never so small in itself. . . ."

He may have been too scrupulous in this matter. There is no proof that the practice and institutions of the Church were everywhere and ever the same, even in the apostolic age. Still less is it evident that Jesus and His Apostles wished them to remain the same for all time. But the apostolic models are guides to us, and anyone who makes essential to the idea of the Church anything which is not clearly apostolic unchurches the Christians of the first age, and does it at his own risks. He is the enemy most to be feared. Both in letter and in spirit the Churches of Rome and England seemed to Robinson to have been faithless to the apostolic ideals. The "Spiritual lordship of the prelacy was a mark of Babylon and of Antichrist," violating not simply the letter but the spirit of the New Testament. The bishop is "a lord over them, and not a minister and servant unto them, and so bears more sway over the profane multitude, whereof those Churches most . . . what consist, by lording it with his imperious canons, and purse-penalties, than many true bishops could do, by their faithful ministry, and service, according to Christ's testament." In apostolic times "the Holy Ghost had appointed sundry overseers or bishops over one flock to feed it. . . . It is, then, the unholy ghost of Antichrist which hath devised one bishop over many flocks, which he cannot possibly feed, if he would." The history of the Pilgrim Fathers shows us what may be accomplished by the abandonment of the Imperialistic ideal of the Christian ministry, and the rediscovery of the visible Church.

IV.

Among other points of present-day interest in the teaching of John Robinson are his views on representative government, marriage, and divorce. With regard to representative govern-

ment, however necessary or expedient it may be in the State, it is out of place in the Church. No Christian who realises the meaning of his act will vote by proxy. The decisions of a Christian, exercising the most sacred privileges of his calling, are his own decisions, and must be taken in full knowledge of the actual situation when the voting takes place. The bishop or elder or delegate who is representing him may know, but the person represented does not know. No man can make a Christian decision in the stead of another. This cuts at the root of consistorial government whether by elders or bishops. Such action is "consonant unto the papists' implicit faith." It is not necessary in the visible Church, as understood by Robinson.

Marriage is an ordinance of God and to be highly esteemed. "The love of the husband to his wife must be like Christ's to his Church." Yet marriage is not a Church ordinance, and no Christian minister should be required to solemnise marriage in the Church. It belongs to the ordinances of nature and of civil society. There is not necessarily anything specifically Christian in it. And there is no direction in the New Testament to show that the marriage of even Christian persons should be added to the duties of any Church officer.

In regard to divorce Robinson held that according to the teaching of Jesus it was permissible only in the case of adultery. In any other circumstances it was not approved by Jesus as a sinless act "in the court of heaven." But Robinson does not say definitely that the judgment of the highest tribunal must be transferred to the civil courts, and so no Christian magistrate be allowed to grant divorce on other grounds. It was not so in the Jewish courts. Still the law, he thought, ought to be stricter in Christian courts than in Jewish, because Christian hearts were less "hard" than Jewish, and so the necessity for relaxation was not so pressing.

Such were some of the opinions and beliefs of a very remarkable man, the pastor and guide of a little company of men and women who have done more than can be told in making possible the freedom of men and the comity of nations.

H. H. SCULLARD.

LONDON.

A PLEA FOR AN EXTENDED LECTIONARY.

THE REV. J. M. CONNELL.

I THINK it will be agreed that the main purpose of a religious service is to stimulate and express the spirit of worship, and that each feature of the service—the hymns, the lessons, the prayers, the sermon—should have this end in view. My object in this article is to consider how the choice of lessons may be made to contribute as fully as possible to the furtherance of the general purpose.

It is in accordance with this purpose that the lessons from the Bible are selected. Except among the most extreme bibliolaters, it has never been the custom to regard every chapter of the Bible as fit for public reading; and even in the most orthodox Churches nowadays many chapters, and indeed whole books, are omitted from the lectionary, simply because they are felt to be out of harmony with the spirit of worship and with the religious views of the worshippers. In the endeavour to worship in spirit and in truth, and to avoid everything discordant in thought and feeling, the choice of lessons from the Bible tends to become more and more restricted in many of the Churches. Thus it may be said that a Bible has been formed within the Bible, and it is from this Bible-within-the-Bible (in some cases a very attenuated one) that the lessons are taken. It is important to recognise clearly that the Churches generally use a very reduced or restricted lectionary as compared with the one they used even twenty or thirty years ago. This reduction of the Biblical lectionary has been tacitly accepted by the congregations, except for an occasional grumble on the part of some member about hearing the same old lessons over and over again. In the Church of England, where the lessons for each day are fixed by authority, this reduction has not taken place; and what I have to say on

the point applies only to the Free Churches whose ministers have the matter in their own hands. It may be that some of these ministers are over-fastidious, and that their choice of Biblical lessons is much more limited than it need be, and that they should begin to extend their lectionary within the Bible itself before going further afield. It is certainly desirable to make renewed and careful search for suitable lessons in the Bible; for in confining the choice to the well-known and well-loved chapters, as is apt to be done, we miss a great deal in the Bible that is of the highest value. Scattered throughout its neglected portions are passages too short perhaps to be read apart as lessons, but too precious to be lost. Some of them might easily be combined so as to form distinct readings, and thus the Churches would be made and kept familiar with them.

In attempting, then, to advocate the use of lessons from outside the Bible, I must not be understood as seeking in any way to discourage the use of those from inside it. That is as far as possible from my wish. If it were a question either of having the lessons from the Bible or of having them from other writings, I should, without hesitation, choose the Bible. I yield to no one in my reverence for it, and in grateful appreciation of all it has done, and is still capable of doing, for the spiritual life of mankind. As I have said elsewhere, "The Bible, both for its own supreme merits, and for the consecration which the piety of the ages has given to it, must remain the book of books for all Christians. It contains the foundation-documents of our faith, the title-deeds, as it were, of that Kingdom of God of which we are heirs with Christ and fellow-citizens with the saints; and to its inspiration is due, in a larger measure than it is possible to realise, whatever is greatest and best in the history and literature of Christendom."¹

As regards the limitations of our lectionary, and the means of extending it, we find ourselves, I think, in very much the same position as the early Christians. For a time their only Bible was the Old Testament; and when the Epistles of St Paul and the Gospels and the other writings which now form the New Testament began to be read in the Churches in an informal way, it was probably never imagined that they would by and by take rank with the Old Testament as authoritative Scripture. But, apart from the supreme interest and value of these Christian writings, it was found that Christianity, with its new and higher thought of divine things, had made a

¹ *A Book of Devotional Readings from the Literature of Christendom*, p. v.

difference in men's use of the Old Testament. That Testament could not be used throughout in the same free way in the Christian Church as in the Jewish Synagogue. Large portions of it had become a dead letter, superseded by the teaching of Christ, out of harmony with the spirit of the new age, or only rendered acceptable to that spirit by a process of allegorical interpretation which was forced and fanciful. So, but for the introduction of the new writings, the Church would have found itself with a very restricted lectionary as compared with that of the Synagogue. The books of the New Testament, however, gradually filled the place of those parts of the Old which had fallen into disuse, and they were, of course, of vastly richer content, more truly inspired of God and profitable for instruction in righteousness.

As I have said, we are in much the same position as the early Christians in this matter. The new spirit, the new science and criticism, the new Christianity of our time, have made a difference in our use of the Bible. We find ourselves with a greatly restricted lectionary as compared with what our fathers had, both as regards the Old Testament and the New. Ministers do not find it easy to read out, with assurance and a good conscience, stories of miracles that never happened, doctrine based on an exploded psychology and theology, reasonings unlikely to convince, and that they do not want to convince; though, of course, it is necessary sometimes to read such things for the sake of the truer and better things that go along with them, and to leave it to the intelligence of the hearers to make the necessary qualifications and deductions.

With the utmost desire to make the fullest possible use of the Bible, we are faced by the fact that there are large portions of it that cannot be used to edification, to the building up of the body of Christ in these latter days. What, then, are we to do? Are we to rest content with our limited range of selection from the Bible, or are we—following the example of the early Church—to take the liberty of reading lessons also from other sources? To my mind there is but one answer to the question. Since the last of the Apostles fell asleep, and the canon of the New Testament was closed, there has been accumulating a vast treasury of Christian devotional literature, and surely it is reasonable to suppose that from such a treasury we should be able to bring forth lessons that will not be unworthy to take the place of the discarded portions of the Bible. If anyone says that even the poorest lesson from the Bible is better than the finest that could be read from post-Biblical Christian writings, then I am afraid that

either he does not know these writings, or that there is still in him something of the bibliolater; and bibliolatriy is not appreciation of the Bible, but superstition in regard to it, or, at best, appreciation *plus* superstition. Many of these writings have long been canonised in the Christian heart; they have proved their inspiration by their power to inspire, their power to promote the life of God in the souls of men. I am not arguing that they are worthy to compare with the best passages of the Bible—that I would not argue; I am only concerned to assert that they are more than worthy to take the place of those parts of the Bible which, for one reason or another, we do not now feel justified in using.

But besides taking the place of the discarded portions of the Bible, the reading of lessons from post-Biblical writings is otherwise, as it appears to me, of great advantage and value. It would symbolise, in an unmistakable manner, the change that has been brought about in the doctrine of inspiration; it would show that we have really got beyond the notion that divine inspiration and revelation ceased when the last of the New Testament books was written. In theory many of us have long been free from this idea; but in practice, so far as the ritual of our Churches is concerned, we lag behind the Church of Rome, which early found a place in its lectionary for the Acts of the Martyrs, the writings of the Fathers, and the Lives of the Saints. From force of habit we follow the custom of reading the lessons from the Bible alone, a custom which arose at the time of the Reformation, when the Bible was held to be the only book that contained the word of God. It is only occasionally in their sermons that ministers can speak of the continuity of inspiration since New Testament times; but if one lesson were read from outside the Bible at each service it would be a constant and impressive witness to the truth. Our enlarged conception of inspiration makes, as it seems to me, an enlargement of our lectionary both reasonable and inevitable. We need not be afraid that by the introduction of lessons from other sources, the Biblical ones would suffer any depreciation. The Bible would remain the chief lesson book. It is the main source of that mighty stream of inspiration which has flowed throughout the Christian centuries. But we shall be guilty of no disparagement of the source if we follow the wanderings of the stream, a veritable river of life, and drink of its waters,

And not only would the lesson selected from the writings of such men as Justin Martyr, St Augustine, St Anselm, St Francis of Assisi, Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, Luther, and

Bunyan, be an impressive witness to the continuity of divine inspiration since the time of the Apostles, but—what is of even more importance—it would be a most valuable means of deepening and strengthening the life of the Churches. Can we, indeed, overestimate the effect which this witness of the ages to the reality of divine things might have upon them? The Christians of St Paul's time were confirmed in the faith by being reminded that they were built on the foundation of Apostles and prophets; and might not the Churches of our day be confirmed in the same faith by being reminded by the lessons in their Sunday services that they are built also on the foundation of martyrs and saints, and mystics and reformers, and puritans and devout philosophers and poets—Jesus Christ being still the chief corner-stone?

The aim should be to make the public worship as varied in its appeal as possible. "A verse may find him who a sermon flies," said George Herbert; and so a reading from such writings as I have named may stir the divine life in some whom the Bible lesson and the hymns and sermon fail to touch. Since the introduction of hymns into the services of the Churches about the beginning of the eighteenth century, as supplementary to the metrical psalms, no step has been taken which seems so likely to enrich and vitalise public worship as the reading of lessons from writings that are outside the Bible but are, at the same time, one in spirit with it.

It is of interest to remember that Isaac Watts and those who along with him were responsible for the introduction of hymns were moved to take this step by the fact that many of the Psalms, which their predecessors in the seventeenth century had sung without any scruple of conscience, were felt to be out of harmony with the spirit of Christian worship and with the teaching of the Gospel.¹ Thus the hymns were intended to take the place of such of the Psalms as had become obsolete and could not be sung without offence to the reason and conscience of the worshippers. Their introduction met with much stubborn resistance. They were denounced as mere "human composures," by way of contrast with the "divine songs of David"; and hardly any names were thought too bad to hurl at Watts for his daring innovation. But there must be few people now who would not admit that the innovation had been completely justified. For many, indeed, in these days, the hymns are the most precious part of the service. Some people, no doubt, would speak of all non-Biblical writings as mere "human composures," or, at any

¹ See Watts' prefaces to his *Psalms and Hymns*.

rate, they would use the twentieth-century equivalent of that phrase, and would resent the use of any of them as lessons in public worship. But those who recognise that other writings besides the Biblical ones are inspired of God ought, I think, to recognise also that such writings are profitable for instruction, and should therefore have a place in the lectionary of the Church. This, however, is what some are still disinclined to do. They tell us that these non-Biblical writings—St Augustine's *Confessions*, Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation of Christ*, Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*, and the rest—are excellent for private reading, but are not suitable to be read in church, except as quotations with which to adorn a sermon—in much the same way as people used to tell Isaac Watts that hymns were good enough for singing in the home, but were unequal to the dignity of public worship. Such a view is, I believe, as absolutely mistaken in the one case as it was in the other. But whereas, in the case of hymns, people generally would have sung them in their family gatherings whether they had been allowed to sing them in church or not, we have to recognise in the case of devotional books, even the best of them, that they are read by few, and that unless they are read in public large numbers of people will never get to know them at all. In the Church services there is the opportunity of making this inheritance of noble and beautiful thought and feeling a more common possession; and shall we, in deference to a custom that has lost its justification, let the opportunity go unused Sunday after Sunday? Ought these writings to be regarded as a mere private possession, reserved for those who have the leisure and the inclination to read them and to search out the precious things they contain? They are of the same spiritual estate as the Bible, and continuous with it, bright like it in the sunshine of the divine love, watered like it by the streams that make glad the city of God; differing from it, as the Old Testament differs from the New, in having flowers of holy thought, wells of devout feeling, and gems of divine truth that are all their own. Why, then, should they not, like the Bible, be made public, so that the wayfaring men among us may rest and be refreshed in their quiet valleys, or climb to their sublime heights and enjoy the visions of God that are to be had therefrom?

It has been argued that the use of non-Biblical lessons would widen the breach that separates the liberal Churches from the more orthodox. But if the use of such lessons is demanded by our own spiritual needs, and brings our services more into harmony with the larger and truer views of inspira-

tion and revelation, it is surely our duty to take the forward step, and leave the other Churches to follow when they will and can. No Church can afford to impoverish its own religious life in order to please others, and it is not for their good or for the good of the world that it should do so. The freedom of the Free Churches is a great privilege, but it is also a great responsibility; it has been given them in order to take such steps as this whenever they are convinced of the desirability of them, and if they fail to do so they fail to discharge their special mission. But, speaking from considerable experience, I venture to say that I have not found that the reading of the non-Biblical lesson tends to separate one Church from another; and I am certain that the reading of such a lesson often helps those who hear it to think more kindly of other denominations. A lesson from Thomas à Kempis, or St Francis de Sales, or Fénelon draws them into closer sympathy with all that is best in the Church of Rome; a lesson from Richard Hooker or William Law warms them towards the Church of England; one from Calvin draws their affection towards the Calvinists; one from Bunyan makes them more friendly towards the Baptists; one from George Fox or Robert Barclay or John Woolman makes them realise and love the spirit of Quakerism; one from Wesley brings them closer to his followers; and surely, in thus cultivating those friendly feelings in themselves towards other religious bodies, they are doing much to establish the only kind of union that really matters, the spiritual union that transcends all dogmatic and ecclesiastical divisions and constitutes the One Holy Catholic Church of Christ.

It will be observed that I have pleaded only for the inclusion of Christian devotional writings in our lectionary, and have said nothing of the literature of other faiths. Is not this literature also, in its way and measure, inspired of God? I should be the last to deny that it is; and I would admit that there are occasions when non-Christian writings may be used as lessons; as, for instance, when the sermon is dealing with one of these faiths a lesson from its sacred scriptures would be quite appropriate. But such non-Christian lessons should, I think, be exceptional. We and our Churches are Christian; we have been nurtured in the Christian tradition; and Christianity is the mother-tongue of our souls and of our religious services. It is the Christian voices, therefore, that we want as a rule to hear Sunday by Sunday, not those of aliens. It is just here, as it seems to me, that some believers in an extended lectionary have made a mistake. On the

principle that the scriptures of other faiths are inspired of God, they have read a lesson, say, from *The Sacred Books of the East*, and they have been surprised that it left the people cold and gave little satisfaction to themselves. But surely it is to be recognised that the forms of thought and expression which inspiration assumes differ greatly according to the different mental and spiritual characteristics of the peoples addressed. What may appeal very deeply to a Hindu or a Chinaman may not stir any devotional feeling in an Englishman. There are many voices in the world, and none of them is without significance for some people; but it is the Christian voices that are most significant for us. This difference of appeal is, I think, a plain fact of psychology, and we have to reckon with it in our choice of lessons.

As I have already said, the chief place in our lectionary should still be reserved for the Bible. By reading the first lesson partly from the Old Testament and partly from the New, the scruples of some worshippers may be satisfied. I am all for lengthening the lessons at the expense of the sermon, which in many Churches is much too long. The main purpose of the service is, I repeat, to stimulate and express the spirit of worship, and the lessons have at least as important a function in this respect as the sermon.

In the selection of lessons from post-Biblical writings, the utmost care should be taken. We do well to be jealous for the dignity of public worship, and the lesson must accord with that dignity, like everything else in the service. As a rule it will be wise to read from books that have an established authority in the minds of men, books that have long proved their value in private devotion, and been canonised in the heart of Christendom. The best example of such books is, perhaps, *The Imitation of Christ*, which, as George Eliot said, has "turned bitter waters into sweet . . . and remains to all time a lasting record of human needs and human consolations." The use of such books will help to disarm prejudice and to commend the practice of post-Biblical reading to every man's conscience in the sight of God. Once it becomes customary, we shall realise how greatly it adds to the interest and helpfulness and enrichment of the service.

J. M. CONNELL.

LEWES.

SCIENCE AND LIFE.

F. C. S. SCHILLER, D.Sc.

LIFE has always been unmanageable. From the moment it was created it turned out otherwise than it should. It was intended to be good, but, alas, it usually prefers to go to the bad. "But that is on account of its endowment with Free Will!" cried the more ingenuous theologians. The grimmer sort, with a juster appreciation of its innate perversity, predestined it wholesale to eternal damnation. Both, however, were such devotees of the dead letter of tradition that they could not master the alphabet of spiritual progress. Hence they could not solve the mystery of Life, which is a perennial spring of novelties. It eluded all their dogmas, or rather, subtly transformed them into satisfactions of its cravings—which is why all the heavens become visions of fulfilled desire, and all the Creeds remain invulnerable to the shafts of reason; also why all religions are so different in practice from what they seem to be in theory. Practically not one of them is able to control Life. It persists in going on much the same all the world over, and exploits them all. All the religions are about equally efficient, and pretty well agreed about what is wrong with Life; but they have *not* succeeded in controlling it.

Next the philosophers took on Life. They "reflected" on it, and, Narcissus-like, too often fell in love with their pale reflections. They "analysed" it, in a harmless, futile way that did not cut it up or hurt it. They "speculated" about it, with minds that mirrored just the one wretched, infinitesimal, individual "aspect" of it that appealed to them personally, which they took to be "universal." They confined it in "categories," and tried to coerce it with chains of "logical necessity." But no logical necessity could secure it, and it passed as easily through a category as through a colloid membrane. So the philosophers retired hurt, betook themselves to the pure contemplation of the infinite inane, and, as

supine spectators of the suprasensible, gloated over the bloodless battles of their categories and the dialectical evolutions of principles too "sacred" to be applicable to the sordid particulars of life and action. Life has clearly been too much both for Religion and Philosophy!

But in the fairy tales it is always the youngest brother that carries off the prize or princess. Now Science is going to have a try. It feels that it is the hero of the hour, and that life must be rendered fit for heroes. It has publicly been recognised to be of national importance, and the man in every street is quite convinced that no limit can be set to the future developments of poison gas and high explosives. *Ergo* Chemistry may cherish a well-founded hope to be a match for Life. Also the British business man has discovered that there is money in chemistry, especially if you can get the Government to provide you with capital upon inadequate security.

Wherefore Professor Soddy, the brilliant and revolutionary researcher whom Oxford has recently recovered from Aberdeen, has become the champion of Science. He has written a brilliant and revolutionary book, called it *Science and Life*, and gone on the warpath, resplendent in the finest British dyes, professedly indeed to tomahawk the humanities and to endow research with all the laboratory equipment it can use, but really to show us how to take Life scientifically. He is not indeed the first brave who has set out from a chemical laboratory on this adventure; in Ostwald's *Naturphilosophie* he had a doughty predecessor. Nor perhaps does his fascinating book contain anything—not even the suggestion (p. 74) that man may be "essentially insane"—quite so delicious as the definition by which Ostwald rendered all philosophic questions *pseudo-problems*. But undoubtedly he does mighty execution upon the enemies of Science, from the Carnegie Trustees to the merest Mods. don. I am filled with admiration of his book—it has set me thinking, furiously, and moved me to raise some questions.

For to think is to doubt, and, if I ask myself whether Professor Soddy has proved his case and made good the claim of his Science to control Life, I have my doubts. Life is so intractable, so unamenable to scientific method. Even if we sternly disallow its claim to freedom as an impudent defiance of the demand of Science for a calculable order of events, does it not exhibit other habits which are hardly less objectionable? Do not the facts remain that it grows and transforms itself by what Science can only describe as "accidental variations," and that it generates, at every instant of its career, a spice of

novelty, which is never wholly reducible to anything old? With all its loyalty to the "cause of Science," psychology can only slur this awkward habit over, not deny it. Moreover, has not Life most reprehensibly set itself to run counter to the downward trend of cosmic energy, and, thanks to the invention of chlorophyll, to some extent succeeded? Was it not Life that stored up the coal and oil we are now wasting so hideously and with such prodigious prodigality? Even as a chemist the simplest plant is still the superior of Professor Soddy. It can make chlorophyll, and he can't.

Still, I will not question that in the end the laboratory will learn to manufacture all that the living body does, the more so that there are other doubts to raise about Professor Soddy's arguments. To be candid, they seem to me to be pervaded by a number of implicit contradictions. Not that I grudge him, or any progressive thinker, the right to express his thought in contradictory terms. Not being a formal logician, I do not at once denounce a verbal "contradiction" as a conclusive proof of error; I recognise that the meaning of no term in scientific use can really be fixed, because it must continually be expanding, to take in our growing knowledge. Professor Soddy's challenge to the Chemical Society¹ to offer £1,000,000 (which it has not got) for an up-to-date definition of the "element" and the "atom" that shall be intelligible to a first-year student of chemistry, can quite well be met by glorying in the rapid evolution of these notions. But *such* "contradictions" are scientifically justified, and are not what troubles me. The contradictions that seem sometimes to vitiate Professor Soddy's reasoning arise from a different source. They are not verbal strains generated in old terms by their extension to new situations, but survivals (largely emotional) of old ways of feeling, after their intellectual grounds have been removed by the advance of knowledge. And the objection to them is that they lead to relapses into obsolete ways of thinking and render nugatory the effect of the new truths.

As our first illustration of such a contradiction we may consider what should be the effect of the new theory of radio-activity on the old assumptions that matter and energy are uncreate and indestructible. These assumptions were, of course, never proven facts, but essentially *methodological*—i.e. the simplest and most natural assumptions wherewith to approach the facts,—and the physicist ought never to have regarded them as dogmas, seeing that all his "proofs" of them presupposed the principles to be established. But this might well escape notice,

¹ *Science and Life*, p. 116.

seeing how prone the human mind is everywhere to turn its methodological assumptions into metaphysical doctrines. The error of the physicist was pardonable, and almost inevitable. When, however, the theory of the spontaneous dissociation of the atom was adopted as the interpretation of the marvellous facts of radio-activity, the logical situation should have become clear. It plainly pointed to the corollaries that the atom was as little immutable as were its combinations, and that in every case it had probably come into being and was destined to pass away, though so far this behaviour had only been established as the habit of the uranium and thorium families. These new facts should have sufficed to discredit the dogma of the indestructibility of matter. They definitely proved that the experimental evidence by which this indestructibility was supported had been grossly inadequate, and that we had *never* really been in a position to decide whether matter was increasing, decreasing, or constant in amount. They should at least have suggested to us that since "atoms" were generated from "electrons" "positive" and "negative" (? male and female), were born and died and had a definite (average) period of "life," they might presently be found to be capable also of *breeding*, although we had not yet detected this habit in an (approximately) stationary population.

Again, if the physical universe is really uncreate and eternal, how is it that the uranium and thorium in it, and indeed all the other perishable substances it contains, have not long ago passed into their "end-products" (if such there are)? Must we not revert to the doctrine of creation and admit that it was no mere "myth"? Or shall we prefer to believe that radio-activity may conceivably be an *acquired habit*, and proves that the "inanimate" world is alive enough unpredictably to change its habits on occasion? We can postulate, of course, a converse process of atomic reconstruction, and even claim to have observed it; but that too, in so far as it is not an illusion, is not a fact (so far), but a methodological assumption. It is mere blindness therefore, or lingering prejudice, to deny that the new facts definitely point to a beginning, and an end, of the cosmic process, and reinforce the implications that were latent in the irreversibility of the course of nature and the "dissipation of energy," which was always a covert way of *denying* the conservation of energy. I conclude that it is an error of tactics for Professor Soddy to call up the old guard of mechanical materialism, as he does in his address on "Matter, Energy, Consciousness, and Spirit."

I pass, secondly, to Professor Soddy's dicta on the subject

of Truth (absolute, pure, scientific, and commercial) and our proper feelings and attitude towards it.

As might be expected, he is quite sound, and admirably clear, on the nature of *scientific* truth, the sort with which he is really familiar. It is the child of hypothesis and testing, and holds its rank just so long as there is no reason to suspect it of error. When it is convicted, it is promptly executed, and replaced by a better, descended from itself. "The measure of the exactness and extent of our knowledge of the inanimate universe is shown by our powers of *controlling* it and *guiding* it to serve our ends. In the inaccessible regions of space the test is *prediction*, but, with regard to the phenomena around us, in addition to this, imitation and *control* follow understanding and are the signs that we are on safe ground."¹ So the man of science is unperturbed by the vicissitudes of truth, which are incidental to its growth; the continuity of the succession is not broken, and his "sense of direction" is not deceived. He finds this sort of truth so satisfying that at bottom he cares for no other.² All of which is simply an expression of what modern philosophy calls the pragmatic theory of truth, and suffices to discriminate real knowledge from spurious.

But unfortunately Professor Soddy does not always content himself with scientific truth. He does not quite discard the notion of *absolute* truth as a blunder incompatible with scientific method. He retains it as a ghost, impalpable and "unattainable."³ He recognises also a *pure* love of truth for its own sake, which is sometimes "overwhelming,"⁴ but fails to specify upon what sorts of truth this manifestation of our cognitive instinct should be bestowed. Clearly the answers to this question will make a difference. If the only truth we love is absolute and unattainable, our affection will be wasted or mocked by illusions. If, on the other hand, it is directed upon commercially valuable researches, we shall be enabled to serve both God and Mammon. But in neither case is the purity and ardour of our affection any guarantee of the value of our object. Professor Soddy fully recognises that our love of truth may be frittered away on unprofitable researches. He disapproves of dissipating effort on "the most useless and uninteresting parts of mathematics,"⁵ and "knows from experience in scientific research how easy it is to immerse oneself in a subject that was fascinating to a past generation, and waste time in the minutiae of still ungleaned detail, until one finds oneself in a

¹ *Science and Life*, p. 161. Italics mine. Cf. pp. 154-156.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 155, 160.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

backwater which the main tide of discovery has left long since, and wherein one can waste a lifetime, which, if spent among the real outposts of knowledge, would have resulted in substantial and permanent progress being made.”¹ Clearly the “pure love of truth” must not be allowed to run *amok*, and even in “pure” science there is need of intelligent *selection* of remunerative subjects of research!

I would suggest therefore that the time has come for scientific men to drop these misleading phrases altogether. They are simply part of the traditional cant of the old “liberal” education which prided itself on being “useless.” But they express neither what they mean nor what they want. What they *want* is to be left alone by the commercially-minded, and to be left free to pursue what they perceive to be the most promising clues of their subject, without being challenged at every step and turn to produce something that has an immediate practical application and can be patented. In this they are quite right; but they should not try to make out that random exploration of a subject guided only by curiosity is more likely to conduct them to important discoveries than the definite incitement of an urgent unsolved problem. What they *mean* is the psychological truism that *personal interest* (generated by whatever ends, hopes, or illusions) must always be the *immediate* stimulus to research. What they *say*, however, plays straight into the hands of those who pretend, for purposes of their own, that the more useless knowledge is the higher and holier it becomes. This, which is *false* of all that is truly *knowledge*—though it long seemed to quench the questionings of the young (and also of their parents) who wanted to know what was the use of what they were taught,—has broken down in consequence of the war and has finally wrecked the old liberal education to which it had treacherously allied itself: it will wreck scientific education similarly, if the interests of the specialist are not subordinated to that of his subject.

This remark leads on, thirdly, to the question of the adequacy of Professor Soddy’s educational policy, and of the reforms he advocates in academic constitutions. His main contention is that it is vitally necessary to demand research, and to insist that universities shall justify themselves by adding to the sum of knowledge. This need he does not exaggerate, but he hardly realises how difficult it is to organise universities so that they will actually perform this function to any notable extent. He perceives, indeed, that education and examination, when

¹ *Science and Life*, p. 198.

prosecuted with the implacable zeal that is customary in this country, are serious obstacles in the path of his ideal. But he has not realised that there are others, no less serious and more subtle, which are rooted in the very nature of the professor as such, and in his necessary relations to his subject and to the institution which appoints him.

It is usual to suppose that human institutions exist to realise some purpose, to satisfy some need. But experience shows that when the institution has been set up, it tends to operate so as to defeat the purpose, and to frustrate the desire, to which it owes its being. The practical difficulty is always how to prevent this. How, *e.g.*, are churches to be prevented from killing religion, by deadening and starving the spiritual instincts, and forcing those in whom they are strong and progressive to accommodate their pace, in the ecclesiastical convoy-system, to that of the slowest and least sensitive? How can law be hindered from defeating the ends of justice, how can teaching be organised so as *not* to starve the appetite for knowledge? To counteract these tendencies is a matter demanding thought and effort upon which Royal Commissions might profitably be employed; for every institution, like the living body, generates toxic by-products and waste products, and in the end is choked by them, if they are not effectively purged away.

Now the professor is an institution of this sort. So soon as he is appointed his interests and those of his subject begin to diverge. His subject demands to be made accessible and intelligible, attractive and progressive, in order that its influence may be spread wide over the minds of men. But if he pandered to these demands, he would die of overwork. What is even worse, he would lose caste. His colleagues, the other professors in his subject, would denounce him as a revolutionary, who pits his wild vagaries against the approved wisdom of the ages and upsets men's minds (meaning their stereotyped lectures), as a disregarder of trade-union rules who will not limit his output to what conduces to the comfort of academic life, and, worst of all, as a "populariser," who degrades the dignity of his subject to the level of the average intelligence. "And what *we* can understand," they will justly say, "we despise." He, therefore, feeling that a "populariser" cannot be popular, declines to be a blackleg. In 99 cases out of 100 he seeks safety and honour in the opposite policy. The more conservative he becomes the more he pleases those whose minds have ceased to advance and to assimilate new truth—that is the old men who appoint and promote him. The more

abstruse he becomes, the fewer he has to teach, the more he is respected, the less he is exposed to criticism. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico*. If he can contrive to develop a specialty that can be entered only through a technical language of his own invention, he becomes a "greatest living authority," and is perfectly safe. Of course he kills his subject in the process, so far as human interest or influence is concerned; but he has his reward. No wonder William James, observing all this, once said to me, in the course of a talk about the unprogressiveness of philosophy, "After all, Schiller, the *natural enemy* of every subject is the professor thereof!" No wonder, too, that there is considerable consensus among professors that their value must not be judged by their output, and that the spectacle of a professor who has triumphantly destroyed his subject, and is flourishing on the proceeds of his crime, is familiar to every academic institution.

All these tendencies are naturally as rampant in Science as in other subjects. They might be even more so, were it not that, unlike the latter, the sciences have a peculiar safeguard. They cannot wholly disavow the belief that knowledge is power, and cut themselves off from the reference to application and the control of events. For they are continually appealing to each other for help in their perplexities, and demanding that science A, say mathematics, shall conduct researches which can be used by science B, say physics. This is in itself just as much an infringement of the independence and "purity" of the science as is the pressure put on it to produce something of commercial value. But it is just as salutary, because it guides its development in the right directions, and protects it against the ravages of the murderous professor. The latter, on the other hand, is the main reason why the sciences are ever growing more technical, and narrowing themselves down to affairs of highly dehumanised specialists, who are devoid of interest in anything outside their specialty, and indeed incapable of understanding it. He is the reason also for "Britain's neglect of Science." For there *was* a time, not so many years ago, when the influence of Science over the minds and feelings of men was appreciably greater than it is now. But that was a time when Science did not scorn to express itself intelligibly, and its great experts, like Darwin and Huxley, did not dread to be popular and disdain to be democratic. In those days Science actually existed as a social fact, comparable with Religion. *Now* it exists no longer. It has been dismembered, like the giant Ymir. We now have no Science, but only sciences, each separated from its nearest

neighbour by insuperable tariff-walls of technical terminology, and when scientists try to co-operate, they are stopped by the confusion of tongues. If Science has lost *prestige* and influence, has it not done so by its own act, and deservedly?

I am not among those, who, judging upon too superficial a consideration of the facts, declare that Science is inherently unfit to form the staple of a really liberal and general education, and that the classics have any natural monopoly of broadening influence. It has been proved over and over again that they *can* be turned into hotbeds of pedantry and every educational vice. I cannot readily forget that it was the scholars of the Renaissance who killed Latin as the living tongue of international communication, by decreeing that no idea and no phrase that had not found expression in the works of Cicero should be admitted into Latin prose. And I am ready to admit that it is quite possible to conceive the curriculum even of *Literæ Humaniores* as a divine opportunity for thoroughly obfuscating the mind of youth and rendering it impenetrable to any novelty of thought. Indeed, something of the sort is not uncommonly tried, not only at Oxford. Still the broad fact remains that the traditional education has on the whole been mindful of man's proper study and concerned itself with human nature as a whole, and has often succeeded in opening up the mind, whereas the scientific man has too often scorned, myopically, to look beyond the borders of his speciality.

Consequently those who devoutly hold that Knowledge is one, and is no "Brownian movement" of sciences, each chaotically struggling for its own hand, and, moreover, that Knowledge is *good* and that ever since Adam took a nibble at the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge and failed to perceive that it was the Tree of Life, men have erred in thinking it *bad*, and imagining, in the teeth of experience, that the fear of wisdom is the beginning of virtue, and that the multiplication of knowledge is the multiplication of misery, have a difficult choice. Are they to cling to the old "humanities" that recognise, however imperfectly, the unity of human nature, or to deliver themselves over to the scientific specialist who will mince them up, body and soul? Or shall they try to persuade him that his specialty needs mitigating by philosophy, conceived as a correlating of scientific principles and methods?

This choice really exists also for the scientific specialist. For unless he can grow some *esprit de corps* and sense of scientific solidarity, so as to combine and agree upon some common policy, it is morally certain that he will continue to be exploited, and remain an instrument in the hands of the rulers of

the world, powerless for good but with an infinite power to harm. For the world's actual rulers, as Professor Soddy points out, are, as ever, ignorant, stuffed with effete ideas, and mostly savages at heart. On the other hand, it seems simple enough, on paper, to dethrone the old types of ruler. The "British Ass" would merely have to turn itself into a trade-union, and keep its knowledge to itself, in order to rule the British masses. If it would only refrain from the "criminal lunacy" of publishing the secrets of science broadcast, it would speedily become, not only more powerful, but also richer and more progressive than Science now is anywhere. But, alas, the scientific world is *not* united, and so long as its spirit remains specialistic it cannot unite.

If it ever does, its first, most urgent and most difficult task will be to render human nature fit to be trusted with more power over nature. Or, in other words, to insure society against catastrophic disruption by internal forces and inherent vices. This would demand the construction of a really efficacious science of ethics, which would not be content to rehearse time-worn platitudes about (inapplicable) "principles," but would be willing to tackle *la bête humaine*, and in co-operation with an operative psychology and a eugenical biology, would remould man into a creature such as he never yet has been, viz. one able to control and harmonise his passions.

If this effort is not undertaken, and that soon, it is entirely possible that his Science may be the death of man. Not because it is intrinsically hostile to human life, but because it will enable him to indulge in his devastating instincts to a fatal extent. That is the last, and very serious, danger that besets the relations of Science to Life.

Or shall I rather say, the penultimate? For it would be unworthy of the candour with which this article has abounded, if I suppressed a final fear with which Professor Soddy's activities alarm me. It strikes me that, with the best intentions, he may be an extremely dangerous man. He is, one understands, like his former colleague, Sir Ernest Rutherford, at Cambridge, pertinaciously tampering with the integrity of the atom, in order, of course, to unlock the vast stores of energy it contains. He makes it quite clear that, if he succeeded, the energy at man's command would be multiplied a millionfold, and be practically inexhaustible. There need then be no more poverty, because we should be rich beyond the dreams of avarice. A world of such *nouveaux riches* might well inspire the social philosopher with the gravest apprehensions.

But now suppose that Professor Soddy did not quite succeed, but came within an ace of it. Suppose, that is, that he discovered how to *start* the disintegrating of the atom, but not how to control the process or to *stop* it. Fortunately "atoms" appear to behave like sturdy individualists, and to be highly indifferent to the Bolshevism of disintegrating neighbours. Still, their stability depends on motions of vibration, and if the shattering of atoms were artificially accelerated, vibrations might be started that would prove irresistibly infectious. And then would not the rhythmic vibrations that shattered the first atoms spread, with the speed of *alpha*-particles, and attack their neighbours? Every atom would become more dangerous than a 12-inch shell. And there would be 20,000,000,000 or so of such projectiles in every pin-point of "matter." So, almost in the twinkling of an eye, a cosmic conflagration would ensue, the famous *ἐκπύρωσις* philosophy had prophesied, and make a holocaust of man and all his works. A few years after, the (relatively backward) astronomers on a luckier planet of a distant sun would record the outbreak of a "new star" with a "strong helium line in its spectrum," as the after-glow of human effort. Thus, finally, would Science triumph and settle its account with Life!

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

OXFORD.

THE FUTURE OF PROTESTANTISM IN AUSTRALIA.

REV. A. R. OSBORN, M.A.,

Melbourne, Australia.

PROTESTANTISM in Australia is drifting. Whatever the ultimate explanation of this may be, the drift is actual, and it may be taken as a basal fact that, unless a distinct change takes place in the immediate future, Protestantism as a religious force in Australia will steadily decline. During the war, more especially at the commencement, it was hoped that the serious issues involved would awaken the people to a new sense of obligation in matters of religion. Similar hopes were entertained in Britain, and there as here they have proved vain. It is probable that even the temporary effects were less in Australia than in the old lands. Australia did not feel the strain of the war as Britain did. There was no war here: there were no air raids: there was no food shortage. To us the war was rather an echo of horrible happenings far off, than a thing present and immediate in its danger. The full horrors were not realised by us, and, although we were touched when we lost our loved ones on the battlefield, we could not but look upon the struggle as a thing remote. Certainly the war did not awaken us to greater seriousness in religion, and, now that it is over, our spiritual condition is, if anything, worse than it was six years ago.

Even before the war broke out, the state of Protestantism was such as to cause apprehension to serious men in its ranks. The outward and visible signs of decay were to be clearly seen. The churches were no longer full: many of them were almost empty. Here and there a popular speaker drew a crowd, but, even where crowds gathered, there was no sign of a revival. As in older lands, the old-fashioned Sunday had passed, never to return. People were escaping from the bustle of the city at the week-end to refresh themselves with the pure air of the country or the sea, and the week-enders were seldom church-

attenders at the places to which they went. An even more serious indication of decline was the failure to retain the young people in the Sunday school or in the church. There were other signs too, such as the decline in the educational status of candidates offering themselves for the Christian ministry. All combined to show that for a time at least Protestantism was drifting.

One of the peculiar effects of the war was the revival of political Protestantism. It would be most unjust to Roman Catholics generally to suggest that their Church was not loyal to the Empire during the war. Roman Catholic lads fought side by side with their Protestant comrades, and in the great struggle religious differences were subordinated to a sentiment of brotherhood. Unfortunately, another factor was at work at home, producing discord. The Irish question influenced opinion here. Some of the Roman Catholic leaders condemned England for her treatment of Ireland. They opposed the Nationalist Party, and in their opposition went so far as to seek a friendly understanding with an extreme section of the Labour Party which was opposed to the war and was ever ready to act as apologist for Germany. To the onlooker it seemed that in this alliance the Church of Rome was making a vigorous bid for political power in both State and Commonwealth. Finally the purpose became so evident that Protestants awoke to its meaning. A Protestant Federation sprang into being, not as the result of any deep religious motive, but as a patriotic and anti-Catholic organisation. Many Protestants held aloof from it, just as many Roman Catholics held aloof from the anti-British policy advocated by some of their leaders. It cannot be said that the community generally joined the Federation. The average Australian dislikes religious quarrelling. When Roman Catholics and Protestants begin to dispute, he is inclined to exclaim: "A plague on both your houses!" Nevertheless, the combined sentiments of patriotism and Protestantism did for a time give vigour to the Federation, and it even seemed that the Protestant Churches might recover by means of it something of their old power and enthusiasm. In the Commonwealth elections held at the close of 1919 the Federation took an active part, declaring itself to be in favour of the Nationalist policy, to be whole-heartedly loyal, and above all to be opposed at all costs to political Roman Catholicism. There can be no doubt that this anti-Roman feeling was in no small measure responsible for the decisive defeat of the Labour Party at the polls. The Protestant Federation may therefore claim to have justi-

fied itself as a political organisation, but not even its most enthusiastic advocates would declare that it has in any way influenced the religious life of the community. Its policy is negative, and it will survive as long as Roman Catholic leaders declare in any aggressive manner that their aim is to obtain political power. As a factor in the revival of Protestantism generally it must be neglected.

What then is to be the future of Protestantism in Australia? The drift is so serious that it must end in ruin if it cannot be checked. The question is, can it be checked? and, if so, how? One answer given to the question is that to avert disaster the Protestant Churches must unite, so that they may be able to present a solid front to their adversaries. For many years negotiations have been carried on in Australia for organic union between different denominations. There was even a movement to secure union between the Anglican and the Presbyterian Churches. To this the question of orders forms an insuperable barrier. Nevertheless, negotiations did take place, and they were characterised by a high seriousness on the part of the negotiating representatives. Various suggestions were made for overcoming the difficulty of orders. One was that all the clergy of the uniting Churches should be reordained. This was scarcely taken seriously. Another proposal was more ingenious. It was an attempt to carry the position without a frontal attack. It was suggested that the question of orders should not be discussed at all, but that, if the principle of government by bishops were admitted, the Church of England might consider whether the welfare of the Church as a whole might not warrant a special and extraordinary measure, whereby Anglicans would accept as on an equality with themselves in the privileges attaching to a priest's orders all ministers in the Churches uniting with them, no matter what the manner of their ordination might have been. The suggestion was ingenious but not practicable, and with the recognition of this fact the proposals for organic union between the Anglican and Presbyterian Churches dropped.

It has been otherwise with the movement among non-episcopal Churches. Negotiations between the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational Churches have now advanced so far that the committees entrusted with the negotiations have been able to lay definite proposals before the governing bodies of the Churches concerned. There are many reasons why union is desirable in a country like Australia. It is a land of great distances, and in country places the preaching stations are usually miles apart. The result is that much

of a minister's time is spent upon the roads. Denominational competition leads to sad waste of effort. One little country place may have in it four or five ministers or home missionaries belonging to different denominations, who are competing with each other, while there are other places where no service is held because no minister is available. It would be far better to have united effort. There would then be no competition; ministers would receive a better salary without having to travel such great distances, and the people generally would be better served. The need for economy of effort is one of the great reasons advanced for Church union. It weighs heavily with the Methodist Church, which is by nature a pioneer in bush and other home mission work. Methodist congregations have not yet been consulted, but conferences and synods of the Church have for the most part voted in favour of union. The only serious opposition has come from local preachers, who think that the proposed polity does not make sufficient provision for lay effort and its due recognition in Church courts. Congregationalists also are in favour of union. The Congregational Church in Australia is not strong, and it has so many affinities with Presbyterianism that there seems to be no valid reason why the two bodies should not unite. Both have modified their polity in a practical way to meet the needs of a new land, and in doing so they have drawn nearer to each other. Consequently nothing but sentimental reasons need keep them apart. Sentiment is, however, a strong factor, and it makes itself felt distinctly in a historical Church. It is influencing many Presbyterians against the union proposals. As far as can be seen, about two-thirds of the members of Presbyterian Church courts are in favour of union, but the remaining third are strongly and even vehemently opposed. A "Church Defence Association" has been formed, and its members are resolved to remain Presbyterians at all costs. What under these circumstances will the majority do? They may feel that union is essential, and they may decide to go on, leaving the settlement of property questions to Act of Parliament. If they do so, it will mean that the present Presbyterian Church will be divided. If, on the other hand, they resolve that union is impossible without the agreement of practically all, the union movement will receive a set-back for many years.

That which gives to the question of union such importance is that it is vitally linked to the problem of Protestantism in Australia. Those who advocate it say that it will result in a revival of Protestantism. They maintain that what Australia

needs above all else is a strong evangelical Church, which could speak with power and authority on great subjects, and that the forming of such a Church would awaken enthusiasm and give fresh life. If this really would be the case, the duty of those concerned is evident—they should press on with union at all costs. But will this result necessarily follow? There are various considerations which must be taken into account before it can be accepted as certain that union means new life. The Churches which are negotiating for union admit that their spiritual life is weak. Each seems to be hoping that the other will give him something he does not himself possess. A leading Methodist minister recently stated in a conference of Methodists that Presbyterians were hoping they would gain in evangelical fervour by the importation of live Methodists through union. "They are mistaken," he said; "we have not got that evangelical fervour which we are supposed to possess." The fact is that evangelical fervour is at a low ebb in all three Churches negotiating for union. Will the union of three lukewarm Churches make one vigorous and efficient united Church?

It may be taken as an axiom that vigorous life in a Church can only come when the members of that Church believe with all their heart and soul that they have a gospel for humanity which has been entrusted to them in order that they may proclaim it. When Luther nailed his theses to the church door at Wittenberg, he felt that the very essence of the Gospel was at stake, and he was prepared to maintain his case or die. That is the spirit of all great reformers, and it was the spirit which provided the motive power in all Protestant Churches at their inception. Each Protestant Church believed that it stood for truth, and the divisions of Protestantism were due in large measure to the great sincerity of those who held divergent views. To them their creed and their polity were matters of principle, and they were prepared to separate from others to maintain them. That their descendants are now willing to sink old differences may be due to clearer vision and increased broad-mindedness, but it may be due equally well to a spirit of indifference. Men seldom quarrel about things which have no interest for them. Certainly, if Church union is to be successful, the uniting bodies must be as enthusiastic over some new programme of Christian work upon which they are agreed, as their ancestors were about things in which they differed. To the critical onlooker, the absence of a definite constructive programme for the uniting Churches is one of the most serious defects in the movement. There is no rallying-point, such as Luther had when he proclaimed

justification by faith, or Wesley when he challenged men to accept or reject the Gospel statement which he uttered. The attitude of many is that they feel union is right, but they have no great enthusiasm for the proposals. They fear that the movement is one of ecclesiastical strategy rather than a great compelling force which will purify and uplift the Churches that are concerned in it. Behind the question of the probability of organic union there is, then, another and more vital one. Do the Churches concerned desire union because they can thereby have a grander organisation and dominate political and social movements in the community, or are they seeking to unite because they are fired with zeal to send out missionaries of the Cross, and can do so on a grander scale by acting together? If there is no fire of religious enthusiasm in the movement, and if ultimately nothing more will be gained from union than the establishment of a strongly organised ecclesiastical body which can hold its own against other ecclesiastical bodies, the motive seems to be similar to that which Protestants have been wont to criticise in the Church of Rome.

It is at this point that the discussion of the local question of the future of Protestantism merges into the larger question of the future of Protestantism throughout the world. The movement towards union in Australia is not accompanied by any outburst of zeal for the spreading of the Gospel. On that point there can be no doubt. Indeed, what its most serious leaders hope is that it will be followed by an outburst of zeal when the people realise what splendid power is in their hands. The prospect seems very doubtful. For one thing, the organisation of Protestantism will never be able to compare in efficiency with that of the Church of Rome. The only real way of securing Protestant unity is by convincing individual members of the right and justice of what is proposed or affirmed. By reason of its very nature Protestantism cannot secure permanent power through ecclesiastical organisation, and it is an interesting fact of its history that at the times of its greatest religious fervour it has tended to division and not to union. This does not prove that union among Protestant Churches is incompatible with religious zeal, but it does seem to indicate that the only way of securing unity is to present a programme of Christianity which will command enthusiasm. The Protestant Churches of Australia are confessedly not doing this at the present time. Can they do it in the future? Can Protestant Churches in any part of the world do it? Is Protestantism a spent force, or can it revive? Has it served its purpose in history, and must it now yield to some

larger movement, to something which might be called a New Protestantism, or even a New Catholicism? Obviously, if it is a spent force, then a scheme of union along old lines is futile. Yet this is precisely what the negotiating Churches in Australia are contemplating. The creed which has been drawn up as part of the basis of union differs in no essential from old creeds of the Churches. It might be described as a compromise creed between Calvinism and Arminianism, and this fact in itself indicates that it is inferior in its logical statement to the great creeds of Reformation times. The proposal to make a new creed embodying our conception of Christian truth in the language and from the viewpoint of our age has not even been made. Nor in this are the negotiating Churches in any respect worse than those standing out of the union movement. No Australian Church, episcopal or non-episcopal, has within recent years endeavoured to revise its statement of doctrine in the slightest degree. During the war it was freely said that the Churches must alter if they were to survive in the new age, and padres affirmed without hesitation that old credal formulæ must go. But they have not gone, and the padres, instead of endeavouring to get them altered, have settled down to the old order of things. Meanwhile religion in Australia, or at least that form of religion which is associated with Church life, is at a discount. The working man openly charges the Churches with being under the control of the capitalist. If he makes any exception, it is always in favour of the Roman Catholic Church, never on any account of a Protestant denomination. Young people are everywhere drifting from the Church of their fathers, and here once again the marvellous system of education in the Roman Catholic Church gives it a distinct advantage over Protestantism. Finally, it is a sign of the times that educated people are tending more and more away from the Churches, and university men are reluctant to enter the Christian ministry.

All these facts point to the conclusion that Protestantism is a spent force, and that the Reformation movement is to be viewed, not as the final and perfect embodiment of the Christian Church, but as a wave of progress similar to other waves of progress, destined in its turn to give way to a new incoming wave. Looking at the Reformation without bias, we realise that it was after all but a section of a grander movement. It was, moreover, distinctly limited in its achievement. It was a movement towards liberty, yet it did not achieve freedom. It was rebellion against external authority, yet it is itself a religion of authority. It affirmed

the principle of freedom of inquiry, but it limited very severely the scope of those who endeavoured to inquire. It arose in conjunction with a great social and political movement towards freedom on the part of the downtrodden people of Europe, but, from the time when Luther sided with the nobles against the insurgent peasants, Protestantism and that movement, which for want of a better name may be called democratic socialism, have trodden divergent paths. Is it rightly credible that the religion of Jesus has no place for the discoveries of science, for the social ideals of humanity, and for a fearless inquiry after truth? Protestantism has not found room for these things, and the question now forces itself upon us, must it not yield to a grander movement which will find room for them?

If the argument here advanced is valid, the future of Protestantism in any country depends upon the statesmanship and determination of its leaders to bring in a reformation as far-reaching and as drastic as the Reformation of the sixteenth century. A reformation of this kind is spoken of privately by ministers and thoughtful laymen, but there is not the slightest evidence of any movement in any part of Australia to bring it to pass. On the other hand, the temper of Church assemblies and conferences is distinctly conservative, if not reactionary. Occasional attempts are made to bring about a revival, but these follow old lines, and, when made on a big scale, they prove conspicuous failures. It is doubtful if an evangelistic mission such as that conducted some years ago by Dr Chapman, or that conducted still earlier by Dr Torrey, would now be taken up with any enthusiasm at all. Dr Torrey realised that a change had come over the people when he said that his task was harder than that of Moody. The people of to-day have a set of ideas different from those of the people of fifty years ago, and the evangelist finds that his appeal evokes little response. It is not the function of an evangelist to recast doctrine. His work is to reawaken enthusiasm for beliefs already held. The fact that he fails to do so now is another proof that what is needed is something more than a revival of the old type: we need a second Reformation.

It would not be possible to conclude a discussion on the future of Protestantism in Australia without reference to the possible consequences of the establishment of Church schools on a large scale. This is a policy which is finding many advocates in Protestant Churches here at the present time. The Church of England took the lead several years ago, and

it has for some time carried out a definite progressive policy. More recently the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches have resolved to do the same. The Presbyterians of Victoria are endeavouring to raise a fund of £250,000 for the carrying out of proposals for the furthering of its system of Church schools. The Presbyterian Church in New South Wales has recently received a large bequest which will enable it to extend its work in this direction. In Queensland Presbyterians and Methodists are working together for the establishment of schools. The declared object of these schools is to strengthen the Church by giving to young people sound instruction in the Bible which they will not get in the secular Government schools, and by fostering a spirit of loyal attachment to the Church. It is not supposed that these denominational schools can meet the needs of more than a relatively small portion of the community, but it is thought that they may do much for the Church of the future by training men and women who in days to be will occupy important posts in the land. The scheme thus outlined has possibilities, though it remains to be seen whether it will receive the support from the people which the leaders desire.

There can be no doubt that the Protestant authorities have been influenced in their determination to establish Church schools by the success of the Roman Catholic schools. The Roman Catholic policy of religious education had its genesis in the counter-Reformation movement. It arose at a time when the fortunes of the Church were at a low ebb, and when the losses were more pronounced than those which are manifesting themselves in Churches at the present day. The object of the movement was partly missionary, inasmuch as it sought to reach out to and gain the children of Protestants; but it was also conservative in the sense that it aimed at keeping the youth of the Church within its ranks. From the point of view from which it was designed the system has been eminently successful. It was the genius of Ignatius de Loyola which first showed how it was possible to construct a system of education upon primary emotions and instincts. His system has been modified and adapted to suit new conditions, but the fundamental aim is the same. With the scientific exactness of trained psychologists, Roman Catholic teachers build up a system of ideas and sentiments which will bind the scholars throughout their lives to the Church. That is why the Roman Catholic Church in Australia has so much power over its young people.

By analogy with the effect of the Roman Catholic system of instruction in arresting the drift from its ranks, the proposed

development in the educational policy of the Protestant Churches seems to be full of promise. Why should Protestants not evolve a system of education which will be as effective as the Roman Catholic? Unfortunately, it is just here that the radical defect in the proposals comes in. Protestantism has never seriously attempted to evolve a religious education system of its own. Here and there individual men like Arnold of Rugby or Thring of Uppingham have endeavoured to make their schools centres of religious influence. To Arnold belongs the credit of utilising games as a means for disciplining character. It must also be admitted that he succeeded in making religion "good form" for the boys of his time; but, while granting this and much more to the great public-school master, it is impossible to find in his system the materials for a complete scheme of religious education, and public schools of a later age which have followed along the lines he laid down are by no means successful now in linking the young people who attend them to the Church. There have been Church schools of this type in Australia for many years. These schools are excellent in many ways, but they certainly are not centres of religious influence. Our Churches admit this and lament it, and yet in their proposals for establishing new schools they have no suggestions to make for increasing the efficiency of the religious training. Obviously, it will not serve their purpose to model their system on that of the Church of Rome. The Roman system takes as a fundamental position the acceptance of a set of dogmas without inquiry. The whole purpose of their system is to prevent inquiry within the range of those dogmas. Protestantism, on the other hand, must allow individual judgment. Rightly conceived, a truly Protestant system of education would aim at leading the pupil to perfect freedom of choice, yet withal to an acceptance of truth and right for their own sake. To do this it must avoid the methods pursued by the Roman Catholics, formulating instead a scheme based upon a clear conception of the nature of moral freedom and of the genetic factors leading thereto. It would seem that the establishment of such a system must be one of the aims of the New Protestantism. Meanwhile, nothing of religious value can be hoped for from the movement in Australia to establish Protestant Church schools. Certainly it can do nothing effective to stop the drift.

From this discussion the conclusion seems inevitable that the future of Protestantism in Australia is doubtful in the extreme. Church union, even if accomplished, will not mark the opening of a new era. The most it can do will be to stem

the drift for a short time, and it is quite possible that by dissolving old ties and destroying old sentiments it may even hasten the process of decay. Nothing can be expected from the education policy, and there is no social policy in any of the Churches other than that connected with the centres of benevolent activity which have existed for years. Sunday schools are confessedly unable to retain their scholars, or to instruct them adequately while they are with them. Under these circumstances the only possible result seems to be gradual decay. That is what is happening at the present time. The Protestant Churches of Australia are slowly disintegrating. Our intellectual activity is not being directed towards religion. Instead, we are under the influence of a practical materialism which is not sufficiently interested in religion to talk about it. This materialism has laid its deadening grip upon our Church life as well as upon the general life of the community.

Yet, in spite of all these things, it is not possible to believe that true religion will die. Out of the wreck of the old must evolve something new. One would like to think that the Protestant Churches possessed within themselves the forces that would enable them to evolve a new order from the old. The present indications are that they have not, and that to endeavour to bring about a reformation within the ranks of Protestantism is to try to put new wine into old wine-skins. So far from endeavouring to reform, our Churches are discouraging the spirit of initiative because it involves too rude a conflict with inherited beliefs and institutions. Men of liberal views are sadly leaving them because they cannot find a home within them.

Yet in history it is often the unexpected which happens. Australians have been so occupied hitherto with the material problems that face them in a new land that they have had no time to think deeply about spiritual ones; but with the development of our land a new era may dawn. If once the idea of a New Protestantism grips the imagination of Australians, that spirit of daring and even of lawlessness which made our soldiers achieve so much in the great war will enable them to evolve a new system unfettered by the mistakes and errors of the past, in which the Gospel of Jesus will have a truer and grander interpretation than it has ever yet received; in which justice, mercy, and truth will be supreme; and which will provide scope for the restless striving of the human soul to know and realise that which is unseen and eternal.

A. R. OSBORN.

A TEACHING CHURCH.

A. C. M'GIFFERT, D.D.,

President of the Union Theological Seminary, New York.

IN the *Shepherd* of Hermas, a Christian document of the second century, occurs the following striking passage: "A revelation was made to me, brethren, while I slept, by a very beautiful young man who said to me, 'Who do you think the old lady was, from whom you received the little book?' 'The Sibyl,' I replied. 'You are wrong,' he said; 'it was not the Sibyl.' 'Who was it, then?' I asked. 'The Church,' he replied. 'Why then was she old?' I inquired. 'Because,' he said, 'the Church was created before all things, and for her sake the world was framed.'"

This sentiment, which represents a common opinion of Hermas' Christian contemporaries, is probably shared by few of us. The Church, we commonly believe to-day, is not an end in itself, but, like all other institutions, a means to a farther end. It exists to serve, we say, rather than to be served; to minister rather than to be ministered unto. Not the world for the sake of the Church, but the Church for the sake of the world, is the watchword, and justly so, at any rate of most modern Christians.

There have appeared recently two very significant books throwing light upon the way the Church has served, or failed to serve, the world in our own day—the one the report of a British Interdenominational Committee, entitled *The Army and Religion*, the other the report of the American Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook, entitled *Religion among American Men*. Both of these reports agree in calling attention to the extraordinary and lamentable ignorance on the part of the soldiers concerning Christianity—concerning its nature, its meaning, and its *raison d'être*—ignorance on the part, not simply of those who have never had

anything to do with the Church, but also of those who have grown up under its influence and in more or less intimate contact with it. The reports agree also in the conclusion that the chief deficiency of the Church lies in the field of education, that whatever else it has done it has egregiously failed to make itself and its message understood.

To quote from the British report :

“That probably four-fifths of the young manhood of our country should have little or no vital connection with any of the Churches, and that behind this detachment there should lie so deep a misunderstanding of the faiths by which Christian men and women live, and the ideals of life which they hold, is, perhaps, the most salient feature of our evidence. Here is an alarming fact, which is, surely, clear proof that something somewhere has gone gravely wrong, and that the hour has come when we must discover the hidden causes of the evil and do what may be done to set things right.” (p. 240.)

Similarly, the American report says :

“The testimony that we have received goes to show that if a vote were taken among chaplains and other religious workers as to the most serious failure of the Church, as evidenced in the army, a large majority would agree that it was the Church’s failure as a teacher. We have not succeeded in teaching Christianity to our own members, let alone distributing a clear knowledge of it through the community at large.” (p. 131.)

The situation thus described demands the most serious attention of Christian people. How are we to explain it, and what is to be done about it ?

It should be said that the evidence adduced in the reports concerns only those of Protestant affiliations and antecedents. Had the study included Roman Catholics as well, we may guess that the results might have been very different.

I. How, then, are we to account for the failure of our Protestant Churches to make Christianity more generally understood by the young men who belong to them or have grown up under their influence ?

A fundamental cause of their failure is to be found in the Reformation itself. When the Catholic Church was abandoned by the Reformers nothing adequate was put in its place. Catholicism was not only a complex of theological

doctrine, but also a well-defined system of moral teaching. Indeed, its moral teaching was its most important part. The whole career of the Christian was carefully regulated, and with its ethical code, its confessional, and its penitential discipline the Church afforded constant instruction in the conduct of life. With the Reformation all this was swept away. The dogma of a present salvation by faith alone meant the repudiation of righteousness by works and the consequent relegation of instruction in morals to a wholly subordinate place. Instruction in doctrine would have shared the same fate had it not been that saving faith was early identified with sound belief, and the purpose of the Reformation interpreted as the purification of doctrine. To teach the true faith thus became a matter of primary importance, in comparison with which the inculcation of Christian ethics seemed of small moment.

Again, it is to be remembered that Protestantism appealed from the authority of an infallible Church to the authority of an infallible Bible. But the Bible lends itself to a great variety of interpretations, and as a consequence the traditional dogmatic system was soon displaced by a multitude of discordant systems each claiming to represent the infallible truth of divine revelation. Inevitably, in the rivalry of warring sects, stress was chiefly laid upon the things in which they differed, and their adherents were schooled rather in their distinctive peculiarities than in the great fundamentals of human faith and duty. Had there been a single undivided Protestantism to set over against Catholicism it would not have been so bad, though even then, probably, Christianity would have been widely overlooked in zeal for Protestantism. But, as it was, not only Christianity but Protestantism itself was too commonly lost sight of in concern for Lutheranism or Calvinism or Anglicanism. In their interest in their own peculiar sect, men ceased to ask what Christianity itself was, or rather they identified it with the tenets of their own form of Christianity and thus made it a system having to do with the periphery instead of the centre of human life. This substitution of the things of secondary for those of primary concern has cruelly avenged itself in these modern days. The old denominational interests have broken down. One of the most striking facts, indeed, revealed by the British and American reports is the impatience of the soldiers with the sectarian divisions of Christendom; and their impatience is but symptomatic of the attitude of thinking men everywhere. But there remains out of the wreck of the old denominationalism no

adequate appreciation of what Christianity is or can be if it be not mere Anglicanism or Presbyterianism or Congregationalism. No wonder the Protestant world is in dire confusion as to what it is all about.

Another cause of the failure referred to is the evangelical revival, the greatest revival in the history of Protestantism, whose effects are still felt in every Protestant communion on both sides of the sea. The significance of the evangelical revival is that it confined attention largely to the experience of the new birth. To save men by bringing them to Christ was its great concern. Like the old-fashioned novels which always ended with the marriage of hero and heroine, the old evangelicalism stopped with conversion. What followed seemed a matter of minor importance, or a matter so simple and self-evident as to require no special thought. Moreover, her absorption in winning men for Christ left the Church little time and strength to guide those already won. A simple theology and a simple code of ethics became a necessity, and it is no accident that the test of Christian orthodoxy was reduced to the acceptance of the atonement and the deity of Christ, and the test of Christian character to abstinence from a few definite and widely popular pleasures. Relieved of the necessity of more elaborate doctrinal and ethical instruction, the Church could give itself, both at home and abroad, to the work of evangelism. The Church was transformed, in fact, from a teaching Church into a converting Church.

If evangelicalism's radical simplification of Christianity had proved permanently satisfactory this transformation would perhaps have mattered little. But unfortunately the simplification was exclusive, not inclusive, and from the beginning left out of sight vast areas of thought and life which have steadily widened with the growth of humanism and humanitarianism during recent generations. As a result the old evangelicalism has become little representative of the mind of Christendom and little responsive to the needs of modern men. That Christianity should seem of all things wholly unreal to vast numbers of the troops, both English and American, as countless witnesses testify, is an illuminating commentary upon the distance we have travelled since the days of the evangelical revival.

II. The immediate duty of the Church, then, is to resume the teaching function which it fulfilled so magnificently in centuries long gone. It has confined itself in recent generations too exclusively to the rôle of exhorter, has been too content with inspiring men instead of instructing them.

What is most needed now is neither exhortation nor inspiration but education.

The Church's teaching function has been largely taken over in modern times by other agencies—the press, the public school, the women's club, the lecture platform. These are not a cause but rather an effect of the abdication by the Church of its ancient responsibility. I have no desire to urge that the Church displace these modern agencies and try to do the work in their place. I am the last one to wish again to bring secular education and the organs of public opinion under ecclesiastical control. But within its own sphere the Church has a duty to perform whose importance is only accentuated by the confinement of its responsibility to the narrower field. When the Church was the great moulder of thought, the great mistress of life in all its varied aspects—artistic and literary and scientific as well as religious—it was possible for it to command the respect of intelligent men whether they were interested in religion or not. Now that its province has been so greatly circumscribed, it must at least show itself expert in the narrower field, or it can count on nothing but indifference or contempt.

The rapid development in recent years of the movement known as Religious Education is a very promising thing in the life of the modern Church. But religious education must not be confined to the Sunday school. The Church itself must become an educational institution. No successful man stops learning when he leaves school. In business or trade or profession he is constantly acquiring education. So it should be in religion. It is all-important that the young receive adequate religious instruction, but it is no less important that they go on learning even after they are grown. The moment education stops, development is arrested and decay sets in. Religion is no finished product which can be imparted in a few lessons and retained through life unchanged. It is a living interest or it is nothing. And so the Church should be a lifelong school, constantly training its members both in the theory and the practice of Christianity.

If preaching has any place at all in the modern Church, it is only as a form of teaching. It shows a lamentable lack of religious insight and of practical efficiency to make the sermon usurp the function of worship, to use it as a means of inspiration when prayer and praise, which presumably bring the worshipper into communion with his God, should be far more effective sources of inspiration than any human speech. There is undoubtedly altogether too much preaching in our churches.

Only the man really fitted to teach should be allowed to enter any pulpit.

But far more important than the sermon is the discussion class in which Christians hammer out for themselves the truth they need to live by. No modern university would think of getting on without the seminar. How many of our churches have anything remotely resembling it? Democracy in education has penetrated our modern schools and colleges, but our churches live still for the most part in the age of pedagogical autocracy. And how antiquated are the textbooks of the Church! Creeds formulated centuries ago still express for us ostensibly the principles of our religion. The chief objection to historic creeds is not that they compel us to believe things we have long outgrown, but that they relieve us of the responsibility of trying to put the things we now believe into teachable form for the generation that now is.

But if the Church is to be a teaching institution it must be a learning institution as well. It can be a worthy *ecclesia docens* only as it is a faithful *ecclesia discens*. What should we think of a university which had in its faculty teachers only and no scholars?—which simply purveyed knowledge handed down from the past and discovered nothing new? The Roman Catholic Church, with its infallible truth and its infallible interpreter, may not need to learn; but Protestant Churches are in no such easy case. When the Reformers broke away from the old Church they found it necessary to go to school again, and the very essence of Protestantism is the recognition that we have not reached finality but must be ever seeking. We have had a fresh demonstration in the last half-dozen years that there is still much to learn. The perplexity of the Church in the midst of the war, its hesitancy in confronting the issues raised by the awful catastrophe, its abnegation of moral leadership and its contentment simply to follow in the wake of public opinion, all this showed its own uncertainty touching the nature and meaning of the Christianity which it claims to represent. Are we surprised that the men in the trenches were so largely in the dark about Christianity? The churches at home, their members and their leaders, seem to have been little better off. It is high time for the Church to awake to the necessity of subjecting itself to a thorough course of instruction. It must cease repeating the lessons it learned long ago. No teacher could continue to command the respect of his pupils who followed such a method, and the Church ought not to be surprised if it loses its hold upon the world when it has nothing fresh to give.

Even if the Church had a changeless message, as the Roman Catholic Church at least believes it has, it would still be obliged to adapt it to an ever-changing situation. For to teach successfully you must have regard to your pupils as well as to your subject. But Protestants believe in an ever-enlarging revelation, and hence the Protestant Church, if it is to be a teaching Church, must be an ever-learning Church, keeping abreast of the age not merely in its expression of the truth, but also in the truth it expresses.

It is frequently said that the Church has lost its influence as a teaching Church because of the divergent and contradictory views that prevail within it; that if we are to recover our leadership we must get back the old unity of faith and the old conviction of absolute truth; and modern criticism, which has resulted in the overthrow of many old beliefs and the unsettlement of not a few minds, is often blamed for the difficulties we are in. This, however, is wholly to misunderstand the situation. There was a time, perhaps, when men took their opinions ready made from their betters, when the main thing in the teacher was to be certain he was right, when demonstration gave place to assertion and learners were convinced by the very positiveness of their teacher's declarations. The Roman Catholic claim to infallibility was exactly suited to that age, and is still suited to the survivors of it. A dogma, asserted dogmatically enough, carries conviction to their minds. But Protestantism by its very constitution neither belongs to that period nor is intended for that kind of people. It is not conviction in the teacher but convincingness in the message that is needed. A certain modesty in the Christian teacher is as becoming as modesty in the teacher of any other subject. Not that he knows infallibly the truth of what he is saying (such knowledge is the cheapest thing in the world, and the most easily assumed by ignorant men), but that he has made his best effort to find out the truth and urges others to test it by their own experience; to accept or reject or improve upon it, or better still to make fresh and independent research for themselves. That kind of teaching makes a subject interesting and attracts students to the study of it. Any other kind makes it simply a task to be learned, which is abandoned at the earliest possible moment. This means no abnegation of our Christian faith. It means to trust Christian truth enough to let it make its way, as any other truth must make its way, not by the pressure of infallibility but by the persuasiveness of its own appeal.

The issue between these two attitudes is a radical one. If

the Church thinks itself commissioned to impose a complete and finished Christianity upon a docile world, it must reconcile itself to a continuance of the unfortunate situation revealed in the British and American reports. The modern world is not docile and will not take that kind of thing from anybody. Why should we expect it to, when all education—outside the Church at any rate—is doing all it can to put an end to such docility?

But it is not enough for the Church to be a learning Church and clothe itself in the humility of the true inquirer. If it is rightly to fulfil its teaching function it must turn its eyes from the superficial and unimportant matters that have too largely absorbed its attention and must grapple with really fundamental questions. A frequent criticism brought against the Church by the soldiers, according to both reports, is its failure to throw light upon the burning problems forced upon men's minds by the war. Questions of polity and ritual and doctrine, interesting enough to the theologian and the sectary, but wholly foreign to the average man; questions of ecclesiastical authority, of Biblical inspiration, of historical criticism, all these have their place. But there are times—and this is one of them—when they pale into insignificance beside the greater questions of human life and destiny: the spiritual interpretation of the world in which we live; the possibility of believing in God at all in such a world; the reality of human freedom and responsibility; the validity of religious and moral values; the nature of the Christian ideal and its practicability in this modern, materialistic, mechanistic age. It may be retorted that such problems as these are as old as human history, and that Christianity has dealt with them over and over again and disposed of them for good. But the retort is misplaced. Most of the questions that agitate philosophers are hoary with antiquity, but they have to be studied afresh age by age in the light of the new experiences and achievements of the race. Christianity cannot escape the responsibility to reconsider its own traditional solutions. It has taken too much for granted and has allowed itself to become absorbed in things of lesser weight, on the assumption that the greater things were settled long ago. The assumption was never less warranted than now. We have got to re-think the fundamentals of Christianity and of all religion, and in the re-thinking we shall find emerging many things that were not dreamed of in our ancient theologies.

The note of unreality in contemporary Christianity is

frequently commented on in the quotations from the soldiers. What does that mean but that Christianity is dealing too much with issues that are no longer living issues for the mass of men? One trouble is that the things the Church is saying seem to multitudes of so little consequence. It is not that they seem untrue but that they seem remote and, even if true, not worth bothering about. If the Church is to regain any measure of its one-time leadership it must grapple with living problems that make a difference in the life of the world. Not that it should deal with all the passing questions of the day. Many of them it may best leave severely alone. But that it should concern itself above all with the great underlying principles upon which all life must ultimately be built for good or ill. More theology we need, in my opinion, not less—a theology that takes things seriously and is not the mere child and handmaiden of some economic or social programme.

The earnestness with which scientists are continually testing and re-testing their fundamental assumptions is worthy of all praise. Christian teachers, dealing as they do with issues of even greater moment, should emulate their example. Too commonly we are only dilettanti in our chosen field. We must come to grips with bottom facts even at the risk of making mistakes. Knowledge progresses by error, and the Church ought not to be afraid of it. It is a great curse to be thought infallible, for you have to be so careful lest you betray your fallibility. The Vatican dogma of papal infallibility, from which so much was expected by many of the faithful, seems only to have condemned the successor of Peter to inglorious silence.

If what I have been saying is true, it is evident that the Church to-day is most in need not of administrators, and not of pastors, and not of preachers, but of teachers. Of course I do not mean mere occupants of professorial chairs, but those who, whatever their official position, whether in pulpit or pastorate or college or seminary, are equipped to discover and interpret the truth. In their hands is the real leadership of the future. In the early Church the apostles, prophets, and teachers were the recognised leaders because it was believed they spoke for God, whose will was the law of the Church. When Christianity was well established and its principles had become stereotyped the teacher was of less importance and the ecclesiastic took his place. At the Reformation, leadership passed again for a season to the teacher, the discoverer and promulgator of truth. But once more the truth was made safe by the formulations of the creeds, and the ecclesiastic

assumed his wonted control. Now again, as in other critical and creative epochs, it is the teacher's opportunity; for it is not the spread of the Church as it is that the world most needs to-day, but a reinterpretation of Christianity which shall make it once more mighty for the regeneration of humanity.

The Church's most pressing problem is to find the needed teachers. How is it to get them? Only as it can convince the rising generation of the reality of the need and the genuineness of the opportunity—that the need is the world's and not the Church's need alone, and that the opportunity is not hedged about with restrictions created by timidity and fear, but is as open as the vast realm of truth itself. For some reason, as is made manifest again and again in the British and American reports, the world outside the Church thinks that the Church cares less to discover truth than to confirm the truth it already has. In some way or other we must convince the world that it is wrong in this opinion. When we have succeeded in doing that we shall not lack leaders, and right-minded men everywhere will again gladly look to the Church for the leadership they need in the things of the spirit.

A. C. M'GIFFERT.

NEW YORK.

MIRACLE AND PROPHECY.

THE LATE WALTER F. ADENEY, M.A., D.D.

THE present generation has witnessed a revolution in Christian Apologetics. All down the ages until the later part of the nineteenth century the main defence of the truth of Christianity rested on the two pillars, miracle and prophecy. Paley's *Evidences* carried the old method on into our own times by being used as a University examination text-book—a soul-destroying futility. Meanwhile more recent productions with fresh handling of the whole subject have laid increasing stress on pragmatic, moral, and spiritual considerations. A good illustration of this new tendency may be seen in Bruce's *Apologetics* (International Theological Library). The innovation has come none too soon, and it must go further, because criticism is emulating the feat of Samson in the temple of Dagon with its treatment of the two old pillars on which have been piled the massive structure of orthodox theology.

It is true that some of those arguments which can be better appreciated to-day were not wholly unknown to antiquity. That second-century work, the beautiful little *Apology* of Aristides, calls attention to the innocent character of the Christians and their kindly conduct; Tertullian appeals to the *Anima naturaliter Christiana*; Lactantius makes much of the moral grounds of belief; and indeed it may be allowed that no apologist has been so foolish as to neglect them entirely. Nevertheless they were relegated to a secondary place, and the most earnest attention of the apologists was always focussed on their two favourite witnesses, miracle and prophecy.

In the earliest times the precedence was given to prophecy. This is seen in the New Testament, the Apostles and the gospel witness repeatedly appealing to the realisation of passages quoted from Hebrew Scriptures in confirmation and explanation of their statements. Seeing that some of them

claimed to possess the charisma of miracle-working, it is very noteworthy that for the most part they made singularly little use of it in the way of evidence. The author of the Fourth Gospel is the one exception to this reticence—a perplexing phenomenon, seeing that he goes deeper than any other New Testament writer into the spiritual nature of Christianity. Accordingly one able critic thinks he detects a later editor in the author of these appeals to miracles in the Johannine literature. It was the same with the patristic apologists—Justin Martyr, Origen, Eusebius, Augustine, and others, with all of whom the fulfilment of prophecy is the dominant topic of appeal for credence to the Christian Message.

When we turn to the eighteenth century, that golden age of English apologetic theology, we find the centre of gravity shifted from prophecy to miracle. If only Hume can succeed in destroying belief in the physical marvels of the Bible, the citadel of the faith would seem to be lost. On the other hand, if Paley can so marshal the evidence as to convince a British jury that they actually happened, Christianity is to be accepted as a revelation from Heaven.

It needs no discussion to show that neither of these lines of argument grips the age in which we live, and indeed it is no longer possible to use them as they were employed by our forefathers. Then what place, if any, should the two subjects—miracle and prophecy—take in Christian theology?

1. MIRACLE.

No one can deny that the attitude of thinking people towards this subject has undergone a tremendous change during the present generation. Until recently we were complacently invited to believe in Christianity because of its miracles. To-day the very reverse of this position is adopted, and some declare that they have renounced the gospel message for the very reason that it is miraculous—as, for instance, the melancholy Robert Elsmere, who becomes an unbeliever in orthodox church theology because “miracles do not happen.” Others claim a stalwart faith when accepting Christianity in spite of its miraculous element: this element perplexes them; they would much rather it did not exist. But they yield their reluctant credence to it for the sake of the spiritual truth with which it seems to be bound up. Others, again, take a bolder course, eliminate the miracles, and breathe freely in the pellucid atmosphere of their expurgated Bible.

The questions that here arise are much more complicated

than those of the times of Celsus, Voltaire, or even of Hume. In the first place, there is the critical inquiry into the comparative authority of the various Biblical documents and their sources. For example, in dealing with the Pentateuch we find the first literary draft of the Hebrew legends in "J" dated about the ninth century B.C., the Deuteronomic sections, "D," from the seventh, and the Priestly, "P," from the fifth centuries. Evidently these successive strata must vary in historical value. But the very earliest of them are hundreds of years later than the persons and events to which they refer, and the bridging of that dim intermediate period we can only assign to unveritable tradition. How entirely different is the case of the gospel history recorded by contemporaries who had eye-witnesses for their authorities. Then we have the contributions of ethnology and comparative religion with the myths and legends of the early national history of other peoples to compare with the primitive Hebrew stories. The researches of Sir James Frazer throw a flood of light on this subject. We cannot ignore his striking analogies. But now, taking the Bible narrative as it stands, a little consideration should lead us to discriminate between the many different kinds of marvels, all of which the apologists have been accustomed to label with the one title "miracle." That the priests by bearing the ark into the bed of the Jordan should arrest the flow of the river is one thing, and that Jesus should hearten a man with a withered arm to straighten it is another; and it only confuses the issue to set them both in the same category as is done in a list of "Bible Miracles." Nevertheless, with regard to the gospel story itself, we should do well to bear in mind Dr Sanday's caution that, if the occurrences there recorded had been reported by modern scientific observers, probably their accounts of them would have been very different from the New Testament narratives. Even here, where the evidence comes so near to the event, we have to consider questions of exactness of observation, correctness of memory, and accuracy in recording—all on the part of simple folk who are quite ready to believe in marvels, and who have no conception of the uniformity of natural law, while their admiration for their Lord and Master is most enthusiastic.

On the other hand, the scornful attitude of arid rationalism argues limited mentality. The question is too complicated. It seems to be impossible even to frame any adequate definition of the word "miracle." The New Testament has three words for occurrences we have been accustomed to designate miraculous, viz. *δύναμις*, *σημείον*, and *τέρας*—rendered

respectively "mighty work" and "miracle"—literally "power," "sign," and "wonder," none of them terms of any very specific application. The first meaning of the English word "miracle" in the *Oxford Dictionary* is "marvellous event due to some supernatural agency." But here we have another word very difficult of definition—the word "supernatural." The eighteenth-century notion of miracle as a breach of the laws of Nature—adopted by Hume—has been generally abandoned because it involves an unproven assumption. The more modest science of our own day declines to set any limit to the powers and possibilities of Nature. An age that has witnessed the discovery of radium and X-rays, and seen the invention of the wireless telegraph and telephone, would indeed be foolish if it pretended to say what could and what could not happen without any disturbance of the course of Nature. Nor is this all; that bed-rock of science, the theory of the uniformity of Nature, is now recognised to be the result of an empirical induction, which by the nature of the case must be imperfect.

Hume's argument on the ground of probabilities may be irrefragable, so long as we grant his data and allow no more. But here another phase of philosophy comes to be observed. The sharp distinction between bodily and mental, physical and spiritual, has broken down. The materialistic conception of the universe advocated by Tyndall, Clifton, and Hæckel is giving place, under the influence of Bergson, Eucken, and other more recent and metaphysical thinkers, to the idea of mentality as the primary factor of existence; so that we must interpret matter in terms of mind, rather than mind in terms of matter, as the materialists had attempted when saying that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." Lastly, in this connection we have to take note of the study of psychotherapeutics, now only in its infancy. There seems to be no known limits to the operations of hypnotism, curative suggestion, telepathy, the influence of one mind on another mind, and also the influence of a mind on the body with which it is connected. When, therefore, we read of a personality so unique as that of Jesus Christ being associated with wonderful cases of the healing of sickness and insanity, we may well pause before relegating the many stories of the kind, so well attested in the gospels, to the limbo of baseless superstition. We might be wiser if we followed the hints which He Himself has given us, and if we therefore aimed in our more limited sphere at some humble following of the great deeds which He said He effected "by the finger of God."

Now, with this conspectus of the case in view, the question returns as to what is the significance and value of it for Christian faith? Here we cannot do better than turn to Christ's own treatment of the subject. It is quite clear that He scarcely attached any importance to His miracles as evidences of the soundness of His claims when pressing His teaching home to the people.¹ If they asked for a sign, He flatly refused to give it them. The expression, "a sign from Heaven," seems to indicate something more startling and portentous than those works of healing—perhaps something like the manna to which reference is made in the Capernaum discourse of the Fourth Gospel, or possibly Elijah's sign of the fire on the altar at Carmel, seeing that our Lord's mission had come to be associated with the name of that prophet. This shows that while no one doubted the reality of His wonderful cures, they did not convince people of the genuineness of His mission. Why should they? The exorcising was assigned to Satanic agency. He Himself spoke of exorcism as being carried on by His opponents, and the deliverance of demoniacs was the most frequent and best known of His curative works. Matthew declares that when at Nazareth He could not do many mighty works because of the citizens' unbelief (Matt. xiii. 58). If the miracles were designed to instil faith, that unbelief would have been the very reason why He should have produced them there. Moreover, while the apologetic argument is not given as His aim, another motive is clearly assigned by Matthew—this is, that He was "moved with compassion." Here is a plain, simple, perfectly intelligible explanation of how it was that He came to spend so much of His time and energy in healing the sick. To give an apologetic or didactic meaning to His action is to take the bloom off His gracious ministry. He saw suffering; He was conscious of power to remove it; therefore His immeasurable compassionateness drove Him to respond to every appeal for relief.

Shall we then say that all this was but a kind of by-product of His ministry, of no significance in view of its world-wide and age-long purpose? That would lead us to conclude that His sympathy with what came immediately under His eyes was largely distracting His attention from the real object of His mission, and so suggest an appearance of sentimentalism.

¹ It is true that He seems to point to His miracles in His message to John the Baptist (Matt. xi. 4-6). But His inclusion of preaching the gospel to the poor as one of His "signs" may suggest a metaphorical meaning in the other phrases. Anyhow, the case is exceptional.

Florence Nightingale must not spend too much time as "the lady of the lamp" nursing the sick if she is to accomplish her stern task of saving an army from stupid incompetence. But suppose we ask ourselves, how did our Lord propose to accomplish His great work? The answer may well be that this was mainly by the very living of His life as the brother-man in the spirit of love to God and one's neighbour which He taught as of primary importance. His cure of a few scores or hundreds of Jews scarcely touched the fringe of the great world's misery. But in doing what He could within His influence Jesus did His part, and as He gathered followers it would be that they within the range of their powers should do their parts, and thus as the spirit of His life spread abroad the kingdom of God would be growing in power and transforming the world into the new heaven and new earth. This may be a very superficial view, but it may help us towards ascertaining the true value of our Lord's deeds of mercy.

No doubt this view of the place of miracle in relation to religion, especially as it cannot but assign the magnificent pageantry of Old Testament supernaturalism—the wonder of our childhood—to the category of unhistoric legend, will appear to impoverish the Bible. But what does it take away? A wholly materialistic treasure, at which the ignorant and shallow gape in awestruck wonder, but which is of no moral or spiritual value. When Aaron's rod, turned into a serpent, swallows the serpents which have been produced by Pharaoh's magicians out of their rods, this might seem to show that Hebrew magic was stronger than Egyptian magic, but it could neither prove the moral right of Moses' demands nor the truth of his religion. There is no reason to think that the real value of the Old Testament is lessened by criticism of its physical marvels. On the contrary, the fascinations of those marvels had turned our attention away from the weighty matters for which we should prize the Hebrew Scriptures. A great nature poem such as Psalm civ. is of more religious significance than Miriam's song in celebration of a physical wonder. Indeed, the old orthodoxy leads to the melancholy conclusion that "There hath passed away a glory from the earth" because we do not enjoy the privileges attributed to antiquity. Besides, it implies that Christians are less favoured than Jesus had been. The mighty arm outstretched for the deliverance of Israel is not raised to save the Armenians from slaughter. Thus there is a double preference—a preference of antiquity to modern times and of Judaism to Christianity. Accordingly, those Old Testament marvels, if proved to be

historical, would tend to discourage present faith by the comparison of the sublime past of Israel with the mournful fate of modern Christendom. But now we are learning to perceive the most valuable parts of the Old Testament to be those sublime utterances of the prophets which set before us great ethical and religious verities, by their very nature eternal, and as serviceable to us as they were to the Israelites of the past.

Then as regards miracle in the New Testament, while the unique personality of Jesus Christ may well induce us to believe in the unique character of His actions, we can gather from His own teaching that He would not have this so completely without parallel as we have been accustomed to suppose. He conferred the gift of healing on His disciples. There are those among us who hold that He intended it to be practised continuously, that it has only been lost by failure of faith, and that it might be recovered—and perhaps in some cases has been recovered—by a reawakening of this primary requisite.

2. PROPHECY.

The apologists have treated prophecy in much the same way as that in which they have been accustomed to deal with miracle—they have valued it mainly as a phenomenon indicative of supernatural agency. The prophet has been regarded as a man gifted with capacity to write history in advance of the events he described as predestined to happen. The subsequent verification of his predictions by the occurrence of those events has then been appealed to as a miraculous proof of the divine authority of those statements. Now with regard to this treatment of prophecy two remarks may here be made. First, if the logic of the implied argument is allowed, that will not amount to a proof of the truth of the later Christian message; it will only go to the credit of the type of Hebrew religion represented by the prophets; in other words, the conclusion pointed to will be not faith in Christ, but faith in Isaiah, Jeremiah, and their confrères. Second, the gift of “second sight” penetrating into the future is no proof of the moral or spiritual value of the general teaching of the men who enjoyed it, nor even of their veracity. We cannot say that because Balaam foresaw the future greatness of Israel his religious teaching in Mesopotamia or Moab was true and weighty.

But now, even within the circle of the marvellous, and when that is valued for the sake of its marvels, the argument very often breaks down. Fragments of Old Testament litera-

ture, torn from their contexts, have been cited as aptly fitting New Testament events, to which we must say that they certainly were not applied by the writers, even if the gift of prevision were possessed by those writers, for the reason that the much simpler interpretation of them as referring to contemporary or older events is plainly indicated. For example, the author of our First Gospel sees in the flight of Joseph and Mary with the child Jesus a fulfilment of the prophet's saying, "Out of Egypt did I call my son" (see Matt. ii. 15 and Hosea xi. 1). But the passage in Hosea shows clearly that the original reference was to the exodus of Israel under Moses. Similarly, that evangelist's treatment of Judas' thirty pieces of silver (Matt. xxvii. 9) as a fulfilment of the prophecy in Jeremiah (cited from Zech. xi. 13; with a reference to Jeremiah xxxii. 6-9) and the disposal of Christ's garments as described in the gospel of John (xix. 24), there regarded as having been foreshadowed in scripture—viz. Psalm xxii. 18—are both instances of a new application of Old Testament words which were evidently intended for contemporary reference without the least thought of the meaning subsequently given to them in the New Testament. Plainly the claim to fulfilment of prophecy based on any such accidental coincidences, while allowable according to the quaint methods of Rabbinical interpretation, are inadmissible under the rules of scientific exegesis. But these coincidences were never important, and the apologist can afford to lose them, while he cherishes the great prophecies, the contents of which are of inestimable value, namely, those which express spiritual and ethical truths and their issues—the essential "burdens" of Hebrew prophecy.

Now, when we come to inquire into the relation of these sublime utterances to Christian truth, we find that we must take up a different ground from that of the old apologists if we are to adhere to sound methods of literary interpretation. In the first place, we see that the most characteristic feature of the prophetic mind was the gift of insight rather than that of foresight. The popular prophet is a person who foretells the future. But even in the form of the utterances only a small fraction of Hebrew prophecy is expressed in the future tense. Most of it is concerned with present affairs, and its greatest productions set forth eternal truths, truth independent of time. The prophets tear up the veil of hypocrisy and shatter the fabric of self-delusion, making a terrible exposure of the condition of their contemporary world, with penetrating insight into human nature. This gives a prophecy the value of an articulate conscience. But the prophets do not stay with

mere exposure and denunciation. Speaking in the name of Jehovah, they declare the counsels of God as these are revealed to them; in other words, they have inspired visions of spiritual truth. This statement demands no formal verification. It is of the nature of such truth to be self-evident when once it is brought home to our awakened spiritual nature, and that is what the dogmatic form of Hebrew prophecy assumes. Then, on the rock of this revelation of God's eternal verities faith builds its hope for the future. The greatest utterances of the prophets point on with assurance to judgment and redemption. The essential idea is that God being what He is, just and good, mighty and merciful, He will not, cannot let the wrongs of the world go on unchecked, or its desperate needs unsatisfied. The golden legend of the Davidian Age associates the future deliverance with a restoration of the royal line in a descendant of the idealised son of Jesse. This is the sum and substance of Hebrew prophecy in so far as it concerns the future. Meanwhile questions of dates and other formal details among which our modern prophecy-mongers revel have really no place here. Products of idle fancy, they are irrelevant and unimportant.

Now we come to the fulfilment of this prophecy as a confirmation of the Christian gospel. Here we must reverse the common process of argument. Instead of asserting that the prophets foresaw what Jesus would be and do, in some cases down to minutest details, we have to turn the case round and say that He endorsed the great ideas of the prophets, and moulded His course of action upon the programme with which they furnished Him, and that He did this deliberately and discriminately, selecting those prophecies with which He was most in sympathy and working on the lines which they had laid down.

We have two palpable illustrations of this method. The first is in our Lord's discourse at Nazareth, when He selected a passage from Deutero-Isaiah and declared that the Spirit of God was upon Him in order that He might do the things there promised (see Luke iv. 17-21 and Isaiah lxi. 1, 2). It was not that the prophet had foretold what the Christ was destined to do; it was that Jesus adopted this prophet's scheme, and was proceeding to carry it out.

The second illustration is seen in the story of the triumphal entry. This was carefully arranged by our Lord down to the method of obtaining the loan of a colt from some friend in a neighbouring village. Matthew rightly detected a fulfilment of prophecy (see Matt. xxi. 4, 5 and Zech. ix. 9). But every-

thing in the story indicates, not that Zechariah had a vision of Jesus riding on the ass, but that our Lord chose this, for Him, quite unusual mode of entrance into Jerusalem, in order that at the very last, abandoning His habitual secrecy about His claims, He might declare Himself as the expected Christ, but without adopting the popular Messianic militarism. Instead of the war-horse on which a conquering monarch would be expected to enter His capital, the prophet depicts the great Deliverer coming in a gentle way of peaceful travel. This ideal Jesus now publicly undertakes to realise.

This fulfilment of prophecy as a programme intentionally adopted and voluntarily carried out by Jesus, rather than as the mere happening of things predicted ages before, is of much higher value as a testimony to the truth of Christianity than the old apologetic view. That view, as we saw, went to glorify the Hebrew prophecy itself rather than the Christian gospel. It was a mere marvel of no moral or spiritual value. But now, in seeing the programme of prophecy carried out by Christ, we have a splendid testimony to the character of His gospel. In the prophets we have set forth the world's desperate need, and over against that the revelation of the very heart of God which assuredly promises redemption from present evils. Then comes Christ, facing that dark problem of evil which the prophets expounded so terribly, and setting Himself to bring about the promised deliverance. In so far as His message is received, and blind eyes are opened and captive souls set at liberty, this programme is fulfilled, and Christ is seen to be realising the brightest dreams of the world's greatest seers.

WALTER F. ADENEY.

LEWES.

THE CLAIMS OF SCHOLASTICISM ON MODERN THOUGHT.

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

IN the period after the death of the Apostles, a vast number of theological problems presented themselves to the early Church, and for several hundred years controversy as to the substance of the deposit of faith did not cease. Scholasticism is a term of wide meaning applied in a general way to Western European thought from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries. By Scholasticism is meant the method of presenting Catholic faith which takes the substance—revealed truth,—arranges all the data of religion under a well-knit system of theology, and reserves to philosophy the task of arranging these truths in their logical connection, deducing inferences, solving difficulties, and harmonising apparent discrepancies. In a word, it designates both a method and a system that grew out of the academic curriculum of the schools.

It is necessary to call attention to the fact that Scholasticism deals with the divine as well as the human, with the theological and ecclesiastical as well as with questions of philosophy and natural science. At the same time it did not fail to distinguish between these two sides of truth, one of which it called revelation and the other reason. While it was the essence of Scholasticism to maintain the agreement of the two, it was equally essential to hold that there is a distinction between them. Nowadays, Scholasticism is accused of undue subservience to authority, and represented as an ambitious attempt to rationalise all religious as well as purely scientific thought. In the philosophic part of the work the Scholastics accepted Aristotle as their guide. St Anselm of Canterbury was the forerunner of the Scholastics inasmuch as he applied philosophy to the doctrines of religion, without founding a connected system of theology. Anselm was the

first writer to state the ontological proof of the existence of God, and he was also the founder of Scholastic realism, the theory (derived mainly from Plato) that universals are real archetypes of the particular things, and that the particulars are mere copies of these universals. He found a brilliant imitator in the genius of Abelard, whose lectures at Paris and elsewhere drew large numbers of students, but Abelard's teaching soon led to heresy. It was St Bernard of Clairvaux who by his trenchant logic and inspired eloquence averted the danger, and Abelard died reconciled to the Church. But the real originator of Scholasticism was Peter Lombard and the great friar doctors of the thirteenth century. The most prominent of these were Alexander of Hales in Gloucestershire, a locality no longer identifiable (*doctor irrefragilis*, died 1245); Blessed Albertus Magnus, Bishop of Ratisbon (*doctor universalis*, 1193-1280); St Bonaventure, the biographer of St Francis Assisi (*doctor seraphicus*, 1221-1274); among the great theologians were John Duns Scotus (*doctor subtilis*, 1266-1308) and the English Franciscan, Roger Bacon. But the greatest of all was the Dominican, St Thomas Aquinas (*doctor angelicus*, 1225-1274), who surpassed all by the depths of his speculation, the clarity of his method, and the extent of his learning. His *Summa* has to the present day remained the standard work of Scholastic philosophy and theology. And the long line of Schoolmen was closed by William of Occam (1280-1347), the invincible doctor who revived the nominalist views.

Scholasticism has taught students to think, to distinguish carefully the meaning of technical words, to systematise knowledge. Its greatest exponent, St Thomas, brought Christianity into closer relations with civilisation and with science, and, while fully protecting the ascendancy of religion, he also awarded to the other departments of life their respective rights. In fact, the very essence of Scholasticism is, first, its clear delimitation of the respective domains of philosophy and theology, and, second, its advocacy of the use of reason.

The world to-day feels more than ever the need of a philosophy which is, at one and the same time, true to all the facts of human experience, which gives an adequate account and explanation of the things that are, and which also safeguards the great and immutable principles of justice and moral law. The world is alive to the dangers of the Gospel of Might, and is ready to receive a Gospel of Right in its place. Mankind cannot live and exist without a philosophy, and we may venture to hope that one of the results of the recent war will

be a return on the part of European thought to those sane principles of Scholastic philosophy which alone offer a satisfactory basis for human knowledge and human activity.

The unhistorical neo-Thomism has often caused the original and genuine system to be depreciated. That St Thomas stood at the summit of intellectual development of his age is convincingly shown by Dante's recognition of him.

St Thomas is one of the great reconcilers, of that order of spirits who have no rest until they discern truths, seemingly at strife together, converging towards and merging in truth itself, the ineffable. One can readily imagine him anything but dismayed at the present results of physical science. Like Aristotle (whom he knew only through a Latin translation), his master, he would eagerly and promptly apply to them his doctrine of "form" and "matter." Truth, to him, would still be the equation of perfect assimilation of the subject knowing with the object known. And in solving riddles offered him he would still have pursued his method of careful equilibration, of balancing between conflicting statements. He cherishes the medium between extremes. Nominalists and Realists might contend; he is with both parties, and with neither. He seeks that higher truth which, haply, should satisfy. And, as is ever the case with the conciliatory, he is claimed by all parties in turn; declared to be inconsistent; praised or blamed for inveterate scepticism. For philosophy, pure and well reasoned, founded on the broad basis of scientific fact, is the greatest human asset in the life and development of any individual, or of any community.

It may be remarked that opinions are often determined more by intelligent anticipation of antecedent probabilities than by a careful examination of facts. And it must be confessed that it does not seem very likely that the writings of St Thomas should be studied or held in high esteem by our non-Catholic philosophers. Even among Catholics there was some need of a movement of revival in Thomistic studies. And if the orthodox had, apparently, been guilty of some neglect in this matter, it can scarcely be supposed that the writings of the Angelic Doctor have been duly esteemed and attentively studied by Protestants and unbelievers. And beyond all this, we have the patent historical fact that, as a result of the Renaissance and the Reformation, the old Schoolmen were deliberately dethroned and rejected, and their names were made a byword for sophistry and hair-splitting and foolish disputation. Nor can it be supposed that their philosophy fared any better than their doctrine and

their Latin style. For did not Bacon come to complete the work of the Humanists and Reformers, and set a new inductive philosophy in the place of the discredited mediæval metaphysics? Surely, a contemptuous treatment of the Schoolmen is one of the characteristics of English Protestant tradition.

Apart from the anti-Catholic prejudice which, as Mr Belloc reminds us, has prevented St Thomas from taking his rightful place in English philosophical studies, the philosophy of the Schoolmen has also suffered undeserved disparagement and neglect from other causes which, though often combined with the *odium theologicum*, are really distinct and independent. "It is idle to indulge in visions of hypothetical history," writes an anonymous critic, "yet it may be safely said that the authority of the mediæval masters would have suffered some decline in England even if the religious revolution of the sixteenth century had never taken place at all, or had never affected this country. For we have abundant evidence of what may be called a pre-Reformation depreciation of Scholasticism, both here and on the Continent, largely due to two main causes—to wit, a natural reaction arising from certain excesses of the latter Scholastic disputants, and the rivalry and hostility of the new Humanist scholars." The influence of both these diverse forces may be clearly seen in the brilliant pages of More and Erasmus. And as this estrangement from Scholastic tradition, to use no stronger term, began before the rise of Protestantism, it can scarcely surprise us to find some traces of it in Catholic lands and in our own theological literature. One may remember how Huxley, nearly fifty years ago, complained, on the one hand, that every day he heard "'Cause,' 'Law,' 'Force,' 'Vitality,' spoken of as entities by people who can enjoy Swift's joke about the meat-roasting quality of the smoke-jack, and comfort themselves with the reflection that they are not even as those benighted Schoolmen." And, on the other hand, he allowed that Scholasticism was anything but dead, and that men of the highest calibre "hold by it as the best theory of things that has yet been stated." All Scholastic philosophy is based upon the distinction between *matter* and *form*. Modern thought makes light of the difference. Likewise, we must bear in mind the distinctions of *substance* and *accident*.

In his candid *Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, Sir James Mackintosh—the redoubted antagonist of Edmund Burke, the man for whose memory Macaulay had such a profound reverence that he was once nearly driven to vindicate it on the field of honour—certainly speaks of

St Thomas with great respect. And he seems to have studied his writings so carefully that he discovered therein an unnoticed anticipation of the controversies of Bossuet and Fénelon. "It is very remarkable," he writes, "though hitherto unobserved, that Aquinas anticipated those controversies respecting perfect disinterestedness in the religious affections which occupied the most illustrious members of his communion four hundred years after his death; and that he discussed the like question respecting the other affections of human nature with a fulness and clearness, an exactness of distinction, and a justness of determination, scarcely surpassed by the most acute of modern philosophers." As, in spite of all this high praise, Mackintosh endorses some of the conventional censures on the Scholastic system, his tribute to St Thomas might, perhaps, be dismissed as inconsistent, and merely an individual eccentricity. But he forestalls this objection by assuring us that all the great men who knew his writings spoke in his praise: "The praises bestowed on Aquinas by every one of the few great men who appear to have examined his writings since the downfall of his power, among whom may be mentioned Erasmus, Grotius, and Leibniz, are chiefly, though not solely, referable to his ethical works." And even opponents cannot deny that St Thomas is the master of precision and analytic subtlety. How many systems of philosophy perish for the want of clarity! How profound the groan of foreigners over German thought! On the other hand, Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Mill are indebted in some measure to their style.

It was, however, in 1879 that Pope Leo XIII. gave impulse by his encyclical *Aeterni Patris* to the renewed study of Scholasticism, and above all of St Thomas Aquinas. The philosophy of the Angelic Doctor was freely admitted to be one of the chief marvels of the ages miscalled the Dark. It could be admired in the way of an incomparable cathedral. More than this, it was now claimed that the majestic monument was capable of being restored and adapted to the requirements of our own times. The encyclical describing Christian philosophy as Scholastic urged the renewed study and application of Scholasticism, especially as synthetised by St Thomas Aquinas. Side by side with the lessons of ancient wisdom, it also advocated the full use of recent discoveries in the natural and social sciences, from which treasures might be drawn "equally profitable to religion and society."

Science and philosophy are each of them autonomous. Truth is truth, from whatever source it comes, and cannot be

opposed to itself. But what of the supposed subservience of philosophy to theology in the Middle Ages? Is this to be renewed in modern times? Cardinal Mercier and his colleagues go upon the old distinction, recognised in the Middle Ages, between philosophical and religious dogma. Their "Rational Dogmatism," as the tendency of neo-Scholasticism may be termed, is philosophical, not theological. The relations of philosophy and theology are as those of philosophy and science; autonomy, self-determination, is the order of the day. It is not the business of the philosopher to vindicate the certainty of theological data or of scientific conclusions. And may we not add, in the way of comment, that this is fair dealing, however it may lend itself, upon various issues, to those subtleties of control and interpretation which came into view, for example, in controversies between the Ultramontanes and the Agnostics of the last generation, or indeed at any period from the Renaissance onward to the present?

It would be difficult to conceive a more demonstrative object-lesson of the hopeless bankruptcy of the philosophies that have reigned in Great Britain from Hume to Herbert Spencer. Assuredly this should be a hopeful season for urging by every means in our power the claims of an old philosophy that justifies our trust in our intellectual faculties, that provides a solid foundation for the ethical convictions of mankind, that satisfies the religious instincts of our nature, and that finally furnishes a coherent rational theory of life for the human race—for the individual, for the family, and for the State. We are living in an age in which the critical faculty far overweighs the constructive, when we can see the faults of what exists and expose them, and see and appreciate all kinds and sides of truth very much more effectively than we can build systems which can commend themselves constructively. We do not say that a critical age is more intellectual or exhibits more intellectual power than a constructive age; but they are different. The great power of St Thomas Aquinas to construct a great system intellectually, which takes account of all the known facts, and which commends itself to a great circle of people, and becomes their adequate intellectual expression—that sort of constructive power we do not appear to possess, at any rate in large measure.

Philosophy is, indeed, perennial, alike stable and full of change. Duly recognising our human limitations, we had best accept the words of Bossuet: "We must not loose hold of any truths which we know for certain, whatever difficulty

there may be in reconciling some of them with others; we must, so to speak, hold on tightly to both ends of the chain, though we cannot see the middle of it, nor follow it with our eyes from end to end." Philosophy must for ever start from the facts of which it claims to give an adequate explanation. In other words, philosophy is not, and should not be, divorced from the particular sciences; it must, on the contrary, go to them for its facts, and keep in touch with their developments. There are also the relations of the new philosophy with its competitors, and with the data of science. Philosophy, to Cardinal Mercier, is "the full understanding of the order in the universe, of man's moral duties resulting from it, and of his knowledge and reality." Philosophy is science "at its highest degree of perfection, that knowledge which penetrates to the bottom." Other knowledge grows from more to more, and also the knowledge of human limitations. Systems perish. Truth, philosophy, are ideals, to use Cardinal Mercier's words, "which in the present conditions of human life we can only approach and never attain."

During the last fifty years, successive Pontiffs have taken step after step to promote the teaching of the Scholastic philosophy in ecclesiastical seminaries. Their avowed object was to provide Catholics, and above all the priesthood, with a solid basis against the vagaries of modern idealism. A coherent system for present uses, it was urged, could be furnished by St Thomas alone. Aristotle, Plato, St Augustine—the "two Antiquities," Græco-Roman and Christian—were reconciled in the Thomistic philosophy. Here, if anywhere, the Christian philosophy which had been the perennial desideratum was adumbrated, if not fulfilled. But what of the modern natural sciences with their enormous reach? Philosophy was duly to be wedded to these very sciences. The ancient principles of Aristotle were of sole avail to interpret and assimilate the established data of science; indeed, it was only by their means that these data were explicable philosophically.

As for the suggestion that famous modern philosophers have appropriated some of the wisdom of St Thomas, we will quote the following testimony of Coleridge: "In consulting the excellent commentary of St Thomas Aquinas on the *Parva Naturalis* of Aristotle I was struck at once with its close resemblance to Hume's essay on Association. The main thoughts were the same in both, the *order* of the thoughts was the same, and even the illustrations differed only by Hume's occasional substitution of more modern examples. I

mentioned the circumstance to several of my literary acquaintances, who admitted the closeness of the resemblance, and that it seemed too great to be explained by mere coincidence; but they thought it improbable that Hume should have held the pages of the Angelic Doctor worth turning over." It will be enough here to remind the reader that modern Oxford has been guilty of "Scholasticism" in the person of one of her most eminent psychologists and mental philosophers—Dr M'Dougall in *Body and Soul*; that even the Dean of Carlisle has told us that another Dean of the fourteenth century, one Nicholas of Autrecourt, anticipated Bishop Berkeley; and we may ask whether Vitalists of to-day would have leapt from Aristotle to Van Helmont, had they studied the *Summa* of St Thomas Aquinas.

If in cultivating their own field with such conspicuous success the mediæval masters did nothing for those physical sciences which have made such rapid strides in a later age, it must, in fairness, be allowed that they did nothing to hinder or delay the progress of scientific inventions and discoveries. But it may be remembered that Pope Leo XIII., in his celebrated Encyclical on St Thomas and the Scholastic Philosophy, expressed a hope that the renewed cultivation of that philosophy would contribute to the progress of the sciences. Neo-Scholasticism is a brave challenge, a notable claim to reconcile science and metaphysics; philosophy must ever draw upon the results of the various sciences as they come to the view; and, the sciences of nature offering a shifting and progressive basis, how shall any synthesis be final? History humanity in the long run must judge. For the present, one could only state in more or less detail that Neo-Scholasticism is received with indifference, welcomed as helpful and adequate, rejected in haughty and hostile fashion. Science twits philosophy with being but poetry at the best, and philosophy bids science consider that it founds upon hypotheses, assumptions, fictions, thus fairly incurring its own reproach. One feels inclined to say that it would be difficult to find a closer approach to the scientific attitude of mind which Huxley described as ideal: "Sit down before the fact as a little child, be prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly wherever and to whatever abysses Nature leads, or you will learn nothing."

St Thomas sometimes consciously went beyond Aristotle. On the whole, he was more concerned to square Aristotle with Christian teaching than to square himself with the Stagirite.

The light of reason is as that of a lamp or of the sun, equally diffused on all sides and by its illumination permitting consideration of the whole circuit of the horizon. That of instinct is a straight, extremely narrow, and very brilliant beam. A philosopher ought not to get himself out of his difficulties by an appeal to theology, nor rest his thesis mainly on theological grounds. Philosophy should be proved by philosophy. But, once so proved, the proof may well be confirmed by theological considerations. It may safely be asserted that there is nothing in Scholasticism that is incompatible with the progress of the physical sciences. If the Middle Ages were comparatively poor in scientific discoveries and inventions, no serious historian of science would lay the blame on the dominant philosophy of the age. For the same comparative poverty is found in lands or in periods unaffected by the philosophy. And, from the nature of the case, the first stages in scientific discovery must be slow and gradual, while the pace is accelerated as facts accumulate and experience gives rise to improved methods of research. The new Scholasticism has abandoned such of its old doctrines as are now known to have been false, while retaining the great constitutive doctrines of the mediæval system, but only after their having stood the double test of comparison with the results of present-day science and with the teachings of contemporary systems of philosophy.

At a time when Empiricism is a dominant philosophy, when Agnosticism is trying to take the place of faith, it is fitting that we should know the common-sense of St Thomas. Those who have any acquaintance with the *Summa* can hardly fail to be struck by its strictly methodical and symmetrical arrangement. His style is distinguished by a manifold brevity. There is brevity in his word, in his phrase, in his paragraphs, in his articles. This has been justly noted as a proof of the author's architectonic genius—in the world of thought, alike to that of the contemporary architects who were building the great mediæval churches. Nor must it be believed that St Thomas is too conservative a mind for these progressive days. It was the error of the Scholastics to put too full a reliance on the secular philosophy, history, physics, and criticism of their own day, to be ever eager to enter into harmony with it, to regard their painfully wrought syntheses as final. Clinging to that belief, their successors were often disposed either to ignore the total change of position on the part of secular thought, or else to labour vainly to bring the world back to that philosophy which their syntheses supposed,

and for which alone it availed. Even our first principles now are beyond the daring conjectures of the early ages.

“What sages would have died to learn,
(Is) taught by cottage dames.”

Perhaps the full significance of a work like the *Summa* of St Thomas Aquinas is not often realised. The questioning of all things in heaven and earth that went on in many directions throughout the mediæval period is reflected in the objections which the author puts before every enunciation of a particular truth. And in, *e.g.*, the arguments which he states for belief in the existence of God, it is most interesting to notice how he confines himself to the use of what we call inductive methods, how he always tries to reason from the known to the unknown. Harnack, in his *History of Dogma*, says with justice that the science of the period when St Thomas lived was “in fetters.” Then he goes on to say: “The science of the Middle Ages gives practical proof of eagerness in thinking, and exhibits an energy in subjecting all that is real and valuable to thought, to which we can find, perhaps, no parallel in any other age.”

CLAUDE C. H. WILLIAMSON.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"EFFECTIVE IDEALISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 659.)

IN the article in question Mr F. R. Hoare seems to underrate the danger of taking neighbourly kindness for the whole duty of man. It would be easy to imagine (some of us may even think we have actually in some measure had experience of) a state of society in which such an imperfect ethic was in vogue; in which goodness and good-nature were confounded, and adherence to principle stigmatised as evidence of a cruel, perverse, even of a bad heart; in which the moral approval of the community went out, for instance, to the patron who considered the nearness and neediness of particular candidates for office above justice and the efficiency of the public service, or even to the professor who gave away examination secrets for the "benefit" of beloved pupils; where, in fact, the general attitude was roughly this, that here we all are under a malignant system to which we owe no loyalty, so that the most we can do is to relieve the misery it inflicts upon those immediately about us.

I do not, of course, accuse Mr Hoare of advocating any such attitude; I only say that his article suggested the above not entirely imaginary picture to the mind of one at least of his readers as inevitably as Sir Francis Younghusband's article apparently suggested to him his delightfully satirical picture of the dilettante pantheist.

What the good citizens of our philanthropical Utopia forgot was that one must not only love one's neighbour as oneself: one must also love God with all one's soul. This is the first and great commandment. Now, Mr Hoare, by doing his best to conceive God as a kind of big neighbour, does his best also to represent God-love as a kind of neighbour-love. As a pantheist, I feel that this identification is unfair. Surely the theistic notion of the love of God is nearer to the pantheistic mood than to the notion of ordinary neighbourliness. God-love may be nearer to neighbour-love than world-love often is, but surely God-love is itself nearer to world-love (I hope I make my proposition clear without a diagram) than it ever is

to neighbour-love. God-love and world-love supply the same necessary corrective to neighbour-love. The real rivalry seems to lie between God-love and world-love.

Now, nobody denies the emotional appeal of the idea of loving and being beloved by a personal God; but what becomes of that appeal if the idea itself fails to satisfy the intellect? This is the question which the modern moralist has to face. Moreover, it is hard to see how a consciousness of the special and personal interest in oneself of a being who is also specially and personally interested in everyone else in the world, born and unborn, besides having the sparrows, the lilies, and the angels to consider—how such a consciousness, even if it can be induced, is calculated to stimulate a rational mind more than the thought, say, of a system favourable to the best that is in us. How much, I mean, of the monotheistic fervour of the past has not been fiercely stimulated by the thought that the worshipper was in some way, racially or individually, the elect and chosen of a partial Deity? The fact is, we are driven more and more to seek our corrective to mere human kindness in some such pantheistic notion, however sentimentally chilly it may feel at first.

To make the world-lover a worshipper of his own ease, as Mr Hoare does, is surely a gratuitous unkindness! It is easy to caricature the moral impulse in any form; Mr Hoare's own busy Samaritan might in the same spirit very well be represented as prompted by a subconscious sense that he is somehow feathering his own nest, and making friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness. To judge as good and just those qualities in others and those aspects of the universe which suit our private ends is a deep-down human instinct, not confined to, nor even most commonly noticeable in, such imaginative types of mind as find inspiration in world-consciousness. Only the man who makes the highest ends his own is worth hearing on the subject of human virtue and of the "goodness" of the world. Whether such a man be prompted chiefly by world-love or by neighbour-love is mainly a matter of temper and brain; but in the one case his neighbour-love will be more discreet than that of ordinary men, in the other his world-love more abiding and effective.

OSWALD COULDREY.

ABINGDON.

"MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 776.)

It would be difficult for any Christian psychologist to find himself in disagreement with the general conclusions of this article. There are, however, particular points which seem to be open to more or less serious criticism.

The first point is a psychological one of no great importance to the argument. The author says that "stored within the psyche . . . is the whole record, without exception, of every experience the individual has ever passed through." Now, it is true that many apparently lost memories can be shown to be really stored in the unconscious mind, but there is absolutely no evidence for the extreme statement that no memory is ever lost. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine any observation which could be devised to prove it. Freud, who has particularly emphasised the

importance of unconsciously stored memories, points out that the permanence of the whole record cannot be proved.

A more serious criticism must be directed against the statement that by Dr Freud "the sexual element in human nature is far too exclusively dwelt upon. It is held to be present in almost every phase of human mentality, normal and abnormal, to affect every relationship in life, even that of parent and child and brother and sister."

We must object, in the first place, that this statement is liable to mislead, since the author does not point out the extended sense in which Freud uses the term "sexual." It includes the psychic or higher aspect of the instinct, as well as the somatic or lower. It includes, therefore, everything covered by the word "love" as ordinarily used. It is, moreover, extended to include many activities with a strong pleasure tone which are not usually spoken of as sexual (as, for example, the baby sucking at the breast).

Furthermore, a Freudian might ask why we must reject Freud's conclusions on the importance of sexuality. Because "such conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid," is Miss Caillard's reply. But what is this more than an expression of the fact that the author has a "resistance" against the idea of the dominance of sexuality.

Freud's conclusions on the subject of sex may indeed be overthrown or modified; but it can only be as a result of scientific criticism of the whole psycho-analytic position. We cannot accept this position as, on the whole, valid, and then reject such part of it as repels us. Such an attitude proclaims itself to be unscientific.

The author's solution is, in psychological language, "the sublimation of repressed instincts into religious channels." With this solution we can have no quarrel.

But is not something else necessary—the frank recognition of the fact that there is no "lower" or "higher" in human nature; that the instincts which we think it unpleasant even to mention are, in themselves, not less holy than the intellect on which man prides himself? The chaining of the sexual instinct has a moral value only because unchained it would become anti-social. For the sake of society, it must be repressed. In itself it may be, as Coventry Patmore suggests, the earthly pattern of the eternal purpose of man's nature—the Love of God.

R. H. THOULESS.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

"SURVIVAL AND MONADOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 803.)

I AM so much in agreement with the general trend of Mr Powell's observations on my article that I hesitate to make further comment. It may be well, however, that I should disown any intention of ignoring the distinction which he so rightly emphasises. Otherwise it might be supposed that my main contention has, at any rate in this regard, been invalidated.

I freely grant that what we know as "matter" exhibits certain characteristics which lead us to differentiate it from what we term, by way of antithesis, "mind." To ignore these characteristics would be futile. But

this is not to allow that we are therefore precluded from regarding matter as being of an essentially "psychical" nature. Its claim to a special category may be due to its plane, or grade, of being, or to its mode of manifestation under the conditions and limits of our experience. Without in any degree blurring the distinction, I ventured to maintain that the physical universe is the "appearance" through which we apprehend a certain class of interactions between monad will-centres. As regards the problem of the relation between body and mind, I repudiated the hopeless dualism which assumes a gap between them. I placed, in sharp distinction to such a theory, the supposition that the body is a highly specialised community of monads. Its physical characteristics would thus be the "appearance" of the complex organic relations thus established. Its reality as a definite mode of being is not for a moment brought into question, nor the necessity for submitting it to physical categories. But there is a world of difference between regarding it as mere material used by an alien mind, and regarding it as a peculiar manifestation of psychical activities.

I trust that this brief restatement of my case may suffice to clear me of the charge of confusion, and may justify my assertion that "the true line of advance, on the score of probability, would be to discover the 'psychical' nature of what we now call 'physical.'"

J. EDWARD MERCER.

CHESTER.

"BUDDHISM AND SPIRITISM."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 721.)

MR DE SILVA's account of the importance attached in Eastern countries to the creation of a harmonious atmosphere for the act of death may be interestingly compared with the attitude attributed to Socrates in the final scene of the *Phædo*. He is here represented as being greatly concerned lest his friends by their lamentations should disturb the state of *εὐφημία* (i.e. "holy calm") at which he aimed, and in which he wished to take his departure. To ensure this, he states, was not the least of his reasons for sending away the women of his household:—

"ἐκείνος δέ, Οἶα, ἔφη, ποιείτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτου ἕνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ τοιαῦτα πλημελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα, ὅτι ἐν εὐφημίᾳ χρόνῳ τελευτᾶν."

The reference to the fear of the creation of a state of dissonance, or the disharmony of a false chord, is also noteworthy as indicating the desire of the philosopher for a "harmonious shaping of his last thoughts." The precept is stated by Archer-Hind, on the authority of Olympiodoros, to be derived from the Pythagoreans.

E. W. ADAMS.

SURBITON.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

DURING the last six months several very important contributions to philosophical thought have seen the light. In particular, three works of far-reaching significance, which will be reviewed at length in these pages, call to be noted. Professor S. Alexander's Gifford Lectures on *Space, Time, and Deity* (London: Macmillan, 2 vols., 1920) constitute undoubtedly a permanent addition to metaphysical science. With the intrepid daring of a Spinoza or a Hegel, Professor Alexander attempts to show that the multiplicity of the universe is derived from Space-Time, as the ultimate ground of things. Space-Time he conceives to be the stuff of which all existents are composed, a stuff which breaks up of itself into the complexes which the world contains. The theory itself is certainly bold and striking, but the great value of the book consists in the thorough and detailed way in which the theory is worked out. Not only mathematical and physical science, but biology and psychology are freely drawn upon for material, and Professor Alexander's handling of the many problems that present themselves is suggestive and stimulating in the highest degree. Dr William M'Dougall, who is leaving Oxford to succeed Münsterberg in the Chair of Psychology at Harvard, has contributed to the *Cambridge Psychological Library* an interesting volume on *The Group Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), in which he tries to determine the principles of the mental life of groups and to apply those principles to the understanding of the life of nations. He rejects the notion of a "general Will," but holds that a society acquires a structure and qualities which are largely independent of the qualities of the individuals who compose it. Such a society becomes, in his view, an organised system of forces which has a life of its own, tendencies of its own, a power of moulding all its component individuals, and a power of perpetuating itself as a self-identical system. One of Dr M'Dougall's contentions which is likely to occasion difference of opinion is that during the historic period the peoples of Europe have made no progress in innate qualities, moral or intellectual, although that period has been characterised by immense mental development. Is it possible thus to sever the "innate" qualities from the empirical details of knowledge and conduct? Lastly, Dr A. N. Whitehead's Tarner Lectures on *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge University Press, 1920) form a very welcome supple-

ment to his *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, reviewed by Dr Broad in our January number. While the previous work based itself chiefly on ideas directly drawn from mathematical physics, the present book keeps closer to certain fields of philosophy and physics to the exclusion of mathematics. Professor Whitehead acknowledges that the view of nature which he has maintained in these lectures is not a simple one. But he urges that we should distrust the jaunty assurance with which people pride themselves that they have at last hit upon the ultimate concepts in which all that happens can be formulated. "The aim of science is to seek the simplest explanations of complex facts. We are apt to fall into the error of thinking that the facts are simple because simplicity is the goal of our quest. The guiding motto in the life of every natural philosopher should be, Seek simplicity and distrust it."

The bearing of the theory of relativity on philosophical problems has been absurdly exaggerated and misunderstood. To suppose that it has any relevance to the issue between idealism and realism is simply to interpret it wrongly; it lends no more support, for example, to a doctrine of monads than to the fundamentally opposed view (say) of Professor Alexander. But of its revolutionary character within the domain of mathematical and physical science there can be no question. And there are now ample means of obtaining such a general view of the character and import of the theory as is possible without resort to the elaborate mathematical apparatus of modern physics. Probably the best introduction which has yet appeared to the whole subject is Dr Broad's able and lucid article in the April number of this JOURNAL. In conjunction therewith Mr Henry L. Brose's Lecture on *The Theory of Relativity* (Oxford: Blackwell, Revised Edition, 1920) will be found helpful. Mr Brose has also published a translation of Erwin Freundlich's booklet, *Die Grundlagen der Einsteinschen Gravitationstheorie*, under the title of *The Foundations of Einstein's Theory of Gravitation* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), wherein the results of the special or restricted principle of relativity are utilised for bringing out the significance of the general theory. The difficulties involved in the principles of classical mechanics are discussed, and it is shown how a series of new discoveries, brought to light by electrodynamics, led necessarily to a new view of the basis of mechanics. In particular, justice is done to the thought of Riemann, "a mathematician," as Einstein says, "far in advance of his time." The valuable *Report on the Relativity Theory of Gravitation*, drawn up for the Physical Society by Professor A. S. Eddington (London: Fleetwood Press, 1920), should also be mentioned. In this Report the absolute differential calculus of Ricci and Levi-Civita is used, but there is much in it that can be followed by a reader whose mathematics have not been carried to that stage. More recently, Professor Eddington has published an extremely interesting and suggestive treatment of the subject in a volume entitled *Space, Time, and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 1920), in which he endeavours to explain and exhibit the consequences of the work of Minkowski, Hilbert, Lorentz, Einstein, and Weyl, without introducing anything very technical in the way of mathematics, physics, or philosophy. Professor Eddington starts with a description of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment of the year 1887 and of the explanation of its results proposed by FitzGerald—namely, that a course of wave-motion undergoes an automatic contraction when

it is swung from the transverse to the longitudinal position. He then proceeds to consider the meaning of the term "relativity" as it is now employed in physics, and turns afterwards to a discussion of the notion of force and of fields of force, bringing out the nature of the generalisation known as the principle of equivalence. Next there are chapters on various kinds of space, on the new law of gravitation, on the influence of gravitation on light, on momentum and energy, on absolute rotation, and on electricity and gravitation. The book concludes with a chapter much more speculative in character, "On the Nature of Things," in which is incorporated the substance of the author's article in the April number of *Mind* on "The Meaning of Matter and the Laws of Nature according to the Theory of Relativity." Here, in this last chapter, Professor Eddington appears to me to have advanced to a position far beyond anything that can be claimed as a legitimate inference from the theory of relativity and to be landed in a subjectivism for which that theory supplies no warrant. What I mean may be gathered from the following passage: "We have a world of point-events with their primary interval-relations. Out of these an unlimited number of more complicated relations and qualities can be built up mathematically, describing various features of the state of the world. These exist in nature in the same sense as an unlimited number of walks exist on an open moor. But the existence is, as it were, latent unless someone gives a significance to the walk by following it; and in the same way the existence of any one of these qualities of the world only acquires significance above its fellows, if a mind singles it out for recognition. Mind filters out matter from the meaningless jumble of qualities, as the prism filters out the colours of the rainbow from the chaotic pulsations of white light. Mind exalts the permanent and ignores the transitory; and it appears from the mathematical study of relations that the only way in which mind can achieve her object is by picking out one particular quality as the permanent substance of the perceptual world, partitioning a perceptual time and space for it to be permanent in, and, as a necessary consequence of this Hobson's choice, the laws of gravitation and mechanics and geometry have to be obeyed. Is it too much to say that mind's search for permanence has created the world of physics?" It is an old doctrine that out of a "meaningless jumble of qualities" mind somehow constructs an ordered nature. Yet mind itself exists only in so far as it knows nature and is in virtue of such function a part of nature, so that what according to the doctrine in question is represented as the product of mind might with more truth be said to be the very making of mind. Finally, within the last fortnight there has appeared Dr R. W. Lawson's excellent translation of Professor Einstein's own little work, written for the non-mathematical reader, *Relativity: The Special and the General Theory. A Popular Exposition* (London: Methuen, 1920). The author tells us he has spared himself no pains in the endeavour to present the main ideas in the simplest and most intelligible form. He has certainly succeeded in producing a delightful volume which is probably destined to become one of the classical texts of physical science. Only at the end does he venture into the domain of metaphysics, where he contends that, since in the general theory of relativity one is constrained to renounce Euclidean geometry, one is led to the conclusion that our space is finite and yet has no bounds; it is curved, somewhat like the rippled surface of a lake.

Professor James Ward's treatment of "perceptual orders"—those, namely, of Time and Number—in his third article on "Sense-Knowledge" (*Mind*, April 1920), is opportune now that the theory of relativity is so much to the fore. Dr Ward contends that in the perception of time, as in the perception of space, a factor is found that disappears from the concept. In space-perception it was extensity—an objective factor; here it is protensity—an essentially subjective factor. It is through protensity that we ascribe to sense-data the characteristic of duration, and so speak of that too as protensity. Duration as experienced is inseparable from the activity which all experience implies: it means not barely to exist but actively to persevere or persist. Though we ascribe it to sense-data, protensity is not, as extensity is, a sense-datum; yet like extensity, it is continuous, and we may even say that it differentiates itself. These primary differentiations are not co-existent, but they give rise to a secondary continuum—the so-called memory-thread—that may be so described. The differentiations of the latter have, however, their spatial analogue in a one-dimensional continuum of positional signs, which, like the positional signs of spatial perception, imply movement, but not space. And it is these "temporal signs" (as Dr Ward calls them) that first lead us to the perception of time-order. They are themselves to be accounted for as the consequences or residua of the same movements of attention on which *tempo* depends. The concept of "pure" temporal order is only attained when the filling and the varying durations of actual experience are left out and an absolute time flowing at a constant rate is put in its place. In the latter half of the article Dr Ward tries to show in regard to number that there is a perceptual knowledge prior to any conceptual knowledge such as that afforded by mathematics.

Philosophical students will be glad to hear that there are some posthumous works of Josiah Royce to appear, and that the first of them, edited by J. Loewenberg, of the University of California, *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (Yale University Press, 1920) has already been published. These form a very useful volume, intended as a partial introduction to the study of post-Kantian idealism. The volume comprises ten lectures, the first two being devoted to Kant. Royce goes at once to the heart of the matter by insisting that the Kantian Deduction of the Categories is the one genuine means of approach to the problems of subsequent speculation. Two assertions characterise Kant's position with regard to knowledge: one is the assertion that the conditions, upon which the form, the structure, the organisation of experience depends, are themselves not empirical; the other is the assertion that when we scrutinise these forms of our experience, we are learning nothing whatever about the ultimate nature of anything that exists beyond the knowing self, but are just learning about the self and its equipment for the life of knowledge. But Kant nowhere, it is pointed out, implies that this self should be viewed as any absolute, or as any superhuman mind that comprehends all the facts of nature at once. He nowhere implies that the self to whose categories all natural facts conform has anything but a virtual, a conceived, unity of consciousness. The knowable world is, for him, the realm of the possible experience of this virtual self to whose *one* experience we inevitably refer any natural fact. The one self, as Kant conceived it, is not a metaphysical entity, but merely a formal presupposition of the theory of knowledge. Royce shows, in a suggestive way, why a view of this sort is

in somewhat unstable equilibrium, and how the Kantian notion of a purely logical unity of consciousness became transformed into the notion of the "Absolute." One of the chief reasons for substituting the latter for the former was interwoven, Royce urges, with motives furnished by the social consciousness. Another reason was that while Kant's philosophy supplied, within carefully guarded limits, a theory of knowledge, it provided no theory of nature. The empirical details of nature remained a mystery. And yet another reason was the problem which the religious thought of the time was bringing into prominence. The author then proceeds to trace the manner in which the dialectical method arose; he discerns its antecedents partly in the Platonic dialogues, especially in the *Parmenides*, and partly in Kant's doctrine of the antinomies. And in an extremely illuminating way he exhibits the dialectical method at work in that extraordinarily brilliant but now little known treatise of Schelling's, the *System des transcendentalen Idealismus*, published in 1797. For Schelling, the problem of philosophy appeared to fall into two distinct departments; there was a dialectic of the self and also a perfectly parallel dialectic of the non-self, or of nature. Abstract from the self that knows experience, and then you have before you the world called nature. Be deliberately naive, while you observe, although with the philosopher's thought in the background, outer nature; view nature as something found; and at once it becomes obvious, so Schelling affirms, that nature itself is not a mere collection of substances, but a process and system of processes. An intuitive observation, an open eye, sees in nature the objective dialectic of the processes there present: everything in nature seeks its own opposite, and transcends, by its relationships, its own isolated being. Abstract, on the other hand, from externally given data, fix attention wholly upon the subject, as that in and for whom are all knowledge and all fact, and then, just as the objective view leads us to regard nature as a process of unconscious dialectic out of which the consciousness of self is evolved, so this subjective view of the same world will show us nature as that which the self necessarily, although unconsciously, constructs—constructs even as a basis for its own attainment of self-consciousness. It is to be hoped some of the readers of Royce's pages will be induced to study Schelling's treatise for themselves; it deserves a better fate than has hitherto attended it. The later lectures are devoted to Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, which Professor Baillie's translation has rendered accessible to English students, and which is comparatively more familiar ground. "Hegel," says Royce in a pregnant passage, "did not suppose that if we had never been enlightened by experience we could deduce *a priori* the nature of the world. But he did suppose that experience had at last attained a point of view from which it is possible to reconstruct, by an *a priori* method, precisely so much of the meaning of experience as is in fact rational." And so far apparently Royce would follow in Hegel's footsteps.

In an article on "Some Recent Theories of Consciousness" (*Mind*, July 1920), Professor A. K. Rogers subjects to criticism a number of writers who attempt "to get rid of psychical states," meaning by psychical states the sort of facts to which traditionally such names as sensation, feeling, idea, and the like have been assigned. He objects to Professor Alexander's analysis of perception that it splits up the concrete mental experience from which it starts into two unreal abstractions. On the

side of the object, there is no doubt a definite and thinkable content; but it is a content devoid of the existential and causally effective character of that which we naturally mean by an objectively real world. It consists of redness, spatiality, and the like, but not of red things in a real space; in short, it consists of logical properties rather than of actualities. On the side of the subject the difficulty is greater still, because in abstracting "awareness" from its object there is no content left in terms of which to think the mental "act." Action, unless some meaning is given to the term quite different from that in its normal use, implies something of which it is the act; and there cannot be an act of that which has no nature *except* action. Again, few things, it is argued, can be more unilluminating than to explain knowledge as the mere "togetherness" of awareness and a quality, for togetherness is one of the emptiest and most general of all relations, while knowing is one of the most peculiar and characteristic facts of the known world. Once more, with reference to the now familiar distinction between "contemplation" and "enjoyment," Professor Alexander's point is that the self cannot contemplate itself, alike because there is nothing to contemplate, and because it cannot dirempt itself and be present in two forms at the same moment. But if mental acts have no distinctive characteristic, what is there to "enjoy" or "live through"? It is unfortunate that Professor Rogers' article was written before the appearance of Alexander's *Gifford Lectures*. Much of his criticism would need re-statement in view of what is contained in the new book.

There is ground at once for suspecting any alleged branch of science which arrogates to itself the title of "new." Of the "New Psychology" of a few years ago, Professor Ward remarked, "new it undoubtedly is, and there are signs that in its present form it will not long survive"—a prediction which even many of those who were once its pioneers would now admit to be justified. At present, the self-styled "New Psychology" is largely made up of generalisations based upon the psycho-pathological researches of Janet, Freud, and Jung; and, although no one would wish to depreciate their work, it is simply childish to suppose that what is disparagingly designated the "older psychology" is thereby superseded. Those who desire to gain information as to the kind of generalisations put forward as "new" will find Mr A. G. Tansley's book *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920) useful. He proceeds upon a principle which, as a matter of fact, every psychologist from Aristotle downwards would have recognised, that the mental factors which produce the characteristic behaviour of the neurotic patient and lunatic are at work in the "normal" mind and give rise to many well-known traits of "normal" behaviour. A large variety of topics are dealt with—the "unconscious," "complexes," "psychic energy" (a loose and misleading conception), "conflict," "repression," "dreams," while under the head of "the contents of the mind" the nature and mode of working of the great dominant instincts are considered. A large amount of material is thus brought together which, when it is handled in a genuinely psychological spirit, will be of scientific value. The recent number of the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* (May 1920) contains a paper by Professor Jung on "The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits." The three main sources of the belief in spirits he takes to be dreams, waking visions, and mental disease. From an anthropological

point of view he is doubtless right. But *psychologically* the fundamental consideration surely is one that he does not so much as mention—namely, that for the primitive mind the means of discriminating an “image” from a “percept” were far less developed than they are for us. A volume on *The Psychology of Persuasion* by Mr William Macpherson (London: Methuen, 1920) also deserves mention. The writer tries to distinguish the elements of persuasion as a mental process, and describes the various forms of false persuasion in individuals and groups. In later chapters he deals with persuasion more exclusively as a form of expression, and devotes special attention to such modern forms of propaganda as advertisements, newspapers, the cinematograph, the novel, and the drama. Then the more formal persuasion of books and speeches is discussed, and in the last chapter an attempt is made to define the typical features that are likely to mark the persuasion of the future.

Professor J. S. Mackenzie's volume *Arrows of Desire. Essays on our National Character and Outlook* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1920) owes its origin, he tells us, to the war. The essays, if somewhat disconnected, are not inappropriately grouped together, and they certainly form a very readable and suggestive book. The chief subjects are—The English Character, Shakespeare's Henry V. as a National Type, The Character of Shakespeare, Conventional Morality, The Sister Nations, Our Present Outlook, National Reconstruction. Professor Mackenzie is optimistic, although not unduly so. “An educated people, in which the spirit of citizenship has been gradually developed, may,” he thinks, “be trusted in the end to see that the most competent people secure control of those things that they are best fitted to manage. This kind of general wisdom of the people requires, no doubt, a long process of cultivation. It is, unfortunately, almost always true in human affairs that all the wrong ways have to be tried before the right way is discovered. But it has, on the whole, been the good fortune of our own people that the process towards this discovery has been a gradual one, ‘from precedent to precedent,’ rather than one of sudden transformations. Many of the peculiarities of the dominant types in our national character depend on the fact that we are constantly clinging to the past, and yet striving towards a better future. We do not readily let go any good that has been achieved, however imperfect it may seem; and yet we do not readily acquiesce in the persistence of any evil, however firmly it may be rooted.”

It is difficult to speak in a few words of Dr Bernard Bosanquet's judicious and inspiring booklet *What Religion is* (London: Macmillan, 1920). His aim has been, he says, to help in guiding some minds to the right type of expectation, the true and open attitude in which they will have a fair chance to feel their religion in its fulness and its simplicity. His hope is not to suggest or advocate a new religion to them, but to assist them to reach the full value of their own. No man is, he believes, so poor as not to have a religion, though he may not, in every case, have found out where it lies. The true religious temper is, he urges, that of simplicity: there is a total simplicity in supreme experiences, and it is impossible to enter into them save by a total sincerity and candour. And this is at the same time the spirit of complete appreciation, which alone can seize the whole fact in its due shape and proportion. “Love speaks with better knowledge, and knowledge with dearer love.” What religion truly is Dr Bosanquet seeks to unfold in a peculiarly persuasive way. Religion is

faith, which is contrasted *not* with knowledge but with sight. And it is contrasted with sight, because it is essential to it that we rise into another world while remaining here. "Whenever a man is so carried beyond himself, whether for any other being, or for a cause or for a nation, that his personal fate seems to him as nothing in comparison of the happiness or triumph of the other, there you have the universal basis and structure of religion." The old expression "Justification by Faith" sums up the knot or centre in which the open secret of all human nature is bound up. For we can only be saved by giving ourselves to something in which we remain what we are, and yet enter into something new. Religious faith means absorption in a good such that nothing else matters and nothing else is real. And this is why religion "justifies" the religious man. What a man's religion brings him, and what he cannot help receiving when he places himself humbly and sincerely in the attitude of religious faith, that, urges Dr Bosanquet, let him hold to without scruple; it will be the nearest thing to truth that he can make his own. I have said perhaps enough to indicate the theme which the author develops in eight brief chapters, dealing with the Peace of God; Freedom and Power; Unity with God, Man, and Nature; Hope and Progress for Humanity; Sin; Suffering; Prayer and Worship; and The Religious Temper. It is a little volume which ought to secure a permanent place in our devotional literature, and to aid many a wayfarer to reach that "peace whose names are also rapture, power, clear sight, and love," parts, as Watson sings, of peace.

Attention should be drawn to Dean Rashdall's article in the *Church Quarterly* (April 1920) on "Personality in Recent Philosophy," in which he discusses the Gifford Lectures of Dean Inge, Professor Webb, Professor Pringle-Pattison, and Professor Sorley. Dr Rashdall tells us that the most convincing argument that he knows of for the Christian interpretation of the universe, including the belief in personal immortality, is Professor Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. From the point of view of pure speculation he regards it as a work of consummate ability, while from the point of view of Christian Apologetics he considers its value to be unique.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS.

The Group Mind. By W. M'Dougall, F.R.S., Wilde Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920.—Pp. xvi+304.

IN his preface the author tells us that the present work must be regarded as a sequel to his *Introduction to Social Psychology*. Its appearance at the present moment is very opportune. It will be welcomed both by the student of social problems and by the general reader.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I. takes up the general principles of Collective Psychology. It gives an outline of the subject-matter and scope of such a psychology, a description of the difference between a crowd and a group, and an analysis of the conditions essential for the existence of a highly organised group. It is shown that the members will recognise the need of co-operation, be moved by a common motive and aim at a common objective which is regarded by each as the aim of the group. Group spirit or group self-consciousness is examined in detail with reference to the part it plays in human communities, both primitive and civilised. The various types of groups are distinguished from one another. Part II. takes up that field of collective psychology which has special relevance to public interests at the present time: National Mind and Character. In the author's opinion, "the answer to the riddle of the definition of nationhood is to be found in the conception of the group mind." A national mind or character—Dr M'Dougall regards the terms as covering the same content—requires for its development homogeneity in the group, either racial or geographical, freedom of communication, the presence of leaders, a common purpose and organisation. The examination of these conditions, with illustrations from the present and the past nations of the earth, furnishes some of the most interesting chapters in the book. They are followed by a discussion of the Will of the Nation and the factors which develop it, of the part played by ideas in national mind, and the rôle of public opinion in nations of the highest type. Part III. is concerned with "The Development of National Mind and Character." This is traced through the Race-making period, the Historical period, the period of Youth, and that of Maturity. Dr M'Dougall distinguishes innate and racial factors in development from tradition, both moral and intellectual. On the whole he is unwilling to recognise the transmission of acquired characteristics; evolution by such means is very slow and limited. The differences between nations depend ultimately on innate characteristics, spontaneous variations, and the effects of physical

environment. A stock of knowledge slowly acquired becomes effective as tradition which, as social environment, gradually moulds the racial character. There is much which is interesting and suggestive in the author's account of the effects of crossing different stocks and of the forces which act as principles of internal selection; e.g. town life, military ambitions, celibacy of clergy. The conditions of progress, intellectual and moral, are analysed. Maine's law of progress, "from status to contract," is illustrated and confirmed.

Historians and sociologists may wish to dispute some of Dr M'Dougall's statements and his interpretation of facts in Parts II. and III., but the important issues for the student of psychology and political philosophy lie in the general principles of Part I. and in the treatment of the Will of the Nation in Part III. In his first chapter Dr M'Dougall writes: "In this book it will be maintained that the conception of a group mind is useful and therefore valid; and . . . some attempt to define and justify it may usefully be made at the outset; though the completer justification is the substance of the whole book. . . . We may fairly define a mind as an organised system of mental or purposive forces." In his book *Community*, Mr M'Iver, who rejects the conception of a group mind, claimed that "the mind of each of us has a unity other than that of such a system." Dr M'Dougall now challenges him to explain what kind of unity he postulates. Mr M'Iver wrote: "Every association, every organised group, may and does have rights and obligations which are not the rights and obligations of any or all of its members taken distributively but only of the association acting as an organised unity; . . . the unity of which we are thinking is not mechanic or organic or even psychic." On this passage Dr M'Dougall comments: "I cannot but think that . . . M'Iver is under the influence of that unfortunate and still prevalent way of thinking of the psychic as identical with the conscious which has given endless trouble in psychology; because it has prompted the hopeless attempt . . . to describe the structure and organisation of the mind in terms of conscious stuff, ignoring the all-important distinction between mental activity, which is sometimes, though perhaps not always, consciousness, and mental structure which is not. The structure and organisation of the spirit of the community is in every respect as purely mental or psychic as is the structure and organisation of the individual mind" (p. 15). But is the unity of system the only unity that we can predicate of mind? The biological conception of an organism applied to mental life might describe the unity from the standpoint of the spectator, even in the case of multiple personality, but it fails to express the unity of individuality from the standpoint of the individual. For the individual there must be the unity of self-consciousness. Dr M'Dougall himself seems to recognise such unity as essential. With reference to organic unity he says, "though mind has this kind of organic unity, it acquires in proportion as self-consciousness develops, over and above this kind of unity, a unity of an altogether new and unique kind; a unity which consists in the whole (or the self) being present to consciousness, whether clearly or obscurely, during almost every moment of thought, and pervading and playing some part in determination of the course of thought and action" (p. 157). After all, then, is not Mr M'Iver right in claiming a unity other than system for the mind of the individual? Is he not also right in denying such a unity to the group? It seems to me he is. Dr M'Dougall lays aside as un-

proven the theory of collective consciousness; the theory that just as colonial animals are a collection of parts each of which is a complete animal structure, so the community or group of individuals is a more comprehensive unit than the individuals who form it, and exists in addition to them. But how can Dr M'Dougall logically proceed to speak of national self-consciousness and of the Will of the Nation? He refers the reader to his *Social Psychology* for his theory of volition. "The essential mark of volition . . . is that the personality as a whole, or the central feature or nucleus of the personality, the man himself . . . is thrown on the side of the weaker motive" (p. 240). "The idea of the self, or self-consciousness, is able to play its great rôle in volition only in virtue of the self-regarding sentiment, the system of emotional and conative dispositions that is organised about the idea of the self" (pp. 247, 248). Dr M'Dougall regards the national mind and the individual mind as parallel. There must be national self-consciousness in order that there may be national will.

Now what does Dr M'Dougall mean by the self-consciousness of a nation or of any other group? He criticises Professor Bosanquet's account of the General Will partly because he regards it as recognising only the lower kind of unity, the unity of an organism, and not that of self-consciousness. It is clear, I think, from his whole criticism of the presentation of the doctrine of the General Will, that he has not appreciated the line of thought which Professor Bosanquet represents. The question does not hinge on the recognition or non-recognition of instinct and feeling in willing, but on the conception of the good. "The General Will seems to be, in the last resort, the ineradicable impulse of an intelligent being to a good extending beyond itself, in as far as that good takes the form of a common good. Though this impulse may be mastered or cheated in a degree, yet if it were extinct human life would have ceased" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 109). "This indestructible impulse towards the Good, which is necessarily a common good, the substantial unity and filling of life by the interests through which man is human, is what Rousseau plainly has before him in his account of the General Will" (*ibid.*, p. 110). Individuals can only realise such a good with fragmentary imperfection; a nation may realise it more completely in the sense that a "plurality of human beings is necessary to enable society to cover the ground, as it were, which human nature is capable of covering, yet actual individuals are not ultimate or equal embodiments of the true particulars of the social universal" (*ibid.*, p. 177). So far as the psychological process of willing is concerned, Professor Bosanquet would not predicate it of the social organism in the sense in which it is predicated of the individual; but then does Dr M'Dougall? Is the self-consciousness referred to anything other than the consciousness of the individual X or Y who has identified the self with the group? Consider Dr M'Dougall's excellent illustration of the distinction between the good of all and the good of the whole (a distinction which curiously enough he says Rousseau did not make), viz. the choice offered Belgium when Germany demanded free passage through the country. To have granted it would have secured material prosperity for the people; to refuse it meant to stand for national rights, to weigh past and future, to consider the good of the whole. (Might one not say rather it was to use a different scale of values?) But whose willing was this General Will? Whose self-consciousness? *Punch's* cartoon of October 21, 1914, gave the answer:—"The Kaiser: 'So you see you have lost every-

thing.' *The King of the Belgians*: 'Not my soul.'" The choice of one man was the expression of the General Will. The discussion in chapter xiii. of nations of the higher type would seem to show that national self-consciousness is the result *in the individual* of organisation, both formal and informal within the nation group. It seems strangely perverse that as against Mr M'Iver Dr M'Dougall should deny of the individual mind any unity other than that of system, and yet as against Professor Bosanquet should demand for the national mind a unity which consists in the whole (or the self) being present to consciousness.

This question of unity is full of difficulty to those who found the unity of system unobtainable from the premises given in the *Social Psychology*. Starting from independent instincts, Dr M'Dougall failed to make it evident how the self-regarding sentiment comes to occupy the position of presiding genius in mental life. Can the answer be found in Association, which is where Dr M'Dougall appears to seek it? The adequacy of the premises of the *Social Psychology* as a basis for the present work is also tested by the question of progress. We are told: "Man is distinguished from the animals by his power of learning. Whereas the behaviour of animals, even of the higher ones, consists almost entirely of purely instinctive actions, innate modes of response to a limited number of situations; man has an indefinitely great capacity for acquiring new modes of response, and so of adapting himself in new and more complex ways to an almost indefinite variety of situations" (p. 209). Now is this power of learning an instinctive tendency to be placed on all fours with the other instinctive tendencies? It may be said it is a form of imitation, but imitation alone would not bring progress. There must be breaking of new ground somewhere, or there would be no extension in the field of activity. Does Dr M'Dougall rely on Association to furnish this extension?

It would be ungenerous to dwell longer on difficulties in a book which offers so much that is valuable to the psychologist, and is of such interest throughout. It is clearly written; the repetition of statement here and there, and the recapitulation with which some of the chapters open, probably find their explanation in the fact that the author "had the substance of the book in the form of lecture notes for some years." It is no doubt with intention that he uses the same hypothesis to show the force of racial characteristics (p. 118), which in his *Social Psychology* was used to show the force of tradition, but a cross reference would be helpful and prevent misunderstanding. There is a verbal error on p. 163, where "principal" is used for "principle." The depreciatory note sounded in the Preface with reference to German scientific work seems uncalled for, and is regrettable. In conclusion, one can wish for the book, in the interests of psychology, as wide a popularity as that gained by the earlier work of which it is the sequel.

BEATRICE EDGEELL.

BEDFORD COLLEGE, LONDON.

The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into its Origin and Growth. By J. B. Bury, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. xv+377.

PROFESSOR BURY'S book and Dean Inge's Romanes Lecture have opened a floodgate of interest and speculation on the reality of human progress as

well as the history of the idea. The Professor deals almost exclusively with the latter, though he begins and ends on a note of doubt. "Belief in Progress," he tells us, "is an act of faith. . . . Even in science we cannot be sure that some day Progress may not come to a dead pause. . . . A day will come, in the revolution of centuries, when a new idea will usurp the place of Progress as the directing idea of humanity." And the Dean is more decidedly negative. The Cro-Magnon men were a finer type than we. What grounds have we for asserting any superiority at all?

The pessimism is not surprising when the greatest and most determined of wars has just been dealing terrific blows to the civilisation in which the theory of Progress has been built up. It needs a well-founded faith to resist depression when one tries all in vain to realise the loss of brilliant life, the vast destruction, the crushing weight of debt, the legacy of hate. Yet, if all the wise men whom Professor Bury quotes have not written in vain, one must make the attempt. We who are left have still to live, and where there is life there is hope.

From this point of view Professor Bury would have been more helpful if he had attempted a more philosophical treatment of his subject, if at least he had more carefully analysed the meaning of the conception of which he traces the literary expression with so much learning and care. Only a very brief examination of this fundamental point occurs at the beginning of the book. "To the minds of most people," he says, "the desirable outcome of human development would be a condition of society in which all the inhabitants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. But it is impossible to be sure that civilisation is moving in the right direction to realise this aim." This seems to imply that Progress consists in the realisation of greater general happiness. But the slightest examination of the various writers whom Professor Bury quotes would be sufficient to show that this was by no means their common idea. Men desire happiness, they often desire wealth, but they also desire knowledge, and they sometimes desire what seems to them a higher good without regard to the pain or happiness which it may bring with it. Hence it is clear that we need a deeper analysis and a more comprehensive conception if we would cover all the facts and be in a position to answer the question, "Is Progress a reality, or only a fleeting notion which has attracted the minds of certain enthusiasts at certain favourable moments in the history of the world?" The first result of such an inquiry would be to show that men have been possessed by different conceptions of what they meant by "Progress" according to the general philosophy or religion of the age in which they lived. Lucretius, who has the immortal honour of having first pronounced the word, envisaged the advance in the terms of Greco-Roman civilisation. He painted the progress of men from an animal state in which they fought with tooth and claw to the highest state he knew, viz. of the city with its laws and order and the beauties of art. Yet to the mediæval Christian—let us take him as represented in Dante, the finest type—progress was of another order altogether. It was the development by pain and purification and love of a higher moral state, where, after a probation in this world, the soul might be united with the Divine, its highest Good. If we pass to another stage, to the men of the Renaissance who first gave "Progress" its modern vogue, the dominant idea was the growth of knowledge, the conquest of Nature by the discovery of her secrets. And at the Revolution the emphasis was

changed again to the conception of Freedom. Progress consisted now in the breaking of chains, in marching freely on to the enjoyment of all that man's nature entitled him to expect.

The first problem, then, from the philosophic point of view is to discover what, if any, is the common idea which underlies these various expressions of belief. We do not think it very difficult to find such common elements, and it will strengthen our confidence in the solution if it should appear that as time goes on they tend to emerge as one harmonious conception in which the different partial views can meet in reconciliation. We would suggest that the chief reconciling idea has been revealed by the two great new sciences of the last few decades, psychology and anthropology, and that the idea is that of the growth of the human soul.

If this is true, we should find traces of it from the first moment that Progress is discussed, and of course we do. "The use and the experience of the active mind," said Lucretius, "gradually taught men who were progressing step by step." To the Catholic mediæval thinker this "active mind" became an immortal soul, finding its fruition in spiritual good. To the man of the new science in the seventeenth century the connotation was a mind in touch with the realities of Nature, a mind widened as the earth was widened by the discovery of a new world, and the universe by the discovery of the telescope. But always, at every stage of the history of the idea of Progress, the growth of the human soul is the common underlying element, and psychology has in recent years made this appear as obvious as it is true. Dr Marett, carrying the new conception backwards into the recesses of pre-history, declares in *Psychology and Folklore* that the "growth of soul" is the conclusion that emerges from the study of the scanty remains of the cave and the drift.

It remains, then, to apply the conception to the most recent manifestations of "Progress" and to ask what solution it offers to the doubts with which Professor Bury concludes his treatise and the stouter denials of the Dean of St Paul's.

The nineteenth century elevated the idea of Progress into a dogma, but did not present it free from certain drawbacks involved in a doctrine of Progress as conceived biologically. Darwin was here the most powerful voice, and if we are misled by a narrow interpretation of evolution, we may easily see it as only a repetition of the struggle for existence made more acute by the use of man's active and ingenious mind for destructive ends. This was the demon of "imperialism" which affected us all and most acutely our late chief enemies. The truth which was obscured by this view of evolution was that in the case of man the "struggle" becomes progressively subordinate, that his real progress consists in the development of those sides of his nature in which all men share and to which all men contribute. And it is a significant fact that in quite recent days there has been a marked change in the sources and the character of the support which is given to the idea of Progress. To Comte or to Spencer, Progress was essentially a non-theological, if not an anti-theological, doctrine. Now, with the excessive specialisation of science and the demonstration by the war of the destructive uses to which science may be put, there is a cooling in the ardour of the scientist's belief in Progress, and one often finds a broader view and a calmer trust in those who look to a supernatural or immanent guidance

from the Divine than in those who do not go beyond the immediate conclusions of the scientific mind. Dr Flint, in his *Philosophy of History*, thus becomes a better prophet of Progress than Professor Bury, who is nurtured on a rationalist creed and holds that "the undermining of the theory of Providence is very intimately connected with our subject; for it was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of Progress was to replace."

If, however, we place ourselves on the firm basis of a growth of soul, these contradictions disappear, and we are able, with a not impossible act of faith, to look beyond the conflicts and the setback of the moment into a calmer region where there is no serious ground to doubt the spread of light and its attendant greatness. The argument is purely a rational and historical one, and need not offend the susceptibilities of Professor Bury or any others who fear the introduction of what they cannot prove. The growth of man's mind has been most clearly demonstrated by science. Whatever the man of science thinks about progress as a whole, he has no doubt about progress in his own region. Even since the war, Einstein's work has been confirmed, and completes, with the necessary corrections, the laws of space and motion which we had learnt from Newton and the mechanics of the seventeenth century. The illustration fits very happily into the necessities of the moment, because it shows how in science at least progress is constant, with change but without revolution. But if in this and in every branch of science we see a constant advance, why should we entertain the fears which Professor Bury expresses? We have yet but scratched the surface of the universe, and the result has been an enlargement of our powers beyond the dreams of the wildest enthusiasts of the eighteenth century. Why should we put any limit to our hopes? What we need to limit is our selfish desires, the putting in the first place of that ideal of personal happiness from which unfortunately Professor Bury made his start. If, instead, we base our conception of progress on the growth of soul, individual as well as collective—individual growth through collective growth,—the example of science is both the most inspiring and the most conclusive.

It will be said that we have no guarantee that science may not go on growing and end by killing us all, or at least fail to keep us all alive and happy in fellowship. And that is, of course, a conceivable issue to man's age-long struggle, just as it is conceivable that this solar system might be annihilated by contact with some other star. Absolute security is no part of the human scheme of things, as it is so far revealed to us, or indeed as we may reasonably desire, for such security would deprive the struggle of its zest and virtue of its nobility. But, looking at the story of man's course as we know it, who can doubt that side by side with this extension of his mental achievement, there has gone a connected improvement in his moral nature, in his political capacity, and even—though this is more doubtful—in his artistic capacity? It must be remembered that in these days we are thinking of hundreds of millions and comparing them with hundreds of thousands in ancient Greece, or Renaissance Italy, or Elizabethan England. And even in these comparisons, the most severe to suggest, the most difficult to carry out, there would be an ample balance to the good on certain sides in favour of ourselves.

Perhaps in the simple fact that, with all the triumphs of modern

science and industry to our credit, we have at the beginning of a new era one of our leading men of learning bidding us question ourselves as to the future, and one of our leading prophets bidding us examine our souls, we may find another augury of hope. For no state is hopeless except that of complete self-satisfaction, and no life is stagnant or decadent except that which repeats the shibboleths of the past without criticism: and in our current writers we find both ample criticism and a wholesome absence of complacency.

F. S. MARVIN.

BERKHAMSTED.

A History of English Philosophy. By W. R. Sorley, Litt.D., LL.D.
Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920.—Pp. xvi + 380.

IF Mr Alexander's sagaciously contemplative angel had to assess the merits of the different nations in philosophy, he would probably give the palm to the Greeks and he might place the Germans second; but he would not make this latter decision without misgivings, and he might even wish to consult an archangel before preferring the Germans to the English. Be that as it may, it is certain that the British genius for philosophy has acquitted itself most worthily in the eyes of all competent judges, and it is not a little surprising that so few complete methodical histories of English philosophy have appeared up to the present. Indeed, I do not know of any which cover the whole field, except the two which Mr Sorley mentions on p. 322, although the list of less comprehensive ones which he gives on that page might have been increased—e.g. by the mention of the relevant chapters in many other systematic histories of European philosophy, or of Mr St George Stock's *English Thought for English Thinkers* (London: Constable, 1912). Everyone who is interested in philosophy, therefore, owes the greater gratitude to Mr Sorley for following up his admirable chapters in the *Cambridge History of English Literature* with this most excellent *History*. Mr Sorley has all the qualities which a historian of these matters needs, and scarcely anyone could have them in a higher degree. He is lucid, sympathetic, and extraordinarily well informed. Moreover, he has a gift for proportion and a genius for conciseness. His book is the fitting culmination of many years of patient, skilful, and devoted study.

The preface states Mr Sorley's intentions very clearly. Although he appears to think that the history of philosophy may be written as if it were only the prologue to the Truth as it is in M or N—as if the Messiah had come, gracefully acknowledging his debt to a succession of John the Baptists,—he wisely does not choose this plan himself, but prefers instead to describe each philosopher from that philosopher's own standpoint, in the belief that "definite concepts and clear issues will emerge gradually as the story progresses." They do; and although English philosophers do not readily assemble into schools, or tie themselves to a common platform, the story of English philosophy, none the less, is a chapter in the development of ideas. Mr Sorley does the *liaison* work very well indeed (although I think he does it even better on the side of ethics or political theory than on the side of metaphysics), and he certainly avoids the temptation of substituting a series of special studies for a

history, although the circumstances of his book's origin must have made success in this particular exceedingly hard to attain.

In the second place, Mr Sorley interprets "philosophy" most generously, including its affiliations (or partial coincidence) with theology, politics, ethics, and economics. This liberal interpretation adds greatly to the interest and to the value of the book, the more especially because Mr Sorley is so delightfully at home in all these fields. He did not need to "get up" any of these subjects *ad hoc*, and he assimilates them all into his narrative with the ease that is born of trained faculties and of much turning over in the mind. The result is that Hakewill, Selden, Harrington, Warburton, Glanvill, and Malthus are treated as they ought to be treated in his book. Mr Sorley is sparing of anecdote and biography, but he gives us just enough to let us peep into the lives of the men and the character of their times.

"By strict economy of phrase," he tells us, he has been able to trace this history from Scotus Erigena to the close of the Victorian era. This economy must have cost him infinite pains, for it is always present and yet it never obtrudes. Indeed, I have not noticed any example of redundancy, unless, perhaps, a slightly unnecessary recurrence to the origin of the phrase "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (pp. 162 n., 200, 220, 229). One may feel, it is true, that this economy of phrase (despite the author's genius for it) has sometimes cost too dear. One would like to see more of the great figures in the story—Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Indeed, nobody on earth could deal adequately with Berkeley in ten pages, of which four are mostly biography; and Hume's theory of belief needs more than a paragraph. On the other hand, Mr Sorley can always reply that proportion must be respected; and perhaps he is right. Moreover, he makes most considerable amends (if these are needed) by giving us a most admirable bibliography of the works of the principal British philosophers, together with the chief commentaries and criticisms upon them. This bibliography occupies some fifty pages, and not a line of it is wasted. It provides exactly what a scholar needs if he essays to follow Mr Sorley beyond the limits he has set himself. (I have noticed only one trivial mistake: the date of Mr Seth's *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* being given wrongly on p. 373, although correctly on p. 322.)

Mr Sorley's comparative chronological table (pp. 303–321) is also most helpful, and if I wished to write a sentence of this kind: "In the year in which Blake's *Songs of Innocence* and White's *Natural History of Selborne* appeared (to say nothing of Lavoisier's *Traité élémentaire de chimie*) revolution and reform came together to the birth, for the long-pent storm burst in France just as Bentham's *Principles of Morals and Legislation* was published, belatedly, in England," I should know where to go. To be serious, this comparative table is as good as it could be, although I might have wished that Mr Sorley had called Richardson's novel *Clarissa* as Richardson himself did, instead of following Leslie Stephen's definitive edition and calling it *Clarissa Harlowe*. But that is a halfpenny matter.

Frankly, I do not see how any teacher of philosophy can afford to do without this book, and I cannot imagine a better or a pleasanter guide for the general reader.

JOHN LAIRD.

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY, BELFAST.

Christian Freedom: Hulsean Lectures, 1918-1919. By Francis E. Hutchinson, M.A., Oxon. and Cantab. (formerly Chaplain of King's College, and Lecturer of Magdalene College, Cambridge).—Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. 172.

MR HUTCHINSON'S book is "a plea for larger intellectual freedom in the Christian Church." He tells us that in his view "freedom is not an absolute good as truth is; yet it is the indispensable condition of reaching truth. From this aspect chiefly," he says, "I have treated of freedom in these lectures." The sincerity and earnestness of the plea for freedom in matters of religion is apparent on every page, and this, and the freshness and independence of thought which pervade the lectures, make them most impressive as a whole. They are moreover, as we should expect, scholarly and closely reasoned.

I suppose we would all claim to care for truth—for knowledge of what is true, and sincerity of profession—in our degree and to the extent of our ability and opportunity. No one could knowingly accept the false for the true in religion any more than in science or history; no one would proclaim himself to be deliberately insincere in his professions of religious belief. But it is in this region, above all others, that the thought even of experts—perhaps chiefly of experts—is embarrassed, and its expression shackled, by inherited fetters. Tradition (no less than custom)

" . . . lies upon us with a weight,
Heavy as frost and deep almost as life."

How to adjust the claims of custom, tradition, institutionalism, on the one hand, and "spiritual" freedom on the other, is a problem which both "reformers" and authoritative rulers have to face. Such freedom is, as the author insists, a condition precedent to the possibility of religious development and advance. Every man who thinks for himself and has the courage of his opinions, is in his measure and degree a reformer. The religious reformer has to take account not only of the "ruler" but also of the crowd, and (like every innovator) exercises his freedom at a risk, and must bear (rightly bear) the "burden of proof." And he has often to carry his life in his hand. This was true of the Hebrew prophets, and pre-eminently true of that "greater than a prophet"—a Hebrew among Hebrews—whom Christians claim as the heaven-sent founder of their religion.

The first of Mr Hutchinson's four lectures, entitled *Christus Liberator*, brings out in a very striking way the spirit of freedom and fearlessness in Christ's teaching and life—his intellectual freedom, his independence of speech and action with regard to social and religious conventions, interpretation of the Scriptures and the Mosaic Law. He was one who came "to liberate mankind from oppression and cruelty, from fear and superstition, from unworthy conceptions of God and man, one who broke the chain of custom and ignored the artificial distinctions among men, and pronounced his blessing on those who preserve 'internal sanctity of soul' . . . the truest liberator that humanity has ever had from all its ills; from moral evil . . . from intellectual error—superstition and fear . . . dread of unfamiliar truth and bondage to tradition; from social error—unbrotherliness, exclusiveness, and all barriers to the instincts of natural kindness; and from ecclesiastical error—legalism and literalism, and from

every tendency to value the form above the spirit, a correct creed above a loyal discipleship."

"Christ's appeal is . . . to the awakened conscience, the open mind, the clear vision which distinguishes means from ends, and which seeks to obey the spirit without being tied to the letter." And "he was able to lead others into freedom, not because he was born superhumanly free from the common necessity of clearing himself from current conceptions, but just because he needed to work through the teaching which he had received to purer and freer thought." "We see Jesus himself subject to the imperfect mental environment of his time and race and national religion." He was "in all points tempted like as we are," and "learned obedience by the things that he suffered." He had a divine capacity of attaining to true wisdom, to perfect courage, to clear vision of the truth, to absolute unselfishness and boundless sympathy, but he had to "grow" in wisdom—in mind and spirit—as in bodily stature. Thus regarded, the life and character of Christ are the most wonderful, the most appealing, the most convincing, of all recorded experience—a miracle that is both natural and supernatural. A miracle that was all miracle would be no miracle for us.

Christ did not give us cut-and-dried rules, but a principle—"a new commandment"—capable of application in all circumstances: not an elaborate organisation, but the guidance of an indwelling spirit. There must be rules and there must be forms, but Christ left it open to his followers to vary rules and modify forms, so long as they worked faithfully in the spirit of their Master; he set them the example of reform where reform was needed in the interests of something better than custom and convention. "He has called us 'to unfold a growing message, and not to rehearse a stereotyped tradition.'"

The title of the second lecture is *Christian Freedom asserted by St Paul but impaired in succeeding ages*. In it are discussed the Apostle's sense of emancipation as a follower of Christ, and his effort to liberate himself and others not merely from the letter of Judaic law, but also from the temper of mind which attaches undue importance to the letter. For St Paul, subjection to the letter is bondage; allegiance to the spirit of Christ's teaching is true freedom, and the Christian principle of life a "law of liberty." As a disciplinarian, it is with moral laxity that St Paul deals, rather than with doctrinal error. In the Christian communities, as described in the New Testament, we see that "the various churches still enjoy a wide latitude in creed and ritual and organisation. It is variety, not uniformity, which the New Testament emphasises as the full life of the Spirit-bearing body." This was naturally followed by development to greater fixity—especially in the region of theology—with consequent increase of stability as one of its advantages, but with loss of freedom, even in things indifferent. Development was inevitable; if Christianity was really alive, it had to grow and change (pp. 74, 75). Particular developments must be weighed and judged. Mr Hutchinson gives in this connection, as a most important criterion, one suggested by the Dean of St Paul's: "The Church is to grow up *into* Christ in all things, not out of him into something very different." And from the same writer he quotes a keen saying about the identity of Christ's Church: "When you want to convince yourself of the identity of an individual, you do not try to squeeze him into his cradle." The author concludes this lecture with

the reflection that "our appeal is from what Christians have said about Christ to Christ Himself . . . we too must stand fast by the freedom He gave us, and not again be entangled with a yoke of bondage."

Lecture III.—*Incompleteness of the Reformation as an emancipating Movement*—begins by drawing a comparison between the religious experience of St Paul and that of Martin Luther; notes that the Reformation was rather a liberation of conscience, than a liberation of mind; and explains how its promise of intellectual emancipation was defeated, and how increase of the religious liberty of the individual, due to free access to the Bible, was coincident with a dangerous exaltation of the authority of Scripture. "The Word of God was simply identified with the Bible, . . . as if no fresh light could reach the human spirit save only by breaking out through the already written word." Against this restriction of the sources of spiritual enlightenment the Quaker protest was valid: "that the Bible was not the final or absolute authority in religion, but the Spirit which both inspired the writers of the sacred books, and still inspires and enlightens every man." The cause of religious freedom was served in England not only by other nonconforming sects, but also by a succession of representative members of the Church of England, such as Cranmer, Hooker, the Cambridge Platonists, George Herbert—whose poem *Divinitie* is quoted on p. 103:

"But all the doctrine which He taught and gave,
Was clear as Heav'n from whence it came.

Love God, and love your neighbour. Watch and pray.
Do as ye would be done unto."

Of Cambridge Platonists, Whichcote is quoted as saying: "Sir, I oppose not rational to spiritual, for spiritual is most rational." The lecture ends with a reference to Edmund Burke's dictum that "the Reformation is not complete; and those who think themselves good Protestants from their animosity to others, are in that respect no Protestants at all."

It is very difficult in a few paragraphs to do justice to Mr Hutchinson's argument, or to give an idea of the cumulative force of the quotations by which the author supports one of his main contentions—the contention, namely, that "representative Christians in almost every generation have felt misgivings about the doctrinal conditions of Church membership and ministry being unduly stringent."

The concluding lecture—*The Church in Bondage*—is thus summarised (p. 116): "The Church of the nineteenth century has not shewn itself friendly to the cause of freedom—social, intellectual, or spiritual. Its excessive reliance upon 'the tradition of the elders' is in damaging contrast with the freedom of criticism which the scientific method has introduced into all modern studies. . . . The kind of authority universally approved [is in contrast] with the special kind of authority which is still often claimed for the past decisions of the Church. It is not enough for the Christian to achieve personal freedom; he needs to enjoy it within the Christian society, for the fellowship of believers is a necessary part of the full Christian life. The Church should be a fellowship in the exploration of Christian faith and life. That fellowship is unduly narrowed and embarrassed by the Church's insistence on the definitions of the past. There is a limit to the legitimacy of symbolical interpretation of the

creeds, and its adoption does not inspire confidence. . . . [As to] the conditions of Christian Unity, no intellectual agreement is to be expected. Why look for any other basis of unity than the confession of discipleship? 'What Christ never insisted upon, neither let us insist upon.'"

This is a book to be grateful for—a book that for the "general reader" at least is arresting and enlightening. It is attractive in style, convincing in argument, scrupulously fair and accurate; it is, above all, inspired by a steady enthusiasm for truth, a flawless courage and candour, and a clearness of vision, that are seen to be not incompatible with the spirit of Christian loyalty and the charity which thinketh no evil. The treatment is worthy of the theme; the plea for intellectual freedom in matters of religion has been well propounded.

Mr Hutchinson's appeal is very apposite to the present time, both because freedom of thought and sincerity of profession in matters of religion were never of more vital importance, and also because they are faced to-day with grave risks and discouragements.

E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

WESTON-SUPER-MARE, SOMERSET.

From Chaos to Catholicism. By the Rev. W. G. Peck.—London: Allen & Unwin, 1920.—Pp. 252.

MR PECK is convinced that "the modern world must discover the Church of Christ Universal before there can be peace or decency among men." The possibility of such a Church he thinks to have discovered in a certain conformity to, with some differences from, the doctrines and practices of the Middle Ages, before the Reformation spoiled "Catholicism." The seven papers that make up his new book serve as buttresses to his former essay, *The Coming Free Catholicism*. They are more in bulk than the earlier book, but notwithstanding this they are only buttresses. Their titles give some indication of their scope: "Chaos and Catholicism"; "Mr G. K. Chesterton and the Return to Sanity"; "Monsignor R. H. Benson and the Case for Rome"; "Ecclesia Anglicana: Her Problem and Opportunity"; "The Free Catholic Movement"; "The Christian Priesthood"; "Methodism in the New Age." The desperate desire for all that accompanies historic Catholicism is not so prominent in these pages. Compared with the former volume it reveals more of the doctrinaire than of the dogmatist. Mr Peck is a Methodist minister, and the two concluding papers were delivered to Methodist audiences. "No riot occurred upon either occasion." This can be readily believed. They are quite innocuous. And more tolerance and charity are to be found in a Methodist assembly than in historic Catholicism.

With the ideal that Mr Peck sets forth there will be hearty agreement. He desires to see a Church that is Catholic and free. "She must set forth the beauty of perfect holiness and the strength of corporate loyalty. She must combine historic sense with progressive endeavour; prophetic utterance with priestly function; dogmatic assurance with intellectual honesty." It is when he comes to detailed exposition that doubts gather. Such a Church must of course be Sacramentarian; excess in this direction

is beyond conception. The Quakers will be allowed to hold their views on condition that they do not protest against what they do not believe. The model is the unreformed Roman Church, for Christianity is in essence what the Middle Ages had made it, before the canker of Protestantism turned its beauty to ashes. He shows defects in the Protestant appreciation and presentation of salvation, and then argues as if he had proved Catholicism to be perfect in these respects. It is true that Romanism has defects. Indeed at present "there is no Church in Christendom that is not a sect." But in its doctrines and in its devotions it is difficult to think that Romanism has gone vitally wrong. He does not go so far as to say that the Roman Church is the divinely appointed centre of unity, but his sympathies are all towards the type of religion that Rome represents in the world, and any unity that does not gather about these elements would have no appeal for him. Other things might go, everything that denied the Roman tradition might go, if this was preserved. Yet the goal is a synthesis, for which this age is said to be ready, that the Roman Church has never achieved. "The only new Church which Free Catholics would welcome must be the Church Universal."

It is easy from the standpoint of membership in an esoteric society to proclaim that all the Churches are sects. This may be a correct diagnosis. It will be difficult, however, to get the Churches, say the Roman or the Anglican, to accept this diagnosis. Even the Free Churches with their growing sense of what traditional Churchmanship implies, which finds recognition in these pages, would need something more tangible to fasten upon than the dream set forth here before they could be persuaded to confess their errors. The Free Churches are denied any true sense of corporate life, but Mr Peck seems to regard this as an error that can be remedied—in Methodism at any rate. This is why he is content to remain a Methodist. In discovering the possibility of a Free Catholicism he has discovered the value of his own Church. This is hopeful. But may not other Churches (or sects) have a value even as they are?

Another question emerges. If the world has waited nineteen centuries and has been put off with sects there will need to be a revision of values in respect to these. We shall need a more exalted conception concerning sects. We cannot submit blindly to the facts of history. Yet history has some intelligible meaning. And, however admirable the ideal set forth here may be, it will be well to cling to the imperfect societies in which corporate Christian experience finds expression a little while longer. Free Catholicism has found no tangible expression; there are endeavours towards the ideal, but they end in a sense of need to enforce the ideal that shatters the conception of freedom. "The Jerusalem that is above is free." Possibly no Church below that seeks to comprehend all humanity and all that is in human nature, as the material for Divine grace to operate upon, will attain perfect freedom. Catholicity will limit freedom until the word of complete redemption finds utterance. Then the Church militant will have become the Church triumphant, and categories of the world will vanish.

Mr Peck's interpretations of nineteenth-century decadence (an exceedingly insular treatment for "Catholic" purposes) and the Catholic revival, of the meaning of Mr Chesterton and Father Hugh Benson, and of the genius of the Anglican Church, are interesting and provocative also. The use of paradox, and general conclusions based upon particular

instances, invite criticism. He is too apt to take side eddies for the main stream. What Mr Chesterton says, what Hugh Benson did, what Dr Orchard and his confrères are declaring, fill up all his horizon, and he imagines that all others must be impressed in the same way. But they are not. A mode of thought grows that regards ritual as not of the things to be sought for and cherished for themselves, but only to be recognised as having their use on condition that they are left behind as soon as possible. Freedom is not to be won by wearing fetters that have hindered it and that have no power to change their nature or significance. What does it prove for the truth and essential necessity of ritual that Hugh Benson was irresistibly attracted by it and was the better for it; or for the surpassing value of the Middle Ages that Mr Chesterton would fain conduct all the world thither? Father Benson was an attractive personality in some respects. His brother's memoir places this beyond dispute. But that he took naturally to ritual has no more Catholic (in the sense of universal) meaning than another fact, recognised but not praised by Mr Peck—that Mr Chesterton takes naturally to the extravagant praise of beer. The appraisal of Mr Chesterton is inflated. "He might speak with Chaucer and Rabelais. He has the vital creative genius, and it is impossible to think of him ever having said his last word." Mr Chesterton is, without doubt, a great man. In the sphere of literary criticism he has done valuable work. Nevertheless, it is possible not to know that he has uttered his first word and yet not to have missed anything that is vital. The English Reformation is denounced as being merely political; the Puritan movement as more ethical than doctrinal; while it is claimed that religion went out with the abolition of Papal rule in England. To say these things is to play conjuring tricks with history. What is not explained is the fact that the old religion was in so parlous a condition that it was put down so easily. Religion that really matters does not disappear at the behest of politicians, and it can survive many a Puritanic ethical lecture. Politics had to do with the English Reformation; how could it be otherwise with a State Church? Yet there were other influences at work. And the Anglican Church has been more of a religious force than the Tudor settlement intended or Mr Peck recognises. There is a strange jumble of idealism and materialism in such a sentence as this: "For, though this is a tight little island, and has been the birth-place of many noteworthy movements, it cannot claim to have invented the Christian religion, and it really is not big enough to contain the Holy Catholic Church." It is a wonder that Mr Peck does not utter his protest against Palestine as being altogether too small to be the theatre of the beginnings of Christianity.

It is perhaps not worth while to dwell upon points of this character, although the criticism might be extended. Yet a protest must be made against the weak habit of writing down as foolish those who cannot follow a dream that has so far given no promise of being a deed in the world. It is to run the risk of Mr Peck's scorn to question his diagnosis. He says: "Only to superficial or prejudiced minds will this seem an unwarranted or reactionary development." He is referring to what he describes as a Catholic revival. He regards such a revival as the same thing as a revival of Christianity. He takes Christianity, indeed, to be in essence what "Catholicity" was in the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages had their place in ecclesiastical development. They were not, however, so

immaculate either in morals or manners as there is a growing disposition to describe them. Mediæval things were not always delectable because Mr Peck says they were and gives no proof. When it is said that "the Church cannot possibly be too churchly, any more than a man can be too manly, or a spade too much like a spade," and the practice of the Middle Ages is regarded as the purest type of what is churchly, this is begging the whole question. But here this is regarded as a closed question. Even the Revelation of John is regarded as a text-book of ecclesiastical ideals because of its sacerdotal imagery which came to full expression in the ritual of the Middle Ages. As for the manners of those times, it is very easy to hide behind a smoke screen. When Falstaff is met in literature some joy may be had of him, although something of pity mingles with it, and thus joy is robbed of its vital meaning. Meet him, however, in real life, in family life, and the joy will vanish. Only shame will be felt, or if anything akin to laughter lingers, it will be laughter near to madness. Any attempt to apologise for what is known to be contemptible breaks down when brought to a practical test, as it must be sooner or later.

Mr Peck has fine emotion, and he is an enthusiast. He has the gift of bold expression, but at times he tends to be merely flippant. He is an impressionist—the things that are suppressed are as significant as those expressed. Above all, he has the mediæval mind. His *a priori* conceptions will brook no disturbance from the modern attitude towards truth. The temper of a reformer is not revealed in these pages. There is an impatience of facts. When Mr Peck dislikes anything, even if it be only a suggestion that seems to arise out of his own conception of things, he straightway seeks to smother it. Enthusiasm can accomplish much, but not always the essential things. The enthusiasm of Father Benson for ritualism could not establish Catholicism, although he had much to say about Catholicism. Where he failed, it is difficult to think that any attempt which merely adopts as a fashion what in the Roman Church has become a habit will succeed. "The question of what constitutes a valid Catholicism is still awaiting settlement," says Mr Peck. He gives expression to some vague hopes that, apart from Rome or High Anglicanism, the Free Churches of England will settle this question. Yet it is evident that he has his doubts. And these doubts are well grounded.

The "Catholic" ideal has been in the world for centuries; it has split upon the very rocks towards which this new attempt is being steered in search of the perfection that is beyond. Catholicism is not enough. The deed waits to be done, and there are no signs at present of its being done. There can hardly be progress by deliberately going back to the old dead and distant things jettisoned by the necessities of progress in the past. If that be the only way, we shall need to ask if progress is at all worth while. Certainly we are not ready to believe that the way of man's proved folly, and worse than folly, can in these later days become the way by which God's complete salvation comes. Mr Peck's new synthesis rules out too many things that the world will not lightly lose.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

[COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

The Faith of a Quaker. By John W. Graham, M.A., Principal of Dalton Hall, University of Manchester.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920. —Pp. xvi + 444.

THE Quaker search for God, Principal Graham says in the opening sentence of his *Apologia*, is based upon the sure foundation of experience; and he acknowledges that the doctrine of the Light within, which was the special message of Quakerism in the seventeenth century, is now widely and livingly held, and is a subject of general religious interest. Thus we are brought to the right frame of mind for the study of such a work as this, which offers, in the author's words, "a sketch of the only considerable adventure in organised mysticism which has made for itself a permanent place in Christian history during modern times." In this account of the Society of Friends we are asked to consider "the classical case of a mystical society with a tough organisation," and in the somewhat composite material of the book we do find an interesting account of the organisation and a description and defence of the various forms of Quaker testimony and methods of religious activity. But there is more than this, and what will perhaps be most attractive to many readers are the passages of personal confession on the writer's part, who has been for many years a teacher and a minister among Friends, and his own contribution towards a restatement of the foundation truths of religion. For the sincerity of every such attempt we must be grateful, and the more so when the attempt is made, as in this case, without any trace of dogmatic assumption or assurance, with the desire simply "to tell in part what never can be told in full; to hold out what little light from the eternal radiance has come my way."

There are two points in Mr Graham's study on which we find our interest concentrated—his presentation of the Quaker ideal of worship, and his attempt, in dealing with the foundation truths of religion, to define the relations between the universal presence of the Holy Spirit, the Immanent God, and what is spoken of as the Indwelling Christ on the one hand, and the personality of Jesus Christ, as known to us in human history, on the other.

There is little similarity, either in conception or in structure, between Mr Graham's book and Robert Barclay's famous *Apology*, but they are alike in this, that in both the sections on Ministry and Worship are vital, and carry one to the very heart of the matter. No one who desires to understand the possibilities of the Quaker method in united worship should neglect Barclay's record of the moving experiences of his day and the account of what he felt when he "came into the silent assemblies of God's people," gatherings in which "the secret power and virtue of life is known to refresh the soul, and the pure motions and breathings of God's spirit are felt to arise." There is a like witness in the living touch of Caroline Stephen's *Quaker Strongholds* and in Violet Hodgkin's 1919 Swarthmore Lecture, *Silent Worship: the Way of Wonder*. Mr Graham speaks from the experience of thirty-five years of ministry, and is very clear in his conviction that this is the true method of worship and also of preaching, which must be on a basis of silence, not of man's will, but of the promptings of the Spirit alone. He has some searching things to say in the chapter on "The Reward of the Ascetic," notably on p. 181, as to the danger of settled orders of service, in which "words become cheap and insincere," and of the unreality, from the point of view of spiritual religion, and the

corrupting power, of a constant and compulsory use of such a liturgy as that of the Church of England Prayer Book; but his plea for the Quaker ideal would have been more persuasive, both in the matter of worship and of preaching, if he had shown some measure of appreciation of what others have found of the same spirit under other forms of administration. Mr Graham, we are sure, did not intend, and is probably unaware of, the gross insult implied in the remark that Friends "decline to preach by salary," as though it were for the sake of salary that any true minister undertakes to preach, and there could be no question of a genuine call of the Spirit, in answer to which a man devotes his life to the ministry of religion, and constantly seeks to put himself more unreservedly at the disposal of that high service. There are doubtless worldly men in every Church, but the abuse of a calling is no true measure of its essential spirit; and regarding the various methods of ministry, we will dare to say that there may be as absolute dependence on the higher promptings of the Spirit in the preparation even of a written sermon to be preached at a stated time (of what Barclay disrespectfully calls the parson's "conned and gathered stuff") as in the quiet waiting of the Friends' gatherings for worship; there may be as humble a surrender to the message which comes with prophetic power, of which a man is simply the organ, even in a church of stately ritual, as in the plainest Quaker meeting. Mr Graham tells us that he has found rest and æsthetic enjoyment at a choral service in Westminster Abbey, but if that is all, he misses surely some of the supreme impulses of spiritual quickening and consecration which come from the solemnising power of music and its pure breathings of aspiration, which go beyond what words can utter. Delight in Nature he allows to his Quaker ascetic, but as with the cultivation of taste and imagination through poetry and the arts, apparently only for the sake of æsthetic pleasure. But there are those again to whom Nature means more than that, and in a deeper communion of the Spirit find the presence of the Shepherd who leads beside the still waters and up to the great heights of life; and that surely is true also of the silent appeal of a great cathedral. There is much to be learnt from the habit of silence and inward recollection, and the fellowship of the quiet meeting is a very beautiful thing; but it is not clear that the uniform method of the Quaker is the only way by which a true ministry of the Spirit may be exercised, nor that all deepest human needs are by that way most surely met.

Our second point of greatest interest is concerned with the doctrine of the Inward Light and the personality of Jesus Christ. What we desire is to realise truth as it rests "on the sure foundation of experience"; but the experience must be rightly interpreted. In the gathered silence of the Quaker meeting, who is it to whom they attend? "The Lord is the Spirit" is an apostolic confession apparently adopted by Mr Graham with the conviction that there is unity or identity between the historical Jesus of Nazareth and the Indwelling Christ. "The belief in the Christ within," he says, "is held in the Society of Friends to-day with the same whole-hearted insistence as it was in the early days. At the same time I do not know of any attempt at what might be called an explanation of the identity of the human life lived in history with the universal spiritual influence acting in all ages and places." Nor do we find in what Mr Graham himself has written an explanation of that identity which altogether satisfies. The right guidance he finds in the doctrine of the Proem of

the Fourth Gospel, with its "daring identification" of the divine Word, or Logos, "whom we usually speak of as the Holy Spirit," with the spirit of Jesus. For the first disciples he holds that the identification was easy, because "they had seen and spoken with the risen Jesus." On this point Mr Graham is quite definite. What Jesus did on the Resurrection morning is recounted as an actual occurrence, "when in the light of new knowledge of the unseen world, freed from the physical body, He was able to communicate several times with His disciples," telling them plainly that He would still be with them. And on a par with those communications, as carrying conviction of reality, are set the appearance to Paul on the road to Damascus and other visions; though with regard to visions this curious remark is added: "While granting in some cases the intrapsychical origin, it is nevertheless difficult to say at what exact time between the Resurrection morn and to-day Jesus abandoned His people or went too far away to be accessible." Mr Graham's confidence is fortified by the results established, as he holds, by the Society for Psychical Research of communications recently received from departed members, and thus he is able to accept without reservation the promise of Jesus, when released from the flesh, to be still actually with His friends, to work and serve and love and sympathise. "There will be personal identity, personal nearness, personal telepathic power." And the conclusion is that the Christian has warrant for believing "that we may in prayer still address our Lord Jesus Christ, the everlasting Paraclete."

On the other hand, there are expressions which seem to lead to a different conclusion, and that it is not Jesus who actually becomes the Indwelling Christ, the universal spiritual presence, the object of worship and prayer in spiritual communion. "The Indwelling God, outwardly revealed in Christ, is my God," says Mr Graham. He speaks of an "Eternal Father soul," "a permeating God, making His home in our souls," and if Christ in the flesh and the Indwelling Christ are to be identified, it is because "communion with our Lord is also communion with the Word, the thought and purpose of the Eternal." "In speaking of the Christ within we are extending our conception of the presence of a certain historical personality into that of the Spirit, of which that personality was the archetype, the classical example, and for us historically the source." We are to learn of our Elder Brother that our nature may become like His. In that sense "the divine Worker within us is endeavouring to have Christ born in us." Such expressions seem to point to one of two conclusions: either that the "Christ within" of the disciples' actual experience is simply the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, by which, quickened in our hearts, we learn what it is to be children of God, or that as an object of ultimate trust and worship it is actually the heavenly Father to whom Jesus taught His followers to pray. The expression is so variously used that both answers seem to be required to cover the whole round of experience so indicated. We cannot conceive of more than one eternal, spiritual Presence, with living power enfolding the gathered silence of Friends in their meeting, realised in the surrender of love and consecration and willing obedience to the Father's will. The right interpretation of the experience would seem to be that it is He, the one eternal Spirit of truth and love, who bears witness in our hearts to the grace and truth of Jesus, and bids us follow Him, obedient to the laws of life after the mind of Christ.

If, as is certainly the case, there is much else of real value in Mr Graham's *Apologia*, to which no reference is made in the present notice, we can only ask him to believe that the silence is due to no lack of interest or genuine appreciation.

V. D. DAVIS.

BOURNEMOUTH.

Tutors unto Christ: Introduction to the Study of Religions. By Alfred E. Garvie.—London: Humphrey Milford, 1920.—Pp. viii + 242.

THE title of this book will not specially commend it to the majority of its readers. At the same time, it serves a useful purpose. It is well to be reminded at the outset that the writer occupies a definitely selected viewpoint. His exposition is coloured by that fact from beginning to end.

The sub-title indicates the general aim of the volume. As one would expect, such topics as the historical development of religion, the comparative study of religions, and the philosophy of religion are successively dealt with. But these discussions do not constitute the distinctive contents of the book: they supply material for some seventy-five pages in all, whereas the prolegomena of this study, and particularly the psychology of religion, are assigned a hundred pages. It is only, however, in the subsequent formulation of judgments of value, and in certain contrasts drawn between Christianity and sundry other faiths, that Principal Garvie really lets himself go. The writer's primary intention then becomes apparent. His well-known *Fach*, as this "Introduction" once more makes plain, is the philosophy of religion—a study in which many an equally confident predecessor has eventually come to grief. The theme, moreover, which evokes his supreme ardour is a philosophical vindication of Christianity wherein it claims to enjoy a lofty and exclusive supremacy.

The History of Religions is expounded, not separately but incidentally, in many parts of the volume. Here is found one of the most unsatisfactory features of the manual. Lack of proportion is not its only fault; there is also frequently an evident lack of concentration. Several chapters are devoted to an examination of definitions of religion, theories of its origin, etc.; but far too little is said of its numerous and distinctive manifestations. As for the actual origin of religion, Dr Garvie supports by ingenious reasoning the view that it "began" at a certain stage in animistic speculation. Such an opinion, challenged already, is sure to be challenged anew. As the writer himself concedes, "this attempt to reconstruct the historical development of religion is only tentative; the most that can be claimed for it is a high degree of probability" (p. 133).

The Comparative Study of Religions is accorded ampler treatment, three entire chapters being devoted to it. For the most part, the comparisons instituted are limited to three faiths—namely, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Principal Garvie greatly dislikes the name "Comparative Religion," and more than once he lowers his lance at it. He may have a passing lunge at it. The risks which accompany the use of the comparative method are duly emphasised; but it must be remarked that an additional peril in this connection is rashly introduced. Dr Garvie asserts that "the purpose of our comparison is . . . to reach a judgment

of value regarding the religions of the world" (p. 139). "The difficult and yet inevitable task of the judgment of value is the issue of the comparative study of religions" (p. 162). But, even on the writer's own showing, this attitude is untenable. If, as he holds, "the comparative study of religions can claim to be a science . . . only as long as it avoids any judgment of value" (p. 139), he must be ignoring the reasonable contention that Comparative Religion *is* a science. As a matter of fact, he misapprehends its spirit and function. Questions pertaining to the objective reality and the relative worth of the diverse faiths of mankind belong really to that branch of the subject which he next proceeds to expound.

The Philosophy of Religion furnishes Principal Garvie with a completely congenial theme. In this connection, he supplies an interpretation of the facts furnished by history when linked together through their individual inter-relations. And, summing up the product of his far-ranging inquiries, he concludes:—

"Among the religions, . . . Christianity can be shown to be in the person, teaching, sacrifice, and sovereignty of Christ as Son of God and Saviour of men, the perfect fulfilment of their imperfect endeavours. . . . Christ alone, among all religious masters, has the absolute claim to the belief, trust, and surrender of all men" (p. 226).

It is here, at last, that one discerns the inspiring motive of this book. Dr Garvie resorts to no camouflage; keeping his goal constantly in view, he makes no attempt to disguise that fact. While this manual is ostensibly an introduction to the study of religions, its primary object is to frame an apology for the Christian religion. "There is need of a book written from the special standpoint and for the distinctive purpose of this volume" (p. v). The author's intention, as already remarked, is sufficiently revealed in the significant title he has chosen. At the back of his mind, throughout the entire course of his reading, there has remained undimmed the vision of a triumphing faith, proudly scattering its foes. His book has been written to establish the confidence of those who esteem Christianity to be the final and absolute religion; it is designed, in particular, to strengthen the resolve of any who propose to undertake service in the foreign mission field.

If prepared for use in a theological college, the manual may serve its turn. It must be pointed out, however, that a genuine study of religions does not concern itself with vested interests. It acknowledges no monopolies. It bestows no favours. It refuses to have anything to do with propaganda. From the contentious affirmations and denials of different schools of theology it holds itself deliberately aloof. Its task is restricted to an attempt to understand the numerous faiths with which it deals, to disclose their historical relations, and thereafter to expound (if possible) those problems which lie at the foundation of our belief in the objective truth of religion.

This little book possesses some admirable qualities. Principal Garvie knows his own mind, and he expresses himself with a refreshing frankness. He shows ample acquaintance with the leading authorities, all of whom are honoured by generous quotations. Attention is directed to the real and vital questions with which the study of religions has to do. A very great deal of valuable matter is to be found in the volume, whose quality

is poorly disclosed in an index which is not only meagre but perfunctory. It is all the more to be regretted that the book is discursive, and somewhat carelessly written. The author has an unfortunate liking for unfamiliar terms, such as "physiomorphized" (p. 72), "solity" (p. 132), etc. In particular, he has gradually acquired the habit of numbering the paragraphs and subparagraphs of everything he writes. In the volume under review, the text has been mercilessly visected. Every page fairly bristles with interjected Arabic numerals, Greek letters, English letters, and other notation-symbols of a similar kind. This procedure has been adopted no doubt, here and elsewhere, with the purpose of increasing the lucidity of the exposition; but, in the present instance, it is carried to such an extreme that it becomes positively perplexing. No printed document should be wantonly disfigured and handicapped in this entirely needless way. Finally, as a handbook for students who propose to offer themselves as candidates for foreign mission service, the volume is chargeable with presenting a very one-sided view. While welcoming the broadening of opinion concerning alien systems of belief, now growingly current among Christian thinkers and scholars (pp. 141, 226, etc.), Principal Garvie also declares, "we do not believe in the absolute superiority of the Christian faith less than we did, but we do not hold the absolute worthlessness of all other religions as we did" (*The International Review of Missions*, vol. v. p. 130). This may seem to be a rather unhandsome concession; but, it would appear (p. 227), it represents the full length to which this critic is prepared to go.

LOUIS H. JORDAN.

EASTBOURNE.

The Pastoral Epistles, with Introduction, Text, and Commentary. By R. St John Parry, D.D.—Cambridge: University Press, 1920.—Pp. clxvi+103.

THESE Epistles played an important part two centuries ago when Episcopalians, Presbyterians and others in this country so eagerly sought Scripture authority for their respective forms of Church government. In modern times their value, as witnesses to Apostolic practice, has been greatly reduced, because criticism has shattered the ancient confidence in their genuineness. Many scholars are willing to admit that 2 Timothy contains fragments of Pauline correspondence, but few to-day defend the authenticity of the three Epistles in their present form. Dr Parry, however, after many years of devoted study of the Pastorals, has produced a scholarly work, which is likely to be referred to in the future as the best defence of the traditional view in the English language. He, nevertheless, admits that the situation reflected in them cannot be contemporaneous with the story of Paul's life and activities found in the Acts of the Apostles, and he is forced to date them in a supposed second period of travelling and preaching on the part of the Apostle Paul, after his imprisonment at Rome, mentioned in the Acts. He finds evidence for this in Eusebius, who states that Paul was martyred in 67 A.D., in the Canon of Muratori, and in the phrase [1 Ep. ad Cor. c. v.] of Clemens Romanus, ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δύσεως ἐλθών. He is of the opinion that Paul visited Spain and Asia between 62 and 67 A.D., and that he was arrested in Asia Minor in 66. This is in line with the suggestion offered by a

recent writer that the persecution of 64 A.D. was confined to Rome, and that the general persecution of the Christians in the provinces only began in 66, before which date, it is argued, the return of the adherents of the new religion ordered by Nero could not have been ready.

This theory is not in itself improbable, but it remains unsupported by facts. The evidence available supports the generally accepted view that Paul suffered in 64 A.D. The reference in Clemens [1 Ep. ad Cor. c. vi.] *τούτοις . . . συνηθροίσθη πολὺ πλῆθος ἐκλεκτῶν* is applicable to no other known calamity in the history of the early Christians. It is strange, if Paul visited Spain and the west as Dr Lightfoot argued, and our author believes, that the traditions of the Spanish Church make no mention of it. As early as 400 A.D. the Spanish Offices referred to the labours of James, the son of Zebedee, in Spain, and he is mentioned again in the writings of Isidorus (600 A.D.) as one of the early missionaries in Spain. The legend states that Theodosius of Tira even discovered his body at Santiago in 829 A.D. In the traditions of Gaul, and especially in the fifteenth century MS., containing the Life of St. Mary Magdalene, which may have been derived from a much older MS., Paul is mentioned as having visited the Rhone Valley. Abbé Duchesne rejects these traditions as worthless. Some of them refer to Sergius Paulus, and not to the Apostle. Apparently there is no evidence of a visit to the West beyond Paul's own statement that he intended going to Spain. The Epistles themselves, if genuine, would lend some support to the view that the Apostle made another tour of Asia of which nothing was known to the author of the Acts.

Dr Parry considers the external evidence for the authenticity of the Pastorals adequate. He, however, overlooks the fact that Marcion omitted them from his canon of Pauline writings. If they were universally accepted among the Christians of his age as the work of the Apostle, it is hardly conceivable that such an ardent disciple of Paul, as Marcion was, would have rejected them, notwithstanding statements in them deprecatory of views he himself was supposed to espouse.

Their language and style, and the highly developed state of Church organisation reflected in them, have been the chief reasons for ascribing them to a post-Apostolic period. The attitude of mind evinced in them is akin to what is found in Clemens' Epistle to the Corinthians.

The author argues that the *ἐπισκοπή* of the Pastorals is not the Ignatian monarchical episcopacy, and that they cannot belong to the early second century, for that reason. Granted that this is so, it does not follow that because the episcopacy at Antioch was monarctic, it was so in Asia. Ignatius, in his epistles, seems anxious to persuade the Asiatic Churches to adopt that form of government.

The argument of Dr Parry that the vocabulary of the Pastorals can be reconciled with the language of the Pauline Epistles on the ground that Paul chose his words to suit his subject, no doubt contains much that is true, but it may be pressed too far, as in our opinion has been done by the author, when he makes the Apostle a frequent attendant at the lectures of popular Greek orators in his old age, in order to account for the similarity between the language of these Epistles and that of the literary *κοινή* of the Domitian period.

The sections devoted to the terms in these Epistles, around which the battle has raged, are important and informing, and if the reader could

be convinced that διδασκαλία, διδαχή, παραθήκη, πίστις, ἐπισκοπή, refer not to a *body of doctrine*, and the *office* of a bishop, a great obstacle to their genuineness would be removed. Our author contends "wholesome teaching," i.e. morally healthy, should be substituted for "sound doctrine" in a well-known passage. That the emphasis in the Pastorals should be on character as a qualification for position in the Church, and not on a personal experience of the truth of the Christian religion, as in the Pauline Epistles, is regarded as being in no way inconsistent with their being the work of Paul, for they are personal letters to trusted friends, dealing with practical affairs and not with the deep things of the soul.

From the point of view of one interested in the problem involved in the Pastorals, this work is not a complete answer to the case against their authenticity; but it is a valiant attempt to re-establish their authenticity.

There is appended a list of words used in the Pastorals, showing which are, and which are not, employed in the other Pauline Epistles.

On p. lxi. "the verb ἐπισκοπή" must be a slip of the pen.

M. B. OWEN.

THE PRESBYTERIAN COLLEGE,
CARMARTHEN.

Simon de Montfort : An Historical Drama in Five Acts. By Alfred Hayes.—London : Methuen, 1918.

HE who writes an historical play or novel proverbially gives hostages to fortune; he challenges on two sides the critic who lives or lurks in every reader. *Quentin Durward* is perhaps, in one sense, the most historical of Scott's novels; yet what bred in young Ranke his lifelong determination to hold the scales impartially was his discovery of the discrepancies between that novel and many of the actual facts. Professor C. R. Beazley's admiration for the poet in this play would seem to have tempted him to give too definite a testimonial, in his preface, to the historian. It is not so much that Mr Hayes makes technical slips; the monks of Lewes, for instance, were not Benedictines in the ordinary sense of the word, but Cluniacs (which alone could explain how a monastery of that importance was only a priory), and it is still more contrary to ancient or modern usage to speak of "Franciscan and Dominican monks"; nor, again, would Prince Edward have seen many milestones, or been troubled with much dust, on his February ride to Kenilworth (p. 179). These, after all, are matters of mint and anise and cummin, though it is a pity they did not attract Professor Beazley's friendly attention. It is rather more serious that Mr Hayes, in the plain prose of his notes, should attribute Bacon's imprisonment to no more serious cause than the jealousy of his fellow-friars (p. 227); that he should accept without scepticism one of the most irresponsible of the thousand-and-one mediæval poison-stories (p. 233); and that he should call Adam de Marisco "the founder in Oxford of the great school of theology, which continued to rule the thought of Europe till the Renaissance" (p. 226). Great as were the personalities of the Oxford schoolmen, the evidence seems to show that by far the greater part of their teaching was done abroad; and, where a man teaches in his earlier and later prime, there also he is probably learning. These again, however, are minor matters, which it would not be fair to mention unless they seemed typical

of others which lend themselves less easily to concrete illustration, and especially of Mr Hayes's attitude towards the whole story of Simon de Montfort himself. He seems to have regarded that remarkable character, like the above-mentioned social and historical details, from too modern a point of view. It is very significant in this connection that, in his list of authorities, he does not claim to have studied Bémont's monograph, which the majority of historical students would probably put higher than Bishop Creighton's or Mr Prothero's. We had hoped, on opening this book, to find something which would take us one step, at least, beyond Bémont's rather agnostic judgment on Simon's character; but we feel, on laying it down, that for Mr Hayes the problems which baffled Bémont scarcely exist. Montfort is, for him, the simple-minded straightforward hero, the consistent saint and martyr, described in the hymn which contemporaries composed in his honour. We get no hint of Simon's undoubted illegalities in Gascony; no inkling of Bémont's uncomfortable suggestion that the Gascon complainants were quite possibly in the right on the main question; no suspicion of mixed motives anywhere, except in a fine passage where Montfort's religion contends with his natural desire for vengeance. Whether we follow Bémont in his further iconoclasm or not, it is impossible to compare the original authorities without concluding that he is at least right in emphasising the complexity of Simon's character and motives, and the quasi-fortuitous character of some of his greatest achievements. To most historians, we feel sure, Mr Hayes will seem to have used full poetic licence in bringing out every heroic fact, even every suggestion of heroism in de Montfort and his wife, and in steadily turning his eyes away from the rest. While agreeing with Professor Beazley that he has made the Countess a very charming person, we feel that she is not the exact daughter of Eve to whom Adam de Marisco wrote his 159th letter, wherein the good friar warns the Countess that the wife's duty is to cleave to her husband with constancy, prudence, and benignity (without which "every wedded soul is convicted of having damnably violated the law of marriage"), and to eschew "that crazy devotion to superfluity of personal adornment" which keeps so many servants at work and costs so dearly to the husband's purse.

But (it may be replied) what does Adam de Marisco matter, so long as Mr Hayes gives us a charming Eleanor? And indeed we are glad to reach this happier ground. Englishmen do not know too much about Simon de Montfort and that struggle for liberty of which he made himself the protagonist; and our main feeling must be one of gratitude towards the author who sets himself to this task. To bring forward again one of the great characters of our past; to win the sympathy of English-speaking peoples for one of the greatest chapters in our long fight for freedom; to show forth noble ideals, whether these were explicitly confessed in all their fullness by Simon himself, or whether they be partly lent to him by a twentieth-century mind—these things are worth doing for their own sake, and this Mr Hayes has achieved. The author shows clearly, though not obtrusively, his conviction that many of these thirteenth-century problems are, in a very real sense, our own problems of to-day. We hope, for the sake of civilisation as well as of literature, that he will find a wide circle of readers.

G. G. COULTON.

The Letters of Charles Sorley. Edited by Professor W. R. Sorley.
—Cambridge: University Press, 1919.—Pp. xiii + 320.

THOSE who are familiar with the volume of poems by Charles Sorley (noticed in these pages in April 1916) will be glad to possess this further volume to place by its side. There is, as Professor Sorley says, nothing, in the book before us, of formal biography; but the letters, extending over a period of less than four years, convey a wonderfully vivid impression of the character of the author, and no reader can fail to feel the genuineness of the remark made by his kindly hostess in Schwerin that "the time with him was like a holiday and a feast-day." A happy joyousness and frankness, combined with a thoughtful seriousness, pervade the letters, and one is conscious all through the book of being in the company of a strong and lovable personality that would certainly have been a spiritual force in whatever career of life he had chosen.

In a brief introductory chapter Mrs Sorley tells just so much of the details of her son's short history as it is needful for the reader to know. He and his twin brother were born in Aberdeen in 1895; and, with their elder sister, spent four years of normal and contented childhood in their parents' country home overlooking the Old Town. In 1900, the family removed to Cambridge, where some years later the boys, who had hitherto been taught by their mother, were sent as day-boys to the King's College Choir School. Charles gained an open scholarship at Marlborough in 1908, and remained at Marlborough until Christmas 1913. The first half of the year 1914 he spent in Germany, intending to proceed for the Michaelmas term to Oxford, where he had gained a Scholarship at University College. On the outbreak of the war, however, he obtained a commission in the seventh battalion of the Suffolk Regiment, and at the end of May 1915 went with his battalion to France. He was killed in the battle of Loos on October 13, whilst leading his company (he was then Captain) at the "hair-pin" trench near Hulluch.

There are five chapters of letters, containing those from Marlborough, Schwerin, Jena, from the Army whilst in training, and from the Army at the Front. All reveal the working of a fresh and vigorous mind facing one after another of the problems of life. It was a critical mind and yet never merely critical; there is a vein of mysticism continually coming to the surface, but it is invariably an intelligent and healthy mysticism. "He revelled in big horizons, natural or social; he loved alike the boundless sweep of the Marlborough downs and the wide problems of human life."

The Marlborough letters date from the latter half of the writer's public-school period. His affection for Marlborough had already become a rooted 'sentiment.' "He loved it," so his house-master relates, "with a deep and growing love; and not the school only, but the downs, in rain, wind, and sun—Barbury, the Four Miles, and Liddington, the swift skies, and windy spaces, the old turf on which he ran for miles, with all its memories and traces of a bygone people." But already the critical attitude had begun to manifest itself. He had become in a sense a "rebel," though an eminently sane and reasonable rebel. By the time he had attained to the Upper Sixth he realised very clearly some of the weaknesses—perhaps the unavoidable weaknesses—of the public-school system. "When one reaches the top of a public school, one has," he writes, "such unbounded opportunities of getting unbearably conceited that I don't see

how anyone survives the change that must come when the tin god is swept off his little kingdom and becomes an unimportant mortal again." And later on, when in Germany, he reverts repeatedly to "the artificial position of responsibility" that is thrown upon a head-boy, "which continually threatens to make one a prig, a poser, or a censor." The atmosphere, he says, deliberately over-develops the nasty tyrannical instinct, and fosters a tendency to be "always striving in the race of showing off," so that it is not what one is but what one appears to be which comes to be regarded as the main thing. Alas! *that* tendency, I fear, is fostered by more atmospheres than one in our human society. In another connexion, his spirit of rebellion was doubtless less justified, though even here one cannot help to some extent sympathising with it. It was a tough struggle, we are told, to induce him to work at anything for which he had no particular liking. Though evidently a classical scholar of no mean status, he revolted against the routine of classical education, and Latin literature especially failed to appeal to him. He rejoiced at the prospect of some day arriving at the stage when "there would be no pressing need to continue those detestable Classics in the detestably serious spirit demanded" in a public school or university.

"In the stirring of the masses" Charles Sorley found, to quote his house-master again, "the spirit of the age"; and, amongst other things, the discovery accounts for the enthusiasm he displayed for the poetry of Masfield. Certainly the two papers on Masfield and *A Shropshire Lad*, read to the Marlborough Literary Society, are remarkable productions, considering the age of the writer. Masfield, he declares, "has brought poetry down to the level of low life, and in so doing has exalted it to the heaven which there exists ignored." Masfield, he avers, "writes that he knows and testifies that he has seen. Throughout his poems there are lines and phrases so instinct with life, that they betoken a man who writes of what he has experienced, not of what he thinks he can imagine; who has braved the storm, who has walked in the hells, who has seen the reality of life." And of Housman he significantly asserts that "the compound of civilised instinct with primitive emotions has made him at his best reach the highest point of primitive virtue."

The letters from Germany are intensely interesting, especially to a reader who happens to be familiar with the districts they describe. One has a certain regret that a portion of the three months in Mecklenburg was not spent *auf dem Lande*, where he would have come more into touch with the "common people" who appeared to him "worth gold," rather than in the fashionable capital. Later on, indeed, during a flying visit from Jena, he did get a glimpse of the country folk in the neighbourhood of Wismar, and noted one characteristic of them—their easy-going, indolent mode of existence, leaving their roads unmade and their hedges untrimmed. A longer acquaintance would, however, have impressed him more firmly than ever with the charming simplicity, the unselfconsciousness, the sterling integrity of the unsophisticated Mecklenburg *Bauer*. But the story of Charles Sorley's life in Schwerin is a fascinating one from beginning to end. His description of the Herr Doktor, at whose house he resided, a "tal fat hearty man with moustaches," who returns home to Mittagessen in a state of overwhelming perspiration, and who shouts out "Liebling!" at the top of his voice as soon as he catches sight of his wife at breakfast, of the refined and genial Frau Doktor, who gives him lessons in German

and whose cooking is superb, and of her brother, the Neuphilolog, who is unashamed of the pursuit of learning, is admirably done, and might serve, I imagine, for a description of countless middle-class homes in the *Vaterland*. And a series of amusing incidents give piquancy to the narrative. There is a delightful naïveté, for instance, about the picture of the Herr Doktor officiating at the harmonium after Abendessen, and, with his eyes closed, deliciously enjoying the thick, smug notes, and of his young English guest exclaiming a dozen times, at the completion of the performance, "Ich danke!"—an exclamation which was intended to conceal his real feelings, but which, if taken as a German would have taken it from another German, exactly expressed them! And what reader can be so dull as to fail to see the stroke of genius involved in the comparison of life in Ithaca in the time of Odysseus with life in Mecklenburg-Schwerin in the time of the Herr Doktor? Underlying the gaiety, however, the deeper side of the writer's nature is all the while disclosing itself. One follows with avidity his gradual recognition of the greatness of Goethe. "The worst of a piece like *Faust*," he is led to confess, "is that it completely dries up any creative instincts or attempts in oneself. There is nothing that I have ever thought or ever read that is not somewhere contained in it, and (what is worse) explained in it." One feels, too, the contagion of his fervent admiration for Ibsen's *John Gabriel Borkman* in the German text, and of his enthusiastic appreciation of the representations he witnessed of it on the stage at Schwerin.

My space is exhausted, and I cannot linger over the letters from Jena or those from the Army. In the former, the allusions to Weimar—that fine old town on the banks of the Ilm, with its beautiful Park and Schlossgarten and lovely surroundings—are specially noteworthy; in the latter, the persistent resolve to be just to the German people strikes one as precisely what one would have predicted. With one last reflexion I must be content. Not a few of this young scholar's judgments were obviously prejudiced and premature; indeed, he now and again repented of certain of them and freely admitted he was wrong. I believe his dislike of Tennyson and Browning, for example, would some day have been no less relentlessly shelved than was his first perverted view of the Rietschel statue of Goethe and Schiller in front of the theatre at Weimar. None the less, the book as a whole is a convincing confirmation of his headmaster's assurance that "he would have been a great and a true man, who would have served his generation." Neither Marlborough nor any other public school can of itself turn out a Charles Sorley. To the moulding of that personality there went influences deeper far than even the most perfectly organised school system can call into being. But is it too much to hope that in the coming time this simple record of "the splendid promise of youth" unpretentiously given in the nation's service may make its quiet appeal to some of those who occupy a Sixth Form, and kindle the yearning to do in some small measure the work he would have done, had the sacrifice not been demanded?

G. DAWES HICKS.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE *ENTENTE CORDIALE* OF THE HUMANIST SPIRIT AS THE BASIS OF A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

FOSTER WATSON, D.LIT.,

Emeritus Professor of Education in the University College of Wales,
Aberystwyth.

I.

POLITICAL philosophers have been familiar, at any rate since the day of Hobbes, with the idea that the best way of erecting and securing political power is for the people to "confer all their individual power and strength upon one man or one assembly of men." It is in this way, Hobbes urged, "wills will be reduced into one will, and every man acknowledge himself to be the author of whatsoever is done by the ruler so constituted. . . . This is more than consent or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: 'I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man or this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorise all his actions in like manner.'" The "multitude" so united is for Hobbes the Commonwealth, and the covenant thus made is the great "generation" of the great *Leviathan*, which, as he says, constitutes "our peace and defence."

Similarly the League of Nations would appear to aim at the "social contract" of a Commonwealth of Nations which should generate a super-Leviathan for a super-Commonwealth. It, too, is founded on a covenant. The essence of the covenant is an undertaking, on the part of all (in theory)

civilised nations, in cases of differences and quarrels with other nations, to appeal to law instead of to military force ; or at least to appeal to it in the first place, and to provide for a "cooling" interval in any case, before military measures are taken. But as there is a sovereign power of Leviathan to compel obedience to the law as administered in the Courts of Justice, so in the Commonwealths of the Nations power is concentrated, super-Leviathan power, in the combined League, to compel obedience to the terms of the covenant, to which each nation has bound itself. By the League of Nations a determined effort is to be made to compel arbitration. As has been said, in 1776 the Declaration of Independence was the high political maxim ; in 1920 we reach the Declaration of Interdependence. An international court will decide questions of international law. But who is to see that the decisions are carried out ? We are driven to the idea of an international authority, founded on force, an international Leviathan. "It is good," Mr Arthur Balfour has said, "that arbitration should be encouraged. It is good that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the nations. It is good that the security of the smaller states should be fenced round with peculiar care. But . . . what is needed now, and will be needed so long as militarism is unconquered, is the machinery for enforcing [these precautions] ; and the contrivances of such a machinery will tax to the utmost the statesmanship of the world. . . . Behind law there must be power." Once more the idea seems to emerge of the necessity of a super-Leviathan. All national law requires its sanction. National force has been the final sanction for national law. Similarly, in a political League of Nations combined international force seems the only practicable sanction to secure the carrying out of the judgments of international tribunals, and also for the defence of any small (or even large) nation wantonly attacked by some other power or powers when the latter are not willing to refer the dispute to a recognised international court.

All these conceptions are prevailingly political. And they appeal, almost irresistibly, so long as we identify our sentiments and interests with the Leviathan idea. We imagine it will always be associated with the right and just, *i.e.*, of course, the right and the just as we see it. But where are the guarantees, or where can be the guarantees, for the future of the super-Leviathan ? Given even the possibility of the creation of perfect machinery of law-courts, and military

force to require the carrying out of decisions, we assume satisfaction in the interpretation of international law, and the finality of its pronouncements. We have seen, in our own country, the extreme difficulty of acceptance of the arbitration idea in industrial disputes. Would anyone suggest that refusal to accept this method of settlement should be followed by armed forces brought to bear on a section of the community? We shall now have the method of a self-binding international covenant binding nations to arbitration, contravention of which will lead to a state of compulsion by the United League against the offender. Though it is hoped that the threat held *in terrorem* will bring the culprit "to reason," we see that, in national affairs, such a threat might prove a provocation to civil war.

II.

"Behind law there must be power." We are familiar with the identification of the "power" of the law as the punitive steps taken to bring the individual into line with the rest of the community. We apply the same idea of "power" to the international scale. Politically a unified power is suggested to *repress*, and bring into line, the nations which show a disposition to refuse reference to international law. The League of Nations begins at once by production of apparatus and machinery. "The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council with a permanent secretary."

But the "power" which is ordinarily regarded as pertinent to the sanction of the law is not the only "power." It is a pity that we come to look on political and governmental "power" as our main conception of "power." It is excellent, or, let us say, it may be indispensable to peace, as a preventative of war. But the idea of power in itself is narrow, self-destructive, inhuman.

Political power, to be safe, must be directed towards some end *greater than itself*. The "power" which must be made available as a sanction for the League of Nations to carry out the decision of its courts of international law must be *itself* a means only to some end greater than itself. The end, in its final form, is humanism, as a transfiguration of undiluted self-regarding nationality into the humanised combination of both nationality and internationality. Humanism includes the rightly perspectived international mind, based upon the family-mind and the national-mind.

What, then, is the conception of "power" which should

lie behind the idea of the League of Nations? Taking the comprehensive meaning of the "international mind" as including necessarily all the implications of home, local neighbourhood, provinciality, nationality, the "international mind" transfigures all these aspects (it does not in any real sense remove them) into the humanism that belongs to our common humanities, and particularly to what an Elizabethan writer called our "best humanities." It is these "best humanities" which stand out as the real end of a League of Nations; the military "power" behind the League (viewed apart from politics) is only a means to the real end. We thus get a standard of criticism and perspective by which to judge, intellectually, of the political machinery. How far will it all tend towards the real end of humanism?

Now this is an educational question, and light can possibly be thrown upon it by considering the educational aspect of the subject.

III.

As a method of procedure, educationally, we can choose between the method of "discipline" as repression and the method of discipline as stimulus. The League of Nations, in the last resort, relies upon the sanction of physical "power"; that is, it foresees the necessity of some mode of repression as "discipline." This, indeed, has been the main method of educational institutions in the past. But we are living at an interesting and, at least, transitional stage of educational development. It is now recognised that, educationally, there is a great waste in relying chiefly on repressive measures of discipline, and that a new era is opening out in the expansion of the method of stimulus. Much of the late Mr Arthur Sidgwick's famous lecture on "Stimulus" might be transferred (in spirit) in application, from the school to society, and from national to international relations. For instance, he refers to a striking sermon by Mr Bowen, of Harrow, on the subject of public spirit, in which he quietly remarked that "anybody would sooner be run out at cricket than run his partner out." It will be said that this public-school attitude cannot be expected to apply to nations. We may certainly say that, if it ever will apply, the method of its development is more likely to be that type of discipline which produced the public-school spirit, viz. that of stimulus, than that of repression. It may be added that the method of repression has played its part, not always a satisfactory one, in the history of the public school. Often the methods of repression and of stimulus have run side

by side. But, on the whole, progress has been unspeakably more rapid when the method of stimulus has been in the ascendant. "Another potent stimulus to thought," says Mr Sidgwick, "is supplied by getting the pupils, whenever it is possible, to share in anything like original research." It is from this unifying sense of humanist comradeship that is developed in research that the Oxford Manifesto to the German professors bears far more international significance than its adverse critics can have realised.

Educationally it is the self-active energies that need developing, not repressing. This is the very basis of the "new education." The first necessity in education, says Dr Montessori, is to practise the child in the difference between *good* and *evil*. "The task of the educator lies in seeing that the child does not confound *good* with *immobility*, and *evil* with *activity*, as often happens in the case of the old-time discipline. Our aim is to discipline for *activity* towards the good, not for *immobility*, not for *passivity*, not for *obedience*." Surely this educational discipline is sound for nations as well as for children. Repressive measures may be necessary, as the final sanction for deliberate wrong-doing, in school and in nation. But in the school to-day educational thinkers are much more alert in measuring and encouraging the stimulative aspects of school-work and school-life. In many schools corporal punishment has completely disappeared; in very many it has nearly disappeared. The stimulative factors to right living and right acting are correspondingly more and more considered and applied. This transformation of view has taken place largely because education, instead of remaining unconscious, and carried on without reflection upon life-principles, has become self-conscious, and a conviction has arisen amongst thinking teachers of the need of bringing their teaching work into direct touch with life, instead of basing itself uncritically upon tradition and artificial maxims, and short-cuts to aims, external to the intrinsic work. The teachers have been led to regard the aim in teaching as being the deepest good, intellectual and moral, of the child, here and now, not his possible exploitation for some occupation or activity ten or fifteen years ahead. The school, and indeed the knowledge given in the school curricula, and the whole mechanism of school-life have ceased to be ends in themselves. All this institutional and material entourage is the *means* of helping the pupils to their own self-development. It is the process of the development towards application of the Kantian ethical maxim: So act towards every human being as to regard him always as an end, and never as a means only.

Such an attitude involves ever increasingly the employment of the method of stimulus rather than that of repression. Hence, educationally, the question arises: Can we look forward to a similar self-consciousness of the claims of humanism, which in the future may help forward the educational stimulus in the various nations towards those "best humanities" which feed the "international mind," and base it upon its natural growth through the family, the local environment, the nation to which it owes its starting-points, to humanity at large? The League of Nations takes within its survey not only international arbitration and its numerous problems, but also international labour questions, "traffic in women and children," the opium trade, trade in arms and ammunition, freedom of communications, international questions affecting the prevention and control of disease. Speaking generally, it deals with preventions of evils, repression of wrong-doing, and its guiding formulas are those of "direction" and "control." Largely, it is disciplinary in its outlook, and disciplinary in the negative and repressive sense.

Its function is, magisterially, to be authoritative, and therefore it does not so easily lend itself to the stimulative. As it becomes authoritative its official voice will make itself heard, and we all trust will be decisive in the regulative side of international political relations, watchfully helping to keep themselves in normal channels of peace and progress.

IV.

But outside of this authoritative and regulative channel of diplomatic and political settlements there are the movements of intellectual, moral, literary, philosophical, religious forces, which indeed are the essential underlying stimuli to the "best humanities." They have, for the most part, freed themselves from even national authority in each case. To be effective, the League of Nations apparently must develop a political orthodoxy internationally. Whereas in philosophy, in literature, in religion, in education, all modern tendencies have passed from the atmosphere of authority to that of freedom. No State Authority compels adhesion to particular views in philosophy, in literature, in education, in religion. It is true that the churches have their creeds, and where there is a State Established Church there is a prescribed set of formularies and creeds laid down; but in modern practice there is an ever-broadening scope of interpretation, in process, apparently, of evolution towards freedom. Philosophy was

bound hand and foot through the Middle Ages to ecclesiastical Aristotelianism. Hobbes desired to use the Universities and the schools to promulgate the doctrine of monarchical absolutism, based upon his general philosophical principles, and invoked political authority for this purpose. But the whole tendency of philosophy since the Middle Ages has been away from Authority to Freedom. Education, indeed, in the past has been subservient to authority. Lily's *Grammar*, Ocland's *Prælia Anglorum* in Queen Elizabeth's reign, Mowat's *God and the King* (a pamphlet preaching the doctrine of absolute monarchy), were State-approved documents authoritatively appointed by the Privy Council to be used in schools. For purposes of organisation in the last half century education has passed through, and is passing through, a period of State control; but the dangers of State exploitation of education may be seen as an object-lesson in the last half century of German education. Yet, education as a subject of inquiry is on the road to becoming free from authoritative control and State exploitation, either for militarism or for any other sectional aims. Literature has become emancipated from the State censors. Freedom of thought and freedom of speech have been won—in all intellectual directions—in philosophy, religion, literature, and the process is going on in education. With freedom came inner expansion, and modern thought has gone forward by leaps and bounds in its elasticity of adaptation to life-needs. But with the growth and development has come the enormous intensification of analysis. Men to-day rarely call themselves philosophers, at most they describe themselves as devoted to one section of philosophy—logic, psychology, ethics, or metaphysics. Hence, philosophy, which ought to concern itself with the whole round of knowledge, the building up of the world of thought as a complete whole, to represent life as a whole, commonly presents itself as a series of sectional studies, and by intense concentration on narrowed areas prides itself on producing an increasing number of mental sciences, approximating to the natural sciences. The nearer these approximations of all sciences together take place, the less of the “best humanities” remains in each sectional study. But if we realise that it is in the pursuit of these “best humanities” that the hope of the future for a spiritual unity of nations is dependent, we shall then see that it is a matter of no slight practical consequence whether the philosophers as a whole take the view that their province is prevailingly humanist, or whether it is to be broken up

into a series of natural sciences. Philosophy needs to be brought back to direct relation to complex life. Aims and ideals are present in, and arise out of, concrete experience. It is a truism to say that every man is a philosopher. But this fact makes it all the more important that every man should have the opportunity to be trained to think comprehensively, as well as carefully and thoughtfully. There is a high international value in trained thought brought to bear on life as a whole. Philosophers, even those ensconced in University chairs, have not affected so large a constituency as they might have done. With new openings such as those of the Workers' Educational Association, and Adult Education classes, there is a great work to be done for humanism by philosophical teachers willing to help to develop the attitude of seeing life as a whole, instead of dividing it up into all sorts of sectional interests. Separation of employments and division of labour have brought, or intensified, the inevitable class interests, and vast increase of knowledge has multiplied specialist pursuits and obsessions—and the claim of man, as man, to understand himself and his relations to his inner and outer worlds is crowded out of consideration. No men have a finer opportunity, in education, to-day than the philosophers to help forward the outlook on life as a whole, and to develop more widely this broad human attitude. The Churches, too, might well join hands with the philosophers, and encourage every man and woman to read and study tentatively some philosophical writer who brings his thought into direct touch with life. Human beings, as such, need a provisional philosophy of life, just as the scientific man adopts, say, his provisional hypothesis of gravitation as the basis of his physical theory. He accepts it as a working hypothesis till some new light modifies this basis. Einstein and his new reading of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge may cause new interpretations of space, time, and motion, and the shifting of ground in a modification of a formerly accepted hypothesis. So human beings, thoughtful human beings (as most of us are able to become, under favourable methods of teaching by others and thinking for ourselves), require provisional hypotheses for the whole of life, which can explain to our thought a reasonable synthesis of knowledge and a basis of spiritual and mental unity. Let me suggest that an example of such a provisional philosophy might be found in Josiah Royce's *Philosophy of Loyalty*. This, in implication at least, unifies religion and philosophy. For the office of religion, in his view, is to aim towards the creation on earth of the

Beloved Community, based on a philosophical communion of saints of all creeds and climes and ages—united on the plane of a developed invincible loyalty to truth, to truth-seeking, to goodness, and to beauty. Royce further suggests that the future task of religion is the task of inventing and applying the arts which shall win men over to unity, and which shall overcome their original hates by the gracious love not of individuals only, but also of communities. Such arts are still to be discovered and to be grown into. But a sign of such humanism as permeates them is to be found in the test: Does this help towards the coming of the Universal Community? As to science, Royce says: "If the spirit of scientific investigation or of learned research shows signs (as it does already) of becoming one of the best of all forms of unifying mankind in free loyalty, then regard science not merely as a possible harmony with religion, but already as one of the principal organs of religion." So, too, with regard to religion itself. Its stagnant or retrogressionary attitude to human life is manifest enough at times, in the minds of critical observers, if not to those within the various folds. Again, Royce offers the test: "Does the religion accepted aid towards the coming of the universal community by helping to make religion not only as catholic as is already the true spirit of loyalty, but as inventive of new social arts, as progressive as is now natural science?" We must look forward to the insight of religion within its own aims becoming as progressive as the work of science itself on its research side, and in the long run on both as unified in the aim of the good of humanity. How intimately all this view would stimulate the *spiritual* unity of nations is evident. Let such a philosophical spirit be broad-spread in each nation, and the basis of international understanding and sympathy would become assured. For the truly humanist philosophical and religious minds constantly are within sight of the truly "international mind." I am only mentioning Professor Royce's book as an example of what I mean by desirable teaching of a synthetic philosophical view of life by the philosophical and religious teachers. If others have better books to suggest, by all means use them. But I suggest that the Churches and philosophy ought to combine, or at least supplement each other in the promotion of the study of some synthetic philosophy of life, especially to meet the needs of adult higher education throughout the nations. Nor can there be any doubt that the specialist bent in modern professional training ought, somewhere in a student's training, to receive the compensatory balance of a more synthetic out-

look on life. This is particularly the case with the training of the teacher. How can he be expected to have the philosophical background of humanism if all his own training has been intensively specialist? It is not sufficient that he should be permeated with the "new" psycho-analytic psychology, or with experimental psychology, and mental - measurement formulæ and standards; for all these studies are at present approximating to the biological or physical sciences. The philosophy that is wanted must be synthetic, presenting thought and life as wholes, not as further professional studies in the analytic and disruptive tendencies of isolated, separate, specialised sciences, however valuable or necessary those may be *in their places*. M. Alfred Fouillée has forcibly said: "Une nation qui en aurait le sentiment, et donnerait aux autres nations le premier grand exemple d'une éducation vraiment philosophique rendrait service à l'humanité en même temps qu'à elle-même." With what some old-fashioned critics will regard as too buoyant an optimism, he is convinced that *l'hégémonie morale du XX^e siècle surtout dans l'ordre de l'éducation doit appartenir aux philosophes et sociologues, et je n'ai pas la moindre hésitation à prédire qu'en fait, avant cent ans, elle leur appartiendra.*

V.

M. Fouillée is an excellent representative of the acknowledged attitude of the best French educationists. But we fear that this aim is not yet understood in England. In English teachers' training colleges I wonder how many students, men and women, are studying philosophy in any comprehensive sense in any part of their course? I do not mean logic, psychology, and ethics in a bald outline. But I mean philosophy as an attempt to get a working-hypothesis for the synthesis of thought and life, to have some underlying conception of a humanist interpretation of the multiplicity of life and nature brought under higher and higher schemes and values into some harmony and unity, so that the effort is encouraged to make life as a whole presentable to thought.

There are, say, 200,000 or more teachers in this country, and, when we consider the teacher's influence, it is obvious what a mental and moral loss there is when this great band of men and women have not been stimulated and helped to a humanist philosophy of life, even for themselves. It is not only a national loss; it is a great *international loss*. It hinders the advance of the spiritual side of international sympathies. If I speak of the teachers, let me include with

them the ministers of religion. Do they not also, even for their own inner aims, need to have a humanist synthetic philosophy of life? Is it too much, to-day, to look for that it should be a philosophy without narrow, sectarian, denominational implications? (those, if felt to be necessary, can be added). But, in the first instance, every minister of religion should be trained, in a synthetic philosophy of life that puts him in intellectual touch and sympathy with men of every other profession, in the "best humanities." This growing understanding, on a philosophical basis, of the solidarity of mankind, and the synthesis of all knowledge, and the implication of the unity (had we knowledge) of all the seen and the unseen, is a desideratum in the individual, in the professional, and in the national points of view. It is the basis, let us remember, of our understanding aright our relation with colonial peoples. It is at the root of sound "thinking imperially." It is, again, a basis of the international mind.

M. Boutroux affirms that morality must be lived before it can be taught. This is a demand which places the seal of unutterable sacredness on the work of the teacher at its noblest. And, implicitly, this demand of M. Boutroux is essential in the conception of the ideal teacher. For the great hope of the future of education, on the social side, is not the development of men and women who will merely set out to make a better social order than the past, but the development of individuals who will themselves *be* that order.

It should be realised that if the untrammelled spirit of philosophy amongst teachers and ministers of religion were the basis of understanding, sympathy, and common ground between teachers and ministers of religion in all countries, and amid all differences, it would bring all the separating differences of the lower level on to the plane of understanding at a higher level. The great opportunity of our physical expansion, consequent on the quickening up of communications and intercourse by land, sea, and the introduction of the new marvellously direct transit by air, makes possible the speedy removal of the old barriers to the transference of the best elements of our modern civilisation from one region of the earth to another. But we must recognise that Gresham's law, which has been regarded as a wonderful discovery in economics for 350 years, that *base coins will drive out of circulation good coins of the same metal*, is true in tendency in many directions besides money. What remedy have we in the case of the interaction of the "lower" and the "best" humanities? Surely it is that the intensifying of our concept of

the "best humanities" should keep pace in our educationists (teachers and ministers of religion particularly) with the increase of the rapidity of communication internationally, because of the enormous increase in the area of mutual influences, good and bad, that is certain to be upon us immediately. Thinking philosophically has become a *social* as well as an educational necessity.

The anti-humanist sectional interests are presenting more and more a solid phalanx, each in its own sphere of activity. "Educational" institutional movements are started as instruments for furthering class economic policies in this country, and internationally, amongst the young at and after the school age. Education is being exploited for class interests. With the anti-humanism of organised capitalists, and the anti-humanism of sectional manual workers, the old humanism of the teachers and scholars is becoming obscured in the hurrying currents of the world-movements.

VI.

Anti-humanists both on the monopolist and on the manual-worker side have revealed, by their expressed opinions and still more by effective action, the sources of their strength. But the maxim *l'union fait la force* does not apply to the force of selfish purposes merely. It applies also to the enormous spiritual power of human co-operation, when urged by self-conscious purpose in good, as well as in harmful, directions.

Even if the League of Nations, by international politics and diplomacy, can successfully preserve the world from war, yet in peace there is still before the world the spiritual warfare between the "lower" and the "best" humanities. *The forces of the best humanities are enormous.* Often, they do not seem so, because they are not yet self-conscious in their co-operation. They are scattered and sporadic.

Let me illustrate. M. Otlet,¹ the Belgian economist, in his comprehensive inquiry in *Les Problèmes internationaux de la Guerre*,² brings together the statistics, which hitherto had been difficult to get at. In 1916, out of a population in Europe of 412,000,000, there were 88,000,000 children between the ages of five and fifteen years. There were 465,000 schools,

¹ I have quoted these figures of M. Otlet in an article in the *Times Educational Supplement*, 25th May 1919. The figures collected by 1916 would be now considerably higher than those then stated. But even in this form, they will probably surprise many people by their vast significance.

² Genève, Librairie Kundig; Paris, Rousseau et Cie.

and 45,000,000 pupils in the schools. There were just about *one million* teachers. As I have said, in the article referred to, "Do any of us realise what it would mean for the world if those million teachers, and eventually those 45,000,000 pupils, were united by an active humanist spirit for the good of the world rather than permeated by the ordinary parochial and local absorption, and ceased to be devoted so entirely to their sectional or specialist or narrowly scholastic interests?" In higher education Europe possesses 276 universities, 32 of which have over 4000 students. These statistics include, of course, all the directions of study, and in the term "humanism" I have in mind all types of teachers (scientists as much as literary teachers) who teach knowledge of value to mankind. Unfortunately, nowhere do we find the narrowing effect of specialist studies ameliorated by a synthetic philosophy of life. In no groups do we find a relatively large philosophical clientèle. *Nor* even is the teaching in the various philosophical chairs prevailingly permeated with humanism. Turning to ministers of religion, M. Otlet's estimate is that there are in Europe and America 700,000 priests and ministers of religion. Do we not at once see what this would mean if every one of these ministers of religion could be counted upon as an active inspirer of the "best humanities"? The common human interest in the investigation of the highest problems of life and thought is the closest bond of human union, independently of the conclusions reached, if the processes of consideration and reflection have been single-minded towards the search for truth. Moreover, the quickened unloosening of moral energy in the closer pursuit of humanist philosophical thought and interest would react incalculably in spiritual insight and power on the clergy's more direct work.

Besides this vast community of teachers and ministers of religion, there is the further educational contingent—the journalists and literary men. M. Otlet estimates European newspapers and reviews at 72,000, and the output annually of books at 150,000. Now humanism as a final end is, in a rough-and-ready way, though *unconsciously for the most part*, not far removed implicitly from all of these educational workers. But what a difference there would be, and what a mighty force combined there would result, if the whole company of teachers, clergy, journalists, and authors, and, let us add, artists (though M. Otlet gives us no help in the way of the census of them), became *self-conscious* of their power and responsibility as humanist thinkers, at least *as self-conscious as all the sectional anti-humanists rejoice in being to-day!*

We speak of the solidarity of mankind. No need, surely, is greater, in the consolidation of this line of tendency, than the *rapprochement* towards solidarity of this irresistible body of humanist, educational leaders. Then would the direction of the world's progress get a unification of *spirit*, in social reconstruction throughout the world, which would transfigure all organisations and leagues, national and international. The unity and solidarity of humanist leaders is finally dependent on the *stimulative* factor of education.

The real test and standard, then, of a League of Nations will be, not the rigour with which, by the accumulation of concentrated compulsory power, nations are kept in order by repressive measures, but: How far can the political League of Nations bring itself into touch with the spirit of the educational body of humanists, as they proceed steadily but surely to develop towards the self-conscious stage of the higher humanism, which (in its procedure by way of mental stimulus and human aspiration) throws off from itself, individually and in groups, the noxiously anti-humanist elements in sectionalism, nationally and internationally, and in doing so renders the method of forceful repression *pari passu* superseded? Politicians and diplomats, as well as teachers, must themselves be drawn more and more into the positive educative spirit of human stimulus towards national and international good, rather than into the watchful attitude of curbing and repressing what has been allowed to prepare itself often by thoughtlessness and recklessness. This has been largely due to the lack of humanist education in the intellectual leaders of the various communities, and their anarchy of individualism, run riot intellectually, in face of the iron-bound cohesion of the separate, sectional forces of anti-humanism.

What might not be accomplished if there were one common spirit, the best humanist spirit like that of Erasmus, rejoicing in the unifying of the sacred and the secular in life, amongst those million teachers, 700,000 clergy, 72,000 editors, and 150,000 yearly writers? And will not the statesmen, the politicians, and diplomats eventually be drawn into the ranks of humanists? The power to conquer the world peacefully exists in these forces being spiritualised, from within or without. It needs awakening to self-consciousness in the vast union of these combined educational leaders. This would be the *entente cordiale* of humanism. The humanist standard is the final measure of the statesmen, politicians, and diplomats, both those who may constitute the *personnel* of the League of Nations, and those who are the active directors of the

destinies of each separate nation in domestic policy. I know no better statement of that standard than that of Bishop Berkeley :

“ Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum* may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but he will most indubitably make a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman.”

VII.

Though I am emphasising the importance of humanist leadership, I am not forgetting the need of the humanist training of the mass of the people. I believe the cultivation of the group-spirit and the group-mind is full of magnificent promise, in spite of its present, often apparently infantile, ill-considered, self-centred, reckless gropings. For us, however, at the present stage, Dr M'Dougall's view, as expressed in his *Group-Mind*, is of special interest :

“ The national character is not always best expressed by the mass, by the vulgar, nor even by the actual majority. There exists a natural *élite* which, better than all the rest, represents the soul of the entire people, its radical idea and its most essential tendencies. This is what the politicians too often forget. That is to say, it is what they forget when . . . they consider that no movement must be undertaken until the mass of the people demands it. They ignore the fact that leadership is essential to the maintenance of national life at a high level, and instead of exercising initiative, they wait for it to come from below—wait for a mandate, as they say.”

Humanist leaders cannot lead, it is true, in opposition to the “soul of the entire people.” But the great difficulty of the “entire people” is to know what its real “soul” is. The great function of humanist leaders is, therefore, that they should be able in their day and generation to reveal that “soul” of the people, *at its best*, to itself. So, essentially the great educational problem, in the widest and final sense of the term, is to develop the stimulus of education in the leaders towards the “highest humanities,” by the recognition of their own effective group-fellowship, and to stimulate the preparedness of the popular “soul” to a readiness to respond to the noblest guidance of leaders. First and foremost is the step of bringing more and more into self-

consciousness, as a vast group, the whole body of humanists throughout the world into a higher and closer bond of unity (both within their own several nations and beyond them), which will disclose stability and continuity of the best permanent human elements.

In his *Science of Power*, Dr Kidd showed how Germany, by educational stimulus, created "the idealisms of German nationalisation and imposed them on the young" through the teachers of the elementary schools, and of the higher schools, and through the university professoriate. But he showed also how ideals of a humanist type, in place of those of a militarist and nationalist character, could be diffused through communities. "Universal peace," he maintains, "can only be secured in one way—by raising the mind of civilisation, through the emotion of the ideal conveyed to the rising generation by the collective inheritance, to a plane where the barbarism of war would be so abhorrent to it that the degradation of engaging in it would take away from a people that principal motive of self-respect which makes life worth living. *Given clear vision in the general mind, this cultural inheritance, utterly impossible as it might seem, could be imposed on civilisation in a single generation.*"

For Dr Kidd's term, "imposed," I should substitute "developed by educational stimulus, derived from the self-conscious group of humanists united by the common spirit of the 'best humanities,' and permeating through their intrinsic sense of responsibility to a dissemination through each nation and through all nations." Dr Kidd's great contribution to sociology consists in his confidence in the foundation for optimism as to the possible rapidity of transference of ideals towards actualisation. His illustrations of Germany and Japan seem to suggest that, under favourable conditions, the "best humanities" would prove to have, at least, equal vital force in winning their way effectively, if urged forward in each nation by humanists with the thoroughness with which Germany inoculated her people in the narrow, aggressive, inhuman militarism of self-conscious, self-obsessed, sectional nationalism.

FOSTER WATSON.

FARNBOROUGH, KENT.

A LEAGUE OF CHURCHES.

A TRACT FOR THE TIMES.

THE REV. PROF. WILLIAM A. CURTIS, D.D., D.LITT.,

Regius Professor of Biblical Criticism in the University of Edinburgh.

As we look back on all that has happened during the six crowded years that lie behind us, we see more clearly than ever that the whole world has been confronted with the heart-searching question: Are nations responsible like individual men? Have they ethical standards which correspond to those which all men acknowledge in private life as sacred and as binding? Is there such a thing as national sin, as international obligation? There was indeed a code of conduct, but it was little more than a first beginning. There were rough rules of decency in public and international life, but party feeling at home and diplomatic necessity abroad put a constant strain upon them, and self-interest was often able to interpret them by a casuistry of its own in such a fashion as to threaten their very existence. All great nations have some record of rapacity, and have used their power to advance their prosperity; but in war and in politics as in commerce something more than decency, something of honour and even chivalry, was able to assert and commend itself. The code was at least alive and growing, but its very growth constituted a menace to all hopes of future aggrandisement on the part of the nations which were conscious of a heavy handicap of time in the race for worldly greatness. I suppose that nothing hurt and revolted us more as a people of sportsmanlike instincts than the spectacle of a hostile race into whose calculations there had entered the assurance that, while they broke the rules of war and policy to their own immediate advantage, we to our initial and probably final disadvantage might be trusted to observe them. But they saw clearly that the rules made

steadily for the permanence of our Empire and the security of our vast possessions. And if they violated them there was a chance that history would bow to their success, and that even Religion would interpret their victory as the will of God, rewarding not necessarily the proud but the prepared, and punishing the unready and complacent. Nothing succeeds like success: it always impresses the unthinking mass of men: it succeeds too often in persuading even the writers and readers of history that it deserved to succeed. As students of the past, their own past and ours, they could claim that victory again and again had crowned a cause which made no pretence of being ethically just if judged by common standards, that defeat had been sustained by smaller nations struggling against hopeless odds in a noble cause. Why should they not hope to add to the record, and trust to posterity to applaud the success of their deliberate venture? The restraining hand of New Testament religion, with its conception of God's fatherhood and human brotherhood, they claimed, should confine its operations to the domestic sphere of private and national life. The Old Testament conception of an Elect People destined to dictate to the whole earth a unifying rule of faith and conduct could still lend its sanction to the ambition of a great and masterful race. And history did repeat itself. The ancient dream of power cherished by Hebrew fanaticism crucified the Incarnate Spirit of the New Testament, and did it with the cry, "We have no king but Cæsar," on its lips. And we have been witnesses of the sequel in the torture of a Christian world which had been groping its way out of the tribal barbarism of the old order. War is a rough and clumsy instrument for the determination of right. Will those who appealed with conviction and confidence to its arbitrament respect its verdict? If victory was to be the final proof of right, will defeat be accepted as the final demonstration of wrong? For them the proof should be conclusive upon their own theory, unless they determine by and by to try again and so retrieve their humiliation. Humiliation, however, may not inspire humility or lead to self-reproach. Rulers and governments may be blamed; allies may be blamed; enemies may be blamed; luck may be blamed. A nation may be hardened by calamity, and forget its faults under its misfortunes. But for us who had no faith in war as a proper instrument of right, who accepted it as a hateful anachronism and a revolting method, it is not possible to derive such unmingled satisfaction from our dear-bought victory as our enemies in the like case would have drawn. Under protest we took up the weapons that we would

have disallowed. With profound abhorrence we dipped our hands in the blood of fellow-men and fellow-Christians. Only with reservation can we glory in the verdict God has permitted us to win. We fought for something higher than national self-interest. We are pledged by our professions and our sacrifices to a nobler cause than victory. Victory will mean failure to us if self-preservation and a military respite prove the only fruits of our success. We struggled for the higher law, the loftier code, in the faith that God willed it and the world needed it. Not for the old order did we rally the allied peoples, and hazard everything we possessed, but for the new order that was already emerging from the old in spite of obdurate prejudice and inveterate suspicion.

The League of Nations is born. It has its infancy and childhood to pass through before it can reach its final form. Who can foresee through what periods of storm and stress its adolescence may pass? It will need the care and protection, the prayers and goodwill, of all right-thinking men to be its sponsors and its friends in the coming years. Let us not jeopardise its future by cherishing illusions as to the ease with which the scheme may be expected to work in the kind of world in which it is being established. It must rest externally upon a fresh understanding between the constituent peoples. That understanding must imply at least a rudimentary system of international law and an international tribunal, and behind it a certain international force to protect its order and to effectuate its decisions. Sooner or later international justice will run counter to the individual inclinations and ambitions of almost every member of the League. Law that is alive in a changeful world cannot help growing, but it is of its essence that the common welfare takes precedence over particular and local interests. Are we willing to bow to unpalatable findings and loyally carry them out? Moreover, we ought in international affairs to remember what is already obvious in social life, that law, however securely legislated and however justly conceived, is essentially limited in its function and in its results. It does restrain, and it does educate, at least in a negative fashion. But no one claims for it the power to inspire conduct. Though ideals create it, and though ideals in turn are suggested even by its prohibitions, it deals with average standards and the bare necessities of justice. Equity, its principle, means much for mankind, just as liberty, its co-ordinate, has meant. But they are only the foundation of a moral order, sanctioning such elementary virtues as honesty and truthfulness, and prohibiting such elementary vices as impurity

and homicide. Law will not save the world, however effectively it may protect its citizens. For the higher virtues and for the graces of human life a less calculated rule of action is necessary, a quite different kind of sanction, a far higher kind of impulse. The final problem is not how to restrain the sins of selfishness and natural desire, but how to shame them out of existence and make them impossible.

If it be true that in the past our own and other nations have made little effort to rise above a rudimentary law in their dealings with one another, if to that extent we are under a common reproach and can make a common confession of our shortcoming, the plea of ignorance or oversight will not henceforth be available. We have deliberately arraigned our enemies, and the world has endorsed our view of their crime and their responsibility. We have denied that nations are exempt from the obligations of the moral law. We have achieved by war not so much a triumph of our principles as a world-wide opportunity for their practice. If we are to use that opportunity we must act in accordance with the light of social experience, and refuse to be content with any merely prudential and precautionary system, with any merely legal and judicial notion of justice. No Christian needs to be reminded that, left to itself, law may as readily provoke transgression and stimulate ingenious evasion as foster obedience and loyalty. Forensic justice may degenerate into an endless debate between the special pleadings of self-interest and custom. If law be invoked legitimately to school and discipline and inhibit mankind, whence ought we to draw the living water of moral inspiration?

That is the question facing the Christian nations to-day. Proud of our soldiers, we are ashamed of war. Ashamed of war, we want our children and our children's children to inherit peace. Peace, we know, cannot be guaranteed by the ever-changing self-interest of outwardly Christian peoples. Sorrow for our dead, horror at war's atrocities, dread of the future possibilities of warlike science, even these will not prevent the recurrence of world-conflict. Armaments however up-to-date, balances of power, considerations of finance, democratic control, these will not suffice. What will men and nations not dare, what will they not perpetrate, for glory, or for power?

If we are to trust in a League of Nations and hope for substantial disarmament and settled peace, the League will need to have behind it not only the mandate of all great nations but their sincere goodwill and enthusiasm. Now that autocracy is overthrown and democracy is in power, the way is open to the use of every legitimate means of influencing

that public opinion to which the governments of free countries are characteristically sensitive and continuously answerable. Though the world may be sobered by sorrow, it still needs to be convinced by reason and conscience, and to be encouraged by a faith that is not afraid to take risks. And just as in our life as citizens and neighbours and social rivals we need more than the calm acceptance of a natural ethic, individual and social, so it has become clear that in the life and intercourse of nations the spirit of Christian faith and duty is a vital necessity. For if nations are under a common Law of God, have a conscience to judge them, are responsible for their public actions, and have become aware of it, this means that they are ripe for admission to the school of Christ and the kingdom of God. Christianity can deal with them. Christianity has a claim upon them. Christianity can supply them with the vital support and incentive they require. Just when it was being taken for granted in many quarters that nations have as such no religion, but are secular institutions, and it was assumed that national Churches had outlived their period and historic function, the theory of national religion at least has received a remarkable rehabilitation through the unprecedented experiences and necessities of the time. For the pulpit as for the press the doctrine of the secular character of the State became untenable the moment it was realised how sacred was the charge committed to the free nations. The Church has its own sanctity, but the State is not therefore profane. Each institution has a distinctive mission to fulfil for God, and freedom is the right of each in order that it may fulfil it. So soon as the conscience of the Church was satisfied that the national cause was just and that our intervention was unmotivated by aggression or ambition, the pulpits of all denominations with one accord made the cause their own, while a complete establishment of army chaplains was immediately organised, so that for the period of the conflict the nation had a *de facto* ecclesiastical union. Not only at the front, but back at home, differences were promptly sunk under the pressure of a common ideal and a common apprehension, and in a real measure all Churches linked themselves to the threatened State and accepted a real though partial establishment. Was it to be wondered at that our Scottish Field-Marshal, remembering what had been accomplished in Church federation and in State connection under his predecessor's and his own command, made use of the opportunity of his first public appearances in his native land after victory to address to all the Churches a soldierly and patriotic and statesmanlike appeal? During the war they

had risen above prejudice and aloofness and rivalry, and had proved that for a great end they could both stand together and march shoulder to shoulder. They had found in the defence of the Empire and of humanity a common aim sufficiently great and urgent to obliterate all minor differences. Were they to return to the old parochial and provincial rivalries? Would the Empire mean less to them once it was safe? Was their war-time fellowship and unity to become a mere memory, a fire burnt out on the national hearth?

There was much that was memorable in Earl Haig's public utterances during those closing days of May 1919. They were addressed primarily to Scottish audiences, academic, civic, and ecclesiastical; but they appeal to thoughtful men throughout the world as the grave exhortation of a devout soldier, schooled in the doctrine that with God all things are possible, and fired by public and patriotic enthusiasm. The war had ended. The Scottish Churches had taken a momentous step on the way to union. In front of the speaker were men who had sunk their traditional differences in the interests of unity, efficiency, liberty, justice, and peace. "The chaplains of all denominations," he said, "did splendid service. . . . They taught our soldiers of all ranks the great lesson of comradeship, the value of unity of effort and purpose. . . . Inspired by one aim and object, following a single noble ideal, they brought the strength of religious fervour and conviction to the aid of our nation in arms. . . . Now that the ordeal of war is over, I believe that the Churches, if they will but combine and act together, have a great and unequalled opportunity to secure and preserve for all time, to the lasting advantage of our race, that capacity for common effort, spirit of fellowship, and community of ideals which by their teaching and example they did so much to foster during the war. I am here to-day to ask you to take that opportunity, to take it now while it is yet within your reach, while the lessons of the war are still fresh in the minds and hearts of the nation. I am a soldier and, I hope, a man of action. I know that there are difficulties in the way of Church unity, and that with all these difficulties I may not be fully acquainted. None the less I have been taught that difficulties exist only to be overcome, and that there is no difficulty of human creation which cannot be overcome by goodwill and resolute action."

"I have seen in my own sphere of activity," he proceeded, "the working of a General Staff. I understand how, without interfering with the discretion of those on the spot in matters

that concern them and them only, it is yet able to give singleness of purpose to diversified operations in many theatres, . . . yet more particularly, how it is able to instil life, energy, resolution, and drive into the actions of all, inspiring all with the feeling that they are working to a common end, that their efforts are interdependent, their failure involving more than their own ruin, and their success guaranteeing the victory of others. I want to see established a General Staff for the Christian Churches of the Empire, some body at least analogous in the ecclesiastical sphere to the position held by the Imperial General Staff in the military organisation of the Empire. There need be no interference in the internal economy of the Churches, whether on their spiritual or their temporal side. What it seems to me is needed at once is a strong representative body, not too large for energetic action, which can direct the general policy of the Churches, infuse them with new energy, and strengthen their resolution in the great crusade of brotherhood, on the long road on which the war has set our feet. This central body must proceed to the further development of an organisation suited to the needs of the Empire. We are entering, we hope, upon an era of peace, bought by vast sacrifices. The object of every one of us is to make that peace secure and permanent. To my mind, the one means by which that end can be achieved is to develop—not merely in Scotland and England, but throughout the whole of the British Empire and the whole world—the spirit of brotherhood born of war. For that great work we need the active help of a strong, vigorous, national Church—a Church which has risen superior to the forces of disruption, and is itself a living embodiment of the principles of fellowship and unity.

“ I desire to see a beginning made in Great Britain itself by forming a United National Church. Then I look further afield, and desire to see a great Imperial Church—a Church in and through which shall be maintained, in a far more adequate way than is at present possible, the great decision and determination of the many peoples who together form the British Empire—the free peoples who, organised in one united Army, lately fought to maintain justice and right. If we can succeed in doing this in the British Empire, we shall benefit the whole world. . . . National Churches, we know, have their dangers if in their outlook they do not see beyond the confines of the Nation, or in their allegiance own no higher authority than that of the State. These, however, are dangers which Scotland at least has known how to overcome ;

and if the other parts of our Empire are in earnest, as I am sure they are, to carry on in peace the work their soldiers have begun so well, then they too will readily join hands with us in our attempt to organise one Imperial Church. . . . It rejoices me to hear that Scotland may be expected soon to give expression, in a way which shall be a glory to herself and a model to all the world, to her great ideal of a Church at once National and Free—a Church which shall carry into the future the heritage of a glorious past, rich in the affections of her own people, and commanding the respect and admiration of the whole world. Yet it will not be enough to have a great United Church of Scotland. What Scotland shall have successfully gained for herself, she must help the whole Empire to achieve. To attain this end it will be necessary for all the Churches of our homeland to combine and enter together upon a great crusade. In such a crusade no Church is better qualified to take the lead than the grand old Church of Scotland, pre-eminent as she is in intellect, in broad-mindedness, in practical ability and good sense.

“The time for action is now. . . . We have had our speeches; now let us come to deeds. Never in all our national history was there greater need than there is to-day that all the forces that make for brotherhood should be gathered together and directed actively upon a definite policy for the social improvement and general uplifting of our race, and, after, other peoples of the world. Never for many centuries have the minds and hearts of men been so well prepared for a movement which shall carry them to higher and better things. At such a time all ranks look to their Church to give a clear and definite lead. It is because I believe that any lead they give must necessarily lose in effectiveness so long as our people are divided up among several Churches, with no single directive body to urge them to combined effort, that I submit that immediate steps should be taken to bring about unity of purpose and endeavour among the Churches themselves. For this reason, too, I entreat our ecclesiastical leaders of all denominations to lose no time in giving us, in Britain and throughout the whole Empire, a vigorous United or Federated Church. We do indeed live in a day of great opportunities. To-day all things are possible to men who have a passionate faith in the ‘things that are worth while’—and back up that faith with courage, resolution, and the spirit of mutual confidence and goodwill. Tomorrow the opportunity will have gone; and who knows when it will return, or by what suffering its return must be

bought? If, as a result of all that our people at home and abroad have gone through together in those terrible years of war, we do not carry forward into all departments of our national life a new spirit of unity and brotherhood, then all that we think we have gained in the war will be lost. Then must we assuredly look forward to other world-wars, only on a yet vaster and more terrible scale, as the certain fate of succeeding generations. Only the creation of a great Imperial Church, with some central organisation to guide its policy, embodying all that is best and soundest in the Empire, will enable us to come safely through the great testing ordeals of peace, just as the spirit of comradeship and true faith enabled our armed forces to rise superior to the testing ordeals of war."

In a subsequent address to Scottish ministers who had served with the Army, the Commander-in-Chief drove home his message with terse vigour: "I am convinced that you have such an opportunity now as may not recur for centuries. The iron is hot: let us strike while it is still malleable and can take shape under our blows. For the machinery a small body is wanted, small but representative, composed of men with ideas and with the courage to take responsibility upon themselves. I have seen enough to know the futility of big committees which exist to maintain the self-importance of the verbose. If we are in earnest in our desire to get something done, we must be content to give the executive power to a few, and to work loyally and with all the energy that is in us to carry out their directions. Our general policy is accepted. We aim at unity, and in the first place at the unity of the Scottish Churches as a stepping-stone to a wider unity which shall embrace all the Churches of the Empire. That, as a general scheme, is sufficient for us to act on: let us hasten to get together our executive to work out the details of our 'special idea.' Let us not be afraid to aim at big things. It is given to few men to carry the whole of their objectives; but if we direct our course at the stars, at least we shall carry the mountains in our stride. Aim high: perchance ye may attain. . . . The object of our endeavour is by the spread of brotherhood and comradeship among men and peoples to prevent the recurrence of world-wars such as that through which we have just passed. That is pre-eminently the task of the Churches. . . . That prosperity may follow in the train of peace is our earnest hope; but the destiny of Britain is something far greater than this, something far beyond anything yet attempted by any race in history. Our

country's mission is to maintain 'peace on earth and goodwill among men.' To attain this we must first of all make sure of ourselves, but having done so, and in doing so, we must carry our own ideals to all whom they have not yet reached. It is an end which cannot be attained merely by wishing for it, which cannot be achieved merely by temporal means. It is a matter which concerns mind and spirit as well as factors economic—which in themselves are secondary and dependent on the more important moral factor. Each of us must do his very utmost to help to reach that goal. . . . Let me summarise the objects of our endeavour. First, there is the unity of the Churches in Scotland. That is already begun. Then the unification of those of Scotland and England; and thirdly, of the Churches of the British Empire. I do not wish you to wait to start on these last two objects. Men's minds are now ripe for them, and there is no time to be lost if we are to reap the full advantage of the moment. Prepare your scheme at once, and if your beginnings are but small, at least begin. I believe that the task will prove easier than you think. Finally, you have to carry the same doctrine to all the nations of the earth. It is a crusade to which I urge you—a crusade not having for its object the redemption of a single city, however holy, but the freeing of the whole world from the devastating scourge of war. It is a task worthy of any Church, and one clearly laid upon ourselves. For the Gospel of Christ is the world's only social hope and the sole promise of world-peace."

More than a year has elapsed since Earl Haig addressed these dignified and statesmanlike sentences to the Churches of Scotland and of the Empire. A swift response could not have been looked for. But there is a danger that his words may be forgotten amid the crowding impressions of an ever-changing and preoccupied world. I make no apology for quoting their substance and calling fresh attention to them. In the interval since their utterance the march of events has reinforced their urgency. Happily, the Churches have been stirring. The congress of Anglican Bishops has met again at Lambeth, and after long deliberation has issued an appeal to the Churches of the Empire and beyond, and an advisory instruction to the clergy and people of its own communion. While the Bishops were in conclave, Presbyterians from twenty countries and representing thirty Church organisations were in earnest conference at Lausanne, reviewing with deep sympathy and concern the European situation after war, and endeavouring to turn to spiritual account the lessons of recent history. Immediately afterwards a great and

notable gathering of Church representatives assembled in Geneva, the seat of the new League of Nations, to deliberate in the frankest manner on Faith and Order in relation to the problem of Christian unity, preparing the way for an ecumenical congress at a later date. Leaders of Eastern and Western Churches were present in strength, including representatives of nations recently at war, the Roman Catholic Church alone holding aloof and declining a courteous invitation to take part. A similarly impressive gathering of representatives from the same communions met later at St Beatenberg under the auspices of the World Alliance to promote International Friendship through the Churches. This at least may be said, that sound foundations are being laid for a consolidation of the divided Churches. All over the world federations have become the rule, not only for kindred Churches holding essentially a common system, but for Churches less intimately related which are awaking to the world's profound need of common action on their part. Theology, once a divider, has powerfully aided this *rapprochement*, for religious scholars have long been working in friendly association. The social activities of the separated Churches have still more powerfully disintegrated hereditary barriers. And now it has become plain to the dumbest perception that, if the Christian Church is to play its appointed part as the arch-peacemaker in the world, its divided ranks must be closed, its militant energies confederated and co-ordinated and re-directed, its inward unity expressed in some external fashion, so that the world may take cognisance of its world-mission on behalf of peace and goodwill and reckon upon its undivided influence. Among Churches which are as yet strangers to each other, whose leaders are as yet mere names to one another, perhaps not even names, unity and union are, of course, unthinkable. A working fellowship is only beginning to be realised. The conditions upon which alone an honourable understanding and a hearty friendship can be based are only coming to be appreciated. Churches, greater and smaller, which have "made good," which have manifestly received the Divine blessing and have evidently been a power for good to the human race and an honour to the sacred name which they profess, still have their orders and credentials questioned by antiquarian or dogmatic scruples. But the atmosphere is steadily clearing. The test of fruit-bearing will in the long run overshadow the test of pedigree. Fruit-bearing in the Christian spirit may indeed come to be recognised as the true mark of legitimate descent. Parties to union or reunion will not be expected to

confer except on equal terms and with open minds, in order that each may bring to the other's future endowment the whole of the gifts of grace and of experience which it has received. Better a world of honest separation than a world of make-believe unity. No Church, no group of bishops or administrators or leaders, can, without direct and unreserved conference with the other parties concerned, lay down the terms of any valid union-settlement. It is the palpable defect of the proposals of the Lambeth Bishops not only that they represent the mind of one order alone of the Anglican Clergy and contain no expression of the mind and heart of the Anglican laity, but also that they emanate from a council-chamber in which the other communions concerned had no voice. In a word, they dictate a policy, however courteously that policy is phrased, instead of offering to go in search of one in concert with the separated fellow-Christians who are in view. Neither minima nor ultimata are in place at such a stage. Formal risks such as attend open conferences have to be faced. They have a way of resolving themselves, however, in the atmosphere of responsible discussion between men and Churches prayerfully desirous of union. Sectional apprehensions and party feeling can only be allayed through frank and serious meeting round a table. The Church of England cannot know, and ought not to think it knows, on what terms it can unite with other Churches until it has met them face to face, without reserve, in a venture of devout faith. In many respects it holds a unique position for mediation in the Christian world, a position unique in its embarrassments as well as in its advantages. Very naturally it fears to take any step which would prejudice its standing or orders in the eyes of the Greek Orthodox or the Roman Catholic communions. Very naturally it defers to their antiquity, although all Churches have an equally ancient descent in the things which matter, just as all men have Adam to their father,—and to their numbers, although together their membership includes most of the surviving illiteracy of the Christian world,—and to their orthodoxy, although it is based too often upon unreasoning loyalty and is merged too often in pathetic superstition. The working piety of the Anglican Church, its scholarship, its ideals of education, its lay sentiments, its attitude to the problems of modern life and the discoveries of modern science, in a word, its spiritual instincts, lay as well as clerical, are notoriously far more closely akin to those of the great Protestant

communions, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Methodist, Congregational, than to any of the branches of the Church Unreformed. But it has been tempted to show greater consideration to the susceptibilities and prejudices of the latter than to the sensibilities of the former, which after all live at its own door, and have shared its history, and speak the same language, and have faced with equal spirit the same anxieties of modern thought and modern democracy. The ultimate question is one of truth rather than expediency or policy or antiquity. Orders, worship, government, dogma—are they right, are they true, are they efficient, are they sole and exclusive? Everyone knows that the mass-opinion of the Anglican world does not share the Roman Catholic or the Oriental Orthodox traditional view of these things. Yet the danger is that through fear of schism, and that on the part of the denouncers of schism, a sectional point of view may be allowed to dominate the situation, even though the result must be that a greater schism will be left unhealed.

But, to return to the general issue, it is clear that a league of Churches devoted to the peace of the world is an urgent necessity. At great expense the nations, great and small, maintain their diplomatic and consular services. They would rather be beggared than go unrepresented at the courts and chancellories of other peoples. The diplomatic apparatus for keeping peace is primitive enough in its essentials, even when it is employed by master minds. It offers bribes to nations, it delivers threats, it contrives to ally or to separate, as national self-interest may dictate. But without the press, or against the press, it can accomplish little. Its staff may be accomplished men, persuasive, attractive, intellectual, personally disinterested; but behind them power must be felt, the power of armed force, or of economic force, and, in either case, of public opinion ready to act. Crisis after crisis, conflict after conflict, has disclosed to suffering humanity the slenderness of all these official restraints upon the engineers and engine-drivers of national rivalry and enmity and passion. The press has extraordinary power, but it also has its limitations, its own self-interest, its own peculiar temptations. The Church must intervene, not merely nationally as in the past, but internationally. It must review and widen its conscious mission. In the name of the Prince of Peace it must not only preach and teach the gospel of peace and goodwill, but it must stretch reconciling hands across the frontiers of national life. It is too late, when the dogs of war are unleashed, to look around for olive branches.

Neither red crosses nor olive branches are permitted in war to cross and re-cross closed frontiers. And, in fact, when wars break out, with singular and pathetic uniformity the Churches of Christ in all lands become at once the stretcher-bearers and the standard-bearers of their nations' cause, for a thousand reasons unable to stand apart either to criticise or to pray, unable to mediate between the combatants, content to wear a military uniform for the time being, each of them a mere unit in a national array under secular command. Even the world desires the Church of Christ to achieve and occupy a worthier position. A higher service the Church may render. But in time of war it can do nothing if in time of peace it has not already been an international force, knowing at least the spiritual representatives of other countries, in touch with their life and aspirations, enjoying their confidence, and able accordingly to influence them. I believe the Church requires, and is called to create, some effective counterpart to the diplomatic service of the State. In addition to its Home Mission and its Foreign Mission it has an International Mission to prosecute, and nowhere more urgently than in Europe, the seat of historic Christianity. Already the way is opening. The war has shattered many prejudices, racial and religious. University life is very largely emancipated from ecclesiastical restraint. Even in Central Europe and the Balkans the clash of creeds is assuming a new aspect, the rival Churches are confronted by novel conditions and common dangers, the adherents of different systems are learning suppressed or forgotten facts regarding one another. Not only the Roman Catholic and the Oriental Orthodox Churches, but Presbyterianism and Lutheranism, have already an extensive international organisation throughout large tracts of Europe as well as in America. Other Churches also defy the limits of national life. And not least, either in fact or in promise, there is a powerful federation of Christian students in the universities of the world, and a world-wide organisation of branches of the Young Men and Women's Christian Associations. A new opportunity plainly offers itself to the Christian conscience and imagination, and a very solemn call is sounding. Men look to Alliances of Nations, to the League of Nations, to Labour Federations, to Socialist combinations, to bring in the political millennium of international peace. Have they not a right to look also to the Christian Churches, to the Church, incomparably the completest organisation in the world, with the highest potentialities and the deepest obligations for the service of reconciliation? The problem is essentially a spiritual one. Not money, not

force, not expediency, not even intelligence or humanity is an adequate instrument for the enterprise. Moral and spiritual persuasion alone will suffice. The horrors of war, the barbarity of war, the suicidal exhaustion of modern war between conscript nations, the costliness of war, the anachronistic folly of war—men may be persuaded of these features of the ghastly business and yet be impotent to save posterity from its renewal. Beyond and above these all too fleeting impressions and convictions, which spring up in the agony of each cruel crisis and anon are forgotten, to be re-learned by each successive generation at an ever-increasing cost, the Christian spirit must be invoked, and its unique estimate of the value and purpose of the solidarity and sanctity of human life brought home to the hearts of men. With tedious and monotonous reiteration the apologists of Christianity have asserted that Christ came to break down the barriers that separate nations and continents, and that Christianity knows no distinctions of race or language. It is time, high time, that a new chapter of practical and unanswerable apologetic should be written by the fingers not of scholars but of Churches. Let the Church, which avows itself the Body of Christ still incarnate, obey His Spirit and glorify His name by inscribing this work upon the page of history as a *fait accompli*.

WILLIAM A. CURTIS.

EDINBURGH.

THE CALL OF THE BISHOPS

AS HEARD BY AMERICAN PROTESTANTS.

THE REV. F. G. PEABODY, D.D.,

Harvard University.

No one can read the solemn "Appeal for a United Christendom," issued by the Lambeth Conference, without recognising the sincerity of its intention and the candour of its declarations. It proposes, with genuine humility and generosity, an "Adventure of Good Will." It confesses the share of the communions under Episcopal authority "in the guilt of crippling the body of Christ" by a "condition of broken fellowship." It approaches the particular problem of recovering the "visible unity of the Church" with full recognition that "the great non-Episcopal Communions" stand for "rich elements of truth, liberty, and life which might otherwise have been obscured or neglected." No note of ecclesiastical arrogance mars this impressive "Call to all Christian People." It should be welcomed as an unprecedented indication of magnanimous and fraternal hope.

When, however, one turns from cordial appreciation of this lofty eloquence and genuine comity to the definitions prescribed for Christian faith, and the remedy proposed for disunion, it becomes the duty of Protestant Christians to express, with not less fraternal candour, the sense of inadequacy, and even of misdirected effort, which this notable document conveys; and it is possible that one who is not associated with any of the "great non-Episcopal Communions," but who has had the privilege of life-long intimacy with many of their leading representatives, may report without prejudice or prepossession the impression which is likely to be made on their minds.

In the first place, the definitions proposed seem inadequate to represent a "genuinely Catholic" Church. Who is a

Christian? Christians, affirms this great assemblage of Bishops, are "those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ and have been baptised into the name of the Holy Trinity." But is this in reality an adequate description of a disciple of Jesus Christ? Is it not obvious that great numbers of persons, though baptised in infancy and still repeating the great affirmations of the historic creeds, may not be Christians at all? Is a Christian to be known by his external conformity or by the fact that in unconscious infancy he was baptised? Are there not baptised persons who are practically heathen, and unbaptised persons who are Christian saints? All American Christians are at this moment reassured of the vitality of their faith through the unremitting and self-effacing service of the American Quakers in the desolated areas of Europe. Yet not one of these devoted men and women has been baptised. Are they not to be reckoned as members of the "Universal Church of Christ"? Did not the Master whom they serve say of such labours as theirs: "Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. . . . Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me"?

The same inadequacy is met when the acceptance of a creed is identified with the faith of a Christian. Every reasoning creature has a creed, but his creed is an intellectual formulation, while his religion is a decision of the will and a direction of the life. A creed is essential to a Christian, but a creed does not create a Christian. The obvious fact is that one might accept almost every article of the historic creeds without thereby pledging himself to the most elementary qualifications of a Christian. To believe that Jesus Christ was miraculously born, that he descended into hell, rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, does not forthwith guarantee to the believer the blessing that is promised to the peace-makers or the pure in heart.

A similar impression is made by the enumeration of conditions of unity which occur later in this stately document. These conditions are described as "the whole-hearted acceptance of the Holy Scriptures as the record of God's revelation of Himself to men, and as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith"; of the Nicene Creed as the "sufficient statement of the Christian faith"; of the divinely instituted sacraments of baptism and the Holy Communion; and of a ministry, "possessing the commission of Christ." Here again the Christian Church is described as a form of organisation, with its constitution, its governors, and its authority. Nothing is here of

conduct, service, sacrifice, or love. Indeed, nothing is here of faith, in the sense given to that word by Jesus Christ. "Thy faith hath saved thee," he said to many a repentant or responsive life, which knew nothing of the Nicene Creed as a "sufficient statement of the Christian faith." In short, the "whole-hearted acceptance" here proposed is directed to a law, a government, a system, not to repentance, brotherhood, or faith. It is not because such external conformity is meaningless that great numbers of the "non-Episcopal Communion" have come to subordinate it as a condition of unity, but because the essential nature of the Christian religion is expressed, not in conformity but in consecration, not in ritual but in righteousness, not in creed but in life. A member of the "Universal Church of Christ" belongs, according to this view, to a much larger fellowship than is proposed in the "Call of the Bishops." That fellowship includes, indeed, many of those who regard the creed commonly called Nicene as the sufficient statement of Christian faith, and who have been baptised into the Holy Trinity; but it is a fellowship which is much more inclusive and catholic. A Christian, in this view, is simply a loyal and consistent disciple of the Master. "If any man has not the spirit of Christ, he is none of his," and correspondingly, if any man has that spirit, he is an acceptable member of the Universal Church of Christ, though he be a Nonconformist concerning the Nicene Creed or a Quaker concerning baptism. All this is becoming increasingly plain to the "great non-Episcopal Communion." They are, at every point, breaking the barriers of dogmatic tests, and promoting an inter-Church unity of service, sacrifice, and power. To propose at such a time a plan of unity which appears to despiritualise the tests of discipleship and to define the Christian Church as an organisation, perpetuated by rule, confession, or tactual transmission of authority, seems to suggest a retreat from the more comprehensive movement, already far advanced, toward a unity of spirit which is the only bond of peace.

When one passes from these matters of definition to the practical programme which the Bishops present for "recovering Christian unity," one is again profoundly impressed by the generosity and sincerity of their intention. There opens before their minds a plain path of mutual conciliation and co-operation, and they point to it with solemn hope as to "a new call for wider service in a reunited Church." As one scrutinises more closely, however, the practical procedure suggested, it proves so illusory that it is difficult to understand how it could have commended itself to men of experience and wisdom as

either conciliatory or reasonable. The plan proposed is, in brief, the acceptance of the Episcopate as "the best instrument for maintaining the unity and the continuity of the Church"; the giving of Episcopal ordination to Nonconformist ministers with "that grace which is pledged to the members of the whole body in the Apostolic rite of the laying on of hands"; and, on the other side, the acceptance by "Bishops and Clergy of our Communion of a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their [non-Episcopal] congregations." Concerning the Episcopate as an instrument of efficiency, there is no doubt much to be said; but it should be noticed that it is not the Episcopate as a form of organisation alone which is here commended, but rather that specific type of Episcopate which is, to use the Bishop's phrase, "possessed" by the Anglican and its affiliated communions. The Methodist Church, for example, numbering approximately seven times as many members in the United States as the Protestant Episcopal Church, is also an Episcopal Communion. Indeed, its bishops have a degree of authority unapproached in the Anglican Communions. Shall Methodist bishops, then, as representing the Episcopate, be accepted as competent to exercise their functions in the Protestant Episcopal Church; or, on the other hand, must they be required to submit themselves for reordination before their ministry is recognised? Is the Episcopate, that is to say, to be regarded as an "instrument" or as a "possession"? It becomes obvious that no identity of procedure is proposed. Non-Episcopal ministers are to be reordained; Episcopal clergy are "to accept a commission." In one case the candidate admits his disqualification until a bishop's hands have touched him; in the other case there is an arrangement by mutual consent. The Nonconformist receives a divinely transmitted authority; the Episcopalian receives a neighbourly welcome.

It may be urged that the Anglican Episcopate is a matter of sacred principle to its adherents while the practice of non-Episcopal Communions is merely a matter of convenience; so that, as an American theologian has remarked, "the principle of the sacramental and supernatural priesthood is outraged and threatened by any such passing to and fro between the Church and organised schism." This suggestion, however, only indicates how slightly the convictions of the Nonconformist conscience are appreciated or even understood. The Baptist Churches, for example, number not less than six times as many members in the United States as does the Protestant Episcopal Church. They maintain that

baptism by immersion, after mature decision and repentance, is the only method of initiation into the Christian Church which conforms to the teaching and practice of Jesus Christ. Here is as definite and sacred a principle as is the authority of the Episcopate to the Anglican Communion, and one which has at least an equal endorsement in the records of the primitive Church. Is it possible, then, that, for the sake of the great cause of unity, certain bishops and clergy of the Anglican connection would offer themselves for baptism by immersion at the hands of their Nonconformist brethren, precisely as they ask those brethren to accept Episcopal ordination for the same great end? Such a suggestion is sufficient to indicate how the proposal of reordination affects the minds of ministers in the non-Episcopal Communion. Either it is a meaningless rite, to accept which would be a sacrilege, or it is a divinely instituted form whereby its adherents are set quite apart from the main movement of the Protestant Churches. The Protestant Communion hold their ministry to be Scriptural, valid, and justified by its fruits. A proposal of reordination seems to them like a proposal of remarriage. A discrimination between the Church and the sects appears to them not only ungracious but unhistorical. They are not, in their own opinion, sects, cut off from the Church, but members of the one body of Christ; and one cannot say of another, "I have no need of thee." In short, the real issue here raised is not concerned with the Episcopate as an "instrument," but with the Episcopate as transmitting the peculiar sanctity of an Apostolic succession. It is not an issue which is pressed by the "great non-Episcopal Communion." They have their own work to do, and, as the Bishops generously say, "their own God-given means of grace." Some of them, like the Pilgrims and Puritans, abandoned Anglican rule because of dissent from its sacramentalism; others, inheriting other traditions, have always regarded the doctrine of Apostolic succession as of dubious historical authority, and as tending to substitute an external for a spiritual Catholicity. With cordial recognition, then, of the fraternal spirit in which the Anglican Episcopate is commended as the "one means of providing such a ministry" to "those communions which do not possess the Episcopate," and with warm appreciation of the priceless contributions made to the Christian life through the order and beauty of Anglican administration and worship, it would seem necessary to say that there is not the least possibility of this path to unity being taken by the "great non-Episcopal Communion."

What seems to the Bishops an open road confronts the great majority of their Protestant brethren with the sign, "Private way." In fact, the movement of united Protestantism has already advanced a considerable distance in quite another direction, toward a unity of the spirit and a religion of practical discipleship of Jesus Christ; and the question of the transmission of the Episcopate already appears to those who are on the way to this spiritual unity to belong to a past era, when questions of ecclesiastical authority were of real interest, and the world had not been summoned to weightier matters of co-operation, sacrifice, and service.

The Bishops, with great suggestiveness, set at the head of their Appeal the majestic prayer of Jesus recorded in the Fourth Gospel: "That they may all be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee." The Protestant Communions gladly repeat this prayer; but they do not conceive that a unity which is to be in any degree after the pattern of the unity of Jesus with the Father can be a unity of external conformity or organisation. However incomplete that unity may be, it must, at least, be a spiritual communion, a unity of motive and desire, a complete conformity of will which may in some slight, human way, offer a dim reflection of the Divine unity of which their Master spoke.

This vast enterprise of spiritual unity has already become conspicuous and promising throughout the Protestant world, and the tragic experience of war has in an unprecedented degree encouraged a new and genuine fraternalism. If, therefore, any communion, with its own precious treasures of thought and life, deliberately chooses to stand aside from this great enterprise, and to claim for itself an exclusive authority of tradition and practice, then the march of Protestantism, though sadly obstructed, must proceed, with keen regret but with undiminished determination, on its own "Great Adventure of Good Will"; where those who walk in the spirit find themselves moving on converging lines toward the longed-for consummation, when, in God's time, the prayer of their common Master may at last be fulfilled, and "All may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may all be one in us."

FRANCIS G. PEABODY.

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF ORGANISED RELIGION.¹

MRS J. W. WOOTTON.

“Destroyers we create ;
Creating we undo.
All things that have been great
Out of destruction grew”²

appears to be the motto of the present generation. The sympathetic emphasise its creative, the unsympathetic its destructive aspect. May not our organised religion have this in common with other of our institutions, that it stands in need of re-creation by a process partly destructive? Enough is now heard, on the one hand, of the failure of organised religion to grapple with the problems of the day, and to transmute the man in the street into the man in the church, and the man in the church into the man in the street; and on the other hand, of the protestations of those who speak in the name of the Churches, that never again will they be what they acknowledge themselves to have been in the past, upholders of privilege, men befogged by unrealities and wholly out of sympathy with the sufferings and hardships of vulgar humanity. With cry and counter-cry of this kind echoing in our ears, we do not need much thought to be quite sure that there is something wrong somewhere. The question is, what is wrong, and where? Are our particular forms of religious organisation at fault? or does the evil lie deeper, and is organised religion in general, and organised Christianity in particular, bound for ever to fail just in those respects in which it is most anxious to succeed?

¹ The substance of an address given before the Student Christian Movement in Cambridge.

² With this quotation Mr G. D. H. Cole prefaces his volume on *Labour in the Commonwealth*.

Undoubtedly every known religious organisation is imperfect, and fails partly by reason of its imperfections. Undoubtedly, too, every religious organisation might be improved, as many have been, and many more, let us hope, will be. An enlightened Church will have greater attractive power than a Church that persists in hiding such light as it has under a bushel. Those who labour within the Churches and without them for more light, for deeper spiritual life, for more reality, for better organisation, are labouring beyond question in a good cause. But the question that they and we have to ask ourselves is this. Are we not perhaps attempting the impossible? Can we ever have an organised religion which is not irritatingly imperfect? And shall we not succeed best in our efforts to establish a living Church if we realise the paradoxical hopelessness of our task? Imperfection is least painful when it is not also disappointment. And if there is truth in the view that the Churches fail because they are Churches and not because they are bad Churches, we had better make up our minds to face the prospect squarely and see the failure in its just proportions.

What I would suggest is simply this—that organised religion, being a contradiction in terms, is an inherently unsatisfactory conception. The ineffectiveness of the religious bodies in our midst, while it may increase or decline with the enthusiasm of their members and the sympathy of non-members, is in the last resort ineradicable. Religion, when most truly itself, cannot be organised. Is not that the secret discovered by those men in whose lives the essence of religion has been best realised? And is it not from realisation of this that these lives have derived the influence which they have wielded over their less spiritual fellows in their own day and after their death? The history of great religions, or of the movements of fresh life within the fold of any one religion, seems everywhere to exhibit the same features and to play out the same tragedy. Great religions and great religious movements are personal. They originate with founders of no common clay, and they spread by virtue of that infectiousness of good things, which Providence has mercifully implanted in a disordered creation. But just because of their personal character they are not immune from the limitations of personality as we know it in temporal conditions. The founder dies, and when the salt of the earth is thus taken away, wherewith shall it be salted? For personality, organisation is substituted; for the spirit, the letter; and for life, death. Humanity is not rich enough to allow of the founders of religions gathering about them disciples

who are worthy of the heritage which is to be bequeathed to them. The disciples, conscious, or perhaps more often unconscious, of their own inability to preserve the spirit of their master, strive to ease it about with organisation. Thus Churches are born and religions die. And, to make the tragedy the more complete, it is often true that the better a disciple a man is, the more certain he is to damn the spirit which it is his whole purpose to save.

Such has been the history both of Christianity in general and of particular Christian sects. Instead of Christ we have Christianity; upon St Francis follow the Franciscans. Such is the history of religious movements which in more modern days have been built up to embody the teaching of a departed founder. Instances will readily occur to the mind, but I will mention none by name, lest, in a selection which is purely illustrative, invidiousness be suspected. It is no answer to say that organisation is a relatively modern growth and appropriate to modern conditions. True, that growth in size which is the prevalent test of progress does necessitate in religion as well as in politics a growth in complexity of organisation also. But organised religion is, for all that, in no sense a new development. The—wholly disorganised—life of Christ is a supreme example of a revolt against organised religion. It is the best example of what may be found in many another life—namely, religion fulfilling its natural function of rebellion against the trammels of organisation, by which would-be religious man defeats his own ends. It was not the circumstances of the time which made Christianity the irregular, revolutionary spirit that it was at birth. It was its own essence that gave it this character; and it is to a large degree the loss of that essence which has so fundamentally transformed this character since. Whatever its date, a great faith is mightier than an organisation, and will soon find organisations against which to range itself in opposition. And this is no accident. It is inevitable in the nature of things. Religion is an untidy thing. It can neither be written in a minute-book nor embodied in a secretary. The ultimate absurdity of the conception of organised religion is best realised by reading for it organised love. If there is anything in our protestations (to which our actions give painfully little colour) that the most generally accepted religion of Western civilisation at this moment is based on a belief that love is divine, then there is neither more nor less absurdity in organised religion than in organised love. But organisation can never control the divine rebelliousness of the heart. Love has heat enough

to melt the prisons of method and order ; it is personal, wilful and passionate. And so with religion. The organisation gains in prominence as the faith, hope, and charity which it professes to express lose their fervour.

From this ultimate contradiction, more perhaps than from the faults of the particular types of religious body in our midst, arise our present discontents. To be condemned for ever to struggle with the impossible is not the best condition for a healthy existence. It is therefore not surprising that signs of unhealthiness should make themselves felt in religious organisations, if the function which is their *raison d'être* can never be fulfilled.

Such signs there are. And if we examine their nature we may perhaps see that it is just this fact, that religion never can be truly religious when it is organised, that explains their presence. We are, for instance, familiar with the large part which organising work plays in any present-day religious association. It must be so. But the danger that the means will become the end is never very far removed. The letter is essential to the expression of the spirit ; but the letter killeth when it ceases to convey spirit, and is only written for the pleasure of admiring its own form. In such wise do non-essentials encroach on essentials ; and sectarian arrogance replaces the love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, and temperance that are the fruit of the Spirit. Intolerance is the infirmity (but not the last infirmity) of minds not noble enough to preserve their heritage without its aid. It is equally the inevitable consequence of the attempt to organise religion.

Again, a half-realisation of their own inadequacy leads our religious bodies to efforts often as undignified as they are unsuccessful to stimulate religious zeal. Aware that our organisation deadens our spirit, we are apt, I think, to attempt to goad the spirit into a precocious vigour instead of clearing away the lifeless erection which impedes its natural development. In the great majority of cases a religious instinct is very real, but grows slowly, and needs the encouragement of a healthy atmosphere rather than a hothouse. One cannot help feeling that the fervour of the appeals which from time to time the Churches make to the public is unnatural. It is certainly repellent to minds which cannot be called irreligious. It is forced because those who make the appeal are—usually, one imagines, unconsciously—goaded by their own failure into an exaggerated enthusiasm which only makes that failure more certain.

The same sense of impotence in its more conscious form is responsible for that morbid self-consciousness which seems to be a characteristic feature at any rate of modern religious organisations. The ministries of our Churches are genuinely anxious to discover and remove the reason why they have so far lost touch with large masses of the populace. They and the more alert spirits outside the ministries devote much print and a great deal more thought to this matter. But their attitude tends to degenerate into the morbidity of the man who never gets on because he is always wondering why he doesn't get on. To take one illustration. A small religious society¹ addressed some while ago a *questionnaire* to a few persons who were likely to have had some experience of its activities. Of these questions the first was this: "What, if any, impression has this society made upon you?" Such a question may well produce in the minds of those to whom it is addressed a sense of repulsion not unlike that which we should probably all feel, if an acquaintance were to write and ask us, "What, if any, impression have I made upon you?" The comparison is not entirely fair, but it is not wholly unfair. There is a strong presumption that a society is not healthy if the effect which its activities produce on outside spectators is prominently before its mind. It lacks the spontaneity of faith at its best; and it is at least in danger of posing. So also with much of the literature which spokesmen of the Churches have produced, especially since the war. The highly representative volume on *The Army and Religion*, to which cleric and lay alike have contributed, demonstrates a consciousness of failure in the past which by its very keenness, perhaps, actually endangers the chances of success in the future.

Moreover, organised religious bodies are characterised by an extraordinary ineffectiveness even when they most wish to be influential. Rightly anxious to avoid partisanship, they end by being unable to express any opinion at all on the matters which most vitally affect the communities in which they live. In response to appeals to the Churches to come forward with a definite policy in this or that matter, or to denounce this or that abuse, the Churches either are dumb or speak with a divided voice. In consequence, their influence becomes negligible, and men do not stop to ask what is the view of religious organisations. In illustration of this kind

¹ I should like to take this opportunity of thanking the then President of the Society in question, by whose courtesy I am permitted to refer to this matter in print.

of ineffectiveness we may cite the Report of the Committee of the Lambeth Conference on the Church and industrial problems. It is, and if it is to be non-partisan it must be, so non-committal in tone as to reduce to the level of the ludicrous the whole effort to keep in touch with things concrete, which is a main reason for the Report's existence. Witness in particular the paragraphs relating to security against unemployment, to the employment of women in industry, to the provision of "reasonable leisure." These are matters about which men really care and which arouse genuine passion. For that very reason organised religion feels it cannot leave them untouched. But to handle them in anything approaching an effective manner would mean opening up the whole field of political controversy. The Churches therefore find themselves condemned to the enunciation of perpetual platitudes. There is an open road to the hearts of us common folk though our opinion on the conduct of that everyday business of life which for the vast majority of us is called industry. Organised religious bodies can take that road; or pass it by and so forfeit a great opportunity. But if they do take it, they inevitably bar their own progress by erecting a barrier of commonplaces. Here is a dilemma indeed.

To intolerance, artificiality, morbidity, and ineffectiveness we have to add excessive conservatism. Religion is revolutionary, organised religion is stagnant. And again the cause of the evil is the same. The disciples create an organisation to preserve the spirit of their founder. They fail to see that circumstances alter cases, and that religious conventions must change with the changing ages. Often the more earnestly we endeavour to carry out to the letter, to-day, injunctions that were given one hundred or nineteen hundred years ago, the more certain we are to lose the spirit of these injunctions. We are none of us great enough to read the spirit of Christ into our own age. And so, if we are devout Christians, we defeat our own ends by a literal discipleship which has not even the merit of thoroughness. There may or may not be progress in human affairs; but there is movement. The one thing that it is impossible to do in life is to stand still; and that is what religious organisations try to do. The pathos of the attempt is intensified by the fact that it alienates the very minds which have that real religion that ought to be in the Churches. Men do not pour new wine into old bottles. The new wine goes into new bottles that are often of vastly inferior quality, with the result that the new wine is spoiled and the old bottles are left empty. The new wine of young enthusi-

asm goes into the new bottles of materialism ; and religious organisations meet with the proper fate of old bottles.

Such and such are our dangers—grave enough and real enough. But, like other dangers, they are probably graver when not realised, and gravest of all when we are ignorant of their cause. They are, I think, the inevitable concomitant of the attempt to organise religion. In passing we ought to notice that the men who, by entering the ministry or otherwise, make this attempt, have a right to be judged with the charity due to those who face the impossible for noble motives. In the words of a modern novelist, “To organise religion a man should have the talents of the devil”¹—which most of us unhappily have not. The judgments passed by the laity on the clergy are frequently harsh ; and their harshness encourages the very self-consciousness which it condemns. The parson’s lot, like the policeman’s, is not a happy one, or an easy one either. The greatest among us are not equal to the task of organising religion ; and for the reason I have tried to indicate, it is not always the greatest minds who are impelled to try. Let us remember this.

Yet, when all is said, we cannot do without our organised religions. With all its inherent dangers and inevitable failures, organised religion has, in a paradoxical world, a real function to fulfil. I have tried to argue that religion at its best cannot be organised. But to the great majority of us religion at its best is a sealed book ; to all of us parts of it are sealed. It is for the sake of the weaker brethren—that is, for the sake of most of us—that the impossible has to be attempted and religion has to be organised. Churches are a concession to the principle of sacramentalism, which is as fundamental as any principle in our nature. As such they have a part to play, and a part which they will only play well so long as they fully realise the essential subordination of the outward and visible sign to the inward and spiritual grace. Organised religion must be the voice which gives expression to the spirit that in most of us would otherwise be dumb. The most fundamental things that we know, love and birth and death, mean more to most of us than all the Churches that have ever been ; and so surely they ought. It is in the face of these simple matters that our being is most deeply stirred ; and the emotions to which they give rise are probably in very many cases more genuinely religious than a great deal that is more frequently

¹ From *What Not*, by Rose Macaulay. The full quotation runs: “To organise religion a man should have the talents of the devil, or at least of the intelligent Civil Servant.”

described as such. It is therefore a right instinct that causes most Churches to intervene on the occasions of birth, of marriage, and of death. The baptism of infants, the marriage ceremony, and the funeral service are all concessions to our sacramentalism, whatever controversies may have raged over the narrower question how many of them may properly be termed sacraments. But the part which organised religion can play in these great events is essentially subordinate. The Church can touch the great things of life, but only as their handmaid; and she will be the better handmaid if she knows her position.

In the second place, there is opportunity for organised religion in the fact that humanity, in the last resort inexpressibly lonely, is also profoundly social. Organised religion is needed as a framework for the fellowship which goes as deep down in us as our sacramentalism. The more profound our religious feeling, the more certain it is to seek at times those forms of expression which are social in character. And it will, in our present state, need the assistance of organised religion in these social aspirations. We cannot make a solemn music alone: but if we are moved by religious feeling it is extremely probable that we shall want to make a solemn music. It is the business of a religious body to provide the means whereby we may devote to the glory of God all the good gifts of sound that we possess. And when we want to glorify God in co-operation with our fellows, it is the business of a religious body to provide opportunity for obtaining that co-operation. Yet even in service of this kind the organisation will serve best when it is least obtrusive. The mightier the faith, the less the organisation.

Closely allied with the openings which our social nature gives for the use, and not the abuse, of religious organisation are those further opportunities which arise from the fact that a crowd is greater than the sum of its parts. This fact is important; and it is also extremely liable to misconstruction. There is no need to emphasise the extent to which emotion gathers force from the presence of a crowd; and this of course is as true of religious as of any other emotion. Many of us, especially if we have a smattering of psychological knowledge, are wont to be a little ashamed of emotion of this kind, and to dismiss it as an exhibition of "herd instinct" and a part of that animal nature of which we have little reason to be proud. But there is little to be said for thus adopting the attitude of the superior person. If we are to condemn an emotion on the ground that it is of brutish origin, we shall find ourselves

condemning the good and the bad together. For

“A man, however well-behaved,
At best is only a monkey shaved.”

Our best is the beast sublimated, as our worst is the beast running riot. Moreover, *corruptio optimi pessima*. The loftiest emotion that we know is in origin as physical as anything in us; is most liable to perversion and most bestial when perverted. It is, therefore, in no way derogatory to an emotion to show its connection with our animal nature. The religious fervour of a great gathering is a herd instinct. It does not deserve our sneers for that. And there is need for Churches to provide, as it were, the herd which will exercise this powerful attraction over its members. An organised religious body should form a centre, on which we may focus the profound capacities for devotion which are latent in this part of our nature.

In such ways as these we may perhaps look to see organised religion a useful feature of our spiritual life for a long while to come. But if there is truth in the view I have tried to present, organised religion ought to occupy an essentially secondary place. Instead of being an institution which is destined to grow in size and splendour, it should take rank with those institutions which work towards their own undoing. The Churches will have succeeded best, and will have most command over our respect, when they have largely deprived themselves of any function to fulfil. In this respect I would class them with political government, with industrial organisation, with the social or economic reformer, with (if the expression be allowed) the militant pacifist, and a host besides. The self-destructive nature of the work which these persons or institutions perform is not good cause for withholding our allegiance from them in the present order. But a recognition that their work is self-destructive will endow our allegiance with a truer sense of proportion than it else would have. We are for ever mistaking the means for the end—not least, perhaps, because it is so much easier to agree about the means than about our ultimate end. But we do ourselves no good this way, in things religious, in things political, or in things industrial. The Church is a means; as an end it becomes ludicrous because it is an attempt to combine two incompatibles—religion and organisation. But the nearer we approach to the end, the less should be the prominence of the means. And whether the end is near or far, we should never let it become so remote from our imagina-

tion that we mistake the means for it. For by so doing we suffer a double injury. The end is lost to view entirely, and the means becomes perverted and useless. In other words, organised religion is a glass through which we see, darkly indeed, but still, if we use it aright, more clearly than if we had no window at all. But if we devote all our energies to polishing the glass—if, becoming window-cleaners, we look *at* it and not *through* it—then indeed the fair prospect upon which it opens is for ever lost to us.

Organised religion no longer occupies the place in our national life which once it held. Especially is this the case with the more educated sections of the populace. The nominal membership of Churches and of other religious bodies may rise and fall, and their active membership may vary also. But I do not think we can dispute that the influence of the Churches is perceptibly waning. Their own agitations on the subject bear sufficiently cogent testimony. But the distress of the spokesmen of religious organisations is largely due to the belief that the decline and fall of organised religion must also be the decline and fall of religion itself. Were that necessarily so, then indeed they would have cause for alarm. But it is not necessarily so. We probably are less religious than we once were. It is not to be expected that, after embracing for six years the methods of materialism in the dealings of nation with nation, we should emerge with strengthened spiritual ardour. But in other ways our very indifference to organised religion may be a sign of a new birth of religion in forms which we have hardly yet learned to recognise as truly religious. There are departments of our life in which we need to be dragooned and regulated by ordinance, in which failure to comply with established usage would be a sign of real delinquency. But our religion is not such. Our faith is perhaps the one sphere in which the old human desire to be “let alone” may rightly reign unchallenged. And if some of us are saying to the Churches that we want their ministrations either not at all, or only in a secondary capacity, it does not follow that there should be weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. Religion is like the wind which bloweth where it listeth. Build shelters to catch it, and you will find that in them there is no blowing at all.

BARBARA WOOTTON.

CAMBRIDGE,

MY NEW-THOUGHT BOYHOOD.

CHARLES THOMAS HALLINAN,

Washington, D.C.

WHEN the social historian comes to write the story of religion in America, I, for one, hope he will devote some pages to "New Thought," as a phenomenon peculiarly significant and American. It is because I feel this very strongly that I am tempted to outline, for the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL, the impressions made upon me by one of the numerous "sects" which swept the United States in the nineties of the last century. In my story—at least so it seems to me—the social historian aforesaid will learn something of America not recorded in the history of Protestantism, at least in the more orthodox forms.

"New Thought," as I now perceive, came into our little suburb on a flood-tide of business and culture, what I am tempted to call "culturine." A big department store—the first of its kind in the country—had sprung up in our raw, windy Western city, and the suburb threw out a rattling, hideous elevated railroad across the intervening territory to meet it. This brought us "within thirty minutes of the city," and yielded us up, before we knew it, to forces we had never met before. That department store unsettled all the ideas—economic, æsthetic, social, and, ultimately, religious—which the community had heretofore enjoyed.

Before that department store came into our existence we were linked uncomplainingly to the past. The furniture in our homes was old stuff, shipped from old homesteads to the new homes in the West. The new which we bought was conservative, modelled for the most part on lines familiar for generations. But the department store changed everything.

Every day it brought in from Michigan, and sold, a whole

train-load of machine-made furniture; gilt, spindle-legged chairs came in; onyx-topped tables; pretentious plush-covered "parlour sets" which wore bare in a season and had to be periodically re-covered. It brought in cheap coloured pictures, vastly alluring to a generation brought up on family portraits, steel engravings of "The Stag at Eve," and worsted mottoes. It brought in pyrography, an epidemic of burnt-wood book-racks and of burnt-leather sofa pillows. It taught us to buy and give to one another "The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam"!

All this didn't come in, I admit, without a bitter struggle. What we chiefly resented was the dilemma presented to us; we wanted everything as cheap as we could get it, and we were disturbed at the wholesale character of the process of manufacture and distribution which gave us that cheapness. Was the thing "common"? That was the paralysing question. We had two categories, as I recall it; a thing was either "nice" or it was "common," and the struggle to classify canned pictures, canned furniture, canned culture of all sorts, was the most unsettling single influence in our suburb when "New Thought" came in.

When "New Thought" came in we had four Protestant churches in our suburb: the small and socially superior Protestant Episcopal church, which unscrupulously combed the other churches for choir-boys; the big humming Methodist church, whose sermons you could hear through the open windows clear out on the side-walk a hundred feet away; the Baptist church, whose pulpit, to the common scandal, was sometimes filled by the Professor of Church History at the big Baptist university near-by, whose theology was reputed to be no better than it should be; and my own church, the Presbyterian. There we had in the pulpit, as I realise now, the first exponent in that part of the country of "muscular Christianity," a youngish middle-aged man who declared impressively that there was nothing molly-coddle about Christianity, and who gave us boys boxing lessons in the big round primary-room with lithographs of a meek Christ on the walls. The Unitarians had not invaded our neighbourhood then, and the only Catholic church was many blocks away—at a distance which was universally approved even though it detained our maids and jeopardised Sunday breakfasts in the suburb.

Of theological controversy or discomfort there was practically none. I do not recall a single young person who had a moment's disturbance over any article of faith. Church lines

were drawn strictly, perhaps a trifle jealously, but if the conversations on the front porches were any criteria, there was a universal relaxation in belief, an amiable desire to reduce creed and formulas to their simplest and least pretentious terms, to make shift somehow with a minimum of personal and collective discomfort. I remember only one flare up, when our somewhat too progressive Presbyterian preacher invited the Catholic priest to occupy his pulpit one Sunday night; this was resented, but chiefly on the grounds that it wasn't an equitable transaction, it being obviously impossible for Father Hissian to return the compliment. One of the vestrymen, who had formerly belonged to the "A.P.A." and who still had a barrel or two of pamphlets on "The Whore of Babylon" in his attic, resigned from the church in protest; but this action, as I remember it, brought a prompt revulsion of feeling in favour of the minister. There was such a thing as carrying your convictions too far!

But if in matters of theology there was a general deliquescence going on, I know now that there was considerable yearning and unrest. But it was fundamentally economic. There was scarcely a family which was not being pinched between the small, rigid income and the steadily rising prices. That department store played the very devil with our peace of mind. It multiplied enormously the apparent necessities of life, and brought the luxuries just without our reach. It turned our own thrift against us.

Now on this absorbing question, that of making ends meet, the four orthodox churches had nothing to say. The organist of the Episcopal church lived diagonally across the street from us; she was driven to "keep roomers" as the suburb expanded, and I noticed curiously, as a boy, that in spite of the social superiority of her church she was in her own conversation as much obsessed by the economic problem as was my hard-pressed Presbyterian mother. The Baptists and the Methodists were shameless bargain-hunters. In short, we were all in the same plight, and we were all equally tender of our religious faiths. I mean that, until "New Thought" came in, we all acted exactly alike in regarding religion as something to be held off, away from the economic struggle.

Then there came filtering into the suburb bits of a new and almost incredible gospel. There were rumours of new sects springing up which made the largest, stiffest claims regarding the relationship between religion and health, and religion and prosperity. Of these sects the Christian Scientists had the most prestige, but they were handicapped somewhat in our

suburb by two things—the persistent newspaper attacks upon Mrs Eddy, and the sense of recurrent scandal occasioned by the aggressive prosecution of Christian Science “practitioners” whose patients had died. In those days the newspapers were quite vigorous in running down such cases and in insisting upon criminal prosecution. All this rather tended to daunt us, in our suburb, where respectability was *sine qua non*. Nevertheless I have to report several conversions to Christian Science, and the slow emergence of a “practitioner” or two.

But “New Thought” came definitely into our suburban consciousness through the “Christ Scientists,” a sect which differentiated itself carefully from the Christian Scientists in title, ecclesiastical structure, and in what the suburban fathers crudely called its “lingo.” The chief exponent of “Christ Science” was a former Congregational clergyman named Van Epps, a rather frail, agreeable gentleman who impressed everybody favourably, he seemed so intellectual and so free from the least trace of the charlatan. Somehow or other—I have quite forgotten how—he established local connections, borrowed the use of a private home for Sunday services, and finally set up a regular church which met every Sunday morning in the little auditorium of our suburban clubhouse.

I shall never forget the stir his sermons created. His services were of marked simplicity—indeed, quite severe in their details,—but he was easily the most quoted man in the town. At first only the bolder or more restless spirits ventured out to hear him; it was an affair of some delicacy, since your presence at his church was quite likely to be reported at your own; but sooner or later a large proportion of the community had sampled “New Thought,” and was deep in the discussion of it.

Some, of course, were promptly impressed with “New Thought” because it was “new.” I don’t know why, exactly, but somehow the “new” had a prestige in those days which it doesn’t seem to enjoy to-day. We believed in Progress, and I guess we were pretty artless about it. Look at the advances in science, we would argue; for that matter, look at the changes in the town itself! Look at the elevated railroad; above all, look at the department store eight miles away, offering unheard-of economies—that bankrupt the whole community! The old was well enough, but the fact is that Truth is like a procession which moves simply and majestically on. It was this sense of the cosmic process which led the plump Miss Fulton to subscribe so promptly to the new faith. Miss

Fulton, if she had been a man, would have been called a "joiner."

Somewhat akin to Miss Fulton in type were those doughty souls, of whom there were several in our suburb, who were drawn to this "new and despised sect" from a secret and romantic desire to recapture the spirit and the experience of the early Christians. They couldn't be told, outwardly, from their conventional neighbours, but inwardly they burned with a flame. They gloried in the contrast between what they conceived to be the potential power of "New Thought" and its statistical unimportance. A dash of martyrdom would have made it quite perfect!

But the thing which most deeply stirred our suburb was the frank and uncompromising way in which "New Thought" addressed itself to our bread-and-butter problems, the problems posed for us by that amazing department store. "New Thought" promised economic redemption in this world, and we were vastly more startled at that—really, I am measuring my words when I say this,—we were vastly more startled at that than we were at the most lavish and specific assurances regarding salvation in the next. Remember, dear reader, as you loll gracefully on your dividends, that for us the old order had changed, only yesterday, as it were; that the old traditional security, open to all thrifty, hard-working folks, had disappeared, and that in its place was a bewildering struggle to adjust rigid incomes to ascending prices. Not a pulpit in our suburb had addressed itself to this plebeian anxiety, this perpetual concern, until "New Thought" came in.

Given the right attitude of mind, said Van Epps (an attitude, I may explain parenthetically, to be secured from him in twenty lessons for ten dollars, with an "advanced course" of ten additional lessons for "students and teachers"), and you could tap the boundless resources of the Universe. Most sermons, I have discovered, are exercises in synonyms; those of Van Epps rang the changes on "reservoir" and "storehouse" and "abundant life." Every Sunday morning he held up over our heads, in his frail scholarly hands, a vast cornucopia from which he poured out—bathing us in it—health, wealth, harmony, energy, abundant life. I want to give Van Epps his due—never in my life have I seen faces so transfigured as were the faces of those who left the secular atmosphere of that suburban clubhouse every Sunday morning.

Take Langdon, for example. He was the "Western representative" of an Eastern "concern"—happy nomen-

clature!—under a contract which ran for three years at a stretch. Every time it was up for renewal Langdon and his wife went through a perfect hell of worry. They had been through five of them, and Langdon's head was grey at forty. Twice out of the five renewals he had succeeded in securing an increase in salary; twice he had been refused, coldly and flatly; and once, I believe, the unequal contest had ended in some sort of a draw. When I knew the Langdons, it is scarcely too much to say that they were living three years at a time, their minds averted from the future.

Langdon worshipped in the Presbyterian church, three pews behind us and over to the right. He was counted a good churchman; I think he was clerk of the board, or something busy like that. But what, I ask you, did Langdon really care about "muscular Christianity"? What did he care how many boys the minister taught to box? What did he care for the sportsmanlike theology which the headmaster of Rugby had worked out for the pacification of English schoolboys, and upon which we were fed, willy nilly? The answer is that he didn't fundamentally care a straw, except possibly during the year following the renewal of his contract, when he was in such high spirits that he would have subscribed cheerfully to anything!

Our whole suburb was made up of "Western representatives," of "sales managers," of "chief clerks," of struggling doctors and lawyers. Langdon's plight, in one form or another, was the common plight. When the spiritual Van Epps declared flatly that security and health and abundance were the privilege of all, he struck a chord to which every heart in our town thrilled.

Nevertheless, of course, there was a big fight on. The invasion was not one to be endured. That classic jibe about Christian Science—that it was neither "Christian" nor "Science"—did yeoman duty all that first winter, I remember. The literal and unhumorous response to this, invariably, was that what Mr Van Epps preached was not Christian Science, but "Christ Science"! The thoughtless promptly challenged you to make clear the distinction, which gave you a fine chance to weave around them that gossamery materialism which, as I look back upon it, seems to me the essence of "New Thought."

Van Epps and his intense little wife did quite a bit of "mental healing"—to the great disdain of the young M.Ds. in our town. Their method was to sit, for half an hour or so, at the bedside of the patient, in unbroken silence, apparently

inwardly absorbed in removing those "mental conditions" which they held primarily responsible for the physical state. But the most striking demonstration which the Van Epps made was one which had little or no observable relationship to their metaphysics. One afternoon Van Epps took his wife to one of the homes where an advanced study class was to meet. He left her there, and went on his way to the University some eight blocks distant. He had been gone about fifteen minutes when some metaphysical question arose in the class, and somebody expressed the wish that Van Epps himself were present to elucidate the point. Mrs Van Epps promptly said she would call him. She stepped out on the front porch and stood, so the story goes, with her hands on the railings, staring fixedly in the direction of the University. Van Epps was blocks away, indistinguishable. Not a sound came from her lips. In three or four minutes she returned to the class. "He has turned back," she announced calmly. "He ought to be here in ten minutes." In ten minutes or so the door-bell rang and Van Epps entered. He turned to his wife: "Did you call me?" he said.

Well, that episode simply tore the town in two. You either believed, or you didn't believe, and wouldn't! The feeling aroused was intense. Those women who were so fortunate as to have been there when the thing occurred, had to repeat the story, on demand, a score of times. Those who belonged to Van Epps' congregation looked upon the incident, logically or not, as clear unmistakable evidence that this man had the "Truth."

What does the Good Book say about the people, how they seek a sign? I suppose it is a universal trait. I know that there were Presbyterians who, for several weeks after that, struggled with the disloyal idea that somehow "muscular Christianity" was a rather sterile thing, sterile in signs, at any rate. They looked at the minister's tan—he never had time, in between his long, strenuous open-air vacations, to get a proper pastoral pallor!—and wondered at the local paradox, that it was he who was now preaching the Christian acceptance of sickness and suffering and the frail Van Epps who harped on health and abounding energy; that it was substantial he who now insisted that religion should be a matter of immaterial values, and the pale scholarly Van Epps who declared roundly that it should be a matter of red blood and corpuscles, of suburban houses and lots, of vulgar increases in salary. The episode, with one thing and another, jarred Langdon loose from the Presbyterian church, and with him

went Leonard, a tall gaunt commuter who was envied because he had "as good as a life job" with the Standard Oil Company, and four or five women, including my mother. I went along too, but I was too young to be counted by either camp as a loss or an asset.

Van Epps' sermons were—I don't know how to describe it exactly—somehow very "regular." He was a great lover of formal logic, a born metaphysician. You may think that his ideas were absurd and irregular, but I know they didn't seem so to him. His mind, to him, was swept and garnished; poverty was abolished in a syllogism; pain and failure were neatly negated; adventure was either eliminated or reduced to comfortable proportions!

But, my goodness, while this was true of him, it was scarcely true of us! With the best intentions in the world, he shipped us off on a chartless sea. Pamphlets began to stream into the house, and little piebald journals, all of them advancing confidently some new and engaging aspect of the "Truth." My sister bought a Ouija board and literally scraped acquaintance with an "Indian guide" who, I am pained to relate, was wholly unsuccessful in guiding me to the spot where I had lost my sweetheart's opal ring. My mother stumbled upon "Karezza" as the solution of all marital difficulties, and spent several strenuous years, just before her death, in trying to lead my old-fashioned father into the acceptance of that distinctly *fin de siècle* version of the blest tie that binds. I myself went in for Ralph Waldo Trine's *In Tune with the Infinite*, one of the "best sellers" among "New Thought" books, which sold by the thousands in that department store before the regular, orthodox book-stores woke up to the demand. I also dabbled a bit, contentedly, in some of the large, useful-if-true assertions of the Rosicrucians, and had a pleasant winter in a course of study, by mail, under a "New Thought" teacher who lived in Florida and was afterwards caught—quite unjustly, as I still believe—in the rather cheap and wholly gratuitous prosecutions of the Federal postal authorities.

Death overtook Van Epps—I fancy the man had been fighting him off for years—and Mrs Van Epps moved silently away. Langdon, now a minor stockholder in that Eastern "concern" and the bell-wether of our flock, moved on into the Christian Science church, where he looks neither to the right nor the left upon the field where the more reckless browse; the Leonards became spiritualists; the plump Miss Fulton remains, I believe, eclectic in taste and, no doubt, is

still happily browsing. After a year of boredom I moved painlessly out into a state of happy nescience. I suppose it will take me fifty years to precipitate a philosophy after what I have gone through!

Shams? Well, no, not exactly—merely part of the characteristic mental furnishings of the period, I should say, a sort of department store religion, a vast hodge-podge of promise and half fulfilment, the shopper's El Dorado, dedicated shrewdly, honestly—in its way, reverently—to the everlasting exploitation of the New!

C. T. HALLINAN.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

RELIGION & IDEALISM, AS PRESENTED BY GIOVANNI GENTILE.¹

ROMOLO MURRI.

THE great modern nationalities sprang up, in the course of the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, out of a religious revolution. But Italy's religious revolution is yet to come; and attention to this fact will go far towards explaining the vacillations, the weaknesses, and the internal contradictions that afflict her and so strangely encumber her path.

There is more. Throughout the Middle Ages and on into the Renaissance the attitude of Italians towards the Papacy and the Church of Rome showed a marked independence of judgment; and fresh springs of the religious life often rose from the bosom of the popular consciousness independently of any direct ecclesiastical impulse. We have only to think of Francis of Assisi, of Catherine of Siena, of Dante, or of Savonarola. But on the other hand, subsequently to the great religious movement of separation initiated by Luther, Catholic Italy was forced with ever-increasing stringency to carry the weight of the papal interests and the spirit of the counter-reformation, till gradually every flicker of spiritual freedom was quenched. It was not till the time of the Napoleonic hurricane, and just after it, that the temporary collapse of the *anciennes régimes* left the country open without further obstacle to the influx of ideas from abroad, under which the religious life recovered a certain initiative, contemporaneously with the movement for national independence and unity.

Mazzini is, first and foremost, a spiritual prophet and a religious reformer. The scrupulously Catholic Manzoni lifts the standard of a Christianity of gentleness, goodness, and renunciation. Gioberti's and Rosmini's unsparing exposures, keen polemics, and projects for practical reform lashed the

¹ Translated by Philip H. Wicksteed, Litt.D.

abuses of the Church, but at the same time stirred in her bosom a fresh impulse to philosophical speculation. Yet, broadly speaking, all interests of a purely religious character were subordinate to the overmastering demand for political independence and unity. It was this that determined Cavour, whose example was followed by all the non-revolutionary liberals, to treat the internal freedom of the Church and of the Papacy with a scrupulous respect that kept pace with his zeal in stripping off their temporal powers so as to exclude them from direct influence upon politics. This went so far that, on the passage of the Law of the Guarantees,¹ Bettino Ricasoli (twice President of the Council, after Cavour) could declare that the New Italy was sacrificing and slaying, as the price of peace with the Papacy, that very religious liberty which it had seemed to be her mission to establish. Meanwhile the Left and the Mazzinians, overtaken by the rising stream of a frankly materialistic trend of thought, lost all feeling for religious questions and surrendered to a dogmatically atheistic movement which still further impoverished the already feeble Italian spirituality.

It is not till we come to the very last years of the nineteenth century and the first of the twentieth that we can note, in Christian Democracy and Modernism, any stirrings of a fresh awakening. And even the Christian Democrats contemplated from the first a political objective beyond their primary cultural mission; for they hoped to reintroduce the Catholics into the currents of the civic thought and life of the country, from which they had withdrawn in sullen isolation, under the impression that their political abstention and negation might serve the cause of the political and temporal revindication of the Papacy. But when the hostility of the Papacy itself, though at first doubtful, had become pronounced, and had repudiated and condemned the movement in its leading characteristic (its affirmation, namely, of the political autonomy of the Italian Catholics), Christian Democracy was driven back upon the original impulse of its idealistic aspirations and was transformed into Modernism, that is to say, the critical re-examination of the values of historical Catholicism. The feebler and more timid of the Christian Democrats returned to the orthodox fold, and the rest broke up to carry into all the varied cultural and political movements of the time the ferment and leaven of spiritual renovation.

Meanwhile, in this first decade of the century, there was

¹ See Bolton King's *History of Italian Unity*, vol. ii. pp. 380 seq.—TRANSLATOR.

spreading a new movement of philosophical idealism. It was but of recent origin, and it found its expression in the works of Benedetto Croce (now a Senator, and the Minister of Public Instruction) and of his contemporary and colleague in the review *La Critica*, Giovanni Gentile. Their teaching was labelled as a form of neo-Hegelianism, and such indeed it was. But it attached itself more immediately to Italian thinkers who had brought rich powers of originality to bear on their task of interpreting the German transcendental philosophy—a Rosmini, a Gioberti, and still more a Bertrando Spaventa. Indeed, it went still further back, behind Hegel and Kant, to the divinations of that great Italian student, Giambattista Vico.

When Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile found themselves in the presence of Italian Modernism and had to reckon with it, their first judgment was harsh and unsympathetic. These Moderns were a guileless folk, wavering between Catholic orthodoxy and free criticism, with a taste for provisional reconciliations that paid little heed to logic, and who tried to put on the drag by picking up and reserving suggestions that had already run their full and fruitful course in the channels of modern culture with no assistance from Catholicism.

But gradually Modernism came to clearer consciousness of itself; and the two philosophers, on their side, were developing their philosophy in the direction of reaching out beyond concepts, in their diversity or unity, and beyond the dialectic of categories and oppositions, into the living movement of the spirit itself. And so it came about that Croce and Gentile modified their first judgment and began to speak of religion and of Christianity with more lively sympathy and understanding. To the two thinkers moving along differing lines of approach, religion came to be seen no longer as a mere *philosophia inferior*, but as the expression and the designation of a perennial factor of spiritual impulse, the "will for the universal," or the "ethical will";—so Croce called it, declaring that the moral doctrine of Idealism found marvellous expression in the eternal symbols of the Gospel, and that since the advent of Christ it had been impossible for the morality of the civilised world to be other than Christian in the ground tissue of its ethical life, as related to the essence of the Gospel. Giovanni Gentile, too, dated from the rise of Christianity the birth of that concrete idealism which he regards as the full and consistent revindication of the moral life and the freedom of the spirit,

asserting itself against the abstract idealism of Plato and of the Greek philosophy.

Gentile has gone on to develop his conception of religion with progressively increasing clarity and precision in his *Sommario di pedagogia*, his *Lo spirito come atto puro*, and finally in the *Discorsi di religione*, published in the current year,¹ to which this brief study is more immediately directed.

If we accept the conception of religion that has hitherto prevailed and regard it as a relation of the soul to God—a God already fully and completely there, as the sum of unmovable reality, inaccessible to the finite spirit of man; and if again we are to regard the spirit of man itself as a concrete thing, or existence, an object amongst objects; and if, finally, we are to regard religious truth as a revelation that comes to the human spirit from without, conveyed to it by physical means, and demanding passive acceptance, then Gentile must declare that “actual idealism” (which is the name he gives to his system) is frankly unreligious, and even, in the orthodox use of the word, atheistic.

But then he will at once bid us note that we have only defined the religious attitude of the spirit, or religion itself, in terms of a certain philosophy and as one of its functionings. We have made confession not of a religious faith but of a philosophical system, and that system pre-critical, naturalistic, based on the principle of attraction.² Now, neither this Aristotelian God (the immobile first mover, already full and complete in himself, without internal movement or development, external to the human spirit and separated from it by an infinite distance), nor the supreme Good (that Platonic celestial idea, from which the soul is exiled, but of which it retains an obscure impression, and to which it must win its way back, so as to contemplate it at last in its beatific fulness), really pertains to spirit at all, but rather to objective nature, that is to say, to the other-than-ourselves, wholly diverse from us, complete and accomplished in itself, external

¹ Vallecchi, Florence.

² “Attraction” must here be understood in its widest etymological sense, as any kind of material or immaterial pull to which any kind of conscious or unconscious trend answers. Such trend may manifest itself as the movement, or impeded tendency to movement, of elemental or elementally organised substances, or as the desire, delight, or other “motion” of a consciousness, or as the voluntary physical movements of an animated being, prompted by his desires, etc. But in every case the pull must be exercised by something that is external and objective to the subject in which that trend exists.—

TRANSLATOR.

to our thought, and such that our thought can never be it—that is to say, can never grasp it, make it truly its own, *know* it. And this soul—which in its turn is a being, a thing, a reality distinct by its very constitution from other realities—itself again pertains to objective nature; that is to say, is something external to the act of thought, coming from we know not where. Thought struggles in vain to grasp it, since it belongs by definition and essence to that region of “otherness” which exists in itself and not in me, the unknowable, the ungraspable, that which precedes thought and is external to it. And just as the “thought” which presupposes a reality external to itself (complete and made up in itself before thought comes upon the scene), so that thought must confine itself to passively reflecting it, is in truth no thought of anything that really is—nay, since the real existence lies outside it, does not truly exist at all,—just so the moral act which has to follow a law given from without, and has to actualise a Good already there in its full integrity, which no finite act can either add anything to or take anything from, is not really moral at all, that is to say, free. For it has its model outside itself, and by hypothesis is only good in so far as it conforms to that model, that is to say, to a goodness which is not intrinsic to itself, or established by itself, but which comes from without, and consists in conformity to an external model, which model alone is truly good,—and yet, after all, we must likewise exclude goodness from it too, since it is in itself the whole made-up sum of reality, the totality of absolute necessity, objective nature, not spirit.

These conclusions are logical developments of the fundamental conception of Gentile's philosophy, according to which thought presupposes no datum, or reality external to itself, whether you call it space or nature, but *knows* just in so far as it precipitates out of itself the object of its knowledge. For, since it cannot pass out of itself (and it is unthinkable that it should), it contains transcendently everything in itself, and the thought is no other than the act of that which thinks, regarded as object, distinguished from the subject and set over against it in the act of thought, though in reality identical with it. But note what we are to understand by “thinking” an action that is also a becoming, *i.e.* auto-consciousness which can be equated with autoktisis¹—

¹ κτίσις = founding, establishing, positing, creation. Gentile's own forms of the words, *autocoscienza* and *autoktisi*, are to be illustrated by such terms as “automobile,” or, better, “auto-suggestion,” and not by the *αὐτοάνθρωπος* or the *αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν* of Greek philosophy.—TRANSLATOR.

a favourite word of Gentile's, this last, and one pre-eminently expressive of his thought.

And note again that thought is essentially identical with will, notwithstanding that the vulgar opinion makes the will an activity distinct from thought, devoted to alienating the spirit from itself, transforming it from ego into an ego, from subject into object; and, notwithstanding, that the naturalistic philosophy (which, as we have seen, includes every system which distinguishes between thought and reality) regards the will as engaged in making something which is already made, which already exists, and in virtue of its accomplished existence defies, in its absolute immobility, the possibility of being anything but what it is.

This is the central point of Gentile's philosophy, which we must grasp and hold firm if we are to understand all the logical deductions from it. He drives it home by a penetrating analysis that reveals all philosophy as nothing else, in its perennial principle, than an attempt to resolve reality into thought. He shows that no philosophy, even though it start from a naturalistic presupposition and thesis, can really help announcing itself, in the very act of its emergence, as a veritable and complete resolution of actuality into the very thought which envisages it as distinct from itself, though in truth it is, all the time, of its own precipitated *intellectum*, and only so can be said to be acquired and secured by it. Even scepticism, in declaring reality to be unknowable, posits so much knowledge of reality as is involved in declaring it to be unknowable, and thereby affirms its existence as the unknowability—which it knows! In possession of this existence, as its stock in trade, scepticism goes on to build up a world of its own, wherein, after the first belying of a thought which, in the very act of denying, it affirms, it goes on to a second, by annexing will and action. For is not action based on the practical certainty of a correspondence between the internal and the external reality, between the subject and the object?

It was only with Descartes that philosophy began to disentangle itself from the inextricable contradictions by which the object, though constituted by the subject in the actual moment of philosophising, proceeded to detach itself therefrom and to shut itself up in impenetrability and incomprehensibility. And even Descartes, though his *cogito ergo sum* makes thought the starting-point of being and resolves being ideally into it, yet himself immediately falls back into dogmatism by referring the evidence for this primal, original, and creative act of thought

to a something outside itself, which it neither constitutes nor does nor creates. Thus thought falls back upon itself, as a form without content, with no reality left to it. The demand reasserted itself successively in Leibniz and Spinoza, who were feeling for a complete and absolute rationalising of the real; and with Berkeley, though he too, for all his *esse est percipi*, still leaves the reality of objective nature, opaque and obscure, outside the *percipere*. Kant made a further advance by reducing the real, together with space and time, to *a priori* categories in the spirit, and, in his *a priori* synthesis of the spirit, affirming the identity of thought and reality; but then he let reality escape him again, by emptying the categories themselves of the *noumenon* which lay within and behind phenomena. In like manner reality evades Fichte, whose transcendental *ego* never succeeds in drawing the *non ego* into itself. It evades Hegel, who posits Space and Nature antecedently to actual thought, and so falls into the hands of anyone who chooses to assert that before and outside actual thought, or thought in action (thought, that is, which is just the coincidence of being and making, and nothing more), there is some kind of reality, or necessity and factor of reality, which cannot be resolved in its totality and without residuum into the actual thought itself, as an interior logical factor, ever denied and ever reaffirmed in the process of becoming or making.

But how does religion emerge from this doctrine, and what place has it therein?

Note, before proceeding further, the wonderful resemblance, nay rather complete identity, between what Gentile says of his pure act and what the Schoolmen, treading in the footprints of Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, say of that pure act which is none other than God.¹ To Gentile and the Schoolmen alike "pure actuality" is the absolute totality, originality, and creativity, unconditioned itself by the time and space which it posits as the modes of existence of concrete and empirical individuality. It knows no past or future, save as internal oppositions, relations, and gradations within the actuality itself, pullulating there in infinite alternations. In a word, it is just—absolute actuality.

The difference between the one and the other pure actuality lies just here:—The scholastic pure actuality is conceived as ultramundane and supramundane, external to the finite thought (which nevertheless is actually thinking it), *interminabilis vitæ*

¹ "Relinquitur quod Deus, qui est actus purus, sit infinitus in sua actualitate" (Aquinas).—TRANSLATOR.

tota simul et perfecta possessio,¹ immobile in its absoluteness, pure being and infinite negation of becoming; whereas the things which it creates, external to itself, are bound in by their finiteness, are multiplex, are closed up by their very existence as individuals against any real possibility of union. Gentile's pure actuality, on the contrary, is not absolute being but absolute becoming. It is a process, a relation continuously re-establishing itself as the unity of things distinguished and the synthesis of things opposite. Things and nature and concrete empirical individualities are not outside it but in it, are itself in its perennial self-making. Its being is this very self-making itself, and is embraced, absolutely without mediation, in the act of thought itself, the primary and transcendent actuality, auto-consciousness and autoktisis. Thus, all that we think and see to exist has its reality in the reality of that which thinks, and which is, because it makes, the universe—and that universe its own.

And just because this act is not a station but a process, not pure subject nor pure object, but subject-object, spirit objectifying itself (whence nature), and reality spiritualising itself (whence consciousness), and just because this process is included in the very act of constituting subject and object alike, as factors in all concrete becoming, distinguishing them but reuniting them in the auto-consciousness wherein philosophy consists, just for this very reason, I say, we can understand how religion rises in the life of the spirit, and what is its function there.

When the spirit conceives itself as subject and transfuses itself into things, endowing them with its conscious presence and making them its own expressions of itself, this is art. It is pure subjectivity and lyrical expression. But the spirit, in the very act of feeling itself as subject, particularising itself, entering completely into the individual and expressing itself in it, becomes aware of its own limitation, and longs to escape from itself, from the factor of the particular moment in which the original infinity is individualised, and which was originally infinite though individualised, but which has now all at once become a throttling sense of the pressure of limitations. So then it seeks to escape from itself again in the reverse direction, posits and affirms itself as an object, but asserts the absolute objectivity, the totality of things, as something not its own and not itself, transcending it and every other particular factor of existence, infinite, eternal, unmovable. And under pressure of this sense of the limits of the subject and the

¹ Boetius. It is the definition of eternity accepted as classic by the Schoolmen; here applied to the eternal Being.—TRANSLATOR.

unlimitedness of the object, the spirit bows down and surrenders itself, and would fain cancel and lose itself and vanish away. Here then we have the factor of mysticism, which Gentile, with a few felicitous examples and citations, sets forth as characteristic of religion, and specifically of Christian religion, exemplified in Paul and the great mystics.

But if this were all, and if the spirit really obliterated itself in this affirmation of objectivity and lost consciousness of itself therein, then religion would mean neither life nor morality, but rather the negation of both. For morality is free activity, the making of good; and therefore it involves the affirmation of the worth of the subject as capable of acting freely and creating good. So if the various factors of the spirit should come to be understood statically, and not in their dynamic movement—the reciprocity by which each factor, as soon as constituted, loses and at the same time realises itself in the other, to which it is united by a relation at once transcendent and immanent,—then we should have to rule out the religious factor in the name of philosophy. But it is not so. For philosophy has her being in the unity of opposites, in subject-objectivity and object-subjectivity, in synthesis, in actuality which continually asserts itself in the alternation of subject, object, and the synthesis of the two.

Hence religion, a factor of the spirit seen under the light of spiritual dialectic, is a self-losing of the subject in the object from which there arises an ulterior and higher affirmation of the subject. It is the mediating intervention of the particular in the universal, wherein the soul loses itself to find itself again. Or, in less technical language, it is the sense of reverence and devout humility and dedication that our empirical and ephemeral personality, conscious of its limitations and its penury, feels for reality and life and absolute spiritual values considered as full and complete in themselves, as eternally and infinitely valid, worthy to claim that every particularised interest or volition or form of being should accept them as divine truth and transcendent and unchallengeable will, should annul itself before them, should deny *itself* in its concrete particular, to affirm and glorify *them* to infinity. In this act of glorifying, the ego, yea the individual and empirical ego, reaffirms itself, but only so far as it feels itself one with that absolute and eternal ego which it began by venerating as transcendent.

Gentile, then, has every right to declare that his actual idealism “does not deny religion, but only the interpretation which religion¹ gives of herself, or rather of her object. It

¹ Were it not more accurate to say, “the theologians in the name of religion”?

looks to a conception of reality on which the mind may rest with the same faith in which it abandons itself to God in its sincerest religious experiences." The difference between idealism and dogmatism lies in the philosophical connotation, conceptual and verbal alike, of reality; their identity, in the act and value of religion itself.

But perhaps all this may look like mere philosophical subtlety, appealing only to speculative students trying to give themselves a distinct account of life and religion. Sincerely and practically religious souls may well look with suspicion on this idealism, and may challenge it as to its true relation to religion on another line. "Do you really believe," they may ask, "that this doctrine of yours is capable of inspiring a line of practical conduct, a vital spirit of action, corresponding to that which religion at large, in its purest inspirations, and Christianity in especial, prompts and imposes on its followers? Can it, for instance, say with full conviction: 'Consider your neighbour as you would consider yourself'? In other words, can your principles yield a moral norm, a religious training? If so, let us have them and let us see what we are to think of them." It is precisely this challenge that Gentile takes up in the third of his *Discorsi di religione*, which I regard as his most interesting and novel contribution to philosophy, and of which a very free epitome here follows.

I need hardly premise that the main objections which idealism has to meet are two. Firstly, there is the idea that it resolves into thought the reality of nature and of the "external" world, of sensation and perception, and in general of all reality save the ego, which it leaves in solitary possession of its realm of shadows. Where is there room in it, we are asked, for right and for morality, which consist in relations to some other, whether God, our neighbour, or nature? And secondly, there is the suspicion that, by transferring goodness, morality, and religion to the transcendental field (that is to say, by transforming them into absolute categories realised by the spirit in its dialectic movement, just because it is spirit, or consciousness of subject, consciousness of object, consciousness of subject-object), you simply obliterate moral good and evil. For does not moral good—so runs the protest—mean something that man can do but so often fails to do, the will for good with which he sets about correcting the determinism of nature and instinct, by grafting on them a higher principle of life—one act of love, as Pascal put it, being mightier than all nature? Is it not the ideal that has to be realised and can only be realised by free, that is, contingent action, by the

determination and the will of man? And surely there is no room or *raison d'être* for these things in your system. Or at any rate they are something far other than what you have now been talking about. For, by your very assumption of a transcendental interpretation of religion, that to which you give the name is a factor of every form of human activity, since all alike consist of the mediation of the particular in the universal, the final and immanent resolution of the subject in the object and the object in the subject, and the synthesis of the two terms in the ego. According to this, the act of the spirit will never be anything else than making the universal concrete by limiting it, evil will be no other than a dialectic factor of good, and the "ought to be" of the ideal no other than the "is" envisaged as a "becoming."

To the first objection Gentile answers that it only rises when idealism is regarded from the point of view of the pre-critical mentality, that is to say, with the mind fixed on the real as object, datum, nature. For in idealism, rightly understood, the object is every bit as real as the subject, the reality which the thought thinks is as true as the thought itself, and everything is left in the order, hierarchy, and sphere in which it stands to the realist; which order and hierarchy and sphere, however, cannot be, and, truly conceived, never have been, any other than such as thought itself gives to reality; for any other order or gradation which should stand outside thought would *ipso facto* be unintelligible. So if ethics—the spirit as morality, or freedom—finds its realisation not in the individual man but in human society, in the relations of men to each other, and further in the relations of men themselves to God and nature, this means that the sense of otherness and multiplicity is intrinsic to the dialectic of the spirit itself as it becomes good and feels the command to seek unity in love, and to think of God as being this unity, which unity would be inaccessible were it not already fundamentally present in the very spirit that wills it; would be inaccessible, therefore, if men were, as the old philosophy imagined, completely made up and stereotyped by the very fact of their existence, monads all external to each other, just as the monads of Leibniz would be, were it not for that "pre-established harmony" of his—a supplementary or corrective unity imposed upon thought from outside, and therefore never really entering into thought at all.

If I am bidden to love my neighbour as myself, says Gentile, it is because in reality—in that reality which is my own inmost ego, transcending the superficial and ephemeral

multiplicity—that neighbour is my very self. Both in yourself and in your neighbour you are to love humanity; you are to love that self of yours which is absolutely and eternally valid, and which therefore transcends the fluctuating particularisations of time and space and all that finds its place in them. *Transcende temetipsum* if thou wouldst seek God, said Augustine. But to transcend yourself is an impossibility, it is a mere empty phrase, if that reality in which we are to abide by transcending ourselves is not our self after all, our highest, truest, fullest self. Just as nature is the passage from the one to the manifold, so love is the return from multiplicity to unity, actualised as freedom and morality.

More serious, perhaps, is the second difficulty; for it strikes at the Kantian formalism, and tells, it would seem, still more heavily against the more consistent and complete formalism of actual idealism. Because to Kant the moral category still had a world other than itself and inferior to itself to moralise, to wit, the world of phenomena and of the utilitarian and empirical will. Whereas Gentile's formalism, having nothing else to work upon but the spirit itself, really is the "absolute formalism" which it proclaims itself to be; which means that it definitely rejects the conception of any made-up and established Good which is to be the standard of the goodness we are to develop in ourselves. To Gentile there can be no *norma data*, antecedent to the free act, to which that act must conform—and by that very fact must itself cease to be free! Still less can there be a reference of the spirit to any shred or form of the concrete and particular which it is the very business of the spirit and of morality to absorb into universality and the consciousness of universality. In any such reference, the norm, the law, the letter may be there, but the essence is gone, and has left behind it—what St Paul means by sin.

We can now formulate more precisely the difficulty of which we have been speaking. If universality is an act, how can it also be a norm? If reality is, transcendently considered, spirituality, and is at its every moment complete and absolute spiritual actuality, what is the sense and what is the use of saying to us, as Benedetto Croce does,¹ "Be spirit," or as Giovanni Gentile does, "Act so that thy actual will may be the universal will"?

I confess that, after carefully reading and pondering over Gentile's writings, I still think that this point deserves further elucidation. But Gentile himself has shown the

¹ In his *Filosofia della pratica*.

direction in which we must look for fuller light; for what is wanted is greater precision in determining the relation between the empirical and the transcendental ego, between the unity that lies so deep within but never ceases to be the actuality, and the concrete visible multiplicity not only of men, but of passions, instincts, impulses, promptings of the will, and states of mind that multiply and contend within one and the same individual and all the time bear the flower of his moral personality as their unity and synthesis, never made up but always on the toilsome path of establishing itself, in a conflict which is always on the balance, and in which the victory must be continuous, since opposition springs up from victory itself.

"That," says Gentile, "is a moral action whose axiom can be regarded not as the law of your phenomenal subject but of your pure ego, that ego whose affirmation and development is the principle of concrete and absolute universality. The phenomenal and particular subject, like all phenomena that alternate and jostle each other in space and time, belongs to the world of multiplicity. But the pure and transcendental subject is unity, and because unity universality."

If, then, to the transcendent subject the good is a category as transcendental as itself, a dialectic factor that absorbs and resolves evil into itself,—absolute creative freedom,—this good must present itself to the empirical ego as the forcing down and conquest and painful transcending of multiplicity, and the evil that has to be overcome will have just so much reality as has this multiplicity itself, as has the flesh, the law, the world. And it is here, in this consciousness of strife, of the subjection of the spirit to the flesh, and the forceful victory that must break it—it is here that we find the seat of that sense of sin and of redemption, and of that opposition between the spirit and the flesh, that makes us sigh for the divine, for the divine unity and freedom and fullness of life. Here is the field of religious experience. And this experience would be vain, unreal, unthinkable, if we chose to regard it as a special faculty of the spirit, a supernatural intuition or consciousness which had for its proper object a divine reality external to the spirit, immobile, infinite, intrinsically inaccessible. Were such an experience and such a God-nature conceivable, there would indeed be an irreparable cleavage between religion and philosophy; for religion would mean total alienation of the concrete and limited human spirit into God, an alienation wholly unconscious and self-contradicting; whereas philosophy can never be anything else than the

assumption of reality in thought, the resolution of reality into thought, and the resultant establishment of reality-thought. Such a reality does not transcend the spirit, but is itself the creation of a spirit that transcends all its own concrete forms and factors; whereas the Aristotelian God can never be the God whom John and Paul affirmed, whom the mystics sought insatiably, whom religion promises to man when it promises him the *vita eterna*, the absolute life beyond which is nothing, and which is itself beyond the time and space which itself has established as its own internal factors. *Dii estis*. And since there are no Gods but one, *Deus estis*.

But being, that is, becoming God, is the spiritual tragedy of life. The spirit is the universe, but this its universe is a hierarchy of values, of things transformed into values; and every concrete universe, every human act which is its own universe to itself, is moral, is religious, is subject to that very valuation which it implies and actualises. So the individual, in this act, has to make his own universe, and has to assign its place therein to everything—to past and future, to nature and God, to the loftiest ideal and the least significant requirement of the moment: a responsibility in which his empirical ego is subjected—by its own will, which yet in the very act of willing is recalcitrant—to an infinite and absolute norm of duty, which is the spirit itself, working in it as universality and absoluteness, sacrificing to itself, in itself, every ephemeral and empty particularisation, and determining that sacrificed it shall be. This is the inmost core of the conception of the sacred and of sacrifice (“sacred-making”), in which all religion lives and moves.

The act of the spirit, then, which conceives itself in the light of absolute value is, by definition, a religious act. But this religion is integral to philosophy. It is no adjunct to it but is lost in it—if philosophy is indeed the auto-consciousness in which empiricity and universality, object and subject, the ephemeral and the absolute, fuse themselves together; and in which free action creates the reality of that living unity which is reality indeed, reality absolute.

“And so,” concludes Gentile, “the deathless life may be called a deathless death; not the death in which the weary soul of Lucretius finds repose, but the death in which repose is never to be found; for thus to die is to live, and the death of religion is the life of the spirit that takes up religion into its own life by transcending it, and in transcending it realises the good and accomplishes its eternal mission.”

ROMOLO MURRI.

CROCE'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

R. G. COLLINGWOOD,

Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford.

AN alliance between philosophy and history is no new idea in this country. Most Englishmen who know or care anything about philosophy have been influenced, directly or indirectly, by the "Greats" school at Oxford; and the distinguishing mark of this school is the connection which it maintains between the study of ancient history and that of ancient philosophy. It is this connection that gives Oxford philosophy its chief merit, a fine tradition of scholarship and interpretation in Plato and Aristotle; and it is, perhaps, the failure to extend the same principle to the study of more recent thought that has led in this school to a much lower standard in the interpretation of modern philosophy, unsupported as it is by any study of modern history.

The ideal of a combined study of philosophy and history is energetically supported by Croce. Himself a philosopher of eminence and an accomplished historian, he feels acutely in his own person the profit which each of his pursuits in turn derives from the other. The historian must study the philosophy of his period if he is to understand those forces which ultimately shaped its destiny; if he does not follow the thoughts of the men whose actions he is studying he can never enter into the life of his period, and can at best observe it from outside as a sequence of unexplained facts, or facts to be explained by physical causes alone. And the philosopher must in his turn study history. How else is he to understand why certain problems at certain times pressed for solution on the philosopher's mind? How else is he to understand the individual philosopher's temperament, his outlook on life, the very symbolism and language in which he has expressed himself? In short, if the philosopher is to understand the

history of philosophy he must study the general history of humanity; and a philosophy which ignores its own history is a philosophy which spends its labour only to rediscover errors long dead.

History without philosophy is history seen from the outside, the play of mechanical and unchanging forces in a materialistically conceived world: philosophy without history is philosophy seen from the outside, the veering and backing, rising and falling, of motiveless winds of doctrine. "Both these are monsters." But history fertilised by philosophy is the history of the human spirit in its secular attempt to build itself a world of laws and institutions in which it can live as it wishes to live; and philosophy fertilised by history is the progressive raising and solving of the endless intellectual problems whose succession forms the inner side of this secular struggle. Thus the two studies which, apart, degenerate into strings of empty dates and lists of pedantic distinctions—"To seventeen add two, And Queen Anne you will view," "*Barbara celarent darii ferioque prioris*"—become, together, a single science of all things human.

This is the point of view from which Croce proposes, and in his own work carries out, a closer union between philosophy and history. It is a point of view which must interest English readers; the more so as in these days, when the pre-eminence of classical studies in English education is a thing of the past, the position of philosophy as a subject of study demands the closest attention. In the past the Oxford "Greats" school has stood for this ideal of the cross-fertilisation of history and philosophy, even when the co-ordination of the two sides has been worst, and the undergraduate has seemed to be merely reading two different schools at once, under tutors who regarded each other as rivals for his attention; but in the future the whole question will be reopened, and philosophy may either contract a new alliance with the natural sciences, or retire into single blessedness as an independent subject of study like Forestry or Geography, or force herself into the company of Modern History, disguised perhaps under the inoffensive name of Political Theory. To solve this problem in the best way it is necessary to have a clear idea of what philosophy is, and what are its relations to these other subjects of study. These, of course, are controversial questions, on which no one can lay down the law; but the conclusions of Croce demand at least our attention, and we propose here to discuss his views on the nature of history and its relation to philosophy. As our purpose is rather to criticise than to

expound, we shall select some of his views and examine these as typical of the whole.

The book in which he expounds them is the *Teoria e Storia della Storiografia* (Bari, 1917), which, like many of Croce's books, falls into two sections, a theoretical and a historical. The relation between the two is close; the ideas which are discussed in the former are exemplified in the latter, and the process of development followed in the latter is only intelligible in the light of the principles laid down in the former. Our concern here is especially with the theoretical section; not because it is the most striking—the historical section is a rapid but extremely brilliant survey of the progress of historical thought, in which the characteristics of succeeding periods are set forth with a penetration and fairness which could hardly be bettered—but because our present business is the explicit statement of theoretical principles.

In order to arrive at a clear concept of what history is, Croce begins by telling us what it is not. It is not annals. That is to say, it is not the lists of dates with which a superficial observer confuses it. To the outward eye, a book may consist of mere chronological tables; but to the historian these tables mean real history, not because they are, but because they stand for, the thought which is history. History goes on in the mind of the historian: he thinks it, he enacts it within himself: he identifies himself with the history he is studying and actually lives it as he thinks it, whence Croce's paradox that "all history is contemporary history." *Annals*, on the other hand, belong to the past; the schoolboy learning a list of dates does not live them in his thought, but takes them as something alien imposed upon him from outside—brute facts, dead and dry; no living reality such as his teacher, if he is a good historian, can enjoy in reading the same list. *Annals*, then, are past history, and therefore not history at all. They are the dry bones of history, its dead corpse.

This is illuminating, and satisfactory enough until we begin to reflect upon it. History is thought, annals the corpse of thought. But has thought a corpse? and if so, what is it like? The corpse of a organism is something other than the organism itself: what, for an idealistic philosopher like Croce, is there other than thought, in terms of which we can give a philosophically satisfactory definition of the corpse of thought?

Croce's general "philosophy of the spirit" supplies him with a ready-made answer. Nothing exists but the spirit; but the spirit has two sides or parts, thought and will. Whatever is not thought is will. If you find some fact which cannot

be explained as an instance of thought, you must explain it as an instance of will. Thought is the synthesis of subject and object, and its characteristic is truth: will is the creation of an object by the subject, and its characteristic is utility. Wherever you find something which appears at first sight to be an example of thinking, but which on inspection is found not to possess the quality of truth, it follows that it must be an example of willing, and possess the quality of usefulness. Such, in a rough outline, is the principle of analysis which Croce applies in this book and elsewhere. History is thought: there is here a perfect synthesis of subject and object, inasmuch as the historian thinks himself into the history, and the two become contemporary. Annals are not thought but willed; they are constructed—"drawn up"—by the historian for his own ends; they are a convention serving the purposes of historical thought, as musical notation serves the purposes of musical thought without being musical thought; they are not true but useful.

This is the answer which Croce gives, or rather tries to give, to the question we raised. But he does not really succeed in giving it. He cannot bring himself to say that annals are simply devoid of truth, are in no sense an act of thought. That would amount to saying that annals are the words, and history their meaning: which would not be what he wanted. So he says that annals are (p. 9) "sounds, or graphic symbols representing sounds, held together and maintained not by an act of thought which thinks them (in which case they would once more be supplied with content), but by an act of will which thinks it useful for certain purposes of its own to preserve these words, empty or half empty though they be." "Or half empty." This is a strange reservation. Are the words of which annals are composed, then, not empty after all? Are they half full, half full, that is, of thought? But if so, the distinction between the act of thought and the act of will has broken down: annals are only history whose words mean less indeed than the same words as used by history proper, but still have meaning, are still essentially vehicles of thought. And Croce would be the first to admit and insist that a difference of degree has nothing to do with a philosophical question like this.

This is not the only passage in which Croce's clearness of vision and common sense break through the abstractions of his formal philosophy. He tries to maintain a philosophy according to which every act of the spirit falls under either one or the other of two mutually exclusive heads (theoretical

and practical), subdivided into four sub-heads (intuition and thought; economic willing and ethical willing), so related that the second and fourth sub-heads involve the first and third respectively (thought is also intuition, ethical action is also economic action), but not *vice versa*. Now this formal philosophy of the mind is purely psychological and empirical in character; it is what Croce himself calls "naturalism" or "transcendence." And with that side of himself which never ceases to combat all kinds of naturalism, he combats this philosophy of his own with the rest. To go into this fully would involve a detailed analysis of Croce's other works, and we shall not pursue it here. But we must refer to it, and insist upon this general principle: that there are two Croces, the realist, dualist, empiricist, or naturalist, who delights in formal distinctions and habitually works in dualistic or transcendent terms, and the idealist, whose whole life is a warfare upon transcendence and naturalism in all their forms, who sweeps away dualisms and reunites distinctions in a concrete or immanent unity. A great part of Croce's written work consists in a debate between these two, one building up dualisms and the other dismantling them; sometimes failing to dismantle them. This we shall find throughout the present book. In fact, at the end of our inquiry, we shall see reason to suspect that this double-mindedness has now become so intolerable to Croce himself that he feels impelled to destroy altogether a philosophy so deeply at variance with itself, and to take refuge in a new field of activity.

The dualism between history and annals is really, if I understand it aright, an expository or "pedagogic" dualism, confused by the attempt to interpret it as a real or philosophical dualism, to which end it has been mistakenly identified with the distinction between a symbol and its meaning. An expository dualism is a common enough device: in order to expound a new idea one frequently distinguishes it point by point from an old, thereby developing what looks like a dualism between them, without, however, at all meaning to imply that the dualism is real, and that the old conception has a permanent place in one's philosophy alongside of the new. Thus the antithesis between the flesh and the spirit, developed in order to define the term spirit, is misunderstood if it is hardened into a metaphysical dualism: so again that between mind and matter, art and nature, and so forth. In such cases the two terms are not names for two co-ordinate realities, but an old and a new name for the same thing, or even an old and a new "definition of the Absolute," and the new supersedes

the old: if the old is compelled to live on alongside the new, it sets up a dualism whose effect is precisely to destroy the whole meaning of the new conception and to characterise the whole view as a naturalistic or transcendent philosophy.

This is curiously illustrated by Croce's chapter on "History and Annals." "History is living history, annals are dead history: history is contemporary history, annals are past history: history is primarily an act of thought, annals an act of will" (p. 10). Here again the word *primarily* gives everything away; but, ignoring that, it is strange that the category in which annals fall is indifferently, and as it were synonymously, called *the past*, *dead*, and *the will*. Here—and numerous other passages could be quoted which prove the same thing—Croce is really identifying the distinction of thought and will with the distinction of living and dead, spirit and matter. The will is thought of as the non-spiritual; that is to say, the concept of dead matter has reappeared in the heart of idealism, christened by the strange name of will. This name is given to it because, while Croce holds the idealistic theory that thought thinks itself, he unconsciously holds the realistic or transcendent theory that the will wills not itself but the existence of a lifeless object other than itself, something unspiritual held in existence by an act of the will. Thus, wherever Croce appeals from the concept of thought to the concept of will, he is laying aside his idealism and falling back into a transcendent naturalism.

But now the idealist reasserts himself. A corpse, after all, is not merely dead: it is the source of new life. So annals are a necessary part of the growth of history: thought, as a philosopher has said, "feeds saprophytically upon its own corpse." Annals are therefore not a mere stupid perversion of history, but are essential to history itself. Annals are a "moment" of history, and so therefore is will of thought, matter of mind, death of life, error of truth. Error is the negative moment of thought, without which the positive or constructive moment, criticism, would have nothing to work upon. Criticism in destroying error constructs truth. So historical criticism, in absorbing and digesting annals, in showing that they are not history, creates the thought that is history. This is idealism; but it stultifies the original dualism. The distinction between history and annals is now not a distinction between what history is (thought) and what history is not (will), but between one act of thought (history) and another act of thought of the same kind, now superseded and laid aside (annals), between the half-truth of an earlier stage

in the process of thought and the fuller truth that succeeds it. This is no dualism, no relation between A and not-A, and therefore it cannot be symbolised by the naturalistic terminology of thought and will; it is the dialectical relation between two phases of one and the same development, which is throughout a process of both thinking and willing.

The same fundamental vice underlies the very attractive discussion of "pseudo-histories." We all know the historian who mistakes mere accuracy for truth, the "philological" historian; and him who mistakes romance for history, the "poetical" historian; and him who imagines that the aim of history is not to tell the truth but to edify or glorify or instruct, the "pragmatic" historian. And Croce characterises them and discusses their faults in an altogether admirable way. But he wants to prove that he has given us a list of all the possible forms of false history, and this can be done by appealing to the list of the "forms of the spirit." But the appeal not only fails in detail—for his list of pseudo-histories tallies very ill with the list of forms of the spirit—but is false in principle.

For "poetical" history, to take an example, is only a name calling attention to a necessary feature of all history. Croce shows how Herodotus, Livy, Tacitus, Grote, Mommsen, Thierry, and so forth, all wrote from a subjective point of view, wrote so that their personal ideals and feelings coloured their whole work and in parts falsified it. Now, if this is so, who wrote real history, history not coloured by points of view and ideals? Clearly, no one. It is not even desirable that anyone should. History, to be, must be seen, and must be seen by somebody, from somebody's point of view. And doubtless, every history so seen will be in part seen falsely. But this is not an accusation against any particular school of historians; it is a law of our nature. The only safe way of avoiding error is to give up looking for the truth.

And here, curiously, Croce breaks out into a panegyric on error, as if conscious that he was being too hard on it. The passage is a most interesting combination of naturalism and idealism. Error, says Croce, is not a "fact"; it is a "spirit"; it is "not a Caliban, but an Ariel, breathing, calling, and enticing from every side, and never by any effort to be solidified into hard fact." This image implies that error does not, as such, exist; that is, that no judgment is wholly or simply erroneous, wholly devoid of truth: which is orthodox idealism, but quite contrary to Croce's general theory of error. But it also implies that error as such is valuable and good: he speaks

definitely of the "salutary efficacy of error"; and this conflicts not only with the description of pseudo-histories as "pathological"—and therefore, presumably, to be wholly avoided—but also with Croce's own idealism, and with the view which surely seems reasonable, that the indubitable value and efficacy of errors belongs to them not *qua* errors but *qua* (at least partial) truths. An error like historical materialism is, as Croce says, not a fact; that is because, its falsity discovered, it is banished, it becomes a memory. Also, as Croce says, it is, or rather we should say was, useful: it superseded a worse error, historical romanticism. But it was once a fact, and then it was a truth—the best truth that could be had then, anyhow; and then, too, it was useful, as an improvement on its predecessor. To-day it is not a fact (except for historians of thought), nor true, nor yet useful. The passage is confused because Croce is assigning to error as such the merits of truth; which is an attempt to express the fact that error as such does not exist, and that what we call an error is in part true and therefore has the "salutary efficacy" which belongs to truth alone. This confusion is due to the vacillation between naturalism, for which some statements are just true and others just false, and idealism, for which truth and falsehood are inextricably united in every judgment, in so far as it creates itself by criticising another, and becomes itself in turn the object of further criticism.

This vacillation is the more interesting as much of Croce's treatment of error is purely naturalistic, and shows no trace of idealism. His general theory of error, in the *Logica*, is absolutely naturalistic. Thought, he there argues, is as such true, and can never be erroneous: an error, whatever it is, cannot be a thought. What is it, then? Why, an act of will. We need hardly point out the absurdities of such a theory. We only wish to point out its naturalistic character; to lay stress on the distinction implied between a truth, as containing no error, and an error, as containing no truth, correlative with that between pure thinking and pure willing, and based on the same naturalistic or transcendent logic. So again his inquiry into the varieties (phenomenology) of error, in this book and elsewhere, and the list of pseudo-histories, are purely naturalistic; and so again is a highly "transcendent" type of argument not uncommon with him, which traces the origin of a philosophical error to the baneful influence of some other activity of the spirit. Thus philosophical errors, which by their very nature can only have arisen within philosophy itself, are ascribed to science (p. 45, the fallacy of the independent object)

and religion (p. 51, the dualism of *a priori* and *a posteriori* truths), errors whose only connection with science or religion is that when philosophers believed in them they applied them to the interpretation of these activities: whereupon Croce, having rejected them as general philosophical principles, uncritically retains them as adequate accounts of activities to which he has not paid special attention, and thus credits these activities with originating them. The result is a kind of mythology, in which Philosophy or Thought takes the part of a blameless and innocent heroine led into errors by the villains Science and Religion. These flights of pure naturalism in Croce have a curious eighteenth-century flavour; it is difficult in reading them to feel ourselves in the forefront of modern philosophy; for Science and Religion, the villains of the piece, represent precisely that Caliban of embodied factual error whose banishment from philosophy has just been ratified by Croce himself.

The same naturalism colours the chapter on the "Positivity of History." Here the doctrine is expounded that "history always justifies, never condemns." History always expresses positive judgments, never negative; that is, it explains why things happened as they did, and this is to prove that they happened rightly. "A fact which seems merely bad is a non-historical fact," a fact not yet thought out successfully by the historian, not yet understood. The historian as such therefore always justifies: if he condemns, he proves himself no historian. What is he, then? Why, a partisan; one who acts instead of thinking, serves practical instead of theoretical needs. The historian as such is a thinker; "the history which once was lived is by him thought, and in thought the antitheses which arose in volition or feeling no longer exist." To condemn in thought is to "confuse thought with life."

Here as usual we sympathise warmly: we know the historian who regards history as a melodrama, and we do not regard him as the best kind of historian. But we are trying at present to think philosophically; and the dualism between thought and life makes us a little uncomfortable. Life, we are told, is the scene of value-judgments, judgments of good and evil, which are products of the will; thought knows only the truth, and in the eye of thought everything that is, is justified. Partiality is proper and necessary to action, impartiality to thought. The statesman calls his opponent wicked or misguided, because, being a man of action and not a man of thought, it is not his business to understand him, but only to defeat him; the historian, understanding the motives of both, calls both alike wise and good.

This is the same tangled skein of idealism and naturalism. The underlying truth, that no historical event, no act and no person, is merely evil, and that it is the duty of the historian to discover and express the good which our hastier analysis of the facts has failed to reveal—this is an important doctrine, and it is an idealistic one; but the terms in which Croce has stated it are naturalistic. The distinction between theoretical and practical men, activities, or points of view is pure naturalism, and here it leads Croce into plain and obvious misstatements. It is monstrous to say that partiality is right and necessary in a statesman and wrong in a historian. Each alike ought to be as impartial as he possibly can in the process of balancing claims and forming a judgment on them; and each must be partial in asserting his judgment, when he has formed it, against his opponent's. The statesman ought to show all the impartiality he can in judging the claims of capital and labour, or agriculture and industry, however energetically he supports his own bills and denounces those of his opponents; and if the historian is impartial in balancing evidence and understanding motives, we do not expect him to be so impartial as to declare a rival's view of the character of Richard III. as good as his own. Because thought must be impartial, are there to be no more controversies?

Controversies, yes, it may be said, but not condemnations. We may refute Mommsen, but we must not condemn Julius Cæsar. But this is quite unreasonable. If I may think a German professor wrong, why not a Roman general? If, as a historian of warfare, I must accept all Cæsar's battles as impeccable, then as a historian of the history of warfare I must accept all Mommsen's accounts of them as impeccable for the same reason. Controversy is for contemporaries, no doubt: *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*. But as Cæsar's historian I am—is not Croce forgetting it?—Cæsar's contemporary. When a man is dead, the world has judged him, and my judgment does not matter; but the mere fact that I am rethinking his history proves that he is not dead, that the world has not yet passed its judgment. In my person, indeed, it is now about to pass judgment. Croce's contention is that I am forbidden to pass any but an exclusively favourable judgment. Why is this? It is because Croce is here assuming a "transcendent" theory of knowledge, according to which judgment has already been passed in a court outside the mind of the historian, a court from which he has no appeal. He can only write down what he finds written on the page of History.

Thus the idealistic principle that there is a positive side in

every historical fact is combined with the naturalistic assumption that the positive side excludes a negative side; the principle that nothing is merely bad is misunderstood as implying that everything is wholly good, and not bad in any sense at all. And this naturalistic misinterpretation of an idealistic principle confuses the whole argument to such an extent that it actually necessitates a naturalistic and transcendent theory of knowledge. Only in the light of such a theory can it be maintained, as Croce here maintains, that every historical event is right, and therefore everyone who thinks otherwise is wrong, as if the opinions of these poor creatures were not also historical events.

The dualism of thought and life is thus pure transcendence, a formal contradiction of Croce's own theory of history. Thought is life, and therefore the historian can never be impartial; he can only struggle to overcome one prejudice after another, and trust to his successors to carry on the work. The progress of thought is always negative in that it means a continual controversy with oneself and within oneself. The abstract "positivity of history" is a delusion, bred of a naturalistic philosophy.

In the same spirit Croce proceeds to expound his conception of progress. There being no negativity in history, that is to say, none in the world of reality, all is progress, every change is, as he says, "a change from the good to the better." There is no such thing as decadence; what appears to be so is really progress, if only you look at it from the right point of view. True; there always is such a point of view, and it is of the utmost importance that we should not overlook it. But there is the opposite point of view too. A change that is really a progress seen from one end is no less really a decadence, seen from the other. It is true to say that the decay of archery was the rise of firearms; but it is not less true to say that the rise of firearms was the decay of archery. Here is one point of view against another: which is the right one? Croce answers emphatically that one is altogether right and the other altogether wrong. But why? Is it the historian's duty always to take the side of the big battalions just because they win? Is he always to side with the gods against Cato? Or do we not rather feel that it was just by siding against Cato that the gods proved themselves no true gods? The historian's duty is surely not to pick and choose: he must make every point of view his own, and not condemn the lost cause merely because it is lost. The fact is that Croce is here again taking a transcendent attitude, asserting the existence of a criterion

outside the historian's mind by which the points of view which arise within that mind are justified and condemned.

It is the less surprising to find this transcendence emerge into full daylight at the end of the chapter. Croce is saying that when a historian fails to maintain a properly "positive" attitude, fails, that is, to maintain that whatever happens is right, he does so because he has attached himself so blindly to a cause, a person, an institution, a truth, as to forget that every individual thing is but mortal; and when his foolish hopes are shattered and the beloved object dies in his arms, the face of the world is darkened and he can see nothing in the change but the destruction of that which he loved, and can only repeat the sad story of its death. "All histories which tell of the decay and death of peoples and institutions are false"; "elegiac history" is always partisan history. This he expands by saying that immortality is the prerogative of the spirit in general: the spirit in its determinate and particular forms always perishes and always must perish.

Here the transcendence is explicit and unequivocal. The "spirit in general" is presented as having characters (immortality, absoluteness) which the individual spirit has not; the whole is the negation of the part; the absolute or infinite is something over against, contrasted with, the finite. The Christianity at which Croce never ceases to gird for its transcendence is here, as often, immanent exactly where he is himself transcendent. It knows that life is reached through death and found in death, and that to live without dying is to die indeed.

The whole discussion of the "positivity of history" is, in fact, vitiated by naturalism. The truth which Croce wishes to express is the same which Hegel concealed beneath his famous phrase, "the real is the rational." What happens, happens for a good reason, and it is the business of history to trace the reason and state it. And that means to justify the event. But this truth is grossly distorted if it is twisted into the service of a vulgar optimism which takes it for the whole truth. Hegel's view of reality, as Croce himself has insisted, was no such vulgar optimism, but a tragic view; and yet the common charge of optimism brought against him is not unfounded, for he, like Croce, had in him a streak of naturalism which at last overcame him. The point of view here maintained by Croce, from which every change is for the better, and all partisans of lost causes are fools and blasphemers, is neither better nor worse in itself than that from which all change is for the worse, and all innovators are Bolsheviks and

scoundrels. A history which was merely a tragedy or a series of tragedies, like the "Monk's Tale" in Chaucer, would be a misrepresentation of reality; but to hold that all tragedy is delusion and error, and that reality contains no tragic elements at all, is to misrepresent it not less gravely. To imagine that the choice lies between these two misrepresentations, that a positive and a negative moment cannot coexist in reality, is just the kind of error that characterises a transcendent or naturalistic philosophy.

We are now in a position to consider the relation between history, science, and philosophy. Science Croce identifies with the generalising activity of the mind. History is the internal and individual understanding of an object into which the mind so enters that subject and object can no longer be separated; it is real thinking. Science is the external and arbitrary construction of abstract types, and the manipulation of them for practical ends; it is not thinking at all, but willing. This is Croce's distinction. It falls, we observe, within the competence of Croce the naturalist, appealing as it does to the abstract scheme of thought and will. What does Croce the idealist say to it? For it is evident that he cannot assent to it.

He answers the question tacitly in a chapter on "Natural History." Here he denounces that kind of "history" which proceeds by making abstract classifications and then spreads out the classes over a chronological scale; for instance, that kind of history of language which imagines that language began by being monosyllabic, and then went on to polysyllabic forms, or that history of morals and society which begins with pure egoism and goes on to "deduce" altruism, and so on. He shows that this type of fallacy, in which temporal sequence is used as a kind of mythology for logical or spacial interrelation, is found not only in the sciences of nature but also in the sciences of man. In both alike, he says, we classify and arrange our facts, and make abstract generalisations which can, if we like, be arranged along an imaginary time-scale. But also, in both alike we can do real thinking: we can enter into the individual and understand it from within. The object, whether "a neolithic Ligurian or a blade of grass," can be penetrated by thought and lived by the thinker.

This simply destroys the distinction between science and history. It proves that as science (abstract classification) enters into the work of the historian, so history (concrete individual thought) enters into the work of the scientist. We are generally told that the business of the scientist consists of

classifying and abstracting: this, we now see, is not the case. A scientist is intrinsically no more concerned with generalising than a historian. Each does generalise; the geologist generalises about classes of rocks, as the historian generalises about classes of manuscripts; but in each case the generalisation is the means to that thinking which is the man's real work. The historian's real work is the reconstruction in thought of a particular historical event; the geologist's, the reconstruction in thought of a particular geological epoch at a particular place. If the anthropologist's aim is to be a neolithic Ligurian, the botanist's is to be a blade of grass.

Croce does not say this explicitly, but it is all implied in what he does say. He is in the habit of maintaining, formally, the naturalistic distinction of science and history, as concerned with generalisations and individuals respectively; but what he calls science is only one fragment of what he knows history to be, and equally it is only one fragment of what science really is. But, not being perhaps so deeply versed in science as he is in history, he readily misunderstands the true nature of scientific thinking, uncritically swallowing whole the naturalistic logic and mistaking one subordinate aspect of science for the whole.

The relation of philosophy to history is a subject often touched on in this book, but in the end left extremely obscure. The obscurity is due to a vacillation between two views; the idealistic strain of Croce's thought maintaining (with Gentile, to whom this side of Croce seems to be not a little indebted) the identity of philosophy and history, and the naturalistic maintaining that philosophy is a component part of history.

The two views are held side by side, without any attempt at reconciliation: probably without consciousness of the discrepancy. But no one who collects the relevant passages can fail to be struck by the contrast. Thus, on p. 17 "philology" (*i.e.* fact) "combines with philosophy" (*i.e.* critical thought) "to form history"; on p. 71 "philosophy is history and history is philosophy"; on p. 136 philosophy is "the methodological moment of history"; and on p. 162 "there is no way of distinguishing historical thought from philosophical." The two views seem to alternate with curious regularity.

The view that history and philosophy are identical is derived from reflections like those with which this paper began. Each without the other is a lifeless corpse: every piece of real thinking is both at once. This is Gentile's view. But the view that philosophy is a mere subordinate moment in history has quite different motives. It seems to indicate

that historical thought is conceived as real or absolute thought, containing philosophy complete within itself; while philosophy by itself is an inferior form, abstract and at best only half true, which requires to be supplemented by "philology" or the study of fact, and so converted into the perfect form of history. We are reminded of Vico's alliance between philosophy and philology by the language here, and of Hegel's dialectic by the thought that one form of activity is inherently imperfect and requires to be transformed into another before it can be satisfactory.

It is to this latter view that Croce seems finally to incline. In an appendix written some years after the body of the book he states it definitely: philosophy is the "methodological moment of history," that is, the working-out and critical construction of the concepts which history employs in its work. And this is an immanent methodology—it goes on not outside history, in a separate laboratory, but within the process of historical thinking itself. The philosopher and the historian have returned from the ride, in fact, with the philosopher inside.

This seems to me to indicate two things: the triumph within philosophy of Croce the naturalist over Croce the idealist, and the shifting of Croce's own centre of interest from philosophy to history.

The naturalist triumphs over the idealist because the synthesis of philosophy and philology in history implies the naturalistic conception of philosophy and philology as two different and antithetical forms of activity, which again implies that ideas or categories, or whatever is the subject-matter of philosophy, are something different from facts, the subject-matter of philology. Such a dualism of idea and fact is wholly impossible to an idealist; and yet only on this assumption can it be maintained that philosophy is immanent in history while history is transcendent with reference to philosophy. Naturalism, transcendence, is the last word.

Further, Croce here shows, if I read his meaning aright, that he is gradually deserting philosophy for history. He appears to have come to the conclusion that philosophical truth is to be attained not by direct fire—by the study of philosophy in the ordinary sense, which he now pronounces a delusion—but indirectly, as a product of ordinary historical work. Philosophy in his mind is being absorbed in history; the two are not poised in equilibrium, as with Gentile, but one is cancelled out entirely as already provided for by the other. This is made clear by the appendix on "Philosophy

and Methodology," which consists of an enumeration of the advantages which he hopes to gain from the new concept of philosophy—solid advantages for the most part, from which philosophy will be the gainer, but all, as he states them, tinged with a very visible weariness of philosophical work.

If this is really the case, and if Croce gives up philosophy to devote himself to history and to the reform of Italian education, it is not for us to repine. It is impossible not to observe in this book (and one sees the same thing in his other books) how his philosophy improves when he turns to handle the more strictly historical problems: how such a sophism as that concerning the "positivity of history" is calmly ignored, or rather the underlying truth of it unerringly seized upon, when he comes to assign their value to the various historical periods, and how the naturalistic element in his thought purges itself away when he becomes a historian, leaving an atmosphere of pure idealism. To say that Croce is a better historian than philosopher would be a misstatement of the truth, which is rather that the idealistic philosophy at which he has always consistently aimed is unable to penetrate the naturalistic framework to which, as a philosopher, he seems to have irreparably committed himself, and is only free to develop fully when he shakes off the associations of technical philosophy and embarks on work of a different kind. The necessity for this change of occupation he is tempted to ascribe to something in the very nature of philosophy and history; but this is an illusion, itself part of the very naturalism from which he is trying to escape. The real necessity for it lies in himself alone, in his failure to purge his philosophy of its naturalistic elements.

If this is so, Croce's desertion of philosophy for history may be only an unconscious step forward in philosophy: a kind of philosophical suicide by which, casting off the abstract "philosophy of the spirit," which by now has become intolerable even to himself, he can reach the point of absolute idealism to which his successors Gentile and De Ruggiero have already carried his thought.

R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE,
OXFORD.

IS CONSCIENCE AN EMOTION?

PROFESSOR WILLIAM M'DOUGALL.

THE Dean of Carlisle has done me the honour to choose me as representative of a certain school of ethical thought and, in a small book entitled *Is Conscience an Emotion?* which appeared in 1914, to criticise my account of the development of moral personality. The outbreak of war and the arduous duties of the Army Medical Service cut short my preparation of a reply and have prevented its execution until the present time. I wish now to examine the Dean's position in all fairness of spirit and openness to conviction. The Dean attaches great importance to the maintenance of the ethical theory which he defends, because he believes it possible to deduce from it the truth of the belief in a benevolent God. Let me say at once that I am only too willing to accept any such proof; to any evidence pointing in that direction my mind is not only open but strongly predisposed. It is, then, in no spirit of hostility to the Dean's theological conclusions that I undertake this inquiry. If he or anyone can prove, or adduce arguments which shall seem to me to point to, the reality of God, Freedom, and Immortality, I will joyfully accept that proof or those arguments. This is a great advantage which may be claimed at the outset for this particular controversy. For too often in the past such controversy has lacked this initial agreement; the theologian has started out with the avowed determination to prove the articles of his faith; his opponent, while professing a scientific openness of mind, has been almost equally committed to a negative attitude, has been moved by an almost equally strong and passionate desire to prove the theologian's conclusions and prepossessions to be false or baseless.

The Dean divides all writers on ethical topics into two great classes, the emotionalists and the rationalists. He points out that a strong tradition in ethical thought tries to show

that "Conscience" is a moving principle of our nature, a motive force comparable in many respects with the emotions and sentiments and impulses that impel us to think and act and behave in certain ways. This is the emotionalist tradition. On the other hand, he points to another strong tradition, the rationalist, which will have it that "Conscience" is essentially a manifestation of Reason, that, as he says, "'the moral faculty' is essentially Reason." He holds that it is of supreme importance to refute the former doctrine and to establish the latter; for only if this can be achieved have we, in his view, any firm ground from which we may infer the Goodness or **Morality** of God.

Let me here at once offer an apology to Dr. Rashdall. He complains that, in briefly discussing his views in my *Social Psychology*, I have misrepresented them. And he has now a further ground of complaint in the fact that, since the appearance of his book, I have allowed the publication of new editions of my own without any change of the paragraphs complained of. My excuse is that I have not, until recently, had time to apply myself again to the study of his writings. I shall hope to make the needed alterations in a later edition. For I admit error of two kinds. First, my all too brief remarks do not give an adequate impression either of the number or of the distinction of those moralists who belong to the Rationalist school. Secondly, I criticised him as holding an attenuated form of the "Moral Sense" doctrine; whereas he has devoted a very large number of pages to the refutation of the "Moral Sense" theory, which he regards as belonging to the emotionalist tradition. Nevertheless, although I see that I was in error here, I still think that he has, in many passages of both his *Theory of Good and Evil* and his recent book, given some colour to this charge. For, though it is the main thesis of both books that moral judgments are the pronouncements of Reason, he repeatedly uses expressions which imply that the Reason which pronounces such judgments is also a power which impels to right conduct, that it of itself supplies an impulse to, **or** creates a desire for, such conduct. He uses expressions which imply that the idea of right, of duty, or of the good is not only, as he so often affirms, a purely intellectual notion, an ultimate unanalysable concept, a category of the Reason, but is also at the same time a tendency, an impulsion, towards good conduct. If these expressions are to be taken literally, my criticism is justified; and they appear not only in *The Theory of Good and Evil*, but are repeated and defended against my criticism

in his later work. It is, I think, fair to demand that Dr Rashdall shall not attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds in this matter, but shall make his renunciation of the impulsive power of Reason quite explicit; for, until he does so, he will remain open to the charge of inconsistency, of adhering to a modified form of the "Moral Sense" theory while expounding the Rationalist principle and basing momentous conclusions upon it. The passages I refer to may be illustrated by the following examples. On one page he contrasts moral ideas with purely intellectual categories.¹ On another he says: "The intellectual notion of right and wrong is present, and may *strengthen* whatever other motives might otherwise impel him to choose one course of action rather than another. There is such a thing as . . . the desire to do what is right and reasonable as such." He speaks of "the desire to obey Reason" and of "the desire to act rationally." Further, he asserts "that the desire to do right is created by the intellect," and denies that in moral action "any other desire need be present except the desire to do right."

These and similar passages lend colour to the view that for Dr Rashdall the idea of right, the ultimate unanalysable notion of right, is at the same time an impulse or a desire to do right. For, if it is not, how can it strengthen other motives for choosing the right, other desires for those things which are good? And this interpretation is further supported by a curious passage in which he contests my statement that to create desire is a task beyond the competence of Reason. He says that this is a dogma rather than an argument;² and he defends the competence of Reason to create desire by pointing to the problem of the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle. "If," he says, "the desire to know whether those angles are equal or unequal springs up subsequently to, and in consequence of, the intellect's apprehension of the idea of an isosceles triangle and of the problem about the equality of its angles, *would there be any harm* in saying that the Reason creates the desire to solve the problem?" To this I reply: "No, there would be *no harm* if this statement were made in a sermon or in a popular address; but, when it is introduced into a philosophical argument by which it is sought to establish the most momentous conclusions about the nature of God and the World, then there may be much harm. We are entitled to ask—Is the statement meant to be taken literally, and not merely as a popular mode of speech in which there is

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 94.

² The whole of my book is my argument in support of this "dogma."

no harm? For the nature of Dr Rashdall's doctrine of Conscience turns upon his answer to this question.

The same inconsistency is implied by the fact that Dr Rashdall continues to use the expression "Practical Reason" and to imply that the "Practical Reason" is something different in nature from Reason pure and simple. If this is what Dr Rashdall means, if his ultimate unanalysable idea of right, or his "Practical Reason," impels to right action, then it is "Conscience" in the sense of Butler and Hutcheson, a faculty of a unique order which we can only believe to have been implanted in the human soul by a special divine act, and from whose special nature and position in the soul we can justifiably argue to the existence of a Moral Ruler of the Universe.

There are, however, abundant grounds for believing that Dr Rashdall does not mean to accept this view. But I must insist that he cannot have it both ways. He must say "yes" or "no" to this crucial question. What he has written justifies, I think, the statement that he has not hitherto faced the question and taken up a definite attitude towards it, has not chosen his answer, "yes" or "no." That when confronted with the issue he will reply "no," seems to be indicated by the following facts.

He does not follow Butler and Hutcheson in directly deducing the Moral Ruler from the alleged nature of Conscience as an impulse to the Right. Rather he distinctly repudiates at great length the notion of a special moral faculty or Conscience in this sense. His argument to the moral nature of God is less direct and more subtle. I shall examine it presently. He shows himself in some passages much concerned to purify the Reason which is operative in moral judgments from every least taint of contamination with emotion, desire, or impulsive power; thus, "Moral judgments are a kind of thinking, not a kind of emotion or feeling or desire."¹ He wishes to identify Conscience with Reason only; for "if Conscience means Reason, we have every ground for supposing that whatever Conscience approves is approved by God."² Again, "It is only upon the assumption that our ultimate moral judgments represent real deliverances of Reason . . . that we are justified in using them to interpret to ourselves the nature and meaning of the Universe in which we live. . . . If our judgments of value are valid pronouncements of Reason, we have the right to claim that in the moral

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 138.

² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

consciousness of man at its highest there is contained a true revelation of the rational Will which expresses itself in nature."¹ Yet again, "The belief in a righteous God is in the main an inference based upon the perfectly clear and definite pronouncement of the moral consciousness—that moral consciousness which . . . is no mere sense or emotion, but a particular activity of that self-same Reason, the validity of which is presupposed by all our knowledge."

Thus it is essential to his theological argument that the Reason which finds expression in moral axioms, notions, and judgments shall be Reason pure and simple, Reason undefiled by emotion, impulse, conation, desire, or will. For all these are subjective, are notoriously the variable expressions of our natures, differing from one individual to another, and in the same individual according to the accidents of time and place. Reason alone stands above these subjective influences; and only when uninfluenced by them can it yield purely objective judgments valid for all minds, all places, and all times, such as are required by Dr Rashdall's argument.

It seems clear, then, that this is really Dr Rashdall's view of the function of Reason, and that those passages in which he seems to imply the contrary view, namely that Reason is a motive or impulsive power, are not to be taken literally. This view of Reason hangs together with the now thoroughly discredited *ideo-motor* theory, according to which every idea is not only an intellectual conception, but also a tendency to action. If Dr Rashdall repudiates it, he does but come into line with modern psychology. But it is to be hoped that he will make quite explicit his repudiation; for this remnant of the "Moral Sense" theory haunts his pages like a ghost which he has not had the courage to lay, or of whose presence he is perhaps hardly aware.

Having apologised for my misrepresentations and endeavoured to explain them, I lay my own complaint against Dr Rashdall. He has done me the honour to name Professor Westermarck and myself as the leading contemporary exponents of emotionalism in Ethics, the doctrine to the refutation of which his recent book is devoted. Further, he is kind enough to say that "a far stronger case [than Dr Westermarck's] for the emotional view is presented"² by myself. It might, then, have been reasonably expected that Dr Rashdall would have made a careful examination of my view, and would have at least shown evidence of having comprehended its main features.

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 50.

² *Conscience*, p. 56.

But he has done neither. His recent book is occupied in the main with renewed arguments against the "Moral Sense" theory, hedonism, and other old-fashioned doctrines which, I imagine, no serious person wishes any longer to defend; for they are based on flagrantly untrue psychological assumptions.

And, in the chapter devoted more especially to the demolition of Dr Westermarck and myself, he does little more than expose some of the psychological slips and errors of which Dr Westermarck, who is primarily an observer and collector of anthropological data rather than a psychologist, has been guilty. There is no adequate indication of my view and no attempt to come to close quarters with it. On the contrary, the reader must, I think, obtain the impression that I have asserted and attempted to justify the following propositions:—that Conscience is an emotion; that the idea of duty, of right, or of good, can be analysed or explained away into an emotion or a group of emotions; that Reason plays no part in bringing about moral conduct, or in forming our moral judgments; that our moral judgments are emotions. For, in the pages devoted to the refutation of the views which I am said to represent, Dr Rashdall repeatedly denies all these absurd propositions, asserting with fervent emphasis and in many forms the self-evident proposition that concepts and judgments are not emotions.

➤ No serious person contends that Conscience is an emotion, or denies that Reason has played a great part in building up and refining the moral tradition and the moral character of persons.➤ The view which I have endeavoured to expound at some length is that Conscience is the whole moral personality, a vastly complex system in which all the elements of personality work harmoniously together towards the supreme end of right conduct and more complete moralisation of the self. And I have endeavoured to show how the growth of such a Conscience or moral character takes place; how it can advance beyond the merest rudiments only by perpetual absorption of the moral tradition, under the influence of admired personalities who most fully embody this tradition. Of all this Dr Rashdall gives no hint in his book, which, from its title onwards, indirectly but seriously misrepresents my exposition. The only pages in which Dr Rashdall deals directly with my views are a small-type appendix to his chapter on the Morality of Savages. In these he does little more than attempt to overwhelm me by arraying against me a host of great names, from Mr Bradley to Dr G. E. Moore. I am not at all intimidated, though I

admit that I am surprised to hear that so many distinguished living persons can be claimed as supporters of the Rationalistic theory.

I wish to go as far as possible with Dr Rashdall, to see whether I can follow his argument and derive from it the firm belief in a Moral Ruler of the Universe which it is designed to engender and establish. I will not delay to criticise what seem to me weak points in his psychology; for, in spite of his Rationalism, Dr Rashdall is a very reasonable man, and his mind is open to the influence of the facts of life and human nature, as he shows by his outspoken repudiation of the extravagances of the extreme rationalists. But this very reasonableness makes his views very difficult to criticise in detail; for almost every statement that seems to me to fly in the face of psychological fact, is corrected or compensated for by some other truer statement to be found on some other page of his two ethical treatises.

What, then, is Dr. Rashdall's argument by which he seeks to establish the moral nature of God? It is nowhere concisely stated by him; but I believe that I have grasped it, and he must forgive me, and will, I hope, correct me where necessary, if I attempt to state it concisely.

If any moral propositions can be shown to be absolutely true (or false), or capable of being absolutely true (or false), this can only mean that they accord (or conflict) with some moral ideal which has objective existence or subsistence, that is to say, which exists or subsists otherwise than in human minds only. Such objective subsistence of the moral ideal can only be subsistence in the mind of God, and God is therefore a moral God.

The problem for the rationalist theologian is, then, to show that some of our moral judgments are absolutely true or false. Dr. Rashdall attacks this problem in two ways. First, by the aid of certain ethical axioms, as follows. Reason is capable of revealing certain truths, such as the truth that $2 \text{ plus } 2 = 4$. This, together with the whole system of mathematical truths for which it stands, is absolutely and eternally true. It was true before any man discovered it, and will remain true when the race of men shall have passed away. That is to say, man has not made these truths; he has merely discovered truths which in some sense and manner subsisted before man's discovery of them. Where then did they exist? They must have subsisted in some mind which is eternal like themselves, the Eternal Reason.

But if there are moral axioms, which also are discovered

by man rather than invented by him, they are, equally with mathematical truths, valid pronouncements of Reason, unalloyed and uncontaminated by the lower and merely subjective aspects of mental activity. Therefore such moral axioms must also have subsisted before man was; they also are eternal truths, and must have subsisted in the Eternal Reason. It follows that the Eternal Reason is moral, and we may legitimately identify it with the traditional God of our religious systems and feel sure that God is not only Reason but Moral Reason; and, since we can conceive of morality only as righteousness and love, we conclude that God is righteous and loving.

This, I believe, is a fair concise statement of Dean Rashdall's first argument. The Dean admits that moral conduct does not proceed from Reason alone. "It must not," he tells us, "be supposed that Morality can ever become purely rational."¹ He seems prepared to admit that actual moral conduct may in all cases be the issue of such factors as I have described, namely the moral sentiments of men organised within the character under the influence of the moral tradition. But, though we *act* morally from such imperfect and merely subjective principles, we *know* morality from the higher principle of Reason. "The question at issue between Rationalists and Emotionalists is not what impels me to do a virtuous act but how I know it to be virtuous."²

The Dean's first argument requires, then, that certain moral axioms, or at least one moral axiom, shall be absolutely true. And it can only be truly axiomatic and absolutely true if it be an immediate pronouncement of Reason alone, such that its rejection is impossible by any rational mind. If such axioms can be discovered by Reason we can deduce from them the morality of God. The argument, unlike the argument of Professor Sorley for the existence of a Moral God, which depends in part upon the empirical fact of the existence of good men and good actions in the historical world that we know, is independent of any realisation of morality, of all existence of moral character and moral conduct. Even though the world never had contained a single example of a good man or a good action, even though it were a world of devils wholly devoted to evil, Dr Rashdall's argument would be just as convincing as it is in the world we actually know, because those devils would be compelled by Reason to admit the truth of the moral axioms, if only they can be discovered.

¹ *Conscience*, p. 112.

² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

In examining this argument one might begin by inquiring into the alleged objectivity of the mathematical truths discovered by men's Reason, and the deduction of the eternal Reason from them. But I am willing to waive the examination of this position, and to grant for the purposes of this discussion the validity of the deductions. Only remarking that even mathematical axioms are not universally admitted to be of a different nature from postulates, I will concentrate upon the question of the moral axioms.

What, then, are these moral axioms on the validity of which Dr Rashdall's first argument wholly depends? He gives us several examples: "The greater good ought always to be preferred to the less." This is the first and, I think, the most indisputably axiomatic of all the examples furnished. It is, I think, indisputably true. Reason compels us to admit its truth, even its eternal truth. But why? Simply because it is a tautological proposition. For if we try to define the meaning of the term "greater good," as thus abstractly used, we can only say that it is that which ought to be preferred. Dr Rashdall offers us another "self-evident axiom, that the more good is always greater than the less good."¹ I agree again that this is irrefutable and axiomatic, and just for the same reason, namely, that it is tautological. It means merely that the greater good is greater than the smaller good; and it is equally true if we leave out the word "good" and say the greater is greater than the less, or substitute any other word for the word "good." There is no limit to the number of such moral axioms that may be constructed, *e.g.* the greater evil is greater than the lesser evil, or the more selfish action is always more selfish than the less selfish action, or the best is better than the worst. So long as we do not play fast and loose with the meanings we attach to words, such moral axioms are eternally and absolutely true.

But Dr Rashdall attaches equal importance to another axiom, "the axiom of equity which pronounces that one man's good ought always to be treated as of equal importance with the like good of another."² This is a statement of a different order. It is not a tautological proposition. But is it axiomatic? Does Reason compel us to accept it as soon as we conceive it? I think not. To me it seems a most disputable proposition. And I imagine that I am not peculiar in this. Suppose that, during a shipwreck, I see two men struggling in the water, on the point of drowning; that I have in my

¹ *Conscience*, p. 182.

² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

hand a life-buoy just large enough to support one of them; and that, by throwing it to one of them, I may save his life and consign the other to death. And suppose I know that the one is a good man strongly attached to life, a man deserving of highest esteem and even veneration, and that the other is a low type of criminal, who has led a consistently wicked life and whose malicious act has caused the destruction of the ship and the loss of hundreds of lives and untold suffering to innocent persons. The "axiom" forbids me to throw the life-buoy to the good man. Either I must cut it in two, and throw to each an ineffective fragment; or I must hold my hand; or I must toss a coin and abide by its decision. It forbids me to exercise my natural, my subjective, preference for the good man. It is then no axiom, but merely a good general rule of conduct, but one too abstract to be of much value.

I submit that every genuine and therefore indisputable moral axiom which can be stated can be nothing more than either a tautological proposition or a moral postulate. I challenge Dr Rashdall to produce one which is not of this nature. He himself seems to be obscurely aware of this state of affairs; for he observes "that these axioms will never tell us what particular actions are right or wrong till we have settled what is this 'good' which ought to be promoted equally or impartially for all mankind. And, therefore, at bottom, the real ethical judgment is the judgment of value which affirms that such and such things are good."¹ This seems to be a frank admission that the so-called moral axioms are not propositions which express real ethical judgments. Moral value inheres only in two things, namely, character and conduct. If Dr Rashdall will admit this proposition we shall discuss more profitably. Real moral judgments, then, can and should always be expressed in propositions concerning conduct or character. So long as they are axiomatic they are tautological, such as—good conduct is better than bad conduct, or, the good man is better than the bad man. As soon as they cease to be tautological, they cease to be axiomatic and are rather highly disputable; and at the best are founded upon experience of good and evil, or simply deduced from other propositions so founded.

The basis of Dr Rashdall's first argument is therefore

¹ *Conscience*, p. 43. I have, I think, heard it suggested that the statement, "Pleasure is good," is a moral axiom. If the word "good" is meant in the sense of morally good, then the statement is plainly false; it is axiomatic only if by "good" is meant "pleasant," when it becomes tautological.

narrowed to the following dimensions. It is possible to formulate tautological propositions about conduct and character, propositions which cannot be denied without breach of the fundamental law of Reason, the law that two contradictory statements cannot both be true. This is a slender basis on which to found so great an argument.

For myself, I would prefer to deduce, from my belief that good men exist and that good actions are done, a belief in the reasonable probability of the Moral Governance of the Universe. A belief, I say, not knowledge; for, if I am challenged by Dr Rashdall to say how I know that good men exist and good acts are done, I reply: I do not know it, I only believe it; and accordingly I must content myself with at the best a belief or a hope in the Moral Ruler of the Universe. That He exists and rules can never, I submit, be demonstrated with the certainty of a tautological proposition; to attempt to deduce knowledge of Him from such tautological propositions seems to me futile, no matter how moral nor how firmly founded on Reason they may be.

I turn then to the second argument. Dr. Rashdall knows in the depths of his own soul that these moral axioms are an absurdly slender, a ridiculous, thread on which to hang his momentous conclusions. Accordingly, there runs throughout his book a second argument, never explicitly stated, but frequently implied. Beside the argument from the validity or truth of the moral axioms, which I have examined, there runs the argument from the "objectivity" of real moral judgments, judgments of actual moral value. He tells us that "the belief in the objectivity of our moral judgments is a necessary premiss of any valid argument for the belief either in God, if by that be understood a morally good or perfect Being, or in Immortality."² In many other passages he insists upon this objectivity as all-important to his argument: "Can we really persuade ourselves that there is no such thing in our minds as the sense—or to speak more accurately—the consciousness of an objective duty? Is not this idea of objectivity just the most fundamental of our moral convictions?"³

How then does Dr Rashdall propose to prove the moral nature of God from the "objectivity" of our real moral judgments? He never tells us, he never states the argument explicitly.

¹ He has himself admitted that the moral axioms "are not merely comparable to the axioms of Mathematics, they are simply particular applications of those axioms." *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 147.

² *Conscience*, p. 194.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

In order to understand the nature of Dr. Rashdall's argument it is necessary to know what he means by "objectivity." In spite of the immense importance assigned to "objectivity" of moral judgments, and the frequent appearance of the word, I can find no definition of it in the smaller book. But turning to the larger treatise I find some light on this all-important question. I find: "The important thing is that we should recognise that moral judgments possess an absolute truth or falsity which is equally valid for all rational beings; and, if that is recognised, it seems most natural to ascribe them to Reason."¹ This seems to invert the procedure of the other book; instead of asking us to regard them as absolutely true or false because they are the work of Reason, he invites us to regard them as absolutely true or false and on that ground to ascribe them to Reason. But he further offers us something very like a definition of "objectivity." "The Objectivity of the moral judgment does not mean the infallibility of the individual, or even of a general consensus of individuals at a particular time and place. What is meant is that, *if I am right* in my approbation of this conduct, then, if you disapprove of it, you must be wrong."² This is the nearest approach to an attempt to define "objectivity" that I have been able to find; and it is in harmony with the passage last quoted. On another page (151) he equates "objectivity" with "universality."

It appears, then, that the "objectivity" of a moral judgment means, not that it is true or absolutely true, but that it is either true or false, absolutely and universally. The important word here is "absolutely." It would not suffice to assert that moral judgments are either true or false, for that is a peculiarity which they share with all judgments or, more strictly, with all propositions in which judgments are expressed. The important property of moral judgments claimed for them by the term "objectivity" is that they are absolutely true or absolutely false.³ If this can be shown

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 166.

² *Ibid.*, i. p. 145.

³ This "objectivity" which Dr Rashdall claims for them is, of course, not claimed as peculiar to them; it attaches to all judgments or propositions which are capable of being tested by reference to some universally accepted standard, such as judgments of length or of weight, and the "objectivity" would seem to depend upon the existence of such standards. The peculiarity of the moral judgments in this respect is that, whereas the "objectivity" of such judgments as those of length and weight is proved by the existence and universal recognition of standards of length and weight, the "objectivity" of moral judgment cannot be established in this way. Dr Rashdall's argument is an attempt to prove their "objectivity" in a different way (namely, by showing them to be "pronouncements of Reason"), and then to deduce the existence of the standards from the "objectivity" of the judgments.

to be their nature, it follows that their truth or falsity depends upon their agreement or lack of agreement with some absolute standard, some absolutely true moral proposition, some absolutely valid moral ideal; from this it would follow that some such absolutely true moral proposition or judgment, such an absolutely valid moral ideal, actually exists. If it exists, it can only exist in the mind of God; therefore, if moral judgments are "objective," the moral nature of God can be confidently inferred.

That, I believe, is an absolutely fair concise statement of Dr Rashdall's second argument. I think it is a good argument, in fact a very strong argument, if he can succeed in establishing the "objectivity" of real moral judgments (not of the so-called axioms) in the sense defined. But has he succeeded in this? How does he attempt to establish this "objectivity"? Merely by insisting that such judgments are pronouncements of Reason. This is the ground of his anxiety to overcome Emotionalism in Ethics. He is not afraid that Emotionalism may impugn the truth of his moral axioms; for he knows that tautological propositions are immune from the infection of all emotion. It is real moral judgments that he wishes thus to defend from its infection. It is with this end in view that he insists that the moral judgment is a pronouncement of Reason, and is not a mere feeling, and is not determined by feeling or emotion. This proposition is repeated again and again in both books with well nigh every possible variation of its formulation. But mere reiteration will not suffice to establish the proposition. Unless he can show that real moral judgments are pronouncements of Reason alone (whether it is called pure or practical matters not) in the same sense that the genuine moral axioms are immediately guaranteed by Reason, the whole argument falls to the ground. But Dr Rashdall hardly makes this claim for real moral judgments. He is too honest and too open-minded towards facts, too reasonable in short, to be a real and thorough-going Rationalist. Rather he tells us that "there is an element in the moral judgment which cannot be reduced to mere subjective feeling or emotion, and which must be regarded as belonging to the rational or intellectual part of our nature"¹—a proposition which no intelligent person will attempt to deny. On another page he tells us: "I have very definitely admitted that in all cases some feeling is, in part, the ground of the (moral) judgment. That being so, the judgment could not be made without the feeling."²

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 150.

² *Ibid.*, p. 151.

In face of this admission, that Reason is only an element in moral judgments and that feeling is another and necessary element or factor, it is useless to contend that they are pronouncements of Reason alone. It can hardly be contended that the "objectivity" of a judgment is established by the mere fact that Reason plays some part in the formulation or pronouncement of it; for this is true of all judgments, and it would follow that all judgments of every kind are "objective."¹ Unless Dr Rashdall is prepared to maintain this, it would seem that his second argument fails entirely. But he has one more string to his bow. "Moral judgments," he tells us, "possess a universality or objectivity. So much is involved in the very idea of Morality or duty or moral obligation."² That is to say, he maintains that the "objectivity" of moral judgments follows from the validity which he claims for these ideas or moral categories—Morality, duty, moral obligation, right, good. We must therefore briefly inquire into the meaning of the alleged validity of these categories. Let us confine ourselves to the category of duty, which seems to be the chief of them. The category or idea of duty is said to be valid; it is a distinct, ultimate, unanalysable category of thought and (in spite of its unanalysability) its validity implies or involves the "objectivity" of all judgments in which it figures. This is, I believe, the real crux of the whole matter. How then is the validity of the category of duty to be established? By asserting that it has just as much title to objective validity as any other of our ultimate intellectual categories, quantity, substance, cause, and so forth. Now I cannot myself attach any meaning to the expression, "the validity of a category or idea," if the idea in question is really ultimate and unanalysable. Only if by analysis we can discover that such an idea implies or involves a proposition can it be said to have validity; and then only if the proposition is true. Consider a moment the category of causality. What is meant by saying that this category is valid is, not that it is unanalysable, but that it involves or implies some such proposition as that every event is caused by antecedent events. And merely to assert that the category is ultimate or unanalysable or distinct does not establish the truth of this proposition. I remember that

¹ Including such "subjective" judgments as "I am not so tired as I was yesterday," or "Names are more difficult to remember than numbers," or "I am in better health than I was last year." In the formation of all such judgments Reason plays some part, but that does not render them "objective"; they remain incurably subjective.

² *Theory of Good and Evil*, p. 151.

some ten years ago Professor Karl Pearson exhorted the philosophical world to reject the idea of causation from their stock of working ideas, on the ground that even in physical science it has done its work, is now no longer useful, but misleading and obstructive, and can with great advantage be replaced by the category of correlation. And I seem to have heard that Professor Bergson, Mr B. Russell, and other distinguished philosophers have made some complaints against the same category. Also I notice that the Neo-Vitalists complain that in biology the dogma of the universal validity of the category of causation has always been and, at the present time especially, is a serious bar to progress; and I for one feel sure that only its rejection and the substitution for it of the category of purpose can open that road. The same is true of other categories; unless they involve or imply propositions, there is no meaning in asserting that they are valid; and if they do imply propositions, the proposition involved in each must stand the testing to which all propositions must be subjected before they can be accepted as true (*i.e.*, of course, if they are not tautological).

Now, the proposition involved in the category of duty is, according to Dr Rashdall's own showing, the proposition that moral judgments concerning duty are objective; and this proposition in turn involves the proposition that there exists some absolute standard or Moral Ideal of duty by reference to which the absolute truth or falsity of the proposition can be shown, or in principle could be shown.

Dr Rashdall's argument is, then, I submit, nothing more than this. He asserts the validity of the category of duty, because he feels that it is valid and strongly desires that it should be valid; but this assertion of its validity involves the assumption of the truth of the very propositions which he wishes to deduce from the assertion, namely, the objectivity of moral judgments and the existence of the absolute moral Ideal or Standard. The three propositions hang together; if one of them can be established or is accepted as a postulate, the other two follow from it. But nowhere does he offer more than a bare assertion of the truth of the first and second of them, namely, the propositions that the category of duty is valid and that moral judgments are objective.

Dr Rashdall's argument may be and has been inverted. We may start with the postulate of a Moral Ruler of the Universe, and we may legitimately deduce from this the truth of the three propositions, namely, the existence of the absolute Standard, the objectivity of moral judgments, and the validity

of the category of duty. And if it can be shown that only thus can the world, including as it does the facts of our moral life, be made intelligible, and only thus can the authority of the moral laws be maintained, then the postulate is a reasonable one to make. But by starting at the other end, as Dr Rashdall does, we cannot establish the moral nature of God; though, if we make the *postulate* that the category of Duty is valid, we may deduce it from that postulate.

In conclusion I would say that, in spite of the best will to be convinced, I can find no power to help me to such conviction in Dr Rashdall's argument. In spite of it and of the array of great names which Dr Rashdall is able to marshal upon the side of Rationalism in Ethics, I continue to believe that the account I have given of the nature of our moral judgments, as well as of our moral actions, is substantially correct. I do not maintain that Conscience is an emotion, nor that any judgments, propositions, axioms, categories, ideas, notions, or concepts are emotions or can be analysed into emotions. But I maintain that Conscience is identical with the whole moral personality, with moral character; that moral character is always a very complex mental structure, slowly built up in the individual under the influence of the moral tradition; that in it the forces which determine both action and judgment are the same fundamental conative forces which, working on a lower plane of organisation, determine our ordinary judgments and actions, namely, they are the innate instinctive tendencies which are common to all members of the human species, and which, when they operate in relatively crude and violent fashion, are felt as the primary emotions.¹ That Reason plays a part in guiding the development of moral character I do not wish to deny. Nor do I deny that it has played a great and increasing part in developing and refining the moral tradition, in purifying it from inconsistencies, and in rendering it a systematic whole. This moral tradition, which has been slowly built up during the course of not less than 10,000 years by the efforts and self-sacrifice of the best

¹ Dr Rashdall has given a definition of conscience which closely agrees with my account of it and which I find entirely acceptable: "Practically the power of deciding between right and wrong involves many emotional elements, and these are certainly included in what is popularly spoken of as Conscience. Conscience or (to speak more scientifically) the moral consciousness [or, I would suggest—still more scientifically—the moral character], may be held to include not merely the capacity of pronouncing moral judgments, but the whole body of instincts, feelings, emotions, desires which are presupposed by and which influence these judgments, as well as those which prompt to the doing of the actions which they prescribe." *Theory of Good and Evil*, i. p. 175.

men of all times, is the most precious possession of mankind. Without its influence, no man, no matter how strong his Reason nor how amiable his native disposition, can achieve such a level of moral character as could be called even a rudimentary conscience.¹ Beside the grandeur of this moral tradition, the ethical axioms propounded by Dr Rashdall, by Kant, or by Henry Sidgwick, and proclaimed by them as the highest achievements of the moral Reason, appear strangely insignificant, if not wholly worthless; for, when they are not merely tautologies, they are highly disputable propositions, and of little value by reason of their highly abstract quality. Though the moral tradition is the greatest thing we know and the most valuable thing we possess, and though it deserves our deepest veneration and solicitude, it is nevertheless incurably infected with that subjectivity so abhorrent to the Rationalist; and our business as moralists is not to disguise the fact by a cloud of words, but, recognising it, courageously to follow in the footsteps of the moral leaders of all time, endeavouring by our reason to refine and improve it a little, and by our conduct to secure for it an increasing influence upon the character and conduct of all men.

W. M'DOUGALL.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

¹ I doubt whether Dr Rashdall makes any mention of the moral tradition in either of his two books. I can find no reference to it in the index or table of contents of his larger treatise. Certainly he does not give adequate recognition to this supremely important factor of all moral life. In a large part of both treatises, what he is really combating is individualism in Ethical theory. If he had himself realised fully the part played by the moral tradition and the fact that societies rather than individuals are the bearers of this tradition, he would, I think, have spared himself much anxiety and his readers much perplexity. Whether the gradual development of the moral tradition can be "naturalistically" explained or requires for its explanation the postulate of supernatural intervention, this is a question which may be debated with some hope of reaching a decision as our understanding of the process of development grows clearer.

MIRACLE INCONSISTENT WITH CHRISTIANITY.

MISS DOUGALL.

WE know how, when Jove shook his hair and nodded, impossible things happened on earth for the benefit of his favoured suppliants; and in the great prayer in the Apocalypse of Baruch (liv.-lv.) Jehovah is thus addressed:—

“Thou alone, O Lord, knowest of aforetime the deep things of the world,

For whom nothing is too hard,
But thou doest everything easily by a nod.”

This is the first natural human hypothesis about God. It emerged early as a childish conception when the sphere of Divine activity was conceived as paltry, and became august when the human grasp of mind was enlarged. When there were many gods, each limited by all the rest, the activities of the tribal god were small because the tribal activities were small; but later the One high God, who could always easily compel all earthly agents to His will, became supremely worthy of reverence.

“The king’s heart is in the hand of Jahveh, . . . he turneth it whithersoever he will” (Prov. xxi. 1). “Isaiah the prophet cried unto the Lord; and he brought the shadow ten degrees backward, by which it had gone down in the dial of Ahaz” (2 Kings xx. 11). “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places” (Ps. cxxxv. 6).

The difficulty in accepting this conception of a God who can always do easily exactly what He wills, faces us in every victory of chaos over order, of evil over good. It is the time-honoured dilemma:—if the sorry scheme of things on earth is fashioned to God’s desire, God is not good; if God is good, He cannot be powerful enough to fashion the world to His

will. But the religious mind ceaselessly insists that God must be both all-good and all-powerful, and has devised more than one scheme of the universe with a view to resolve the dilemma.

The solution first offered consisted in explaining all welfare as the reward of virtue, all failure and misery as the punishment of offence against Deity, the Divine goodness consisting in rewarding the good and never sparing the guilty.

When this solution was perceived to be too crude, it came to be held that the miseries of the good were sent for the testing and embellishment of their characters, while the prosperity of the wicked was attributed to the kindness and longsuffering of God, who sought their repentance because, if they did not repent, He must ultimately destroy them. This was a noble conception of God's ways with men, but it was necessary to distort many facts of life in order to fit them into it; and the good, being single-eyed, will ultimately observe facts. Taking the story of Job's sorrows as a type of the misfortune common to nomad life, men naturally ask: If the character of Job was tested and ennobled by his afflictions, what effect had the proceedings of Satan, God's agent, upon the characters of the Sabeans who stole his oxen and asses and slew their herdmen? What of the triumphant sin of the Chaldeans who stole his camels and slew their drivers? And what of the servants and sons and daughters who were slain? What reason have we to believe that their sudden deaths were either the fit reward of their sins or the consummation of their characters? The drama of Job tells a story the like of which has happened a thousand times in the world's history, and men have long recognised that the afflictions that may instruct one strong soul commonly involve the crimes or misery of others. The writer of that great drama was concerned only with the problem presented by his leading character, and, wiser than many of his interpreters, he does not force the facts of inoffensive suffering into any theory that justifies God as the afflictor. He can only show the inadequacy of the religious conceptions of his day and reiterate in his own way what all saints have said, that God can impart Himself to those who seek even while their heart's question remains unanswered.

But the problem remains:—how can God, while able always to intervene “easily by a nod,” allow the faithful to call upon Him in vain? It is the failure that often meets the missionary efforts of the best men that, more than all else, refutes the doctrine that the sorrows and disappointments of the good

are always blessings in disguise. One large factor in their difficulty is precisely the Christian belief that when man is in distress it is useful to appeal for aid to the mercy of God. For the Christian especially, any satisfying conception of God must be in harmony with the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth concerning prayer. "Ask and ye shall receive," is the burden of all that Jesus said on the matter.

There is a story of a good man who travelled into the then unknown north-west of Canada with an Indian tribe, and there taught them, developing all that was best in their own religion and imparting to them all that they could understand of the Christian faith. He won their love, and they learned the simple arts of a cleaner civilisation. There grew up in the wilderness a garden of which the noblest fruits were the Christian hearts of the Indian braves and the better condition of their wives and children. It all happened, as the missionary thought, as an answer to constant and trusting prayer. But then adversity came. Hostile tribes threatened; food supply failed. He sent messengers for help to the nearest towns, and no help was sent. A little thing—a very little thing—might have turned the scale of fortune as between war and peace, food or famine, help or neglect. But, alas! although constant in prayer, firm in belief that God would in some way save, this good missionary and his disciples were finally beaten down by the enemy, and the women and children were massacred or captured. Where the light of love and Christian truth had shined, darkness closed over. The record of this man's daily prayer and ceaseless faith, with the brief jottings of all that had come upon them, was found buried deep in the earth, and with it a New Testament containing the boundless promises to faithful prayer. Whether this story be fact or fiction, is it not typical of religious tragedy? In the two thousand years since those promises were first proclaimed in Galilee, how many missionaries have thus worked and prayed and trusted, and fallen with the downfall of their life's work! It is only of the successful mission that the world takes count, because it alone can commonly preserve its records.

In the areas round the Mediterranean basin, how many countries that were once Christian have fallen or been driven back into the more "beastly ways" of lower religions? Taking the north of Africa alone, the communities which produced an Origen and an Athanasius, a Tertullian, a Cyprian, and an Augustine, must have arrived at no small degree of good living and sound thinking. There must have been many mothers like Monica: what of their prayer and faith? As

early as the third century, councils of seventy and eighty African bishops met at Carthage. Can we suppose that these fathers in God failed to pray for the Church in their native lands? What befell? Must we affirm that the harem which has succeeded the domestic hearth of Christian families in those regions is as good in God's sight?

There was a good man recently connected with an English-speaking university who had three promising boys. The parents, as the result of some crisis in their affairs, became truly religious. That their sons should lead high-minded Christian lives was their greatest desire. It cannot, of course, be asserted, in any such case, that the training given by the parents was the wisest, or the environment the best; but the parents gave themselves to prayer for wisdom and for blessing on their sons, in which others, like-minded, joined them. All the sons went to the bad. This is not a usual case—such effort is most frequently rewarded—but my point is that one such case disproves the easy belief that the disappointment of such parents was ordained of God for their good. However excellent the result on their own characters, it could not counterbalance the loss of character in the sons or the harm they did in the world.

Another theory advanced to reconcile God's power and goodness is that the counsels of God are so inscrutable that we cannot possibly know what is good and what is evil in His sight. It is therefore man's highest duty to accept all things that take place as the will of God without complaint or question. This, the Stoic virtue, is paganism *in excelsis*: it is also the religion of the good Muhammedan: it is not Christianity. True Christians have always at heart rejected this fatalism, although often rendering it lip-service. For it is obvious that man can enter into no real relationship of prayer and faith and missionary endeavour with a God who may or may not approve of any human purpose, who may or may not respond to faithful prayer.

The accumulated results of thought and observation have led multitudes to believe that if they are to preserve their faith in God's goodness and mercy they must give up the belief that He can at all times intervene miraculously in human affairs. Three further answers to our problem have been suggested, which all accept the limitation of Divine power.

One of these assumes two orders in the universe—a natural and a spiritual. The natural order, once started by God, spins on down its grooves of change without influence

from on high, while God acts only in the world of spirit, and freely gives, to those who ask Him, "spiritual" blessings. Two difficulties appear to face this easy answer. In the first place, the failure of missionary effort can hardly be called a spiritual blessing, even when it comes as the only apparent response to long and faithful prayer; for no missionary with the spirit of Christ could suppose the refining of his own soul more important than the elevation of the multitude around him. But, in the second place, it commits us to a dualism entirely unchristian. For Christianity involves a belief in God immanent in man and in nature as well as transcendent. This God is not a God who has wound up the universe like a clock and left it to go by itself. If God clothes the lily, if He fosters the whole creation groaning and travailling till it comes to triumphant sublimation, if God manifested Himself in human flesh, the order of nature cannot be exclusive of spirit.

Again, it is now frequently maintained that God works miracles in the physical sphere, but will never coerce the free will of men; and all the suffering of life is held to be caused by the sinful choice of men. At first sight this seems a most helpful solution, but it cannot, so to say, be brought to face the music of the spheres. "In the beginning," pain was born before sin. When the morning stars first sang together, the universe had become a system in which sentient choice could not be independent of physical conditions. To say that human free-will is the *only* limitation to God's interference in nature does not solve our dilemma. The doom of some of the highest efforts of man has often been sealed by a bad harvest or other natural catastrophe. Communities struck by famine or plague, by fire or flood, cannot make the same moral choice possible to them under normal conditions; and, however free we may hold ourselves to be, this same relation of physical cause to spiritual effect is part of all our life. Either the material misfortunes which necessarily paralyse much good endeavour are the direct will of God, and manifest His character, or His power of interference in lower nature, as well as in human will, must be limited. If self-limited, the limitation none the less holds good even against what we might call the wish or desire of God. For if God does not desire the spiritual welfare of every community in every time and place, He is not the Christian's God.

The last, and, as it seems to me, the only, answer which is consistent with the Christian revelation, is that God has chosen to work through nature, never performing His own

will in spite of natural sequences, but taking upon Himself the whole burden of the universe that in some way emanates from Himself. Such a universe could not be mechanical, and must be thought of as in all its parts alive and interpenetrated with spirit, but with spirit which is not God nor wholly in harmony with the transcendent Spirit of God. This spirit in nature—untamed but tameable—would be everywhere and in all things open in greater or less degree to the influence of God, manifesting His beauty. In this belief all things that have a material nature have, in their own degree, a spiritual nature; and these two natures are not two things but one thing, just as man—spirit and body—is not two but one. The spirit that is in all things and attains personality in every man, is not God, but is open to the influence of God, and when yielded to that influence becomes the perfect agent of God. So that, although we may speak of God as immanent in man and in all things, and manifest when these are wholesome and good, yet all things are the object of His transcendent love, and He is the object of the love of all things and all men; yet lover and loved are not one but two. If God so loved the world as to give it part of His own freedom, seeking from it some better thing than could be got by compulsion, if He seeks to win and foster the highest by forgoing the right to interfere or compel, He may still be believed to be the loving all-Father revealed by Jesus Christ. If He is thus conditioned, He may still be believed to be responding by ways of His own to every sentient cry, although at times no outward sign can be given to show that He does not forsake His best beloved when their cause and His lies in the dust.

With such a conception of God and His universe, prayer as taught by Jesus, in all its simplicity of childlike petition, would still be the breath of life; for nature, thus conceived, is no closed system of fixed habits or sequences; it is living and growing. But although we cannot at any time say what is possible or impossible, we are not environed chiefly by uncertainty; but so slow and orderly is development that many things are always certainly possible, *i.e.* to be calculated on as proceeding from other relations of things. Science is the knowledge of all that is calculable and reliable; it cannot deal with all that element in nature which is beyond.

Here is a linnet perched upon a twig. Science is every day learning more things that are certain about linnets and twigs, but it cannot tell us to which side the bird will flit, to which spray its little feet will next cling. Some men of

science may say that if they knew all about linnets and bushes they could certainly forecast all future flittings; but that assertion, resting upon no evidence, is not scientific. It is a theory—as much a matter of inference and interpretation of fact as any religious theory.

Science can only know anything by abstracting certain aspects for examination. By this partial knowledge the world has gone forward to cleaner and easier conditions by leaps and bounds. But science can know nothing of the whole of anything, still less of the whole of all things.

Christian faith constantly affirms that in reality spirit cannot be abstracted from matter, nor matter from spirit; that God, who must be able to know and do all that is possible, is concerned with the growth of the flower, the fall of the bird, and the cry of the child for food, no less than with the search of the soul for the unsearchable riches of His grace. It has also maintained that out of these riches, out of His own inexhaustible fund of joy, God, when He cannot consistently relieve His children, can amply compensate them for their temporal suffering.

There are few chapters in Church history more moving than the record of the pioneer life of the Pilgrim Fathers upon the harsh New England coast; but out of their sometime failures and misfortunes and sometime successes grew the simple proverb, "God always answers in the letter or for the better." This childlike jingle reflects the whole high Christian faith in petitional prayer, as the vast and splendid pageant of the morning is reflected in a drop of water that falls from the housewife's bucket on the moss of the well.

But to the observant and musing mind such a faith is impossible if it must be harmonised with the belief that God can at all times do anything that He will, "easily by a nod."

For this reason it appears to be a misfortune that a group of young Anglican clergy, in many ways progressive, should be heading a revival of faith in miracle.

In Canon Temple's new magazine, *The Pilgrim*, no less than two complete articles and some paragraphs in a third are given to the defence of miracle as thus defined: "This is indeed the only intelligible definition of miracle, viz. an act of God directly intervening in the natural order."¹ Canon Temple has himself written in the same sense in *The Challenge* and *The Oxford Magazine*. This group assert that God has performed and does perform, at certain times, marvellous acts,

¹ Canon Oliver Quick in *The Pilgrim*, Oct. 1920, p. 96

otherwise called "special interventions," or "invasions of," or "irruptions into, the natural order." They do not, indeed, claim that God can do *anything*; the recognition of some limitations has long been part of the orthodox position; but they say that the chief proof of God's activity in the world is "the irruptive action of God, such as orthodox Christianity believes to have taken place at the Incarnation, and to be repeated (or perpetuated) in the Sacramental system."¹

But as we look about us we see that it is those who have themselves felt the power of God manifested in Christ and in the Sacraments who believe, in the orthodox sense, in the miraculous nature of the Incarnation or the Sacraments; and we suspect the real belief of such people to be based, not on their belief in miracle, but upon their religious experience, which is incommunicable. On the other hand, to those who have not yet had this personal experience—and each generation in its childhood must belong to this majority—this insistence upon the miraculous nature of Christ and of the Sacraments raises the problem of God's non-interference in an acute form. As far as can be gathered, this group do not face the problem of Divine non-intervention; but it is to-day a more urgent question than ever, owing to the fact that the sense of justice and some knowledge of history are more widely diffused than ever before. Explicit or implicit in the world's mind is this question: If God's relation to us is such that at any time He could have miraculously inaugurated a new system of salvation, why were the ancient civilisations, one after the other, allowed to go down into the dust without this help? What of that brave and beautiful attempt to establish an ethical monotheism in ancient Egypt? What of the noble traits in the religion of Hammurabi, superseded by what was more base? In almost every country there is evidence of a period or periods in which a high religious ethic emerged only to be lost. Where was God's "special intervention"? Or again, since Christ came, what of the millions of men and women who have been left without the miraculous help of the Christian Sacraments? Probably the advocates of miracle would at once reply that God sent the Christ in the earliest stage of human development in which His Gospel could be received. But if God waited upon the processes of development—the long processes of physical and spiritual development—before He manifested Himself in Christ, are we not bound to believe that He chose to condition His power to save men by these very processes of natural development? It is not going much further to believe that He always

¹ Canon Temple in *The Oxford Magazine*, Nov. 6, 1920.

chooses thus to condition His power, and this is all that is maintained by those who deprecate the insistence upon miracle. The Church has gradually receded from the belief that God's power of action is unlimited. The actions of God, which by St Paul are likened to the potter's arbitrary control over the clay, are in the thought of Augustine and Aquinas represented as subservient to consistent purpose and the limitations of possibility. To maintain that God always works through the order of nature, including human nature (for man cannot be separated from nature), is thus a consistent development of orthodox doctrine.

"Artifex," in the *Manchester Guardian*, calls attention to Canon Quick's article, and remarks: "Mr Quick has what in politics is called a cross-bench mind. . . . When quite first-rate, as in Mr Quick's case, it is priceless." With such a recommendation from such high source we may fairly take his article as a consistent statement of the position. Canon Quick's contention (apparently shared by Canon Temple, as he inserts in his magazine another article which expresses the same difficulty more crudely) appears to be that unless God works miracles we should find it difficult to believe that He is active in the world, for without them we could never detect His working, or say how or when or where He worked. Put in simple language, he would seem to urge that we could never believe God sent us our daily bread through bakers if He did not sometimes send it by a raven. The bulk of Christian experience cries out against this. Most religious people believe that what is good comes from God because they believe in God and not because they have first believed in miracles. But further, it must be pointed out that all that can be seen in a miracle is the result. God cannot be detected at work. We cannot say how any miracle is performed. If we could see a dead man raised to life, we could not see God doing it, or be sure that some combination of natural processes could not have produced the result. Those who would insist that the result was a miracle would be insisting that nature is a closed system and adequately understood.

That God should be universally invading the universe everywhere, at all times, with the constant pressure of His inspiration, seems to Canon Quick to be almost equivalent to cancelling the Divine action anywhere. In this connection it may well be remembered that in the whole biological system there are no duplicates. Every living thing, vegetable or animal, is a special and particular life. Any personal care

that God bestows upon each must therefore, to meet the need, be special and particular. Our Lord, when He said that no sparrow fell to the ground without God, did not apparently mean that God exercised miraculous intervention, but that He did care for each individual sparrow. When God clothes the lilies He clothes each a little differently. It is true that His way of acting in the matter would be somewhat difficult to detect, but a high faith says, and will always say, that everything of beauty is clothed with the beauty of God, while no one thing is like another. In human life this is far more obvious. Every soul has a different experience of God. To say that God is always speaking to all men is not to say that He is saying to each the same thing, or to deny that to each soul his word is different every hour. Faith must believe that God adapts Himself to each; that for each He has a separate revelation of Himself and a separate vocation; and for each, if the revelation is rejected and the vocation neglected, God must suffer a special and particular grief. It is only in very abstract and scientific thinking, such as is a good deal of the thought of orthodox theology, that a universal activity is conceived as a vast sameness. For example, when our Lord prayed that Peter's faith might not fail, it would appear that He asked for the particular help of God. But the particular help is not necessarily miraculous help. When St Paul thanked God for the way in which the Thessalonians had received his message, is it necessary to suppose that in thanking God for a special gift of grace he imagined that a miracle had been wrought, except in the sense in which all religious life is a miracle?

The moral appeal of this advocacy of miracle is derived from the belief that without it God will come to be regarded rather as a Principle than a Personality. "The obvious danger is lest God come to be conceived simply as a meaning, an explanation, an ideal, and nothing more; lest His existence cease to be thought of as substantive and concrete altogether, and appear merely as adjectival to the world of things, because we cannot realise substantive, concrete existence except in terms of the particular and material."¹ In answer to this we would ask whether the writer of the twenty-third Psalm is describing the miraculous activities of God, or his own sense of God's personal care in every detail of his common life? If he conceived of God in His saving activity as substantive and concrete, who taught him? Was it not God Himself? The constant cry that belief in God's personal care will fade

¹ Canon Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 104. Cf. definition of miracle quoted above, p. 302.
VOL. XIX.—No. 2.

from the earth if some precise doctrine is not accepted, leaves us uninterested because of its radical unfaith in the power of God to reveal Himself to men whenever and wherever they lift up their souls. God is not passive or inert: what He teaches does not return to Him void. If, as we believe, God has revealed Himself in Christ, it is only God Himself stirring in men's hearts who can teach the meaning and force of that revelation; and to insist that we know precisely how He will do this, and to assert that He can only do it in one way, is to have small idea of the resources of the living God. Personally, I believe that whatever is truth concerning God cannot fail from the earth, because I believe that the activity of self-revelation is of His essence.

Finally, the view which I have tried to maintain does not deny any event which the Church has affirmed to be miraculous; it is the miraculous nature of the event it denies—miracle being defined as something independent of natural processes. Whether these events took place in fact or in reverent imagination is a separate question. We are so ignorant of the forces of life that no really liberal theologian would claim to know all that is possible in any aspect of life. That claim is left to those who insist that certain events, if actual, must be miraculous. All that is maintained by the liberal critics whom Canon Quick criticises is that, if Christ came in the likeness of God—if God be indeed, in love and mercy, like Christ—then something other than God's will or desire must prevent Him from effectively saving the world from all that is base and ugly and false, and that something must be the limitation of nature, because all religious experience goes to show that God is working in and through nature, including human nature. That, for some high end, He manifests Himself only in our nature, is the very pith of the doctrine of the Incarnation. That God suffers in all the evil that the process of development includes is the doctrine of the Cross. The old, pre-Christian faith in a God who at times breaks in and does all that He wills, has grown with the higher faith, as tares grow up with wheat; but as tares and wheat grow together, the difference gradually becomes plain: the one will support life, the other will not.

But the splendid ambiguity with which Canon Quick uses his word "intervention" makes it very difficult to grasp. He says: "Every time we act voluntarily and freely at all we intervene in the order of natural events and thereby influence its subsequent course. The doctrine of miracle asserts simply that God has acted in an analogous way."¹ In this sense of

¹ Canon Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

the word "intervention," everyone who accepts the revelation of God in Christ believes that God with supreme power can do and does all good things that are possible in the sphere of life, and thereby is always influencing its subsequent course. If man, being evil, knows how to give good gifts, how much more God! But how often does man know the agony of impotence to relieve or save! He stretches forth his hand, but in vain. He would give his life for the objects of his love, yet they sink before his eyes in physical or moral degeneration. The whole course of human nature, the life of Jesus Christ—if this reveal God at all—reveal Him as taking upon Himself an analogous impotence, and waiting for the intelligent co-operation of men through whose understanding and zeal He can alone accomplish His will on earth.

The analogy between God's free action and man's must be correct, or God could not have revealed Himself in the Divine Man. Man's free action is strictly conditioned by the scheme of nature, and it is impossible to conceive of God both as good and doing whatever He will "easily by a nod." Man's freedom reveals to us that God may always be acting freely, acting definitely in place and time, and yet be accepting the limitations of the nature in which He works.

We may not believe in miracle, and yet believe in the Incarnation as a particular act of God at a definite time and place—an act made possible by many generations of Jews who had sought God's friendship continually. Just because of the perfect co-operation of our Lord Jesus Christ with the Father, in intelligence and feeling and will, He was the supreme manifestation of the Divine activity on earth.

LILY DOUGALL.

CUTTS END, CUMNOR.

THE MIRACLES OF SADHU SUNDAR SINGH.

THE REV. C. W. EMMET, B.D.,

Fellow of University College and Vice-Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

THOSE who are in touch with religious movements in India have been aware of the emergence of a very remarkable personality in Sadhu Sundar Singh. He is a Sikh of high birth, who, after a period of bitter opposition to Christianity, became a convert at the age of sixteen. He at once adopted the life of a Sadhu, a wandering "holy man," without possessions or ties, whose life is from the first dedicated to the service of religion, in the narrower sense of the term. As such he has travelled in Tibet, as well as in India and Ceylon, bearing his testimony to the power of Christ.¹ Wherever he goes, crowds flock to hear him, and he has recently been addressing meetings in England, making a profound impression. In the course of his earlier journeys he met with an extraordinary series of hardships and persecutions, and his deliverances have been regarded by many as strictly "miraculous." The object of this paper is to examine the records of these events: our inquiry will cast a good deal of light on similar Biblical narratives.

I should wish to emphasise very strongly that there can be no question of the complete sincerity and *bona fides* of the Sadhu himself. These qualities impress themselves the moment one sees him and hears him speak. And all who have come in contact with him agree absolutely on this point. Nor, again, is there any doubt of the reality of his religious experiences or of his remarkable power as a preacher of the Gospel. To the writer of this paper he is in truth a "man of God," in touch with the living Spirit of Christ, and

¹ The Sadhu was born in 1889, converted in 1904, and the journeys cover the period 1908 to 1917.

one whose influence on the conversion of India to Christ is likely to be very great.

In view of this, it may seem a little cold-blooded to analyse and criticise the story of his experiences. But he himself speaks of them publicly, and the account has been given to the world in books which are widely read in India. They must be open to examination as other similar records, past and present, and any clearing of the ground in this direction will only serve to deepen the impression made by his personality. And the questions at issue are fundamental for religion. Does God help a man of special sanctity by direct miraculous interventions, or by methods which are in harmony with general natural and psychological laws? Does the form assumed by such stories in our time throw any light on similar narratives of the Old and New Testaments?

There have been several accounts published of the Sadhu's adventures.

(1) *A Lover of the Cross*, by Alfred Zahir, Sub-Warden, St John's Christian Hostel, Agra (North India Tract and Book Society, Allahabad, 1917). A revised edition, published in 1918, makes the following claim :

"The new edition is entirely different from the former in that it presents the picture of Sundar Singh's life in its natural hues. In this all danger of marring the simple beauty of his life by decking it with the borrowed plumes of charming words and bewitching style and language has been avoided. Nor has fictive imagination been given a chance to alter the narratives in order to add to their force and beauty."

A comparison of the two does not, however, show much difference in essentials, though we shall note a few points where the earlier account is toned down.

(2) *Sadhu Sundar Singh: Called of God*, by Mrs Parker (Christian Literature Society for India, Madras, etc., 1918). Here the language is far less flamboyant, and the miraculous is less strongly emphasised, but the incidents are substantially identical.

(3) *Saved to Serve*, by Alfred Zahir (C.M.S. Mission Press, Sikandra, Agra, 1917). This is an account of a visit paid by Sundar Singh to an aged Himalayan saint, and of what he learnt from him.¹

¹ Of these books, apparently only Mrs Parker's can be obtained in England. A study of his life and teaching, with an account of his mystical experiences, by Canon Streeter and Mr A. Y. Appasamy, is now in the press, and will be published by Messrs Macmillan under the title *The Sadhu*.

All these books are based on conversations with the Sadhu himself, and Mrs Parker's contains a special testimonial from him, testifying that she had been guided by the Spirit of God, "so that she had written it without any mistake."

I understand that the first reports of the miracles current in India came from travellers, and were even more exaggerated than the published stories. We find, too, that the later narratives (the 2nd edition of *A Lover of the Cross* and Mrs Parker) tend to be more cautious with regard to supernatural explanations. This is, of course, a reversal of the ordinary process, familiar to students, whereby the miraculous is usually heightened as time goes on. The explanation is obvious. So far as the West is concerned, this is a critical age, and the instinct now is to analyse and explain such stories. And the hero himself is still living: though he does not seem himself to be affected by what he would regard as "scepticism" of the miraculous, he is absolutely honest, and is ready to help his friends to get at the actual facts. He is further very much alive to the danger of sensationalism, and refuses to allow himself to be exploited by the curiosity of those who are merely attracted by tales of the supernatural.

It may be pointed out that, though the source of most of the stories is the Sadhu himself, he never kept any diary or written record of his travels. Further, he is soaked in the New Testament, and particularly the Gospels. The influence of these on the record of his experiences is obvious, and affords a good parallel to the influence of the Old Testament on the record of the life of Christ as we find it in the New.

The greater number of the extraordinary events which we shall consider fall under the head of help and deliverance coming mysteriously and ascribed to angels. The best known of these is the story of the delivery from a blind well.¹ At a village called Rasar, in Tibet, the Sadhu was arrested for preaching heresy, brought before the Lama, and thrown into a well used for the execution of prisoners. It was full of dead men's bones, and was completely closed by a heavy iron gate above, which was padlocked. "For three whole days he lay agonising with hunger and writhing with pain in the whole body, and specially in the arm, which had been intentionally fractured by a blow from the sentry's club." Suddenly during the night he heard the gate opened and found a rope let down. With difficulty he was pulled up; the gate was padlocked and

¹ See *A Lover of the Cross*, pp. 61 ff. (references are to the 1st ed., except when otherwise stated).

his deliverer suddenly disappeared. "I greatly marvelled at this mysterious help, but I now know that it was only one of the many instances in which Jesus Himself came to save me." His helper touched his broken arm and it was healed instantaneously. The Sadhu hobbled to the village and, when his escape became known, was at once rearrested, like the Apostles on a famous occasion. The Lama, "reddened to the ears with offended dignity, and frothing at the mouth with anger," inquires who has had the key, since the padlock could be opened by no other means than its own key. It is found hanging to the Lama's own girdle, and, "overawed with superstitious fear," he entreats the Sadhu to depart at once.

In the later accounts the "three whole days" are omitted, being toned down to "on the third night." The sense of time must obviously be vague under such conditions. The 2nd edition of Zahir mentions the fractured arm, but Mrs Parker only speaks of it as "injured,"¹ in which case a sudden cure under the stress of strong emotional faith is more intelligible. In both the later accounts Jesus becomes simply "a friend," "the man," or "his deliverer." I have, however, heard the Sadhu, when telling the story, insist strongly that it must have been an angel; he seemed much impressed by his sudden disappearance. Most readers will agree in surmising that either some secret sympathiser stole and replaced the key, or else the Lama himself secretly delivered the prisoner. He would have the haunting suspicion that this might really be "a holy man" after all, and was evidently glad to find an excuse to send him away, if not unharmed, at least alive. The parallel with the story of the imprisonment of Paul and Silas at Philippi, and still more with the deliverance of Peter by the angel,² is obvious, and we shall not be overstating the case if we say that it is at least probable that here too the explanation is to be looked for along the lines of human agency.

There are other stories of the same type which it is hardly necessary to repeat in detail. Sundar Singh is banished from villages, left starving and alone in the jungle; mysterious hands bring him food and drink, carry him over an unfordable

¹ "Almost broken," said the Sadhu himself at a meeting in Oxford.

² Acts xii. The story as it stands raises a grave moral difficulty. Peter is released by a special divine interposition, but the guards, who on this hypothesis are quite innocent, are allowed to be executed. It is one thing to say that God does not interfere in the course of events to prevent innocent suffering; quite another to suppose Him interposing at one moment, and then leaving others to bear an undeserved punishment which is the direct consequence of this interposition.

stream, or undo the bonds by which he has been tied to a tree.¹ Having performed their errand, the ministrants vanish as suddenly as they came. Sometimes these are definitely regarded as angels; at others, this is left to be implied, or the possibility is left open. It is, however, always sufficiently obvious that we have once more to do with unknown sympathisers, attracted by the personality and need of the Sadhu, but fearing to risk the hostility of their fellows by appearing openly. A state of exhaustion induced by prolonged meditation and fasting does not lead to accurate observation of bare fact.

Of special interest is the incident given by Mrs Parker (p. 61). Driven from a village, he takes refuge in a cave and sees a number of men approaching him with sticks and stones. When within a few yards of him they suddenly hesitate and fall back, whispering together. They then come forward and ask, "Who is the other man with you in bright garments, and many more who surround you?" The Sadhu replied that there was no man with him, but with awe the men insisted that they saw a host of bright ones standing all round the cave. Then the men besought the Sadhu to accompany them to their homes, and going with them he spoke of Christ, so that they feared and believed his words. The Sadhu then knew that God had sent His angels to protect him." There are obvious Biblical parallels,² and the incident throws a vivid light upon the attitude of mingled hostility and fear with which such a "holy man" is regarded. It also illustrates the suggestion that his release from the well was due to the Lama himself.

During the course of his wanderings the Sadhu resolved to retire into the jungle for a forty days' fast. The account of this is clearly influenced, as indeed was the actual attempt, by the Gospel narratives of the fast of Christ. In *A Lover of the Cross* (2nd ed., p. 66), the fast is definitely described as lasting "for forty days," but Mrs Parker (p. 37) makes it clear that the actual duration was quite uncertain. The Sadhu knew he would lose count of time, and tried to keep it by collecting forty pebbles and dropping one each day, but after a time became too weak to continue doing this. He tells us that during his increasing physical weakness he felt "a great

¹ In one case a gold coin is found in a cake, given him at a mission bungalow where he has received a very cold welcome. This enables him to complete his journey in comfort at a time when he was nearly at the end of his strength. (*Lover of the Cross*, p. 47.)

² In particular, we may compare the story in 3 Maccabees, where the vision of angels which terrifies the elephants is seen only by the enemies of the Jews—a very unusual feature.

quickenings of the spirit," and that "matters of intense spiritual importance were revealed to him." He was discovered in a state of exhaustion by some bamboo-cutters, and nursed back to life by the devotion of friends.

There are several adventures with animals which illustrate the well-known influence of certain "psychics" over animals. Twice he sleeps with a panther beside him, and once with a cobra, without receiving any injury. "Never to this day," he says, "has any wild animal done me any harm." On one occasion he missed his balance while crossing a *khud* and dislodged a rock, which fell on a huge cobra, crushing it to death. Three cowherd boys at once greet him as a great *rishi* or holy man, since no one has ever been able to kill this cobra or to use the path on which it lay. The villagers welcomed him warmly and listened eagerly to his message. The setting reminds us of St Paul at Malta, though there are obvious differences. In other cases of his escapes from animals, which are more parallel, the results on the witnesses are just the same.

Another story of a somewhat different type is quoted in *A Lover of the Cross* (p. 8), on the authority of a letter from a Hindu witness. "One day when we were reaping corn in the field a Sadhu [Sundar Singh] came up to us and began to preach religion. We all felt very annoyed at his interference in our work and showered some curses upon him. But little heeding our curses and threats the man went on with his talk. At this my brother took up a stone and hit the man on the head. But this good man unmindful of the insult closed his eyes and said, 'O God, forgive them.' After a while my brother who had flung the stone was suddenly caught with a splitting headache and had to give up reaping. At this the Sadhu took my brother's scythe and started reaping the corn. . . . After he had gone we noticed an amazing thing. The field where this good man has reaped has never yielded so much corn as it has this year; we have gathered two *maunds* above the average this time."

It will be noticed that, though this and the killing of the cobra are miracles attributed to the presence of the Sadhu, there are no miracles attributed to his own deliberate action or word; he is not himself a miracle-worker. In particular, there is no record of his figuring as a healer—a feature which we should certainly have expected.¹ This may fairly be

¹ I am told that the Sadhu did cure a certain boy in Ceylon, but, finding that the result was to attract popular attention away from his message to his personal powers, refused to comply with further requests for healing.

claimed as testimony to his personal humility and to the desire to avoid sensationalism of which we have already spoken.

Unfortunately, we cannot pass over in silence the account given in the book *Saved to Serve* of the interviews with the hermit. While touring through Kailash, Sundar had a fall and found himself "at the mouth of an enormous cave wherein sat a hoary old creature, something between a man and a beast. . . . Closer examination of this object revealed it to be an old man who sat with his eyes closed, as though in deep meditation. Long streaming hair covered practically every part of his body, and formed a natural covering for it. His beard was so long that it swept the floor, while his eyebrows dangled over his eyes like a screen." The Sadhu has long conversations with the hermit, and is informed that he is a convert from Mohammedanism, born 318 years ago, and converted by Jernaus, a nephew of Francis Xavier. He reads from a MS. New Testament dating from the time of Constantine, and knows twenty-one different dialects. The saints are constantly with him; "only a little time before your arrival here S. Francis of Assisi, Polycarp, and Linus were present with me in the spirit. This Linus is the real author of the world-renowned book, *The Imitation of Christ*." The Maharashi, or hermit, has a precise knowledge of the details of Sundar's life and doings, and is able to leave his body at will and travel to heaven. He narrates interviews which he has there with the son of the widow of Nain, John the Baptist, and others, and conversations between Christ, angels, Adam, Moses, and others. The animals complain in heaven, "Oh, Lord, it was Adam who sinned: why then do we also suffer death, seeing that we are innocent?" (Someone seems to have been studying Baruch or 4 Esdras.) There are revelations about the near approach of the end of the world, the day of Judgment, and the Millennium, all connected with the Great War. Christ constantly travels about in England in human form. The hermit also explains that the word "sin" represents his past state, but the *I*, which stands for self, has been removed, and "O, which represents the illimitable being, has come in, so that now instead of *sin*, which was my former state, *Son*, that is the Lord Jesus, dwelleth in me." It is interesting to find this Indian hermit playing upon English words and familiar with a type of blackboard lesson very popular in Evangelical circles.

It is obviously not worth while criticising the details of all this. We are in the region of sheer nonsense, and somewhat dangerous nonsense. Nor is it necessary to ask how much of

it is to be attributed to a possible cave-dweller, to the Sadhu himself, or to Mr Zahir, the writer of the book. But it is frankly to be regretted that a missionary Press in India should publish such a work. The cause of real Christianity and the final conversion of the East cannot really be advanced by such methods, however well-meaning and whatever their immediate success with the uneducated masses.¹

It is a relief to pass from this extravagance to a consideration of the Sadhu's own visions and mystical experiences, which bear the mark of sanity and reality. The story of his conversion will take its place among classical examples of such experiences. After a period of hostility, during which he attacks Christianity with great fierceness, he finds himself increasingly unhappy and begins to study the Gospels. The study develops into "a passionate devotion"; he reads words such as, "Come unto me, all that travail," "So God loved the world," and a strange voice within him seems to say, "At length thy trials are ended and thy peace is come."² According to a later account,³ he determines to put an end to his anguish, either by reaching a solution or by throwing himself under a passing train. At the decisive moment he sees a vision: "My room became suddenly lighted with a glorious light, and in the midst of it I beheld a Figure with Hands upraised. I recognised this Person at once. His hands and feet were pierced, and a crown of thorns adorned His brow. I had seen pictures of Him in some Christian books. This person looked wistfully at me and said, 'How long, yea, how long wilt thou deny and persecute me?' I heard these words and fell down to worship Him, and confessed my sins."

No doubt here, as in similar cases, there is much which might be said as to the distinction between the underlying spiritual reality and the outward form in which the experience is clothed. The question may also arise how far subsequent reflection on this experience has coloured the Sadhu's recollection of what he actually felt at the time. It will

¹ Mrs Parker glides somewhat cautiously over the Sadhu's relations with the Maharishi of Kailash, and quotes a warning that common interpretations can never disclose the meaning of the visions, since the saint has to clothe his ideas in language which cannot be taken literally. But this does not really ease the situation. Zahir's book is not written as an allegory or a record of "imaginary conversations," but as an account of actual psychic experiences and revelations. The Sadhu is inclined to depreciate the importance that has been attached to this incident.

² *Lover of the Cross*, 1st ed., p. 20.

³ *Ib.*, 2nd ed., p. 31. Mrs Parker mentions the vision briefly, and says nothing about either of the voices.

have been remarked that here the earlier account is the shorter and less detailed. The words "How long wilt thou deny and persecute me?" have clearly been influenced by the narrative of St Paul's conversion; in speaking of his early life as a persecutor the Sadhu constantly brings out the parallel, and uses language derived from the Epistles and the Acts. It is possible, then, that the impression of the words has formed itself in the Sadhu's mind as the result of his meditations (we note, of course, the parallel with what probably happened with the writer of the Fourth Gospel), or else that they really were part of the conversion-experience, mediated by his previous study of the New Testament. We have just the same alternatives with regard to St Paul's mission to the Gentiles, the consciousness of which it has been common to suppose was really subsequent to his conversion, while Loisy and others now regard it as strictly synchronous. We may hope that some of those who have been in close touch with Sundar Singh may be able to throw some light upon the extent of the original experience. It ought, *e.g.*, to be possible to verify the determination to commit suicide, of which the 1st edition of *A Lover of the Cross* says nothing.

But, apart from the details, if a new life and the enhancement of the personality are the tests of conversion, here is a conversion beyond cavil, a conversion to be ascribed, as is that of a Paul or an Augustine, to the living Spirit of Christ, working through whatever channel.

In other cases we seem to have to do with mystic experiences in which the Sadhu's vivid sense of the inner Divine companionship projects itself into the impression of a "Companion" walking by his side. A man with a lamb thus accompanies him for some way, speaking "words of wisdom and admonition," and suddenly disappears, lamb and all. "I am fully persuaded that he was some angel of God who had been sent for my instruction."¹ A similar story² reminds one strongly of the walk to Emmaus.

Again, on the principles of religious psychology we shall have no difficulty in accepting the very impressive accounts of the Sadhu's joy and inner peace of mind under intense suffering. Nailed³ on a flat board, his body covered with leeches, and hanging in agony all through the night, "he was quite happy and spent the time singing hymns of praise and glory to God." This is only one example of many, and

¹ *Lover of the Cross*, p. 37.

² *Ib.*, p. 66.

³ "Nailed," so Zahir. Mrs Parker, p. 38, "fixed . . . in stocks."

illustrates in a familiar way the power of a strong emotion to inhibit pain. The appearance of the Sadhu presents the health and vigour which we should expect to find in one who has discovered the joy and peace of the Divine companionship. There are, again, few better examples of the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount and the power of the Gospel in action than the Sadhu's habit of "non-resistance" when faced with insult or violence, and the resulting converting power of genuine love.

We have, then, in all this the opportunity of studying a contemporary example of the way in which the popular mind reacts to an impressive personality which seizes its imagination. We can watch the actual working of the belief in the miraculous as it produces this series of stories on the borderline between the normal and the supernatural. There seems no reason to doubt that in most cases something remarkable, whether by way of coincidence or otherwise, really did happen ; it is not a case of pure fiction or myth. It is, however, obvious to the careful reader that there is nothing which cannot be explained by human agency or on the lines of the principles of modern psychology, especially in its study of the phenomena of trance, intense concentration, and auto-suggestion. But it is equally obvious that in a less critical age the stories would have received just the slight additional touches required to make them unequivocally supernatural, and that this could easily have happened during the lifetime and without the encouragement of the person chiefly concerned. Indeed, in certain circles in India this stage seems to have actually been reached. Probably the average religious reader halts between two opinions, and is ready to accept either interpretation according to the mood of the moment.

We have suggested that the incidents and the experiences before us are readily explicable by human agency and on the recognised principles of psychology. But this does not mean that we are debarred from accepting in a quite true sense the Sadhu's own explanation that it was God who guided and delivered him. The choice is not between chance and Providence, but between two ways in which God can be thought of as working.¹ Does He help or protect His servants by sending "an angel" or by the operation of His Spirit on the heart of men ? The special interposition of a supernatural agency may at first sight be attractive to some, but is it not a far grander conception to think of the Spirit of God as working through the personality of such a one as the Sadhu, and so

¹ See on this whole question Miss Dougall's essay, "God in Action," in the volume *The Spirit*, edited by Canon Streeter (esp. pp. 35-40).

drawing out the response and the latent powers of good in his fellow-men? We rejoice to see the hand of God in the courage of those unknown friends who in face of public opinion, and perhaps at considerable risk, rescue or feed him in his hour of need, and we find in what they did the answer to his prayer of faith. And, if in his mystic experiences we find an element which we attribute to the subconscious working of his own mind, we do not therefore explain them away as subjective or hallucinatory. For we do believe that "there is Some One there." The Divine Spirit "passing into holy souls maketh them friends of God and prophets," and, working within the limits of that mind of man which is His own creation, is able to thrill and touch them with the immediate consciousness of the presence of "the Beyond that is within."

C. W. EMMET.

OXFORD.

A CHRISTIAN SCEPTIC OF THE FOURTH CENTURY : SOME PARALLELS BETWEEN ARNOBIUS AND PASCAL.

MARGARET LEIGH.

WE do not often read Arnobius, but in passing over his seven books *Adversus Nationes* we miss perhaps the most interesting and original apologetic work in Latin between Tertullian and Augustine. The style has all the vigour and vividness which distinguishes the best African literature of the period; the matter is never dull or technical, though much of the argument is addressed to philosophical or semi-philosophical readers; and the text is not overweighted with quotations from Scripture. Indeed, the absence of biblical quotations, and the curious doctrine of the soul as not actually immortal but capable of immortality by grace, which Arnobius attributes to Christ himself, together with other points of doubtful orthodoxy, suggest that the book was composed in a hurry before its author had thoroughly assimilated the teaching of his new religion. The most interesting part of his work is contained in the second book, where he tries to rear a system of faith upon the basis of pessimism about human nature and scepticism about the possibility of knowledge. Not only in the general trend of thought, but also in smaller details of expression, the reader is constantly reminded of the *Pensées* of Pascal. Arnobius is a man of slighter mental calibre than Pascal, and trained in less severe studies; but he has the same moral earnestness, the same mistrust of human reason, the same tendency to doubt and passionate desire for faith. Pascal had no doubt read Arnobius; but given two men of so similar a temperament, parallel passages need not be the result of borrowing or suggestion. In the parallel between Arnobius ii. 8 and Pascal Art. xxiii. 10, Augustine is referred to, and he may be the intermediary in other cases.

The book is not systematically arranged, but the process of thought seems to be something as follows. Arnobius is impressed with the impotence and corruption of man, the feebleness of his intellect and the impossibility of any knowledge about final things, the wastefulness and purposelessness of the natural order. Consideration of all these things leads him into universal scepticism; but, finding that every action implies some kind of belief, he thinks it better to adopt a hypothesis which brings hope rather than one which brings despair, and proposes Christianity as a working explanation of the world which will make morality worth while and justify preoccupation with salvation. He frankly admits ignorance, and substitutes faith for reason. Roughly speaking, this is Pascal's position. It will be interesting to compare some passages in detail.

The impotence and corruption of man is a constant topic with both writers. Arguing against the arrogance of the Neoplatonists in supposing that the souls of men are divine, Arnobius (ii. 16) asks them to explain in what way we are so far exalted above the beasts that we scorn to be numbered with them. We are made of the same flesh and blood, we are born and die in the same way, like them our main concern in life is to get and keep our food. But we are said to excel them in reason (*ratio*). What is this reason we boast of so much? If it is merely the ingenuity which teaches us how to build houses and protect ourselves from heat and cold, we share it with birds and insects; and whereas this faculty comes to them naturally, we have only acquired it after a long period of toil and misery (ii. 17, 18.)

If men had any true knowledge of their own nature and of God's, they would never suppose that there was anything divine in the power of making baskets, swords, breastplates, and ploughshares (ii. 19), but would show their excellence in good living, which they manifestly do not (ii. 17). Superficially, the arts and sciences, geometry, grammar, logic, music, seem to be signs of the supposed dignity of man; but even these, far from being innate, as Plato imagined, are only acquired with much labour and study (ii. 19). As a counterblast to the slave in the *Meno* with his innate knowledge of mathematical truths, Arnobius (ii. 21) supposes the case of a child, offspring of a Plato or a Pythagoras, who had come to manhood in a subterranean chamber to which no sights or sounds from outside could penetrate, tended by a naked nurse who never spoke. Imagine that such a person were released at a mature age and questioned. Far from showing any knowledge

of mathematical properties, he would not understand the uses of the commonest things, or know that water is wet and fire burns, nor would he be able to produce anything but formless sounds. Instead of trailing clouds of glory, this divinely-born creature would be more brutish than the lowest of the brutes.

Arnobius is so deeply convinced of the abject state of man that he is led into a disproportionately long attack upon the Neoplatonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. His objections are partly metaphysical and partly moral. He insists upon the difficulty, familiar to students of Plato, which is involved in the "participation" of material objects in the ideas. If the soul is immaterial, how can it have any connection with the material body? How can contact with the body cause the soul to forget the knowledge it had before (ii. 26-28)? If the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be affected by anything done in the body, and morality is superfluous (ii. 29). To avoid these difficulties Arnobius supposes that the soul is of an intermediate nature (*medix qualitatis*, ii. 35), not naturally immortal, but capable of receiving immortality by the grace of God as the reward of righteousness. This odd doctrine commended itself to Arnobius because it humiliated man to his due place, and made morality supremely important and salvation the main concern of a man's life.

In another passage (ii. 37) he asks what could have been God's purpose in sending immortal souls into the world. The course of nature would have continued unchanged if there had been no race of men. What difference would it have made to the world if there had been no kings, generals, orators, professors, poets, or cooks? (ii. 38). Perhaps we are to suppose that He sent them into the world to undergo the squalors of generation and corruption (ii. 39); to lose their innocence in sin (*ibid.*); to be distracted by the bewilderments of philosophy (*ibid.*); to wring from the earth a bare living by the sweat of their brow, while all other creatures are fed and clothed without toil (ii. 40); to seek distraction from their labours in the cruelties of the amphitheatre and the immoralities of the stage (ii. 41, 42).

We have not to seek far for similar passages in the *Pensées*. "We need not," says Pascal (Art. i.), "have a very exalted intelligence to realise that there is no real and abiding satisfaction to be had in this world; that all our pleasures are but vanity; that our misfortunes are infinite, and that in the last resort the death which threatens us at every moment must inevitably, within the space of a few years, force us to make the horrible choice between eternal annihilation and eternal

torment." In another passage (Art. xvi. 11), "Man is only a reed, the feeblest thing in nature. . . . It needs not the whole world to arm for his destruction; a vapour, a drop of water, is enough to kill him." Everything in nature demonstrates the truth of the doctrine of original sin.

Arnobius' theory of the soul as intermediate between mortality and immortality suggests several passages in the *Pensées* in which Pascal speaks of man as being half way between two extreme states (Art. xvi.)—that he occupies an intermediate position between angels and brutes, and in consequence his attitude must be a mean between despair and pride (Art. iv.).

Not only the misery of man, but the purposelessness of nature, is food for the pessimism of Arnobius. Apart from the problem of evil and pain, which he very wisely does not attempt to solve, and the dilemma in which it places everyone who believes in a God who is at once good and omnipotent, he is puzzled by the apparently useless multiplication of natural kinds (ii. 59)—doubtful whether God could have made noxious insects, such as locusts, centipedes, and cockroaches (ii. 52). "Why," he asks, "when it would have been better for us to receive light by several eyes, so as to guard against the risk of blindness, have we only two?" What useful purpose is served by flies, spiders, thorns, tares? Why should there be so many varieties of corn? (ii. 59).

The argument from design, which can never have convinced anyone but a born optimist in easy circumstances, would have brought little satisfaction to Arnobius, nor did it bring any to Pascal. He says (Art. xiv. 1) that it is useless to tell persons without faith (*i.e.* who are not convinced already) that they have only to contemplate the least things around them to see God revealed. Try to prove the existence of God by the course of the stars and planets, and they will only think that the proofs of Christianity are remarkably feeble.

The scepticism of Arnobius is complete. "What," he asks (ii. 7), "are we able to know by our own power, even if all the ages were given up to research? We whom some unknown and envious power has made so blind and arrogant that, though we know nothing, we completely deceive ourselves, and are puffed up with the idea of our own wisdom? Can anyone explain the mystery that baffled Socrates in the *Phædrus*—the nature and origin of man with all his multiplicity and contradictions, the purpose of his creation, the nature of his creator, his function in the world, the reason of his subjection to countless evils? Can anyone explain whether we

evolved from the slime like worms or were moulded by the hand of a creator; whether our real life is passed in sleep or in wakefulness; why our hair becomes grey gradually and not all at once?" He jeers at the eagerness of philosophers to assert their own dogmas and contradict anyone else's, although only one of the various opinions can be true. "It is all lost labour to bring forward an opinion as if it were knowledge, or to maintain a doctrine which, even it were true, is capable of being overthrown, or to take as true something which is perhaps false and no better than an illusion" (ii. 57). He challenges philosophers to explain the simplest natural phenomena, and justifies scepticism as the only possible attitude for a reasonable man. "What is there blameworthy in being ignorant of anything, or in admitting your ignorance without any affectation of knowledge? Which is the more open to ridicule—the man who professes ignorance of some obscure question, or the man who claims to have certain knowledge of things that transcend human conceptions and are wrapped in mystery?" (ii. 51).

Arnobius understands the impossibility of absolute scepticism, and realises that the simplest practical action is based on some assumption. No sailor, he says (ii. 8), undertakes a voyage without believing that he will return home; no farmer sows without expecting to reap; no general joins battle without the hope of victory. All philosophers (ii. 9) believe in their own theories, in the *ipse dixit* of a master; even the sceptics have faith in Carneades, and inconsistently believe their own doctrine of universal doubt. Since it is clear that we cannot live without assumptions of some kind, Arnobius urges his readers to stake everything upon the hypothesis of hope. If the authority of Plato or Pythagoras is worth following, why not Christ's, who promises eternal life? (ii. 11). These promises refer to the future, and things yet to come admit of no proof. "Is it not better sense," he says (ii. 4), "when confronted with two alternatives equally doubtful, to choose that which offers some hope rather than that which offers none? For if what is alleged to be at hand turns out to be without foundation, our mistake involves no danger; but if in due course it proves to be truth indeed, we shall suffer the greatest loss of all—I mean the loss of salvation." Let us then simply admit our ignorance of ultimate questions, and substitute faith for reason, believing the promises of Christ (ii. 60).

The parallels in Pascal include some of the best-known passages in his book. "A reasonable man must inevitably put the matter to himself thus: 'I do not know who has sent me into the world; I do not know what the world is, nor

what I myself am. I am in a terrible state of ignorance about all things. I do not know what is my body, what are my senses, what is my soul, or even that part of me which thinks what I am saying. I see the awful spaces of the universe which close me in on every side, and I find myself fixed in one corner of this vast expanse without knowing why I am placed in this spot rather than in another, or why the short span of my life has been allotted to this point rather than to any other in the infinite series which has preceded me or will follow me. . . . All that I know is that I must soon die; and least of all do I know the nature of that death I know not how to escape. I know not whence I come, nor whither I go; I only know that when I leave this world I shall fall for ever either into nothingness or into the hands of an angry God, without knowing which of these two conditions will be my lot for all eternity. This is my state, full of misery, weakness, and obscurity' (Art. i.). Again, at the beginning of the same article, he praises the Christian religion because it teaches that men are in darkness and in alienation from God, who has hidden Himself from their knowledge, and can only be found by those who seek Him with all their hearts. The war between Pyrrhonists and dogmatists will last as long as humanity itself (Art. xxii.). Everyone must take sides, for neutrality is Pyrrhonism *par excellence*. And yet either alternative seems unreasonable. It is absurd to claim certain knowledge when the smallest shock makes us let go our hold: on the other hand, no one has ever been a consistent practical Pyrrhonist. Would you have us doubt that we are awake, that we are being pinched, that we are on fire, that we exist, even that we doubt?

There is nothing left to us but to act on probabilities, as all the world does. "If we ought to do nothing for the uncertain, we ought to do nothing for religion, which is not certain. But how many things, voyages, battles, are undertaken in spite of the uncertain issue!" (Art. xvi. 85).

It is uncertain whether the soul is immortal or not. And yet it is our first interest and our first duty to enlighten ourselves on this question, because the whole conduct of our lives depends upon the answer we give. "The immortality of the soul is a thing which touches us so profoundly that a man must have lost all feeling if he is not interested in knowing the truth about it. All our thoughts, all our actions, will take such different courses according as we have eternal goods to hope for or not, that it is impossible to make any reasonable advance without keeping in view this point which ought to be

our ultimate objective" (Art. i.). The chance of losing eternal salvation is too great to risk, even if it were infinitely small. We are forced to choose between the yes and no of God's existence; to proclaim ourselves neutral is to vote with the noes. If we say yes and win, we win everything; if we lose, we lose nothing. But if we say no and lose, we lose everything. The wise man, since he is forced to choose, will obviously choose yes. This famous passage (Art. ii.), too long to quote, is a development of the idea in Arnobius. The inevitableness of the choice is more clearly brought out, and characteristic use is made of the mathematical conception of infinity, which adds force to the argument. The wager has often been objected to as so much sordid calculation of gain and loss, possibly because its critics have been put off by a candour and clearness of thought a little disconcerting to those who prefer indefiniteness in religion, and have given a narrow interpretation to the "eternal goods" (*biens éternels*) to be hoped for. After all, Pascal's argument is only a more closely reasoned version of a modern writer's definition of faith as the resolution to stand or fall by the noblest hypothesis—a definition in which the idea of staking all on something uncertain is present, though less baldly expressed.

Attention has been drawn to some striking resemblances in method between Arnobius and Pascal: to attempt a criticism of this method would be outside the scope of a short article. I would only say in conclusion that an apology for Christianity based upon Pascal would have a special power with the younger generation at the present time. Most of us are no longer satisfied with the facile explanations of the world and human nature given by neo-Hegelians and Liberal believers in progress. The melancholy experience of the last five years has brought disillusionment. We want to face the facts, and have a theory, if there is such a thing, that will fit them. We do not want a theory that flatters our vanity by assuring us that we are naturally disposed to good or capable of understanding everything, because such a theory does not seem to fit the facts. After all the triumphs of humanity and enlightenment, we are not much nearer the solution of the problems which matter. If religion is not to be merely an ostrich attitude to life, it will have to take account of these facts, and base its apologetic on scepticism and to a certain extent on pessimism, and in so doing it will blunt the edge of many of the objections to Christianity.

MARGARET LEIGH.

CATHOLICISM AND CIVILISATION.¹

G. G. COULTON, M.A.

MR BELLOC here, within the space of scarcely more than a dozen review articles, covers all European history from the Christian era to the Reformation; and thence, more briefly, down to our present day. His main thesis, repeated more than once in practically the same words, is that "Europe will return to the [Catholic] faith, or she will perish. The Faith is Europe. And Europe is the Faith" (pp. 6, 321, 331).

This plea has been commended to us by German historians with a great show of documentary evidence, which will seldom bear verification. Mr Belloc gives no references and seldom appeals to documents. His very first pages go so directly to what is really the root of every discussion between Catholic and non-Catholic, that it is worth while to quote from them at some length. This first chapter is headed, "The Catholic Conscience of History," and it begins:

"I say the Catholic 'conscience' of History—I say 'conscience'—that is, an intimate knowledge through identity: the intuition of a thing which is one with the knower—I do not say 'The Catholic Aspect of History.' This talk of 'aspects' is modern, and therefore part of a decline: it is false, and therefore ephemeral: I will not stoop to it. I will rather do homage to truth and say that there is no such thing as a Catholic 'aspect' of European history. There is a Protestant aspect, a Jewish aspect, a Mohammedan aspect, a Japanese aspect, and so forth. For all these look on Europe from without. The Catholic sees Europe from within. There is no more of a Catholic 'aspect' of European history than there is a man's 'aspect' of himself. Sophistry does indeed pretend that there is even a man's 'aspect' of himself. In nothing does false philosophy prove itself more false. For a man's way of perceiving himself (when he does so honestly and after a cleansing examination of his mind) is in line with his Creator's, and therefore with reality: he sees from within. . . . A Catholic, as he reads [the story of Europe], does

¹ *Europe and the Faith*, by H. Belloc (Constable, 1920: 7s. 6d. net).

not grope at it from without, he understands from within. . . . He is not relatively right in his blame, he is absolutely right. . . . I say again, renewing the terms, The Church is Europe; and Europe is the Church."

Let us admit freely that there is some real truth here, only underlining for both parties that all-important parenthesis, "*When he does so honestly and after a cleansing examination of his mind.*" But in this absolute form of a self-evident proposition in which Mr Belloc states his thesis, it lends itself too easily to Dr Johnson's famous parody: "Who drives fat oxen should himself be fat." Superficial resemblances do not make for real comprehension; and the Catholic may be hypnotised by the mere superficialities which he has inherited from his past. It is true that much which is familiar to him becomes comprehensible to others only after patient study and by a strong effort of imagination; a good deal, perhaps, is never understood. But it is equally true that the reckless Catholic understands the Middle Ages no better than the reckless Protestant; he suffers from what Mr Belloc rightly stigmatises as "the fatal habit of reading into the past what we know of its future" (p. 277). Because such a Catholic has been born and bred among the same words as his remote ancestors, he vainly imagines himself to be living among the same things; and though, in the schools, he could pass a far better examination in these things than his adversary, yet, in the face of realities, he is heavily handicapped by the ignorance of his own ignorances. Mr Belloc, for instance, appeals to Justin Martyr (p. 78): "He was as near to the Crucifixion as my generation is to the Reform Bill—and he gave us a full description of the Mass." Yet what Justin actually describes is a service far more nearly resembling an ultra-Protestant Communion than the modern Roman Mass; we may, of course, read all kinds of other things into it as a pure flight of fancy; but, so far as "full description" goes, Mr Belloc writes like a man who has never seen Justin's actual words. No doubt he has; but the present hypnotises him; he thinks inevitably (when he thinks carelessly) in terms of the modern Mass, the only conception of the Eucharist which he has ever really grasped. Even well-informed Roman Catholics naïvely take for Protestant innovations a good many things which Protestants have inherited from the Middle Ages; and it is difficult to say which is more mistaken, the modern Catholic who believes he is living as he would have lived in the thirteenth century, or the sceptic who boasted that he "knew nothing of the ages which knew nothing." The subtle tempta-

tions to exaggerate Catholic continuity may sometimes prove even more fatal than the grosser delusions of anti-clerical historians.

And there is another Catholic disability which is even more frequently ignored—that of comparative Bible-ignorance. The most distinguished University professors in that communion, men in Holy Orders, sometimes fail to recognise quite familiar phrases from their own Vulgate.¹ The very President of the present Papal Commission for the Correction of the Vulgate Text has not only blundered thus over well-known Pauline passages, when met with in other contexts, but has actually committed himself to ludicrous mistranslations of common Latin words occurring in the Vulgate, such as *præco*, *expers*, *consummare*. The whole story of this Vulgate revision is, indeed, almost incredible. Charles the Great, with Alcuin's help, did what no Pope or Council had attempted during the four centuries since Jerome, and produced as good a text as the circumstances permitted.² Yet the negligence of the higher ecclesiastical authorities suffered rapid contamination of these good texts; and, after more than four centuries again, we find Roger Bacon protesting to Clement IV. that a thorough revision of the Vulgate was one of the crying needs of the day. He complained that even the greatest of his fellow-philosophers, such as Aquinas and Albertus Magnus, were partially at the mercy of corrupt texts; and that the fitful efforts of his contemporaries (for the Friars had brought new life into Bible-study) had only made confusion worse confounded. "I cry unto God and unto your Holiness concerning this textual corruption; for you alone, under God, can bring a remedy. . . . For, if the letter be false, then are both literal and spiritual senses falsified."³ But, even if Clement had lived longer, he would have done nothing effectual. The only really scientific "correctorium" of the Middle Ages was produced by a private scholar of Bacon's school; and it exists now in very few MSS. When, long after the invention of printing, Cardinal Ximenes attempted a revision, this was a great step forward. The first official Papal edition came out in 1590; it was commended solemnly to the faithful, under anathema, as the only true text; yet in 1592 a fresh edition was published by Clement VIII., with equal solemnity, differing in more than 3000 places

¹ I may refer for details to the Appendix to the 2nd edition of my *Medieval Studies* (1st series) and to my *From St Francis to Dante*, 2nd edition, p. 356.

² See S. Berger, *De l'Histoire de la Vulgate en France* (Paris, 1887), pp. 3 ff.

³ *Opus Tertium*, ed. Brewer, pp. 92 ff. The Dominican Denifle, perhaps the most learned medievalist of our day, confessed the justice of this criticism.

from its predecessor. "From 1592 to our own day, scarce any attempt has been made to revise the true text of the Latin Bible; and the Vulgate, even at the present moment, is the worst published and least known book in Latin literature."¹

Although, then, a considerable Bible-ignorance is common to the Roman Catholic Church of Bacon's day and of our own, yet it puts the modern Romanist at a great disadvantage in studying his forefathers. For a considerable number of exceptional men, like St Bernard, knew the Vulgate, and thought in terms of the Vulgate, as truly as Bunyan possessed the letter and the spirit of our English version. It might be argued, indeed, that the *élite* of really educated and earnest medieval ecclesiastics knew their Bible, as a whole, better than their modern representatives. And, beyond this, a great deal of medieval thought—even legal and political—was based upon Biblical words and ideas which may not always have been recognised as directly Biblical by those who used them. Therefore, although the enormous majority of the faithful laity, and even a majority of the priesthood, were more ignorant of the sacred text than it is easy for us to conceive,² yet Bible-ignorance on our part is almost as fatal to the complete comprehension of those people as our historical ignorance would be to a comprehension of their historically-ignorant minds.

And this is a still worse disadvantage when we attempt to compare medieval with modern religious thought, and to estimate the social significance of post-Reformation developments. Mr Belloc, therefore, is no judge, but simply a passionate advocate, when he tells us of early Protestantism that "for authority it could find nothing but a printed book, a translation of the *Hebrew* Scriptures."³ He shows astounding ignorance of familiar Pauline texts in contending: "It is important to remember that [the ordinary Roman of from A.D. 190 to 270] would never have regarded the legal distinctions between slave and free as a line of cleavage between different kinds of men. It was a social arrangement and no more" (p. 58). Writing under these limitations, he misses a great truth which was plain to Michelet, that the Englishman or Scot, who has so often been ready to go everywhere "*avec sa Bible et son Anglaise*," has found in these two things, if nowhere else, enough spiritual and domestic comfort to fill his whole life. The Catholic is at least as much tempted to

¹ Berger, *l.c.*, p. 16: this was written in 1887.

² See M. Deanesly, *The Lollard Bible* (1920), especially chapter vi.

³ P. 311; italics are mine; cf. p. 323.

ignore what the Bible has done for society, as we are tempted to undervalue the Church.

It is difficult for us to conceive the horror with which even so broad-minded a scholar as Sir Thomas More regarded any revolt against the only Church he knew. To him, heresy seemed essentially subversive of all society, civil as well as religious; he was convinced that the triumph of Lutheranism would spell not only damnation in the next world but bankruptcy and barbarism in this.¹ Therefore even this extraordinarily broad-minded, learned, and humane man thought the existing penal laws not severe enough; he had already done God service by burning heretics, and was ready to burn as many more as should be necessary. If they should multiply beyond the control of sword and faggot, if heretics should ever be bold and numerous enough to take up arms in self-defence, More had no doubt of the issue; the orthodox would arm themselves and exterminate them. All this was natural enough in More, who, with all his greatness and saintliness, was a man of his time. When Mr Belloc boasts that "the sword fits the hand of the Church, and Catholicism is never more alive than when it is in arms" (p. 297), here again we make allowance for his mood; he speaks loudly to encourage himself. But it is very difficult to understand how he, with all the history of the past four centuries to instruct him, can write almost as More would have written: "The Reformation is simply the turning back of that tide of Roman culture which, for 700 years, had set steadily forward and had progressively dominated the insufficient by the sufficient, the slower by the quicker, the confused by the clear-headed" (p. 294). He is here claiming ground which the clear-headed Newman took care not to claim;² nor does he, so far as I can see, make the least attempt to justify this tirade by any historical evidence except cheap, vague, and tedious abuse of Germany, and by a strangely perverse enumeration of Roman and non-Roman populations to which I shall presently return. He practically ignores Christ's own test: *By their fruits ye shall know them*. He constantly exhorts us to use our imagination: let us for once appeal to his own. Suppose a visitor from another planet to go round the Western world (including, of course, the two Americas) in order to discover which of these populations, four centuries ago, had broken away from God's direct guidance, had ceased to obey God's Vicegerent on earth, had committed themselves to a revolt of barbarism

¹ More's *English Works*, 1557, pp. 866 c, 870 c, 901 b, 992 b.

² See especially No. VIII. of his lectures on *Difficulties felt by Anglicans*.

against culture, and had been suffering all these centuries from moral and spiritual anarchy. Would not our visitor's first difficulty be to find any obvious and decisive symptoms of this barbarism? and, if we compelled him to judge between population and population, would he always put the Catholics on the better side?

Nor need we appeal only to the imagination; for we have historical facts. In all the things that matter most in life (leaving the disputed point of religious faith aside), did post-Reformation France gradually outstrip, or did she fall behind, England, in comparison with what those two countries had been under a single faith? Do not the 5th and 8th of Voltaire's *Letters on England* express real and serious inferiority on the French side? And, if these contrasts are no longer true in our own day, does the France of our day still hold to the Faith of the Ancien Régime? Mr Belloc, turning away from this and other equally obvious questions, asks us to accept a theory paradoxical in itself, and supported by assertions partly only doubtful, partly quite untenable. For him, the main significance of the past nineteen centuries is that of Roman civilisation; the nations of "ancient Roman stock" were clear-headed and civilised; the rest were muddle-headed and barbarous; the Reformation was a revolt of these barbarous masses against their natural masters; and the very existence of modern Protestantism is an open sore which civilisation can no longer tolerate.¹ The one disaster which turned the scale in that revolt was the defection of Britain. This, however, was an "accident" (p. 285). Ireland, though not of ancient Roman stock, remained true to the Pope; but this, again, was "an accident, inexplicable or miraculous" (p. 27). Even the Greek Schism, for which such obvious theological reasons can be given, was "an accident, mainly geographical" (p. 290). That Poland, with still less Roman civilisation than Ireland, should be among the few Catholic populations of to-day, seems to pass even this facile explana-

¹ Except in so far as a few of them may serve the purpose of drunken helots; or, rather, of a prey for the Catholic eagle to whet his beak upon. Spain and Portugal "did not enjoy the religious wars which revived France; and it may be urged that Spain would be the stronger to-day had it fallen to her task, as it did to the general populace of Gaul, to come to hand-grips with the Reformation at home, to test it, to know it, to dominate it, to bend the muscles upon it, and to re-emerge triumphant from the struggle" (p. 298). One of the great enemies of the Faith is "the indifference which is always common to a society long and profoundly Catholic and ignorant of heresy, or, having conquered heresy, ignorant at any rate of a struggle for the Faith" (p. 307).

tion of accident or miracle; I cannot find that Mr Belloc makes any real attempt to account for it.

The arguments by which he strives to prove that England is of ancient Roman stock are often very inconclusive; but this is a point which will interest most readers far less than it interests Mr Belloc. The real crux comes when he attempts to explain the "accident" of the English Reformation. He confesses, of course, to a good deal of corruption in the Church; but he writes as one who cannot realise, even remotely, the comparative forces of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, either here or on the Continent. His choice of the demand for communion in both kinds as a typical protest, and the proof he builds upon it of the absence of "any philosophical driving power behind heresy" (p. 275), would suffice in itself to prevent our taking his picture of the medieval Church seriously. Fortified with this and similar preconceptions, he is able to convince himself that the bankruptcy of the Ancien Régime in religion had little to do with the English Reformation. This revolt he traces to three peculiar causes, of which the second (which he admits to be of minor importance) seems merely doubtful. His two main causes seem worse than doubtful. Stated in the loose and rhetorical language which Mr Belloc affects, and appealing not only to a religious party but also to the present discontents of the proletariat,¹ they have a superficial plausibility which vanishes under that "special attention" which the author claims for them (p. 300).

The first cause is, that the English "squires had already become too powerful"; "an oligarchy" had acquired "considerable power over the Courts of Law and over the soil of the country"; "a rich avaricious class was already empowered to act in Britain." This class was "tainted with atheism" (pp. 301-303). But who are the men whom Mr Belloc here discredits under the insidious designation of squires and oligarchs? Does he mean *all* the English landlords? or the greater landlords only (*i.e.* the barons)? or only those who stood between the baron and the yeoman—the Squire Westerns and the Squire Pastons? If he means *all*, his generalisation is patently false; the landowners of England had been more truly an oligarchy in earlier centuries, and had had more power over the soil and the law courts, than under the Tudors. If Mr Belloc means the *barons* only, the same

¹ With which, it may be well to explain, I sympathise as strongly as Mr Belloc; I only repudiate his diagnosis of the causes and his suggested remedy. He is practically developing William Cobbett's well-worn thesis, but without that downright farmer's excuse for a narrow view.

objection holds good. If he means the third class, the simple squires and smaller knights of the shire, he must produce some sort of historical evidence for his contention. Nobody who has studied the Paston Letters can imagine that those Norfolk squires had the same power in the law courts as the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk and Lord Moleyns; indeed, their failure to get legal protection and redress against the most obvious injustices of those great men is one of the common-places of social history. They were at an equal disadvantage in questions of power over the soil or the tenantry. Their class constituted far less of a powerful oligarchy, in any true sense, than William the Conqueror's lords, or the barons who rose against John and Henry III. Their wealth was not comparable to the wealth of those barons. Their atheism is simply a flight of Mr Belloc's fancy; we find far more infidelity in the great centres of Italian culture, and at the University of Paris, than anywhere in England. That, indeed, is another obvious difficulty which Mr Belloc simply ignores; the hotbeds of pre-Reformation heresy were far less the "barbarous" districts upon which he would fasten the guilt of the Reformation than the centres of European life and thought—Tuscany, Lombardy, Languedoc, and the great cities of the Rhineland, with their unbroken centuries of Roman and medieval civilisation; together with universities like Paris and Oxford, Bologna and Padua. In England, London and most of the great cities were Lollard centres; while the pro-Catholic rebellions were confined to the far West and North (always the most barbarous parts), and to Lincolnshire, which had less of Roman culture than the counties which sent their contingents to support the King. Where Mr Belloc, again, talks of the Reformation as being the sort of thing to affect "certain mountain valleys in Switzerland" (p. 285), he is at variance with the plainest facts. The cities of Switzerland welcomed the new ideas; Catholicism has survived mainly in the mountains. Therefore, even though his classification of Roman and non-Roman populations were far more accurate and less arbitrary than it is, the logical conclusion would be very different from that which he draws. We should be compelled to decide that Catholicism is a delicate creed suited only for peculiar conditions; barbarism bluntly revolts against it, and the highest culture pays it lip-homage, but smiles. Mr Belloc's peculiar thesis does less real justice to his Church than the more reasonable of the Protestant theories, which always allow to the Roman Catholics an honourable place *inter pares*.

No less mistaken is his second main cause of the Reformation—Tudor despotism. The “New Monarchy” in England was only despotic in comparison with later Plantagenet monarchy; it was far less so than that of orthodox France. The English were not tricked or bullied out of their faith by Henry VIII.; and their change of religion is not answerable for present social and economic inequalities. Those tendencies against which we are struggling to-day are far older than the Reformation; and Henry’s breach with Rome was popular in two senses: first, that many had hoped for it long before he was born, and secondly, that, when the crisis came, far greater numbers were perfectly willing to stand by and see the change accomplished. Professor A. F. Pollard and Mr H. A. L. Fisher have brought this out so plainly that no man writing in the year 1920 has any right to ignore their evidence without producing a single rebutting reference or quotation. While Continental princes had great standing armies to enforce their will, Henry had only a bodyguard of a hundred archers.

It only remains to note one more of Mr Belloc’s “causes,” which, however, to do him justice, he does not class with these other two as absolutely essential to our comprehension of the subject. Henry “blundered” into the breach with Rome through carnal lust (pp. 304–5). Yet there was nothing to prevent his indulging in the same promiscuous and open concubinage which characterised the courts of orthodox princes in this and many succeeding generations; and, at one point, the Pope actually proposed as one possible solution that Henry should have two wives simultaneously.¹ So far as Henry’s divorce was responsible for the breach, the root must be sought not in his libidinous desires but in his political necessities; he needed a legitimate male heir to secure his throne. It is strange that we should be driven so often to repeat this very obvious correction.

Let me end by briefly opposing to Mr Belloc’s thesis the reflections of a student of medieval documents who never hesitates to admit that the Church was, on the whole, the most beneficent institution of the Middle Ages; but whose main complaint is that she has never patiently suffered the co-existence of rival missionary institutions.

¹ *Letters and Papers of Henry VIII.*, vol. vi. No. 6627; cf. 6705 and App. 261. It is extremely probable that the Pope’s proposition was only a ruse; but even this would be enough to destroy Mr Belloc’s contention. This, again, is so clearly brought out by Professor Pollard that there can be no excuse for ignoring it.

(1) On the one hand, we find a series of complaints from the greatest and most orthodox churchmen, for at least four centuries before the Reformation. These ecclesiastics represent the corruption of their own Church as intolerable; they cry bitterly for radical and immediate reform; and they often prophesy some catastrophic revolt as the only alternative. Frequently, also, they assign as one of the main causes of heresy the evil lives of the clergy, from the Pope downwards.

(2) On the other hand, reforms were attempted; but these were always partial and short-lived; some had even no very deep root of sincerity, like the monastic reforms of the notoriously unchaste Pius II. or Wolsey.

(3) Meanwhile, the only thing that kept heresy within bounds was persecution—increasingly cruel and systematic in proportion as milder or more sporadic efforts failed.

(4) Such persecution was logically defended then, and is often palliated by modern apologists, on the plea that the truth of Catholicism is not relative but absolute; that this creed could not be content with a mere *primatia inter pares*, even though such a primacy were granted; that it holds in a unique sense the keys of heaven and hell, and that the alternatives of heaven and hell are so awful as to outweigh all ordinary considerations.

(5) Therefore, as a necessary consequence, persecution became more and more cruel and systematic in proportion to the growth of heresy: this is one of the few directions in which medieval civilisation did not advance, but went steadily from bad to worse for three centuries at least.

(6) Though the Protestants, at first, were only one degree less intolerant than the orthodox, yet the very existence of large Protestant populations, who soon showed themselves inexterminable except by such wholesale and repeated slaughters as no civilised community could contemplate (and who, in the last resort, might even have conquered the Catholic powers in open warfare), began to reduce religious persecution on both sides to an absurdity; so that, in its cruder forms, it is almost unknown at the present day.

(7) It yet remains to be proved—and Catholic apologists very seldom attempt to prove except by dogmatic assertions and *ex-parte* appeals—in what respects the world is worse for its present belief that even the best religious denomination is only *primus inter pares*; that one creed is not separated from another by all the distance between heaven and hell; and that all creeds will best commend themselves to humanity by abandoning the ancient methods of force, bluster, or pious fraud.

These points, so far as my experience goes, are almost

universally ignored by modern Catholic writers on the Reformation.¹ They are not denied or combated; they are simply left alone.² Yet, if such things could be said of the history of any other great institution, would not its modern representatives hasten to put themselves right with the world by frankly avowing the general justice of past revolutions, and by making the best of a modern civilisation which, with all its imperfections, can no longer be fairly described in the language which St Bernard or Grosseteste applied to their own times? It is the rigorous chain of Infallibility which prevents the modern Roman Catholic from thus laying aside the weight of his own past, and running with patience the race that is set before us all. The case cannot be put more trenchantly than it was put by Newman, after nearly twenty years' experience of his new Church, to a friend who was anxious to found a Catholic Historical Review. "Nothing would be better" (replied the future Cardinal) "than an Historical Review for Roman Catholics—but who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one's facts, one would be thought a bad Catholic."³ Monsignor Duchesne, perhaps the greatest of living Catholic historians, has seen his principal work put upon the *Index*. Their scholar of profoundest learning, Mabillon, very nearly shared the same fate, and was in fact compelled to suppress a preface in which he had unobtrusively hinted at strong evidence for monastic corruption as early as the twelfth century.⁴ Mr Belloc, in spite of himself, is mainly dependent on what Newman called "doctored" history; his elaborate generalisations rest upon sand.⁵

G. G. COULTON.

CAMBRIDGE.

¹ Perhaps the most learned, and certainly the most candid, of these writers is P. Imbart de la Tour, who shows only the natural bias of an honest advocate, and who does not ignore the weight of the evidence against him. The only two who can compare with him in learning are J. Janssen and L. Pastor; but a closer scrutiny shows that they depend to a great extent on second-hand material, often untrustworthy and often undigested.

² Except so far as the corruption of the fifteenth-century Church is admitted; but even this is often so minimised as to render the apparently candid admission more misleading than a flat denial.

³ *The Month*, Jan. 1903, p. 3.

⁴ *Mélanges Mabillon* (1908), p. 101; E. de Broglie, *Mabillon* (1888), vol. ii. pp. 218 ff.

⁵ *P.S.*—The above had already gone to press when I received, by the author's courtesy, a copy of Father W. H. Kent's article on "Catholic Truth and Historical Truth" (*Catholic Historical Review*, Oct. 1920, p. 275). While gladly confessing my agreement with very much that he says, I feel bound to add that he seems hardly to meet my main contentions.

ANTI-SEMITISM IN ENGLAND.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

THE growth of anti-Semitic feeling in England is one of the painful by-products of the War. Bitter things are said about the Jews now which would, I think, have been unheard of in any respectable quarter twenty years ago. One or two of the great London daily newspapers, and one of the most sober and venerable of the London weeklies, often indulge in disagreeable anti-Jewish observations and remarks. A famous monthly is even more openly and virulently "anti-Semitic." The causes of these phenomena are numerous and various; some are even inconsistent with others. But if you once heartily dislike anybody or anything, any stick will serve with which to beat the dog.

Racial, religious, and economic causes all contribute to the undesirable result. I cannot investigate these causes fully, for to do so would take far too long, and I should not be allowed the space. Moreover, I want to look at the matter in a somewhat different way.

European anti-Semitism largely depends upon the actual presence of Jews in the countries of Europe, and upon their claim to, or their possession of, complete civic, religious, and political equality. Let us assume that all the Jews of Europe chose to leave Europe, and to settle in an empty province of China, or in a large empty island in the Pacific Ocean. Let us assume that not a single Jew, whether by race or religion, was left behind. Anti-Semitism would obviously decrease. It would hardly come within practical politics. The hatred of the Jew is due to his contiguity and ubiquity, to his claim and desire to be a European, and to his actual presence in Europe. (For the sake of simplicity, I am taking no notice of America.) Few people hate the Chinese, so long as they are in China, and stay there. But if there were seven million Chinese who

wanted to live in Europe in the same way, and on the same terms of perfect equality, as the Jews now live, or claim to live, in Europe, the feelings of Englishmen as regards the Chinese would undergo a change. So, too, if the same thing were to happen in the case of Zulus or Hottentots. Then, in spite of all the grand phrases which are used about the brotherhood of man, universal philanthropy, or the love of enemies, there would probably be much hostility, bitterness, and even hatred.

Now, hatred is one thing, but hostility is another. Hatred of persons is, perhaps, never justified; but there may, perhaps, be justified hostility. Let us set out some of the reasons why, in the assumed case of Chinese, Zulus, or Hottentots, such hostility and bitterness would arise. First of all, there would be the question of colour. And with that would go the dislike of a large group of men and women of a supposed lower or inferior race living in our midst, and claiming civic and political equality. For it would be said that these men and women have other ethical ideas and ideals than ours, and that ours are higher than theirs. They have also other religious ideas and ideals than ours, and ours are higher than theirs. Again, if they marry exclusively among one another, they are an alien body in the State, whereas the citizens of a given State should, so far as possible, be homogeneous. If, on the other hand, there is any mixture of races, the result is even worse. The progeny may, likely enough, have the vices of both parents and the virtues of neither. Economically, the presence of the alien group is bad, because they tend to undersell, and to work under evil conditions. Moreover, they would probably have a lower standard of comfort, and would tend to become larger in numbers as the years went on. France for the French; England for the English. There is now, in the most literal sense, no *room* for generosity to the alien.

Such would be the arguments. And can we say, with complete candour, that there is nothing in any one of them? A book such as Stoddart's *Rising Tide of Colour* may be exaggerated, but that its fears and its opinions are wholly negligible, he would be a bold man who would assert.

The question, therefore, presents itself: Can the case of the Jews be rightly regarded as on all fours with the assumed case of the Zulus and the Hottentots, or even with the assumed case of the Chinese? Are the Jews to be rightly put on a level with those others? If so, there seems something to be said for anti-Semitism and for the anti-Semites. Hardly,

indeed, is there much to be said even then for the bitter hatred, and for the often hardly veiled incitements to pogroms in Eastern countries, which distinguish the most rabid of our western anti-Semites. But there *would* be a case for the dislike of having large bodies of Jews on equal terms, and on footings of complete freedom, in European countries.

Writing as a Jew, am I, then, to suppose that Jews are as different from Europeans as the Chinese, and as inferior to Europeans as the Hottentots?

Let me briefly go through the reasons which, in the assumed incursions of Zulus, Hottentots, and Chinese, would cause a more or less justified hostility.

The colour reason falls to the ground. Jews are no less "white" than their fellow-citizens of other creeds. They are neither yellow nor black, neither brown nor red. Then comes the question of race. It is very doubtful how far the Jews of Europe can be regarded as all belonging to one and the same race. It is doubtful what percentage of them, and what percentage of the blood of any one of them, could rightly be described as purely Semitic. Whether, however, the races, whatever they be, of which they are to-day composed, are lower in the scale of excellence than the "Alpine" or the "Mediterranean," not to mention the great "Nordics" themselves, I cannot discuss. Nor can I touch on the possibility that, among the infiltrations into the original Semitic stock that have happened through the ages, there are not, among existing Jews, some strains of all these various European races. What I think we may safely aver is that, be the original race or races of European Jews what they may, their blood has not prevented them, or does not now prevent them, from acquiring the virtues and the faults, the ideas and the ideals, the capacities and the limitations, of the Europeans among whom, for such a very large number of generations, they have continuously dwelt. The difference of race need make no material difference in mental endowment or in ethical outlook. It would seem to be true to say that the original or basic Jewish race was not so far removed from the original race or races of Christian Europeans as to prevent Jews being, or becoming, as good and valuable citizens of the European States as those in whom no trace of Semitic blood could be discerned.

Let us, however, look at the matter in a less theoretic, and much simpler, way.

It is possible that it may be accurate to speak of the Jews as possessing certain faults and certain virtues, but it

is very doubtful how far these virtues and faults are due to race, and not far more due to environment, circumstance, or education. It is certain that both special virtues and special faults tend to disappear where the Jews live in a continuing environment of liberty and emancipation. In such an environment the Jews tend somewhat rapidly to acquire both the faults and the virtues of their neighbours, so that not only do French Jews tend to become different from English Jews, English Jews from Italian Jews, and so on, but French Jews tend to become much more like Christian Frenchmen than like English Jews, English Jews tend to become much more like Christian Englishmen than like Italian Jews, and so on.

It is doubtful whether the Jew is by "nature" more of a materialist, and less of an idealist, than the European Gentile. His "materialism," when it exists, is due to other causes than to blood. The long-continued persecution, degradation, and ostracism, from which an enormous percentage of European Jews has suffered for so many generations, have produced effects in character which cannot be effaced in a year. It is, indeed, wonderful how rapidly, in the sunshine of equality, these effects—the bad ones frequently, and occasionally, alas! the good—tend to disappear. There are special virtues and special vices which persecution, degradation, cruelty, and hatred are calculated to produce. At the one end of the scale, you get heroes; at the other end, you get scum. When the immensity of Jewish sufferings is considered—for no people, no religious community, has suffered as they, and yet survived—the marvel is that the scum is as small as it is, and that the spirit, courage, capacity, and joyousness of the "race" have not been broken and dulled for ever.

It is needless to specify the vices generated by persecution: the hunted, hated, and despised animal tends sometimes not to show towards his tormentors the virtues of truthfulness and affection. Even when the persecution is relaxed, the human nature may be warped. It is the next generation only who can acquire the virtues of equality. But if active persecution is supplanted by active hatred, it is more hard for these virtues to spring up. Anti-Semitism causes the very evils of which it then proceeds to complain. The alleged materialism of the Jews, their "loudness," their vulgarity, their love of money and jewellery, their ostentation, are also largely, though not entirely, the result of secular persecution and degradation. The Jew had only one idealism, his religion. Besides this he could have no other ambition, no other joy, no other relief from misery, than money and

“external goods.” When emancipated, and more especially when his religious belief is weakened, his unbroken spirit tends to rush to the full enjoyment of material things. But this tendency will disappear with better education, continued equality, the full participation in all other human idealisms and creations of the spirit, and, above all, with a religious revival. It is possible, though not certain, that the European Jew needs religion even more than the European Gentile—needs it, I mean, even more in order to keep pure and “spiritual” and simple and sweet. That is why the present writer is so tremendously keen on Liberal Judaism. That, however, is another story. But even as things now are, few will venture to say that the Jews *as a whole* are “morally” inferior to their Gentile neighbours. Nor are they physically degenerate. Give them a chance, and they soon become fond of athletic exercises and games. And if there is one native and indelible tendency in the Jewish race, it is their affection for their children and the willingness of the parents to make sacrifices for their offspring.

Anti-Semitic writers and newspapers in England to-day make great capital of the part which, as they allege, has been played, and is being played, by Jews in the Bolshevik movement in Russia, and in anarchic and anti-social movements throughout the world. The most frantic efforts are being made to ascribe the murder of the Czar and of his family entirely to Jewish agencies and to Jewish hands. That, in the event (which most decent persons desire) of the downfall of Bolshevik rule, such efforts will assuredly lead to the massacre of thousands of wholly innocent persons, is presumably not altogether to the distaste of those who make them.

Now, assuming that there is a certain sprinkling of Jews in the Bolshevik movement and in the anarchic and anti-social movements all over the world, and assuming, which is by no means certain, that among those who compassed, and among those who connived at, the detestable murders of the Czar and of his family was a small percentage of Jews, what follows as regards the general question of Jewish morality? Very little. At present, the Jewish Russian is, for his numbers, better educated than the Gentile Russian. In every Russian party which was, or is, antagonistic to the old *régime*, Jews were, or are, therefore, to be found out of proportion to their numbers. The deeper explanation of the presence of Jews among the Bolshevik party is to be sought in the continued persecution and degradation which Russian Jews have undergone. On the whole, the Jew is not revengeful or cruel,

and it is a Talmudic saying that he who is unmerciful is no descendant of Abraham. But, as I have already urged, persecution breeds scum. If there are some men of Jewish race (not of Jewish faith, and not, therefore, by Jews recognised as Jews) who have yielded to the lust of revenge, is it for the Gentile, whose systematic persecution has brought this about, to marvel? Should the Gentile, by the virulence of hatred, add fuel to the fire? He who is ostracised from human society, and forbidden to be a citizen of the country in which he lives, may sometimes sink into becoming the enemy of all society and of every organised state. Forbidden the joy of patriotism, he would destroy patriotism throughout the world. Again, the Russian Jew, like his Gentile brother, has too often abandoned religion. But the Gentile has other spiritual resources; the hunted and persecuted Jew has none. It has, moreover, to be freely admitted that the higher fruits of liberty—order, self-control, moderation—are not to be won in a day. Transplant a Russian Jew of twenty to London or New York, and the heady wine of freedom may make him mistake licence for liberty. He may use freedom for evil ends. It speaks well for the Jews as a whole that such abuses and perversions are exceptional.

In any case, such instances of "Jewish iniquity" are no evidence against "Jewish" morality. One might more legitimately argue that it is Jewish morality which has made them few.

It may, however, be said that, though Jewish morality is a high morality, it is not the *same* morality as the morality of Christian Europe. The States of Christian Europe need one and the same type of morality throughout their borders. Here the anti-Semitic argument from morality becomes inseparably mixed up with the argument from religion.

I do not think that this argument can be regarded as not worthy of full respect and serious consideration. Europe is Christian. England is certainly a Christian country. It would not be unreasonable that Christians should dislike the presence in this country of a compact group of persons, claiming and possessing full civic and political rights and privileges, who belong to a religion wholly different from Christianity, and with moral ideas and ideals gravely different, even if not grossly inferior. Such might be the argument not unjustly used against the Hottentots and even the Chinese.

Against Judaism and the Jews the argument has, I think, little value. For the moral ideas and ideals of Christianity and Judaism are very nearly the same. The *highest* things in the

Old Testament, which, as a matter of fact, constitute the ethical elements in the religion of modern Jews, are in tune with the best ethical elements in the religious teaching of the New Testament and of Christianity. I do not deny that we find in the New Testament the command: "Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you, bless them that curse you, pray for them that despitefully use you," but it is hardly for the anti-Semites to object to a religion the sacred scripture of which does not contain these sublime injunctions. *They*, at any rate, cannot think that these commands are of any practical importance. There is, without irony or sarcasm, just *enough* difference in the ethical teachings of Judaism and Christianity to be of stimulating value; there is *not* enough to cause the presence of the dissentient minority to be of the smallest ethical danger or disadvantage to the majority. If the Jew can rightly learn to admire and to appropriate the ethical ideals and efflorescence of the New Testament, the Christian could rightly learn to appropriate more fully the highest ideals and delicacies of the Old Testament and of the Rabbis. Does the one need to take to heart the saying: "Love is the fulfilment of the Law"? Does the other never need to obey the order: "Thou shalt love the resident alien as thyself"?¹ It is sometimes said that Judaism is *this*-worldly, while Christianity is *other*-worldly. The antithesis is false; but if there were anything in it, if it were true that Judaism was specially keen on making *this* world into a true kingdom of God, then Judaism would be entirely congruous with the prevailing spirit of modern Christianity. The truth is that the teaching of modern Judaism and modern Christianity as to this world and the next world ("the vestibule and the hall," as an old Rabbi called them) and their relations to each other have, to all intents and purposes, become the same. It would be idle to ask people with violently buzzing bees in their bonnets, such as the regular anti-Semites, to adopt any reasonable course. But if those who have milder prejudices would only consent to learn what modern Judaism actually teaches and holds, they would find that there is no ethical objection to the presence of Jews in Christian environments. The Congregational Union has recently issued an interesting liturgy for optional use in the Congregational churches. Among the prayers which they have incorporated is a long litany written not more than eighteen years ago by the late Rabbi Simeon Singer for the services of the Jewish Religious Union. That

¹ Leviticus xix. 34. The Hebrew word "ger," translated "stranger" in the Authorised Version and Revised Version, means literally "resident alien."

does not look as if the spiritual and religious ideals of modern Jew and modern Christian were so very different from one another. Would the readers of this Review like to have before them another very brief prayer from the same gifted pen? Is it of Hottentot level?—

“Thou whose infinite power and wisdom are reflected in the infinite varieties of Thy creation, we see Thy handiwork also in the differences that prevail in the minds of men. We pray to Thee for all men, Thy children, our brethren. Take them all under the sheltering wings of Thy love. And may we, recognising that divergences of thought and belief are of Thine implanting, strive the more zealously to be one in charity and forbearance, one in the desire to know and do Thy will. Amen.”

But even if the religious objection falls, the “foreign body” argument remains. The Jews refuse to marry their Gentile neighbours, and an unassimilated and unassimilable foreign body in the State is considered a disadvantage. The extremest anti-Semites find objections in both directions, for if and when the Jews do marry “Gentiles,” it is alleged that the purity of the Gentile race suffers. The Jew is once more equated with the Zulu or the Chinese, and the offspring of Jew and Gentile is regarded as the offspring of white and yellow, or white and black. I will not touch upon this objection, which I believe to be unfounded and inadmissible, but as one who, for purely religious reasons, still desires the Jew to mate only with the Jew, or with the proselyte to Judaism, I will confine myself to the other.

Now, if the Jewish reluctance to marry the Gentile had any other than a religious root, Christian hostility would be perfectly justified. For then it might be argued that this very reluctance proves that a Jew cannot be a perfect French, Danish, or German patriot, as the case may be. But it has *no* other root than religion. A small minority can maintain its identity and distinctiveness in no other way. Let Jews intermarry freely with men and women of other faiths, and in a few generations Judaism must disappear. And a good thing too, would say the anti-Semites. Yes, but those who believe in Judaism and its mission cannot say so. Yet the purely religious reason for the reluctance to intermarriage takes away its political sting. It does nothing to impair the fullness and intensity of Jewish patriotism. To the Jew (except to that dangerous modern creation, the nationalist Jew), what makes a man a Jew is

religion; and just as he who abandons or denies Judaism is to the Jew no Jew, be his race and ancestry what they may, so is he who has adopted Judaism a Jew in the fullest sense of the word, be his blood and lineage Aryan or Semitic. I will not waste words as to Jewish patriotism. It is difficult for an English Jew to write upon the subject with restraint. Suffice it to say that the blood which the Jews shed for England in the Great War was no less gladly offered than the blood of the purest Aryan or "Nordic" in the land. Treat the Jews as equal citizens, and you will have no cause to regret it; you will soon have reason to appreciate the fervour of their patriotism. What is rather wonderful is that in thousands of cases the patriotism has not been wanting, even when the citizenship was in default. It cannot, however, be denied that the volume and intensity of anti-Semitic hatred have in some quarters inclined some Jews to despair, and to throw up the sponge. Hence the growth of Zionism and of Jewish nationalism, which, at bottom, are a surrender to our enemies and to their contention that the Jews themselves admit that they cannot become, and that they do not want to become, citizens of the countries in which they dwell. Whatever the future of Palestine, the welfare of the immense majority of Jews depends upon those who refuse to surrender or to despair. Citizens we are, and citizens we claim to be; and not only citizens, but worthy citizens, who love, and mean to love, their European country and their European homes.

A few words must suffice as to economic objections: these, to some extent, cancel one another.

On the one hand, the Jews are disliked because they are capitalists and financiers, lovers of wealth and of money; international financiers, moreover, who promote militarism, reaction, and darkness. On the other hand, they are disliked because of their poverty, their low standard of comfort, their prolificness, their tendency to sweat and be sweated, to undercut and undersell. But they are also, as we have seen, disliked because they are the too violent enemies of the capitalist, because they are wild and anarchic socialists and communists, the plotters of red revolution and of ruin. So far as there is any truth in one, or other, or all of these allegations, they are the fruit and issue of disabilities and degradation. What occupations and professions were open for centuries to the Jew except the lower forms of acquisition? When other occupations and professions are open to them, it is not found that Jews are slow to take advantage of these newer opportunities.

They soon learn the higher standards of comfort; it is even curious that among the Jewish critics of themselves there are some who think that Jews have a tendency to raise this standard unnecessarily high. Give the Jews freedom and justice, and even a short respite from hatred and prejudice, and there is no reason to suppose that these various products of disabilities and persecution will not entirely disappear. If a group of men have *no* country, how can they learn loyalty to *any* country? Where every man's hand is against you, you may be tempted to hit back. It does no good, but you may yield to the temptation. And these evil passions cannot be overcome by all in the twinkling of an eye. Is it too much to ask from Christendom, in return for centuries of persecution, a few years of patience? Certain ugly characteristics of the hunted animal—fear, cunning, untruthfulness—may have shown themselves in a few Jews who had not yet learnt to love and care for England. But the Jew learns very quickly. Indicate to him that you *want* him to learn, that you will *welcome* his learning. Even as things are, the learning is going on apace. At this very moment, in the far east of London, taught by one of the finest Jewish Englishmen alive, the sons of the alien are learning

“to set the cause above renown,
To love the game beyond the prize.”

They are learning

“to count the life of battle good,
And dear the land that gave them birth,
And dearer yet the brotherhood
That binds the brave of all the earth.”

Give them only a little encouragement; a little surcease from suspicion and hatred; a little breathing space; a little time.

Anti-Semitism tends to make the people it hates at last worthy of hatred. For hatred will at last breed hatred, and suspicion will breed suspicion. Equality, fairness, love: these are curative. To make the Jews as like you as possible, treat them as you treat any other English citizens. They will soon resemble you—in your very failings as well as in your virtues!

Meanwhile, the lesson for the Jews is always the same. First: Cast not off religion; for in religion—in a living harmony of religious belief and religious practice—lies your true salvation. Secondly: Never despair; keep to your old ideal—Englishmen of the Jewish faith: nothing less, nothing more.

C. G. MONTEFIORE.

DISCUSSIONS.

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion except under certain circumstances. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"SCIENCE AND LIFE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1920, p. 101.)

I.

DR SCHILLER, in his interesting and racy article on Professor Soddy's book, *Science and Life*, has dealt with what he takes to be the real aim of the work, viz. to show us how to take life scientifically. He has also touched upon the professed aim of the work—"to tomahawk the humanities"; and it is on this aspect that I wish, if I may, to add a few supplementary remarks.

Professor Soddy is one of those vigorous and provocative writers who use words as hoplites to smash an entry for ideas by violence. The method has its advantages, though it is not always necessary to launch a punitive expedition of a heavily armed troop of words to batter down an unoffending reader's preconceptions and prejudices without so much as an attempt at preliminary negotiation. Such expeditions are not invariably successful. Moreover, the time is past when the originator of a new or unpopular view need fear with Harvey "lest he have mankind for his enemies." Therefore, to many, Professor Soddy's onslaught on the "humanities" and the older learning will appear unnecessary. His strong and urgent advocacy of the claims of science at the expense of the gentler learning will needlessly antagonise those more moderate thinkers who are in sympathy with his main thesis, and who fully recognise the increasingly important part which science is playing and must play in the affairs of to-day, but who are unconvinced that it cannot attain its rightful place except at the price of their much-loved "humanities." It is an inspiring spectacle, this latter-day, dim, mysterious battle of the Arthur of science to wrest from Nature, on behalf of mankind, her ultimate secrets. It would be not a whit less inspiring if the knights of the Round Table of science were to emulate not only the courage of a Lancelot but also his gentleness.

Yet, when the smarting has a little subsided, if we emulate the example

of Lewis Carroll's character and "look again," I think we shall see that the instrument of chastisement in the Professor's hands is not really a tomahawk but a vigorously wielded slipper. It is, of course, very humiliating to be slipped, but devotees of the humanities may take comfort when they remember that the great Hercules himself had to submit to certain "stimulations of his muscular integument" from a similar instrument (or what corresponded to it in those days) brandished by Omphale. But Professor Soddy does lay on a little too heavily when he says that science owes but little to the past. Even "philosophies" that have come down to us from not much later than "the day of the wooden horse of Troy" have more than once proved a source of inspiration and encouragement to a new and original mind of a later day. The frank acknowledgment by Copernicus of his debt to Pythagoras and Aristarchos is a well-known case in point. Old wine is not necessarily unfit for new bottles.

The thought of man is not to be likened to the old atomic conception of matter as a series of detached and indivisible entities. It is rather a continuum, a flowing stream, originating in and fed by unnumbered streamlets; now coursing smooth and tranquil, now in turbulent spate from the accession of some sudden flood of waters. But it is the same stream. The cold light of science takes on a warmer glow when the worker is sympathetically aware that the same questionings which he is engaged in answering revolved with lesser radius in some distant brain of long ago. So to think is a corrective of that common mood of chill aloofness which seems to regard the history of the generations as that of a series of dead bodies "which time hath piled up at the gate of death." Rich generalisations yet lie buried in our histories of science, awaiting the advent of what Coleridge termed the "esemplastic" type of mind. There is something dim and mysterious to be sensed in these records, and it is irresistibly suggested to a reader that there are laws governing discovery other than those generally admitted, the clear enunciation of which might do much to clear the path and shorten the labours of the moderns. And we want more, not less, imagination, even in science, as Professor Soddy has himself admitted in a remarkable passage in another work. The story of science is full of instances where an investigator, after long voyagings, found himself apparently marooned on a desert island of fact cut off from all access to the main continent of truth. Yet the means of communication all the time lay open before his eyes, had they not been holden so that he could not see. The disciplined imagination in such cases might have taken on the function of a third and clearer eye. And what better nourishment for the imagination can be provided than that accruing from a study of the despised "humanities"? Perhaps there will yet come a time when the poet will assist the scientist in his laboratory, and a Lucretius may yet earn his salt!

Even if the only result of a *rapprochement* between some of our scientific workers and the politer learning were to be the gradual dawn of a conviction that good science need not necessarily be written in bad English, we might yet welcome a "crowning mercy" greater than Worcester.

It is impossible to resist one final piece of banter. It has been jestingly said that there are not more than seven original plots. It would appear that there are not many more original ideas. For his sins, Professor

Soddy, in enunciating his theory of what may be termed "the conservation of souls" (*Science and Life*, pp. 151-152), might almost be paraphrasing certain passages in the *Phædo* and the *Republic* (cf. *Phædo*, ch. xvii.; *Republic*, book x. ch. xi.).

E. W. ADAMS.

II.

This interesting article touches the very foundation of our being, with its plea for the treatment of science as a *whole*, instead of in parts. But when Dr Schiller points out the necessity for self-control to go hand-in-hand with the development of science, as we understand it, and observes that "this would demand the construction of a really efficacious science of ethics, which would not be content to rehearse time-worn platitudes about (inapplicable) 'principles,' but would be willing to tackle *la bête humaine*, and, in co-operation with an operative psychology and a eugenical biology, would remould man into a creature such as he never yet has been, viz. one able to control and harmonise his passions," I think an example might be found amongst Hindus.

If we listened less to missionary tales of the side of Hinduism which rightly or wrongly shocks our Christian instincts, ceased to refer to the Hindu as a "native" (which word carries with it a world of ignorant contempt), and if, instead, we made a scientific study of their mode of life, eugenics (which help to produce their wonderfully developed brain-power, and comparative freedom from lunacy), diet, as affecting character, and system of hygiene, we might discover that the Hindu had actually achieved the remoulding of man to a large extent, and that he *has* learnt to control and harmonise his passions. He alone seems to have grasped the science of being, and to see things as a *whole*, and not in sections. But he does not give away his knowledge, unless it is asked for (see *Anglo-Indian Studies*, p. 21, S. M. Mitra).

Our pride of conquest causes us to imagine that we cannot learn from a people outwardly conquered by force of arms, but the fact remains that there are unexplored mines of knowledge relating to *la bête humaine* and to the essence of life, if sought for from that ancient but virile people.

D. CHAPLIN.

LONDON.

"MAN IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1920, p. 776.)

I SHOULD like to state that I am in agreement with the first criticism passed by R. H. Thouless on my article. The assertion that "*every* experience the individual has passed through is stored within the psyche" is too sweeping. At the same time it would, I think, be acknowledged by psychologists and psychotherapists that when an attempt is made to revive lost memories, some one of the methods employed, by no means always the same one, almost invariably succeeds.

With regard to the second criticism, my article was written in the full understanding that Freud uses the term "sexual" with an extended meaning, and including the psychic as well as the somatic instinct. I do not in consequence hold that it covers, or can be made to cover, everything

included in the word "love," even as ordinarily understood. The love between parent and child, or between brother and sister, is not, in normal persons, of the same kind as that between men and women who are "lovers"; and to regard the pleasurable experience of a baby sucking at the breast as sexual, honestly appears ridiculous to most people. Further, if my critic will re-read the second paragraph on p. 784 of the July *Hibbert Journal*, he will find that I there give the reason why Freud's unmodified conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, viz. because the first subjects of psycho-analysis, those on observation of whom he founded his conclusions, were in a morbid condition either of body or mind, or both. I quote the few sentences of my article referring to this part of the subject: "Such extreme conclusions proclaim themselves as morbid, and they have probably arisen because all the first subjects of psycho-analysis were in a morbid condition. It is not wise to generalise from such premisses alone; nor even when normally healthy subjects are also taken into account is there certainty with the Freudian school that knowledge of mental states ascertained to be true in those whose conditions were pathological, has not unduly influenced the conclusions reached with regard to the healthy. It is the case that many psychologists of eminence have been unable to accept extreme Freudian conclusions."

I cannot agree that there is "no lower or higher in human nature," although it is true that the "lower" instincts, namely, those which we share with animals, are as entirely innocent in us as in them on one condition: that in us they are kept under voluntary restraint and control, otherwise they degenerate into the licence which is the worst foe of liberty. It is not exclusively for the sake of society that the sexual instinct needs restraint. To the individual also its unrestricted indulgence would be inimical, not because it is unholy—nothing natural is that—but because it is not really *human* unless it transcends and transforms that in the natural which is below the human stage.

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

"A TEACHING CHURCH."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1920, p. 123.)

THE article by Dr A. C. M'Giffert, in the October *Hibbert Journal*, contains (p. 131) the following amongst many other interesting passages: "The Vatican dogma of papal infallibility, from which so much was expected by many of the faithful, seems only to have condemned the successor of Peter to inglorious silence."

I think this sentence evinces a misunderstanding of the dogma in question, and therefore—especially as the subject is important not only in itself but also as affecting the divisions amongst Christians,—I would suggest the following considerations.

In the first place, ought not the doctrine to be regarded, not as an isolated thing, but in its historical perspective? The sentence which I have quoted above would seem to imply that the Vatican Council's definition was the conferring of a new prerogative on the Holy See, and that therefore things previously unknown might have been expected to result. No Catholic theologian would look upon it, however, as anything

of the kind, but all would say it was simply a clearer verbal explanation of a function belonging to the Holy See from the beginning. "The Vatican Council," say Wilhelm and Scannell (*A Manual of Catholic Theology*, vol. i. p. 94), "[was] completing the definitions of the Fourth Council of Constantinople, the Second Council of Lyons, and the Council of Florence, and the Profession of Faith of Pope Hormisdas." Indeed, the *catena* could be carried further than this, and could be linked on to our Lord's words recorded in such places as Matt. xvi. 18-19; John xxi. 15-17; Luke xxii. 31-32, etc.; but my object here is not to elaborate Scriptural or other arguments, but simply to draw out the correct meaning of the 1870 definition, in view of a misapprehension. That definition merely explained the nature of an always-existent prerogative; new, strange, or startling results could, then, hardly be expected of it.

"Papal infallibility is a negative protection. We are confident that God will not allow a certain thing to happen; that is all." "God will take care that he [the Pope] does not commit the whole Church to [error]" (Father Adrian Fortescue, *The Early Papacy to the Synod of Chalcedon*, p. 22).

"Infallibility does not mean inspiration, . . . but that *when* the Pope decides a point of faith or morals *ex cathedra* he shall decide it truly" (Father Ryder, *Catholic Controversy*, 11th ed., p. 32).

"The Vatican Council only requires us to believe that God protects him [the Pope] from error in definitions of faith or morals when he imposes a belief on the Universal Church" (Addis and Arnold, *Catholic Dictionary*, ed. 1917, p. 676).

From this it will be seen that those who looked upon the 1870 definition as beginning a new and "magically oracular" stage of Church history were viewing the matter wrongly both in theology and in relation to historic perspective.

With regard, however, to the idea that the result has been "inglorious silence," surely this statement overlooks a fundamental factor. In Church history there have, of course, been numerous actual personal definitions by Popes: as late, for instance, as the Immaculate Conception in 1854 (? and *Apostolicæ Curæ* in 1896). We must remember, however, that infallibility also extends to confirmations of the *de fide* decisions of Councils. "The infallibility of general councils, *so confirmed*, follows from that of the Church. 'What God,' says St Athanasius, 'has spoken through the Council of Nicæa remains for ever'" (Addis and Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 237). Considering the otherwise bewildering and contradictory history of Councils (Catholic and heretical), it seems plain that only by such confirmation (whether at once or ultimately) can the true be separated from its opposite. The Papal prerogative, then, far from being "ingloriously dumb," would appear as the key of Church history, and the guarantee of verity; and this is illustrated by the unity where it is believed as contrasted with the confused conditions elsewhere.

J. W. POYNTER.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. JAMES MOFFATT, D.D.

THE eleventh volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (T. & T. Clark) appears with welcome punctuality. It is a tribute to the perseverance and skill of its editors and publishers that this invaluable work is being carried on with unabated care and without any diminution of excellence. The present volume, "Sacrifice—Sudras," happens to include some of the most important subjects in theology. There are the usual number of articles upon philosophy and science, including two notable papers on the Sceptics and Socrates by Professor Burnet, an illuminating account of the Latter-day Saints by Professor I. W. Riley, and a useful survey of Socialism by Dr S. A. Mellor; there are also articles on Spiritism, as Mr Schiller prefers to call "spiritualism," and Second Adventism, by Professor S. J. Case, which are of real service, although the former is too compressed. But for the purposes of this survey it is only needful to call attention to the leading articles on various aspects of theology.

The Old Testament is illustrated by articles on the Samaritans, by Professor W. J. Moulton; the Scribes, by the present writer; the Sadducees, by Professor G. H. Box; and the Semites, by Professor G. A. Barton. Professor Box agrees with Geiger that the Sadducees originally were Zadokites, and regards the Zadokite documents as "the Messianic manifesto of a party or section of the Sadducees," thus denying Kohler's interpretation. In the composite article on Sacrifice, Professor R. A. S. Macalister deals with Semitic sacrifice in its forms and origin, while Dr Moses Gaster describes the Jewish ideas of sacrifice after the Fall of Jerusalem. The general attitude towards sacrifice in Israel is trenchantly discussed by Professor Kennett in *The Interpreter* (July, pp. 251-263), and in a small pamphlet, *Deuteronomy and the Decalogue*, which is issued by the Cambridge University Press at a preposterous price. He argues that Jeremiah the radical held aloof from Josiah's reformation, because it tolerated sacrifice at the central shrine, instead of abolishing it altogether. The king was antagonistic to the immoral practices which gathered round sacrifice, but Jeremiah considered it a bold lie to claim any divine sanction whatever for sacrifice. "A lying pen of scribes hath dealt falsely" (viii. 8), and this refers to J, recently published. The decalogue of Deuteronomy was meant to supersede the decalogue of JE, and therefore there is significance in the words "he added no more" (Deut. v. 22); the real decalogue was

not accompanied by any Levitical legislation about obligatory sacrifices. If it is argued that Deuteronomy does contain some sacrificial elements, Professor Kennett replies that, "after the purification of sacrifice from its grosser associations, the school of Jeremiah that survived the prophet would not retain the evident antagonism to all sacrifice which he had felt, and might even be willing to acquiesce in the Deuteronomic law," content to have the emphasis laid on ethics instead of on ritual. But this evident antagonism hardly fits all Jeremiah's utterances, *e.g.* xvii. 26, and, psychologically, it is not essential as the clue to his position. However, it is useful to have this interpretation stated forcibly, and especially to be reminded that (a) "at least till the time of Nehemiah and indeed much later there was as great a difference of opinion among those who professed the religion of Jehovah as there is among Christians at the present time"; and (b) that "in the whole of the Old Testament there is not one single hint that sacrifice is a type of a more perfect method of atonement." In the *Revue Biblique* (October), Father Vincent publishes a historical and geographical study of Gen. xxiii. 1-20, which is valuable on account of its exact local knowledge; Professor Burney (*Journal of Theological Studies*, July, pp. 319-325) unearths an acrostic poem upon Judas Maccabæus in 1 Macc. iii.; and Dr K. Kohler (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, October), in an essay on "The Essenes and the Apocalyptic Literature," endeavours to show that the Essenes were not remote from the apocalyptic movement in pre-Christian Judaism, as is commonly alleged, but that they emanated from the "esoteric circle of the Hasidim." Dr C. Ryder Smith, in his *Bible Doctrine of Society* (T. & T. Clark), includes the New Testament, but the bulk of his well-arranged book is devoted to a survey of the Old Testament ideas and customs before, under, and after the monarchy. Dr Smith naturally deduces the sociology from the theology. He treats institutions and habits as they are found within Israel, not as they may have originated outside. He has an excellent chapter upon Accommodation, as necessitated by the presence of ideals which had been outgrown. Indeed, his handbook is of real educational value, in a province of research where there is apt to be a considerable amount of loose thinking and talking. The closeness with which it adheres to the text of Scripture will make it useful for teachers.

There is less than usual in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* that is specifically related to the New Testament, although Mr G. N. L. Hall, in a comprehensive study of Simon Magus, notices how historical analysis of the sources tends to "vindicate the authenticity of" Luke's account in Acts viii. 9-24. In *The Interpreter* (October), Dr R. H. Charles discusses "Christ's Teaching on Divorce," apropos of Mark x. 2-12 and the parallel in Matt. xix. 1-12, arguing that Mark "takes no cognisance of the case of adultery, but only of the other inadequate grounds advanced for divorce," and that Matthew's narrative, with its additions, preserves the real meaning of Jesus, who "allows the right of divorce on the ground of adultery, as well as subsequent re-marriage on the part of the guiltless person concerned, but forbids divorce on any lesser ground, as well as the re-marriage of those divorced on any such lesser ground." Mr G. H. Whitaker (*Expositor*, October, November), on "The Philology of St Luke's Preface," lays stress on πεπληροφορημένων. Instead of taking it as a sonorous equivalent for πεπληρουμένων, he reads it as meaning that the gospel-facts came to full fruit and development; ἀνατάξασθαι he takes

as "to reproduce or reconstruct," $\pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\iota\nu$ "may refer to the Acts, his second volume," and $\kappa\alpha\theta\epsilon\xi\eta\varsigma$ alludes to the continuity, which "was to be a special, perhaps the special feature, of his work." Professor J. H. Michael (*Journal of Theological Studies*, October, pp. 14-15) rejects Dr Rendel Harris' rendering of $\epsilon\xi\eta\gamma\eta\sigma\alpha\tau\omicron$ in John i. 18 as intransitive, derived from Sirach xxiv. 6, and meaning "took or had the pre-eminence," and agrees with the present writer that ver. 15 is an interpolation. Professor Burney, however (*Expositor*, November), agrees with Dr Harris that the difficult quotation in John vii. 37, 38 is due to mistranslation of an Aramaic original; the Aramaic terms for "belly" and "fountain" are the same, unvocalised, and the quotation really ran, "rivers shall flow forth from the fountain of living waters," our Lord having in mind words like Joel iii. 18, Isa. lv. 1, and Jer. ii. 13. In *The American Journal of Theology* (July, pp. 436-455), Mr H. J. Cadbury examines Professor Torrey's hypothesis about Semitic sources for Acts, and advocates the alternative hypothesis that "Luke took over his material from sources which so far as they were written were written in Greek," only that he "recast all his material in his own style, but varied the style to suit the situation, and in particular in the case of lyric passages, dialogue, and public addresses he put into the lips of Jesus something of the Semitic idiom which was known to him from the Greek Old Testament." M. L. Dieu begins (*Revue Biblique*, 1920, pp. 555-569) an examination and restatement of the hypothesis that John Mark was the authority for Luke in Acts i.-xv.; and G. Baldensperger (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, pp. 5-43), discussing the influence of apologetic in the primitive Church upon the tradition of the origins and the Galilean ministry of Jesus, shows how the primitive missionary gospel was Messianic, how one of its tasks was to prove that the Messiah could come and had come from Galilee, and how this interest affected particularly the composition of a gospel like Matthew during the height and heat of the propaganda. It was not an apologetic true to the deep meaning of Christianity; with its emphasis on external proofs, "elle n'est pas suffisamment pénétrée par l'esprit religieux et moral de l'Evangile."

In the early paragraphs of an article on "Saints and Martyrs," Father Thurston handles early Christian life and thought, as Mr L. D. Agate does in his felicitous survey of "Christian Slavery," in which he notes, by the way, how the early fathers of the Church found it "easier to say that 'the true slavery is the slavery of sin' than to grapple with the evils of an institution inseparable from ancient society." But otherwise, apart from the article on Simon Magus, to which I have already referred, and articles on Samosaténism and Semi-Arianism, this volume of the *Encyclopædia* has little that bears upon the development of early theology. We welcome heartily Dr A. Marmorstein's *Doctrine of Merits in Old Rabbinical Literature* (Jews' College, London) for its rich collection of Agadic material, illustrating the Jewish idea that man can acquire merit before God. The roots and ramifications of this belief are laid bare in a way that is most helpful to students of religious ethics in the early centuries. An equally welcome but much more comprehensive treatise is Mr Campbell N. Moody's *The Mind of the Early Converts* (Hodder & Stoughton). The title gives no idea of the range and freshness of this book. It is a remarkable study of early Church life, especially of the apologists down to Origen, in the light of the modern mission-field. Mr Moody shows how

factors which are by no means "Greek" are producing among Chinese Christians what corresponds to the "Catholicism" of the early Church, and how it is still, as then, difficult for teachers and people to appreciate the depth of the Gospel. At point after point he throws light upon the significance of the apologists, in this connection. The book is the result of serious study; but it stands out from nearly all monographs upon the subject by its grasp of the actual conditions which determine theological effort. "We have in English no sufficient account of" Hermas, says Mr Moody. In a recent Survey (July, pp. 812, 813) I called attention to some fresh contributions of a sporadic nature, and Mr Moody himself has a chapter on *The Shepherd*, which is fully abreast of modern criticism, as well as illuminating from his particular thesis. Thus he writes, apropos of the disappointments which some of Hermas' contemporaries found in their Christian experience of prayer: "The *Shepherd* of Hermas gives the explanation that imperfect faith, or some unknown temptation or sin, was the cause of delay or failure. This explanation, however unsatisfying, is exactly the same as that which is given by Chinese Christians to those who are young in the faith." In his Donnellan Lectures on *Barnabas, Hermas, and the Didache* (S.P.C.K.) Dr Armitage Robinson describes the *Shepherd* of Hermas as "the earliest example of the application of the imagination on the grand scale to the enforcement of the Christian religion and morality." He accepts the tradition that the book was written when the author's brother was bishop of Rome. But the main interest of Dr Armitage Robinson's book lies in its re-statement of his theory that the *Didache* is dependent on Hermas and Barnabas, and indeed a late imaginative picture of what the writer thought the primitive Church had been. In his book, *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity* (Macmillan), Professor Kirsopp Lake declares that the *Shepherd* "has not been adequately discussed by modern scholarship," and (pp. 110 f.) notices its adoptionist theology. But neither he nor Dr Armitage Robinson grapples with the problem as Mr Moody does.

A convenient and scholarly edition of *The Sayings of Jesus* (Cambridge University Press) is published by Mr H. G. Evelyn White; it includes the Oxyrhynchite Logia, with introduction and notes. Dr W. H. Mackean's *Christian Monasticism in Egypt to the Close of the Fourth Century* (S.P.C.K.) gathers together the salient data for an appreciation of the special forms assumed by monasticism in Egypt. The subject is not so unknown in English as Dr Mackean suggests; there is, for example, the account in Mr H. O. Taylor's *Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*. But this book has a place of its own as a reliable popular estimate. Virtue, as Pope admitted, might

"Dwell in a monk or light upon a king,"

and the advantage of Dr Mackean's pages is that they will open to many general readers and young students the amount of temporary justification for monasticism as a lay protest against the corrupted Church of the third or fourth century. Mr G. L. Marriott lays advanced students under a real obligation by printing for the first time, in *Macarii Anecdota* (Harvard University Press), seven homilies of this Egyptian Christian in the fourth century, i.e. if he is to be identified with Macarius Magnus or Macarius of Alexandria. The introduction discusses the question whether the relation of one of his homilies to the Lausiac History does not oblige us to place

him later than A.D. 420. In the *Analecta Bollandiana* (tomus xxxviii. 1, 2), Delehaye's article on "Saint Martin et Sulpice Sévère" (pp. 1-136) is a detailed, exhaustive examination of Sulpicius Severus in the light of recent research, especially in view of M. E. C. Babut's critical study. The writer almost hesitates to criticise unfavourably the work of this brilliant young Frenchman, who died fighting in the war. But his arguments are courteously put; he makes out a case for Sulpicius Severus, as well as for Martin, in reply to M. Babut's searching attack. It is a specimen of keen, historical reasoning, which is full of stimulus and critical suggestion even where it is not convincing.

Professor Ephraim Emerton's critical study of "The *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio of Padua" (Harvard University Press) is all the more useful as this great mediæval pamphlet has not yet been published in a critical edition, and has never been fully translated into English. Marsiglio was a political theorist, who took a vigorous part in supporting Louis IV. against the Papacy; Professor Emerton deprecates the idea that his French friend John of Jandun had any share in the *Defensor Pacis*, and outlines Marsiglio's theory in that work. It was a plea for the reorganisation of the Church and the control of a General Council, which struck heavily against Papal pretensions, and profoundly influenced subsequent European thought. Professor Emerton, for example, thinks that Wycliffe must have "had before him the text of the *Defensor Pacis*." In the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 84-90), Lobstein has a few pages upon "Les Commentaires de Calvin," in connection with a recent work by M. Louis Goumez on *La Doctrine du Salut, d'après les commentaires de Jean Calvin sur le Nouveau Testament*. But we have to chronicle a first-rate monograph in Mr A. Mitchell Hunter's *Teaching of Calvin* (Glasgow: Maclehose, Jackson & Co.). Mr Hunter shows himself to be well equipped for his task; he gives a modern interpretation of Calvin's work, which is critical and sympathetic; he writes lucidly, and altogether has made a fine contribution to the study of Calvinism. If a book like this were read, there would be fewer of the tiresome, unhistorical remarks about Calvinism which are still to be heard even in educated circles. "There is much need of popular illumination as to what Calvinism essentially is," says Mr Hunter. It is pleasant to think that we have now a competent and not too technical book which will dispel a number of vain shadows and conventional misunderstandings. On a smaller scale, M. Arnold Reymond's essay on "Pascal et l'apologétique chrétienne," which fills an entire number of the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (June-July), has the same original and incisive note. Descartes and Montaigne, he thinks, represent the two poles between which Pascal oscillated. He attaches Pascal's admiration for Descartes to the period of his first conversion, and suggests that later on Pascal drew away from Cartesianism; he analyses the effect of Pascal's scientific studies upon his apologetic, which rests on (a) man's misery apart from God, and (b) God's revelation in history, as seen in prophecies and miracles. Neither of these bases is tenable to-day; but, M. Raymond suggests, in an age when money is the practical god of many, the second basis might be furnished by a Church of men and women whose disinterested lives were an actual demonstration of God's presence. There is a discussion of the famous "wager" argument, and indeed the entire essay is a valuable comment upon the *Pensées*; it forms a useful supplement to Mr H. F. Stewart's Hulsean Lectures.

J. E. B. Blase's biography of *Johannes Colerus* (Ten Brink & De Vries, Amsterdam) is a detailed, illustrated, and original study of this Lutheran minister at the Hague, from 1693 to 1707, who admired Spinoza and wrote his life, though he preached against what he considered to be his detestable philosophy. English readers know his biography of Spinoza from the version in Sir Frederick Pollock's study of Spinoza. But Colerus played many other parts in the stormy ecclesiastical world of Holland. He was born in 1647 and died in 1707, after a vigorous and not unsuccessful career. This biography deals at length with his varying fortunes, and is certainly the fullest record of his activities.

The *Encyclopædia* has thorough articles on Salvation (Christian) and Soteriology by Professor T. B. Kilpatrick, and on Sin (Christian) by Professor H. R. Mackintosh, also on the Holy Spirit by Mr R. B. Hoyte, all sound pieces of theological reasoning. In the article on "The State of the Dead" (Christian), Dr Charles Harris shows how men are breaking away from traditional orthodoxy, by arguing that the parable of Dives and Lazarus implies that in the intermediate state torments are only temporary, and that repentance is possible after death. This new departure in eschatology is worked out with candour and ability in Professor R. G. Macintyre's book on *The Other Side of Death* (Macmillan), which insists on the need of modifying the conventional position and of presenting a reasonable belief about the future. Professor Macintyre re-states the hypothesis of Conditional Immortality; he prefers to call it Potential Immortality. "Orthodoxy professes to believe in a hell which it no longer dares to preach," and universalism weakens the decisiveness of the present life; the way out of the tangle is to make immortality ethically conditioned, and to admit that for many the first chance they get of choosing or refusing God will be in the next world, where God gives a further probation. The case for "conditional" immortality has never been put so persuasively or so weightily, and Professor Macintyre's book will require to be taken into serious account in all future discussions. Canon V. F. Storrs, in a pamphlet on *The Divinity of Christ* (Longmans, Green & Co.), meets the current dissatisfaction with the Chalcedon formula about the two natures by suggesting that, instead of over-emphasising the two natures, we might start by emphasising the reality and humanity of Christ's person, and apply to this consciousness the conception of growth. The lecture is open-minded and well adapted to guide the popular mind. Canon Storrs pays generous tribute to Professor Mackintosh's standard book upon *The Person of Jesus Christ*. Professor J. H. Snowden's *The Personality of God* (New York: The Macmillan Company) is a sturdy exposition of the idea of a complex, self-sufficient personality in God as the source of human faith and life. The repetition of the metaphor about human personality as a dewdrop reflecting the sun is apt to lead to misapprehension. But Dr Snowden makes his point clear. He argues that the Trinity "adumbrates a distinction imbedded in the constitution of God and is the necessary condition of his infinite life." The general lines of proof are familiar to readers of Lotze and Dr Illingworth and Canon Temple. What the problem involves, and what has to be done to render it less unintelligible, is indicated by Mr F. R. Tennant in *The Constructive Quarterly* (June), the first of a series of articles upon the reconstruction of theology. Mr Tennant has a refreshing aversion to muddled thinking, and his articles lay down unambiguously the desiderata in question.

Sometimes this is better than offering speculative solutions. Professor Clement C. J. Webb's introductory lecture on *Philosophy and the Christian Religion* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press) is a finely tempered statement of the relation between philosophy and religion, and particularly of the services rendered by Christianity to philosophy, *e.g.* in developing the notion of personality, "a notion of the profoundest importance, for which ancient philosophy had no special name at all." Signor Giovanni Gentile's *Discorsi di Religione* (Vallecchi Editore: Firenze) contains three lectures, the first a reprint from *Politica* upon the political question, the other two upon the philosophical and the moral problem of religion. Dr Johnson said of Addison, "He thinks justly, but he thinks faintly." Signor Gentile does not think faintly. He is an emancipated thinker, for whom religion renders itself largely into a matter of personal idealism, or rather of individual reflection asserting itself in a more or less mechanical order of nature. The intellectualistic bias of the author is severely criticised by his fellow-countrymen, Signor E. Buonainti, in an article in *Rivista Trimestrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* (pp. 303-312)—an Italian quarterly, by the way, which we hail with pleasure. The critic will not allow that Gentile thinks justly. He points out severely, perhaps too severely, the evaporation of anything like real religion in Signor Gentile's view of culture. Professor J. B. Pratt's volume on *The Religious Consciousness* (New York: The Macmillan Company) is the most ample handbook on the subject which has appeared, full of information and suggestion. It is a psychological study, which aims at an objective delineation of the factors in the religious experience. He discusses subjects like religion and the sub-conscious, the various stages of religion in the individual, conversion, social expressions, worship, and mysticism. It is a merit that he analyses without theorising unduly, and, when one considers the range covered, it is remarkable that the volume maintains so high a level of impartiality. If the psychological method would only drop the *questionnaire* system, it would be more impressive, however.

Professor Pratt's closing chapter upon the place and use of mysticism contains, among other good things, a searching criticism of Miss Underhill's theory, and a passing reference to the fact that the Bible possesses for the mystic "a deeper meaning than its merely historical and superficial aspect." The attitude of mystics to the Bible deserved more attention. It is, indeed, an important matter, which is commonly passed over with a few general remarks about allegorism and the Song of Solomon. However, in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (pp. 44-72) M. Charles Dombre goes into it with some thoroughness. He points out how the mediæval mystics vary; John of the Cross, for example, knows, quotes, and uses the Bible, while others either ignore or depreciate it. Even among mystics who care for the Bible, it is only certain parts that make an appeal—not the prophets, not the epistles, not the life of Jesus except at the beginning and at the end. The influence of the Church is one reason, according to M. Dombre; the stress on direct intuition is another. It is quite rare, as he points out, for a mystical writer to notice any difference or difficulty in the Bible text. Dr J. H. Bernard's pamphlet on *Dogma and Criticism* (Longmans, Green & Co.) admits that difficulties are felt by many to-day with regard to specific historical statements in the Apostles' Creed, and over ideas and phrases in other creeds. The origin of these lies in the scientific study of the Bible, which refuses

to bury its head in mystical sands. Dr Bernard admits that "if we were now rewriting the Athanasian Creed we should change some phrases"; he will not have anything to do with repressive measures against Christian scholars who cannot accept the letter of the Creeds at every point. But he will not hear of the Creeds being revised or replaced by others, on the double ground that they afford a basis for common faith among the Eastern and Western Churches, and that they preserve essential truths of faith and history, without which the Church would not be Christian. Mr Eric S. Robertson, in *The Human Bible* (Nisbet), is more bold. He hopes to see the Church emerging "out of musty song-mills like 'Hymns Ancient and Modern,'" but he sees the Church of England standing "largely helpless" in the land, because "it has, fastened to its neck, two mill-stones, its lovely Prayer-book, and its unlovely Convocation." He advocates a simple Christianity, purged of Pauline theology, and resting on the consciousness and teaching of Jesus about the Kingdom. This is the conclusion on which his exhilarating and exhaustive discussion of the Bible converges. The Old Testament is examined as a record of human aspirations, which are fully met in Jesus. Mr Robertson is well acquainted with the critical processes, and argues in no iconoclastic spirit; he writes briskly, persuasively, and with an eye to what he regards as the kernel of Christianity. Mr Edward Grubb's volume on *The Bible: its Nature and Inspiration* (Swarthmore Press) is much less radical. He outlines the structure and characteristics of the various books, and gives some sensible advice about the proper attitude towards the Bible. No better handbook could be put into the hands of ordinary people; it is cheap, well written, and modern in spirit, while true to the Christian principles. The same may be said of a larger work by Mr J. R. Cohu, *The Bible and Modern Thought* (London: John Murray), although it deals only with the Old Testament. Its "aim is to place before the reader the present attitude of Modern Thought towards the vexed problems of the origin, composition, and historical trustworthiness of the Old Testament." Mr Cohu is not content to analyse literature; he estimates it. His book shows very wide reading and, what is still better, sound judgment. A chapter like that on "The Religious Value of the Priestly Code" is a really valuable help to those who desire to understand the growth and genius of the Old Testament.

JAMES MOFFATT.

REVIEWS.

The Concept of Nature. By A. N. Whitehead, Sc.D., F.R.S.—
Cambridge University Press, 1920.—Pp. viii + 202.

THIS book, with the exception of the last two chapters, consists of the first course of lectures delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, under the Turner Benefaction. The general outline of Professor Whitehead's theory of nature will be familiar to readers of the HIBBERT, either from his earlier *Principles of Natural Knowledge* or from the review of that work by the present writer. The main difference between the earlier and the later expositions is that in *The Concept of Nature* detailed mathematical deductions are avoided, and more attention is given to logical and epistemological considerations. Neither book can be dispensed with if Professor Whitehead's views are to be properly understood. The detailed deductions are needed to show that such premises as Whitehead's really do lead to workable definitions of the concepts used by mathematical physics. The epistemological discussions, quite apart from their intrinsic value, which is very great, are needed to show that some such interpretation as Whitehead's is not merely one possible alternative, but is the necessary way of analysing nature if we are to reach results that are intelligible as well as practically useful. In this review I shall confine myself mainly to logical and epistemological points.

It is a fact of observation that we can think about nature without thinking about thought. This remains true even if nature be in some way existentially dependent on the thoughts of ourselves or of God, as many idealists have held. Nature for the present purpose is defined as that whole of which—or of part of which—we become aware in sense-perception. Now, whether all sense-perception involves thought or not, it is certain that it involves a form of apprehension which is not thought, viz. sense-awareness. And it is also a fact of observation that we can think about nature without thinking about sense-awareness. This, again, is true without prejudice to the possibility that nature may in some sense be existentially dependent on the sense-awareness of ourselves or of someone else, as Berkeley held.

The next point, then, is to explain how sense-awareness differs from thought. We often talk of sensing and thinking of the same object, e.g. red. What is the difference? To explain this, Whitehead distinguishes three components in our knowledge of nature, viz. "fact, factors, and entities." Fact is the whole object of sense-awareness, factors are the distinct elements of this whole which also become objects of sense-aware-

ness, entities are "factors in their function as the termini of thought." The difference between sense and thought will therefore rest upon the difference between factors and entities, or on the difference between factors as such and factors treated as entities. Factors are of two different kinds, viz. events, *i.e.* bits of the whole fact which is nature, and objects that are not events, *e.g.* qualities like a definite shade of blue and relations like *between*. The latter are "situated in" the former. Now, any factor can be treated as an entity, and when this is done it is not merely sensed but thought about. An entity is treated as factor when it is merely demonstrated as a bare subject for thought. It is what answers to phrases like *this* and *it*. We of course meet with factors as elements in related wholes. And if they are events there will be qualities situated in them. Nevertheless, in thinking about them we drop the qualities and relations and think of the factor as a bare entity. This does *not* mean that we suppose that in fact it exists without qualities or relations. We do not. We treat the factor which we know to have qualities and to stand in relations as a mere peg on which to hang judgments. In dealing with other people we need to make them treat the factor, which we have turned into an entity, in the same way. This we can sometimes do by mere pointing. Yet generally we have to do it by using a descriptive phrase. Many phrases that appear to be merely demonstrative are elliptical and really involve descriptions. When we say: *That is a queer figure*, we are merely demonstrating. But when we say: *That man is a queer figure*, we mean, *That is a man, and has a queer figure*. The second statement would be contradicted by saying: *That is not a man but a scarecrow*. Thus we notice that when a descriptive phrase is used (*a*) we always do come down to a bare entity denoted by *that*, but (*b*) in order to make another man think of it we have to make an assertion about it which is not the assertion that we are principally intending to convey to him.

Now, Whitehead holds that a misinterpretation of the process by which thought treats factors as entities is the basis of the philosophical view of substance, and that the scientific concept of matter is a half-hearted attempt to combine this philosophic view of substance with the scientific question: What is nature made of? As regards the first point, entities without qualities and relations are regarded as the bearers of qualities and relations, and it is supposed that we only perceive the latter. The truth is that we perceive factors, and simply for purposes of thought treat them as entities. The second point is that science cannot rest in the philosophic notion of substances as entities without qualities or relations, and therefore gives to matter spatio-temporal qualities and relations, but refuses to give it any others. The other qualities are rejected because of the philosophic notion of substance; the spatio-temporal ones are kept because without them matter would be scientifically useless. The difficulties of such a view are not noticed. But clearly, if we only perceive attributes, it is only attributes that we have a right to regard as extended and standing in spatio-temporal relations. If matter be in space and time at all, we cannot identify its space and time with those in which we perceive attributes to be. No doubt the current doctrine of matter includes valuable elements; it expresses real facts such as permanence of mass of chemical constituents. Yet it expresses these facts in a muddled way, and the source of the muddle is the hypostatization of entities.

The second chapter deals with Theories of the Bifurcation of Nature,

and is extremely important. Bifurcation consists in dividing nature into two parts, a causal part—atoms, electrons, light-waves, etc.,—and an apparent part—colours, sounds, etc. The old naïve theory according to which we perceive the attributes of things which are bare substances is not itself a bifurcation theory in this sense. But the moment it is faced with the fact of the transmission of light, sound, etc., it tends to develop into a bifurcation theory. The colours that we do see are “apparent nature,” the vibrations that we do not see are “causal nature”; nature splits up into “the dream and the conjecture,” as Whitehead happily puts it. It seems to me that bifurcation theories are of two different types. Whitehead gives examples of both, and objects to both forms about equally, but he does not explicitly distinguish the two. The first is the theory of psychic additions. This is the view that when causal nature acts on mind, mind responds by creating apparent nature. The theory of primary and secondary qualities is an example of such a view. The second is the theory that when causal nature acts on mind, mind responds, not by creating, but by perceiving apparent nature. This second view can be stated so as to be completely self-consistent. It is most easy to do this on the absolute theory of space and time. Yet in any case it leaves the connection between apparent and causal nature unexplained; it makes causal nature conjectural, since we are never directly aware of it; and so it renders an ascription of spatio-temporal attributes to causal nature a mere far-fetched hypothesis. On both theories the fundamental difficulty is that we are not describing the relations of one bit of nature to another, but are talking of the causal relations between nature and the mind. In the one case we say that causal nature stimulates the mind to create apparent nature; in the other, that it stimulates the mind to perceive apparent nature. The fact is, as Whitehead says, that we do not believe in light-waves because they are just the sort of things that would be likely to stimulate a mind to create or to perceive colours. “The real question is: When red is found in nature, what else is found there also?” What we have to do is simply to exhibit the fundamental entities and relations in nature (*i.e.* the total object of perception), and to be sure that they are adequate to express all the observed facts. It is the inadequacy of the classical concepts used in dealing with nature that has led to bifurcation theories with their illegitimate introduction of the mind as a *deus ex machina*.

The third chapter explicitly deals with Time, but it also contains important principles of wider application. First, it explains what is meant by the notions of empty places and times. When we are aware of a part of nature in sense-perception, only certain features are distinctly discriminated and recognised to contain qualitative peculiarities. But none of these discriminated and qualified events are felt to be complete in themselves. They all refer to something beyond themselves which is not discriminated. The whole of which they are thus recognised to be fragments is a spatio-temporal whole. Now, we can think of other fragments of this whole, as definitely related to the discriminated fragments, without thinking of the particular qualities that reside in these other fragments. Thought of in this way, they are what we mean by places and bits of time. The whole of nature is in fact a spatio-temporal whole, and a bare event is a bit of this, thought of in its position in the whole, but without reference to the special qualities like colour, temperature, hardness, etc., which may reside in it.

Next, the whole of nature divides up into subordinate parts called durations. The content of any specious present, *i.e.* the immediate object of an act of sense-awareness, is a duration. But it contains thinner durations, and is contained in thicker ones which are certainly not within any specious present of ours. The notion of durations is fundamental for Whitehead and is very difficult to grasp. (i.) I think it is clear that the reference to a specious present is not a *definition* of a duration, but only an *example* of one. There are durations which do not, so far as we know, fall within any specious present. (ii.) I am not perfectly clear whether Whitehead regards the peculiar immediacy which belongs to durations that do fall within specious presents as a fact of external nature, or as a "psychic addition." There is no doubt whatever that the existence of durations is regarded by him as a fact of external nature; but this does not, of course, answer the present question. (iii.) Durations are said to be wholes all of whose parts are simultaneous. This sense of simultaneity does not imply "instantaneousness." And it is perfectly compatible with—indeed always coexists with—succession. I do not think that this can be regarded as a definition of durations. It would rather be true to say that Whitehead's sense of simultaneity is defined by reference to durations. Simultaneity, in this sense, is an irreducible *three-term* relation. The events A and B are not, as such, simultaneous; you can only say that they are simultaneous with respect to some duration C. With respect to thinner durations they will not be simultaneous. Time in nature is an expression of the relations between durations; space is an expression of the relations between events in a single duration.

Time is within nature in the sense that the measurable time of physics expresses the relations between durations, and durations are slices of nature. On the other hand, time extends beyond nature, in the sense that our mental acts succeed each other; what was perceived ceases to have immediacy and becomes merely remembered or quite forgotten. But the time in which the mind is cannot be identified with the time-series of nature, because mental events do not have those properties of natural durations which lead to a definition of physical time. Lastly, we must be prepared to recognise as a possibility (and, since Einstein, as a fact) that the whole course of nature contains many alternative time-series, each of which is as good as the rest. The whole course of nature can be analysed equally exhaustively into many different families of durations, just as a cone can equally well be sliced parallel to its base or to one of its generators, and so on. Each family defines a different and equally legitimate time-series.

In Chapter IV. the Method of Extensive Abstraction is explained. There are some improvements on the exposition which was given in *Principles of Natural Knowledge*. The sense in which the properties of an abstractive class of events converge to a definite limit as regards their numerical values, whilst the class itself does not converge to a limit, is made plain. Also the reason for the introduction of primes and antiprimes is explained; they are introduced in order to avoid irritating special cases of merely technical interest. The connection between puncts and event-particles is made clearer, and the useful distinction between the positional, the extrinsic, and the intrinsic properties of an event-particle is carefully pointed out. An event-particle derives its positional quality from the intersecting moments to which it belongs; it derives its intrinsic properties from qualities situated in the events that converge to it; whilst its extrinsic properties

are simply the relations in the convergent series of events that belong to it. The necessity for passing beyond momentary spaces and defining timeless spaces is well brought out at the end of the chapter by the question: "What is meant by saying that Cambridge in the instantaneous space of 10 o'clock is 52 miles from London in the instantaneous space of 11 o'clock?"

The problem of timeless space is dealt with in Chapter V. As readers of the earlier work will know, its solution depends on the relation of "cogredience" between a "percipient event" and its associated duration. These two difficult notions are much more clearly explained in the present work than in its predecessor. In the first place, it is made absolutely plain that the percipient event falls entirely on the side of nature, and in no sense on that of mind. It is roughly the events that constitute the life of the observer's body. Now this, being a factor present in all sense-perception, is apt to be ignored. Sense-perception is *at least* a triadic relation involving the mind, the body, and external events. Cogredience is the relation between a finite event of any kind and a duration, when this event (*a*) lasts just as long as the duration, and (*b*) has a fixed place in the duration. In particular, the percipient event is cogredient with the duration which is the content of a specious present. This simply means that for a duration to be present the events in my body must (*a*) extend through it and (*b*) keep stationary within it, *i.e.* that there must be one sense of *here* just as there is one sense of *now* in the duration. Other events cogredient with this duration are *there* in one definite sense. When the *here* becomes another *here*, the *now* becomes another *now*. Probably the particular duration which is present to us is determined by the percipient event; when the percipient event is succeeded by a new one which is not cogredient with the old duration, a new duration becomes the content of a new specious present. And this duration need not even belong to the same family as the previous one, *i.e.* there may be no third duration which contains both. Obviously cogredience gives us the notion of rest; and from it the notion of movement and of timeless spaces, in which alone movement has a meaning, can be derived. What we see approximates to an instantaneous space. Now there is no movement in an instantaneous space. Yet we seem to see the path (*e.g.* a road) along which an object that we also see is going to move. But this path is in a momentary space, and therefore never will be traversed. The solution of the difficulty is that, if our expectation is fulfilled, the moving object traverses in timeless space that straight line which is "occupied" by the momentary line which approximately is what we see.

Chapter VI., which deals with Congruence, is philosophically a great improvement on the corresponding parts of the *Principles of Natural Knowledge*, though I hardly think that the mathematical statements in it would be intelligible to anyone who had not followed the detailed deduction in the earlier work. It opens with a most illuminating discussion of M. Poincaré's view that measurement is purely conventional. Whitehead first distinguishes identity of numerical measure from congruence of what is measured. The former presupposes the latter. He then points out that, when the axioms for congruence are laid down, there is a whole host of different relations which equally fulfil them. The choice of one rather than another would lead to entirely different judgments as to what is congruent with what. Now, Poincaré's position was that nature gives us

no clue to choosing one relation rather than another. This must be carefully distinguished from the view that we are in fact confined to a small *set* of possible relations, and that we cannot say which of *these* has been chosen, because the resulting differences fall below the limits of observation. The paradox of Poincaré's view is that with all these alternative congruence relations open to us we should in fact have all chosen practically the same relation, as is shown by the almost complete agreement among our judgments as to what is congruent with what. The strength of his position is that, if space were really independent of time, as the classical view holds, there really would be nothing in nature to guide our choice. Whitehead's own position is that there are facts in nature which guide our choice, but they are facts about motion. They thus generate a theory of congruence both for space and for time. We judged that certain spaces and times were congruent long before the laws of motion were heard of; it is therefore absurd to suppose that our choice was guided by a desire to make the laws of motion as simple as possible, and that King Alfred judged that candles took equal times to burn equal lengths "out of a sentimental regard for Galileo, Newton, Euler, and Lagrange."

In the seventh chapter, which deals with Objects, we leave pure space-time, and enter the realm of matter. Objects are characteristics of events; they can exist in many times and places, unlike events themselves which cannot recur. Some objects can be perceived by the senses, but many cannot. All events in nature are situations of objects, but when the objects are imperceptible we call them empty. The general relation between an object and an event is called "ingression." Ingression takes various forms, including "situation" as a special case. Most difficulties about matter arise from three connected kinds of over-simplification:— (i.) The failure to recognise that there are many different types of object. The most important are sense-objects, perceptual objects, and scientific objects. All are equally real. (ii.) The failure to recognise that different kinds of objects are differently related to events, *i.e.* that there are different kinds of ingression. Even objects of the same kind (*e.g.* sense-objects) have different relations of ingression to different events. (iii.) The failure to recognise the existence of irreducible many-term relations. With these over-simplifications the problem of where an object is becomes hopeless; with a less simple-minded theory it becomes soluble. Every scientific object is, in a perfectly definite sense, everywhere. For an electron makes some difference throughout the whole of space and time. Yet it makes more difference to one event than to any others. This is called the event where it is situated. Still, the difference between situation and other kinds of ingression is mainly one of degree. A physical object is a connected set of sense-objects situated in a finite event. As a general rule the same event, or one not far removed from it, is also the situation of a scientific object. Multiple relations are specially needed for dealing with sense-objects. The ingression of a sense-object into an event involves at least (a) an active condition, which is generally an event occupied by a scientific object; (b) passive conditions; these really include the whole of nature, but most obviously include the event in which the sense-object is situated; (c) a percipient event, *i.e.* something going on in our bodies; (d) the event which is its situation. When the events (d) and (a) practically coincide we have normal perception, and the same event is occupied by other sense-objects and therefore by a perceptual object. This is the

general rule, but there are plenty of exceptions. If (*b*) includes an event with the qualities of a mirror, the situation of the sense-object and of the event which is the situation of that scientific object which is the active condition will be widely different. In such a case we do still subconsciously perceive associated sense-objects in the situation of the one actually sensed. Thus this situation contains not merely a sense-object but also a perceptual object. But this perceptual object, being situated in a quite different event from the causal scientific object, cannot be counted as physical. We call it a *delusive* perceptual object. Its ingression in the event in which it is situated is principally due to the mirror and to the perceptual event. For this reason it cannot be perceived from most places, whereas a non-delusive perceptual object can be perceived by practically anyone from practically anywhere.

The book closes with two supplementary lectures, not delivered under the Turner Benefaction. They contain a good summary of the whole theory, and are of special interest in bringing out Professor Whitehead's attitude towards the general theory of relativity which has become so prominent since the *Principles of Natural Knowledge* was written. The position is this. The transformations of the older theory of relativity are deduced by Whitehead from his own principles without any reference to the velocity of light. This is an enormous philosophic advantage. Purely spatio-temporal transformations ought to depend on the nature of space-time as such, and not on the properties of particular kinds of events in space-time. Conversely, Whitehead refuses altogether to regard gravitation as due to the properties of a non-homaloidal space-time. His view is that it is utterly impossible to give any clear meanings to congruence or to motion on such a theory. But he quite recognises that the traditional statement of the law of gravitation must be modified to meet the difficulty that "*the distance between two particles,*" which appears in this statement, has ceased to have any one unambiguous meaning. He states that by using the tensor method he has succeeded in reformulating the law of gravitation, with no nonsense about non-homaloidal spaces, but with the introduction of two different potential functions in place of the single function of the classical theory. Mathematicians and philosophers will eagerly await the publication of this vitally important piece of work.

The thanks rendered in the preface by Professor Whitehead to the Cambridge University Press officials seem to me excessive. No doubt their hearts are in the right place, but they have passed at least six bad mistakes. On p. 51, l. 4, for *sight* read *touch*; p. 86, l. 8, for *external, eternal*; p. 148, l. 4, for *agree, argue*; p. 155, l. 17, for *sense-object, perceptual object*; p. 180, l. 4, for *universely* (a pleasant conceit!), *inversely*; and on p. 188, l. 9, for *by* read *from*. In conclusion, I must say that anyone who has read *Principles of Natural Knowledge* will find his understanding of that book much improved by reading *The Concept of Nature*; and that anyone who has read neither should go at once to his (or her) bookseller and order both.

C. D. BROAD.

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL.

A Study in Realism. By John Laird, M.A.—Cambridge University Press, 1920.—Pp. xii + 228.

PROFESSOR Laird's book will be particularly welcomed by those who take an intelligent interest in philosophy, but have not the opportunity for special study. It gives the reader a good idea of the history and of the implications of the realistic theory of knowledge; it is written in a lively style—perhaps somewhat elaborately lively—and it touches upon a number of extremely interesting and important topics. The range of subjects discussed is indeed so wide that few are treated with any degree of thoroughness; but the author's readiness to discuss them at all will constitute, I think, one of the chief attractions of the book for the general reader.

The fundamental contention of realism, we are told, is that the object of true knowledge is independent of our knowing it, and that knowledge is "a kind of discovery in which things are directly revealed or given to the mind." "There is nothing in the relation between the mind and things which of itself makes anything inaccessible to knowledge." The process of knowledge always implies that the mind is confronted with an object; when that object is present and sensory, we have perception. If nothing intervenes between our minds and the thing which confronts us, perception may be said to be direct and immediate. What is it, then, that is directly perceived? Omitting answers which obviously contradict or are irrelevant to the fact of perception, Professor Laird goes on to discuss at some length the theory of "sensory atomism," according to which all we perceive are sense-data. This theory seems to him to be a true but incomplete account of the facts: sense-data certainly are perceived, but only as elements in a wider context. Particular shapes, colours, sounds, etc., are always "suffused with meaning" when we perceive them; they are signs as well as facts; and Professor Laird goes on to maintain that "meaning" is a characteristic of the things apprehended, and belongs to them as indefeasibly as do the qualities of hardness, extension, etc. This is a rather startling assertion, and perhaps the author is not really prepared to insist upon it, for in the same chapter he admits that "meaning may need a mind." The plausibility of the contention that meaning is an actual constituent of the perceived sensory complexes and is independent of mind rests, I think, on a confusion between "meaning" and "connection": it is argued that, since connections between real things are independent of our minds, and meaning presupposes connection, it too is independent of mind. Thus on p. 32 we read: "Meaning implies togetherness, but things may be found together as well as put together. A cow's tail is together with the cow, but if anyone was responsible for this conjunction, it was God." Quite so; but what of it? The connection between the cow and its tail certainly is objective and involves no reference to the apprehending mind; but we do not usually express this by saying that "a cow means a tail." And if Professor Laird really believes that meaning is "as radically objective as anything else that can be apprehended," how can he speak of "acquired" meaning? The "cold look" of the snow perceived at a distance can only be said to be an acquired meaning if we are considering the psychological development of the apprehending subject; so far as the objective order of fact is concerned, snow can no more have "acquired" its coldness than its whiteness. One cannot have it both ways: either meaning is as objective as colour or sound, and in that case it cannot be

"acquired" by the mind, or it is essentially bound up with mind, and then it cannot be a feature of the external world waiting to be discriminated by the subject, like a simple sense-quality.

The sensory complex which in perception directly confronts the mind has the kind of meaning which is elaborated into the common-sense notion of a physical thing. In spite of the difficulties involved in the ordinary conception of thinghood, the author thinks that "the material world is, broadly speaking, what it is perceived to be, although there is much error and enormous risk of error in our perception." The fact of error is said to be inexplicable—though why, on Professor Laird's premisses, it should be so, I utterly fail to see. If knowledge were a mere reception of sense-data by "diaphanous" states of mind, it would, indeed, be difficult to see how error would be possible; but if knowledge consists in the subject discerning the object and bringing to bear upon it his previous experiences, then it is obvious that, our minds being finite and imperfect, we may either fail to discriminate that which is before us, or may introduce into the object features that do not belong to it—or may do both.

The facts of memory, expectation, mental imagery, and abstract thought do not, Professor Laird thinks, contradict the fundamental principles of realism. Memory, he maintains, is the mind's awareness of past things themselves: we may inspect the past as well as the present; expectation, on the other hand, involves no direct acquaintance with the future, but is a present fact representing or signifying the future. Knowledge of universals is as immediate as knowledge of the particulars; though universals do not exist but only subsist, yet they confront the mind and reveal themselves to it. They are independent of our thinking and are literally discoverable as they are in themselves. As to images, Professor Laird contends that they are "apprehended things confronting the mind, given to the mind like anything else that it discovers," that "they are really physical facts partly identical with perceived or remembered things." "The elements imaged at any time," he writes, "are literally the same elements as those formerly perceived." This interpretation of images is full of difficulties and is, I think, hardly consistent with Professor Laird's account of sense-perception. He insists that we perceive physical things, not percepts (*e.g.* p. 56); but in that case how can an image consist of literally the same elements as those formerly perceived? The essential characteristic of images is that they are "immaterial," and unless a physical thing be resolved into a mere assemblage of appearances there is simply no meaning in saying that an imaged mountain is made of the same stuff as a real mountain. It is indeed hard to resist the conclusion that the author has not quite made up his mind as to what the object of perception really is; from certain passages it would appear as if he meant that we perceive *both* the physical thing *and* the percept (*e.g.* p. 88), while some of his arguments can only have force on the assumption that we perceive appearances and not physical things. But the greater, and I think the more valuable, portion of the book is based on the view that the act of perceiving is always directed upon actually existing things. This view of perception is familiar enough, and a great deal of what Professor Laird says is merely a restatement of the theory worked out by Professor Hicks in "The Basis of Critical Realism"¹ and elsewhere.

¹ *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 1916–1917.

In the last three chapters of his book Professor Laird seeks to interpret the nature of mind, the problems of value, the facts of constructive imagination and of religious experience in the light of a realistic theory of knowledge. These chapters are extremely interesting and suggestive, and whether one agrees with the author or not, one can but admire his determination to come to close quarters with some of the most difficult questions that realism has to face. Briefly, his conclusions are that "moral value or its opposite belongs to human actions, character, and dispositions in the same sense as redness belongs to a cherry"; that beauty is a predicate of things that bring delight; that individual minds are substances and not adjectives of the cosmos; that mysticism is a mistaken theory because the identity which it assumes between being and knowing is impossible.

These conclusions and the grounds on which they are based are so far-reaching and controversial that I can do no more than refer to one or two points that first suggest themselves. There seems to be a curious lack of cogency in Professor Laird's treatment of æsthetic values. He urges—quite rightly, I think—that judgments of beauty refer to things and not to our feelings about them, and says that "it is not nonsense" to contend that "the Ninth Symphony would be beautiful if no one heard it, and that the frozen seas would still glisten with loveliness after all life has departed from the earth"; but this contention, he thinks, goes beyond the evidence, "for beauty in our experience is never appreciated without delight, and it would therefore be illegitimate to argue that beauty would still be beauty in the absence of any possible delight." But surely it must be either one or the other: if beauty in its very meaning implies delight, it *is* nonsense to speak of things being beautiful when no one apprehends them; and if it is *not* nonsense, then the inseparability of beauty and delight in our experience is irrelevant to the point at issue. One might as well argue that it would be going beyond our evidence to say that colour is independent of mind because in our experience colour is inseparable from our seeing it; and if Professor Laird is going to take that line, what becomes of his realism?

There is a difficulty, too, involved in his treatment of moral values. It is maintained that moral obligation is more than a mere feeling, that the reasons for it lie in the value of the end, and that morality stands or falls with the validity of judgments of value. Now this contention would be true even if there were no generally binding rules of conduct, and if each particular case had to be judged on its own merits. A judgment of value may be objectively true of a given situation, but, if that situation is perfectly unique, it would not be true of any other. Whether or not such unique situations are likely to arise is another matter; the point is that the objective and binding character of moral judgments does not prejudge, one way or another, the generality of their application. Professor Laird, I believe, would agree with this, and yet he bases his argument against subjectivism in morality on the fact that *some* rules of conduct at any rate are universally binding. His examples in this connection are not happily chosen; thus, *e.g.*, he remarks that "there must be some rules of property if human society is to exist at all." Is it not somewhat rash to assume that the institution of property is an ultimate condition of human existence?

As to mysticism, which Professor Laird weighs and finds wanting within the space of seven short pages, one would question the correctness

of his interpretation of the mystics' position. There may be more to be said in defence of the philosophy of mysticism than the author appears to think.

It is characteristic of Professor Laird's general outlook that he insists on the discreteness of the world rather than on its unity, and is more concerned to vindicate the empiricist reality of concrete particulars than to dwell on their connection with the cosmic whole; and he appears to think that this is the characteristic attitude of realism as such. But the view that in knowledge we are "face to face" with reality leaves room for more than one interpretation of that reality, and allows full play to the thinker's individual or national predilections; and Professor Laird's distrust of a metaphysic that threatens to disturb the practical, "common-sense" conceptions of workaday life is so typically British that one is tempted to ascribe it not to the "temper of realism" but to the temper of the race.

NATHALIE A. DUDDINGTON.

LONDON.

Primitive Society. By Robert H. Lowie.—New York, 1920.—
Pp. viii + 463.

THE author of this book, Dr Lowie, of the American Museum of Natural History in New York, is a well-known authority upon the American aboriginal, and has done much work upon the social organisation and religious institutions of the Crow Indians. The book before us shows good evidence of an intimate first-hand acquaintance with the problems presented by the social organisation of savage and barbarous peoples. Until lately this has been a most backward branch of anthropology, a backwardness due largely to the fundamental place it takes in human society, so that it is far less obtrusive than the more superficial features of ritual or details of art and craft.

Dr Lowie has brought together in a most useful form existing knowledge concerning such institutions as marriage, kinship, the various forms of social grouping such as the family and clan (here called the sib), the position of women, property, government, rank, as well as those forms of association, secret and open, such as men's societies and age-grades, which form prominent features of so many human societies. It is natural that the facts of North America should be most fully described and classified, but other parts of the world are also thoroughly considered, Africa lagging somewhat behind the rest, however, in fullness and accuracy of treatment.

On the theoretical side Dr Lowie ranges himself with the historical as opposed to the unfortunately termed "evolutionary" school of anthropology, and is perhaps too scathing in condemnation of his countryman, Lewis Morgan, who, in spite of his many faults and mistakes, must always rank as the greatest of the pioneers in this subject. In his historical treatment, however, Dr Lowie cannot bring himself to reject the view, generally accepted in America, that that continent has escaped the widespread movements of culture which we now know to have been widely diffused over the earth.

Many features of the book show that Dr Lowie is beginning to nourish

doubts concerning this "Monroe doctrine" of American ethnology. The half-way attitude detracts in some degree from the consistency and clarity of his treatment, but this is a small fault beside its many merits. At present the book holds the field without a rival as an introduction to the study of the social organisation of the less-civilised regions of the earth.

W. H. R. RIVERS.

ST JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

Christian Socialism, 1848-1854. By Charles E. Raven, M.A., Fellow and Dean of Emmanuel College, Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1920.—Pp. xii+396.

MR RAVEN, being himself obviously full of enthusiasm for his subject, has given us a study of Christian Socialism in England which it is an inspiration and a pleasure to read. There was room and need for such a book, if for no reason other than this, that a movement which flowed from such genuine spiritual loyalty and love, attracted men of such fine and noble character, and evoked for a time so much self-sacrificing zeal, deserves to be worthily recorded and remembered. It is more than probable that Mr Raven, in his own eager loyalty to the memory of great men, rather exaggerates the actual historical importance of the movement. It endured for a short time only. Its definite social experiments, especially the Associations of Producers, the self-governing, co-operative workshops, and so forth, ended in failure, if not in disaster. Upon what we might call the "Socialist" development generally, the movement exercised practically no influence at all, and no one would look in the accepted socialist philosophy of to-day for the slightest trace of such influence. It is extremely doubtful, too, whether Christian Socialism accomplished much within the Christian Churches; certainly, it did not do so in its own day nor immediately after; and though, probably, its spirit inspired a succession of Christian thinkers with the desire to make definite social application of the ethics of Christ and the Kingdom of God, and especially of the ethics involved in the doctrine of the Incarnation, the number of such thinkers has always been, and is to-day, quite small, whilst the mass of Christian believers remain rooted in the notions of a merely individualistic salvation and a kingdom of heaven that has singularly little relation with the kingdoms of earth. Christian Socialism converted very few Christians to socialism and still fewer socialists to Christianity. Though Mr Raven vigorously, and to a large extent rightly, protests (*cf.* pp. 340, 341, 369, etc.) against undue belittling of the significance of the movement, it does seem, on the whole, that the interest and value of Christian Socialism lie not so much in its results upon history, which were meagre, as in the sort of spirit that gave it birth and the uplifting character of the men who mainly supported it; and this fact Mr Raven's book, whether designedly or not, does actually emphasise. For the moving pages all through are not those which deal with achievements, but those which present to us the leading figures in the movement; and these pages, let it be said, are thoroughly well done. The best chapters in the book are chapters ii. to v. inclusive, where we learn, not what these great men did, but *why* they wanted to do anything at all, and *whence* they drew their power. They must have been a fascinating and

wonderful group: Denison Maurice, whom Mr Raven boldly claims as the greatest Churchman of the century (p. 75), and Ludlow, to whom in this book full justice is at last done, and Kingsley, the fiery and unstable, a kind of Peter, and Hughes of *Tom Brown's Schooldays*, and Neale, and others rich in talent, rich in enthusiasm, above all rich in the faith of Christ; and there is something, we are quite sure, which all reformers and revolutionaries have still to learn from that discipline of the "weekly Bible-reading," which, we take it, was a real communion with Christ, that kept these men going in all their thought and labour (*cf.* p. 134). Of course, there was very little in the movement that deserves the name "socialism," unless that name is used in some loose and casual way. Hardly any of the leaders of the movement, excepting Ludlow, had any particular acquaintance with genuine socialistic thought and philosophy. They were passionately aflame with indignation against the horrors of the industrial system and the callous brutality of *laissez-faire*: they believed, or at any rate Maurice believed, that the Gospel and Faith of Christ meant brotherhood in human life and the absolute value of each individual soul; but they never really advanced to radical criticism of the social system surrounding them, they were in no sense whatever revolutionary, the Alpha and Omega of socialistic philosophy, namely the attack on private property, did not concern them, and they remained to the end mildly reformist in their activities and their proposals. If they were socialists at all, they belonged to the gentlest utopian and emotionalist school. "Christian Socialism," said Maurice, "is, to my mind, the assertion of God's order. Every attempt to hide it under a great machinery, call it organisation of labour, or what you like, I must protest against as hindering the gradual development of what I regard as a divine purpose, as an attempt to create a new constitution of society, when what we want is that the old constitution shall exhibit its true functions and energies" (*Life of Maurice*, vol. ii. p. 44). That is hardly a socialistic sentiment, and the "old constitution" was, for Maurice, what some of us would regard as a very Tory and deplorable sort of affair. Socialism can never be reformist merely without ceasing to be socialism, and it is highly probable that a genuine *Christian* socialist philosophy, could we arrive at it, would be less reformist and more fundamentally revolutionary than any. True enough, the Christian Socialists were mostly on the right side in every conflict: they fought a good fight in the lock-out of engineers in 1852, and generally they stood firmly on the side of the workers—a fact which, to some minds, of course, may not be a recommendation. Nor does their failure to build up a really socialistic philosophy on a Christian basis detract from the value of the work they did, and still less from the value of the spirit in which they laboured. Mr Raven, it is true, wants to make them into real socialists and thorough-going revolutionaries, seeking the abolition of the wage-system, the total reconstruction of society, and so forth (*cf.* pp. 247–249, etc.); but we do not think he succeeds. There are isolated utterances on the part of Ludlow and Hughes which point beyond the general outlook of the movement, but that is all. In the end their most enduring influence was educational, and that not only in the "Working Men's College," so romantically instituted, so devotedly maintained, but also in the stream of thought, deep if not very wide, which started from them, and to this day continues and deepens, and perhaps also widens in the number of those it includes, within the Anglican and other Christian Churches.

Evidently Mr Raven has envisaged the episode of "Christian Socialism" against the background of his own loyalties and enthusiasms rather than against the background of history, especially socialist history—the history of socialism and socialist philosophy—in this country. We would not complain of this method; rather we accept it as explaining some of the highly controversial, partial, and almost, at times, unenlightened, references which the author makes to socialist philosophy and the socialist movement generally, and by which, through their accumulation, the final few pages of his book are rendered extremely unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, the main task has been thoroughly well done; the enthusiasm of the book is refreshing; and those who care to read it will be thereafter grateful indeed to the writer.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

LIVERPOOL.

De la Discipline Intellectuelle (pp.191) and *La Paix des Nations et la Religion de l'Avenir* (pp.31). Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 1919.

THESE little volumes are supplementary to the author's *La Religion*. In the former he relates the discipline of the intellect to that wider discipline, moral, social, and religious, of the individual, which he dealt with in the last-mentioned essay. Like the moral, the intellectual discipline is secular and social, the result of aggregate social experience and effort. One of the chief lessons of the intellect has been the knowledge of its own limitations, which it is very far, as yet, from having fully learnt. At the same time, faith in its powers, within these limits, is essential. This faith is justified by the achievements of Science in the sphere of practical application and invention. It is only so far as Science leaves this, its proper field, and begins to enunciate general world-conceptions, that it goes astray, and its worst error has been the pretension to create a new basis and scheme of morality (p. 49). No new foundation can be laid but that which is already immanent in the society and individual, the sense of duty, which has been of gradual growth; its early beginnings, like those of intelligence, being observable in the forms of animal life inferior to man. The moral sense covers a wider field than that of intellect, and therefore, though their union and interaction are necessarily intimate, the attempt to subject the former to the latter, or reduce it entirely to intellectual terms, is utterly contrary to their respective natures and relationship. Their unity and difference are manifested in the fact that, while each aims at different ideals, those of Goodness and Truth, neither ever fulfilled though in process of fulfilment, yet Goodness cannot be abstracted from an intellectual, nor Truth from a moral element (p. 46).

In the third chapter the author maintains that, while the dogmatism of the Church has done much to hamper individual thought, it cannot in the long run stay the march of Truth. On the contrary, all efforts directed to this end have had the opposite effect. On the other hand, there is the dogmatism of theoretical science (chap. iv.). Where this has been content to destroy the pretensions of theology, it has done a useful work in clearing away obstacles to knowledge. Where it has attempted to destroy, not only the superstructure, but the very foundations of faith, such action has recoiled on itself. For faith in the ideal is at the base of all morality, and

all exercise of the intellect—faith in the correspondence of the moral sense and mental powers with Reality. And that Reality is what, in religious language, is called God (pp. 116, 117).

Such, however, is not precisely Loisy's view, since in this summary an important word has been altered. Instead of "Reality" Loisy has 'Human ideal,' and thus, while admitting transcendence in a certain sense, he yet limits it to its social manifestations, whether now or in the future. It is a kind of religious positivism.

With these views it is hardly possible for him to maintain that nice balance between socialism and individualism which he affects (p. 175), but which it is in any case difficult to adjust without inclining in one direction or the other. He is strongly opposed to individualism, and his stress is always on the rights of Society as against those of the individual. But Society is composed of individuals: in itself it is an abstraction, and the question can therefore resolve itself into a balance of conflicting rights and duties. At least this is an aspect which cannot be neglected. The subject occupies a larger field in *La Religion*, but here it is to be noted that, as part of his proposed transference of the moral and intellectual authority, once generally exercised and still claimed by the Church, to the National Teaching Body, he suggests (pp. 134, 135) a kind of moral inquisition, which might, if realised, easily develop into a new tyranny.

Yet, if there is any lesson to be learnt from history, it is that Society is by no means always right, and that if, in the main, it has progressed in the ideal direction, this is largely owing to the action of individuals. He does not allow enough for what theology calls "inspiration," and philosophy "intuition"; for the sudden emergence of the religious and moral genius, a factor so notable in the history of Israel, where, though circumstances doubtless helped to make the prophet, they stood, for the most part, in strong contrast with his teaching.

And, generally, it must be observed that the opposition is not, as Loisy maintains, only between the self and Society, or even idealised Humanity. There is also an opposition, at once deeper and higher, between the self and its moral ideals as such; ideals which doubtless have developed in and through Society, but which have transcended it mainly by means of individual activities. Society takes cognisance of, and imposes, civic and external duties, not the inward cultivation of the distinctively Christian virtues.

The short pamphlet on the "Peace of Nations" is the opening lecture of the course on the history of religions in the Collège de France, delivered 2nd December 1918. It consists in the main of an application of the principles of the foregoing works to a kind of International Federation—an ideal which the author is fully aware is a very long way from being realised.

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE, SUSSEX.

The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion. Bampton Lectures. By Rev. A. C. Headlam, D.D.—London: John Murray.—Pp. x + 326.

WITHOUT any doubt the conscience of all serious Christians is made uneasy by the sight of our "unhappy divisions," but an equally potent instrument in stimulating the demand for reunion is the growing impotence of all

Christian Churches. In countries steeped in ignorance the power of the priest may still be fitfully exercised, but in all countries where freedom of thought obtains, official religion rests helplessly on its laurels, and calls on its past to redeem it from its present evil case. And the sense of failure is an even more effective goad towards working for reunion than that of duty.

Dr Headlam's contribution to the cause of reunion is in many ways the most notable of any made for many years past. For it is the work of a scholar and a theologian whose studies have equipped him admirably for his task. He possesses the advantage, too, of being in the confidence of many of the most sober and devoted members of his Church. And what is even a greater gift is his, that of a balanced judgment and a cool, equable, and sympathetic temper. With all these advantages, it is not surprising if we are given a course of Bampton Lectures which will not only mould thought, but also lead to practical changes.

The difficulties attaching to all proposals for reunion lie partly in our traditions, and partly in the nature of the case. Two principles have come down to us in stark opposition, the principle of freedom and that of order. The latter was paramount in the Middle Age and is still no negligible quantity. It dwells in the claims made for the hierarchy, and deduces the existence and nature of the Church from the powers of the priesthood. It rests on externals, and, therefore, on history and its documents, on unwritten traditions, and on prejudices which are not brought out into the open. Its most consistent champions are the Roman hierarchy, and those members of the English Church who lean towards Rome. Dr Headlam frankly gives up the former as hopeless. But will not the ears of the latter be equally deaf to his appeal?

There is then the principle of freedom, viz. that which puts the Church first and its representative ministry second; which regards the bishop as no bishop apart from his church, and the decrees of councils as valid only when ratified by the whole body of the faithful. This is the principle of ecclesiastical democracy, and it would seem incompatible with the principle of monarchy as held by Papalists, or of aristocratic government as taught by High Anglicans. Dr Headlam argues—and his arguments have solid ground in history—for the view which makes for freedom. On the other hand, he finds the principle of order allowed for sufficiently if we insist on the ministry and the Sacraments being used to fulfil the intention of Christ and His Apostles. "The Early Church recognised the value of the succession of Christian bishops as a guarantee of the correct traditions of the Christian religion, but had no theory of succession by ordination. What was believed was that the Sacraments were duly administered because they were the Sacraments of the Church and of Christ. The only condition for which there is any real authority in the New Testament is that ministers were appointed by laying on of hands and of prayer. It was natural and right that the Church should make regulations for the future administration of the Sacraments and should appoint the bishop as the proper minister of ordination, but the Sacraments depend not on the ministry but on the Church, and within the Church, if they are administered according to the teaching of the New Testament and with the intention of doing what Christ and His Apostles did, they are valid." That is well said, and it sums up in short compass Dr Headlam's main contention. But his plea for the recognition of this standpoint by our fellow-Christians at home is likely to be neutralised by his demand that,

so soon as we have induced all bodies of Christians to reunite on the basis of all their orders being valid, then there should follow "the most careful adoption by the united Church of the historical Episcopate and the rule of episcopal ordination for all its ministry in the future." This demand may be made innocuous enough, no doubt, but it will not seem so to our sturdy Independents and resolute Baptists. The very word episcopate will have to be surrendered before these will ever consider its claims. Probably, too, we should come across many Episcopalians who do not regard episcopacy as a wholly blessed thing.

Where many of us would have liked Dr Headlam's further instruction is at a point where he frankly warns us not to look for it. He makes certain quite contemptuous references to critics or "certain scholars." These critics "find all sorts of reasons for rejecting" texts such as Mark x. 35-45 and Matt. xx. 20-28, and are told that "we cannot waste more space on such trifling." The decision seems lamentable on many accounts, for after all critics have their place, and some are of more worth than others. This unsympathetic tone towards criticism can but remind us of men like St Bernard who have stained their fame by their unwillingness to believe that faith and reason have a common purpose. Moreover, the heresy of one generation becomes the orthodoxy of the next. When *Lux Mundi* appeared a quarter of a century ago it raised a storm of protest. To-day its position is taken for granted. Who rails at criticism imperils Knowledge, and in the end will find that he tilts at windmills.

But this allowed for, we can but welcome Dr Headlam's Bampton Lectures as a hopeful sign of the times. They would have been still more useful if their author could have shaken himself free from the delusion of the concrete universal as applied to the Church. Even if Dr Hort be right in maintaining that to the early Christians their Church was but Israel in a new form, it does not follow that experience and reflection would affirm their judgment to be correct. And certainly, any doctrine which puts the Church first and the individual second seems to fly in the face of the direct message of Jesus. In any case, we cannot to-day accept the infallibility of the first disciples, but must take things as they are, and improve them as best we can where they need improvement. If the divisions of Christendom be an evil—and they are not wholly evil—and if better machinery will end the divisions—a disputable hypothesis—then federation seems the way out of our difficulties. Yet Dr Headlam will have none of this simple and straightforward method. W. F. GEIKIE-COBB.

CHURCH OF ST ETHELBURGA, E.C.

Erasmus and Luther: Their Attitude to Toleration. By Robert H. Murray, Litt.D.—London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1919.

IN this learned book Dr Murray has isolated one aspect of the Reformation movement for special study. With the growth of wide divergence upon questions of doctrine, toleration became a matter of critical importance, and its influence in public policy during the last four centuries has made it impossible for mediævalism to exist except as an exotic in the modern

world. The Inquisition as an instrument for crushing heresy, or as the protector of a divine pattern of uniformity—it matters little from which point of view we regard it—is out of fashion. Few men would be so foolish as to revive the old argument that it is better to torture bodies than to damn souls. Even in presence of opinions which we regard as poisonous we still do homage to freedom of thought. For this change in public manners, resting as it does upon a profound change in theological ethics, we are indebted in the first place to the two dominating minds of the sixteenth century, Erasmus and Luther. Which of the two showed the greater force and originality on this subject? How far was their own insight blurred by temperament or the critical circumstances of their own time? These are among the questions to which Dr Murray tries to find an answer. The task has led him to a fresh handling of the abundant material, and of the permanent contrast in character between the teacher of a peaceful renaissance and the prophet of religious revolution.

There is no evidence in the case of Erasmus that his belief in toleration came as the result of struggle. His teaching about it is consistent. He is guilty of no passionate reactions against it. He claimed for himself and for others the freedom which is essential to every great searcher for knowledge. He was a humanist to his finger-tips. Toleration was native to his mind. Like the Alexandrines, he regarded the Greeks no less than the Jews as forerunners of Christ. "When I read certain of these great men," he writes, "I can scarcely avoid saying: Holy Socrates, pray for us." Or again, in reference to Cicero: "I cannot read his books on Old Age, Friendship, and Duties without stopping and kissing the manuscript. . . . He is inspired." This is the pure devotion of the scholar, with his love for the open face of truth and his scorn for whatever disfigures it. But blending with this there was also an element of Christian insight. For Erasmus, tolerance and the restraint which it imposes upon the clash of opinions were inseparable from the mind of Christ. When he unlocked the New Testament with the key of knowledge he confronted the harsh manners of his age with the image of Christ in the Gospels. The Church in its origin owed its existence to love, not to force. "Christ founded a bloodless empire. He wished it always to be bloodless. He delighted to call himself the Prince of Peace." He was prepared to take all the risks to traditional opinions of placing the Bible in its integrity in the hands of the common people, for "Salvation is not more common and left open to all than the doctrine of Christianity: it drives away none save him who drives himself away." In all this there is a noble spirit of consistency, which was not deflected from its course by ecclesiastical hostility or the vehement demands that he should support Luther in his open revolt and his final break with the Church. "I have always written," he says in a letter to Joachim Camerarius, "have always thought the same things." In the case of Luther the problem is much more baffling. The difference between the two men is hardly explained in Dr Murray's striking phrase, "Erasmus was a great humanist, Luther a great human being." Nor do we get much light, except upon the intensity of their personal misunderstandings, from the suggestive fact that Erasmus was a middle-aged man of European reputation while Luther was still young and unknown. At the same time, it would be hardly fair to say, as we are tempted to do, that Luther was only tolerant by accident; for Dr Murray's evidence, drawn especially from *The Freedom of a Christian Man*, and

confirmed by numerous sentences from his letters and other writings—"I will have no forcing and compelling," "No man can or ought to be forced to believe, but everyone should be instructed in the Gospel and admonished to believe, though he is left free to obey or not to obey"—is conclusive to the contrary. The truth is that Luther had far more tolerance in his heart than he was ever able to practise in the revolutionary ferment of his own life. He saw the uselessness of force in religion; but he also saw the spirit of liberty which he had evoked running riot in undisciplined violence. This it is which justifies Dr Murray's conclusion that on the subject of toleration he was essentially opportunist. Sturdy common sense, the conservative instincts of his own nature, and the sublime confidence of the mystic determined his attitude to Carlstadt and Münzer. Like Cromwell in Ireland, Luther regarded himself as God's instrument in his dealings with the Peasants' Revolt. The mystic in politics has no use for mild principles of toleration, and does not even regard consistency as a virtue. It is, I think, open to question whether Luther's earlier teaching had much influence upon the progress of toleration, in view of this desertion of it for what Dr Murray calls pragmatic reasons. The Lutheran settlement of the problem of Church and State has been distinctly unfriendly to personal liberty in matters of faith. Its controlling principle, *Cujus regio ejus religio*, is simply an echo of Luther's own words, "In a country there must be one preaching only allowed."

All this is admitted by Dr Murray. He goes so far as to draw a parallel between Luther and Bismarck. "They believed," he says, "in the mass of mankind when the mass believed in them—but not for a moment longer. Both were anxious to influence the people, the one by his pamphlets, the other by his newspapers. Just as Luther tried to crush the peasants, Bismarck tried to crush the Socialists. As Luther in 1525, by his pamphlets against the peasants, became the involuntary and unwilling instrument of political revolution, so Bismarck in 1875, by adopting protectionism, became the involuntary and unwilling instrument of social revolution." And so we are brought to the strange conclusion that, while the calm statements of Erasmus on the subject of toleration are untarnished by the lapse of time and remain as ideal standards for the future, Luther helped the same cause chiefly by the destruction of unity, and thus creating violent oppositions of thought and practice, for which toleration was the only practical way of peace. It is not for us to say which has conferred the greater benefit upon the world. On the whole, Dr Murray seems to weight the scales on the side of Luther. It is the view which is likely to be popular in religious circles, though scholars and men of reflection will enter their own *caveat*. Of more value than these temperamental judgments is the desire to rise above them into the blissful mood in which ardent conviction and calm reasonableness do equal homage to Love, which is at once the finer breath of knowledge, the fiery core of faith, and the goal of all our strife. To such prophecy Dr Murray has nothing to say; it lies beyond his scope; but his careful and fascinating study of these protagonists of freedom, with their mingled strength and weakness, points the way to a solution of the problem of toleration which, by doing equal justice to every noble faculty of the soul, will set a term to the long conflict between humanism and faith. We cannot part with his book without a word of special gratitude for its excellent bibliography and index, and the wide and exact scholarship of its abundant references and notes.

WM. HAMILTON DRUMMOND.

The Revelation of St John. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary. With Introduction, Notes, and Indices, and the Greek Text and English Translation. By R. H. Charles, D.Litt., D.D. (International Critical Library). 2 vols.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920.

SHIPWRECK, as Dr Charles has elsewhere pointed out, is a fate which has befallen even the greatest scholars in the past who have attacked the problem of *Revelation*. It is some comfort, therefore, that the most distinguished of British apocalyptic students is able to announce in his preface the discovery of an insurance against it. A multitude of disintegrating theories have been propounded. "The bulk of these were due to their authors' ignorance of John's style. . . . With the utmost light-heartedness they excised from his text chapters and groups of chapters which are indisputably Johannine." In other words, they launched on the troubled waters of exegesis without first testing the timbers of their ships.

From such adventure Dr Charles guards himself by that exhaustive examination of fact which our native tradition of scholarship requires as an indispensable preliminary to theory. One can only wonder why, in these days of costly printing, he has devoted such disproportionate space to the out-of-date redactional conjectures of Spitta, Bousset, etc. The reason is probably because, as he tells us in his preface, he was himself tempted at the outset to a similar hypothesis. In the progress of his studies, however, he became profoundly dissatisfied, and increasingly convinced that the only safe guide was to be found in exact textual criticism. The writer of the Apocalypse had "created a Greek that is absolutely his own. This Greek I slowly mastered as I wrote and rewrote my commentary chapter by chapter." The most permanent result of this work is seen in a Short Grammar of the Apocalypse (Introduction, § xiii.), the need for which has been expressed by more than one modern scholar, but which has never before received such thorough treatment. With the help of this Grammar, Dr Charles, assisted by able collaborators, has overhauled the text minutely, and declares roundly for the "absolute pre-eminence" of Codex Alexandrinus as the basis of reconstruction. Here, as elsewhere, Dr Charles rather prejudices his case by over-emphatic language, but his judgment of the relative value of the MSS. and Versions is founded on accurate and acute reasoning. Confirmed by a reliable text, the Hebraisms set forth in the Grammar (many of these are pointed out for the first time) are undeniable. Whether their regular irregularity proves that "while John wrote in Greek he thought in Hebrew" is another question; but at least the timbers of the critical ark are sound, carefully chosen, and cunningly fitted together. Dr Charles is well prepared to launch out into the deep of exegesis.

Yet, once embarked, we are conscious that the shipwright's craft differs from the science of navigation. Not that Dr Charles is pedantically dependent on the result of his textual criticism. When desirable, he rejects what it favours (*e.g.*, on xix. 12 c, "though the diction is Johannine this clause seems to be interpolated") or includes what is suspect (*e.g.*, on xxii. 8, "here apparently the editor has normalised the text"). In spite of this freedom, his commentary is the work of one who steers by the shape of the tiller rather than by the stars. For the whole exegesis is made to turn on a single text (xiii. 8), where "as many as should not worship the

image of the beast should be killed" is interpreted as a prophecy of universal martyrdom. For this remarkable conception the only support which Dr Charles gives is Pliny's letter to Trajan. Yet he should have known (since he actually refers elsewhere to the context, vol. i. p. 198 n.) that the details of the persecution are to be found in 3 Macc. ii. 27, where Caligula (disguised as Ptolemy Philopator) decrees exactly the same penalties for refusal to sacrifice, namely, (1) death, (2) loss of civic rights, *without exterminating the Jews*.

An expectation of universal martyrdom being postulated, everything is made to centre on this culminating event in the history of the Church Militant. To it *all* the visions in the first thirteen chapters lead—except rather more than half! There are two pauses in "the orderly sequence" (the sealing in chapter vii. and the Angel of the Cloud in chapter x.), a proleptic vision (the two Witnesses, chapter xi.) and a retrospective vision (War in Heaven, chapter xii.), besides a "grotesquely ignorant interpolation" (the First Four Trumpets, chapter viii.). Thus exceedingly tossed with the tempest, we draw near to the quicksands of the Two Beasts (chapter xiii.). Dr Charles accepts (without discussion) Victorinus' identification of the Beast from the land with the heathen priesthood, adding the modern German limitation of the reference to the provincial Cæsar cult. Indeed, with universal martyrdom in sight, what other explanation can be given of the destroying power? Any Christianity outside the Roman Empire must be ignored, and the latter chapters of *Revelation* must be a prophecy of Nero redivivus heading Parthian hordes against the second coming of the Christ.

The one objection to this scheme (that it does not square with the facts) is fortunately of little importance to the modern exegete, who is familiar with a useful though generally short-lived tribe, originally also of Teutonic extraction. An Imbecile Editor has been at work. "This shallow-brained fanatic and celibate, whose dogmatism varies directly with the narrowness of his understanding, has stood between John and his readers for nearly 2000 years." Sexual self-sacrifice (and perhaps, according to the latest theories, even monogamy) are heritages from "pagan faiths of unquestionable impurity," whatever may be the opinion of Paul of Tarsus or of that Benedict in whose Abbey Church Dr Charles ministers. Forgetful of the dangerous homing tendency of curses, Dr Charles does not hesitate to adopt the violent language which is a master-shipman's privilege. But it gives his whole argument an unfortunate appearance of special pleading. When other reasons fail, a thing is so "clearly," or "incontestably," or "manifestly," or "beyond question." Any alternative is "against every reasonable meaning," or "absolutely impracticable." Dogmatism is always apt to create a prejudice in the reader's mind, and in this case the more apt because one cannot avoid an uncomfortable impression that something is being kept back. Why, for example, does Dr Charles give no note on N.T. prophecy when the two principal symbols of Revelation (the Lamb and the Bride) are attributed in the Fourth Gospel to the Baptist? Why does he not examine the use of the number Seven, with its even more important concomitants the Triad and the Eighth? Why does he not mention the Man on the White Horse (*El Khidhr*) in commenting on the Word Triumphant? Why has he rewritten his note on viii. 12 in *Studies* so as not to show ignorance of Day and Night being astronomical concepts distinct from the heavenly bodies?

With the Imbecile Editor as pilot, our ship labours exceedingly. John,

we are told, "did not live to revise his work, or even to put the materials of x. 1 to xxii. into their legitimate order." Dr Charles accordingly rearranges them. Since all Christians have been killed, the thrones of the First Resurrection (xx. 4) can have no occupants but martyrs. (The Imbecile Editor has thus added to his heresy by disparaging martyrdom as well as matrimony.) On similar grounds the City of God (xxii. 10) was originally a description of the millenarian "camp of the saints" in which the martyrs reign. Passages which do not fit this re-ordering are either grotesque interpolations, or, being written on separate pieces of parchment, are misplaced by John's "very unintelligent" disciple. However, "the reverent and patient research of the present age" has enabled Dr Charles to discover the true teaching of the great Christian Prophet. Restored to their original order, the contents of *Revelation* fall "naturally" into seven parts, of which the second occupies nearly two-thirds of the whole MSS., the fifth is built up of twelve verses selected out of three chapters, and the sixth is limited to five verses. Truly the hinder part of our ship is broken with the violence of the waves.

It is not possible in a short review to do more than indicate the cause of this disastrous landfall, namely, Dr Charles's almost total lack of interest in the history and geography of the Ægean, from an island in which *Revelation* is dated. For centuries before Greek history begins, East and West had been mingling along the great trade routes of S. Asia Minor, more particularly along the Cadmus track *via* Rhodes (which includes Patmos in its sphere), and thence north and west. Of the Semitic elements in the resulting commixture Hebrew culture is a secondary and late constituent. Dr Charles could have saved himself the lengthy discussion of the inconsistency between *Revelation's* First Heaven and Jewish tradition, if he had noted that at Cos (between Rhodes and Patmos) the seven *λύχνοι*, the two *λυχνία*, a throne with brazen *κύκλος*, and other significant ornaments were used in the sanctuary of the Tyrian Herakles (Ross, *Ins. Gk. Ined.*, No. 310). He would not have been so ready to conclude that the use of Hebraisms proves imperfect knowledge of Greek, if he had taken account of the possible kinship between the three "strong" angels of *Revelation* and the Kabiritic Triad, for in the cult of the latter at Samothrace (where Cadmus found his bride) "the autochthones used an ancient dialect of their own, of which much is preserved in the sacrificial ritual unto this day" (Dio. Sic., v. 47). Since this included the Semitic word *Kohen* for priest, the grammar of the Apocalypse is patient of explanation as an Ægean convention for mystic utterances.

With all humility, the present writer would express the wish that, should Dr Charles ever revise his commentary, he will reduce its over-positive tone outside those subjects where his twenty-five years' study of Jewish writings makes him peculiarly entitled to speak. Where his notes deal with that side of the problem, his work is superb (*e.g.* the masterly excursus on the Souls under the Altar, vol. i. p. 172). It is most distressing to find under the same covers arguments like the deduction from the order of the foundations of the City (vol. ii. p. 168), where he fails to notice that there is no reversal of the zodiac if the plan was made by an observer from below. He has, in fact, tried to prove too much. A great Hellenist (the late Bishop Hicks of Lincoln), discussing Sir W. Ramsay's studies in the *Expositor* some years ago, expressed to the present writer the firm opinion that "all is Hebrew." Dr Charles has given us an invaluable

catena of references to apocalyptic literature and a notable monograph on the grammatical peculiarities of *Revelation*, but he has unconsciously demonstrated Hicks's judgment to be wrong. Hellenist alone and Hebraist alone here alike failed to bring the ship across the bar. There remains only the method of Comparative Religion—to check the observations of one by those of the other, and to cast anchor where they do not agree.

C. E. DOUGLAS.

LONDON.

The Power of Prayer. Edited by the Right Rev. W. P. Paterson, D.D., and David Russell.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.

THIS is a volume of twenty-one essays, two of which are contributed by the editors. The remaining nineteen are selected from 1667 essays received in response to the offer of £100 made in May 1916 by the Walker Trust of the University of St Andrews, for the "most widely helpful essay on the meaning, the reality, and the power of prayer." The competition was open to the world, and the widely varied points of view represented in the essays are reflected in the selection. Seven of the eight essays adjudged best are published in the volume, and are by Christian writers. The selection of the others has been chiefly determined by the design of the collection, namely, "to throw light upon the life and thought of the whole religious world of to-day, including the regions of ethnic and eclectic faith." The Theosophical point of view is expounded by Professor Mehta, whose essay is entitled "The Oriental Conception of Prayer," and is illustrated by quotation from the Christian Scriptures and Western writers such as Huxley and Emerson, as well as from the Bhagavad Gita and the teaching of Eastern sages. There is "A Study of Bahai Prayer" by Dr J. C. Esslemont. Mr Wm. Loftus Hare traces the history of prayer in its more mystical aspects in the Hindu and Buddhist Scriptures, in the teaching of Christ, and in the writings of well-known Christian mystics. Chinese religious thought on prayer finds expression in an essay by a Wesleyan missionary. And Mr Edward Lawrence, writing "From the Anthropological Point of View," gives examples of the prayers of savage races, among the more advanced of which he finds petitions of a distinctly ethical character. As further illustrative of the variety of view might be mentioned a contribution from the standpoint of Christian Science on "Prayer in relation to Spiritual Law and Absolute Reality." The treatment, however, is more propagandist than scientific.

Another outstanding feature of the essays, as Professor W. P. Paterson remarks in his excellent introductory essay, is "a very distinct stamp of modernity." The recognition of the classic treatises of earlier divines is scant as compared with the ampler knowledge that is shown of current literature. The predominant tendency is to treat the subject philosophically, though the appeal to the authority of the Scriptures and to personal experience is by no means wanting. The prize essay, by Canon M'Comb of Baltimore, in which thoughtful treatment is combined with lucidity of expression and a high literary quality, will no doubt be found most popularly helpful. To the scientific reader, Dr Mellone's valuable essay will probably appeal more. Of similar interest are "A Modern Apology," by Pasteur C. A. Bourquin, and "A Chaplain's Thoughts," the latter having the further value of conserving the witness of the battlefield to the efficacy of prayer.

The personality of God is much discussed in the more thoughtful essays. Those, however, of a more pantheistic character hold that the belief in an impersonal deity is not incompatible with a prayerful spirit. The tendency in essays of this type is to interpret the Divine immanence in terms of the developing finite consciousness, and of the general evolution of mankind. But by far the more representative view is that the Transcendence of God may be believed consistently with His Immanence, which need not be interpreted in terms of an advancing and conscious world-process; and that the idea of Infinitude may be combined with that of God's fatherly care. Certain attributes involved in objections and difficulties are discussed—for example, the immutability of God in the question of the relation of prayer to the conception of the world as a fixed order, His wisdom and love in relation to the view that prayer is needless.

Along with a most marked agreement on the efficacy of prayer and the importance of its practice, there is a considerable divergence of opinion as to the relative value of the various kinds of prayer, its proper subjects, and its answer. And while in some essays, particularly the more mystical, petition is discounted and prayer viewed rather as pure adoration, the more common view, and surely the right view, is that petition is of the essence of prayer—"the natural form in which the sense of dependence finds expression." Appeal is also made, in support of the efficacy of petitionary prayer, to the authority of the Scriptures and the evidence of personal experience.

As to the proper subject of prayer, spiritual benefits have, of course, the consensus of opinion. Some strongly urge that *only* subjective effects, such as illumination and moral invigoration, should be looked for in prayer. This exclusion of prayer from the realm of material benefits is not, however, generally upheld. God is supreme, it is argued, in both realms, and wills to be sought of for all things that minister to His children's well-being, temporal as well as eternal. It is also urged that the objective and subjective realms are "closely interwoven." The difficulty occasioned by the scientific conception of the reign of law in the material realm is dealt with at some length by several writers. It is pointed out that the subjective realm also is under law, yet that fact does not preclude the communication of thought, feeling, and impulse in human intercourse. In illustrating, by human analogy, the possibility of the Divine communication of subjective benefits, much appeal is made to the "phenomena of telepathy," also to the significance in this respect of the modern doctrine of the Divine Immanence. Telepathy is also resorted to in dealing with the more difficult question of the granting of material benefits—in the case, for example, of a person in financial distress receiving help. A generous impulse, it is explained, may be divinely communicated to one in affluence.

Where, however, the bestowal of material good involves an apparent interference with the uniformity of natural laws, various hypotheses are offered in explanation. Sometimes the validity of the theory of an universally fixed natural order is questioned. "The uniformity of natural law," one essayist contends, should be understood hypothetically to mean only, that is to say, that given certain conditions certain results will follow. And may not God in answer to prayer by the fresh exercise of His creative power give rise to new conditions and so produce results in other than normal ways? The doctrine of the conservation of energy, it is held, is a "physical postulate" based on empirical grounds, and to which we are not warranted in giving the universality of mental or moral necessity. More-

over, it is further asked, if the reign of natural law does not preclude the exercise of human volitional agency, why should it be conceived of as limiting the Divine Will?

Professor Paterson mentions the attempt made by apologists of the nineteenth century to meet the difficulty by the predestinarian hypothesis, which, accepting the view that the "material realm is a closed system," holds that "God in the beginning had foreknowledge of all prayers, and so arranged the cosmic forces that at the appropriate moment they should work out the answers to those prayers which He decreed to answer." To the objection that this made prayer unnecessary, it was replied that prayer also was foreordained, or that, if foreordination made prayer superfluous, the same may be said of all human effort. Professor Paterson points out that this line of reasoning is markedly absent from these modern essays, and suggests the predestinarian scheme of thought may not generally appeal to the religious mind of to-day. Another theory meets the difficulty by regarding prayer as itself a force or law included within the system of cosmic energies and natural laws. "Prayer," writes one, "is a part of the order of the world and is as constant as this order. . . . If you say that all is law, we say prayer is part and parcel of the system, governed in accordance with law." But it is a "force which acts in harmony with the fundamental laws of the universe." Hence the implication that the scope of prayer is limited within the material realm. "It functions" only "in those regions of experience in which the accomplishment of the Divine Will waits on the co-operation of the will of man."

The Theosophic conception of "prayer force" as a kind "of vibrational activity," to quote an Indian writer, "set up in our mind in the time of deep and earnest sentiment, passing on its vibrations to the great ocean of mind power in which we live, and producing currents which travel on until they reach the mind of other individuals," may seem crude psychology, and may be objected to from the Christian standpoint on the ground that it reduces prayer to a kind of material or magical agency, especially when the theory ascribes to "mental force, shaping and directing energy, in the realm of atoms and cells," a significant feature in the wide recognition of the therapeutic value of prayer. While the increased interest in this aspect of prayer may be ascribed in part at least to Christian Science propagandism, its interpretation in the essays is more in accordance with traditional Christian teaching and recent scientific developments in Psychology.

Reference is made by more than one writer to the growing tendency to trace the subjective efficacy of prayer to the power of self-suggestion; but this, it is pointed out, must ultimately mean Divine reinforcement; that, as Mr F. W. H. Myers contends, "even the self-suggestion which refuses to appeal to any higher power, which believes that it is only calling up its own private resources into play, must derive its ultimate efficiency from the increased outflow from the Infinite Life."

What gives peculiar value to the volume is the striking unanimity of its testimony to the power of prayer, and its witness to the universality of prayer, and to the earnest occupation of the educated lay mind of to-day with the problems of religion. In addition to the essays there is a useful bibliography and a comprehensive index. The wealth of material, and the excellent way in which it is edited, render the work an invaluable help to the study of religious experience.

A. E. DAVIES.

385

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

SOURCES OF POWER IN HUMAN LIFE.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

I.

THE civilised world at present seems to many of us to be living, as it were, under a cloud. Its dominant mood is that of unhappiness, depression, unrest. It is obsessed by anxieties and suspicions, uncertain in its hold on life. It has forgotten joy. Like a neurotic man, whose sickness has no name and few definite symptoms beyond general uneasiness and lack of hope, it is incapable of the existence which it feels to be wholesome and complete. Impotent and uncertain of aim, full of conflicts it cannot resolve, society is becoming more and more querulous, less and less reasonable. Sometimes it seeks violent and destructive changes as the only cure for its state. Sometimes it tries grotesque and superstitious remedies. Sometimes it relapses into apathy. But we cannot hope for any permanent improvement until it discovers the real nature of its disease.

The source of the trouble must first be sought, not in a disorder of the social body as a whole, but in the state of the individual cells composing it. Those individual cells—the ordinary men and women of whom society is built—are not, most of them, living with the whole of their lives. They—or rather we, for few of us can clear ourselves of this charge—are imperfectly vitalised. We have allowed one whole aspect of our being, and that the most important, to atrophy; never using the whole of the power and perception of which we are capable, never stretching to full span. Thus our existence is impoverished, and our reaction to our surroundings distorted. We are, in fact, fitted for active

correspondence with a wider, richer world, a more real order than that in which we suppose ourselves to dwell: and this correspondence is a necessity, if we are to be sound and happy members of human society, using our powers to the full. We know what happens when we do not get enough physical exercise. We know, too, the damage that results when an active intellect is given nothing to do, an ardent emotional nature lacks opportunity of expression. But we forget that the soul is, or should be, yet more vividly alive than body or brain. It, too, demands its share of experience; its food and work. It is, or should be, aware of its own aspect of the universe—the spiritual aspect. And when the soul's innate spiritual craving, its natural hunger for life and love, is misunderstood or ignored, when opportunity for self-expression is denied it; then, not only its own existence but the whole personal and social life it should sustain is thrown out of key. This, I believe, is what is happening to us now. We are being starved at the source; and the problem which confronts us is, how best we may tap that source, draw from it the strength which will enable us to deal effectively with life. This question is far more practical than many of those which are agitated by social reformers. It is, indeed, the central question for the sociologist; for it concerns the true mental health and full vitality of every human being, and we cannot hope to construct a stable community unless these, the members that compose it, are thus living a full and balanced life.

From time to time we know that men and women have emerged who pierced the mesh of convention, looked with clear eyes at the universe of which we are a part, and saw, felt, and loved the spiritual reality which alone gives meaning to the whole. If we read spiritual history with the same interest and understanding which we give to tales of dynasties and wars, we should recognise these men and women as pioneers of the race. In different ways, under different symbols, they have told what they knew. Though these symbols may obscure their meaning, we see that at bottom they are all trying to tell us the same thing: that all saw and felt a Life and Reality which is one, and were inspired by it with the same passion of love and desire. These men and women, if we look at them side by side and compare their discoveries about the power of human nature with our own distracted state, their quiet certainties and heroic sacrifices with our anxiety and greed, suggest to us that modern progress has not been entirely in the direction of goodness and

truth ; and that the nervous sickness of society, the aridity of our lives, are so many condemnations of our own sloth, stupidity, and cowardice. They saw something really there, which we have either missed, or confused with the special creed under which it was offered to us. But the life of the spirit is a concrete reality, not a religious notion or a dream. It has always been present with mankind ; independent of the religions with which it has been associated, the imperfect ideas of God which men have held.

In every religion, mixed with much that is crude and symbolic, we see the human soul seeking with more or less success for its own life, a "new birth" into the atmosphere of reality. The preaching of the Hebrew prophets and Christian apostles, the monastic movement in its purity, the spiritual teaching of the Sūfis, and of ancient India, the missions of such men as Boehme, Fox, or Wesley—all these, as we are now beginning to see, have been efforts, generally misunderstood, to meet this one need and show this one way to happiness and abundant life. Those who responded without flinching to the invitation to a change of heart, generally found the promise of new life was true. They discovered for themselves that there *is* something in the universe which demands our love and humble adoration ; which, in spite of all our disillusion, in spite of squalor, cruelty, waste, decay, does perpetually whisper to us messages of confidence and hope and repays our faith and love by a gift of power. This element of experience is just as real as any of the other elements ; more, it is abiding and invincible. If we attended to it, allowed it to influence our conduct, regarding it as at least of equal importance with the so-called "economic" considerations in life, we should be happy. Even as it is we all have moments in which we are sure that there is more to see, know, and love ; and that we ourselves shall be more real, do better work, when we see, know, and love it.

The mystics have given many names to this voice and this message. But all agree that the world we commonly live in is not so much unreal as half real. We have got it out of proportion, because there is something—to them obvious—which we commonly leave out. The mystic Jacob Boehme, struggling to express what he has perceived, says, "When I see a *right* man, there I see three worlds standing." These three worlds are the "dark" physical world of conflict and pain—mere nature, as it is when it is left to itself ; the "fire-world" of energetic creative life that inspires it ; and the "light-world" of spiritual energy, beauty, and truth. Some

of the most recent speculations both of biology and of philosophy seem to be leading us back to such an analysis of the Real. A distinguished French thinker, Dr Geley, has lately declared that life has three elements: basal substance, vital dynamism, and psychic principle. A complete man, Boehme feels, must in some sense be, and live in, all these three levels of reality. That is, he must be not only the complete and healthy animal, not only the vigorous, creative personality, not only the exalted spirit living in contact with the "light," but all these. Not many of us can claim to live up to this ideal; yet, if we do not live up to it, we are not fully alive in any department of our being, since one of our chief powers has atrophied, and one aspect of the universe is closed to us. Most of us, it is clear, live in two worlds: too many only in the "dark" world of unmeaning, toilsome physical existence. Mysticism, which is the science of the spirit as psychology is the science of the mind, has for its object the introduction of our consciousness into the third world; that world of eternal beauty and significance which is not separated from us, but, as another great mystic observed, "absent only from those who do not perceive it." Its aim is to arouse and educate the spiritual principle already latent in us, and give it its rightful place. "Our whole teaching," says Boehme, "is nothing else than how a man should kindle in himself God's light-world." The "seed" of the light-world is present in each of us, though not realised by a consciousness too busily engaged with other things. Our business is to make it central for that consciousness, draw from our environment the nourishment it needs, and so "grow up from nature-dark to spirit-light."

I do not say that other aspects of life are not real too, or that we do not truly form a part of the texture of the physical universe. I believe that we do form part of it: but this texture, like the cellular stuff of which our bodies are built, is only one aspect of the whole reality, and its meaning is only understood when we become aware both of the unresting life-force—the Fire—which energises every part of it, and of the Spirit of Light which is its "Father and ever-present Companion." To achieve such a realisation is not to withdraw from the stream of natural life and effort, but to plunge into it more deeply, find its heart. There we discover ourselves to be in contact with—in fact, to be the agents of—a veritable Life which is not merely goodness, not merely beauty, not merely power, but the source and synthesis of all these. Those who trusted this life enough to take the

risks it demands have been, in spite of suffering and hardship—for it is no easier to achieve than any other kind of perfection,—the strongest, happiest, and most harmonised of men. “The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance.” This, said St Paul, who knew by experience the worlds of nature, fire, and light, is what a complete man ought to be like. Compare this picture of an equable and fully harmonised personality with that of a characteristic neurasthenic, or of an embittered worker concentrated on the struggle for a material advantage; and consider that the whole difference between these types of human success and human failure is the presence or the absence of the spiritual principle in life. We know that where this spiritual principle has been dominant, as it was in the early, enthusiastic stage of many religious movements, it has brought with it a sense of well-being, a joy, a power of endurance, and a vigour unknown to the mass of men. There is no reason but human indolence and scepticism why these gifts should not again transform the race.

Looked at in this way, we see that the struggle for a personal spiritual life is no selfish undertaking, as busy social reformers sometimes insist. On the contrary, it is the first step in all valid social reform. Society is keenly interested in, and gains from, the full development of each of its members; and no one is fully developed in whom that life still sleeps. Moreover, those who know the “light-world” can’t keep it to themselves. It shines through them. As an artist reveals new beauty to the mass of men, so the truly spiritual man inevitably stimulates their capacity for God, and so gives them new life and new access to reality. He is a centre of infection; but that which he spreads is happiness and power. So, whether we regard it from the social or the individualistic point of view, it is plain that the reintegration of our lives, and the achievement of a more complete existence, is demanded of us: and that this is a task hard enough to call forth all our energies and all our enthusiasm. Instead of a formal religion, bound up with a creed based on marvellous occurrences, or theological doctrines which we, perhaps, find it difficult to accept, we have a new more real life—humanity’s next stage of growth—to aim at; a life possible of realisation here and now, which, as the mystics assure us, can “transform the furnace of the world into a garden of flowers.”

II.

We may recognise and even regret the absence of a spiritual element in our lives ; and with it our lack of power, our starved sense of joy. But we shall not listen for long to those who deplore our condition unless they be prepared to give us not merely a diagnosis, but a prescription. And this prescription must be given us, not in some traditional formula, but in the language of our own day ; though we must expect to find that its ingredients have long been known and used. Modern man has, in some sense, made himself a new universe from fresh data. The stream of history has carried him on to a point of view which is perhaps no truer than that of the past, but is for him inevitable. The theory of evolution, the modern concept of electric energy, the "new" psychology, even a caricature of the law of relativity, control his vision of the world. If we want to help him, we must take him as he is. Here, where he stands, we must stand by him, and point out the colour, form, and beauty, the infinite possibilities, the unchanging splendour of the landscape *from his point of view*. It is no use telling him what that landscape used to look like from the view-point which was occupied by the early Christian or the mediæval man—the names they gave to its salient features, the bits they liked best. He does not want, in Boehme's pungent phrase, to be "a mere historical new man." This means that we must restate the truths we hold to be eternal ; and a little consideration shows that this restatement must find a place for two distinct and complementary aspects of all true spiritual life—its outer vision and its inner discipline.

First, Vision. The man who is dissatisfied with the meaningless incompleteness of physical existence and its apparent aims, wants to be helped to glimpse a wider horizon, grasp something of that Reality in which he lives and moves. The mystics assure him that this Reality is God, and that the whole secret of existence is contained in His love. They say that, until we thus fall in love with the spiritual world, we shall not be aware of its beauty and compelling power ; and that, to give ourselves the chance of doing this, we must attend to it. For lack of attention a thousand forms of loveliness elude us every day. The artist's world, so much richer and more significant than ours, is simply the reward of his steadfast and disinterested gaze. So too perception of God depends on attention to Him. Hence the second point, Discipline. The inner self must be trained if it is thus to become aware at first

hand of the "world of light." Until this remaking of personality, this redirection of consciousness, is achieved, the ordinary man must, to a great extent, trust other people's account of it.

Now a practical mysticism—by which I mean the spiritual development possible to the average man—offers just these two things; which are indeed two aspects of one transformation, since "we only behold that which we are." It shows us innumerable men and women who had the vision; who were aware of an unchanging love and beauty which really transformed their lives, for whom our mysterious universe gradually unfolded like a flower, so that they gazed more and more deeply into its heart. It offers to teach the method of self-conquest and of contemplation by which they remade their consciousness, and redeemed their lives from concentration on the transitory and unreal. It shows us their final state, in which they became fresh centres of creative life; receiving it—as an artist receives æsthetic joy—in order to give again. This, it says, is the way men can cure their spiritual impotence, their uncertain touch on life, and obtain access to the real sources of vitality.

But mysticism is not alone in pointing out this way. Its first declaration, that there are other and more real ways of seeing the world awaiting those who will try them, is supported by orthodox religion, by philosophy, by the arts. When we listen to great music or poetry, when visible beauty suddenly looks us in the eyes, we seem to stand on the fringes of a world into which we have never fully penetrated; a joyous and divine world, in which the elements of common life are given new colour and worth, and their apparent conflicts understood. This is the "kingdom of heaven" into which it was the first object of Christianity to introduce the minds of men; and few of us pass through life without at least a glimpse of it. Philosophy too speaks of that same vision. Idealism seems based on a intuitive knowledge of it, and of the sharp distinction between that absolute and unchanging world of spiritual reality and the illusions of material life. Even the fashionable realism of the moment, which acknowledges nothing beyond the world of space and time which we know in part, yet tends more and more to a spiritual reading of existence. It too discerns a tendency in the ceaseless onward flow of creative life towards a higher perfection, a transcendence we vaguely call "divine." For it the universe is not seeking that which is already present in eternity, but is slowly making its own heaven—evolving the light-world from

the dark matter and creative fire. Every life, thought, deed or love which transcends the level of being in which it is born, and achieves the spiritual plane, contributes to the bringing in of that heaven, the "manifestation of the sons of God." Our bit of effort is thus a part of the great thrust of life, "gazing eagerly as if with outstretched neck," as St Paul said in a flash of poetic intuition, towards a divine perfection not yet reached.

Accepting in a general sense the picture this philosophy puts before us—and we must acknowledge its appeal to our courage and industry, its implied spirit of faith, hope, and love,—we may turn from vision to discipline; and see what psychology has to tell us of the sources and powers of the inner life, the extent in which it may be directed to spiritual ends. At once we see that it too declares transcendence, the sublimation and vigorous use on higher levels of our crude instincts and desires, to be the secret of full life, of mental health and power. When Boehme, having described the three-fold world in which a right man dwells, goes on to say that the art of living is to "harness our fiery energies to the service of the light," he is speaking almost in the words of a modern psychologist. What are those fiery energies? They are the passions and instincts born of our lowliest needs, ready to be spent on any object, but capable too of a sublimation of which we do not yet know the limits. We are adolescents, feeling within ourselves the conflict of the animal-child out of whom we have grown, and the spirit-adult to which we tend: yet it is the primitive energy of that animal-child, the "anxious fiery life" stretching out towards experience, which shall make possible the emergence of the new man. It craves for more life and more love; and this craving, this urge, is the unique instrument of all progress, physical, mental, or spiritual,—one aspect of the "secret onward push" which actuates every living thing.

We are not closed systems, but a part of the texture of the universe; and, equally with it, channels of the power that inspires it. Through us creative spirit—whether we choose to call it with Boehme the fiery driver, or with Bergson mental energy, or with Freud the libido—is surging. This energy, with its tendency to press on somewhere, is ours to direct and use; becoming, according to the degree of its sublimation, a strong sinner, fighter, lover, artist, or saint. All lies in the direction in which we thus push into experience, the levels with which we choose to set up our correspondences, on which we satisfy our hunger, spend our desire and love. How do we

set up correspondences with any level of experience? Simply by attending to it. The man of science learns nature's laws by concentrating upon them. It is to the steady and impassioned gaze of the artist that beauty and significance are revealed in common things, to inspire the love and rapture he expresses in his works. So too it is primarily the man who attends to the spiritual world that finds it. "Knock, and it shall be opened unto you; seek, and ye shall find," is, like many other New Testament sayings, a scientific statement. This proceeding need not involve any formal creed or religious practice, save the one act of faith that there is a spiritual aspect of existence to be found.

Now attention is a limited gift. We can only attend at one time to a certain narrow range of experiences: and of these, those in the centre of the field will be intensely real to us, those on the fringes will be vague. It needs a little consideration before we realise how tiny a fraction of our possible experience we can take in, how much we are obliged to renounce; the extent in which even the most self-indulgent life is based on self-denial. Hence the importance of a wise use of attention. It is for us to choose what we will put in the centre of our field. Commonly we put our worldly interests and anxieties, our transient loves. The result of this was described by St Paul: "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness to him." They are not in focus; he cannot perceive them as realities. Though he may be an idealist in philosophy, he lives as though materialism alone were true; repressing those inconsistent impulses and feelings which testify to other levels of reality, and by this act throwing his mental life out of key. The mystics put spiritual interests in the centre of the field, and by attending to that aspect of reality enter more and more deeply into it; coming at last to the perfect and conscious harmony with the spiritual order which some of them call the "practice of the presence of God." How do they do this? First, by that quiet, steady attention to the spiritual which is the essence of prayer: an art which any one may practise who chooses to open his door to the eternal world waiting on the fringes of the common life. Next by a drastic reordering of their whole natures in conformity with the perfection they have seen and loved. Last, by energetic work in harmony with their ideals; for nothing is truly ours till we have expressed it in our deeds. These are the three elements of that discipline which the spiritual life demands of those who really want it—steady contemplation, drastic

self-conquest, eager service; and this, I believe, is their true order of importance.

The deliberate act of attention comes first. If we ask, "Attention to *what*?" it is easiest for us, heirs of Christian civilisation, to say, "Attention to God"; because this is a name we all understand until we attempt to define it. "Be still, be still and *know*," is the condition of entrance into that atmosphere of reality. The mystics say again and again that their only secret is "the love of God"; that if we attend to God we inevitably love Him, and that this love evokes the power to do hard things. By love we come to share His point of view. "The sharp dart of longing love," says an old English writer, "shall never fail of the prick, which is God." No one who has witnessed the expansion of a starved nature touched by this vivid and unearthly passion, its growth in nobility and power, can doubt that this is a vital process, a real episode in the remaking of man. Unless we thus fall in love with the spiritual world, we shall never be aware of its beauty and compelling power. To give ourselves the chance of this, we must attend to it: and such an attention is simply the essence of prayer. Therefore we need not hope to attain a sane and stable life until we have placed the inner stillness of devotion at its heart: setting aside a definite time each day in which to attend to it, scrutinising our moral nature in its light, combing out the tight knots of prejudice and self-interest in which that nature so largely consists, and for its sake doing our ordinary work as well as we can in a spirit of consecration.

Should one of these constituents be left out, all the others are maimed. Neither contemplative, moralist, nor man of action alone satisfies human ideals and human cravings. We tend at present to starve our spirits by encouraging the active life at the expense of the contemplative life; forgetting that action itself depends for its perfection on the outward fling of the heart in adoration, conditioning its homeward turning swing of charity. "Do you wish for a pause?" said someone to Elizabeth Fry at a social gathering. Under the spell of her personality the pause was made, and all present breathed for a few moments the atmosphere of the spiritual world; the only atmosphere in which we can hope to glimpse the true proportions of things. The vagueness and ineffectuality of much social effort is due to the lack of this pause in our perpetual busyness.

III.

The old Christian ideal for ordinary men and women was that which was called the "mixed life"; in which, as Ruysbroeck said of it, "work and contemplation dwell in us side by side and we are perfectly in both of them at once." This conception came from Christ's own life; the supreme example of a balanced consciousness, rooted in eternity yet fully alive in the world of time, and swinging as it were between loving attention to God and practical service of man. All that I have so far said of it is only a restatement of one or two principal points in his teaching and experience. If we read the New Testament without dogmatic prejudices, accepting the narratives of the Gospels and the Acts as they stand, we see that the whole book is the record of a group of people who, under the leadership of one supremely harmonised personality, found out a new and true way of living—not reconдите, but ready for everyone who has the courage to try it,—and practised it with success. We see that the main object of Jesus was to declare the "kingdom of heaven," not as far off, but as something existing here and now in the world. He did not invite men to spin theories about what he was; but to "follow" him, leave unreal interests, accept his view of life, and try the experiment of living in his way. His unique impressiveness arose from the fact that he was himself living and growing in that kingdom, and spoke from within it; for it was and is, as the mystics have always insisted, "a temper, not a place." Those who trusted him he introduced into it; conferring on them the "pearl," the "hidden treasure," the "leaven," a new life achieved at least in germ, not by shirking any of the dreadful accidents of existence, but by absorbing every bit of it—suffering, treachery, disillusion, death—into the scheme.

This change of consciousness—this "new birth" on fresh levels of being—is what New Testament writers mean by salvation: for them, not a religious notion, but a concrete fact. Its possibilities they think are endless: "It doth not yet appear what we shall be." They are sure that, perfectly exhibited in Christ, this whole and vivid life is also accessible to all men. He was, said St Paul, "the eldest in a vast family of brothers"; showing the real curve of all human growth "from glory to glory." In the completeness of his adaptation to the two worlds of spirit and of sense, expressed in his two chief activities—the nights spent in solitary communion with his Father, the days spent in human intercourse and helpful-

ness,—the true nature of man was fully revealed. The “mystery,” says St Paul, is the existence in us of the same capacity for wholeness of life—“Christ in you the hope of glory”: and the real obligation laid on Christians is not to believe theological statements, but to “put on that new man.” Two thousand years have passed and we have not, save in a few isolated cases, achieved this fuller vitality. As a rule we pay little attention to the witness of the handful of men and women who have done so. Yet now psychology begins to hint that a more thorough life indeed waits for us; that untapped wells of health and power and unexplored levels of sublimation are within our reach. It supports our secret conviction that, if we could but see existence as Christ and those who shared his mind have seen it,—that is to say, transfigured and made significant by the light of the “Kingdom of God,”—we should know how to deal with its problems, material and spiritual alike. Many of the mystics assure us that they did see life in this way, and they describe its result. Ruysbroeck says that a truly enlightened man “walks in heaven” here and now, seeing all things in a “simple light”: and that the mark of this walking in heaven is, that he is filled with “a wide-spreading love to all in common.” In that phrase is concealed the link between what is sometimes called “social Christianity” and the spiritual life. It means that our passional nature with its cravings and ardours, instead of making whirlpools of self-centred anguish and self-centred joy, becomes an instrument of the spirit and flows out in streams of charity and power towards all life.

Such wide-spreading love—all the ardour, tenderness, and idealism of the lover spent not on one chosen object but all living things—is a passion born of the spiritual vision, and is its inevitable active expression in the world of time. We ought to possess it. If we do not, that is because we neglect the two ways to its achievement. One of these is an individual activity; the deliberate turning of the attention towards the spiritual world. The other is corporate; the full use of that herd-instinct which underlies our whole social life. The spiritual consciousness is more often caught than taught. When the young man with great possessions asked Jesus, “What shall I do to be saved?” Jesus replied in effect, “Put aside all lesser interests, strip off unrealities, and come, give yourself the chance of catching the infection of holiness from me.” He gave his secret in its fulness to the “little flock” which simply followed him, not to the educated persons who listened and argued with him. From them it spread to all

who submitted to their influence: for the gift of a real and harmonised life flows out inevitably from those who possess it to other men. Again and again the history of spiritual experience illustrates this law; that its propagation is most often by way of discipleship and of the corporate life, not by the intensive culture of solitary effort. God educates men through men. We most easily recognise spiritual reality when it is perceived transfiguring human character, and most easily attain it by sympathetic contagion. The common idea of the mystic or contemplative as an individualist is false; though, like an artist, a measure of solitude is essential to him. He receives in order to give again. The lives of St Francis, Fox, Wesley, General Booth, are various examples of this peculiar power of spreading new life.

We acknowledge this law in other departments of experience, and are careful to place our children where they can get the influences we think appropriate to their future. These influences, social, intellectual, or practical, arise from the collective attitude of the group, its "spirit" or "tone"; and especially from the strong personalities of that group, the leaders of the herd. Psychologists tell us that as members of a flock or a crowd our sensitiveness to the impressions of our fellow-members, our "collective suggestibility," is enormously increased. This law, of which all religious bodies take full advantage, holds good even on the highest levels of spiritual life. Therefore, since most of us are weaklings, if we wish to further our latent capacity for that life we should draw together; obtaining from our incorporation the herd-advantages of corporate enthusiasm, unity of aim, mutual protection, and forming a nucleus to which others can adhere. Thus the strong will be saved from the evils of individualism and the weak will receive support. Christianity has shown us the extent in which a "little flock," swayed by love and adoration, may ultimately influence the world: and it may be that our hope for the future depends on the formation of such groups—hives of the Spirit,—in which the worker of every grade, the thinker, the artist may each have their place. In such an open society, the fact that all the members shared substantially the same view of human life, strove though in differing ways for the same ideals, were filled by the same enthusiasms, would allow the problems and experiences of the Spirit to be accepted as real, and discussed with frankness and simplicity. Thus oases of prayer and clear thinking might be created in our social wilderness, gradually developing such corporate power and consciousness as we see in really living religious bodies.

The history of the Bāb movement, or of the Salvation Army, show that this is no idle dream: and indeed there seems no reason but our own apathy and self-consciousness to prevent the formation of such groups among those workers of all types who are already dissatisfied with their own vague hold on reality. Were they created within existing Churches, this might yet heal those Churches of their creeping paralysis and make them again true centres of life and light, giving shelter and nourishment to the neglected mystical element in our psychic lives.

The rule of such a group need be little more than the "heavenly rule" of faith, hope, and charity; for these are and must remain the key-words of human transcendence. Faith carries with it the realisation of man's true existence within a spiritual kingdom here and now, hope his infinite power of recovery and advancement, charity his attitude towards other selves and things, visible and invisible alike. Under this threefold law—which is really the threefold expression of one ideal and one love, and must be applied without shirking to every problem of existence—the active life would be fully, even enthusiastically, lived. Every real manly and womanly instinct would find due and harmonious expression, since these instincts in their purity are movements of the spirit of life. And on the other hand, that vivid and earnest communion with the eternal order which is the essence of prayer would be fostered: perhaps by some definite rule of silence and solitude, perhaps by an extension of that system of corporate retreats which is now being tried by the Churches with astonishing results. Such an experiment, which is the essence of Christianity, has never been made on an extended scale. We do not know the extent of the renovation which might be worked silently from within, did those able to apprehend eternity thus accept its obligations, draw together, and work for the regeneration of the whole. For members of such groups luxury, idleness, and indifference to the common good would be impossible. They would inevitably come to practise that sane asceticism—not incompatible with gaiety of heart—which consists in concentration on the real, and quiet avoidance of the attractive sham; and makes of the true ascetic an athlete, who keeps in training for a definite end. Plainness and simplicity do help the spiritual life, and they are more easy and wholesome when practised in common than when adopted by individuals in defiance of the social order surrounding them.

The aim alike of the group and of its individual members

must be the unification of idea, emotion, and action; the re-direction of energy from lower to higher and more universal interests under the unique impulsion of the love of God. Such a simplification of life and consecration of its powers—with a resulting positive sense of happiness and liberation—is seen in some degree in the great lover of truth, of beauty, or of his fellow-men. But its perfection is only found in those who are dedicated to eternal interests or, in the language of religion, whose “self is wholly merged in the will of God.” There is nothing new in this prescription. It has been the ideal of all prophets and saints. But the truths which these declared now need some fresh expression, which shall win for this interest the mighty forces of herd-suggestion and make the laws of the kingdom in all their costing effort and moral austerity “good form” for our distracted herd.

The group then, however formed—and first no doubt it will be small and simple,—has before it an ample choice of work to test its courage and sincerity. Though its aims should involve no mawkish idealism, refusal of fun, or insistence on “uplift,” yet its earnestness must find expression in acts. Every established evil is a challenge to it. All weak, suffering, or neglected things invite its interest; all men and women confused and disheartened by the pressure of a merely material life. Generosity and pity, a deep understanding of man’s slow struggles and of the unequal movements of life, will forbid intolerance. But new knowledge of beauty must reveal the ugliness of the many satisfactions we now offer ourselves, and new love the defective character of many of our social relations. Looking always for the reality behind the appearance of life, and seeing the possible perfection of every soul and so of every society, the member of such a group must have a definite attitude, for instance, towards such problems as war, state punishment, industrialism, the drink traffic, prostitution, international diplomacy and finance; and must bring this attitude to bear on the politics of the State. Again, the doing of all work in the spiritual light, the judging of all economic problems by its standards, not those of expediency, is for him a necessity of existence; because he regards the whole world as a religious fact. Consider the effect of this imperative on the attitude of worker, trader, designer, employer: how many questions would then answer themselves, how many sore places would be healed. New value would be given to craftsmanship—itsself an expression of Spirit and part of the creative scheme,—and a sense of dedication, now almost unknown, to those who direct it. These proposals are not unpractical.

Impracticality consists rather in permitting one side of our nature to atrophy, and acquiescing in the consequent low level of consciousness and of achievement. The spiritual groups of earlier times—Francis and his “little brothers,” Fox and his friends, Wesley and his disciples—were remarkable for the vigour and originality with which they tackled the problems of existence. Spiritual values were so real to them that they could afford to treat our most revered illusions lightly. To their fresh simplicity of vision no evil appeared “necessary” or incurable: no hostility too great to be overcome by love. Sloth or lack of zest, and doubtful dread or lack of hope are, said Julian of Norwich, the only serious sicknesses of the soul. If it were not for these we might do all things; and those in whom that zest and hope have triumphed are there to prove that this is true.

EVELYN UNDERHILL.

LONDON.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE “SPIRITUAL EXERCISES.”

THE REV. FATHER LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

THE aim of the *Spiritual Exercises* of St Ignatius is to secure the conversion of a sinner, to enable one to arrive at a decision in some spiritual crisis, or in general to correct failings and to bring about improvement in our spiritual life—all of which phenomena, whatever else they may imply, are psychological in character. The method of the Exercises also is psychological. Hence in days when we are wont to consider all things, especially behaviour and belief, from the point of view of psychical process, it may be worth while to examine the principles involved; all the more so, seeing that the Exercises have produced such remarkable results. No one would claim that St Ignatius was a psychologist, or that he consciously applied psychological principles. Far from it. Yet not only is there an immense amount of psychology in this sixteenth-century text-book on the spiritual life, but, curiously enough, it is of the most modern type.

It is often alleged that experimental psychology has discovered nothing of much practical value. But there is at any rate one exception to this alleged rule, and that is in the matter of “suggestion.” The precise nature of “suggestion” and “suggestibility” is still in dispute, but the laws by which suggestions work are both known and are being applied in practice with the greatest fruit. Much pain has been relieved and many diseases have been cured by this means.

It is, moreover, urged by some—by Dr Baudouin, for example, of the New Nancy School—that the method is so simple that there is no need of a skilled practitioner: one can apply it oneself. If you want to get well, just tell yourself so *under the appropriate conditions*, and you will get well. This is auto-suggestion; and all suggestions, it is said, must

become auto-suggestions before they will work. The advantage of hetero-suggestion is merely that the other person may have greater knowledge and skill, and so will inspire that supremely important element, confidence, without which suggestion can hardly take effect.

It is the appropriate conditions that are difficult to secure. Of these the first is to choose a moment when the mind is tranquil, almost dormant, and the body is comfortably at rest. Place yourself in an easy chair, relax the muscles, and let your mind become vacant. Baudouin mentions the time of waking or of dozing off to sleep as moments when suggestibility is at a maximum. Hypnosis is usually unnecessary. It is the *dolce far niente* condition that is of paramount importance, and this by practice one can attain oneself.

The next condition is more difficult to realise. Tell yourself that you are getting better, and at once the idea arises: How absurd, when I know that I am not! These counter-suggestions are easily evoked, and difficult to sublimate or to avoid. Yet, if allowed to prevail, they will counteract the good effect of the suggestion you wish to make. Round each type of psycho-physical activity are grouped innumerable ideas, which act as stimulants, exciting and directing the activity in question, at the same time inhibiting others. Neither the complex nor the process by which it works need rise above the threshold of consciousness. The aim of suggestion is merely to start a particular complex working. But just as different activities may be incompatible, so may different complexes be incompatible, and, owing to the law of association, we may set going just the opposite complex to that we desire. The result in this case will at best be negative, and may be disastrous. Counter-suggestions, therefore, if they cannot be avoided, must either be ignored, or by gentle suasion converted into their opposites.

The third condition is to avoid all effort of will, or the Law of Reversed Effort will come into play, and the sub-conscious self, taking umbrage at our firm resolution, will produce just the contrary effect to that we seek to elicit from it. Suggestion does not work by way of resolutions, but automatically.

So novel a psychology was certainly foreign to the mind of St Ignatius, and, at first sight, would seem to be not only irrelevant to the Spiritual Exercises, but even incompatible therewith. But a closer examination will, I think, show that this is not the case. There is a parallelism throughout, and, of the two, the psychology of the Exercises is the more

highly developed. Both are psycho-therapeutic in aim, though one seeks natural and the other spiritual health, and—the question of grace apart—there is a profound resemblance between the methods by which they seek to attain it.

The first condition of a successful retreat, like that for successful suggestion, is that one should free oneself temporarily from worldly affairs and retire into tranquillity and solitude. Throughout there must be as complete a silence as possible: even the eyes must be guarded. The whole man, mind and body, is to be devoted to the purpose in hand. "When I am composing myself to sleep," says the first Addition, "I am to think of the hour of rising and to what purpose, recapitulating for a brief moment the Exercise which I have to make." So, too, "when I awake, not giving place to these or those thoughts, I am to advert immediately to what I am about to contemplate," and to encourage in myself the appropriate emotions. Though the exercises themselves are of the nature of meditations or contemplations, St Ignatius is fully aware that, if the ideas therein to be suggested are to fructify within the soul, it must be in the proper disposition, emotional and conative or tendential, as well as intellectual. External aids—darkness or light, variations in posture, in the amount and kind of food, in the use of mortification, in short, the whole environment in which the retreat is made—will contribute to this end. But these "additions" must be treated as aids, not as ends, and regulated according to their effects, which will vary with different individuals. One may meditate kneeling, sitting, standing, prostrate on the ground, or lying back with uplifted face; but, says the fourth Addition, "if I find what I want kneeling, I will not proceed to any further posture, and, if when prostrate, in like manner." So, too, if in any particular thought I find what I want, "there will I rest, without anxiety to advance further till I am satisfied." Similarly with regard to the use of food and of mortification, in regulating which the aim should always be to intensify the emotion appropriate to the subject in hand.

When I enter upon a retreat, I want something of God, namely, guidance as to how to regulate my life, and strength to carry out His will when I discover it. Hence my attitude of mind with respect to God is one of receptiveness, of expectancy, and also of generosity, should He call upon me to make some sacrifice. The aim of the first consideration, known as the Foundation, is to strengthen and develop this attitude of submissiveness. I believe in God, who created me to be happy in His knowledge, love and service, and all other

things to help me towards this end. If I am reasonable, then, I shall be indifferent towards creatures in themselves, using them or not using them, according as they serve my end and the divine purpose in my respect. This should be my attitude with regard to the particular line of conduct about which I am in doubt. I make no resolution, for I do not yet know God's will. But I want to know it, and want grace to act in accordance with it. And I know that, if I desire them, both may be had.

The attitude of mind required by St Ignatius in an exercitant, therefore, though directed primarily toward God, is of the same type as that required in one who is to undergo therapeutic treatment by modern, psychical methods. The presence of God is to be called to mind at the beginning of each meditation, and of Him the exercitant should ask grace that "all his intentions, actions, and operations" may be directed to God's service, and in particular for "that which he wishes and desires." It is desire that is necessary at the outset; not efforts of will, or firm resolutions, at any rate as yet. God is going to do the main part of the work, not the exercitant. All he does is to place himself in such conditions that grace may be able to operate in his soul.

In like manner, the attitude of the exercitant toward the giver of the meditations should be one of receptiveness, confidence, sympathy. The main function of the latter is to outline the subjects to be thought over, but he will also make reference to situations on which they have practical bearing. These suggestions the exercitant will ponder. Hence, in order that both may derive greater profit, says the Preface to the *Exercises*, "it must be presupposed that every good Christian should be readier to excuse than to condemn a proposition advanced by his neighbour."

Similarly on the part of the giver there must be the greatest consideration and sympathy, especially when acting as director. But he must not attempt to make the meditations in place of the exercitant. Realising full well that "it is not abundance of knowledge that fills and satisfies the soul, but the inward sense and taste of things," St Ignatius requires that, after a brief summary statement of the points of the meditations, the exercitant should be left to work out the rest in reflection and prayer. Again a sound principle is involved: suggestion will work best when, having ruminated upon it, we digest it and make it our own.

If we say, then, that an Ignatian retreat is so ordered as to evoke in the exercitant a maximum of suggestibility, we shall

only be stating a plain fact. St Ignatius anticipates that many suggestions will be made, in the course of a retreat, from which good may result, and the exercitant must be ready for them. If they do not occur, he must inquire whether he is faithfully fulfilling the conditions laid down, and in this matter should consult his director. Without such suggestions, efficacious in their after-effects, a retreat would be useless, for we make it in order to discover and to do God's will. So important is this, that we are recommended after *each* meditation to make a brief examination as to our success or failure in this matter, and to inquire as to its reasons, that we may profit by experience and so discover the best way to attain that which we are seeking.

Whence come these suggestions ultimately? The psychologist will class them as auto-suggestions if they arise spontaneously, and as hereto-suggestions if they be made by the giver of the retreat; the latter type predominating, since most ideas which appear to arise spontaneously will in all probability be due to association. St Ignatius recognises both these factors; and, as we have seen, would make use of them. But he also recognises another factor—the influence of "spirits."

The Spirit with whom we seek to get in touch is God. It is He to whom we look for suggestions; He who must sanction them, if they come from another; He who must render them efficacious. Here lies the key to success, the secret of the wonderful effect that retreats have so often brought about. The chief difficulty which the psychotherapist encounters in his work is that of inspiring his patient with sufficient confidence to prevent or, failing this, to overcome counter-suggestions. The same difficulty besets one who would attempt to cure himself by auto-suggestion. But in a retreat the suggestion comes from God, whose power is as infinite as His knowledge, and whose knowledge is as infinite as His love. If the exercitant be convinced of this, there is no limit to the effect that a retreat may produce. The weakling is strengthened, the doubter ceases to waver, the conversion of the sinner is assured. No counter-suggestion can avail in one who submits himself entirely to God and places all that he has in God's hands.

This entire oblation of oneself to God occurs many times in the course of the Exercises. "Behold, O Supreme King and Lord of the universe, I, though most unworthy, resting on Thy grace and help, offer myself wholly to Thee, and submit all that is mine to Thy will." The prayer suggested by

St Ignatius for communion, the *Anima Christi*, bespeaks the same idea: "Soul of Christ, sanctify me; Body of Christ, save me; Blood of Christ, inebriate me; in Thy wounds hide me." So, too, does the prayer of the last meditation of all: "Take, O Lord, and receive all my liberty, my memory, my intellect, and the whole of my will, whatever I have and possess; Thou hast given me all; to Thee, O Lord, I restore it; all things are Thine, dispose of them as Thou wilt. Give me Thy love and Thy grace, for this is enough for me."

It is sometimes said of the Society whose chief inheritance is these Exercises, that it seeks to instil into its subjects "blind" obedience. It would have them be mere instruments in the hands of their superiors, a "stick in an old man's hand." The expression is used by St Ignatius himself, and it is true that he does expect exact obedience to all orders which conform to divine law and to the Constitutions of the Order which he founded. What one actually does in this life is of small significance, a drop in the ocean of human affairs. The thing that matters is that in whatever one does one should be doing God's will. That is the aim of all disciples of our Saviour, and thence flows their power. Obedience to a human superior within a religious order is but a particular means of attaining this end. It in no wise excludes that personal direction by the Holy Spirit which St Ignatius, in common with all other Christian writers, regards as the first principle of the spiritual life.

The oblation of oneself to God, however absolute, and whether made by way of obedience or not, leaves much undetermined. And it is here that the Exercises should help. They require as a first condition that we should offer ourselves wholly unto God; but they do something more than this. They indicate how we may distinguish, among the many suggestions that may occur to us in the course of a retreat, those which emanate from a divine source. The contemplation of an object or of an action or line of action is almost invariably accompanied by an emotion, more or less intense, the character of which will in part depend upon subjective conditions, and in part upon the object contemplated; while, on the other hand, the tendency of the idea to issue ultimately in act will usually be strengthened by this means. St Ignatius would have us, therefore, study these emotions, and by means of them would distinguish the character of the suggestion which gives rise to them. Since, however, the same suggestion may give rise to different emotions in different types of men, he first of all distinguishes for our present purpose two types.

The first is the man whose thoughts and desires are wholly engrossed in commercial, carnal, or ambitious pursuits, and who has little or no appreciation of spiritual matters. The second is the man who has already made some progress in the spiritual life and desires to make more. These are not clear-cut divisions; divisions seldom are, whether in life or in physics. But they will serve.

The first type of man will, *ex hypothesi*, have some inordinate attachment, possibly many, the pursuit of which is sinful. If he is to serve God truly, this attachment must be broken. It will be useless to appeal to higher and more spiritual motives, to the example of our Lord, to His passion, to the pure love of God; of these things as yet he will have no appreciation. One must appeal to the very motives which he is accustomed to act upon—to the prospect of loss or gain, of suffering or happiness, of ambition thwarted or successful; and must show him that his life, as he is leading it at present, is too narrow in outlook. He has forgotten to take account of sin, death, and the divine power and judgment. In retreat, transcending his normal outlook, he contemplates these facts in all their naked vividness, and asks of God shame for his sinfulness, confusion at the thought of his folly. If he attain what he ask, there will occur the inevitable suggestion that his present mode of life must be altered, his attachments given up. This will be accompanied at first, not by consolation, but by desolation; not by feelings of contentment and joy, but by distress and, it may be, violent perturbation. It is the idea of the creatures to whom or to which he is attached that will tend to console him.

In this case the perturbation of mind is due to the struggle between good and evil which is taking place within the soul. This is inevitable. The creature-complex which hitherto has dominated the sinner's life cannot be broken up except by a struggle which must of necessity be painful. The pain here is a sign that God is working for a cure, is seeking to break the bonds of a self-induced slavery, and that, if the soul surrender to the divine suggestion, it will become free. Once it surrenders, the pain will give place to joy, the intensity of which will depend upon the extent of this surrender. And upon this same factor will depend the comparative freedom of the penitent from a recurrence of the struggle, and, should it recur, the ease with which he is able to emerge victorious.

Quite a different rule for the discernment of spirits must be used in the case of a man who is already serving God. Divine suggestion, or divine sanction given to suggestions

which occur naturally and are dwelt upon, will be recognisable now by the consolation which attends them. In this case, says St Ignatius, "it is the way of the evil spirit to sting, to sadden, to raise obstacles, making the soul restless by false reasonings, that it may get on no further. And it is the way of the good spirit to give courage and strength, consolations, tears, inspirations, and repose of mind, making things easy and removing obstacles, to the end that the soul may go on further in doing good." The suggestion that there are faults which need correction no longer causes perturbation now, but is received "as a drop of water that enters into a sponge," or as "one coming into his own house by an open door."

From the psychological point of view the explanation is the same in both cases. It is a question of apperception. If the complex of ideas, emotions, desires, conscious or subconscious tendencies, is incompatible with the suggestion which seeks to enter it, there is conflict and pain. If, on the other hand, there is harmony between the suggestion and the dominant complex of one's mind, it will be readily and joyfully apperceived, and will at the same time be thereby intensified and rendered the more efficacious. It is in order to eliminate the possibility of conflict that, as we have seen, the blank mind and restful body are recommended as the most favourable condition for treatment by suggestion. But so difficult is it in the waking state to obtain this condition, that hypnosis must often be resorted to. St Ignatius would work by suggestion throughout, and would obviate or overcome counter-suggestions by use of the apperceptive principle. He would not have a purely blank mind, but rather would stimulate faith and evoke the appropriate emotion, that suggestions may have at least a chance of success even with the habitual sinner. And he would help these suggestions in the conflict that in this case must inevitably arise, by indicating their origin, intensifying confidence in God's mercy, and by the promise of victory and happiness if trust in God prevails. In like manner with those seeking to make progress would he strengthen suggestions already accepted by the contemplation of incidents in Christ's life, of His passion, or of His resurrection, thereby encouraging confidence, loyalty, hope, and the resolution to endure; while he would tide over times of dryness and despondency by the memory of past consolation and the assurance of its return.

From the scientific point of view the process throughout is thoroughly sound, but for its success it supposes something

more than mere psychology. There is postulated from the start a firm belief in God; not necessarily a practical belief, but at least a conviction of His existence, His power, and His love for mankind. Destroy this, and the therapeutic value of the Exercises is reduced to zero. It is useless to tell a man to make suggestions to himself unless you explain to him also something of the nature of auto-suggestion and of his so-called subconscious self. He must believe in these things if his suggestions are to prove efficacious. *Possunt, quia posse videntur*. So, too, must we believe in divine suggestions if we are to place any trust in them. Explain God as the mere product of human ratiocination, and His power for good has vanished. Explain consolation as the mere effect of psychic process in no sense due to God, and it ceases to have value either as a token of grace or as a stimulant to action. Neither is such rationalising necessary, for the truth is that God operates in all things and through all things for the good of those who choose to recognise this fact and to make use of it.

On the other hand, there is need of great caution in using consolation as a criterion of divine guidance even when it occurs in time of prayer. The danger is too obvious to need remark, and St Ignatius is fully aware of it. He holds that when the consolation is without assignable cause, there is no deception in it, since it proceeds from God alone. "Nevertheless," he says, "the spiritual person, to whom God gives such consolation, ought to look with much watchfulness and attention to distinguish the time of the actual consolation from that which follows, in which the soul remains aglow with the favour and remnants of the consolation that is past; for, often in this second period, by her own proper activity, working upon habits and the consequences of concepts and judgments, she comes to form various purposes and opinions which are not given immediately by God our Lord; and which therefore need to be very well discussed before entire credence is given them and they are carried into effect." In fact, he would have us always "attend to the course and current of our thoughts," and regard only those as approved by God in which "the beginning, middle, and end are all good, tending to entire good." So soon as evil appears in their wake, or they tend to make us restless and troubled, we must begin to suspect them. In other words, with St John, we must "try the spirits if they be of God," for many false prophets go about.

In particular would St Ignatius have us exercise great

care where there is question of choosing a vocation in life, of accepting or refusing some preferment, or of coming to a decision in any other matter of importance. We must not make the choice in accordance with inclination, and then seek to convince ourselves that it is also in accordance with God's will; but must first set clearly before our minds that it is God's will alone that matters, and then consider carefully from the point of view of His greater service the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative that offers. We should also inquire whether we be clearly conscious that our inclination towards one alternative is prompted primarily by the love of God; should ask ourselves how we would advise another to act in similar circumstances; should try to imagine how we would desire to have acted if lying on our death-bed, and what account we would be able to give of ourselves in the matter before the judgment-seat of God. The actual decision may come in various ways. God may "so move and attract the will that without doubt or the power of doubting we must follow His guidance." A "gathered abundance of clear light and knowledge" may break upon us after a long conflict and much emotional stress. Or we may decide the matter quite calmly after prayerful deliberation. But unless we have tried the spirits and have inquired whither they would lead us and by what route, we cannot be sure that the suggestions God seems to make, in reality come from Him.

Belief in the power of divine suggestion, and the attempt to guide our lives by this means, does not imply that we are to cease to use intelligence, and to be guided solely by emotion. Quite the contrary: it means that we must take account of both intelligence and emotion, and must use the latter intelligently. Neither does that confidence in and entire submission to God, which is the first condition of success in the use of the Ignatian method, involve the renunciation of freedom or the weakening of our will. In surrendering to God one does not become a mere automaton. One surrenders freely, and one's surrender must be freely renewed and sustained. The will, no less than intelligence and emotion, is operative throughout.

This statement would at first seem to be in flat contradiction to the theory of suggestion, between which and the principle of the Exercises we are attempting to establish an analogy. According to the Law of Reversed Effort, "when an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the

subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion" (Baudouin, *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion*, p. 116). The formula for suggestion is not "who wills can," but "who thinks can" or "who imagines can" (*ibid.*, p. 10). "The teleology of the will is conscious, whereas the teleology of suggestion is subconscious" (p. 274). "If we inquire of the 'new' pupils, of those who have failed in their first attempts, concerning the manner in which they made their suggestions, we get some such answer as this: 'I took a lot of pains'; 'I tried as hard as I could.' But as soon as the pupil is made to realise that herein precisely lies his error, he promptly begins to make headway" (p. 125).

The contradiction is only apparent. The above law, *mutatis mutandis*, is identical with the famous dictum of St Ignatius: In prayer, act as if everything depended on God; and in conduct afterwards, as if everything depended on yourself. The confusion arises from the identification of the term "will" with those of its functions which require "effort." For "desire" is a primary condition of the use of suggestion. We can neither make nor accept suggestions unless we desire what is suggested. Even under hypnosis suggestions which are incompatible with our deep-rooted desires and our character will fail in their effect. Confidence and affection are also of importance, and in these, no less than in desire, the action of the will is involved. The point which Baudouin wishes to bring out is that it is not we who are going to bring about the effect, but the suggestion itself, and that our attitude towards it should be passive, not active. We should in no wise seek to enforce it, but merely submit quietly to its influence. Precisely the same condition is requisite for successful prayer. Quietly we allow to float before our mind the thoughts that have been put before us, and await suggestions. Some of them we shall recognise as coming from God, and in these we shall rest, bathing in them, so to speak, and submitting ourselves wholly unto them, because we believe that God inspires them and will give to them efficacy. Both processes are initiated by a voluntary act, and, throughout both, the will is operative in the selecting of some and the ignoring of other suggestions. Yet in neither should there be an effort of will, a straining of attention, or a determination which in our own strength we resolve to carry out.

Success in prayer depends upon this principle no less than does success in the use of suggestion. In practical life, on the

other hand, the reverse is the case. Success here depends largely upon the firmness of our resolves and the determination of our efforts. We are ever planning, purposing, striving, persisting. Yet even here, and especially in the matter of temptation, it is possible to use the will wrongly. A temptation is of the nature of a suggestion. Hence the attempt to repress it—*positive resistere*, as the theologians say—may result only too frequently, if the psycho-analyst is to be trusted, in increasing its pertinacity and intensity! The way to overcome temptation, especially if it be of the passionate type, is to nullify it by counter-suggestion. An unholy thought may be connected up with other thoughts more innocent in character. Its energy will thus be sublimated. For this our meditations will have prepared us. They will also suggest to us that on the side of the counter-suggestion a divine energy is working, which, if we quietly submit to it, cannot but prevail. As in agriculture and industry we use the energy of our will rather to direct than to battle against the energies of nature, so should we use it in dealing with the powers of our own complex nature, and with those other powers, around and above us, to whose influence we are constantly subject. It is not by sheer effort of will that we shall overcome temptation, but by submitting ourselves voluntarily to another influence more powerful than that which would enthrall us.

This applies to the moment of temptation. Prior to this the will may be used in other ways. The evil idea which in temptation tends to issue in act is usually suggested by external circumstances, and, even when arising from the body, is often thereby intensified. Such circumstances are "occasions of sin," and, though the inclination to enter an occasion of sin is itself a temptation, it is usually far less intense than the further temptation to which it will lead. It can therefore be more easily avoided. The prudent man will not act on impulse and haphazard, but will so order his life that those impulses which in him tend strongly towards evil get as little encouragement as possible. The strength of temptation depends largely upon the past—not only upon past actions, but also upon the complex of thoughts and images which has been built up around them under the influence of environment. The bigger the complex, the greedier it is of fresh material. Such material is but fuel to the fire, and must not be supplied to it. A strong character will mould its environment. But if our character be weak in any particular we can only avoid sin by avoiding such circumstances as will suggest sin. Meanwhile counter-suggestions must be encouraged by

meditation and strengthened by prayer, that the old complex may be dissolved and its elements woven into more spiritual complexes where their energy will be differently orientated.

"The work of modern science is a great achievement, but it is incomplete," says Baudouin (p. 278). "For its completion a certain change is necessary both in outlook and method. As the philosopher Spir has well put it, 'We are masters of nature externally alone; inwardly we are nature's slaves.'" The "organic control" of ourselves is in his view "a heritage which has been lost in the course of evolution" (p. 276). He would regain it by means of suggestion.

Christianity, too, believes in a heritage that has been lost in the course of evolution. What Baudouin calls "organic control," her theologians call "integrity," and attribute to its loss "concupiscence." She would also regain it by the very means which Baudouin recommends, but with the difference that what he, as a scientist, ignores, she from her wider standpoint recognises: namely, the possibility of enhancing the power of suggestion by appealing to Him who is the supreme faith-healer.

Psychotherapy is based on the principle that there is a subconscious self which can do things which we cannot do voluntarily, and seeks by means of suggestion to utilise this subconscious machinery. Substitute for the subconscious self God, and you have the fundamental principle of the Spiritual Exercises. Based on the conviction that God knows things which we do not know, and can do things which we are unable to do, the Exercises seek, by means of divine suggestion, to utilise this power to man's upbuilding. They seek, too, to reconcile the warring elements in human nature, but would do so by first reconciling man and his Creator. A philosophy which takes account of man as well as of nature is better than one which is content with nature only; but it will still be in theory defective, and in practice halting, if it fail to take account also of the source whence both man *and* nature draw their being and activity. Self-conquest is possible, but only by God's power can we attain it, and only as God's instruments solve the problems of the world in which we live.

That is the fundamental principle—far deeper than those of mere psychology—which underlies the method of the Exercises. To its efficiency experience amply testifies, and will testify still, if it be used; the more so, and not the less, because the psychologist of to-day takes cognisance and is analysing the processes involved.

LESLIE J. WALKER, S.J.

SHINTO.

THOMAS BATY, LL.D., D.C.L.,

LATE FELLOW UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD,
Legal Adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office.

A GODLESS country, some people have styled Japan. There are even Japanese who acquiesce in the statement that Shinto is a mere system of statecraft, and cannot be regarded as a religion, "properly so called."

It is not unnatural that missionaries, brought up against a religion which has no creed, no code of ethical prescriptions, no definite dogmas of heaven and hell, should fail to recognise in it the essentials of what they are accustomed to style "religion"; nor that those Japanese who have imbibed their culture should share their ideas. Accustomed to preach a code of ethics, to be faithfully observed on pain of post-mortem torment, the old-fashioned Christian minister would be strangely puzzled if the promises of felicity and the threats of eternal flame were withdrawn from his scheme of things. One great Christian thinker, indeed, wished that they might be, "in order that men might be led to virtue through love of it alone." But few, until quite lately, reached this standpoint. Creeds, again, are still regarded in Christendom as of the essence of religion, except by the Unitarian. Ethical codes, from the Ten Commandments down, have, in more or less detailed form, been laid upon the conscience of the pious.

Yet analysis would show us that neither creed, code, nor Tartarus is of the essence of religion. The mystic is independent of Tartarus—transcends Tartarus, and in a sense desires it. Paul the Apostle transcends codes and finds all things lawful, if not expedient. Creeds are seen to be the props of an age of decay: the substitutes for devotion to a Reality.

It is such a devotion to a living Reality that constitutes Shinto.

Etymologically it is The Way. It is the Path of the Ideal; just as in so many other religious systems the notion of a Path or Way is used as a name for the life of faith. Its one precept is, "Follow your own heart's dictates"—in other words, "Respond, like a needle to the pole, to the impulses of your conscience"; and reverence, it adds, all that has given you a conscience to follow. In general, and for the mass of people, it will be their physical ancestors who have given them this conscience; instilling their loving impulses into them by nurture and affection all down the ages. Pay a due meed of hearty reverence, then, to them: and above all, to that which is beyond and behind them—the glowing Force of warmth and brightness which is symbolised in the Sun. Many Powers there are—and each is a *Kami*, a thing above, which deserves to be revered. But above all, Love, in its dearest aspect of warmth and light—the celestial goddess, Amaterasu-ohomikami. "He who called God Love and Light did more for religion than all the philosophers."

And there is a symbol on earth to venerate—the Descendant *par excellence*; the Emperor, conceived as the embodiment of human tenderness and intellect. Every religion has its symbols: there is certainly nothing intrinsically sacred in two crossed pieces of wood: there is nothing intrinsically patriotic in coloured calico of red, white, and blue. Yet the Frenchman will die for the one, and the Catholic for the other: not for the sake of crossed sticks or calico patterns, but for the sake of Christ or France. The flag may be soiled, the cross worm-eaten—it is of less than no consequence.

And the Emperor is much more than a symbol. He is conceived as embodying the Ideal which he stands for, and which is worshipped in him. The supposition that an Emperor might not be perfectly kind and just, and the inquiry as to what would be the duty of the people in such a case, is simply not entertained. It is an hypothesis from which the mind recoils. As Lord Stowell said in a famous case, the very supposition involves "extreme indecency." The Mencian doctrine that an Emperor who is not perfectly kind and just is no Emperor has little vogue in Japan. The Japanese clings to the assurance of Imperial perfection. This is a fact which, whether we understand or approve it or not, is vital to the life and conduct of the Japanese. The whole value of a symbol lies in the fact that it does ray out the high ideas which it is held to embody. When people take the Virgin's picture, like Knox, for a "pented brod," fitter to swim than to be worshipped, its symbolic virtue has gone

out of it. But that is not to say that it never had any. In sober fact, the Imperial Person still has, and more strongly than for centuries has, the symbolic virtue. Still the Imperial Majesty is in itself majesty *in excelsis* in the eyes of all Japanese.

"Obey the Emperor" is therefore analogous to "Obey the Cross," "Obey the Tricolour"—not the Symbol, but the living Idea. The devotion of a Spaniard to the material Cross, of a Chard or Bromhead of Zululand to the material Flag, finds its parallel in the devotion of a Japanese to the August Occupant of the Throne. When Chard died with the colours wrapped under his uniform, no one hinted that it was a ridiculous sacrifice for a square yard of bunting.

The Japanese symbol is, indeed, the more spiritual and sublimated conception: for a carefully cultured soul is surely greater than any material thing. And the spirituality of the conception is shown in this—that it is not physical ancestry which is ultimately the important matter in determining the imperial descent, but culture. Europeans are apt to smile at the Japanese assertion of unbroken descent in the dynasty, which is clearly and avowedly adoptive in certain links (though always within a certain high lineage). But that is its very glory: it is not a descent based *merely* on physical connection. Physical connection is the normal guarantee of a community of basic ideas, but it is not a necessary or sufficient guarantee, and the adoptive successions are there to show that the fact is recognised. In short, the Emperor satisfies exactly Mr C. Chesterton's conception of a mediæval king—"the Sacramental Man who summed up a nation."

Japanese religion, therefore, like Greek, starts with the conception which modern religion is slowly tending to approach. It discards particular dictates; it has no place for casuistry. If the heart is right, all is right—and its sole concern is to see that the heart shall grow in virtue through the sweet influences of home, in reverent admiration of all that is lovely and exalted. It has no use for fragmentary dogmas, and bits of proverbial philosophy such as were dear to Confucius. The soul is organic, and part of an organism—not a machine to be regulated by precepts and oiled by rewards.

Japanese religion owns a multitude of Powers—and are there not a multitude? Like the Greek, the Japanese moves about in touch with the supernatural. There is a Power in the waters; in the leaves; in the crystal; each facet of life flashes a different admiration on his soul. "Est deus in nobis"

even—and the valiancy of the rebel, the skill of the marauder, are truly the work of God.

Like Mr Ruskin, the Shintoist disdains to stimulate goodness by any *vis a tergo*. Ruskin somewhere recalls the case of a woman who viewed with extreme gloom and disfavour the idea of abolishing Hell. "What would keep my son straight if it wasn't the fear of Hell?" What sort of a goodness was it, Ruskin commented, which needed the fear of hell to preserve it! But it is simply wrong to represent Shinto as devoid of faith in a future. In no other religion in the world is the absolute continuity of life so vividly realised. The Communion of Saints is not a creed with the Japanese, it is an uncontradicted experience. The individual, his *Kami*, and his friends who have "changed their world," are all part of the one fabric of existence. Death does not abolish them. The signs of their presence may be different, and that is all.

One is often told that their religion sits lightly on the Japanese, and amounts to nothing. It is true that it is not a religion of gloom, and that it accords very well with delight in the beauty of the world. The essential difference between Shinto and Buddhism may be put in this—that the Buddhist tries to escape from the world, the Shintoist to overcome it. Both aims are ultimately the same—the conquest of perfection. But the Buddhist concentrates on withdrawing altogether from material images—the Shintoist on playing the ideal part under the stress of all their changes and chances. No one will say that Japanese religion, Buddhist or Shinto, consists in a nod of the head to the god, on the way to a festive orgy, who has seen the single figures agonising in prayer at the shrine, or who has, as I have, watched the lonely pilgrim bowing and returning to bow, again and again, with wide-stretched arms, in mute response to the glory of the Sun and the Sea.

"He made us, and He'll take care of us," the concise conviction of William Black's old Scotswoman, is, in short, the attitude of the Shinto worshipper.

The relations of Shinto to Buddhism and Confucianism have often been explained, and I have not skill to dilate on them. But, shortly, Buddhism, imported in the eighth century, made its way by explaining the *Kami* of Shinto as manifestations of the Buddha. It introduced an element of melancholy, which runs side by side in the Japanese character with the trustful optimism of Shinto. It appealed to the weak disgust with the world which is apt to assail at times the noblest

natures. But it never displaced the dear familiar *Kami*. In 1868, when the Shogun ("Tycoon") delivered his power into the hands of the great Emperor Meiji (then Mutsuhito), Buddhism, whose fortunes had been bound up with the Shogunate, was disestablished.

The founders of the Tokugawa Shogunate had been fervent Buddhists, and the resplendencies of the Nikko temples built by them are alien to the plain simplicity of Shinto architecture, as seen notably at Isé (where "there is nothing to see, and they won't let you see it," according to disappointed tourists). The resumption of power by the Mikado was founded on a revival of Shinto learning, which took its rise, long before the Restoration, in the writings of the learned Motoöri, the morning star of that reformation. Its culmination in the events of 1868 led naturally to an official depression of Buddhism.

As a private, and nearly universal, cult, however, Buddhism is active and powerful: though still perfectly compatible with Shinto. Until lately, the funeral ceremonies were Buddhist, and the marriage rites domestic; but recent fashion is to resort to Shinto temples for both.

The influence of Confucianism on Japanese religion was almost wholly bad. It dates from some few centuries back, and, besides introducing an almost Pharisaical minuteness of ceremonial and etiquette, it is responsible, as nothing else, for the depressed position of women. Before the Confucian and Chinese influence, feminine influence was great. There were feminine Empresses. There were feminine heroes and poets. The Empress Zhingō is perhaps the greatest hero and conqueror in Japanese history. The supreme deity is a goddess, and in the exquisite culture of the Heian epoch the original and penetrating thought of feminine writers produced unrivalled masterpieces of classical literature. The author of the *Tosa Diary*—high official, mature nobleman, and head of a family—writes in the character of a woman.

But Confucianism introduced the desolating doctrine that the sexes must specialise in virtue. That is a dogma which is really at the root of all our Western and Eastern ills, for virtue resents being torn in pieces; but Confucianism has made it specially baleful. It has carried out the rending of the seamless robe of Right with remorseless completeness. The true nobility of the daughters of Japan is apt to be camouflaged under a thick affectation of meekness and hysterical shyness. It is melancholy to see the bright freshness of the very young girl—eager, courageous, original—fade into the insipid artificiality which is too often her fate at twenty.

There is new wine, however, in Japan which is bursting the old bottles of Confucianism. Chief is the sacramental wine of Shinto. Its implications are as yet unsuspected; but a nation which adores a goddess will not long be content with artificial women. It was the worship of the divine mother Saint Mary that alone created Western chivalry. Another element of ferment is the devotion of the Japanese to their infant daughters. They will not always be content to see them lose their bright, straightforward strength as they grow up. To such a pitch has it already come, that Japan is already faced by the possibility of a rising generation of self-confident girlhood. The noisy and selfish damsel is beginning to appear on the scene, as any visit to the theatre will prove. And unless Japan can throw over the ethics of Confucianism, and admit women to the open enjoyment of masculine stateliness and initiative, the thwarted desire will break out in unhealthy licence—in self-will, vulgar loudness, and egotism. The reflecting Japanese is justly terrified at the prospect of the soft and tender Japanese girl's turning into the rough and masterful Westerner, of whom he has only too cruel experience, and of whom he recognises the militant suffragist and the inconsiderate high-school romp as the dreaded types. He is right. But if he is not careful, he will get them. If he tries to thwart the soul's desire for perfection, he will drive it into faults. The faults Confucianism chooses for recommendation are artificiality and meekness. If a desire for straightforwardness and honour is met with a Confucian negative, the result will be to drive the girl right into the arms of Western roughness and vulgarity. They will represent to her her ideal of freedom.

Not only that, but, as the more perfect is more attractive than the less perfect, the girl who to the grace and amiability which are her tradition adds high dignity and independence, wins particularly the regard which is denied to the meek and submissive. "I like Western women, because they have the dignity of men," was the reason given by a Japanese for marrying an American. It is in the nature of things that the admirable shall be admired.

The present observer sees, therefore, in the future a sudden subversion of Confucianism as striking and as far-reaching as was the subversion of Buddhism. Either that must happen, or the filtration of Western ideas will provide Japan with a luxuriant crop of spoilt daughters, who snatch at the vices nearest to those virtues which orthodoxy would deny them. And the most natural and obvious path to the abolition of

Confucian ethics is the grace of Amaterasu-ohomikami, the Goddess of Shinto.

In fine, Shinto is the nearest equivalent existing to-day for the old religion of the Western world—that of Greece. It is Light: but not only Light—it is Sweetness as well. “To attain Sweetness in accord with human nature, which is at the same time the nature of the gods,”¹ appears to be the essence of Shintoism.

Conscience, reverence, and sweetness (“umashi”) find as their companion virtue a passionate devotion to stainlessness. Even sheer physical cleanness is sedulously inculcated by Shinto. It is easy to disparage the importance of physical as compared with moral purity. But after all, it washes—physical pollution is, inevitably, not a nice thing. To remove it *may* involve greater moral pollution; still, the desire to remove all that is physically disgusting and foul is a purely ethical desire, and one in root and essence with the impulse towards spiritual stainlessness. “Let a man first wash himself,” says Carlyle; “let him first be physically clean!” Although that which is without defileth not a man, yet contented acceptance of it does.

Not that physical cleanliness is regarded as all, or chief. The oracle of the God of Katori is quite explicit on the point. “To God, inward purity is all-important; mere external cleanliness avails not . . . if one is pure in heart, rest assured that one will even feel the Divine presence with him, and possess the immediate sense of the Divine within him (cf. Gentshi Kato, append. *Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan*, ‘The Japanese Analects,’ p. 67) of Shintoism.”

Blood, corruption, decay, the humours of the body, birth, death—all these are essentially anathema to Shinto, which is simply the expression of natural human feeling.

For, above all, the inmost attraction of Shinto reposes on the fact that it is utterly natural. It invokes no revelation, no sacred books, as its warrant. Its sole warrant is the human heart and the nature of things. Evil is evil, all the world over, in spite of changeful appearances. The heart of sweetness is one and indestructible, and folds the living and the dead in one web of immortality—whether we call her Amaterasu-ohomikami or by some other name.

Mirror, Sword, and Jewel—these are the symbols of Japanese religion. They all embody the ideal of clear and lovely splendour. The Mirror, which must needs be stainless,

¹ I.e., there are not two standards of morality for the divine and human: what is sweet is sweet, whether in God or man.

or it ceases to be a mirror, is the chief. The Sword indicates the prime necessity (if again we may quote Carlyle) "that a man be valiant." The Jewel is for beauty and sweetness. Stainlessness, Sweetness, and Valiance—such is the Japanese ethic.

If the reader has followed us so far as to be ready to admit that such a system may properly be termed a religion, it is a fair question to propound whether it can be a universal religion. It is usually regarded as intensely exclusive—far more so than Judaism; made in and for Japan, and incapable of communication except to members of the Japanese State. There seems no place in it, not even an inferior place, for the sojourner and the stranger. Can such a system be other than a local and temporary one?

Now, the first comment to make is that, in fact, it is in Japan, and solely in Japan, that the system of Shinto has had its rise. Nowhere else, in historic fact, has a religious system arisen discarding all but the most sublimated ethics, directing its votaries to follow their conscience in reverence to those who have nurtured them, and founding on no finite and mutable creeds and scriptures. Brahmanism and Buddhism tend to mortification; Christianity is bound up with a host of irrelevancies which are *de fide*. Japan alone is the origin and seat of Shinto. Ancient Greece may have had the same religion; but ancient Greece is buried—Pan is dead. Moreover, the great fact of ancient Greek religion was not the celestial Light and Love, but rather the stern brilliance of the dreaded Thunderer. The Thunderer does not rule Japan. He is a considerable god, but rather an amusing one; with grotesque tastes, and a good loud drum. In Japan, "force of heart holds its own against fire-balls." There is no question as to the supremacy of the Ancestral Goddess over the lightnings of Zeus.

The religion being unique, it is no wonder that its scope at first sight appears to be limited. But is it so in reality? Are the millions of the earth, outside Japan, regarded as a mere shifting background for the human drama?—a mere collection of atomic dust without God in the world?

It is a fundamental question. For, essentially, questions of world-politics are religious questions. Either Japan must abandon Shinto, or Shinto must be conciliated with Occidental religion, or else there must be inevitable strife. It is the religious nerve that is the irritable nerve. It seems to me that Shinto is readily to be reconciled with Western religion, in spite of its apparently exclusive character. Western religion

is rapidly shedding its irrelevancies and is retiring on fundamentals. It is ready, and indeed eager, to neglect the formal and external, and to see the same Reality under different names and aspects. But is Shintoism?

I should, ignorantly and regretfully, have answered the question in the emphatic negative two years ago. That the elect religion was for the chosen people seemed to be the only admissible conclusion. State and religion were seen so closely intertwined that there seemed no Shintoistic salvation possible without the pale of the Japanese Empire. Amaterasu-ohomikami was the God of the whole world, but she had no particular care for or interest in the outlying lands. They were relegated—I will not say to her “uncovenanted” mercies, for there is nothing “covenanted” about the love of Amaterasu for her People, who are also her Family—but to the position of a hardly regarded background in the scheme of things.

But indeed it is not so, or need not be so. The *Warongo*, or Japanese Analects, translated by Gentshi Kato (see the reference to them above), and published this year (1918), contain an oracle of the God Watatsumi Daimyojin which shows how far the later Shintoists were prepared to go in the path of comity.

“Not only in Japan does one and the same Japanese God of Heaven manifest Himself, in different forms, but also in many other lands. In India He was born as Gautama. . . . In China, the three sages, King Futsze, Laotze, and Yen-hui, were neither more nor less than our own Kami Himself. You may ask, Why does one and the same God assume such varied forms? It is simply because, being one and the same God, He desires to preach the selfsame truth, and therefore He takes forms differing only in appearance from each other, so that He may adapt His teaching to the understanding of everyone” (*cf. ibid.*, p. 75). So, Fujiwara Kanetaka is represented as saying (about the end of the sixteenth century): “We should not fail to welcome any strangers, whether Buddhists from India or Confucianists from China, who come and show homage to our Divine Kingdom. For they are all in reality offshoots of one and the same tree of our Shinto, or the Way of the National Gods. Each foreign doctrine represents a different aspect of the selfsame truth of Shinto in its own country, accommodated to circumstances. Should anyone think otherwise, *it is because of his entire ignorance of the vast comprehensiveness of our Shinto.*”

It is useless to say that these extracts show traces of Christian and Buddhist influence on primitive Shinto. We

are concerned, not with what Shinto may have been, but with what it is. And such conceptions as are embodied in the Analects show that it is capable of being regarded as a "comprehensive" religion, has in fact been so regarded, and may properly be so regarded at the present day and in the coming future. As another oracle (*ibid.*, p. 81) says: "Our Sun-Goddess—that is to say, or broadly speaking, all our Shinto gods without exception—is believed to manifest Herself as Surya (Hindû Sun-God) or Mahavairocana (the All-Illuminations) in the Buddhist teaching. The same Sun-Goddess, however, also manifests Herself in the form of the Dragon-God of the sea, who is ready to grant petitions made by any creature in all the Three Worlds. Even the followers of Sakyamuné should not fail to pay due homage to the Sun-Goddess. This is because all things in the Universe, Heaven and Earth included, are after all but different manifestations of the One Supreme Being."

Let us close with quoting the sayings attributed by the same source (p. 87) to Yamato-hime:

"The Goddesses of Isé are self-existent and primordial, having neither beginning nor end—a Great Spirit, the Over-Soul. . . . This Great Spirit, or Innermost-Self, of the Kami transcends all our thoughts and is incomprehensible. The Most High stands aloof from earthly things and yet is not the Non-Existence, or Absolute Nothing or Void, as nihilistic Buddhism asserts. . . . The essential in man is his soul, the Innermost-Self, which is derived from the Kami. Hence, the Kami is the most Ancient of the Ancient, the Fathomless of the Unfathomed, the Hidden One, the First Principle."

TH. BATY.

TOKIO, JAPAN.

THE MECHANICAL BASIS OF WAR.

B. A. G. FULLER, B.Sc. (OXON.), PH.D.

OF all the ways in which the God of Things as They Are cynically discredits the ideals and discourages the enthusiasms of the moral reformer, none to-day is more distressingly brutal than his persistent refusal to create the State in the image of the individual, and model the so-called comity of nations, if not after the Communion of the Saints, at least upon the community of ordinary, mediocre, sinful men. Human beings, to be sure, are not always perfectly polite, forbearing, and just in their personal relations with one another. Still, the direct and personal dealings of man with man can usually be damned with the faint praise that they are better at any rate than international relations.

The highest degree of comity possible among nations seems to have been realised once and for all very early in history. This degree is so small that we are almost justified in saying that the evolution of a moral order among States has never taken place. Such rudiments of ethical conduct as have succeeded in establishing themselves still require nations to go armed to the teeth. International law is a mere counsel of perfection to be followed or not as expediency dictates, which no State feels itself in honour or duty bound to enforce or obey. All the tradition and all the machinery moral and physical by which order is kept among individuals within the State are lacking in the society, if such it can be called, of nations.

This failure of States to develop an international moral order *pari passu* with the evolution of a moral order in personal relations presents a very curious and baffling phenomenon. It is so obviously desirable and theoretically so easy to conform the behaviour of States to the elementary decencies of the social life and conduct of their citizens by the substitution of arbitration for battle and the introduction of international

law-courts and police, that the would-be social and political reformer is hardly to be blamed for feeling that the world is trembling on the verge of a political millennium into which the mere touch of a worker's, a woman's, or a Wilson's hand will be sufficient to precipitate it. And yet at the present moment these ideas, apparently so sensible and so easy of realisation, seem less at home than ever amid the troubles of a naughty world and continue to dwell, like Plato's ideal State and all other Utopias, in Heaven.

We shall do well, in view of the obstinate character of the disorder, to make a thorough examination of the case before hazarding or accepting the diagnosis that war is a preventable functional malady which modern enlightenment is about to eliminate from the world. There is at least room for suspicion that we may be dealing with an organic difficulty in the constitution of human society beyond the reach of the League of Nations, Women's Suffrage, or the collapse of the Capitalistic Bourgeoisie.

Now all war cures or prophylactics presuppose one of two things. Either they assume that a plurality of localised States is not an ultimate form of social organisation but merely a stage in a well-defined evolution towards complete political integration in an international world-state. Or else, supposing, perhaps blindly or on purely sentimental grounds, that nations will retain in the future their separate existences and independent sovereignties, they draw an analogy between the State and the individual, and from the fact that both are grown in the same culture, as it were, of human nature infer that both can be made to display an equal virulence of moral virtue and aptitude for social organisation.

Neither of these assumptions should be made without a preliminary analysis of the nature of the sense of nationality. For our purposes we may discover in the sense two factors, one psychological, the other geographical or geometrical. Psychologically speaking, national self-consciousness is one among the many manifestations of that universal and all-compelling group-consciousness which makes man a social animal and the group a quasi-organic entity endowed with "over-individual" incentives and motives of behaviour. Indeed, the researches of social psychology suggest that man thinks and acts more fundamentally in point of time and instinct as the member of a group than as an isolated individual, and that his detachment from the group as a distinct person is a comparatively tardy event in evolution. The group, then, not the individual, might seem the original,

essential, and dynamic human unit; the individual, not the group, the derivative and subordinate aspect of human nature.

The distinguishing mark of the national form of group-consciousness is localisation in space. A nation is a group whose over-individual consciousness particularises itself in and is bound up with a given geographical area, just as the sense of individual personality is bound up with the possession of a particular body. This attachment of group-consciousness to space is one of its most ancient and enduring characteristics. Of all the cements which bind human beings to one another a bit of earth shared in common holds hardest and lasts best. Love of country withstands the strain of personal affection, family ties, conscience, honour, and love of individual life itself. It survives the cold class hatreds and the bitter industrial unrests of the winter of our discontent. Nay, more, it betrays itself in those who profess themselves its betrayers. Even from out the whirlwind of Bolshevism one seems to catch the voice of Holy Russia calling upon her sons to arise and repel the foreign invader of their native land. Furthermore, it is only when the nomad stage has passed and the group has abandoned locomotion in free space for lateral expansion about a fixed point that any high degree of social evolution has taken place. In fact, human life has drawn so much of its fairest flowering and noblest fruition from its attachment to the soil, that man so far as his spiritual life is concerned should perhaps be called not a higher animal but a higher vegetable.

This localisation of group-consciousness in space which makes a nation a country also makes it something very like an organism. The State combines, we might almost say, the localised and highly specialised sense-organs and individualised reactions of the higher animals with the diffuse and comparatively uniform sensitisation and the vague and simple reactions of the protozoon. The individuals composing the State are the sensitive spots, as it were, in which its consciousness has become collected, differentiated, and intensified. But the State also retains in its corporate, group capacity a primitive and fundamental irritability, diffused throughout its entire length and breadth, which makes national feeling more than the mere sum of the individual minds of its citizens and national reaction more than the component of their individual activities. In any case, a State is a state of mind common to a number of individuals which welds them into a body distinct from all other bodies and causes them to act "as one man"

with a unity of purpose and operation which resembles the activity of an individual being.

It is granting the primary character of group-consciousness, its propensity to localise itself in space, and the resultant quasi-organic nature of the State, that we must approach the contention of the internationalist. He is really arguing that the fundamental group may be widened so as to weld together all mankind, that the entire earth may be made the soil in which this universal group is rooted, and that all local loves of country may be transcended in love of the world as a whole.

The testimony of history is not so one-sided or convincing on this point as the internationalist would have us believe. He points to the many instances of the merging of the distinct group-consciousness, the jealousies, and the enmities of smaller units in the larger nations of to-day as fair evidence that such an amalgamation may be repeated on a larger scale in a federation of the world. But he forgets that usually this consolidation has been not voluntary and based upon sweet reasonableness, but due rather to the existence of the dangers and the vigorous use of the methods which he is seeking to abolish. It is an open question whether without compulsion, conquest, and the danger of foreign aggression the trend of events would be toward the amalgamation of smaller units or the disintegration of larger ones. As it is, history shows no great preponderance of centripetal over centrifugal tendencies.

If history affords no secure foundation for the internationalist hope, psychology might be held to undermine it altogether. It is a psychological commonplace that the personal self-consciousness of any given individual depends upon and means from the very beginning a consciousness of other selves with which he contrasts and differentiates his particular self. Apart from the foil of this consciousness of other personality, he could never become aware of his own. Self-consciousness, in a word, is essentially plural in content—is primarily of selves and only incidentally of self. It can find and recognise itself only in a multitude.

Now there is certainly a fair presumption that the social as well as the personal consciousness of the individual is subject to the same law of plurality. It may be that man cannot be conscious of belonging to any group at all, or in other words be a social or even a gregarious animal, save in so far as he is conscious of groups other than and foreign to his own. In that case the very nature and existence of human society implies and depends upon the existence of a plurality of reciprocally contrasted or exclusive societies incapable of

fusion, and the achievement of a single all-inclusive political unit is as impossible psychologically as the development or persistence of a personal self-consciousness. Nothing short of an invasion from another planet, with its alter-ego of an extra-terrestrial group, can transfer the allegiance of man from a quarter to the whole of the globe and make him a citizen of the world. The late Professor Lowell's interpretation of the canals on Mars may very likely prove a more certain harbinger of international peace than President Wilson's advocacy of the League of Nations.

The balance of fact inclines us to believe that this presumption is true. All forms of social consciousness are as exclusive as they are inclusive. In every social as in every mathematical circle, from the family to the State, whatever its size and purpose, concavity and convexity are inseparable phenomena. Take away external pressure and you have removed the principle of internal cohesion. For inner cohesion, both psychological and physical, is largely an activity of recognising and resisting pressure from without. In short, the presence of an outsider is everywhere an integral part of the feeling of being inside any organisation whatsoever. And nowhere is this more noticeable than in national self-consciousness.

So much for the reformer's vision of a federation of the world and a parliament of man. The evidence of history or of psychology bids us be wary in acquiescing in his hope. It remains to examine the contention of those who, without hoping to fuse or federate the different national sentiments and sovereignties, still argue that distinct and sovereign nations are as susceptible of moral conduct and relations as are the separate and unique personalities of individual men.

This view presupposes, as we have already remarked, an essential similarity in the conditions which engender or mould the growth both of nations and individuals, since only like causes and circumstances can be expected to yield like results. Not until this supposition has been more closely examined can we estimate the soundness of the argument.

Our investigation may well begin—and perhaps end—by seeking to discover the fundamental condition which permits an inter-individual moral order to develop and persist. The existence of moral conduct and relations among individuals is too often taken for granted, and referred off-hand to merely anthropological or biological causes such as the naturally social and altruistic nature of man, his inherent sweet reasonableness, or his perception of the selfish advantages of a

calculated compromise peace with his naturally hostile fellows. But, obviously, explanations of this sort do not solve but merely postpone the problem. The moral order cannot be made to lift itself by its own bootstraps, but must stand upon a prior, non-moral ground of some sort. We have to ask what are the circumstances which permit man to have an altruistic and gregarious nature, or enable him to make the contract or the compromise upon which society is founded. These circumstances will of necessity be antecedent logically and temporally to even the rudiments of ethical conduct and relations.

The answer is suggested by the social theory of Hobbes, which, seeing in ethics and politics an extension of geometry and mechanics to the sphere of mind and will, regarded the right of self-preservation as a psychological expression of the first law of motion, and the substitution of compromise for collision between human wills as the equivalent of mechanical action and reaction in the movement of physical bodies. For, whether or not this reduction of conscious and social activity to terms of mechanical energy can be successfully carried out, the permissive condition of a moral order would seem to lie in a mechanical and geometrical accident. This accident is the occurrence of empty space between individual human beings and the consequent possibility of growth and movement without constriction and collision. Were men planted side by side with little or no intervening space, neither locomotion nor the expansion incidental to the normal mechanical process of growth could take place without encroaching upon places already filled. The ultimate relations of organisms so pushing and squeezing as they must to occupy the same space would be actually the *bellum omnium contra omnes* predicted by Hobbes of the fundamental condition of individual beings, and their struggle for existence could never be translated from terms of mechanical pressure into those of an economic and social competition which permits, though haltingly, the expression of a moral ideal. In a word, such organisms could never develop altruistic forms of consciousness and conduct.

The evolution of inter-individual morality, then, has been possible only because of the existence of inter-individual space. But now international space does not exist. The situation in which we have just fancied the individual is the real situation of the State. Nations are planted beside and bounded by one another without intervening space. The reproduction of the individual organic parts of which they are composed impels them to the only movement possible to them on

a priori geometrical grounds—lateral expansion. This movement may for a time mean the growth of population without constriction within loosely fitting home areas, or a bulging into comparatively empty and therefore non-resistant spaces such as colonies. But eventually it must involve a struggle to occupy a place already solidly filled by another. Biologically, so to speak, nations must, geometrically they cannot, occupy the same space. In their case, then, the geometrical prerequisite of a moral order, *i.e.* the possibility of occupying throughout growth different spaces, is lacking. Hence their relations are fundamentally unmoral. But their behaviour cannot be called immoral, since they are situated in a space in which there is no room for the distinction between good and evil.

The fact that the State is a collection of organisms whose inter-individual relations are moral avails nothing. For, as we have seen, these beings, free in their individual capacity to grow and move in space unimpeded, are in their collective capacity deprived of that mobility in free space which is indispensable to the occurrence of moral conduct. Indeed, it is not the least of the ironies of existence that the same group consciousness which, taken internally, as it were, is the very essence and meat of all altruistic, social, and ethical values and behaviour, should when applied externally poison human life perhaps beyond hope of cure.

The essential unmorality of the State is temporarily obscured in those cases where an excess of territory over population and a consequent absence of pressure by population upon boundaries breed the illusion of international space and hence of the possibility of conforming international activity to inter-individual standards of ethics. It is, for instance, interesting to note that during and after the Great War the prevalence among the Allies of so-called "idealism" over "realism" and "imperialism" has been in fairly constant inverse ratio to the proportion of population to territory. Japan, having occupied too much of her national area to have any great quantity left in which to deceive herself into idealism by a fictitious sense of locomotion, acts accordingly, and her "realism" and "imperialism" are the normal expression of her geometrical position. The question for her, as it will be for every nation in similar circumstances, is not whether but where she shall expand. Italy and France, with some spare room at their disposal, but less spaciouly and comfortably situated than the Anglo-Saxons, are notably less confident that the former things have passed away and

that there will not be any more war. The British Empire and the United States, however, in their ability to expand throughout an indeterminate future within spare room happily already seized and annexed, have the psychological equivalent of the individual's power of locomotion, ability to avoid collision, and consequent capacity for exercising forbearance and behaving ethically towards his neighbours. The illusion of international space, uninhibited by anything in their own experience, and in the case of remote, unschooled, and ingenuous America by anything in her knowledge of the experience of others, has become for them an *idée fixe*. It is no wonder that, having forestalled for centuries to come their own need of space in which to grow, the British and the Americans should advocate on the most far-sighted grounds the immediate curtailment of the wants of others less forehanded. Beguiled by the ample and brilliant prospects of their respective empires, they not unnaturally forget the essentially local, temporary, and contingent character of their good fortune, and regard it as a permanent political condition capable of serving as an example to other nations still regrettably disposed to "imperialistic" expansion. At the Congress of Versailles they imposed this view on friend and foe alike, extolling as the foundation of a just and lasting peace the maintenance of a territorial *status quo* which in reality deprived everyone except themselves, and perhaps Russia, of space for future growth.

The relief of pressure upon boundaries by emigration is a temporary and unsatisfactory alleviation. Group consciousness is such that any one nation tends to view with disfavour the loss of its members to another. Even idealistic America is apt to look somewhat askance at the man who renounces his American citizenship in order to become the subject of a foreign power. A national group instinctively prefers to find room for its surplus population by enlarging if possible its geographical area. This feeling is one of the grounds of the well-nigh universal desire for colonial expansion.

Emigration however, even if it were an approved, would form but a temporary, expedient. If the emigrant is absorbed into his new country he increases by so much the pressure from the other side of the boundary line and hastens elsewhere the disappearance of the illusion of international space. If he is not absorbed he either becomes expatriate and parasitic, or else remains an active member of his old group and exemplifies the dangers of the German doctrine of double citizenship.

The expedient of birth-control is likewise unsatisfactory.

Theoretically, to be sure, it seems the logical solution of the difficulty. If all nations could be persuaded to limit the size of their populations to the size of their present allotments of space, and stunt deliberately their growth at the point where any further increase would require more room, it would seem as if war might be really abolished. But in the first place it is doubtful whether a group in the plenitude of vigour and national self-consciousness can deliberately stop its own growth, any more than can the individual. Again, supposing that it could, such a dwarfing could take place only through the compulsory practice of birth-control by the individual members of the group. Birth-control, however, even in a permissive form is considered rather improper to mention and quasi-criminal to practise. And though doubtless the day will come when it will be considered moral to be rational in the propagation of the species, we may doubt whether it will do more than enlighten the present enforced ignorance and leave the degree of restriction to private discretion. This degree is perhaps more likely to be determined by immediate economic conditions than by an enthusiasm for the League of Nations and a conscious intention of minimising the occasions of war.

The hope, then, of those who look for an international moral order pacifying the relations of sovereign states in the same way that inter-individual ethics harmonise the conduct of autonomous individuals, seems as futile as the internationalist dream. The abolition of a plurality of group consciousnesses is psychologically impossible without destroying the whole social and moral nature of man. But as long as that plurality exists and is localised, as it is in national self-consciousness, in a plurality of contiguous spaces on the same plane, the inevitable growth of each resultant body and soul politic must eventually precipitate a struggle for room in which to continue the process of lateral expansion in which the development of a nation consists. It is to this inadequacy of the geometrical medium to the amount of mechanical movement seemingly destined to take place within it that the vast and endless battle of history is due.

It is an interesting and perhaps not too distant excursion into the realm of metaphysics, to note in passing that this inability of the external world to find room for the free and unconflicting development of all the processes of physical growth which it initiates and fosters is the counterpart and, to borrow a term from Schopenhauer, the "objectification" of a similar inability of the will to include within the scope

of its activity all the various ends and goods which suggest themselves to it as goals of natural and fruitful pursuit. In every human heart, more desires, more aspirations, more alluring vistas of self-fulfilment, more would-be selves than can ever be realised, obsess the vision and tempt to attainment. All the many possible lives which any man might live, each one fraught with a whole career and big with a new and unique personality reflecting in its own way and from its own angle the glory of the world, battle with one another to fill a consciousness which is too narrow to contain them all, and to become a self which is too finite to be more than one of them. There is no one, however Leonardo-like the sweep and subtlety of his experience may have been, but must at the end, when he reviews and ponders upon the dead selves strewn thick as the leaves in Vallombrosa along the path of his career, carry down with him into the dust "*le regret de je ne sais quelles patries jamais retrouvées, de je ne sais quels êtres désirés ardemment et jamais embrassés.*" But selves battle and die on the field of consciousness unheard save by the spiritual ear alone; whereas history resounds with the tumult and the shouting amid which the captains and the kings and their empires depart.

Our final word, then, as to the elimination of war must be one of pessimism. Peace and a moral order have appeared among human individuals only by reason of an accidental geometrical situation which has permitted a limited class of organisms a particular kind of biological evolution. The cause of war among nations lies ultimately in the fact that human groups do not fall within this class. It lies so deep that it cannot be eradicated without shattering both the structure of Euclidian space and the psychological laws upon which the existence of self-consciousness and human society are conditional. Indeed, against the too hopeful pacifist might be flung with a moral turn Heracleitus' reproach of Homer for praying that war might pass away among gods and men: "He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away."

B. A. G. FULLER.

'TWEEN WATERS, MASS., U.S.A.

THE NEWEST FREEDOM.

GINO SPERANZA,

Bedford, N. Y., U. S. A.

THE seal of the little republic of San Marino bears this motto: "In Smallness there is Safety." It is the only instance, I believe, of a sovereign State pointing with pride to its diminutiveness. The importance or import of this is not so much in the fact itself as in its converse. Sovereign States have always striven for "bigness," justifying it as a condition essential to greatness.

This striving for "bigness"—called to-day expansion or development—has been a marked, if not the salient, characteristic of our times. The fact that such expansive theory, which we call progress, was considered corruption by the Romans has made little difference to our age. For by utilising natural energies unknown to the ancients it has come to believe itself immune from the workings of those disintegrating forces that in other epochs have come into play almost automatically with the extension of empires.

All this material expansion in our days, all the increase in mechanical productivity, the rapid extension of "plant" in our schools, the pooling of businesses, the concentration of interests, of labour, of capital, and of effort, the growth of States by annexations, protectorates, or mandates, the trend to crowded cities, have converted our civilisation into a world which thinks in terms of *size* and *figures*.

If we doubt this growing habit of mind to think in what I may call "mechanistic terms," let us ask ourselves how often we base decisions in our daily life on figures, measurements, or statistics rather than on arguments; how we seek the aid of "expertness" rather than of judgment; how our problems are studied and presented more and more as lines and curves on quadrille-ruled maps denoting time, history, and

population, or flashed in bright colours upon a screen in democratic and impersonal synthesis openly arrived at! Consider what engineering jargon has been introduced into our common language; how we speak of "surveys" of indigence and illiteracy, of welfare "workers," of "efficiency engineers," of "organised" philanthropy, of "standardised" labour and "dynamic" religion!

What concerns us most, however, is how this mechanistic habit of mind is affecting our moral and spiritual outlook. For, as an acute French observer recently pointed out, our mechanical progress, while increasing the comforts of life, has also inspired us with a desire to do things *with the least possible effort*; and this has had its mental and spiritual correlatives in a growing disbelief in struggle and renunciation as the basic forces towards intellectual achievement and moral conquest. So that we find the "mechanistic" conceptions of our Age of the Machine colouring and affecting all life, whether in human conduct, action, or outlook in the sense-world, or in aspirations, faith, and hope in the transcendental sphere. Whether we turn to politics or the struggle for economic adjustment, to education or morals, we discover a world which has been converted into what a European philosopher has described as "an immense mechanical device where all is explainable by the logic of cause and effect, where phenomena are residueless and reducible to material forces, physical or chemical."

And what of the harvests? In education the mechanistic striving for "bigness" is very pronounced, with its unescapable resultants of standardisation and specialisation. In the field of scholarship there is a surfeit of what the Italians so happily call *faciloneria*; so much polished veneer for the lucidity of clear depth, such iconoclastic criticism brilliantly worded but lacking real doctrine, so much art clamouring against the "restrictions" of past models and insisting on the right of "free expression," and even a sort of intellectual class-feeling among the new democrats of learning against the privileged class of real scholars!

In the throbbing, agitated world of politics the democratic system is breaking down as practical government from the sheer weight of its extension in size and congestion. The physical strain on leaders of empires, whether European premiers or American presidents, is becoming more and more unbearable; while the plethora of laws and the intricacies of budgets make the legislative function of guarding the interests of the State an empty phrase. And no less burdensome,

though in a different way, has become the problem of running our large cities.

But it is democratic doctrine and democratic ideals especially which suffer from "mechanistic" taint. Democracy is interpreted and applied as a theory of mathematical values, while its levelling process, which originally was its distinction as an uplifting force, now works more and more downward. It is a political equality degenerating into a problem of simple arithmetic with numbers as the only arbiters. Quality hardly counts any longer, and the principle of majority rule means to-day little more than that six against four make Right. If we wish to gauge our regression in political concepts it will suffice to compare the current idea of the State as a mere servant of the people with the Aristotelian conception of *polis* or with Bosanquet's modern ideal of citizenship as "a great spiritual experience"!

If we turn to current philanthropy we find organisation and expertness have become real obsessions constituting a tyranny strangely compounded of plutocratic and bureaucratic forces. Neighbourliness, Christian giving, and helpfulness other than organised is looked down upon as reactionary, unthrifty, and, at least in America during the war, as unpatriotic! One's own impulses of simple fellowship and human mercy are frowned upon as the prejudices of the untrained. For all giving must be exercised to-day through those who have made a "life study" of the art of giving other people's money. And, proud of our progress, we look back with horror on those mediæval pietists who paid monks and nuns to do their praying for them!

Naturally, the Churches have not escaped the "mechanistic" tendencies of the times. They are all "adapting" themselves to the demands of a mechanised humanity. People do not go to them, but they go to the people; but with what message? The wages of sin is death? No; our lives must not be darkened with this ancient and uncomfortable fear. God's mercy is a far pleasanter doctrine than the fear of the Lord as the beginning of wisdom. And congregations must be entertained! After all, we cannot be too censorious, for how else can the old Churches compete with the new which abolish hell altogether and replace sin by error! In a large American city there has even been founded a temple called the Church of Life and Joyousness. Thus the Freudian philosophy—that monstrosity of the Age of the Machine—would seem to find theological confirmation; and mankind need not worry about the words of the Master: "If any man will come

after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me."

But could there be a darker indictment against the Age of the Machine than the world's attitude towards the Great War within a brief span of its triumphant close? We called it a struggle for freedom from German hegemony, from Prussian militarism, but it was much more than that. Germanism meant "standardisation" of the world's efforts; it meant, had it succeeded, the plotting out of the world into "organised," "specialised," and "regulated" zones of trade and economic activities. A German victory would have carried with it the gradual centralisation and standardisation of human culture and human endeavour; men would have been gradually divided into classified workers and producers, each trained to efficiency in the one kind of labour, mental or manual, to which he would have been "scientifically" assigned. Europe, if not America, would have been changed into a well-ordered, spick-and-span, busy, productive, comfortable, and highly "organised" world, but a world filled with a spiritually enslaved humanity. In short, German success would have meant the safe entrenchment for another century of the Age of the Machine.

But the larger part of civilised mankind revolted against such a possibility; it fought it, it is true, as the politico-military thrust of the Germanic race for world-power, and during the struggle it did not stop to analyse the deeper truths and ideals which were immanent in the conflict. But it surmised those truths and ideals and acted superbly under their compelling and inspiring force. Only thus can we explain what was pre-eminently a revolt of freedom-loving peoples rather than a struggle of sovereigns and states. For let us not forget the transcendent and supreme fact of the war, that whatever aims some statesmen and leaders may have had, or whatever national or racial appetites emerged with the armistice, yet during the great periods of the drama the people fought with the *élan* of crusaders and suffered with the splendid resignation of martyrs.

Yet within a few months of the armistice the forces of destructive criticism largely succeeded in beclouding the great spiritual issues of that struggle, often honouring those who had opposed it or endangered its success. Men and women who had suffered in the Cause now heard nothing but discussions of victory in terms of lost capital, of lost trade, of diminished man power, or of the inability of the enemy to pay indemnities. Leaders announced various pro-

grammes of "reconstruction," but what did such programmes hold forth? They all sought to force the molten mass of mentally dazed and body-weary humanity from its golden crucible of spiritual exaltation into the old grooves of a materialistic and "mechanistic" world. Humanity in the throes of its spiritual re-birth cried out for Messiahs, and the "reconstructionists" again tendered to it Efficiency Engineers! The financiers said the world's unrest was due to the exchange and an unsettled trade balance; the economists said it was due to lack of production, which raised the cost of living; the reconstructionists said the hope of the world rested on the possibility of "speeding up," of earning more wages so as to have the old comforts and more of them. The post-war slogan of every reformer, of every statesman, of every leader became: "Produce! Produce! Produce!" It was the old motto of the Age of the Machine, and it rang false in a world ennobled but worn out by a struggle to be free. And none of the panaceas announced brought relief; neither high wages, nor increased comforts, nor participation in profits, nor political recognition stilled the unrest; for behind and beyond the visible, tangible, and often grossly selfish and material demands lay the awakened urge of mankind wishing to be rid of the tyranny it had fought.

There is political tyranny—a form of oppression which men have learned to distinguish and have forged weapons to fight; but there is a more insidious tyranny, not as easily discernible and harder to cast off, and that is the tyranny of *ideas*. Of such is the tyranny of the Age of the Machine—a body of superstitious beliefs, scientifically buttressed, in the power and importance of those forces which make men *comfortable*, for which we have surrendered our faith in the forces that make men *free*.

For, can we claim to be free—we of the great, modern cities—when a defect or interruption in the complex appliances and processes which give us water, food, light, power, and heat may suddenly cut us off from the supply of these necessities? Are we free when little or nothing depends upon our individual, direct, personal effort, inasmuch as the infinite number of things which are needed in daily life are the product of some mechanism or organisation which we do not know and of which we are no part? Are we free when every line of production for the feeding, the housing, the comfort, and the movement of mankind is so specialised that suspension of production or of activity in any one line of joint effort may destroy our health or depreciate our property? When, despite

abundance in the fields, the crops which were to sustain us may rot through a strike of harvesters ; or when, despite teeming warehouses, a difference between railroad engineers, or brakemen, or longshoremen, or truck drivers and their respective managers may cut off our food or the milk supply for our children ?

Worse yet, our power of choosing freely and knowingly has been abridged and circumscribed even for trained and scholarly minds ; for " the world about which each man is supposed to have opinions has become so complicated as to defy his powers of understanding ; what he knows of events that matter enormously to him—the purposes of governments, the aspirations of peoples, the struggle of classes—he knows at second, third, or fourth hand."

It is under this tyranny of ideas of the Age of the Machine, with its glib, easy, and comfortable notions as substitutes for ideals, that the world has grown so restless. For the revolution which all men seem to expect as a bloody or bloodless upheaval is here and among us, potent and effective in the world of ideas. It transcends political and economic causes, even if in its early stages a rebellious, dazed, and weary humanity strikes, blindly and selfishly, at the foundations of political and economic institutions. Has there not been, asks one scholar, " deep in the consciousness of all of us . . . an apprehension lest the multiplication of things, manufactured things, should some day overwhelm us and our whole life " ? If philosophers and scholars have felt this as an undefinable *malaise* of the spirit striving to be free, is it strange that the masses sought for the same freedom by battering at the only doors which for them seemed to shut out the light ?

Now, the first essential to the Newest Freedom is a change in our habits of thought. This does not mean the casting out of the Machine from our civilisation, but the dislodging it from its position of pre-eminence in the affairs and the thoughts of men. John Galsworthy has said that coal is a curse, and suggests our abolishing it ; but neither coal nor any utilisation of forces which add to man's comfort and leisure is a curse. The curse is in the *importance* the Age of the Machine has assigned to these things. Mankind needs steam and electricity, but *it needs other things more*. It is the return to these other things, now gradually taking place, which constitutes the awaited revolution ; and it is the flux of action and reaction of the period of slow adjustment which creates our present " unrest." We must be prepared in the future for such

tremendous changes as "the gradual decay of our great cities and our great industries." It may become necessary for many nations to make themselves nationally self-supporting and pre-eminently agricultural. The wealth which comes from trade may again come to be considered "morally poisonous," as Plato and other great men held it to be. The handicrafts, justly called in the past the Lesser Arts, already reasserting themselves through an ever-increasing cost of machine-made products, will surely have a renaissance of their ancient splendour. The moral and mental influence on labour and life of this change alone will be immeasurable. We all shall learn to do something with our hands—and love it. We shall not hunger, or thirst, or be stranded and helpless if others cease to labour and to produce. If this may appear to some like a turning backward, let them realise that it is a turning back to the truths which the Past visioned better than we have, and not to its ignorance. What we have too universally overlooked is that all the inventions and discoveries of our times have not changed and *cannot change our human nature*. To suppose that they could or would has been "the fundamental mistake of the whole industrial civilisation." Still less could any conceivable extension of machinery or utilisation of natural energies affect the basic law of life. The basic law is *struggle*, and its immortal tools are personal effort and personal renunciation. With these was fashioned an Ancient Holiness; with these also will be forged the Newest Freedom.

GINO SPERANZA.

BEDFORD, N.Y.

PRINCE KROPOTKIN'S PHILOSOPHY IN THE LIGHT OF TO-DAY.

LOUISE H. WILLIAMS.

IT is said that the configuration of the country has a recognisable effect on the character and outlook of the natives. One may infer that not only the type but the extent of the country has also its influence; hence, perhaps, that quality of largeness so characteristic of Russian literature.

This is compatible, as in the shorter stories of Tolstoi, Turgenev, and less famous writers, with extreme limitation of scene, monotony of action, and minute, almost cumbersome, presentment of domestic detail. Yet, in those vignette-pictures of humanity, framed, perhaps, in a few versts of half-tilled ground, there is a hint of immensity, a suggestion of something beyond time and space, totally lacking in some broad, imposing, cosmopolitan canvases. Moreover, the strains of idealism and realism are intermingled in a manner unique in literature: resignation, that national characteristic, is compatible, in individuals and groups, with moments of the most poignant revolt; and the true religious temperament is invincibly present in avowedly anti-Christian personalities.

Such apparent paradox presents itself in the character and work of Kropotkin, who, according to Stephen Graham,¹ was moved to "the greatest pain" by the particular religious bias of Dostoevski's writing, yet who shows, in his own life's work, the most Christlike devotion to the cause of the down-trodden and to fostering amongst them the very sentiments of helpful, practical fraternity that are the essence of Christian teaching. Nowhere amongst his writings is this more in evidence than in his *Address to the Young*, published in 1885, when he was himself undergoing a term of imprisonment for agitation on "the people's" behalf. (Be it remembered in this connec-

¹ "The Bolsheviks and Literature": Stephen Graham in *John o' London's Weekly*, 22nd January 1921.

tion that the Author of the Sermon on the Mount once "overthrew the tables of the money-changers" and cleared the Temple courts with a whip.)

Kropotkin is many-sided. He is naturalist, scientist, historian, economist, anarchist (self-styled); but always, and most profoundly, he is philosopher.

Now, philosophy is not, as the average Englishman is too much inclined to think, a kind of intellectual game practised by a remote and leisured few. True, it demands some exercise of thought—an occupation he is averse to. But there are innumerable degrees in the evolution of philosophy, and, though it asks of its high priests widest knowledge, of the acolyte it asks only intelligence and veracity. Philosophy of some type is as necessary to the labourer as to the professor. It is no abstruse thing; it means neither more nor less than assessment of circumstances and the adoption of a deliberate attitude towards them. In *Mutual Aid*, his most famous work, Kropotkin deals throughout with practical philosophy. There is not an ounce of metaphysics in the book. But one plain theory is announced: that Mutual Aid, as practised during the evolution of species, was *at least* as powerful a factor in efficient survival as Mutual Competition and the survival of the strongest; the bulk of the book is taken up with proofs. Now, the value of Kropotkin's proofs is that they are not taken from his own observations alone, but from facts coming under the notice of men who set out to look for something else and found and recorded these by the way.

We are all of us prejudiced in favour of, or against, particular views of life, but the more we correct our bias by considering the views of other truthful people the better for our ultimate statements. Opposing facts may be true; we must assess the relative proportions of truth.

Froude once said of history: "It often seems to me as if history was like a child's box of letters, with which we can spell any word we please. *We have only to pick out such letters as we want, arrange them as we like, and say nothing about those which do not suit our purpose.*"¹ That, unfortunately, is the standpoint of many gifted writers and of nine-tenths of contemporary journalism. It is not the standpoint of Kropotkin in either *Mutual Aid* or *The Great French Revolution*. He admits his bias—the salt of every earnest man—but presents also the other side; and indeed, the "other side" has had the world its own way for so long it needs no introduction.

¹ *The Science of History*: a lecture by J. A. Froude, Feb. 1864.

When we are confronted with what appears to us a new idea or theory, we can do no more than submit it to the judgment of our experience;—*our* experience, mark you, not that which is traditional. When the notion of Mutual Aid as a prime factor in evolution dawned on Kropotkin it was set over against the idea of Mutual Competition. Both facts were true in Nature; what mattered tremendously was, which was the most proportionately true. From his varied experience—as traveller and prisoner, aristocrat and outcast; as a student of Nature and of ancient history; from association with men of all ranks and of all countries—Kropotkin drew confirmation of his theory sufficient to warrant him in presenting it to the world as of immense importance to the development of civilisation.

The whole tendency of thought in recent centuries was against it. The whole structure, political, social, and economic, of Europe was against it. Men who were indifferent to Darwin subscribed whole-heartedly to the Mutual Competition theory under political pseudonyms such as a limited *laissez-faire*.

With the few who were already in a position of vantage it worked excellently; for in the hands of men Competition became a much more murderous weapon than it was as practised by animals. Accepting it in its original sense, it postulated that animals competed to the death for the means of subsistence *when the need was pressing and within the period of scarcity*. Man went further and mortgaged the future. By means of every dodge that his ingenuity could devise, he secured not only what the individual gained during his lifetime, but all profit that might accrue to it, to his successors of legal or lineal descent. Further, he eliminated the factor of continual individual struggle, as it existed amongst animals, and produced abundance of what exists but slightly in Nature, a “parasite” class. As a natural corollary he was impelled to maintain a reserve of available labour that, in all but name, was in a state of slavery—witness industrial history.

Not all men, of course, dwelt quite comfortably under this *régime*; hence the rise of the various philanthropic ameliorative societies. But, as Kropotkin saw, their existence only emphasises the fact that a competitive industrial order depends for its standing-ground on a basis of hunger-driven humanity.

In periods of general prosperity even the poor prosper comparatively and do not assert their condition in the public eye. But in times of world-scarcity, such as the present, the abomination of the social structure is nakedly revealed—to

those who cannot turn away. Competition to the death is to be seen in all its degrees at work between nations, classes, even individuals. We shall never have a better opportunity of studying the principle, from causes to results. Even those who deliberately brought it to a crisis are, in spite of themselves, afraid.

Is it not wise, before worse befall us, to try the alternative, the equally true, principle, Mutual Aid?

Combination is the essence of Mutual Aid. The very men who decry its existence in Nature pay unwitting tribute not only to its existence, but to its efficacy, by striving by every means within their power to prevent combination amongst those whom they desire to hold subject. In all countries where, no matter what the government be nominally, real control is in the hands of financiers and merchants, the "Haves" scheme to prevent combination on the part of the "Have-nots." Why? Because combination begets power.

But one perceives in history that it is not so much the very rich as the little rich who are most anxious to maintain a "mere subsistence" class. They themselves have acquired property recently; they know by experience what it means to be without it, and, believing that there will not be enough to go round, they fight the more jealously to retain intact what they have just grasped. The small trader is by circumstances an intransigent.

Kropotkin, in his *Great French Revolution*, shows this convincingly. The "Third Estate" schemed to stir up and use "the people" to pluck *their* power from the flames; but when they saw that these ragged and starving hordes were actually capable of organising themselves, thereby enforcing *their* demands, they became frightened, and promptly tried to break up and disintegrate their unity.

"For in the Paris insurrection leading to July 14, as all through the Revolution, there were two separate currents of different origin: the political movement of the middle classes and the popular movement of the masses. At certain moments during the great days of the Revolution the two movements joined hands in a temporary alliance, and then they gained their great victories over the old *régime*. But the middle classes always distrusted their temporary ally, the people, and gave clear proof of this in July 1789. The alliance was concluded unwillingly by the middle classes; and on the morrow of the 14th, and even during the insurrection itself, they made haste to

organise themselves, in order that they might be able to bridle the revolted people.”¹

And again:—

“While the revolutionaries exulted, believing that the Revolution was almost accomplished, the reactionaries knew that the great struggle, the real one, between the past and the future, was only to begin. . . . The reactionaries understood something more. They saw that the middle classes, who until then had sought the support of the people, in order to obtain constitutional laws and to dominate the higher nobility, were going, now that they had seen and felt the strength of the people, to do all they could to dominate the people, to disarm them and to drive them back into subjection.”¹

Returning to *Mutual Aid*, Kropotkin shows that the periods of greatest happiness amongst the greatest number were always those when certain stable productive conditions were brought about by “popular” as opposed to military or political movements—movements such as those which led to the rise of the Free Cities throughout Europe during the Middle Ages. If we compare these movements with those of the later peasant risings throughout France at the close of the eighteenth century, we shall see that they had many points in common. There was the same determination to resist extortion, to find and apply principles of equity in dealing between man and man, and to obtain unhampered access to the means of production, especially land.

It is impossible to enter in detail into the wording of the early city charters or Guild-statutes, but a type of clause customary in them all was one assuming common responsibility for the maintenance of individuals who had become incapable through age, accident, or disease: “Fraternal assistance in necessity of whatever kind” (Guild-statute of Verona, 1303).

Guilds are the natural form of association of the working, the unpropertied people. “If the institution of the Guild has taken such an immense extension in Asia, Africa, and Europe, if it has lived thousands of years, reappearing again and again when similar conditions called it into existence, it is because . . . it answered to a deeply inrooted want of human nature; and it embodied all the attributes which the State appropriated later on . . . with this difference from the State, that on all these occasions a humane and brotherly element was intro-

¹ *The Great French Revolution*, pp. 58 and 159.

duced instead of the formal element which is the essential characteristic of State interference.”¹

The mediæval cities were built, spiritually and materially, by Guilds: the architecture of the period testifies to their value, to the ideal of the architect as to the faithfulness of the mason.

“Self-jurisdiction was the essential point, and self-jurisdiction meant self-administration.”¹ “To guarantee liberty” [from extortion] “self-administration and peace was the chief aim of the mediæval city; and labour . . . was its chief foundation.”² There was communal buying and baking. “In short, if a scarcity visited the city, all had to suffer from it more or less; but apart from the calamities, so long as the free cities existed, no one could die in their midst from starvation, as is unhappily too often the case in our own times.”²

Self-jurisdiction, self-administration, the honour of labour redeemed and the necessities of life guaranteed—such was the outcome of the people’s revolt in the Middle Ages. It was achieved by Mutual Aid, working in limited areas in complete accord with common conditions and needs. Set against it the picture of society to-day, under Mutual Competition:—vast remote provinces controlled by a centralised bureaucracy as far out of touch spiritually with the needs and desires of their inhabitants as it is materially; administration markedly inefficient, delayed by the necessity of lengthy “explanations” to a distant headquarters; Labour manipulated, handicapped, and hoodwinked, consequently unwilling, distrustful, and in revolt; seven-tenths of the world-wealth as well as control of the means of production in the hands of a few, whilst of the majority some starve, some linger miserably on the borderline, and the bulk hire themselves out for the day’s needs and are entirely without guarantee for the future.

It is impossible, of course, to go back to the actual conditions of the Middle Ages, but, following out Kropotkin’s analysis, it is not impossible to rediscover the principles that made them, for the greatest number, the happiest period known to history as well as that yielding the highest quality output.

The first thing we find is really representative government—though not of the brigand princes! Both jurisdiction and administration were plastic—a natural outgrowth of the moral and material conditions prevailing in a given area—and as such

¹ *Mutual Aid*, popular edition, pp. 134, 136, and 138.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 138-9.

they fitted the circumstances and evolved with the times. Kropotkin is a steadfast opponent of present-day State control. A formal bureaucracy possesses neither heart nor conscience ; it deals with humanity as a machine ; it can neither give nor take. Government from a distance—by one race over another, by peoples psychologically different, even by townsmen over agriculturalists—presents very obvious elements of failure : first, because administration does not keep pace with events ; secondly, because the causes of events are frequently misunderstood and the treatment misapplied ; thirdly, because such administration is wasteful, obstructive, and frequently unjust for lack of intimate and practical knowledge of the conditions involved.

Smaller states are the most prosperous so far as the bulk of the inhabitants are concerned—as may easily be verified. But self-government is compatible with extensive federation as well as with an excellent international spirit.

But when we talk of spirit we get to the root of things. It was the spirit of the common people that made the Free Cities possible. It was the spirit of the common people that made the French Revolution possible. But the spirit of the common people in England to-day will not carry them far. They suffer from an overdose of wrongly conceived education, a deification of brain and a contempt for fundamental character. A sharpened brain is a prong to pick up riches ; honesty may be a weight on the handle.

What does this education produce ?

First of all, irresponsibility. The students look to "the State," an independent, outside abstraction, to provide and administer all necessary services.

Secondly, a perverted outlook. Craftsmanship is despised and clerkdom exalted ; the clerk is a "gentleman," the carpenter is not.

Thirdly, greed and egoism. Nowhere is the Darwinian formula more rampant. Competition is the universal text in the schools—competition not in being and doing but in getting and keeping. It is not mental acuteness that is lacking in the youth of to-day, but endurance, honesty, and the capacity for self-sacrifice in pursuit of an ideal.

Consequently to all this, the people do not perceive that the roots of well-living must be developed from *within themselves*, and cannot be grafted upon them by any type of outside government or State.

The workmen of the Middle Ages organised *themselves*, evolved their own laws and accepted their own responsibilities.

The ragged people of Paris organised their own "districts," evolved their new laws, and in some cases *administered them before the so-called Representative Assembly had put them to the vote*. The peasants in the provinces did likewise. They took the trouble not only to think out but to carry out new methods of communal buying and selling, and of agriculture; and alike in town and country they endeavoured, with a great measure of success, to sink selfish aims in the fight for the common weal.

Principles of equity are incompatible with a policy of "beggar my neighbour."

Principles of irresponsibility are incompatible with self-government.

From Kropotkin's point of view the great fault of the English Labour Movement is its lack of responsibility. It is not prepared, when the moment arises, to assume its duties and carry its possible failures. It talks of "the State," but is not itself, integrally, that "State." The great Trades Unions concern themselves mainly with wages and with the industrial conditions of their particular body. They are not representative of "the people." In fact, the English Labour Movement is not a People's Movement at all; consequently it will disintegrate and fail.

It may be said that Kropotkin idealises "the people"—the common, inconspicuous, lazy, long-suffering, unlovely people. And again it may be said that "the people" have not originated ideas—not formulated them, at all events, in such terms as the world accepts. But they have ever been the first to take action—even sacrificial action—upon such ideas as gripped their hearts.

All the great religions have been spread upon People's Movements; all the signal struggles for liberty have been effected through People's Movements; peace in the world to-day, if attainable at all, will be attainable only through a united Peoples' Movement, bursting the bonds of caste and creed and submerging national prejudice.

L. H. WILLIAMS.

LONDON.

IS CONSCIENCE AN EMOTION ?

THE VERY REV. THE DEAN OF CARLISLE.

BEFORE attempting some reply to Professor McDougall's criticism in the last number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL upon the book which bears the above title, and the view of Ethics which I have expressed in that little book and in my *Theory of Good and Evil*, I think it may be well, for the benefit of readers who may not be acquainted with these works, or perhaps with those of my critic, to indicate as briefly as possible the point at issue between us.

At about the same time—some twelve years ago—there appeared two works of the utmost importance for the study of Ethics. One of them was Professor Westermarck's *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*; the other was Professor McDougall's *Social Psychology*. Westermarck's book is far the most elaborate history of primitive moral ideas which has ever been published. I say advisedly, primitive moral ideas; for, as usually happens when anthropologists write about Ethics, the history of developed and civilised Ethics is dealt with in a much vaguer and more superficial manner. Considered as a collection of facts and empirical generalisations, the value of Westermarck's work may be fully admitted. But the philosophical part of it contains little that is particularly new or particularly valuable. His theory as to the ultimate nature of our moral judgments is at bottom the old moral-sense theory over again—the theory of such old English moralists as Shaftesbury and Adam Smith, who attempted to resolve our moral judgments into a particular kind of feeling or emotion: very little is added to the arguments employed in its defence, and nothing is done to meet the objections which have been urged against it from the times of Butler and Price down to those of Green and Sidgwick. Far weightier is the case presented in favour of the emotional origin of morality by Professor McDougall. His *Social*

Psychology really does break fresh ground, The originality of his book consists chiefly in these two features: (1) While he agrees with Westermarck and the older writers of the emotional school in finding the *ultimate* origin of our moral ideas in emotion, he recognises that moral ideas as they exist now in their developed form are not mere emotions but (as he calls them) "sentiments or organised systems or emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object." The influence upon the moral ideals of society and institutions and the modification of the individual's emotional tendencies by growing reflection are far more adequately recognised. And (2) the tendency of the older "sentimental" school was to assume the existence of a certain *specific* feeling of approbation or disapprobation. Men like Hutcheson practically claimed for this feeling a certain intrinsic authority, and consequently attributed to our moral judgments the same kind of objectivity which is claimed for them by the rationalistic moralists who treat these judgments as the work of Reason. Hume demonstrated the untenability of this position. He showed that, if the moral judgment is at bottom nothing but a feeling of approbation or disapprobation, then it is quite impossible to contend that there is any absolute standard of conduct by reference to which a judgment of approbation actually felt by anyone can be pronounced a wrong judgment. All that can possibly be meant by saying that an individual's actually felt approval is wrong, is that he approves things which the majority of his fellows disapprove. Moreover, instead of treating this moral approval as ultimate, Hume analyses the grounds upon which the approval is given; and he finds its explanation in sympathy with the real or supposed utility to other people of the conduct approved. And ever since Hume's time the tendency of the emotional moralists has been to resolve moral judgments into the single emotion of benevolence towards individuals in some social group. This in the main is the position of Westermarck, except that he emphasises the importance of sympathetic resentment as well as of pure sympathy. Morality is with him at bottom altruism: the moral emotions are simply different varieties or applications of altruistic feeling. The greatest originality of Professor McDougall lies in his recognition that, so long as we are dealing with the origin of the actual moralities, this origin must be found in a much wider range of emotions, and that these emotions are the accompaniment of instincts which are shared in their primitive forms by the lower animals. The moral ideas are not simply developments of a general tendency

towards sociality or altruistic feeling and conduct: different moral rules or ideas spring out of different instincts.

The instincts which have, according to Professor McDougall, played the largest part in the evolution of morality are such as these: (1) the reproductive and parental instincts, with which is connected what Professor McDougall calls "tender emotion," the earliest form of social feeling; (2) the instinct of pugnacity, with which are connected the emotions of resentment and revenge, broadening through complication with other instincts into indignation at various kinds of anti-social conduct, and giving rise to the practice of punishment and the whole machinery of criminal justice; (3) the "instinct of kind," or the gregarious instinct, which inclines an animal to be more friendly towards members of its own species than to those of other species, resulting in the formation of tribes and other communities, and forming the basis of the emotion which produces loyalty towards the community and the chief; (4) the instincts of acquisition and construction, which have been developed into the idea of property and the moral judgments connected therewith.

Now, considered as a psychological explanation of the process by which morality has been developed in its earlier stages, I for one cannot help recognising that there is a great deal of truth in Professor McDougall's account. It cannot, I think, be denied that the explanation why certain particular kinds of conduct first came to be approved or disapproved really is to be found in emotions of a kind which in a simpler and more primitive form are shared by the lower animals. And, even when we turn to the savage's notion of "right" and "wrong" in general, it must be granted that the state of mind which induces him to resent anti-social or any sort of uncustomary conduct is very like the state of mind which impels a flock of wild birds to put to death (if the popular belief be true) the escaped cage-bird, whose behaviour is unlike that of its wild fellow-creatures; which inspires an elephant with revengeful feelings towards the man who has injured it, sometimes a year or more ago; which induces gregarious animals to unite in defending one another against the common foe. I find it impossible to deny that when we see a squirrel making a little hoard of nuts and resenting the action of any other squirrel which interferes with it, we do see before us the beginning of the tendency which culminates in the fully developed notion of property; or that the monogamous instinct of the higher apes is the basis of the hardly less instinctive monogamy of most savage tribes.

I admit the large element of truth which there is in Professor McDougall's account of the psychological development. But still his theory is open to the same fundamental objection which has commonly been urged against the old Moral Sense doctrine or the later attempts to resolve morality into sympathy or social feeling. Directly we turn from the instinctive behaviour of the lower animals or what may be called the quasi-instinctive behaviour of savages to morality as it exists in normal individuals at an advanced stage of social development, we find that there is an element in that morality which it is impossible either to explain or to justify by the emotional theory. The developed and reflective moral judgment claims objective validity, and upon the emotional view such a validity cannot be conceded to it. If moral approval is merely a feeling or a sentiment (it doesn't matter for the present purpose whether it is a single kind of feeling or a number of distinct emotions or any sort of amalgam or product of many such distinct emotions), it is quite meaningless to say that, if I like one kind of conduct and you dislike it—if I approve fighting under such and such circumstances and you say that it is wrong—one or both of us must be in error; just as unwarrantable as it would be to say that, if you like mustard and I dislike it, one of us must be wrong and ought to change his views. And yet the conviction that there is an objective right and wrong in conduct is the very heart of our moral convictions. That conviction asserts itself most strongly just when we have most doubt as to what in the particular case is the right action. The notion of an objective duty, an objective right and wrong, or an objective good and evil, undoubtedly exists. The question is, "Is this concept a mere delusion, or is it an ultimate category of human thought—just as much so as the ultimate axioms of mathematics or the ultimate laws of thought?" Of course, if Professor McDougall is right in his dogmatic assertion that "the function of reason is merely to deduce new propositions from propositions already accepted,"¹ then it would be absurd to ascribe our moral judgments to the Reason. Professor McDougall in his *Social Psychology* writes as though this last view of Reason would be universally accepted. For him Hume's demonstration that such a view must end in an absolute scepticism which can justify mathematics and science as little as morals or theology, and all that has been written against that scepticism in the course of the last century and a half, seem to have been written in

¹ *Social Psychology*, ed. xi., p. 379. As to his present view I say something later on.

vain. I should have thought that if there was a proposition about which you could find a general consensus of philosophical opinion (outside the school of Pragmatism) it is the proposition that you cannot account for the ultimate principles upon which science and mathematics are based by any induction from experience, and that certain self-evident propositions are implied in all our thinking. Even if Reason has nothing to do but to "deduce new propositions from principles already accepted," such deduction implies certain principles of inference which cannot themselves be deduced from anything else. How does Professor McDougall get these principles? Are these, too, merely "a system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of some object"? If so, Professor McDougall's reasonings possess as little objective validity as the moral judgments whose validity he denies, and my theory of Morality—since I personally prefer it—is as valid as the theory which Professor McDougall, since he has invented it himself, naturally prefers. It would be useless to pursue the argument further on these lines. But for those who admit that Reason recognises immediately the truth of certain propositions which are implied in all our thinking, the reply to Professor McDougall's theory will be this—that the ultimate principles of Morality are as much implied in our thinking about conduct as the ultimate axioms of Mathematics are implied in our thinking about quantity and number. The objective validity of our ideas about Right and Wrong, Good and Evil, Value and Unvalue, is established in exactly the same way as the validity of the categories of Number and Quantity, the law of Contradiction or the law of universal Causality. In the one case and the other the only proof that can be given is that we actually think in this manner—Professor McDougall as much as anyone else, as he plainly shows on almost every page of his book, not to say by every action of his life.

This is a bare statement, as plain as I can make it in so summary a form, of the point at issue between Professor McDougall and myself. In his paper in the last HIBBERT JOURNAL Professor McDougall replies to the line of criticism of which the above is an abstract. He now admits that some of the rather contemptuous strictures which he bestowed upon me in his *Social Psychology* were based upon misunderstanding. I thank him for the admission—an admission which, I may remark, seems to imply that those criticisms were not based upon a very complete perusal of the work which he was criticising. The present article shows considerably greater appreciation of the point at issue between us, and a more

serious effort to meet my objections. But still I experience a great difficulty in replying to him, because at bottom the reply would only involve a reassertion of the argument which has failed to carry conviction, and the argument is one which is apt to suffer by compression. I can hardly hope to make it convincing to a reader who has not read my longer book, or at all events the smaller work—*Is Conscience an Emotion?* All that I can do is to say a few words about the points on which, in spite of the real good-will which he has brought to bear upon the task, Professor McDougall still fails correctly to apprehend, or to do justice to, my position. And before I make that attempt, I would beg the reader to note that the question with which we are immediately concerned is not a theological question at all. In his *Social Psychology* Professor McDougall was disposed to treat the theory as an entirely obsolete opinion which had long since been abandoned except by a few baffled theological apologists. He has now discovered that the rationalistic view of Ethics is one which has been and still is held by a very large number of eminent philosophers—some of them of a very anti-theological variety. He is still rather disposed to prejudice the question by suggesting that my interest in it is purely theological. I can assure him that this is very far from the case. I regard the question for its own sake as of more importance than any theological inference that I personally may base upon my own answer to it; and for the present I shall confine myself purely to the ethical side of the matter. I fully recognise the sincerity of Professor McDougall's desire to understand my difficulties and to meet them; but I cannot honestly say that he seems to me to have been very successful in seeing what I am driving at. My feeling in reading him is that we are not, as lawyers say, *ad idem*: we are not really discussing the same question. I am primarily concerned with the metaphysical problem, what is the ultimate nature of the concepts "Right," "Wrong," "Good," "Evil": what kind of truth or validity can they claim? Professor McDougall, though nearer to it in the present paper than he was before, hardly seems to look at the metaphysical question from the inside: he still seems practically to treat the question as a psychological one. He does not seem to have grasped the difference between questions of origin and questions of validity: false judgments are as much psychological facts as true ones. Professor McDougall is primarily interested in the psychological question as to the process by which ethical ideas have historically been developed;

and his complaint that I do not come to close quarters with some of his doctrines is based simply upon the fact that I am discussing another question. In spite of this difference of point of view, I must do my best to reply to his objections—or rather a few of them. A discussion of all of them would far exceed the limits of an article.

(1) He finds a difficulty about my view as to the relation between Reason and Desire. He complains that I use “expressions which imply that the idea of right, of duty, or of the good, is not only . . . a purely intellectual notion, an ultimate unanalysable concept, a category of the Reason, but is at the same time a tendency, an impulsion towards good conduct.” I do not think I have ever used language which suggests that the idea of Duty or any other idea *is* an impulse. It does, I contend, in a sense create or give rise to an impulse or desire to do what Reason pronounces ought to be done. And this is what, I understand, Professor McDougall wants to deny. But he himself holds that we have such a desire. He expressly declares that in the truly moral man the master-motive is “the desire that I, the self, shall do the right.”¹ How such a desire could exist without there being already in the mind an idea or intellectual apprehension of there being something that it is right to do, I fail to understand. If I am right in supposing that this idea proceeds from Reason, then I see no ground for making my “renunciation of the impulsive power of Reason quite explicit,” in the sense in which I hold it. I do renounce Kant’s attempt to account for action without desire at all. I do not hold the “thoroughly discredited ideo-motor theory, according to which every idea is not only an intellectual conception, but also a tendency to action.” I do not hold that *every* idea is an impulse to action, nor do I hold that any idea whatever *is* an impulse. I do hold that this particular idea of duty is in some persons accompanied by such an impulse to do what duty prescribes, and that the existence of the idea is at least a *causa sine qua non* of the desire, and consequently of the action. And my opponent appears to agree with me. How Professor McDougall can explain conduct motivated by “the desire that I, the self, shall do the right” without an intellectual notion of Right, I must leave it to him to explain. Whether this notion is objectively valid is another matter: for the moment we are both dealing with psychology. An idea is not a desire, though there are some desires which presuppose ideas.

(2) Professor McDougall complains that I give no hint of

¹ *Social Psychology*, ed. vi., p. 262.

the influence of tradition in the formation of the actual moral ideal which is accepted by, and influences, any particular individual at a given time. I may not have actually used the word tradition (I have more often spoken of education, environment, custom, and the like); but I have constantly implied it, especially in all that I have said about the gradual evolution of the moral code in bk. ii. chap. iv. of *The Theory of Good and Evil* ("Morality and Evolution"); and the thirty-eight pages devoted to "Moral Authority and Moral Autonomy" may be said to constitute a discussion of the problems connected with the influence of tradition. If I have not more elaborately discussed the part played by tradition in the generation of the actual moral ideal of a given individual or a given society, this is because, unlike Professor McDougall, I was not writing a history of the genesis of moral ideas, but examining the nature and the validity of the ideas which we actually possess.

(3) Professor McDougall quarrels with my view about moral axioms. He contends that the proposition, "More good is always greater than less good," is tautological. I have expressly recognised that this and other ethical axioms are really mathematical axioms, and that the only strictly ethical element in them is (*a*) what is implied in the conception of "good," (*b*) the assertion that mathematical axioms apply to "good." Whether the mathematical axioms, taken by themselves, are tautological, I think I may be excused from discussing: to do so would involve a rather elaborate logical discussion about analytic and synthetic judgments. Not many logicians would be disposed to admit that such judgments are tautological; for to make them so is to make all mathematics into an elaborate tautology. But that, when applied to Ethics, they are not tautological is best shown by the fact that they have been denied. Many of my Oxford friends deny that the greater good is to be preferred to the less good: in fact, they seem to deny that quantitative conceptions are applicable to the good at all. I have fully admitted that these axioms give no guidance until they are brought into connection with the concrete judgments of value, "this or that is good," "this is a greater good than that." That does not show that they are meaningless or useless, or that they do not involve an ethical element which is of great importance. But I will pass on to the concrete judgments, "this or that is good." Such judgments I regard as no less rational and objective (though no doubt they may be more often disputed) than the abstract

proposition, "it is right to produce the greatest possible good."

Professor McDougall challenges me to produce "a moral axiom which is not either a tautological proposition or a moral postulate." He rightly divines that I should meet his challenge by such a judgment as "pleasure is good." And to this he replies: "If the word good is meant in the sense of morally good, then the statement is plainly false; it is axiomatic only if by 'good' is meant 'pleasant,' when it becomes tautological." If Professor McDougall really expects me to accept this contention, the sentence only shows how completely he has failed to catch the whole drift of my contention. I have in my *Theory of Good and Evil* devoted much space to showing that the term "good" does not imply "morally good," if by that is meant that it possesses the particular kind of goodness which we attribute to a good will or a good character, and yet that it is not at all the same thing as "pleasant." I hold that "pleasure" is a good or intrinsically valuable thing, and that "moral goodness" is a still more valuable thing; and I hold that good is used in the same sense in the two assertions. Since Professor McDougall denies the truth of the proposition in the sense in which I hold it, he would, I presume, admit that it is in that sense not tautological. As to the suggestion that such axioms may be postulates, that is, of course, the main question between us—whether such moral judgments can claim objective validity; and to that question I will return shortly.

(4) With regard to another proposition which I believe to be an ethical axiom, Professor McDougall is so far from admitting that "one man's good ought always to be treated as of equal importance with the like good of another," that he positively denies it, and he tries to corner me with the casuistical problem of the saint and the sinner drowning on the same plank. He here ignores all that I have said in my *Theory of Good and Evil* (i. pp. 223-241) as to the sense in which I hold the Benthamite axiom, "Everyone to count for one, nobody for more than one." I have expressly admitted, or rather contended, that the axiom is only true if understood to mean "*Cæteris paribus* everyone to count for one," or "Every man's good to count as equal to the *like good* of any other." That axiom does not necessarily imply that every man is capable of the like good. I have contended that the real meaning of the proposition is that each person (*i.e.* the conscious life of each person) has value, but the value of all persons is not equal. In the case supposed, to save the sinner

and allow the saint to drown would be wrong, (a) because the saint is of more intrinsic worth than the sinner, *i.e.* he is capable of higher good: the good which the sinner would realise if saved would not be a "like good" with the saint's: (b) because to keep alive the sinner would violate the very principle of equal consideration asserted by the axiom, since it would ignore the claims of all those whom the survival of the sinner and the death of the saint would probably injure. I have fully admitted the highly abstract character of this axiom. To show that, in spite of this abstract character, this and the other ethical axioms do offer valuable guidance would involve much illustration; but I may say briefly that the reason why they are valuable is that in a very large number of problems, especially wide social and political problems, the respects in which one individual differs from another are irrelevant. If I know that one course of action will produce a certain amount of good for many, while the alternative course will produce the same good for few, it is my duty to prefer the former unless I have some reason for supposing that there are more intrinsically valuable persons in the one group than in the other (*i.e.* persons capable of higher good) or persons likely to produce further good for others. And in most ordinary social and political problems there is no such reason.

(5) Professor McDougall wants a definition of "objectivity." Ultimate concepts cannot be the subject of strict definition. I can only illustrate what I mean in an indirect manner. I can say, for instance, that I claim for the judgment, "this is good," the same kind of truth which is claimed for a mathematical or scientific or historical judgment. I mean that the judgment is true independently of my thinking or feeling it. I mean that moral judgments do not merely imply that certain kinds of conduct excite a certain kind of feeling or emotion in me. If my moral judgments were ultimately based upon any such emotion or "emotional disposition," it would be as unwarrantable to claim any such objective or universal truth for them as it would be to insist that, if I happen to like mustard and you dislike it, one of us must be wrong. The simple fact would be that, just as some people like mustard and some people dislike it, so some people approve the sinking of the *Lusitania* and other people disapprove of it.

It does not follow from this that "the objectivity of a moral judgment means, not that it is true or absolutely true, but that it is either true or false, absolutely and univers-

ally." I do of course mean, when I say that it is right to do this or that, that the proposition is true, just as I mean it when I say Caesar crossed the Rubicon; but in neither case is my individual judgment infallible. We claim objective validity for moral as for historical judgments, although we may freely admit that a particular moralist or a particular historian is sometimes in error. The fact that the historical judgment rests upon experience in a sense in which the ethical judgment does not is not here to the point. *Qua* objective, they are exactly on a level. Of course, if Professor McDougall denies the objectivity of scientific and historical judgments, there is no more to be said. Scepticism is a philosophy which "produces no conviction but admits of no refutation." I do not find it clear whether my critic does or does not admit the objective validity of such judgments. If he does, I may challenge him to say why he will not admit that our moral judgments are equally valid, since we equally think them true.

I have frequently compared moral to mathematical judgments, not because their objective validity is greater than that of historical or scientific judgments, but because, according to most logicians, they are *a priori* or (if that phrase is objected to) "immediate," and yet universal, judgments. And on this point I may remark that in the present paper Professor McDougall is willing "to waive the examination" of the alleged objectivity of mathematical truths, "only remarking that even mathematical axioms are not universally admitted to be of a different nature from postulates." He hardly seems to realise the fundamental importance of this question, or to see how much of his book would have to be rewritten if the proposition which he is here willing to assume for the purposes of argument should haply turn out to be true. He has hitherto always assumed a view of Reason which makes it merely deal with inferences: how we get our fundamental premisses of reasoning is a question with which he does not seem hitherto to have concerned himself, and on that point apparently he has no settled convictions. It is impossible that controversy should lead to any fruitful results until the Professor has made up his mind upon this fundamental question of logic. If Reason does give us some truths *a priori* or immediately, it becomes possible to believe that it should be the source of others. But no argument in favour of the intuitive or immediate and objectively valid character of our ultimate moral judgments is likely to be accepted by anyone who does not recognise that there are such things as immediate judgments

which are not mere "judgments of perception." For the discussion of this fundamental issue there is obviously no space here, and we must proceed in uncertainty as to whether we have in common this essential premiss of my argument. Professor McDougall demands that the objectivity which I claim for moral judgments should be "proved." I do not know what kind of "proof" would content him; or what "proof" he would himself offer for the objectivity of our scientific or historical judgments. The only kind of proof that can be given of these, or any other ultimate self-evident truths, is that we all do actually think in this way—Professor McDougall himself included, as he makes plain in almost every sentence of his paper, *e.g.* when he talks about a "vastly complex system in which all the elements of personality work harmoniously together towards the supreme end of right conduct and more complete moralisation of the self." Professor McDougall here quite distinctly assumes that there is a supreme end, that there is some conduct which is *really* moral. This would not be the case if (say) my judgment that I ought to save a drowning man meant merely that I, and perhaps a majority of my species, feel an "instinct of kind" or a certain "tender emotion" which induces me so to act. In that case, if I do not happen to be influenced by this feeling, or if (though feeling it) I am more strongly influenced by the instinct of acquisition which impels me to rob him, it would be meaningless to say that my conduct is immoral in any other sense than that an "instinct of pugnacity" might induce some of my fellows to hang me. If moral judgments are ultimately based on emotion, then (as Hume contended) acts are not approved because they are moral; they are moral because they are approved: that they are approved is all that is meant by calling them moral. And that is not what I mean by the word, nor what Professor McDougall means by it.

(6) "In face of this admission that Reason is only an element in moral judgments," says Professor McDougall, "and that feeling is another and necessary element or factor, it is useless to pretend that they are pronouncements of Reason alone." I have not admitted that feeling is an *element* in the judgment: in fact, I do not know exactly what such an assertion would mean. What I did admit was that feeling is in many cases part of the ground on which a judgment is made. If (to take a non-ethical illustration) I feel a pain in my finger, and then judge "I have a pain in my finger," the pain does not become the judgment or an element in it, but I cannot make the judgment unless I experience the pain.

So there may be moral judgments which could not be made unless I had a certain feeling or emotion, but this does not make the emotion an "element" in the judgment. I could not judge, for instance, that the emotion of pity was, even apart from its social effects, a valuable element of character, unless I had experienced that emotion; but the judgment, "pity is good," is not the same thing as the emotion indicated by the word "pity," and the whole question between us is not how I come to feel pity, but what I mean by saying "pity is good," and whether that judgment can claim objective validity.

(7) Professor McDougall cannot attach any meaning to the expression "the validity of a category or idea," if the idea is really ultimate and unanalysable. I am afraid I cannot attach any meaning to the idea of a category which is analysable, if by that he means "strictly definable." Professor McDougall tries his hand at analysing the category of causality, and he tells us that it "implies the proposition that every event is caused by antecedent events"—a definition which violates the well-known rule that a definition must not contain the word sought to be defined. Unless I already know what causality means, I am none the wiser by being told that "every event is caused by antecedent events." If he objects to the category of Duty because it does not involve or imply a proposition, I can analyse the idea of Duty as well as he analyses the category of Causality: the category of Duty certainly implies that "every man ought to do his duty." But after all, Professor McDougall does not believe in the category of Causality, and proceeds to give grounds for rejecting it. That there is such a category has of course been disputed by some philosophers who do not deny that there are such things as categories. If there is no category of causation, the categories of quantity or of substance and accident will do equally well as illustrations of my meaning. But Professor McDougall appears to reject not merely this particular category of Causality but the very idea of a "category." Once again he fails to realise that no satisfactory discussion of our problem is possible till he has made up his mind upon the question whether all our ordinary thinking does or does not imply the existence of certain immediate judgments for the truth of which we can give no "proof" or other guarantee except that the truth of them is so implied—that we cannot think without them, and we cannot help thinking with them. Until he has made up his mind upon this momentous but at the same time quite elementary question, I can hardly expect him even to

understand—still less to give a sympathetic consideration to—my contention that the terms “good” and “ought” are not definable just because they represent ultimate concepts or categories of thought. Perhaps the best thing I can do is to suggest that, if Professor McDougall would read Dr Moore’s *Principles of Ethics*, that writer might be more successful in bringing home to him at least what is meant by the contention and the grounds on which it rests. His advocacy would have at least this advantage—that he is not in holy orders, and is not seeking to construct a theistic argument.

(8) Professor McDougall has discovered an inconsistency between my *Theory of Good and Evil* and *Is Conscience an Emotion?* He quotes from the former: “The important thing is that we should recognise that moral judgments possess an absolute truth or falsity which is equally valid for all rational beings: and, if that is recognised, it seems most natural to ascribe them to Reason.” He proceeds to remark: “This seems to invert the procedure of the other book; instead of asking us to regard them as absolutely true or false because they are the work of Reason, he invites us to regard them as absolutely true or false and on that ground to ascribe them to Reason.” Here, and I think elsewhere, my opponent writes as if he had never heard of such a thing as mutual implication. From my point of view, to say that a judgment is objectively true implies that we ascribe it to Reason:¹ neither proposition is a deduction from the other, but each implies the other. There is therefore no difference between the two modes of statement on this head.

(9) And now I must say a word as to the theistic argument which I base upon the rationality and objective validity of our moral judgments. I do not think I need go into it at length; for Professor McDougall hardly seems to dispute that, if the objective character of these judgments were established, it would be reasonable to suppose that they were valid for the divine Mind, and might be regarded as revealing to us the purposes of that Mind. His contention is (1) that this objective validity is not established, and (2) that my conclusion is not “proved.” Here again it does not appear what kind of argument he would regard as “proving” such a conclusion.

¹ Or at least to the intellect. Questions about the difference between “Reason” and “Understanding” are not here relevant. What I am concerned with here is simply the difference between a judgment which claims universal validity and a judgment which merely asserts a preference of my own: of course, even that judgment claims objective validity, so long as it is understood as merely stating the fact of my personal preference.

Of course no philosopher will claim for this or any other ultimate theory of the Universe that it can be proved in the sense in which a geometrical proposition can be proved. Perhaps at bottom what I mean by saying that this view of the Universe is proved does not differ greatly from what Professor McDougall means by saying that he "believes" it. There may be a difference in the strength of the conviction. And on my view the belief is a rational belief: while if I took Professor McDougall's view about the nature of our moral judgments, I should not think it rational, and should cease even to "believe" in the goodness of God.¹

My opponent's own personal "belief in the reasonable probability of the Moral Governance of the Universe" appears to be an inference from the fact "that good men exist and that good actions are done." But it is equally certain that bad men exist and that bad actions are done, and I fail to see why we should infer the goodness rather than the badness, or the moral indifference of the divine Mind, in the absence of any reason for supposing that the good character and the good actions possess more value than the bad. This can only be inferred if our own moral judgments which assert this superior value of the good can be regarded as objectively valid. Here we once more return to the main question between us, and once more I must insist that the only reason for thinking that they possess this validity is that we actually think so and cannot help thinking so—Professor McDougall included. A strong argument against his theory could be constructed by merely bringing together the passages in his writings in which he himself assumes all that I contend for. I might appeal to his habitual use of such terms as "higher" and "lower" as if they meant something other than mere preferences of his own or of a certain number of other civilised men; and to all that he says about the development of a "self-approbative instinct," and about the process by which we "learn to despise the opinions and regards of the mass of men and to gain confidence in our personal and moral judgments"—about the gradual emergence as the master-motive of "the desire that I, the self, shall do the right."

¹ Professor McDougall attempts to draw a distinction between my position and Professor Sorley's as to the moral argument for the existence of God. I can discover none. I have read Professor Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God* with almost entire agreement, and have discovered no important difference between us except as regards his view of Free-will. Nor, I think, would Professor Sorley discern any such difference. At a vital point of his argument he quotes, and adopts, a whole paragraph from mine, just on the point which is here at issue.

All this really implies that some men's actual moral judgments may be wrong—really worthy of disregard and contempt, as much so as judgments about scientific or historical truth which fail to correspond with Reality.¹ On Professor McDougall's own view such assumptions are wholly unjustified. He has as little right to "despise" the judgments of the savage or the moral ἀναίσθητος as he has to plume himself because he may like his tea strong while I may like it weak. Take such a passage as the following:—

"There are two important differences between the truly moral man and the prig. The prig finds in the desire for an admirable and praiseworthy attitude² his only, or at least his predominant, motive to right doing; whereas the moral agent desires the right for its own sake in virtue of his moral sentiments, and habitually acts from this motive; and it is only when a moral conflict arises, with the necessity for moral choice and effort, that the self and the self-regarding impulse play the decisive role. Again, the truly moral man has an ideal of conduct so high that he can hardly attain to it, and, realising this, he is moved by the desire not to fall short of it, and not to incur the disapproval of his ideal spectators; whereas the prig's ideal is so easily within his reach that he constantly attains it, and achieves the pleasure of self-approval—'he puts in his thumb and pulls out a plum, and says—What a good boy am I!'"³

The whole of the passage implies that there is an intrinsically right motive for moral conduct, and that the "truly moral" man is influenced by it, while the prig is influenced by an intrinsically wrong motive. This would be a most unwarrantable dogmatism if Professor McDougall's theory were well founded. On that view all that the distinction could mean is that Professor McDougall dislikes the prig, while another man might perchance prefer him to the "truly moral man" after Professor McDougall's own heart. The fact that Professor McDougall finds it quite impossible to adopt this attitude is the best illustration that could be afforded of the bankruptcy of his theory.

I have a sincere respect for Professor McDougall's psychological writing. I do not think, for instance, that it is easy to exaggerate the importance of the argument against materialistic ideas which he develops in his *Body and Mind*; and on the purely psychological side I recognise the value

¹ Professor Joachim will forgive me if on the low "level of thought" on which we are now moving I accept provisionally the correspondence theory of truth.

² In strictness Professor McDougall should have said "admired" or "praised." "Admirable" implies that some admiration is justly bestowed and other admiration not so.

³ *Social Psychology*, ed. vi., pp. 257-8.

of his *Social Psychology*. If he would take the trouble to discover the real meaning of the main problems of Logic and Metaphysic, and make up his own mind about them, he would be in a better position for entering into controversy with those who approach the study of Morality primarily from the point of view of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, and would perhaps make the discovery that he is really a believer in the objective value of that idea of moral obligation which his theory annihilates. There are, of course, writers—and able writers—in abundance who deny this objectivity with full consciousness of what the denial means and of the consequences which it carries with it; but I do not think Professor McDougall can be included in their number.

H. RASHDALL.

THE DEANERY, CARLISLE.

MEDIÆVAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw, M.A., LL.D.,

Professor of Mediæval History in the University of London.

I.

"THE MIDDLE AGES," a high authority assures us, "were essentially unpolitical."¹ True as that generalisation is, it is merely negative. It tells us what they were *not*. If we were to ask what positively they were, the answer would probably be: "The Middle Ages were essentially theocratic." They were, in fact, dominated by the conception of the Kingdom, or Kingship, of God. It was their constant consciousness of the transcendence of the divine that gave them their distinctive characteristic. Their great representative men—Ambrose, Augustine, Benedict, Gregory the Great, Charlemagne, Hildebrand, Bernard, Francis, Dominic, Louis X., Dante—lived continually as in the presence of the Deity, whose servants they felt themselves to be. And even to the generality of less lofty souls the realisation of the supernatural was so intense that it determined the cast of their minds and the mode of their lives. It prevented politics from prevailing; it stopped the State from developing its sovereignty; it caused the cathedral to raise its pinnacles high above the battlements of the palace; it gave the Papacy an authority superior to that of kings, and impressed upon Christendom a unity which superseded every distinction of race, or language, or terrestrial allegiance.

This mediæval conception of the divine overlordship, and of the consequent community of Christian men, had to some extent been anticipated by the trend of later Greco-Roman thought. Zeno, the founder of the Stoic School, bringing

¹ Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire*, p. 90.

from his Cypriot home the cosmopolitan ideas of the Orient, had taught in the once-exclusive walks of Athens the doctrines of human equality and universal brotherhood. The followers of Zeno advanced still further on the pathway of divine philosophy; for it was to one of them, viz. Cleanthes, that St Paul referred in his great discourse on Mars' Hill, when he said that one of the Athenians' own poets had attributed the equality and fraternity of man to the fatherhood and sovereignty of God: "For we also are his offspring." Even beyond the Stoics had Poseidonius, the master of Cicero, gone. For to him the transcendent Deity was not the cold and distant abstraction which He always remained to the philosophers of the porch; he regarded Him as intimately concerned with the affairs of men, and as approachable by men through numerous mystical avenues of prayer and sacrifice. Poseidonius, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Porphyry—these men and their multitudinous disciples were not far from the Kingdom of God. But they did not quite attain to it; for they lacked that certitude and that confidence which belief in direct revelation and in personal divine governance gave to both the Jews of the old dispensation and the Christians of the new.

Mediæval theocracy, indeed, was based upon the Bible; and those who would understand the dominant conception of the Kingdom of God which prevailed during the thousand years that divided Diocletian from Dante must begin their study by inquiring, first, what views of the Kingdom were held by the prophets and priests of the Old Testament, and, secondly, what modifications of these views are presented in the gospels and epistles of the New Revelation.

II.

The idea of the Kingdom of God was prominent throughout Old Testament times. It was an idea, however, whose content was by no means fixed. On the contrary, it was subject to a development so remarkable that in its final form it had but little of its original connotation left. Four main phases can be distinguished. At first, as is shown in the Pentateuch and the early histories, the Kingdom was conceived as a present existing theocracy, limited in its scope to the children of Israel. It was the actual and realised rule of Jehovah through the instrumentality of priests, legislators, and prophets. The end of this phase arrived when the people came to Samuel and demanded a king. "The thing displeased Samuel," we are told, "when they said, Give us

a king to judge us." He consulted Jehovah on the matter. "And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee: for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them." The election of Saul as king thus marks the first great apostasy of Israel. It was, in effect, the dethronement of God: a revolution in which the primal theocracy perished. Hence a second conception of the Kingdom of God took the place of the first, now no longer possible. Although a mortal and extremely errant monarchy had superseded the sacerdotal dominion of Jehovah, yet the finer and more devout of the Jews refused to see in it more than a temporary expedient necessitated by turbulence and war. Such men as Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Hezekiah are theocrats still. But the Kingdom of God in which they believe is a future, not a present realm. When the evil interim is past, then, they predict, will Jehovah be restored, and will rule in righteousness and peace. But even to these long-visioned seers the Kingdom is still exclusively Hebrew in its scope: it is to be restored to Israel alone. The Babylonish captivity initiated a third phase. On the one hand it demonstrated to the Jews the disastrous mistake which they had made in abandoning Jehovah and trusting to kings. On the other hand it shattered their national exclusiveness, brought them into contact with alien peoples, enlarged their tolerance, gave them proselytes, broadened their spiritual horizon. As a result a new conception of the Kingdom displays itself in the prophetic writings of such men as Habakkuk, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel. It is still a dream of the future, but when realised it will no longer be limited to the Jews. It will embrace all mankind; although the Jews will hold the first places. The prime requisite for admission to it will be character—it will be the Kingdom of the just; but still circumcision and ceremonial will be insisted on. With the return of the exiles to Jerusalem the day of the restored and enlarged theocracy seemed to be not far distant. A rude shock, however, was speedily administered to the too-sanguine disciples of the post-exilic prophets. The yoke of the Persian lay heavy upon the chosen people, and they were made to feel that they were no longer a nation, but merely a tolerated religious sect. When the might of Persia was laid low by Alexander the Great, the Macedonian and Seleucid empires were even less favourable to patriotic particularism. Finally, the Romans under Pompey conquered Palestine (B.C. 63), and the Holy Land became a province of

the most powerful and enduring dominion which the world had up to that date seen. It was obvious that the restoration of any sort of temporal sovereignty to the small remnant of divided and distracted Jews was a very remote contingency. In these circumstances—that is, during the centuries that immediately preceded the Christian era—the Jewish conception of the Kingdom of God assumed an eschatological tone. The restoration of the reign of Jehovah and the re-establishment of the rule of the Levitical priesthood were to be preceded by a divine catastrophe—by a day of judgment and revenge; by the violent overthrow of the existing order, and by the creation of a new heaven and a new earth. Such was the burden of the prophecy of Daniel at the beginning of the period, and such the message of the Psalms of Solomon at the end (c. B.C. 48). The age in which John the Baptist preached, and Christ was born, was quick with the expectation of the coming of the Kingdom. John himself continually cried, “The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand”; and Christ, when he first spoke, also proclaimed “the Gospel of the Kingdom.”

III.

The eschatological view of the Kingdom of God, prevalent in the closing centuries of the old dispensation, remained prominent and permanent in the opening centuries of the Christian era. Two changes, however, marked the evangelisation of the conception. First, admission to the Kingdom ceased to be at all dependent upon any external observances, and became purely a matter of faith and character. Secondly, the Jews ceased to enjoy any precedence or privilege; citizenship in the Kingdom was thrown open on equal terms to all mankind. As to the date of the spectacular establishment of the Kingdom, New Testament writers markedly differ. The Evangelists expect the speedy end of the age, and speak of the Great Day as imminent. St Paul, more cognisant of the stability of Rome, distinguishes between the present and preparatory Kingdom of Christ (to extend which he laboured incessantly) and the ultimate Kingdom of God, whose advent might be very far off. The writer of the Apocalypse treats more definitely of three epochs, viz.: first, the present age, in which the Church struggles with the powers of evil; secondly, the millennial reign of Christ on earth, following his return in triumph; thirdly, the final and eternal Kingdom of God, whose establishment is to be consequent upon the Great Judgment of all mankind.

But beside this dominant eschatological view of the Kingdom of God two other conceptions have their place in the New Testament, and both of them have played a notable part in Christian history. One is the idea of the Kingdom as a dominion wholly spiritual, a timeless and spaceless lordship, seated in the soul of the individual saint. "The Kingdom of God is within you"—such is the great utterance of Christ, whose inspiration has led myriads of the faithful to open their hearts to enthrone their Lord, converting the frail tabernacle of their mortality into a palace for the indwelling God. The other is the idea of the Kingdom as the present and visible association of those who acknowledge the authority of Christ, accept his salvation, and enrol themselves in his communion. In this sense the Kingdom of God tends towards identity with the Church of Christ. But it never quite attains it. For on the one hand the Church in its terrestrial imperfection always includes some lost souls, such as Ananias and Sapphira, who are not of the Kingdom; and on the other hand the Kingdom includes some, such as John the Baptist, Simeon, and Cornelius—to say nothing of the great old saints of earlier days,—who are not of the Church. The Church is thus not identical with the Kingdom—it is the Kingdom in the making.

This is the conception of the Kingdom of God which became dominant in the Middle Ages: that is to say, the conception of the Kingdom as the present and visible community of Christian folk; bound together by ties of faith, hope, and love; organised as a theocracy; governed by bishops, priests, and deacons; nourished by sacraments and services; moving towards universal and everlasting dominion; expecting the second advent of Christ. Let us proceed to examine it in detail.

IV.

When we say that the theocratic conception of the Kingdom of God recovered its ascendancy in the Middle Ages, we do not mean to imply that the other two conceptions—the eschatological and the spiritual—ever died out. The contrary was the case: both survived, and both were, from time to time, powerfully operative. Mediæval seers were constantly on the alert, looking for the signs that presaged the end of the world, and frequently predicting, with a confidence which no disillusionment could diminish, that the advent of the King was near. Mediæval saints, with equal constancy, in long succession, surrendered their spirits to be ruled by God,

converting their souls into divine dominions fruitful in all good works. But neither the coming and triumphant Kingdom, nor the inward and spiritual Kingdom, was the characteristic Kingdom as conceived by the mediæval mind. That, as we have remarked, was rather the present and militant community of Christian folk.

The growth of this theocratic idea—the idea of a present and visible Kingdom of God upon earth—is traceable through all the early Christian centuries. It had many features in common with the idea of the primitive Jewish theocracy; but there was one tremendous difference. The Jewish Church was also the Jewish State; but the Christian Church was not the Roman Empire. On the contrary, Church and State were two separate organisations which in process of time developed a mortal antagonism to one another. The Empire in a series of widening and deepening persecutions strove to extirpate the Church; the Church in return denounced the Empire as Babylon, as the purple harlot, drunk with the blood of the saints. This divorce of Church from State, this conflict between religion and politics, was alien from both the Hebrew and the Roman mind. The Hebrew was habituated to the conception of a polity dominated by priests; the Roman to a priesthood controlled by politicians. Both Church and Empire were thus, for different reasons, restless in the presence of this novel antagonism. Hence, when the persecutions had definitely failed, the way was prepared for the epoch-marking conversion of Constantine. Church and State were reunited. The Emperor, as *Pontifex Maximus*, placed himself at the head of the Church: he became *Episcopus Episcoporum*. The Church rejoiced that at last the Kingdom of this world had become the Kingdom of God. When, before the end of the fourth century, both paganism and heresy were suppressed, the problem of the relation of Church to State seemed to be happily settled. Henceforth there would be but one community—the *Respublica Christiana*—which in its religious aspect would be the Church, in its secular aspect the State. The command, “Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s,” appeared to have lost its relevance; since Cæsar had become the earthly vicegerent of God.

This identification of Church and State in the converted Roman Empire, however, did not long continue. Indeed, it never fully took place at all. The *Respublica Christiana* remained an unrealised figment of the mediæval imagination. Nay, more, it never effectively obtained possession even of the

mediæval imagination. For it stood for a conception of the relation between religion and politics that was essentially non-Christian; it embodied either the pagan conception of the Greek and Roman city-state, or at best the Hebrew conception of the primitive theocracy. The essence of the teaching of Christ had been that religion is a personal, not a political matter; not a matter of birth, or circumcision, or allegiance, but a matter of faith, discipleship, sanctity, and service. To identify the Roman Empire with the Christian Church, even though the converted Constantine or the pious Theodosius was at the head of the composite organism, was to abolish the distinctive Christian tests of creed and character, and to admit the world, the flesh, and the devil to church membership. The monstrous impossibility of the re-identification of Church and State, and in fact the extreme difficulty of their permanent reconciliation, became plainly evident when the sanctified Constantine was succeeded by the heretical Constans, and he by the apostate Julian. When, a century after the conversion of Constantine, Augustine wrote his *Civitas Dei*, he was under no illusions concerning any visionary *Respublica Christiana*. He distinguished in the sharpest conceivable manner the City of God, which he tended to identify with the Church, from the City of Man—*Civitas Terrena*—which without hesitation he identified with the Roman Empire of his day. Throughout the Middle Ages the powerful Augustinian tradition was entirely opposed to any identification of Church and State, which it regarded as equivalent to an identification of sheep with goats, saved with damned, God with Mammon. At the end of the Middle Ages, Augustinus Triumphus was but repeating the sentiments of his great namesake at their beginning, when he said: “Regnum terrenum est malum et diabolicum, et opponitur regno cœlesti.”

V.

Augustine, indeed, and all his followers (especially those of the monastic orders) utterly repudiated the notion of a *Respublica Christiana*—that is, of a Kingdom of Man which was also a Kingdom of God, of a State that was also a Church, and a secular community that was also the elect of Christ. It was too obviously contrary both to observed fact and to sound theology. Nevertheless, this notion, essentially non-Christian though it was, survived and re-emerged from time to time as part of the tradition of the Roman Empire. It flattered the pride of German Cæsars; it provided a justification for the

suppression of heresy by the secular arm; it satisfied the mediæval passion for unity. Charlemagne acted as head of the Church as well as head of the State: he judged Popes, called Councils, determined dogmas, made himself supreme over all causes both spiritual and temporal. So far as in him lay, he attempted to realise in his Holy Roman Empire the Kingdom of God on earth. In this endeavour he was followed, amid progressively unfavourable circumstances, by the other great mediæval emperors, notably Otto I., Frederick Barbarossa, and (perhaps we may add) Frederick II.

But over against this fitful and ineffective imperial ideal of the terrestrial Kingdom of God had risen an incomparably more potent and operative Papal ideal. It was based on Augustine's conception of the Catholic Church, although it did not always include his supplementary doctrine of the diabolic origin of the secular power. To Augustine the Catholic Church, not the Roman Empire, was the Kingdom of God on earth. But what precisely he meant by the Catholic Church is not so clear as one could wish. Sometimes he seems to limit it to the small company of the predestined elect; at others he broadens its bounds to include all conforming and consistent believers; finally he appears to identify it with the *ecclesia externa*, i.e. the whole organised body of those who accept the sacraments and obey the hierarchy. This last most comprehensive conception is the one which the Papal theorists made current in the Middle Ages. Again, when Augustine wrote his *Civitas Dei* (A.D. 412-27) the bishopric of Rome had not yet developed into the Papal primacy. Within thirty years, however, of Augustine's death, Leo I. fairly started it on its monarchic way, and by the time of Gregory the Great (A.D. 590-604) its ascendancy in the West was unquestioned. Here, then, in the multitude of Catholic Christians, drawn from all nations, kindreds, and tongues, organised in dioceses under bishops, and governed in the last resort by the Successor of the Apostles and Vicar of Christ—here was the Kingdom of God in being and in power. It was a magnificent conception: for it implied not only ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but also control of all secular concerns. All kings and governors were baptised Christians, and as such subject to the authority of the Papacy. Politics, commerce, industry, education, art, literature, philosophy—these and every other sphere of human activity had their religious aspects and were to be made subservient to the laws of the divine Kingship. Never was this Papal regency so nearly realised as during the pontificate of Innocent III. (A.D. 1198-1216). As sovereign lord, under

God, of the whole Catholic world he excommunicated and deposed, decreed and executed, wielding an absolute sway over the souls and bodies of the faithful everywhere. "*Petro non solum universalem ecclesiam, sed totum sæculum gubernandum (Christus) reliquit*"—such was his tremendous assertion.

VI.

Alas, that it must be recorded! The attempt of the Papacy, no less than the attempt of the Empire, to realise the mediæval conception of the Kingdom of God on earth issued in tragic and irremediable failure. This failure was, no doubt, to some extent due to the recalcitrance of unregenerate man, to the backsliding of the baptised, to the activity of the enemies of the Church. Unholy Roman Emperors rebelled against the Papacy which had created them; national kings refused to bow to the authority of cosmopolitan priests; civil lawyers repudiated the validity of ecclesiastical canons; a materialistic middle class declined to pay its spiritual dues; a rationalistic laity began to question the most sacred creeds; heretics and schismatics arose in ever more formidable swarms. The thirteenth century, indeed, saw the commencement of a general revolt against the Papal theocracy. This is true; but it is only part, and a minor part, of the truth. The mediæval Papacy failed to establish the Kingdom of God on earth mainly through faults of its own. It became involved in conflicts for temporal dominion, in the course of which it prostituted all its spiritual powers to secular ends; it became greedy of land and wealth, and showed itself ready to barter divine prerogatives for lucre; it passed into the hands of unworthy men who used its august influence to aggrandise their families or even to minister to their own lusts; it grew to be obscurantist, intolerant, persecuting; it became torn by suicidal schism, and rent by scandalous civil war; it sank into the sanguinary mire of Italian politics, lost its cosmopolitan character, and was degraded into a bandit principality. Never has there been a greater catastrophe since Lucifer fell from the heavens.

In vain did Councils seek to reform the Papacy and to restore the Kingdom of God; in vain did Dante pour forth the thunder of his lamentations and denunciations, calling upon the Cæsar of his day to repeat the regenerative work of Constantine and Charlemagne; in vain did Marsiglio of Padua announce that the true Kingdom of God was not the reprobate Papacy but the ever-pure democracy of Christian men and

women. It had to be left to the Reformation to accomplish by violence what reformers had been unable to achieve from within by a long process of peaceful persuasion. The Reformation dissolved the mediæval illusion of a terrestrial Kingdom of God, whether it were an Empire supreme over things spiritual; a Papacy supreme over things temporal; or a visionary *Respublica Christiana* in which Emperor and Pope ruled as co-ordinate authorities, joint representatives of the pre-eminent Deity. It brought to an end the mediæval confusion between the Church and the World. It revived the ancient spiritual ideal of the inward Kingdom of God, re-emphasised the personal nature of religion, recalled men to faith and good works, and turned their hopes once again to the future Kingdom of Glory. No doubt the world has profited by the mediæval efforts, however unsuccessful, extended over a thousand years, to bring the government of mankind into harmony with the divine will. Much was accomplished during that millennial period, both by Emperors and by Popes, to repress wickedness and vice and to encourage true religion and virtue. But the main lesson of the failure of the theocracy of the Middle Ages is that the Church and the World are for ever distinct; that no alliance between God and Mammon is possible; and that the Kingdom of God cannot be established by carnal means, but must come (if it come at all) without observation, by the silent working of the Divine Spirit upon the souls of individual men.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON.

WHAT DID JUDAS BETRAY?

PROFESSOR BENJAMIN W. BACON.

THERE are critics (not of the radical school alone), and there are earnest followers of Jesus, who still refuse to believe that he advanced any claim to be the Christ. They attribute this ascription to the enthusiasm of disciples who, having come to believe in his resurrection, permitted their new-born faith in his destined office of Deliverer of Israel to colour their recollection of his ministry.

To the ordinary reader this incredulity may well seem strange. Why, then, he asks, did Jesus suffer the fate of an insurrectionist at the hands of the Roman governor? This objection is only one out of many, but it will perhaps stand foremost even with historical critics; for on this question the majority of scholars will probably side with the ordinary reader, though with better appreciation, perhaps, of the grounds of denial.

The sympathies of the present writer, let it be confessed at once, are wholly with the majority of critics and the ordinary reader. Not on doctrinal or sentimental grounds, but purely as a question of the valuation of testimony from the historical point of view, we feel compelled to hold that Jesus did claim (with whatever reserves in his interpretation of the title) to be in some true sense the Messiah of his people. However drastic his criticism of the rôle which would-be disciples expected of him in this capacity, he did claim to be the expected Son of David, the King of Israel; or at least he refused to disclaim the title, when a simple disclaimer might have delivered him from the cross.

The basis of this conclusion is not merely that fundamental outline of Petrine story which comes down to us under the name of the Gospel of Mark. It rests also upon the so-called Second Source, that compilation of discourses probably older than our canonical Mark, which has been combined with

it independently by our first and third evangelists. The coincident material of Luke and Matthew not found in Mark is probably our most authentic source for the teaching of Jesus. In this occurs a saying very differently worded in the two authorities, and differently placed. In Luke xxii. 30, where it has a fuller context than in Matt. xix. 28, which adapts it to a Markan setting, it forms part of an interpretation of the Last Supper as prefiguring the messianic banquet in the New Jerusalem. As Andreas of Cæsarea long ago perceived, it is nothing less than an application to the occasion of a well-known psalm which glorifies the restored city of David as the centre whither the tribes go up to give thanks to the name of the Lord:

For there are set thrones of judgment,
The thrones of the house of David.

In this psalm is certainly to be found the key to Jesus' meaning when he assures the disciples that they who have been faithful to him in his trials shall "sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel." However "other-worldly" in its outlook, this utterance could hardly proceed from a Leader of less than messianistic claims. And its authenticity does not rest upon the testimony of the Second Source alone. We have a primitive reference to the promise in the "faithful saying" of 2 Tim. ii. 12: "If we suffer, we shall also reign with him," to say nothing of Paul's allusion to the "judgment of angels," in which the saints are to participate according to 1 Cor. iii. 6. Such scanty evidence as can be gleaned, therefore, outside the pages of Mark, does not tend to reduce the probability that Jesus did in some sense claim the throne of David. It tends rather to increase it.

All must agree that vague and various as were the attributes of messiahship in Jesus' time, the title was so fundamentally political in character that to put forward a claim to it would involve extreme danger, not merely to the life of the claimant, but also to the peace and well-being of the nation. Understood in the only sense it could convey to the average man, unless special pains were taken to impose upon it a new and non-political sense, it could be no less than a fire-brand of revolution applied to the inflammable material of Zealot nationalism. If only to avoid kindling the uncontrollable flames of insurrection, Jesus must have insisted (as indeed the Gospels represent) upon the strictest secrecy, if he at all permitted its application to himself.

But if so large a measure of accommodation and adaptation

would be required to bring the conception (even in the transcendental form of a Son of Man doctrine, as in apocalypse) into harmony with Jesus' actual work of bringing Israel by repentance and faith into reconciliation with its Father in heaven, would not the risk be more than enough to offset any possible gain? If Jesus' task was that of the religious reformer, the "throneless king" who teaches a new system of ethics and seeks to establish a relation of peace and goodwill between man and man and man and God, why should he complicate the matter (our opponents may well ask) by introducing this issue of Jewish nationalism? Why should he imperil both life and cause by resort to these "high explosives," when so little of real advantage could be expected from it? Devout spirits such as Martineau have felt the whole messianic conception as it lay in the minds of those whom Jesus addressed to be alien to his primary work. When, therefore, they compared its frightful and proved capacity for rousing the passions of religious war with the modicum of advantage derivable from it to the cause of the great Teacher, they refused to hold him responsible for introducing the idea. To their mind his claim to the title must have originated in those later, post-resurrection days in which the Master's earthly career began to assume in the devout imagination of his followers a radiance of supernatural glory. There is a certain incongruity of the messianic ideal, not in the form that may have been given it by the learned and devout, nor the form that it received later in the teaching of Christianity, but in the sense it would convey to the multitudes whom Jesus addressed, with that of the teacher of personal religion that we conceive him to have been. It is when we do full justice to this that we best appreciate the grounds of an incredulity we cannot share.

There are others, perhaps less susceptible to this sense of moral incongruity, who likewise deny that Jesus laid claim to messiahship on the ground that his ministry as a whole, when we study the records in a way to discriminate historical fact from religious idealisation, sets forth the prophet and teacher, and nothing more. If we leave out the single incident of Peter's confession at Cæsarea—or, better still, take the rebuke then administered by Jesus to have been in reality a rejection of Christhood not merely in the political, but in *any* sense—there will scarcely remain an act or word in the story which would not find appropriate place had religious reformation been the only aim. It is in fact only the later and dependent gospels of Luke and Matthew which introduce a claim to

Davidic descent in Jesus' behalf; whereas Mark has gone to the length of interjecting a paragraph (Mk. xii. 35-37) whose special object is to prove that to the kind of Christhood which Jesus claimed Davidic descent is quite irrelevant, since it is conferred by the act of God in the supernal sphere. Indeed, the Markan representation of the kind of Christhood which Jesus claimed is by no means devoid of historical difficulties which we shall be obliged to face.

Such are some of the reasons which lead not a few men of sober judgment and devout feeling to regard the claim to messiahship on Jesus' behalf as a post-resurrection development.

On the other hand, the resurrection visions themselves require to be psychologically accounted for. They did not come to men destitute of a pre-existing belief in Jesus as "he that should restore the kingdom to Israel." Disciples who merely mourned the tragic loss of a beloved teacher would furnish no mental soil for the growth of messianistic dreams, nor is the cross likely to have confirmed such political hopes, granting them to have grown up in the disciples' minds without warrant in any properly understood utterance of the Master, and contrary to his intention. Only belief in some personal claim of Jesus makes the reaction from the cross psychologically conceivable. Take this away and you make it impossible to explain the wide acceptance of the resurrection faith.

And antecedent to the resurrection experiences is the crucifixion. This cruel punishment was not inflicted by the Roman governor on a harmless Teacher who had inculcated respect for the rights of the civil power merely to please his most hated opponents, the chief priests and scribes. To drive Pilate to a judicial murder likely to involve such serious consequences the indictment must have had some colour of plausibility. In this case it was concisely and officially summed up in a superscription which (in spite of variations of detail in the report) remains indisputable on the principal point. The one clear, positive datum in our whole inquiry is that Jesus went to his fate as "the King of the Jews." The further we go in the direction of attributing this charge to mere calumny and false accusation the harder we make it to account for the sudden rise, after the catastrophe, of the belief that Jesus was indeed the Christ. If it be asked, Why, then, does so little appear of this political aspect in the Gospel of Mark? we may ask rather, Why so much? For we cannot afford to disregard the obvious necessity driven home upon the primitive evangelist by hundreds of martyrdoms of removing from

his account of the ministry everything that could give colour to the Jewish charge of political disloyalty.

There is still another step in our backward tracing of antecedents. How shall we justify the persistent silence of the Prisoner himself, who at the bar of a reluctant Roman judge thus forced on his own fate, becoming as it were *particeps criminis* by refusing to utter that single word of disclaimer which might have sufficed to set him free? For all our Gospels agree that Pilate would gladly have released him. Whom indeed could he more wish to shelter and support against his bitter enemies the Sadducean hierocracy than the popular Teacher of such principles as "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's"? "The hissing brood of Annas" must have had better evidence than appears upon the surface of the Gospels to force the hand of such a man as Pilate in securing the execution of their victim. But the mainspring of their conspiracy is not likely to have been disclosed upon the streets.

The silence of the Victim before Pilate is well attested. It was early taken as a fulfilment of the Isaian prophecy.¹ This also impels us to take sides with the ordinary reader in his conviction that if Jesus did not personally advance a claim to be "the Christ," he at least refused to disclaim the title. Nevertheless we shall be obliged to concede more weight than the average reader might perhaps approve to difficulties involved in this conviction, especially certain reticences of the Gospel of Mark. For the Markan story of the martyrdom of Jesus, its representation of his claim to "Christhood," and of the accusation under which he was "betrayed," has certain peculiarities to which we must now give closer attention, since the matter concerns one of the most vital elements of our faith.

1. One of the most striking of these Markan peculiarities has already been briefly adverted to. If early tradition may be accepted, this Gospel is of Roman origin, composed after the death of Peter. Preponderant modern critical opinion agrees in substance to this, so that we are probably not far wrong in dating it in its present form from Rome, early in the reign of Domitian, the persecuting emperor (81-96 A.D.). Considering the probable political background, it is not without significance that among many other anti-Jewish-Christian characteristics this Gospel completely eliminates the claim to Davidic descent so persistently urged on behalf of Jesus by his Palestinian following.

The two pedigrees of Luke and Matthew, which trace the

¹ Is. liii. 7.

royal descent of Jesus by contradictory lines through his father Joseph, are indeed more ancient than the narratives of birth without relation to Joseph with which they have been editorially combined; otherwise they would harmonise better with them. Nevertheless we cannot rely on the genealogies for more than proof of early belief in the fact of Davidic descent. Fortunately it is belief in the fact rather than the fact itself with which we are now concerned. The same social distinction was accorded in the same period to the great rabbi Hillel, and a similar one is still claimed among Arab stocks by descendants of Mohammed. It is also extremely fortunate for our case that we happen to be in possession of documentary proof of the general currency of this belief many years earlier than any of our Gospels, so that we are quite justified in referring to its non-appearance in Mark as an "elimination." However valued, the belief had led in the Jerusalem Church before the time of origin of our Gospels to the formation of a little Christian caliphate, with the "kindred of Jesus" (the so-called *Desposyni*) at its centre, and during the reign of Domitian it became the occasion of Jewish denunciation to the Roman authorities of two sons or grandsons of Jude, the brother of Jesus, named James and Zoker, as claimants of the Davidic throne.

The "documentary proof" to which we have referred is nothing less than the Epistle of Paul to the Romans. In its opening words the Apostle admits that "according to the flesh" Christ had been born "of the seed of David"; but he would have the Christians at Rome realise that the real claim of Jesus to the messianic title "Son of God" rested on higher grounds. He had been "manifested" as such by the act of God himself, who raised him from the dead and made him to "sit at his right hand." Ignorance, then, will not account for our Roman evangelist's disregard of Jesus' Davidic descent. Indeed, he himself reports on two distinct occasions the cry addressed to Jesus, "Thou Son of David," though he nowhere vouchsafes any explanation of it. On the contrary, we must reckon this significant silence among the phenomena to be accounted for. Influence from Pauline teaching would be the simplest explanation, and this lies especially near to hand, since the same evangelist also introduces a section of his own (Mk. xii. 35-37*a*), based on the same proof-text employed by Paul, with the aim of showing that Davidic descent is non-essential, and that the Christ to whom David himself looked forward was a heavenly man (to use the Pauline expression), raised up to sit "at the right hand of God."

Before turning to this comparison, however, we should

introduce the further witness of another document, itself certainly influenced by Paul, the so-called Epistle to the Hebrews, which first appears at Rome and was probably addressed to a Roman community not long before the composition of Mark's Gospel. The epistle consists largely of a detailed application to the question of Christ's messianic office of Ps. cx., the same on which Paul had based his doctrine of the exaltation of Christ to sit "at the right hand of God." In fact this psalm is so constantly employed from First Corinthians down in proof of his exaltation that we may reasonably call it the Ascension Psalm. Most critics take it to be the coronation ode of Simon the Maccabee, celebrating the raising of this head of the dynasty by popular acclamation to a perpetual inheritance of both the Zadokite high-priesthood and the Davidic throne. Even if the apparently intended acrostic of the name of Simon in the opening letters of its lines be fallacious, it certainly celebrates the enthronement of a messianic priest-king. To the writer of Hebrews the appropriateness of the Psalmist's comparison of his hero's seat of power with that of Melchizedek is enhanced by his own application of it to Jesus. For more truly than of Simon could it be said of Jesus that God had exalted him to a perpetual and royal priesthood, when by the resurrection he summoned him to "sit at his right hand." In particular this writer emphasises the Pauline conception of how Jesus had been "declared to be the Christ" by pointing out that the royal priesthood of Melchizedek had been "without father, without mother, without a genealogy."

With two such predecessors in the field we should find it less difficult to understand why a Roman evangelist might consider it legitimate to pass over without mention the fact of Jesus' Davidic descent, and to insert a refutation of the assertion of "the scribes" that the Christ must be of the seed of David.

2. The Markan story of Jesus' trial before the Sanhedrin, with its curious refusal on the evangelist's part to grant any recognition to the great saying of Jesus on destroying the temple save as "false witness," is another instance of this evangelist's apparent effort to remove from the story elements capable of misconstruction as involving political messianism.

Jewish accusation (to say nothing of Jewish-Christian tendencies) would make any evangelist, but especially the compiler of a Roman Gospel, sensitive to the need of Christianising the Jewish conception of messiahhood, especially in the way of removing from it all political connotation. Nor have we the right to expect in writers of this type such

consideration for the historic sense as would be paid by the critic. But an evangelist who goes to the length of making David himself look forward to a transcendental Messiah, and from the first demoniac outcry in the synagogue at Capernaum down to the solemn utterance before the Sanhedrin speaks always as if this Son of Man conception were the only true and original idea of messiahship, might be said almost to have denaturalised the term. A Jewish Christian might perhaps justly complain that it had been not merely Christianised but Paulinised.

The description of a formal assembly of the full Sanhedrin at midnight (of Passover night!) on a few hours' notice at the house of the high priest has been shown to be an idealised scene in the volume previously referred to. Like the supplementary scene of debate over the Ascension Psalm in Mk. xii. 35-37, the scene of the trial¹ is introduced by the compiler of the Gospel in circumstances where, from the nature of the case, no data would be obtainable beyond the vaguest and most untrustworthy reports. Its apologetic purpose is transparent, and the impracticabilities already referred to should suffice to make us realise that the evangelist is merely attempting to tell what might have transpired if Jesus could thus have confronted his chief accusers. Of course he depicts the scene after the analogy of Jewish accusation and persecution in his own time. In reality public assumption of responsibility for the execution of Jesus is the last thing that the conspirators would have consented to. As Jesus himself implies in his dignified protest in Gethsemane, his arrest was a secret, illegal proceeding. The object was to deliver him up to Pilate under an accusation serious enough to secure his execution, while the high-priestly conspirators avoided popular disturbance by keeping as much as possible in the background. A formal assembly of the Sanhedrin, even if physically possible under the circumstances, could not even give colour of legality to the condemnation, nor in any way promote their design with Pilate, and it would involve just that publicity and that assumption of responsibility for a judicial murder exasperating to a large and dangerous element in the populace which the conspirators were most anxious to avoid. Hence the trial scene of Mk. xiv. 55-64, in which Jesus is condemned on a charge of "blasphemy," because he made himself "the Son of God," must be understood to reflect the merits of the case as between Synagogue and Church in the evangelist's own time, rather than what actually transpired when Jesus was

¹ Mk. xiv. 55-64.

secretly haled before the "hissing brood of Annas" to be held in the high priest's house until he could be delivered up to Pilate in the morning before his Galilean followers should have time to intervene. Indeed the third and fourth evangelists show by the changes they make in this scene from Mark that they have a more historical conception of the situation. In Luke the midnight gathering of the Sanhedrin is omitted, leaving only the session of the morning after, a less improbable gathering which may have served as the model for the idealised scene. In John it assumes a form within the limits of the credible, for Jesus is merely brought by his captors into the presence of their masters the chief priests for private examination, no doubt with the object of eliciting some admission to be used in the accusation to Pilate.

If, then, the Markan scene of the midnight trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrin is largely due to the evangelist himself, and aims to produce a just impression of the contention of Church and Synagogue in the evangelist's time, showing why and in what sense the Christians claim that Jesus was and is the Christ, and why the Jews denounce this claim as blasphemy, it is important for us to obtain his point of view. For the often-noted fact that the charge for which Jesus is condemned before the Jewish tribunal is not the same as that presented to Pilate, and could be of no service toward securing the end in view, proves that there is a difference, and that the story of the trial before the Sanhedrin stands apart from the real sequence of events. It does, however, subserve another end of great practical importance to the evangelist. It enables him to make clear to the reader in what sense Jesus claimed to be the Christ, and why the unbelieving Jews reject his claim. Hence the direct affirmation "I am" in answer to the high priest's demand "Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?" instead of the ambiguous "Thou sayest" of the (more historical) trial-scene before Pilate. Hence also the complete repudiation as "false witness" of a saying which the subsequent story (xv. 29) connects with the fate Jesus actually suffered, and which we have independent reason to regard as standing for a real and important utterance. As the matter stood *in the evangelist's time* between Church and Synagogue, the trial-scene before the Sanhedrin gives a very true impression concerning the Christhood claimed for Jesus, and the horror with which the claim was rejected as "blasphemy." *To our evangelist* it is a purely religious matter, concerned with heavenly things alone, and having no political aspect whatever. But even if we suppose the Sanhedrin to have

assumed the gratuitous responsibility of convicting Jesus of blasphemy because he professed an expectation of return as Son of Man on the clouds of heaven, it is quite certain that he did not meet his fate under this charge; so that the main result of the interjected paragraph (Mk. xiv. 55-64), which separates the former part of the scene of Peter among the servants in the court (verse 54) from the latter (verse 65) so awkwardly that it appears to be the very members of the Sanhedrin itself who engage in the buffoons' play of baiting the prisoner, is to drag into the foreground another accusation from that which really led to the crucifixion, leaving the actual charge in obscurity.

So conspicuous is the omission in this case that the later evangelists take note of the fact. Pilate asks before a word has been said upon the subject: "Art thou the King of the Jews?" This is indeed the real question and the only relevant one. But no such accusation has been made. Luke therefore supplies the omission. In Jn. xviii. 34 Jesus asks the counter-question so naturally suggested by it: "Sayest thou this of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me?" Obviously Pilate had indeed been told it by "others"; for it is not really probable that the accusers had forgotten to state the chief point of their indictment, and the only one on which they could hope for the desired sentence to capital punishment. Mark says nothing of this. His concern is with the religious question in debate between Church and Synagogue whether worship of the glorified Son of Man is or is not blasphemous, and to this he diverts the attention of the reader.

3. Among all the reticences of Mark affecting the condemnation of Jesus none has received so large a measure of consideration as his representation of the betrayer and his motive. Not that the general attitude of the evangelist has as yet been connected with the insufficiency of the story as it stands to account psychologically for the betrayal, but that independently the action and character of Judas have been felt to be a puzzle, continually inviting new attempts at imaginative explanation. Mark suggests no motive but the baldly mercenary one of money; and this is dismissed at once by most reflective minds as too petty and sordid for any man deliberately chosen by Jesus to be one of the group of his most intimate companions. Since we can hardly accept the fourth evangelist's explanation that Judas was purposely chosen to carry out his diabolical part¹ and urged on to the fulfilment of it,² we can only hold that the fundamental Markan story

¹ Jn. vi. 70 f.

² Jn. xiii. 27.

is defective on this point also, perhaps through mere ignorance, perhaps from motives akin to those which would seem to have led to the reticences already noted.

It is not merely the action of Judas which remains psychologically unexplained, but that of the high-priestly conspirators. According to Mark, Judas has nothing to reveal save the place where Jesus is staying, and even that he is wrong about, because the hastily armed posse must first have gone to the house where Judas had left the company at the passover banquet, perhaps the "house of Mary the mother of John (Mark)" of which we hear in Acts. Only afterwards will they have been conducted out to Gethsemane as a spot where the Master might probably be found. There the treacherous token of the kiss was given in order that the Victim might be singled out and taken while the rest were merely dispersed; for every additional prisoner would cause needless encumbrances and complications. But if this was the only service Judas could render his thirty pieces of silver were an over-payment. The ordinary agents of Annas could have done the work much better, without resort to the slippery aid of hired traitors.

There was something else of which the chief priests were much more in need than mere opportunity to seize Jesus in the absence of the multitude. Of opportunity to arrest him, publicly or privately, they had more than enough long before the tardy arrival of Judas. What they did not have, but must obtain if they were to gain their end, was *evidence to secure his condemnation*. With Pilate they could count upon no favours. Nothing would serve short of evidence sufficient to compel their enemy, the hard-headed, overbearing Pilate, to put this man to death as dangerous to the state. Doubtless the Sanhedrin might be induced to make out a case against Jesus as a false prophet under Mosaic law, but the Sanhedrin could not inflict the death penalty, and without this the conspirators would be risking far more than they could hope to gain. Evidence *that would weigh with Pilate* was the *sine qua non*. For we must not lose from view the fundamental fact that from the beginning the crucifixion was the result of a secret plot, having in view nothing else than what was actually brought to pass, the execution of the Galilean Leader by Roman authority as a messianistic disturber of the peace. Could Judas supply the evidence requisite for this? And could a motive be found sufficient to secure the treachery? Such questions, and only such, would have practical importance in the eyes of Annas and Caiaphas.

We have seen in two earlier instances that the Roman evangelist is not forward to describe acts or utterances relating to Jesus' claims to messiahship which might give occasion to misconstruction. He suppresses the claim to Davidic descent. He brings forward the later, Christianised idea of messiahship as if it were the accepted sense and the political a Jewish perversion. He does so in all good faith, but naturally without historical perspective. He even denies to such utterances as that on destroying and rebuilding the temple all right to appear as authentic sayings of Jesus. All this is appropriate to a work having the objects of a Gospel and not a critical history. But the result of such effort to avoid misconstruction, such forestalling of Jewish calumny or Jewish-Christian dependence on a "Christ according to the flesh," is that Jesus is made to take an apparently inconsistent attitude. At Cæsarea he forbids the Twelve to divulge his claims to be the Christ—with what excellent reason we have already seen. But on the ascent from Jericho he intervenes to prevent their attempts to silence the imprudent outcries of Bartimæus. He even welcomes and rewards as a signal instance of faith the blind man's appeal to him as "Son of David." In like manner he should surely (from Mark's point of view) have discountenanced the hosannas of the multitude who hailed him as "Son of David" when he drew near to Jerusalem, and acclaimed the coming "kingdom of our father David." But Mark himself gives no indication that he sought in any way to restrain them, and Matthew represents him as again intervening to prevent those that would. It is hard to account for these elements of the story if Jesus' opposition to what we may call "Son of David" messiahship was as complete as Mark represents.

Most of all would consistency require (if Jesus had no sympathy with such clearly political messianism) that he suppress at once the symbolic act of a nameless enthusiast which Mark dates "two days before the passover." It was "as they were sitting at meat in the house of Simon the Leper"¹ at a banquet where Jesus was the honoured guest. Into the midst of the group came "a woman having an alabaster flask of ointment of pure nard, very costly, and she brake the flask and poured it over his head."

We must of course distinguish the significance of the act as intended by the woman from that which Jesus declared that it must really bear. Had the woman intended her tribute

¹ Professor C. C. Torrey, by a plausible conjecture based on the Aramaic, substitutes the reading "Simon the Jar-maker," *garba* for *garaba*.

as "anointment for burial" she certainly would not have chosen this festive occasion to offer it. The utterance of Jesus is an instance, exquisite in pathos as well as in poetic imagery, of that higher interpretation which is characteristic of his teaching, and which receives special exemplification where the question is as to the sense in which his messianic claims are to be understood. Just as at Cæsarea Philippi Peter's ascription to him of the Davidic throne without the suffering of the redeeming Servant is rejected to make room for the Christian doctrine of a Son of Man who gives his life a ransom for many, so now Jesus accepts the tribute but transmutes its sense. The effect upon the circle of followers, whose hopeful enthusiasm must now have been at its very zenith, cannot have differed greatly from the effect upon the Twelve of his former tragic warning. At Cæsarea Philippi he bade them look not for a Son of David, but a Son of Man. Here he declares: "Not a throne, but martyrdom awaits me."

If we distinguish the sense which the tribute bore to its author from that attached to it by Jesus we must take a further step. We must also ask: What significance would the action have in the eyes of Jesus' enemies, and of those who were seeking occasion to deliver him over to Pilate as dangerous to the state? In the latter class must now be reckoned one of the Twelve, the only one of Judæan origin, and one whom we must suppose to have shared the ill-concealed resistance of all to Jesus' interpretation of his messianic calling. Of this Peter was only the mouthpiece, but Judas was not more spiritual-minded. On the other hand we have little or no reason to suspect him of motives which were not felt in less degree by all. The rift between Jesus and the Twelve had begun at Cæsarea Philippi. Not Peter only but Judas also had been forced to think what was implied for himself as well as for Jesus in this new rôle of Christhood. What must the scene of the anointing have meant to Judas, and why is it so curiously dovetailed into the story of the betrayal?

As related by Mark the story intervenes between the account of how "the chief priests and the scribes sought how they might take Jesus with subtlety and kill him" (Mk. xiv. 1-2), and how Judas went away to them and offered to deliver him up (verses 10-11). The only motive suggested for the treason is money, and even as respects this Mark makes no direct connection. It is only a later and dependent writer who "puts two and two together" by making Judas the author of the murmurs at the "waste of the ointment." The

mercenary motive is that on which the fundamental narrative is built, and we must expect to find it developed and applied with ever new detail. But it gives no real explanation, and the reader remains at a loss to understand why such great importance should be attached to the incident. It cannot be merely to prove the appropriateness of this kind of giving over against almsgiving, that "whosoever the gospel is preached throughout the whole world that also which this woman hath done shall be spoken of," and there is no word to explain its close association with the treason of Judas. Clearly the third evangelist sees no connection, for he eliminates the story altogether, save for a trait or two which he uses to embellish the totally different story of the penitent harlot (Lk. vii. 36-50).¹ The fourth makes a symbolical connection. By dating the incident *six* days before the passover,² he makes it coincide with the setting apart of the passover lamb on "the tenth day of the month." To supply the surprising omission of the name he introduces the Lukan characters Mary, Martha, and Lazarus, and further shows that he is following the conflate narrative of Lk. vii. 36-50 by taking over the curious resultant trait of an anointing of the *feet* (Lk. vii. 38, 46). So far, then, as Mark is concerned, the incident fails to show its true connection and significance. We are not even told who the woman was, of whom the story was to be "a memorial." As for the significance of her act, and above all its relation to the story of the betrayal with which it is so closely linked, we are left, to say the least, in great obscurity.

The story of the anointing, looked at from the standpoint of the author of the tribute, has one meaning. It has another when looked at from the standpoint of Jesus, who lifts it to a higher and more tragic plane. We have still to ask ourselves what must have been its significance in the eyes of those who take the lead in this whole chapter of tragedy, the high-priestly conspirators, and Judas their tool. To see what it would inevitably mean to them, or at least the sense it could be made to bear in the denunciation they were plotting of Jesus to Pilate, we need only place alongside it the story of the setting of the torch which kindled the greatest and bloodiest revolution in the history of Israel. In the ninth

¹ Verse 46, and the references to the ointment in verses 37, 38, together with the name "Simon" seem to be derived from Mark.

² So Epiphanius, *Haer.* i. 3: "We take the sheep from the tenth day, recognising the name of Jesus by the *iota*" (the first letter of Jesus, and the symbol for ten).

chapter of Second Kings the historian tells of the downfall of the Baal-worshipping dynasty of Omri, the murder of Jezebel and all the household of Ahab. It was a revolution instigated by the prophets and their adherents which set Jehu upon the throne and wiped out in blood the long-continued effort to subject the people of Jehovah to Canaanite institutions and worship. The story begins with the coming of a messenger from Elisha to Jehu as he sits at meat in the midst of his captains in the camp as they are besieging Ramoth Gilead. Elisha gives the lad a flask of ointment, and bids him summon Jehu to an inner room, pour it on his head and say: "Thus saith Jehovah, I have anointed thee king over Israel." This done, the messenger is to open the door and flee for his life. When Saul was secretly anointed in the house of Samuel,¹ the anointing was the signal for revolt. It was the signal for counter-revolution when Solomon was anointed at Gihon,² in every great age of Israel's patriotic past it had sounded the tocsin for national uprising.

We who read the story of the anointing of Jesus by an unknown enthusiast as he sat at meat in the house of Simon in Bethany, in the light of a purely religious interest, may find the resemblance remote; for we are accustomed to the adaptations it has experienced at the hands of generations of successive interpreters, all of whom were deeply concerned to minimise everything which could lend colour of justice to the charge that Christianity threatened the state. But it would hardly have seemed remote to those who were seeking grounds on which to denounce Jesus to Pilate, and when we once ask ourselves the question: What did Judas betray? we too may see reason why the story should occupy the place it does at the very beginning of Mark's account of the conspiracy. If we limit our attention to the progress of the plot itself the movement is direct from the anointing of Jesus in the circle of his intimates to Judas' offer of betrayal, the denunciation to the governor, Pilate's question: "Art thou the King of the Jews?" and the crucifixion of Jesus on this charge, after he had formally refused to disclaim the title.

Whether because of the reticence of Mark, the ignorance of the evangelists on this point, or for some other reason, the question, Why did Judas betray the Lord? has never ceased to interest students of the Gospel. It easily kindles the romantic imagination and consequently produces unending floods of that sort of "psychological" criticism which never can be proved either true or false, and whose value is pro-

¹ 1 Sam. x. ff.

² 1 Kings i.

portionate to the ease with which it can be produced. It is not unreasonable to raise the question of motive; but the only legitimate starting-point for the enquiry is the New Testament text. And if we consider the suggested motive of mere avarice inadequate, there remains nothing else save that which we are plainly told influenced all the Twelve, their reaction to it varying according to their individual courage or cowardice. At the one extreme stands Peter, not less, but more courageous than the rest, following "afar off" when the ten "forsook him and fled." At the other stands Judas, who carried his disloyalty to the point of deserting to the enemy. If he received money for his treachery, as is usually the case under parallel circumstances, and is almost always popularly imputed as *the* motive, it was an irrelevancy. *The* motive which affected all the Twelve was disagreement with their Leader on the question of his messiahship. And the disagreement was unavoidable because he, on his part, refused to relinquish the title Son of David, in spite of its dangerously political connotations, while they, on their part, were not ready to accept his transmutation of this ideal into that of a suffering Servant, and a glorified Son of Man. Even Judas might have been willing to follow Him "unto prison and death" had it been a question of the "kingdom of our father David" and "thrones of judgment" in a restored Jerusalem. Jesus was for both. He would be both Son of David and Son of Man. His Father's will must prevail "on earth" as well as "in heaven." But when military preparations were ultimately reduced to "two swords," and the Leader declined even to ask the "ten legions of angels" whose intervention would have turned the scales in his favour, personal courage was paralysed by uncertainty.

Mere cowardice, like mere avarice, is a motive which can satisfy none but the superficial reader as an explanation of the conduct of the Twelve. When we look below the surface the narrative itself shows a common cause for the infidelity of all. None had risen above what Mark in Pauline phrase describes as the "hardening of heart" distinctive of their people. They were not prepared wholly to let go their hope of a Christ "according to the things of men"; and the seemingly inconsistent attitude of their Leader, in the same breath welcoming tributes to "the Son of David" and consigning both their authors and himself to a fate he made no effort to avoid, was the worst possible for the retention of military morale. In the going up to Jerusalem the Leader went further and further in

advance, the followers fell further and further behind. And Judas was last of all.

The question *Why?* is notoriously difficult. When we turn from it to the question *What* did Judas betray? we have surer ground, and may hope for more light upon the whole problem. Reasoning from the one clear, outstanding fact that Jesus met his fate as **THE KING OF THE JEWS**, and that no mere hostility of the Jewish authorities could have brought him to the cross without evidence sufficient to force the hand of even a reluctant Roman governor, we cannot but attach the highest significance to the fact that immediately before the crisis, enthusiasm on the part of his Galilean following had reached the level of the scene described by Mark in the house of Simon at Bethany. It is true that its messianistic significance is minimised by the evangelist, but the same is true of several other sayings and occurrences which conflict with Mark's interpretation of the sense in which the title Christ should be understood, and which were capable of misconstruction by enemies eager to denounce the new sect. In spite of this, in spite of the forced connection with the context effected by a later evangelist who depicts Judas as a "thief" who kept the common purse, and was disappointed to lose expected booty, we cannot but hold that the tradition which leads Mark to intertwine this story with that of the betrayal has real historic value. It stands between the account of the plot laid by the chief priests "to take Jesus by subtlety and kill him," and the offer of Judas "to deliver him unto them." The reason is not far to seek. The report carried by the traitor furnished that ground of accusation to Pilate which the conspirators had thus far sought in vain. A charge of "blasphemy" would be laughed out of court. Accusations of disorderly conduct in driving out traders from the temple would be referred to the temple police, and might even fall back upon the conspirators' own heads in the form of a counter-charge of laxity or corruption. Irresponsible outcries to the Healer and Prophet as "Son of David" were not enough. They might furnish ground for suspicious watchfulness, but they would be more than counterbalanced by a true report of the Prophet's treatment of the test-question: Is it lawful to pay the census-tax? One thing, and only one, of all the incidents narrated could fully meet the purpose of the conspirators. It is the account of how, as Jesus sat at meat surrounded by the circle of his intimates in the house of Simon at Bethany, he had been approached by an enthusiastic disciple and formally anointed **KING OF THE JEWS**. Moreover, he had

not rejected the tribute, but had even rebuked those who sought to stay the woman's hand.

We have sought to bring out the sense which prompted the daring act. We have sought also to appreciate the higher sense in which Jesus received it, and to realise the chill his poetic words of warning would throw over the assembly. If we follow down this latter reaction to its intensest and basest form we shall come as near as our sources allow to the real motive of the traitor. Why follow such leadership further? Why risk all for a kingdom built only "on the clouds of heaven"? Already the doors of possible escape were rapidly closing. What had just occurred at the house of Simon would soon come to the ears of the Sanhedrin. Desertion was the easiest road of escape, and he who first carried the news would fare the best.—If such was the traitor's reasoning there is excellent cause for the grouping of anecdotes in this primitive tradition of the tragedy. There is an answer also to our puzzled question: Why should the scene of trial before the Sanhedrin be concerned with one accusation, while that with which Pilate confronts the Prisoner, and on which he meets his fate, is one that no one had so much as mentioned until Pilate himself brought it squarely to the fore. Our answer is: Judas betrayed the fact that Jesus had been anointed "King of the Jews."

The "good confession (*μαρτυρία*)" witnessed by Jesus "before Pontius Pilate" was a refusal to confine his claims to a kingdom "not of this world." His kingdom was to be from heaven, but its realisation and the seat of its authority were to be on the earth. Had he been content with the ideal alone he might have gone free. Rome had no quarrel with a merely platonic city of God. The confession "Thou sayest" is an avowal with reservations; but it is an avowal. Jesus did claim to be "the Christ." Not perhaps in a "political" sense but as Founder of a new social order of peace and goodwill. And this new social order is not to be instituted among angels, who are supposed to already possess this peace and goodwill, but "among men." Faithfulness to this ideal was the test in the first age of the Church, and it has its analogies to-day. There were those who were content to suffer with Jesus that they might also reign with him; and there were those who shrank from the good confession, those who followed afar off, those who denied, and those who maligned and betrayed the cause.

B. W. BACON.

ENGLISH EDUCATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY.

J. TALBOT, T.D., D.L., M.A., B.Sc.,

Headmaster of the Royal Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne.

THE basis of this article is an address to the Association of Headmasters, its purpose being to raise some broad questions which seem to have an important bearing on Education, both in its national and in its scholastic aspects; to propound problems rather than to discuss them fully; and to put forward suggestions the validity of which will have to be determined later. Lack of space and not lack of will makes this somewhat unorthodox method necessary.

To a schoolmaster one of the most puzzling things in English history is the contrast between our success as a nation and our national attitude towards the intellect.

"No nation, I imagine, has ever gone so far as England in its neglect and contempt for the intellect. The average Englishman has no interest whatever in truth. When he speaks of telling the truth he only means saying what he thinks, which very often is not the truth."

These are hard words, but they were spoken by the present Bishop of Manchester, himself a schoolmaster, and are the well-weighed opinion of an exceedingly able and thoughtful man. The worst of it is that they are true. Take the schools: how many boys love and appreciate intellect, or have the ability and determination to think clearly? Or the men in the street: how many can give you an opinion on any matter which is not a reflection of convention, or of the daily paper? Can you find a politician, Labour, Liberal, or Tory, whose ideas are not the reflex of his herd? I doubt if you can find one.

And yet, in spite of this, we have emerged victorious from a war against a nation which has paid more attention to the

training of intellect than any other nation in the world, and in the struggle we have achieved many things which no sane human being thought possible.

This looks like a paradox, or an accident; if it were an isolated case one would dismiss it with a shrug of the shoulders and the usual remark about muddling through. It cannot be dismissed in this way when one finds that, as a nation, we have always possessed the curious and curiously consistent habit of doing the same thing: the fact that the phrase "muddling through" is proverbial shows this quite clearly.

For a key to the riddle one must look to the recent work which has been done on the nature of the human mind, combined with certain characteristics peculiar to English education.

In 1895 Freud first put forward the idea that our conscious mental activities were largely controlled by the activities of the unconscious mind. This theory was suggested, in the first instance, to explain certain forms of hysteria, but an enormous amount of more recent work shows quite clearly that the role of the unconscious is just as important in normal as in abnormal minds. The theory at first met with violent opposition, but is now generally accepted in its main outlines; the position at the present time being closely analogous to the position of the theory of evolution some ten or fifteen years after it had been propounded by Darwin. In the same way that the idea of evolution was well known before Darwin, so psychologists had been aware of the unconscious before Freud; the latter, however, for the first time brought forward experimental evidence of its existence and showed how its mode of action could be investigated. There is another close parallel between the development of the two theories: Darwin, Wallace, Weismann, and Mendel all held different views as to the mechanism of evolution, and the strife between their various adherents is active to this day. So with the New Psychology: there is a bitter feud between the disciples of Freud and of Jung as to the interpretation of certain phenomena, but all are agreed as to the activity of the unconscious mind and its preponderating influence in our total mentality.

The theory has been developed since its first inception, and is briefly this: The mind has slowly evolved along with the body; and just as man's body is essentially an animal's body with certain purely human characters, so man's mind is essentially the active unselfconscious mind of an animal with the addition of the selfconscious faculties of the human being.

The investigations of Freud and his successors into the content and action of the unconscious side of the mind have produced some very striking results, showing quite clearly among other things that it is essentially active, that it is the abiding-place of habit and instinct, and that these really control a large number of actions which we ascribe to the action of our conscious intellect. The meaning of this is that man is not really the intellectual animal he is so proud of being, but that he is a rationalising one: he acts very largely under the sway of the Unconscious, but, full of pride in his intellect, invents a rational explanation for an action really instinctive; just as a man who, under the influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, picks up a chair and puts it on the middle of the table will explain, when asked why he did so, that he wanted to see something on the floor, and so moved the chair out of the way, being entirely oblivious of the unconscious impulse under which he acted.

The question which this theory of the mind raises is obvious: Is our national success due to the fact that we have despised intellect and have relied on our instincts?

For the schoolmaster the problem takes a slightly different form: "We have striven for generations to make reason the guiding light: we have failed to kindle more than a spark: has the nation succeeded because of our failure? Are we to give up this thankless task and turn to the training of the Unconscious?"

The answers to the two parts of this last question are perfectly definite. To the first the reply is that we must redouble our efforts to develop the intellect if civilisation as we know it to-day is to continue.

The answer to the second is that the training of the Unconscious is equally vital, that English schoolmasters have developed a technique for such training superior to that existing in any other nation in the world, and that the widest possible extension of it is essential.

To consider the first question rather more closely. If the psychologist emphasises the present importance of instinct he emphasises also the growing importance of intellect; man is slowly becoming a rational animal, and his instincts are slowly coming more and more under the control of reason. It is in this direction that his evolution tends, and the tendency must be helped, and not thwarted. This is a purely theoretical reason, and as such may not carry much weight with some people; but there is another, which is practical and also far more urgent—I mean the mechanical basis of

modern civilisation. I shall never forget one of my first days in Northumberland. We were staying with a friend, and picnicked at Borcovicus, one of the great camps on the Roman Wall. We were looking at the ruts the Roman waggons had worn in the gateway, and he turned to me and said, "Do you know why the gauge of our railways is the gauge of these ruts?" I said, "No." "Well," was his reply, "George Stephenson invented the locomotive to draw my father's coal-waggons." Look at the implications. Less than two generations ago the first real advance in locomotion was made since the dawn of history. It is very little more than a century ago since man first began to exploit the energy stored up in inanimate nature, and in this short space of time the whole framework of our modern civilisation has been built up on the machine—a purely intellectual product. Without intellect, and highly trained intellect, civilisation, as we know it, must collapse from the breakdown of its mechanism for production, communication, and transport.

At the same time, the intellect has produced the most terrible engines of destruction. The next war will come suddenly—far more suddenly than the last—with the raining down of poison and pestilence on the great cities, while at the same moment the nerve-centres of the nations are blasted out of existence.

The control of all these intellectually produced mechanisms cannot be left to the instinctive action of humanity alone without the certainty of disaster. It is like giving a child a real motor-car or a battleship to play with, instead of a toy. Humanity has created enormous engines: some must be kept running, or the nations die; if others are let loose, the nations will be blotted out. Intellect, and intellect of the highest order, is necessary for the control not only of the individual machines but of the mechanism as a whole; everything is so closely interlocked now, that the consequences of a single breakdown cannot be localised and may bring universal disaster. Whether we have created a Frankenstein or not, it is certain that trained intellect is not merely a thing desirable, but a thing vital and essential to the continued existence of civilisation as we know it to-day.

This, however, is only half the problem, since, as we have seen, man acts largely under the sway of his unconscious mind. We live in an age of democracy, and Demos, with his intellect at best partially trained, tends to act instinctively, blindly, and often violently. Demagogos, cunning enough to play on the instincts of the crowd, looses forces over which

he has no control. Demos or Demagogos, taking charge of these great machines, plays with and smashes them (as he has done in Russia) and starves amidst the ruins. The fate of Russia will be the fate of civilisation unless we schoolmasters can educate the unconscious minds of Demos and Demagogos, ruler and ruled.

This, surely, is quite sufficient justification for the earlier statement that such education is necessary; but, before going on to consider the methods which can be used, it is necessary to look for a moment or two at some examples of unconscious action in daily life.

One of the most striking is the belief in the existence of large bodies of Russian soldiers in England at the beginning of the war. Almost everyone believed it; there was not the slightest atom of real evidence to support it. Anyone who looked at a railway map of Russia would have seen that it was ludicrously impossible. We believed it individually because we wanted to; when a number believed, the belief was intensified by the herd instinct, which makes us do or think what everyone else is doing or thinking, and is the foundation of the methods of the up-to-date politician, advertiser, and journalist.

Another example is the way the country, Cabinet Ministers who knew all there was to be known about German preparations included (Demos and Demagogos), refused to face the fact that Germany was bent on war. The facts were unpleasant, terribly unpleasant, so our unconscious mind hid them and withdrew them from the cognition of our rational mentality. None are so blind as those who will not see.

We have as a nation a bad habit of talking about ideals and then turning the pursuit of them into a paying proposition. We start out to help Belgium and France, and collect large slices of Asia and Africa in the process; or we commence a strike to reduce the price of coal, and end with an advance in wages. It is a very bad habit, and leads to our being called a lot of very unpleasant names, such as "Perfide Albion!" and so forth. We are not perfidious really, but only examples of unconscious desire dominating action.

All these, and a hundred other things like them, are constantly brought forward as examples of intellectual dishonesty, muddled thinking, and so forth. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred they are examples of rationalised instinctive action, and are not governed by purely intellectual considerations at all. It is a pity that this cannot be generally realised: to know all is to forgive all, and certainly much of the mis-

trust and accusations of dishonesty which embitter industrial strife at the present moment would be avoided if it were.

This divergence from the strict line of the argument is due partly to the intrinsic importance of the examples themselves, and partly to the fact that they show the extreme difficulty, if not the impossibility, of preventing the unconscious mind from tampering with the intellectual control of the mechanical framework of civilisation. If a man had told you, when you were full of the Russian myth, that the wish was father to the thought, and that there was nothing else in the story, you would have overwhelmed him with a carefully reasoned argument—you would have rationalised an unconscious wish. Lenin has done it in Russia : Wilson did it at Versailles.

We cannot keep the Unconscious away from the machine, so we must do our best to train it so that it may do as little harm as possible. In order to discuss its training it is necessary to look rather more closely at the Unconscious than hitherto.

The unconscious part of the mind, our mental inheritance from the animal kingdom, is full of inherited instincts—hunger, sex, and self-preservation being probably the most primitive. The last differentiates into the flight and fighting instincts. Close to these come the herd instincts of combination for offence (wolf pack) or defence (cattle), or of copying exactly the action of another (rabbit). There are many others : some come from a later stage in the animal development, some are purely human, but all are susceptible to education and can be modified. An instinct may be suppressed, in which case we are fully conscious of the urge but do not allow it to affect our action. For instance, a man sits down hungry to dinner, and sees a peach, which he would much like to eat, on the dish in front of him : his hunger instinct impels him to take it, but his conventional herd instinct suppresses the hunger instinct, and he makes banal remarks about the weather to the lady on his right.

In repression the thing goes a stage further. An idea or emotion connected with an instinct is driven into the depths of the Unconscious as the result of a conflict with one or more other ideas of higher value to the individual. The idea still exists, but seems to come under the ban of what Freud calls the censor, which prevents it from reaching the conscious levels of the mind. For instance, to a soldier in France the idea of death or mutilation may have become so intensely unpleasant as to be unbearable, with the result that the emotion of fear was forced out of consciousness, and when once repressed was kept from returning to consciousness by the "censor."

The same thing may happen in an ethical conflict. A strong ethical demand may repress a natural instinct which is regarded as evil ; or, on the other hand, a man may stifle his conscience out of regard for his comfort. In both cases, as the result of a mental conflict, an idea or emotion based on an instinct is forced out of consciousness—it is not destroyed. On the contrary, one of the most important facts about repression is that all these instincts seem to have associated with them a considerable amount of mental energy which is constantly striving for expression in action : if suitable action is denied, as it is to a repressed instinct, the energy in its struggle for expression gives rise to those unconscious mental conflicts from which spring most of our latter-day neuroses. Repression is essentially an evil thing, which tends to throw the whole of the unconscious mind out of balance.

It is, however, possible to “sublimate” an instinct : the direct expression of the instinct in action may be inconvenient, but the expression may be modified and the liberated energy turned into new and ethically more valuable channels.

Sublimation and absence of repression are essential for a healthy mind, whether the mind be that of an individual or of a nation.

Let us look at our national propensity for muddling through in the light of these ideas. It is obvious that the nation has relied on instinct in the past, though the great and increasing complexity of civilisation is making it more and more dangerous to do so in the future ; but why has instinct been right so often ? What has just been said about the evil effect of repression on the unconscious mind and the enormous value of a properly sublimated instinct suggests the answer. There has been extraordinarily little mental repression in English as compared with Continental history. From the earliest days there has been free and public discussion about all matters of law and custom, and every man, however lowly, has been able to bring his grievances before the judgment of his peers. The same is true of religious questions : there has been a wide and sane tolerance which has rarely permitted persecution. The result has been that our unconscious mind has not been warped by repression. In addition to this, our intense national devotion to outdoor sport and games has sublimated the fighting instinct : we still have it, and it is in perfect working order, as the Germans found to their intense surprise in the war. In peace we have for centuries turned its energy into other channels, and in so doing have learnt determination, team-work, and above all else to keep our

temper and our heads in an emergency. In these two things, absence of repression, and sublimation of the fighting instinct through sport, you have in great part the reason not only for our muddling through, but also for the very existence of the British Empire.

All this, however, has been a happy accident of history. The next point to be emphasised is that British schoolmasters have developed a technique for training the Unconscious which is superior to that existing in any other nation in the world. It is well known under the name of character-training, but it assumes a new aspect in the light of the New Psychology, for character is the name we give to the instinctive reactions to environment which determine a man's intellectual judgments and actions: in other words, it is his unconscious mind as exhibited in behaviour. Again our national instinct has been right not only in making us lay such tremendous emphasis on character-training in schools, but also in developing the methods of such training, which are essentially different from those used in developing the intellect.

Schoolmasters often suffer from mixing up the two things: the apostle of "solid grind," for instance, is mainly training character; the man who puts "interest" before all else is really trying to awaken intellect. A careful examination of classroom methods ought to be undertaken from this point of view. It is probable that both the Conscious and the Unconscious can be trained in school, but this question cannot be discussed here: a number of problems are involved which require working out. One thing is clear, and that is—why drastic repression, as distinct from rational control, is essentially bad. The German system of intense pressure is bound to harm the Unconscious, and may help to account for some of the curious anomalies one finds in the German mind, especially its utter inability to appreciate British mentality, and also for the large number of school suicides in Germany.

The real place for character-training, however, is out of school, and it is here that the boarding school has an enormous advantage over the day school. Games have already been mentioned as sublimating the fighting instinct and developing the team (or herd) spirit and so sublimating the instinct for self-assertion at the expense of one's neighbour. There is no need to go into any detail here, but it is interesting to notice that, since organised games have come in, fighting has gone out ("milling" has vanished from Harrow, though the milling ground is still there), and bullying has largely gone too. The fact that they are based on a very primitive instinct explains

the tremendous hold which games have on the mind of the boy, particularly when one remembers that the evolution of the individual epitomises the evolution of the race, and that the boy must in many ways be regarded as corresponding to primitive man. The reason why boys are allowed to "run" the whole of their games (expression as against repression of instinct) is also obvious, as is the reason why "producing champions" (as they do in America) instead of playing games is useless to anybody. In organised games we have in England one means of training the Unconscious through the liberation of instinct which is both invaluable and unique. It is widely applicable, in schools of all types; and in view of the conditions of modern democracy, one of the most important educational reforms possible would be to extend this training through the whole of the elementary schools.

The great boarding schools, however, have another and greater asset in the house system: here again we have the liberation and sublimation of instinct in its most perfect form. The good housemaster has his finger on the pulse of the house, but the control is entirely in the hands of the boys: they have their own hierarchy of prefects. To the head of the house the housemaster is a trusted friend to whom he can always look (and not in vain) for counsel and inspiration. A good house is the embodiment of the herd instinct *in excelsis*. All are keen on the welfare of the house; they learn that each has his own job to do, that a slacker is no use, that discipline is essential; as they grow older they have to maintain discipline, and that involves self-control and insight into the minds of others; above all, they are brought daily into contact with the wise and sympathetic mind of the housemaster. There is no training in the world which could approach the training of a good house were it not that one primitive instinct—sex—suffers serious repression: this is, of course, the great problem of the boarding school, and as yet no solution has been found. The day school is free from it to a very large extent, but it lacks the house system, and the balance of advantage between the two is not easy to strike.

There is, however, one form of school activities which combines many of the advantages both of games and the house system which is available for day as well as boarding schools—the Corps. As a method of training character and bringing many forms of school work into close relation with outside activities it has no superior, and is probably by far the most potent means of character-training at the disposal of the day school. It is purely British in its atmosphere of ordered

freedom: no militarist nation will look at it, for it sublimates, and so weakens the grip of, the fighting instinct. Unfortunately, lack of space forbids more than this brief reference, and an inadequate discussion of military training in schools would do more harm than good.

These three forms of out-of-school activity have been taken as examples of the means by which the unconscious can be trained: there are many others, all characterised by the facts that they are run by the boys themselves and that their appeal is based on an instinct which is sublimated. Taken together they form a wonderful system, like nothing else in the world. Not long ago it was confined almost entirely to the great public schools: it has spread into the secondary schools, and is to-day at work in many of the elementary schools. Believing as I do that civilisation is in deadly peril unless we schoolmasters can educate the unconscious mind of Demos and Demagogos, and that our predecessors have forged the tools which will enable us to do the work, I would urge my readers to help to develop and spread the training of character by every means at their command. Whether or not it is possible in this way to save the machinery of civilisation from becoming the plaything of an untrained Unconscious, one cannot tell; but the new theory of the mind opens out another possibility of safety, by throwing new light on the intellect.

The teacher who puts interest before all else has been mentioned as trying to awaken the intellect. Sometimes he succeeds, sometimes he does not: it often looks as if he had to break down some barrier in the mind, as if the latter were content with a state of semi-automatism in which it reproduces impressions, but does no real mental work on what it receives from the teacher or from any other source. The mind is rational, can appreciate a chain of reasoning and can reproduce it, but is curiously machine-like in its action. In contrast to this type of mind there is another which, receiving an idea, uses and moulds it, and gives it out again transformed into a new and vital thing. If the first type is likened to a machine, the second contains in addition a source of energy. One of the great problems of the schoolmaster is to convert the first type into the second—to break through the barrier and tap some hidden energy source. The change can be seen taking place: sometimes a boy wakes up suddenly, sometimes he is waked up; sometimes he develops slowly, sometimes never. We are profoundly ignorant about the whole thing, except that we know that a boy cannot change his type of mind of his own volition. This of itself suggests that the barrier may

be closely related to Freud's "censor," which can dam up in the Unconscious the energies of a repressed instinct. We know that the Unconscious has much to do with thought—memory alone is enough to show this; but in our present connection what we call flashes of insight are much more to the point. You are thinking hard on some difficult question: some new idea springs suddenly out of the dark background of the mind, and like the good fairy in the pantomime dispels the darkness with a flood of light. Such an inspiration often comes after one has ceased from deliberate thought, often some time after. Sometimes the unconscious mind-work is still more startling. I know of a case where two very able men, a physicist and a mathematician, were engaged on a joint research: the problem was a complicated one, and the former, having got as far as his mathematics would take him, turned it over to the mathematician. The latter was in trouble almost at once, as he could not see how to throw the data into a form suitable for his analysis. He brought his troubles to the physicist, who said, "If you do so and so you will be able to get an equation, and when you have solved it you will get a result of this sort," and wrote down an expression. The mathematician went home, and after about three days' work found that the result came out in the exact form in which it had been given to him. After this had happened about three times in one term, the mathematician came to me and complained that the other man was uncanny. I took the first chance I had of asking him about the matter, and he said that he was very sorry, but he had not the slightest idea how it had happened; the formula seemed right, so he put it down. Of course, this is a very extreme case, but it suggests that the difference between the two types of mind is that one can draw energy from the Unconscious, while the other cannot. It also looks as if the activities of Freud's "censor" were not confined to keeping back from consciousness simply things unpleasant, but that it functions much more widely: the Unconscious contains many things besides those driven there by repression, which cannot get out because of a "doorkeeper" of rather rigid views, who stops all unpleasant things from entering consciousness, and admits other things only grudgingly, but with a cheerful inconsequence which is rather surprising.

The apostle of solid grind has been referred to as training character rather than intellect. There is no doubt about the fact that he does produce a dogged, persevering type of mind which is of great value to the community, but (to continue the metaphor) he seems to ruin the "doorkeeper's" temper.

It is an exceedingly difficult point to argue from individual experience, because boys' minds differ so enormously one from the other, and one cannot eliminate the personality of the teacher. But it is a very striking fact that the German *abiturienten Examen* was instituted in 1834: since then the whole of the German secondary school system has been based on not more than three types of school, a rigid curriculum, and educational pressure of steadily increasing intensity, while during the last generation Germany has produced hardly one man of outstanding intellect. She has produced an enormous number of machine minds of very high quality, but the spark of genius has been singularly lacking, particularly since the time that the teachers themselves have been the victims of intensive *Kultur*. In Britain, with no real system of secondary education, with every type of school, and with school curricula so elastic that they have been called slipshod, things have been very different: taking one subject and one university alone, you have Stokes, Kelvin, Maxwell, Rayleigh, and Sir Joseph Thomson as against Helmholtz (b. 1821) for the whole of Germany. You get very similar results with any other subject.

To account for the souring of the "doorkeeper's" temper is more difficult, but Archimedes' shout of "Eureka!" seems to have a distinct bearing on the question. The flash of insight, the right word, is always accompanied by a very distinct sense of pleasure, and really creative mental work is generally, if not always, accompanied by distinct emotional excitement. Is emotion the poppy-seed for Cerberus? or, to put it differently, must we, in order to call an idea from the unconscious mind, charge it with pleasurable emotion before it can pass the doorkeeper? The machine mind, at its best, as seen in the modern German scientist, will catch a new fact, classify it, and put it into its proper place with the zest of a schoolboy hunting butterflies: the emotion is there, but it is confined to facts, or the ideas of others: the joy in his own ideas has been destroyed in the German boy by his nine years' "grind" at Gymnasium or Realschule. The boy whose interest has been sufficiently awakened for him to feel the joy of some intellectual achievement of his own, however slight, seems to be fundamentally different in that he has to some extent mollified the "doorkeeper" by his keenness. But, however keen he may be, the "doorkeeper" is always on guard, and lets but little through.

On this conception genius to some extent controls its own "doorkeeper," and can summon what it wants from the un-

conscious mind; while in insanity the door gives way, the "doorkeeper" is swept aside, and the complexes—those distorted monsters engendered of mental conflict and repression—pour out and occupy the conscious as well as the unconscious mind. There must be two types of genius, one of which is closely related to insanity where the "doorkeeper" is weak, the other controlling a strong "doorkeeper" through some intenser joy.

The problems raised are by no means purely academic: they go to the root of our teaching methods, for one thing. They show that the intellect is of two sides rather than of two types, the machine and the energy sides, which can be developed by different methods of training; and that it is necessary to learn how both can be developed, harmoniously in one brain, to the best advantage. This is deep water, but a further plunge suggests that it may be possible to educate the "doorkeeper" and so tap new sources of mental energy, as our forebears did of mechanical energy a century ago.

Actuated, possibly, by the valour of ignorance, I have tried to apply some of the doctrines of the New Psychology to certain aspects of English history and English education, and have drawn conclusions which may be summarised shortly as follows:—

The amazing way in which England has muddled through history into the biggest Empire of the world, in spite of her notorious neglect of intellect, can be explained largely by the fact that she has relied on her instinct, and this has remained unwarped through the absence of repression, and through the sublimation of her fighting instinct by outdoor sports.

Owing to the extraordinary development of the machine the framework of modern civilisation has been reconstructed in the course of the last century on a mechanical basis; and since the machine is a purely intellectual product, reliance for the future on instinct alone is bound to lead to disaster.

It is therefore necessary to train the intellect to the utmost.

On the other hand, the Unconscious will also have a great effect on political action, especially in these democratic times; and, if a disaster to civilisation is to be avoided, it too must be trained.

Character is really the Unconscious as expressed in behaviour, and there is no more perfect method known of training character than that which has been evolved in the great public schools, based on absence of repression on the one hand and sublimation of instinct on the other. This

technique of training is spreading, and must be spread through every school in the country.

Finally, some of the problems of the nature and training of the intellect have been discussed in the light afforded by the New Psychology.

Throughout the attempt has been made to show the very present dangers which beset civilisation to-day, and the essential part which education, both in the class-room and on the field, must play if these dangers are to be avoided. Class-room and field, however, unless the spirit of the school be there as well, are but as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. It is a strange thing, the spirit of a great school, subtle, intangible, elusive. In some ways it is a tender and fragile thing, as love is, and yet, like love, it is stronger than the grave. Like love, too, it comes upon a boy sometimes gently, unnoticed, slowly making his very soul its own; upon another the vision flashes, and the whole world is changed by its splendour. Sometimes it speaks with low voice of chivalry and honour and self-sacrifice; sometimes, like some old Hebrew prophet, pours bitter scorn on things evil and things base. And then the spirit brings the boy visions of the past, of poets and statesmen, fighters and thinkers, who have gone out from the school into the great world—and he too is going out, and the honour of the school is in his keeping, and he will have his part to play, and wonders what it will be, and prays that he may be worthy.

“God give us bases to guard or beleaguer,
Games to play out, whether earnest or fun;
Fights for the fearless, and goals for the eager,
Twenty, and thirty, and forty years on!”

It is no chance that the greatest school song and football song in the world ends with a prayer, for the spirit of a great school is dangerously like the Spirit of Christ. Can you wonder, when you think of the men who have made it: men who spent their whole lives working and praying for the boys they taught; whose sole aim was to send out into the world men better than themselves?

And we are their heirs, and this is our heritage; the spirit is in every school, the spark of it in every boy, for us to cherish. It is not easy; you cannot hurry; it means work and it means disappointment. We have only one guide, but that is the Spirit of Christ.

J. TALBOT.

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

WHAT IS THE GOOD OF KNOWLEDGE ?

A. D. RITCHIE,

Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.

EVERYONE who reflects upon his actions assumes that his life consists, in the last analysis, of the pursuit of some end which is good in itself, and not good merely for the sake of something else. Or, if he cannot assume this, he must confess his life is vain. But he will see that most men pursue consciously certain fairly definite and proximate ends without inquiry as to whether they are good in themselves or good as means only, and whether the ultimate ends to which they are means are good at all and not bad. Provided some end is in their sight, they seem to follow it without looking any further. For instance, many desire money and spend their lives in getting it, without reflecting that money is a means, and is not good in itself at all, and without stopping to consider what they want the money for, or whether the purpose for which they want it is good or bad.

This applies to the pursuit of knowledge as well as to the pursuit of other things. In the case of knowledge one may confess that the unreflecting devotee is better justified than many other unreflecting ones. The pursuit of knowledge is, after all, most exciting and absorbing at the present time. These are the halcyon days of knowledge, of such expansion as has never been known before. As far as we can see ahead, the discoveries that have been made are as nothing to the discoveries still to be made, and our instruments and methods show no signs of exhaustion. It is natural, therefore, to allow the excitement of the chase to blind us to the question of the value of the quarry. But we have no reason to believe the present state of affairs to be permanent, and, even if we had, it would still be legitimate to inquire at any stage, "What is the good of knowledge?"

The men of learning and of science who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge are apt to be somewhat taken aback at the naïve questions of those who take no part in the pursuit. The man of science will confess in answer to inquiries that he is at present engaged in the study of so-and-so. The plain man will ask, "What is the use of that?" and it is not easy to answer him. The man of science assumes implicitly that the continual acquisition of fresh detailed knowledge about the external world is something good and desirable for its own sake. The plain man assumes equally implicitly that knowledge is in itself a nuisance, and only to be tolerated if it leads to something else he considers good and desirable—wealth, let us say, or happiness, or relief from pain.

Before starting to discuss what is the good of knowledge, it is necessary, according to the rules of the game, to define the terms used. This I can hardly attempt to do. The good I must leave undefined; but for that I have precedents. As to knowledge, it is too soon to try to define it. It is less than three thousand years since the question was first discussed, and it is absurd to expect a solution yet. Nevertheless, a few remarks may not be out of place.

When Socrates asked Theætetus, "What is knowledge?" Theætetus replied to the effect that the sort of things Theodorus, the mathematician, taught him were knowledge, and that, of course, there was also the kind of knowledge that carpenters and seamen and farmers had. For saying this Socrates reproved him. Now, let us brave the anger of Socrates and say that Theætetus was quite right. He was not, indeed, defining knowledge in the sense in which Socrates wanted it defined, but was illustrating in a very sensible way the sort of things that were meant to be indicated by the use of the term "knowledge." Therefore, if anybody asked what I meant by knowledge, I should say that mathematics, and physics, and chemistry, and the other sciences, and their applications to the various arts and industries, were all branches of knowledge, and that in addition there were history, and law, and the knowledge of languages, and other humane studies; and to complete the list I should add philosophy. When I speak of knowledge, then, it will be understood that I intend to denote the process or state of knowing any or all of these kinds of knowledge. It is implied, of course, that there is always somebody who knows the knowledge, or it is not knowledge at all, but a mere possibility of knowledge. Men sometimes speak as though books by themselves, even if there is nobody reading them, constitute knowledge.

This is quite legitimate in so far as what is recorded in books is easily accessible to anybody of the requisite training; and there are plenty of people of the requisite training. Thus I say that the date of the birth of Shakespeare and the Specific Heat of Mercury are both known, or are parts of the knowledge possessed by mankind, though possibly at the moment I write this, or somebody reads it, there is no man on earth who can answer correctly the question, "When was Shakespeare born?" or, "What is the Specific Heat of Mercury?" This is simply because almost any civilised man can easily ascertain the answer by consulting the correct books. If there were a plague such that none but Hottentots were left alive, it would not be correct to say that these things were known, although the books remained; but it would be correct as soon as a learned Hottentot deciphered the requisite books. All this is introduced simply in order to insist on the fact that knowledge is something in (as we may say) some man's mind, and that any one of a very large class of things is knowledge.

The admirable Theætetus, it will be remembered, suggested also another definition of knowledge which, though fallacious, as it turned out, was a definition of the kind Socrates was asking for. This definition was that knowledge is right opinion or belief. In spite of all objections to it, the definition is a very valuable one. For one thing, it makes the point I have been urging quite clear. We have knowledge about a thing when we have some definite and explicit belief about it, and our belief turns out to be right. It is very important to remember that when a belief is right or true all that that means is that it has never been found to be wrong. There is no mysterious "*je ne sais quoi*" about a true belief, in addition to the pedestrian fact that it has never led anybody astray.

It will be observed that comparatively few of our beliefs have the character of knowledge. Many of them are merely wrong; others are so ill defined that we cannot tell what their implications are, and so cannot tell if they are right or wrong. Besides, there must be many things about which nobody has any experience at all, and consequently no belief, but which yet might be objects of knowledge. At this point it may be worth while just mentioning a distinction between two kinds of knowledge which has been pointed out by a more recent philosopher than Plato. That is the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The terms, unlike most philosophical terms,

explain themselves. What we are acquainted with we know unequivocally, and with a sort of intimacy and warmth that is lacking in the things known to us by description only. On the other hand, such knowledge is to all intents and purposes incommunicable. It is the chief virtue of descriptive knowledge that it is communicable, and it forms, in fact, the common medium of exchange of thought. Knowledge by description is knowledge not of concrete individuals but of classes and relations, of universals, in short. This sort must be based somewhere and somehow on knowledge by acquaintance, or it is likely to be fallacious. But the acquaintance knowledge is kept in the background. It is like the gold reserve on which a paper currency is based. Only the notes are seen and change hands, but it is the gold that gives them their value. So we communicate by means of description, but it is our common stock of acquaintance that gives value to the communication. A point that need hardly be insisted on is that the means of communication of knowledge are symbols. The symbols may stand either for universals ordinarily recognised as such, classes and relations, or for individuals, in which case the symbol is called a proper name. If we consider some individual and his name—Jones, let us say—we may either know him by acquaintance or by description; we may either know him or only know about him. In the first case we have had certain actual experiences, certain events have occurred, and what it is that has been experienced or the events that have occurred we label “Jones.” Jones, for us, is the complex made up of the experiences of him. But if we only know about him, as, that he lives at Tooting, that he has red hair, that he is “something in the City,” that his golf handicap is 12, and so on, though we have acquired this knowledge by experience of a sort, it is not experience of Jones; it is purely symbolic experience which is relevant by convention only. There are no objects of experience or events we can label Jones, but merely a sort of blank which we believe has certain relations. Jones is therefore not a complex of events but a complex of universals, which is a very different thing. He is not strictly a concrete individual at all; he is a figment of thought, though possibly an important and useful one. All this is something of a digression, but is necessary, I think, in order to make clear what sort of a thing knowledge is. All our knowledge as embodied in the sciences is of this abstract sort; it is knowledge about things and not direct knowledge of them; and the things which it is about are in just the position of

Jones when we are not acquainted with him. Nobody has made the acquaintance of an atom or an electron, though these are the most important objects of physical knowledge; but nobody wants to make their acquaintance; they are not interesting from that point of view. Of course we must have some relevant knowledge by direct experience somewhere on which to base our knowledge by description, but this will be for fiduciary purposes only, and provided it fulfils this function it does not matter how it comes or of what sort it is. To revert to the simile already used, it may be necessary sometimes to produce some gold as a guarantee of good faith; but it need not be exchanged, and it does not really matter where it is as long as it is known it can be produced if required. I have stressed this point in order to show that the actual experience on which knowledge is based tends to become small and remote and uninteresting as knowledge increases, and, though always there, it plays a less and less conspicuous part.

In the time of Wordsworth it was thought that the advance of science, by enlarging the experience and elevating the mind of man, would result in the most magnificent poetry and literature. But it has not. On the contrary, the progress of science is in a subtle way inimical to poetry or art of any sort. Nobody can get up any poetic fervour about reading off a length on a scale, which is what experience is reduced to at the hands of science. As for writing a poem about the differential calculus or the theory of gravitation, it simply can't be done. To return to our proper subject. I have said already that we only know our beliefs are right by failing to find them wrong; therefore, as long as we take a soft and lenient view of our beliefs, so long we are liable to error. It is only the most rigorous and systematic scepticism that can keep our beliefs in proper trim, and prune away accretions of falsehood. The necessity for avoiding error due to false belief is by itself a complete justification of the sceptical habit of mind—Philosopher's Itch. As this is a habit repugnant to the majority of mankind, it is well to be clear what its justification is, and that the whole history of philosophy and science stands in defence of it.

I will take it that, on the negative or critical side, any sort of intellectual adventure is to be encouraged as tending to the elimination of error, for everybody will agree that error is an evil, and that anything tending to avoid error is so far good,

There are now two possibilities to consider: first, that, though knowledge is not positively good in itself, ignorance

or absence of knowledge as leading to error is evil, as just mentioned ; second, that knowledge is good, and that *therefore* ignorance is evil. In the one case ignorance is evil because knowledge is good ; in the other, in spite of knowledge not being good.

Now, we say that error is to be avoided, and hence ignorance, which leads to error. But what sort of errors are evil ? Clearly, unless knowledge is good, purely intellectual errors that have no practical consequences, if there be any such, would not be evil. That is to say, only errors that interfere with the attainment of whatever goods are attainable in life are evil. There would be no harm in believing that two and two make five, but that it leads to unpleasantness in practical affairs. The plain man undoubtedly takes the view that ignorance is as good as knowledge if it does not get us into difficulties, and is very much less trouble. We need not quarrel with the plain man on this point as yet, but must at any rate insist that he usually underestimates the amount of apparently quite useless knowledge which has to be acquired in order to avoid the most elementary blunders, and what very radical criticism of alleged knowledge is needed. The plain man is after all, by definition, one who has his thinking done for him ; that is his plainness ; and he relies on others for avoiding the consequences of his mistakes. It is notorious that everybody thinks any kind of work he has never tried ridiculously easy. Therefore it is no wonder the plain man should have erroneous ideas about knowledge.

It might perhaps be thought that, because it is admitted that ignorance leads to error and error to unhappiness, therefore knowledge leads to happiness ; but this is a fallacy. It is true that, where ignorance leads to unhappiness, knowledge on that particular point will tend to remove the cause of the unhappiness ; but that will not in itself constitute happiness. Moreover, the process of acquiring the knowledge may cause more unhappiness than it alleviates. The Persian poet says :

" Sober, I sit with strangers ; overcome
With wine, I lie within my love's embrace."

If he means his second proposition to be implied by his first, he is guilty of a similar fallacy. It is an illusion that if you are miserable when you are sober you are therefore happy when you are drunk ; you may simply be miserable in a different way. This illusion, it must be confessed, is not confined to Persian poets.

Let us avoid this kind of fallacy, but admit that it may be

the case that knowledge is good in itself and is a cause of happiness directly, and not simply as implying freedom from error. But it still remains to examine the evidence for this theory,

We find many philosophers extolling knowledge as one of the greatest of all goods, and the source of infinite and endless felicity. Plato and Aristotle, and in later times Spinoza, have said this: not to mention any others. We are told that those who aspire to the attainment of the greatest good must first of all learn science and mathematics, and, above all things, philosophy. But all specialised studies are but propædæutic to the one final act of intellectual contemplation, a prelude to the hymn of dialectic. So says Plato, that great enchanter; and Aristotle has said much the same thing too. Spinoza, whose words seem to echo ancestral voices of prophecy, says that the generality of men set their hearts upon things unworthy, and of their nature ephemeral and unsatisfying, on the pursuit of wealth and honour and the lusts of the flesh; and he shows that from this cause come the bondage and the misery of mankind. The solution of the whole matter lies in the pursuit of knowledge, and the consequent turning of the attention and the affection of those who possess it towards what is infinite and eternal.

Ordinary knowledge as we know it, knowledge of men and things and the whole of nature, is largely a matter of making many books, of which there is no end, and of much study, that is a weariness of the flesh. It is not this that is desired for its own sake, but something that arises out of it. So far the philosophers are in agreement with the plain man. But the plain man considers knowledge as a means merely to those ends condemned by Spinoza—wealth and honour and animal gratifications. For the philosophers it is a means to quite other ends. The activity of the mind in learning is a preparation for a further activity transcending all others, but conceived as essentially of the same kind, as an intellection. But chiefly, they say, learning is the key of the Gate of Paradise. This is nothing but Mysticism.

At this point, a word about what I mean by Mysticism. To the plain man (confound him!) Mysticism is even more repulsive than knowledge. In his mind it shares the bad odour rightly attributed to "Occultism," or "Spiritism," or "Spiritualism," or "Theosophy," or "Gnosticism," if he has heard of it, or any other of the thousand superstitions and quackeries that at all times have deluded men. But by Mysticism I mean no pseudology about the "other" world, no

bogus religion, and nothing with spooks in it. What the mystic claims, I think I may say without fear of contradiction, is a certain kind of experience that is not the experience of the five senses. He can set about acquiring this experience in various ways, and he can say how he does so; but about the experience itself he can only speak in metaphors, or better still be silent. It is no more possible for a mystic to say what he has experienced than it is to tell a man born blind what colour is like. The mystic, in fact, has a certain sort of knowledge by acquaintance, that is incommunicable as such.

Everyone will be ready to admit Plato as a mystic: you can believe anything of Plato. But Aristotle, the most bourgeois of philosophers, and Spinoza, the Rationalist, are they also among the mystics? Honestly, I think they are; but I may have misunderstood them. I will leave you Aristotle and Spinoza; Plato is enough for the sake of the argument. The point is simply this, that Plato, who more than most philosophers urged the necessity of cultivating knowledge, did not urge it as good in itself, but as a means to some further good. The ultimate good he speaks of under the aspect of knowledge, but it is something very far removed from what is ordinarily meant by knowledge, and unless it be conceived as some form of mystical experience I cannot think how it is to be conceived. It is possible to smile nowadays at Plato's zeal for the study of mathematics as a preparation for the contemplation of the absolute good. We think we know too much about mathematicians to cherish any illusions as to the mystical value of their studies. Most Occidental thinkers too, not the plain man only, have very little use for mysticism in any form.

Let us, therefore, ask another question: why do those men who as a matter of fact pursue learning in a disinterested way, pursue it? Why do philosophers and mathematicians and men of science and learning shun delights and live laborious days? Is it because they wish to save mankind from that sort of unhappiness that comes from ignorance about the external world? This might account for an enthusiasm for what is called applied science, but not for the study of mathematics and philosophy, or the humane studies, unless these subjects are to be conceived as purely critical and negative in their scope. Are these men merely ambitious of the applause of their fellows for knowing more about something, no matter what, than anyone else? Is it that the pursuit of knowledge brings them a livelihood less disagreeably than any other kind of work? Or is it that they are moved by some impulse they

do not trouble to analyse, something that may be called an instinct?

The last seems to be the most probable suggestion. If one considers men one actually knows, it is likely to appear that they pursue knowledge from a variety of motives; but the best of them do their work in obedience to what seems to be an instinct. They do it because they cannot help themselves. When they speak of their work it appears to be just a fascinating game. To them the character of nature, or the laws of mathematics, or whatever it is, seem irresistibly comic, endlessly entertaining, or marvellously lovely: time cannot wither nor custom stale their infinite variety. It is not reason that urges them, but passion. They do not usually stop to consider why they have this desire or what they are aiming at, any more than a lover considers why he loves his mistress. It is all too obvious to invite inquiry.

But others may be permitted to make the inquiry for them, and if they do they cannot rest content with saying merely that the desire for knowledge is an instinct. We have so far mentioned two alternatives: that knowledge is desirable as a means of avoiding error in the affairs of daily life, an explanation that seems inadequate; or that knowledge is desirable as a preparation for what I have called mystical experience. Can the latter alternative be the right one, since many who pursue knowledge are innocent of any avowed mystical tendency, and would even reject the idea with scorn? But their innocence does not prove that the explanation is wrong. It is quite possible that those men whose pursuit of knowledge is instinctive, but unstained by worldly motives, are unconscious and unawakened mystics.

There is still another possibility open. Knowledge may, in spite of appearances, be good in itself. Now, it is notorious that most of the things we call good are not good in themselves, but only good as means. They are not good simply, but are good for something. Thus we say, or some of us do, that beer is good. If we apply Moore's test¹ to this proposition—that is to say, if we consider what a universe consisting exclusively of beer would be like—we perceive at once that beer is not good in itself, but only as a means. Beer, in fact, is good for drinking. If we analyse its goodness further we have to say that it is good to drink because it quenches thirst, or because it has a pleasant flavour, or because of its pleasant after-effects, or something of that sort. What it all boils down to in the end is, that what is good in itself is some

¹ G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, §§ 55, 57, 112.

state or activity of human consciousness, and beer, if it be good, is good as a means to that end.

I will state this proposition as cautiously as possible, for it is necessary to be clear about it. The ultimate or complete good, whatever it may be, and so far as we can conceive it, must at least contain as an important ingredient some kind of activity of some human minds. I state it this way so as to leave open the possibility of a good in which consciousness is not an ingredient, while suggesting that such a good would be negligible compared with any of which a human consciousness was an ingredient. Further, it must be left ambiguous whether all human minds whatever, or only some, partake of it. And lastly, the possibility of mental activities other than human being concerned must not be prejudged. For instance, the good may be considered as primarily a state of activity of the mind of God, but it will be only good for us if we partake in it. Nevertheless, our consciousness may not make up the whole of it.

Many writers on ethics have not troubled to decide what they mean by the good, but those who have, whatever their views, will almost certainly be found to agree with this statement. For instance, the Hedonists simply pick out pleasure as being the one state or activity of mind which is good in itself. In fact, the chief defect of Hedonism, apart from gratuitous blunders of Hedonists, is that if it is possible it is tautologous. That is to say, the Hedonist announces that the good is pleasure; but if we ask what pleasure is, in order not to restrict the meaning of the term unduly, he will have to say that pleasure is that state of mind which is desirable, *i.e.* good, in itself. All we have got is that the good is a desirable state of consciousness, for which the name pleasure has been made, not very felicitously, to stand. When Kant, at the other extreme, said that the only unconditional good was the good Will, he was stressing unduly an aspect of the good consciousness that the Hedonist unduly neglects. The Hedonist's account of the good has too passive an appearance, even when it is free from nauseating suggestions of a Mahomet's paradise. Kant, with his "Duty for duty's sake," cannot be accused of grossness; but the pure activity which is all he allows us is about as satisfying as a theorem in pure mathematics. But at any rate it remains clear that as far as concerns men the good is a state or activity of human minds.

Knowledge, then, might be good in itself in either of two ways. First, it might be good because the activity of knowing was in itself good. Secondly, it might be good because the

object known was good in itself. Let us take the first alternative first. One criticism that suggests itself is this. All knowledge that has yet been heard of, whether concrete or abstract, scientific, philosophical, or humane, is avowedly imperfect and incomplete. The more a man knows about a thing, the more acutely is he aware of the vast extent of his ignorance. However careful a man is, he always makes some mistakes somewhere. Moreover, all knowledge is specialised. By studying one thing a man condemns himself to ignorance of another. Can anything so fallible, so partial, and so mutilated be permanently and unequivocally good? Perfect knowledge might be good, but it is a good that is unattainable.

This is not, perhaps, quite so grave a defect as appears at first sight. After all, anything really worth having is strictly unattainable in a finite time and with finite means. To quench one's thirst is good and pleasant in itself, apart from its relative goodness as a means of life. But the fact that we shall be thirsty again does not prevent our enjoying drinking either at the moment, or in anticipation or in retrospect. It is not reasonable to suppose that the enjoyment of knowing is destroyed by the fact that we cannot know everything, and that there are few moments when we have the enjoyment, and many when we have only the painful effort of trying to find out: at any rate, knowledge is never said to bring satiety, and that is one point in its favour. Still, all this that has been said against knowledge is a defect; and our confidence in it as something good in itself would be increased if it were a source of permanent and certain satisfaction, instead of uncertain and intermittent joy.

Lastly, let us apply Moore's test. Would a condition of consciousness which consisted in nothing but just knowing things, no matter what, be desirable? I am inclined to say, it would not. But I lay myself open to a damaging retort. Somebody will say, "You have never experienced what it is really to know anything, and are not qualified to judge." We are sailing rather too close to the wind here: let us go about on the other tack.

The other alternative was that knowledge was good because it was knowledge of a good object. Now, in the case of knowledge by description the immediate objects of knowledge are neither good nor bad, but indifferent. Therefore, it is only knowledge by acquaintance that can be good in this sense. Bearing in mind what has been said about the nature of the things that are good in themselves, it will be seen that we have got back perilously near to mysticism again. We cannot get

out of it, I think, by saying that knowledge of objects that are not good in themselves, but good as means, is after all good ; because we cannot know that they are means to anything good unless we are first acquainted with the end to which they are the means.

Now for one last attempt to get away from mysticism. It may be urged that, though knowledge is not good strictly in itself or by itself, yet it is an essential ingredient in any perfect good. A state of mind which involves false belief or no belief is not so good, or does not contribute so much good, as one in other respects the same, but having true belief. If I am right in supposing that true belief is nothing but belief which does not as a matter of fact lead us into error, then it is absurd to speak of a mind having false or no belief being in other respects the same as a mind with true belief. If they are really the same in all other respects, then they are the same, and the distinction between them is meaningless. While, therefore, we may allow that the addition of knowledge to any state will make it better, we cannot allow that that can be the only change ; consequently this view amounts to very nearly the same thing as the view that knowledge is good as a means, and does not help us very much.

At this point the plain man, who must have been getting restless all this time, will burst in with one of his bright thoughts and say, "Isn't it possible for knowledge to be good both as a means and as an end?" We shall agree with him, but point out that it does not affect the argument. I expect you are tired of the fellow, him and his plainness ; let us see if we cannot find out what his theories really are, and then abolish him. Assuming that knowledge is a means to the goods of life, we shall ask him, what are these goods? Then a little discourse in the Socratic style is pretty sure to reduce him to saying something fatuous. He is certain to be a worshipper of the Golden Calf, or the Fatted Calf, or some sort of calf ; and there we shall have him.

But he has raised an interesting question. Knowledge is at any rate part of life, or a means of life. What then is the good of life? This question is too large a one to discuss at the tail end of an essay, but the chance that it offers of a final score off the plain man is too good to resist. We shall give him one of three alternatives: either the life of the individual is of no value, or it is of value for the sake of humanity, or it is of value for the sake of something outside human life—for the sake of God, we will say. Of course, he will jump at "humanity"; it is a blessed word. And he

will probably fight shy of the third alternative, so that we shall not require to ask him whether he conceives God under the aspect of a person, or as the Absolute. The other alternative, that life has no value, he will not consider for a moment.

Now, we shall say to him, the lives of all mankind, as far as we can tell, are perfectly finite. They are the lives of a finite though large number of individuals enduring for a finite time, and occupying a finite place. There is nothing infinite about mankind except the capacity to endure evil. We know as a matter of history and of present experience that the lives of most men are wretched and unsatisfying. As Hobbes said of men in a "state of nature," we may say of men in their present state, that their lives are "nasty, brutish, and short." It is hard to say whether the lives of those who have the pleasantest environment and the best material means and opportunities are any less brutish or nasty than the lives of those who have the unpleasantest environment, the scantiest means of existence, and the fewest opportunities. Some have believed that all this misery is a passing phase, and that all will be put right in course of time. But it is hard to see what are the grounds of this faith. Nobody is now deluded by clap-trap about Progress, that progresses nowhere, and Evolution, that evolves into we know not what. All we know of the promise of the passage of time is that every one of us will sleep the predestined sleep, and that perhaps his troubles will then be over. But all our achievement and all our hope will be over too; Death will have "covered it all over with those two narrow words, 'Hic jacet.'"

If our lives and our hopes and fears are bounded by this earth and this life, it is an ironic consolation to be told that, though we are miserable now, our descendants hereafter will be happy. It is reasonable for one bounded by space and time to demand his good here and now. Would Ulysses have spared Circe if she had said she was very sorry she could do nothing for his companions at present, but had hopes that in the course of ages the descendants of these swine would become men? It is conceivable that for beasts who live from moment to moment, and for men who live like them, this life is happy; but for those who look before and after, it is without firm hope. We can conceive of no means of mitigation of our lot in our time, or in any time, that is not ludicrously inadequate, so that there is only one conclusion:

"O brothers of sad lives! they are so brief;
A few short years must bring us all relief;

Can we not bear these years of labouring breath?
But if you would not this poor life fulfil,
Lo, you are free to end it when you will,
Without the fear of waking after death."

This ought to settle the plain man; but let us go on to consider the matter seriously without his interference. However much these last counsels of despair and this defiance of ineluctable fate may impress us for the moment, it never holds our imaginations for long. "Cheerfulness keeps breaking in." The note of despair and defiance rings false when we listen carefully; it is hysterical and not sane. The City of Dreadful Night is a City of Nightmare, and we are not its citizens in our waking hours. Why is this? If we honestly face the facts of this "wearisome condition of humanity," we have to confess that so long as we keep within purely material and earthly bounds there is no logical escape from complete pessimism; and yet pessimism never really grips hold of any sane man's imagination; it never really convinces him. In spite of all appearances to the contrary, every man believes there is hope for humanity, somehow. There comes from somewhere a light to lighten our darkness. We may use the formulæ of religion and the name of God to speak about it; we may wrap it up in the obscurities of a metaphysical creed; or we may be as silent as the Pythagoreans: but it is there, whether we look for it or not. There is no escape from the mystical solution of the question, whether we ask the question about life in general, or about knowledge as part of life or as a means of life.

If there is no avenue of experience besides the five senses of our bodies, then all is vanity, and the knowledge based on those five senses is the vanity of vanities. But nobody is convinced that it is vanity, hardly even our plain man when he is not acting in his official capacity.

A. D. RITCHIE.

MANCHESTER.

A PEOPLE OF DREAMS.

ROBERT KEABLE.

THAT dreams should play a great part in the life of a Bantu people is not surprising, but to those who know them, it may well remain a matter of no little interest that the subconscious state should occupy so much of the attention of the Basuto. For the Basuto, but one branch of the Bantu stock, are nevertheless one of the most civilised branches. Missions have been at work among them for three-quarters of a century ; a school is a feature of nearly every large village, at least in the more accessible parts of the country ; and even up remote valleys all but untrodden of white men, the native is clothed and far advanced from a state of precarious savagery. The Basuto edit their own newspapers, quite largely send their sons to college, and have already produced qualified medical men, lawyers, and a novelist. Moreover, the war enlarged their vision. The other day the first aeroplane passed over Mont-aux-Sources, and a headman in an out-of-the-way village was aroused from his afternoon siesta by his excited and terrified wives, who could give no clear statement as to this new terror. But Mpanzi took but one look at the heavens. "You fools," he said, "have you not heard of aeroplanes before? I saw them every day in France. Disturb me no more till the cows come home." And he went back to sleep!

It is the more interesting, then, that civilisation has done little or nothing to shake their faith in dreams, and that, despite doctors and hospitals, they still for the greater part say and believe of a man unconscious that he is dead. The Resurrection is no stumbling-block to the intellectual Basuto. My own district in my own time produced a prophet who died and rose again from the dead, and who drew excited crowds after him. He visited me, dressed far better than I

in European clothes, and accompanied by two natives, introduced respectively to me as his chaplain and his secretary. Moreover, he was very far from being a charlatan out to establish a sect or to make money. Those converted by his teaching he sent to the nearest missionary, of whatever denomination he might be, with a small slip of paper certifying that so and so wished to become a Christian. I had probably two hundred such in all, who went regularly through their three-year course of instruction, and of whom the greater part were baptised.

This belief of theirs is indeed a most important factor in missionary work, and any would-be successful missionary must take it into consideration. Thus, in my own case, I ran my head at first against this brick wall. I had come from East Africa, where Christianity is opposed by resolute systems—Islam, and a definite organised heathenism with classified devils and exorcisms committed to writing. In Basutoland no other system opposes the Christian Faith. I have never met a heathen who did not admit that Christianity was the only true religion. On all big occasions the heathen will come to church. Unbaptised chiefs, almost without exception, are eager to have a church and school in their village. Personally, then, I could see no reason, other than that a man might prefer to be drunken unreprieved and have many wives, why the heathen should not convert in far greater numbers than they did.

But there was a reason, and I discovered it when I approached individually certain persons whose cases seemed to be the most bewildering. To take an example: there was an old man, the husband of but one wife, and she a Christian, no excessive drinker, and a most decent and delightful personage. He was, moreover, the brother of one of our earliest and most faithful Christians. He sent me gifts whenever I visited his village, and was frequent at such services as our discipline allowed him to attend. But he remained a heathen. Not until he knew me well would he give me a reason for his obstinacy: but then it came out. He had had no "call." It was useless for me to urge that God had done His part in the scheme of salvation; that my own presence and preaching constituted a "call"; and that nothing remained for him but to accept. He awaited a supernatural occurrence; at times, more definitely, he would say he had had no "dream." And he died, dreamless and unbaptised.

Incidentally, and to conclude this portion of our subject, it is worth saying that I attribute a great deal of the success

that unquestionably attended the work of the mission in my own district to the attitude which I readily adopted towards this matter. I find no personal difficulty whatever in the supernatural. The drift of pinions, would we hearken, beats at our own close-shuttered doors. What I know of science seems to me but to open unexpected windows through which one views increasingly fresh vistas of mystery. The more I have had experience of the world's remoter places, the more sympathetic do I become. I read of theophanies on every page of the Bible; I should have to disbelieve all human evidence if I did not see them in every century of the Church's life; and I have found my world encompassed with that which has no other explanation. The modern attitude seems to be that science will explain all one day. Maybe. It will assuredly open other windows than we wot of to-day. But if I am there to see, I expect increasingly to look through with interest deepened and with faith confirmed.

As a result of this, I did not laugh at my people's dreams. It is true I told my prophet that were an angel from heaven, let alone a man risen from the dead, to preach any other doctrine than that of Jesus Christ, I should not believe, and equally I urged upon my hearers that God had already called them by His Son; but I read to them the Scriptures, and I spoke to them of saints, and they knew that if they told me they had seen an angel in the way, I should at least be reverent. So indeed did angels throng about us. So did we see in the night visions. I relate them almost without comment. A normal explanation may cover them all. For myself, I can only repeat that there is little of the normal that seems to me on that account any the less of God.

In the first place, the native dreams frequently of the dead. So far as I know them, the Basuto, in common with most South African natives, have no definite theology at all as to departed spirits. Tribes and individuals exhibit occasionally more or less complete beliefs, and these often find their way into books of comparative religion, but taken as a whole the hereafter is as shadowy to a native as it is to the modern European. He certainly believes in a soul, but he has not defined its measure of immortality or of personality, or come to any conclusion as to its residence hereafter or manner of life. A few suggestions, however, emerge from the dreams that have come to my knowledge. Thus I have not known a native to dream of one long dead. I have not known him to visit any place of the dead (as distinct from visits to heaven, which are common enough, and will be spoken of in

their place), but it is the dead who visit him. And, lastly, I have not known the natives to be commonly fearful of dead bodies or of burial-places, or to associate these in any particular way with their dreams. (I hope it will be most definitely noted that I am writing only of my own experiences, and of my experiences among the fairly civilised Basuto. I say nothing in prejudice of other and better observers, or of other tribes.)

The kind of dream that I came much across is well illustrated by the following story. Up among the mountains, behind one of my remoter stations, is a steep valley; and up this valley, at the end of everything, is a village. I had never been there, and am still not aware that anyone from there had ever been to see me. Late one afternoon, then, a man came from this village to call me to a "sick" woman of whom, as we went, he related these facts. A month previously (or thereabouts) the woman's heathen husband died. A week later (or thereabouts) she awoke one night screaming, and had said that as she lay asleep she had felt a hand on her shoulder. Awakening—such was her language, but of course she spoke of her dream—she saw her dead husband, in his ordinary clothes and so "real" that she forgot for the moment that he was dead. She gave a cry of joy, and demanded where he had been to return to the hut so late. On that he had said: "Send at once for the priest at — and be washed from your sins." "But why do you come now to tell me that?" she asked. "Lest you die as I have done, unwashed," he replied awefully. And at that she remembered his death, was convulsed with terror, and found herself awake.

Her folk had temporised with her, and had not sent for me, none of them being Christian there; but ten days or so later she had dreamed again. This time her husband was angry, had said nothing, had not indeed needed to say anything, for she had known instinctively his anger and the reason for it. From that time she had eaten next to nothing, and had been in a kind of fit all day long, merely reiterating that I must be sent for. But the night before she had dreamed that a white priest came in, in a white vestment, and, laying hands on her, had healed her.

The sequel is soon told. I heard her moaning, like that of an animal in pain, some distance from the hut, and she took no notice of my entrance. When I could see no sign of ordinary sickness, I knelt and prayed, and in my prayer commanded her to be at peace, and laid my hand on her. Her moanings died down at once. They concluded soon after

I had finished the prayer. She sat awhile not speaking, but then arose and gave me food. From that day she entered on her instruction, and was baptised last year; and she has brought with her a dozen or more from that village.

In another case, a teacher of an out-station died during the influenza and at a long distance from home. His village learned of his death. Some days later his wife awoke in the night, called her son, and sent him to the door to listen for horse-hoofs. He could hear none. "Then," said she, "it will be to-morrow. The father will arrive. My husband has just told me to listen for horse-hoofs, for the priest is coming. And that I must not worry, but trust him, and he will do all that is right." Now I had been intending to visit the village that day, but I had decided later to go the day after. No one there could possibly have known either intention. Likewise the day following I was much delayed both in starting and on the road. I galloped up to the house late, expecting all would be in bed, and I was much surprised to find the boy awaiting me in my hut. "Mother told me to wait for the father," he said. While I was there, the chief came to see me. After preliminaries, he said: "The father knows that for two years I have 'listened' to his voice, but I have not been converted. Also for two years I have watched (naming the teacher), and now last night he came to me and said I should not delay. Now, therefore, will my father write my name in his book?"

And lastly, amusingly and interestingly, I myself dreamed. With extraordinary vividness I thought I woke and saw this teacher, of whom I had been very fond, in my hut. I, also, did not realise at once that he was dead, and asked him what he wanted. "Come outside," he said. He took me out, under bright stars, and made a gesture to the wide semicircle of mountains. "You have to preach up and down all these," he said. "Why, yes, of course I shall, if I have time," I said; "but why do you wake me now to say so?" So saying I looked at him, and knew him dead. Also it seemed to me that he was dirty as with earth. And as I recoiled with the horror of the realisation, he said sadly, and with an expression curiously unlike a nightmare: "Yes, I am still dirty. Pray for me."

I give all these three dreams because here is a mass of matter for the theorists. We are all absorbed in the affairs and matter of the dead teacher. I coloured my dream with my beliefs, and the chief his with his already half-formed intentions. I may have been in mental telephony with the

wife. One and all, we were over-superstitious. Doubtless it was so; I am well content to believe it. God fulfils Himself in many ways.

Dreams that do not involve dead friends are even more common in my experience. There is hardly a native who has not had several. The instances that have come my way are nearly all connected with religion, as is natural, and they well illustrate the native psychology. Few of them contain elements that cannot be explained, but none of them are without interest.

The first dream of this nature that I shall tell has indeed a peculiar conclusion. The heathen wife of a Christian husband, who had steadily resisted baptism, dreamed for four nights running as follows: (1) that she was lost on the veld, in terror, and running over rough ground on which she finally stumbled and woke; (2) that she was again on the veld, but running towards a light in the sky ere she fell and woke; (3) that she was again running, but that the light was clearer and in the shape of a cross; (4) that she reached a deep kloof and saw on the other side, beneath a luminous cross, the figure of a woman clothed in white, holding up and out a child. The kloof was full of worshipping people on their knees, through whom she could not make her way, and in the course of a frenzied attempt she awoke. The moment I entered the hut the next morning, an arresting thing took place. She literally threw herself out of bed and upon her knees, but at my side rather than before me, her hands clasped as if holding the feet of someone next but needless to say unseen by me. She exclaimed again and again: "*Ahe, Mofumahali!*" ("Oh, Queen! Oh, Queen!"), and, when lifted up by her husband, said repeatedly: "The woman has come in with the priest!" She was apparently very ill, with a temperature of 105°, and I baptised her at once. She has made a resolute convert. When under instruction and normal, she was entirely ignorant of the Incarnation, for I examined her particularly to that end. She said, also, that she had never been inside a Roman Catholic Church, and we had no such figure at that time in our own. Nor could I discover that she had ever seen any such picture. It would not have struck her that these points were of any interest, so that I doubt much if she would consciously have lied; but of course she may have heard of such things, even although she had normally forgotten them.

A complicated story concerns another man and another catechist of mine. The catechist was summoned to a distant village by a man who had been ill, had "died," and had

returned to life. The man said that having died, he found himself on an unknown road which he traversed for some time. Presently the road divided, and he hesitated which branch to take. While he hesitated a native came up to him, took him by the arm, and led him along one branch. As he went, our friend became increasingly struck with his guide's villainous countenance, and finally demanded whither they went. "Never you mind," sinisterly replied the guide; "come on." At that the "dead" man became terrified, and cried for help, and on his crying, a third person came running across the lands. He was observed to have a cross marked on his brow, and at the sight of him the guide fled. The newcomer was much out of breath, explained that that road was the road to hell, and besought our friend to turn back and send for a teacher. He did so, reached the place in which he had first found himself, returned to life, and sent for the catechist.

Now the catechist was in a bit of a quandary. He had instructions not to baptise except *in extremis*, and he did not himself think that the man was very sick. So he signed him a catechumen, which service involves making a cross on the brow, and returned. The man promptly lay down contentedly enough, and that night "died" again. His friends went so far as to make his coffin and dig his grave, and they sent for the catechist to bury him. Imagine, then, my teacher's astonishment to find on his return that the fellow had again come to life, and was withal most reproachful! His own story now was that he had again reached the cross-roads, and jubilantly taken the other turning. But in a while he met the third man, who looked at him, shook his head, and observed that he had no business there. "Why?" demanded the other; "I went back and I was signed." "There is no cross on your brow," said the man, "and unless you bear a cross you cannot come this way. Come and see."

So he led him to a clear stream and they looked in. Sure enough, our friend's forehead was unmarked. Very angry and much hurt, he demanded an explanation, and was told that only the cross of baptism endured permanently, and that he had only had the outward sign of a catechumen signed upon him. At that, without a word, although the other stood and shouted at him, he ran back, returned to life, and now, reproachful at what he considered was a trick that had been played upon him, demanded baptism. My catechist thereupon gave it up and baptised him, and in less than an hour he was again "dead." Still much perplexed, the catechist gave him twenty-four hours for a reappearance, and then buried

him; and buried he is to this day. In all the story, for which I can definitely vouch, as I examined all the witnesses (and the grave), that is about all that will not admit of two explanations.

The point of interest really lies in this, that in his sub-conscious state the man certainly had access to information not known to his normal state. He honestly did not know enough of Christianity to distinguish between baptism and the signing of a catechumen, which is not wonderful, for the catechumens all consider themselves Christians, and I have known even catechists so poorly taught that they did not consider the baptism of a catechumen *in extremis* at all a vital matter. A natural explanation must presume, I suppose, that the man had somewhere, at some previous time, heard the matter fully explained; that while unconscious his subliminal self was troubled about it, and troubled twice; and that this subliminal uneasiness delayed his fleeing spirit. But my catechist does not know of the subliminal. He was chiefly worried over the identity of the other men in the story, and at what had been shouted at the dead man and not by him reported.

The experience of the prophet I have mentioned presents many points of interest. He was undoubtedly a heathen, of no education whatever, and of some thirty years of age, when all that I shall tell befell him. He lived in a village far removed from Europeans, and in a little-civilised district. He fell ill, and he "died." It was winter, and therefore probably he was "dead" for some three days, for he recovered only when the grave was dug, the coffin made, the food prepared, and the mourners gathered. He sat up suddenly while the old women were discoursing upon him; and thus, so to speak, enjoyed the experience of hearing his own obituary notices. He told the old folk entirely what he thought of them, where he had been and what he had seen, and they were his first converts.

It seemed to him that he had been dead many years, and the full recital of those years would take much time. He had, for example, come to a river and observed that it was both too full and too deep to cross. On the bank were gathered many souls, and now and again unearthly spirits crossed the river easily, selected one and another, and as easily led them over. Then the prophet (to anticipate) mingled with the crowd, and asked why it was that one and another were selected. Could he not cross? The people one and all glanced at his knees, and told him that not until they were

hard from kneeling did he stand any chance of crossing. And thus does the prophet to-day inculcate the duty of prayer.

Once across, after long learning of prayers, he came to God's throne, and was there ordered to return to earth and make up for lost time by preaching repentance. Like another Isaiah, he confessed that he could not speak; not so much, however, because his lips were unclean, but because he was unlearned; and therefore God ordered him to be taught to read. This, therefore, constituted one miraculous sign of his office, for having never learned he now could read. In the hut, on awakening, he immediately demanded a book; and there was none in the village. In a day or two one was procured from the Mission, and at once he opened it and began to read. Such is the universal testimony. Further, he now knew many prayers. Also he had a gift of interpretations. And I was assured by his chaplain that he had performed miracles of healing. The chief miracle that I saw was that he made no sect, as I have said. Called by chief after chief to his village, this unbaptised man converted numbers and drew no reward other than that he lived on hospitality. I thought I detected that his secretary would have liked a contribution, but I am not sure. Certainly the man himself struck me as being extremely simple and straightforward. The confusion of our sects bewildered him, and for that reason he was not willing to join any. The French Protestants did, however, ultimately baptise him; and to this he consented because they give him the readiest welcome. A Church of England minister or two had also invited him to preach in church. I think he was disappointed that I did not.

Here, then, was a conversion pretty nearly as complete and sudden as that of Saul the Pharisee; but I did not meet him until a year or more after it occurred, and upon only one point could I really lay hold. I tackled the reading "miracle," and the interesting thing was that undoubtedly he could not read much even then. So far as I could discover he could "read" anywhere in the Gospels, the commoner Epistles, and some of the psalms with ease and fluency. Given a place, he would glance at it and then begin. If you stopped him, however, he knew at what point in the print he had been arrested. In the Old Testament, with the exception of such passages as Genesis i. or Isaiah li., he went much more slowly. He stumbled hopelessly among the genealogies of Chronicles like a child beginning to read.

This is then, as likely as not, an amazing case of the subliminal memory. As a boy or as a young man, in village

after village, he may have been within earshot of the reading of the Scriptures ; for converts, who can do so, will sit on the ground and read aloud for hours, and the services of the French Protestant catechists consist largely of such readings. It must be supposed, then, that the whole of these had been stored by him subconsciously, and were now, by a strange circumstance, placed at his normal disposal. Since then he had learnt syllables and letters. But he still could not read. He said himself that he could only "read" the Bible.

A final illustration I will give, upon which I confess my inability to comment in the very least. I was on trek in the heart of the Drakensberg, and *by chance* called for twenty-four hours at a village which I had never visited before, and, as a matter of fact, have never visited since. Towards the afternoon of the day that I was there, a native rode into the village, on a dead-beat horse, inquiring for the white priest. On his being brought to me, he exclaimed : "Thou art the man, my father !" and forthwith asked me to go into a hut. Within, he told me that he was a Mosuto from the far south, naming a distant district that I knew although I did not know the village. He said he had dreamed that he was to seek out this village in which I was ; that in his dream he had seen the road, the village, and finally myself ; that he had been told that he had but six days in which to make the journey ; and that he was to give me this. Thereupon he placed in my hand a golden sovereign.

That is the end of it. He did not want to become a Christian, and could not see that he had been "called" to be converted. I had no good work particularly languishing for want of a sovereign, and I did not give him a Bible. No one in the place knew him, and he said he had not been there before. Certainly I had not been near his village, and I had not even come along any part of his road. Also, if he had been a day late, he would not have found me there ; and he made nothing out of his journey save only that he shared my evening meal. We went our several ways in the dawn. Maybe we shall meet again in the dusk and understand a little better. In the meantime I confess that this remains the most curious, the most unexplained, the most trivial, and the most bewildering incident that I have known even amongst a people of dreams.

ROBERT KEABLE.

WEST WRATTING, CAMBRIDGE.

WORDSWORTH'S INTERPRETATION OF NATURE.

THE REV. J. P. LILLEY, M.A., D.D.

THE views men take of Nature are inevitably determined by those they have been holding of God and man. If we regard God as simply the transcendent Creator and man merely as His chief representative on earth, our conception of Nature will prove materialistic and lifeless. If, on the contrary, we think of God as immanently active in the universe and man as His offspring, on the way to become in a yet fuller sense His son, and destined to do the work of his Father in heaven, then Nature acquires a new and spiritual interest for us. Man may be the microcosm and Nature the macrocosm ; but the superior rank and potency of man place him in the position of one who is not merely impelled but bound to interpret Nature aright and turn his knowledge to the best account for the enlightenment and progress of the race.¹

This great work may be said to be the chief task to which Wordsworth devoted his life. The whole spirit of the age in which he grew up to manhood was specially favourable to its accomplishment. It was an epoch of great thinkers, especially in Germany ; for men like Hegel, Fichte, and Schelling were then at work and were exercising their keen intellects on the relations of God and man, of Nature and history, with a freedom and power never seen before. All of these writers had a very lofty conception of what the mind of man is in itself and what it can accomplish in the pursuit of knowledge. Wordsworth had probably little direct acquaintance with their writings. Any knowledge of them he had would be derived mainly from Coleridge. But he shared in the spirit in which they studied, and, possessing himself a mind of great

¹ *Homo naturæ minister et interpres.*—Bacon.

penetrative force as well as philosophic breadth and constructive energy, he reached conclusions closely akin to theirs.

Happily, he surpassed them all in the gifts of imagination and poetic expression, and very faithfully did he develop these. In his early youth, even while still at school in Hawkshead, he felt himself to be "a dedicated spirit," "a sensitive being, a creative soul"; and afterwards he never ceased to pray, "more gaining than he asked," that the "prophetic Spirit" of God, who possesses "a metropolitan temple in the heart of mighty poets," would descend upon him also:

"Upon me bestow
A gift of genuine insight; that my song
With starlike virtue in its place may shine,
Shedding benignant influence, and secure
Itself from all malevolent effect
Of those mutations that extend their sway
Throughout the nether sphere."¹

A rich answer was vouchsafed, with the result that we have in his works a conception of Nature that began to exercise a very salutary influence on the men of his own generation, and continues to do so in growing measure up to these days in which we live.

In this paper, therefore, I shall try to bring out, first, what Wordsworth's interpretation of Nature really was; and then, by way of making the exposition, if possible, still clearer, to discuss the many objections that have been offered to it.

I.

The first element that came into play in forming Wordsworth's view was a deeper conception of the unity of the universe. This sprang from the new and more genial thought of God which some of the best minds of the day were beginning to entertain. So long as He was contemplated only as an Artificer, the various parts of the universe might still indeed bear the stamp of His wisdom and power and goodness, but any unity they had could be nothing more than mechanical. On the other hand, if the primary fact of the universe was life, and this life was regarded as flowing from the living God, then "the heavens and the earth and the sea and all that in them is" were knit together in a very much closer bond. They were all in vital communion with one another. The life that seemed to slumber in the stone and moved in the

¹ *Works* (Knight), vol. v. p. 25, ll. 87-93.

vegetable and was actuated by instinct in the animal and came into personal consciousness in man, was seen to pervade the whole sum of created things, and imparted to them a deeper significance and worth.

It is this great truth of the freedom of the universe to which Wordsworth gave such eloquent expression in the last book of the *Excursion* :

“To every Form of being is assigned . . .
 ‘An active Principle’ ; howe’er removed
 From sense and observation, it subsists
 In all things, in all natures ; in the stars
 Of azure heaven, the wandering clouds,
 In flower and tree, in every pebbly stone
 That paves the brooks, the stationary rocks,
 The moving waters and the invisible air.
 Whate’er exists hath properties that spread
 Beyond itself, communicating good,
 A simple blessing, or with evil mixed :
 No chasm, no solitude ; from link to link
 It circulates, the Soul of all the worlds.”¹

The later shape which this idea assumed in the poet’s mind was a happy assurance that all created things, as pervaded by one spirit, were in essential harmony with one another. This feeling had indeed been widely held and expressed before Wordsworth’s day. The thought of the interdependence and concord of the different parts of the universe seems to have been a favourite one with the Christian poets in the days of the Renaissance. George Herbert, for example, in one of his most striking poems says :

“Man is all symmetrie,
 Full of proportions, one limbe to another,
 And all to all the world besides.
 Each part may call the farthest brother,
 For head with foot hath private amitie,
 And both with moons and tides.

Nothing hath got so farre
 But man hath caught and kept it as his prey :
 His eyes dismount the highest starre,
 He is in little all the sphere :
 Herbs gladly cure our flesh, because that they
 Find their acquaintance there.”²

We gladly yield to the saintly pastor the honour of possessing this insight. Yet Wordsworth was the first to make constant

¹ *Works* (Knight), vol. v. p. 353, ll. 1-15.

² *Poems* (Bell’s Aldine ed.), p. 120.

and consistent use of the pre-established harmony of things as the keynote of his poetic work. His supreme task was to proclaim

“How exquisitely the individual mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external World
Is fitted: and how exquisitely too—
Theme this but little heard of among men—
The external World is fitted to the Mind,
And the Creation (by no lower name
Can it be called) which they by blended might
Accomplish: this is our high argument.”¹

The originality and priority of Wordsworth's work in the development of this thought appears more distinctly, when we think of the strains of other poets who preceded him. Pope and Crabbe and Cowper were all awake to the harmony of created things; but how did they use it? Pope still only clung to the artificial modes of speech about Nature that generations of poets had employed before. Crabbe wrote with Nature and her charms before his eyes, and deserves praise for this return to reality. Cowper went far beyond both and in the right direction; for he brought out with exquisite feeling the idea that all the brightest and grandest scenes of Nature are, down to the least details, symbols of the love of Him by whom and for whom God made the world. Yet even in Cowper there is little or no trace of any conviction that, beyond the furnishing of this symbolic material, Nature had any higher function to fulfil in the life of mankind; and at this point other poets of the day also came to a halt.

On the other hand, Wordsworth's spirit could never be content with such a goal. He was never willing that Nature should be regarded as a storehouse of objects which should enrich our human speech or supply the starting-point for symbolic pictures of higher spiritual truths. He was persuaded that it was possible for man to enter into such a contact with Nature as would yield an intercourse fitly called not loving observation only but actual communion, the human spirit bringing to her the sensitive eye, the hearing ear, and the understanding heart, and she in return stirring up in him sensations and impulses and intuitions of priceless worth.

If the experience of the Wanderer in the *Excursion* may be taken as representing his own, this conviction seems to have been forming at a very early age:

¹ *Works*, vol. v. p. 24, ll. 63-71.

“ In the after-day
 Of boyhood, many an hour in caves forlorn
 And 'mid the hollow depths of naked crags
 He sate, and even in their fixed lineaments
 —Or from the power of a peculiar eye
 Or by creative feeling overborne
 Or by predominance of thought oppressed—
 Even in their fixed and steady lineaments
 He traced an ebbing and a flowing Mind
 Expression ever varying.”¹

The explanation is psychologically simple enough. Man himself is externally of flesh and blood. Yet within him as the lord of created life on earth there is a spirit that enables him to use it for his mental and spiritual progress. Is there in the vast orb on which we exist a principle analogous to the constitution of man's inner being? If the world we inhabit is part of a living universe, must it not have, as man from the beginning has really believed it has, an indwelling Soul, endowed with some kind of consciousness and will, that enables it to meet the human soul and minister to its longing for fellowship? Wordsworth was fully assured of the existence and beneficent activity of such a mundane Being. After boyhood had merged into manhood, he recalled with gratitude his entrance into this new realm of thought and feeling:

“ And I remember well
 That in life's every-day appearances
 I seemed about this time to gain clear sight
 Of a new world—a world too that was fit
 To be transmitted and to other eyes
 Made visible; as ruled by those fixed laws
 Whence spiritual dignity originates,
 Which do both give it being and maintain
 A balance, an ennobling interchange
 Of action from without and from within;
 The excellence, pure function and best power
 Both of the Object seen and eye that sees.”²

Thenceforward the Soul of the world began to wear to his view an aspect that held and fascinated his inmost spirit. In its most general application, this phrase is used as a convenient designation for the sum total of the infinitely varied forms of consciousness of higher or lower degree that are diffused over the world. In this sense, divine wisdom and power and goodness are ever with it; but, if there is to be assigned to it any more definite conception, it is essentially Beauty:

¹ *Works*, vol. v. p. 34, ll. 153–162.

² *Works*, vol. iii. p. 366, ll. 367–378.

"Beauty—a living Presence of the Earth
 Surpassing the most fair ideal forms
 Which craft of delicate Spirits hath composed
 From Earth's materials—waits upon my steps,
 Pitches her tents before me, as I move,
 An hourly neighbour."¹

In the midst of such companionship, he could not consider the brightest pictures set forth in the myths and legends of ancient days as mere fictions, never to be realised in the experience of men: these would rather abide as indispensable forms for the delineation of what they might enjoy still:

"For the discerning intellect of Man
 When wedded to this goodly universe
 In love and holy passion shall find these
 A simple produce of the common day."²

It is in such utterances that we find the real key to the meaning of the great *Lines composed above Tintern Abbey*. Most frequently they have been taken to illustrate the direct immanent activity of God in Nature. But though this truth of course lies in the poet's mind, it is here in the background and cannot justly be said to be the special lesson he desires to teach. As the very language used shows, it is rather the presence of the Soul of the world in the shape of Ideal Beauty which the Divine Creator employs in His ministrations to humanity that the poet has in view:

"And I have felt
 A presence that disturbs me with the joy
 Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
 Of something far more deeply interfused,
 Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns
 And the round ocean and the living air
 And the blue sky and in the mind of man:
 A motion and a spirit that impels
 All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
 And rolls through all things."

Moreover, this wonderful strain carries in it far more than appears on the surface. It is no mere chance utterance, but the classic expression of the poet's creed concerning "the Active Principle" that is at work in the universe. The depth of his conviction respecting it is seen in the further applications of this Presence which he everywhere makes. For on this basis he rears the more definite belief, also in various forms adopted in the earliest generations of the race, that within this mundane Soul, and acting as its channels, there are special agencies or "powers," whose function it is

¹ *Works*, vol. v. p. 24, ll. 42-47.

² *Ut sup.*, ll. 52-55.

to come into yet closer fellowship with mankind and, where there are a perceptive eye and a willing, open heart, to give them guidance and help that in the last resort are none other than Divine. Wordsworth does nowhere say that he went in search of these powers; for there is not the slightest trace of modern spiritualism in his mind. But he does aver that, in ways too deep to be fully defined, such "powers" find access to the believing heart and mind, and minister to them both enlightenment and cheer.

Why should such gracious intercourse be thought a thing incredible on a living planet? The state of our Heavenly Sire is, as Milton said, "kingly"; "thousands at His bidding speed, And post o'er land and ocean without rest." His whole administration of the life of His human family is organised on the principle of mediation. As the Son is the channel by whom the Father sends the Spirit, so is the Spirit in turn the Agent by whom are distributed and guided the spiritual beings that execute His behests. The Holy Spirit comes into the most direct and intimate contact with our spirits, and on Him alone we are consciously to depend. But, if He chooses, may He not also use other "powers" or spirits as intermediaries and make them to us channels of deep peace and abounding joy? This at least was Wordsworth's belief, adopted deliberately and with full consciousness of all that it implied. He learned by personal experience that there were such "powers," mighty enough to watch over the scenes and the processes of Nature, and yet human enough to take part in the guidance and protection of the race. What such spirits were in themselves he did not presume to say; but he was sure that they were ministering spirits sent forth to minister wherever they heard "the still, sad music of humanity."

The earliest and simplest expression of this conviction is found in the verses entitled *Expostulation and Reply*:

"The eye, it cannot choose but see;
We cannot bid the ear be still;
Our bodies move where'er they be
With or against our will.

Nor less I deem that there are Powers
Which of themselves our minds impress;
That we can feed this mind of ours
In a wise passiveness.

Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come,
But we must still be seeking?"

Additional references are scattered through many poems. Three of these may be mentioned here, as worthy of special note.

When in *The Recluse* Wordsworth is rejoicing in the favoured spot that was to be his home for so many years, he says :

“ Ah ! if I wished to follow where the sight
Of all that is before my eyes, the voice
Which speaks from a presiding spirit here
Would lead me, I should whisper to myself :
They who are dwellers in this holy place
Must needs themselves be hallowed.” ¹

And later on, referring to the inward effect of Beauty, he adds :

“ By such forgetfulness the soul becomes
Words cannot say how beautiful : then, hail !
Hail ! to the visible Presence, hail ! to thee
Delightful valley, habitation fair.”

So, too, in the poem on *Nutting*, and referring especially to his feelings in boyhood after tearing down the boughs of the hazel trees, he says :

“ I felt a sense of pain when I beheld
The silent trees and saw the intruding sky—
Then, dearest Maiden, move along these shades
In gentleness of heart : with gentle hand
Touch—for there is a Spirit in the woods.”

Most touching of all is the allusion in the sonnet *On the Departure of Sir Walter Scott from Abbotsford*, for Naples :

“ A trouble, not of clouds or weeping rain,
Nor of the setting sun's pathetic light
Engendered, hangs o'er Eildon's triple height :
Spirits of Power, assembled there, complain
For kindred Power departing from their sight ;
While Tweed, best pleased in chanting a blithe strain,
Saddens his voice again, and yet again.”

Yes : there are Powers, the poet holds, that speak to the souls of men. By the external listener their accents may never be heard at all, or at most may only sound like the babbling of a wandering cuckoo. But to the trained heart and ear they are voices from heaven :

¹ *Works*, vol. viii. p. 244, ll. 273–278.

"Have not *we* too?—yes : we have
 Answers : and we know not whence ;
 Echoes from beyond the grave,
 Recognised intelligence !

Such rebounds our inward ear
 Catches sometimes from afar.
 Listen, ponder, hold them dear :
 For of God,—of God they are." ¹

It is in the depth of this conviction that we see the secret of Wordsworth's persistence in his poetic work, as well as the facility with which he carried it out. Under God, he felt himself to be in the hands of Nature ; and he worked along with her in every fresh portion of the task entrusted to him. As he tells us in a passage of *The Recluse*, which lays bare his heart to us more than any other :

"Of ill-advised Ambition and of Pride
 I would stand clear ; but yet to me I feel
 That an internal brightness is vouchsafed
 That must not die, that must not pass away. . . .
 Possessions have I that are solely mine,
 Something within which yet is shared by none,
 Not even the nearest to me and most dear,
 Something which power and effort may impart :
 I would impart it, I would spread it wide." ²

With such exalted views of the world in which he lived as a sphere filled with spiritual and beneficent activity, Wordsworth could not fail to reap a rich harvest of gladness and power. As he anticipated, he had to maintain a course of plain living and high thinking, to attain his end :

"For I must tread on shadowy ground, must sink
 Deep—and, aloft ascending, breathe in worlds
 To which the heaven of heavens is but a veil." ³

But at last he won his reward. Bringing to Nature a wealth of aspiration and desire, already half creating what he longed for, and half finding it in Nature herself, he found, as in his earliest days, a constant peace and joy, and at times even a rapture that made his earthly experience a foretaste of the tree of life that is in the Paradise of God :

"In such access of mind, in such high hours
 Of revelation from the living God,
 Thought was not ; in enjoyment it expired.
 No thanks he breathed, he proffered no request ;

¹ *Works*, vol. iv. p. 26, ll. 13–20.

² *Works*, vol. viii. p. 255, ll. 673–690.

³ *Works*, vol. v. p. 23, ll. 28–30.

Rapt into still communion that transcends
The imperfect offices of prayer and praise,
His mind was a thanksgiving to the Power
That made him : it was blessedness and love." ¹

It is at this point, accordingly, that we are enabled to discern the place occupied by Wordsworth in the succession of mystical thinkers. Most frequently he is spoken of as a nature-mystic. Sometimes, as by Coleridge and Professor Knight, he is classed with the philosophic school. Doubtless there is an element of propriety in both of these estimates. But they need to be balanced by the fact that in the last resort he is essentially a religious teacher. It is indeed true that it was by yielding to the influence of Nature he found himself drawn nearer to God; and that from this higher standpoint he formed a coherent scheme of philosophic thought that became "the master light of all his seeing." Yet he was never dependent on nature or philosophy alone for the divine vision that possessed his soul and guided his art. Once brought back to God, he abode in direct union and communion with Him, and found in Him the home of his heart and the refuge and strength of his whole life. He was a religious and devotional mystic. Neither the external world in which he took such delight, nor the higher visionary world to which he claimed to have access, could satisfy his spirit, but only the living Father in whom all live and are moved and exist. It was thus he was so ready to say:

"Soul of our souls, and safe-guard of the world,
Sustain—Thou only canst—the sick of heart :
Restore their languid spirits and recall
Their lost affections unto Thee and Thine."

II.

It is neither an easy nor a welcome task to pass from the thought of such high fellowship into the region of controversy. But criticism has to be faced, if Wordsworth's interpretation of Nature is to be vindicated or even fully defined. The views of poetry, in its province and aim as well as its language, which he tried to establish were so different from those that prevailed before his day, that he could not but meet with sharp opposition from many of his contemporaries. The bitter form which it assumed may surprise us; but the opposition itself was inevitable.

So also, however, has it been in some measure up to our own day. Indeed, the objections to his views have been so

¹ *Excursion* (Moxon), vi. p. 26.

numerous that within the limits of this paper I cannot discuss them in full detail. But I feel bound to mention them, and then try to indicate at least the lines on which they may be met.

One of the commonest criticisms of the poet's tenets is that he did not so much interpret Nature as read into her the thoughts that sprang up in his own mind. So that deep Scottish thinker, Dr John Duncan, once remarked to his friend William Knight. "But what do you make of these lines?

‘One impulse from a vernal wood
May teach you more of man,
Of moral evil and of good,
Than all the sages can.’

That's not true. He had not read many folios. 'A vernal wood' may steep you in sentiment and make you cease from thinking at all, but it cannot teach you in any sense of the word. I dare say that he saw those 'humanities' in the wood that he had *put into it*. But I don't see how he could expect them, if he had not put them in."¹ Essentially the same objection is raised by Lord Morley, and that too in connection with this same verse. "It is best to be entirely sceptical as to the existence of system and ordered philosophy in Wordsworth. When he tells us that 'one impulse from a vernal wood can teach us more of man,' such a proposition cannot be seriously taken as more than a half-playful sally for the benefit of some too bookish friend. No impulse from a vernal wood can teach us anything at all of moral evil and good."²

Equally persistent is the charge that Wordsworth's views of Nature really merge in the animism of heathen communities and the polytheism of Greece and Rome. Is not the idea of "powers" present in the landscape essentially equivalent to the notion of separate spirits that take possession of manifold objects and operate thence on human life? Where is the difference in the poet's belief from the ignorant superstitions of African tribes? Has not Wordsworth also practically set his imprimatur on the old mythology, when, for example, he says in the familiar sonnet:

"I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn,
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea,
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathed horn."

¹ *Colloquia Peripatetica*, pp. 53-54.

² *Studies in Literature*, pp. 46-47.

Such inquiries, it is thought, seem to justify the opinion of an intelligent teacher who affirms that "it may be questioned whether modern poets have not overdone the note of Nature-worship and turned the minds of their disciples to a vague and fictitious paganism. . . . The Nature-school of poetry appears—and not undeservedly—to many people as a feeble sentimentalism, a babbling of green fields out of touch with lives spent in great cities."¹

But again, what shall be said of Wordsworth's conceptions in the light of philosophy and science? He was by no means the first to ascribe life to the planets that roll in space, or to the mountains, forests, rivers, and seas of the earth. Plato and Aristotle, not to mention earlier teachers, did so in ancient days. But modern philosophy has surely exploded these old ideas and rid the minds of thoughtful men of the absurdities they involve; and has not modern science only confirmed its conclusions? No wonder is it, as Leslie Stephen suggested, that Wordsworth detested science. He did so, apparently, because the very constitution of natural objects, as disclosed in the various departments of scientific investigation, gave the death-blow to his poetic theories. To transform dead matter into sources of life and thought would seem to require an energy beyond the reach of poetic imagination. As Dr S. B. Watson, a friend of Coleridge, wrote of his similar views, "The word 'Nature,' in any intelligible sense, means nothing but that method and order by which the Almighty regulates the common course of things. Nature is not a person; it is not active; it neither creates nor performs actions more or less energetically, nor learns, nor forgets, nor re-exerts itself, nor recruits its vigour. Perhaps it will be said that all this is merely figurative language. Figurative language is very much misplaced in strict philosophical investigations; and these particular figures, which might be quite consistent with the atheistical philosophy of Lucretius, sound ill in the mouth of a pious Christian."²

Most serious of all, to some minds, is the cognate objection based on the fact that Scripture itself presents no points of contact with the imputation of such power to Nature as Wordsworth assumes. The universe is often regarded as simply the work of God's hands—the material structure which He reared and furnished to be man's dwelling-place; itself, however, now lying under the curse of sin and destined therefore to be consumed with fire and merged in the new

¹ J. C. Stobart, *The Wordsworth Epoch*, p. 31 (Arnold).

² Coleridge's Works: *Miscellanies*, pp. 357-358 (Bohn).

heavens and the new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness. With the sufferings entailed by sin on man and beast, it is often added, the poet showed but scant sympathy.

Now, at first sight and taken as a whole, these and similar objections seem to present an array of opposition too formidable to be overcome. Yet it may be possible to question the validity of one and all of them.

How feeble after all, for example, is the suspicion that the poet must have read his own thoughts into Nature! It vanishes the moment we recall what has been already suggested concerning what Nature is, and the relation in which man stands to it. The word Nature (Latin *natura*) is literally a *becoming*, and designates the process by which life comes to birth in definite forms. With these forms in view, how easy was it for man to adopt the more comprehensive idea of Nature as a system which, in virtue of an implanted life, is ever changing and ever developing higher results! Since man is a part of this system as well as its head, there can be no gulf betwixt him and Nature, but rather a reciprocal activity. Shakespeare held that even the smallest orbs sang to the multitude of the heavenly host; but he took care to add that the same harmony was also in the immortal souls of men. It is only the muddy vesture in which they are enclosed that keeps us from catching its notes. Goethe too was surely right when, to critics that carped against this position, he replied:

"Ihr folget falscher Spur,
Denkt nicht, wir scherzen:
Ist nicht der Kern der Natur
Menschen im Herzen?"¹

This is the truth that students like Rabbi Duncan and Lord Morley forget. Wordsworth never denied that he brought certain thoughts and feelings to the contemplation of Nature. What he insisted on was that these were always responded to and enhanced by her suggestions in return, so that there was a real communion betwixt them. On this point Coleridge, a more penetrative thinker than either of those mentioned, was entirely at one with Wordsworth. "When the bodily organ," he wrote, "steadying itself on

¹ *Gott und Welt: Ultimatum*, Gedichte II. S. 139 (Cotta). I venture to give these lines a rendering in English:

"You wander blindly round;
Pray, deem not that we jest:
Is not the core of Nature found
Within the human breast?"

some chance thing, imitates, as it were, the fixtures of 'the inward eye' in its ideal shapings, then it is that Nature not seldom reveals her close affinity with mind, with that more-than-man, which is one and the same in all men, and from which

'the soul receives
Reason : and reason is her being !'

Then it is that Nature, like an individual spirit or fellow soul, seems to think and hold communion with us. . . . I should say that at such moments Nature, as another subject veiled behind the visible *object* without us, solicits the intelligible object hid and yet struggling beneath the subjects within us, and, like a helping Lucina, brings it forth for us into distinct consciousness and common light."¹

In the light of this statement, the verse in *The Tables Turned* so much objected to, has only to be set alongside two verses from a related poem to yield a perfectly simple and consistent meaning. In the lines *To my Sister*, written in early spring, the poet says :

"Love, now an universal birth,
From heart to heart is stealing—
From earth to man and man to earth ;
It is the time of feeling.

One moment now may give us more
Than fifty years of reason ;
Our minds shall drink at every pore
The spirit of the season."

Hence, if I may take the liberty of paraphrasing, the poet's meaning in the earlier verse is simply this: "One flash of the illumination that so often comes to us amidst the scenes of Nature shall show you the love which ever radiates from the heart of God. This love also works in the soul of man ; and in contrast with it you shall see, from the destruction which still prevails in the world, that evil and suffering are not yet purged out of the realms of nature and human life. Here, therefore, you have before your eyes an object-lesson from God Himself on the reality of good and evil, more vivid and impressive than has ever been given by the wisest of our race."

As to Wordsworth's favouring the ideas of animism or polytheism, the charge is almost too preposterous to need refutation. In animistic religions, the spirits inhabiting objects in Nature were usually all the divinity that was known to their worshippers. Moreover, they were malevolent and jealous

¹ *Miscellanies*, ut sup., "On Thinking and Reflection," p. 252.

of human happiness, and were therefore regarded by devotees with fear and trembling. Wide as the poles asunder were these from the "powers" of the Soul of the world. The poet's belief in their presence and sympathy with man is a psychological fact of which he is a credible witness. But, though he had cultivated the gift of discerning these, it was in no sense peculiar to him. Other poets, like F. W. Faber, had it perhaps in greater measure than himself.¹ In any case, these "powers" were ever subordinate not only to Nature but to the living God from whom Nature herself had her being. Wordsworth neither bowed down to them nor served them: he only desired their friendship and help, and found it in rich measure.

Thus also are we to understand his use of the old Greek and Roman mythology. It suited the purpose of his art to speak of the old gods as still living and working in the world. But to set these alongside the "Great God" whose alone he was and whom he served, would have been regarded by him as "vanity." In any sympathy or respect he showed to the old beliefs, Wordsworth is fully supported by other gifted writers. Ruskin was no indiscriminate admirer of his work, yet, as quoted with approval by Dr Edward Mercer, he said: "By 'gods,' in the plural, I mean the totality of spiritual powers delegated by the Lord of the universe to do in their several heights or offices, parts of His will respecting man or the world that man is imprisoned in; not as myself knowing or in security believing that there are such, but in meekness accepting the testimony and belief of all ages . . . myself knowing for indispensable fact, that no true happiness exists, nor is any good ever done by human creatures, but in the sense or imagination of such powers."²

The objections from philosophy and science, though looking more serious, are no less vulnerable. It is admitted that several of the ancient philosophers regarded, and spoke of, the planets as living creatures (*ζῶα*). As we see especially in the Dialogues with Phædrus and Timæus, Plato did this without the least hesitancy. But if he also deified them, it was only in the poetic sense of the term and because they seemed to participate in a life imparted to them by the Sovereign Creator of the universe. It is really some of Plato's modern followers that are responsible for the extreme views attributed to him. An egregious specimen is seen in the essay on "The Mundane Soul"

¹ So Wordsworth said to Aubrey de Vere. *Essays chiefly on Poetry*, vol. ii. p. 278.

² *Nature-Mysticism*, p. 95 (Geo. Allen).

by Abraham Tucker, the moralist so highly esteemed by Paley and Sir J. Mackintosh.¹ There is no reason to believe that Wordsworth ever read this paper; nor can we be sure that he was at all conversant with the teaching of Plato or Aristotle. It is more likely that, as Professor Knight held, he had by sheer mental force developed a philosophic system of his own, which practically embraced all that was best in Plato and his predecessors of the Grecian schools.

Hence it was really to the exaggerations of writers like Tucker that Dr S. B. Watson's remarks were at all applicable. Sara Coleridge was justly indignant that her father's views should ever have been prefaced by such superficial criticism. In a letter to Miss Fenwick (1849) she went as far as to say: "I marvel at the objections of *The Guardian* and Dr W—— to my father's personification of Nature. This seems to me rather old-womanish. Do they suppose my father meant that Nature was an independent, self-subsisting Power, like a pagan deity, walking about the visible universe in a green robe, a sky-blue bonnet and earth-coloured petticoat?"² Coleridge had no such idea, nor had Wordsworth. It was a fundamental tenet in their philosophy that Nature in all the amplitude of her wealth was the fruit of Divine creative Love and Wisdom and Power; and, if at any point their views coincided with Plato's, it was only because Plato by dint of heaven-born genius had penetrated into a very wonderful approximation to the doctrines of Christianity.³

As to the opposition from the side of science, it is simply not true that Wordsworth had any antipathy to this branch of knowledge. With students of science who were mere scientists and had neither eye nor ear for anything beyond its province he had but little patience; and he could express his scorn for their one-sidedness brusquely enough. Of an exemplar of this class whom he imagines coming to his grave, he speaks as

"One to whose smooth-rubbed soul can cling
Nor form nor feeling, great or small,
A reasoning, self-sufficing thing,
An intellectual all-in-all."

But to science, strictly so called, he looked with all due reverence; for in it he saw that knowledge of the laws of the external world which alone could meet the growing needs of human life on earth. It was under the influence of this feeling

¹ *The Light of Nature pursued*, vol. i. pp. 399–420.

² *Miscellanies*, ut sup., p. 352.

³ Cf. *Plato and Christianity*, by Rev. W. Temple, pp. 83, 87.

that he could say: "Poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science." Thus also he felt free to add: "If the labours of men of science shall ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition, and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the poet will sleep then no more than at present; he will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science, not only in their general indirect effects, but he will be at his side, carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself."¹

In fact, science, in the full sense of the word, as accurate and integrated knowledge of external things, needs the help of poetry. Dr J. Young Simpson has summed up this principle in words we can all accept: "In intercourse with Nature, feelings are awakened which incite to further knowledge, and knowledge in turn plays in different ways upon our feelings. Now any account of a phenomenon in terms of science will appeal to our intellect; but the phenomenon, even the account of it, may appeal to one of these other aspects of the human constitution. And without the inclusion of these other aspects, the account is not complete."²

If Wordsworth had lived in our times, he could have held this position with even greater confidence. For what is the conclusion which the most recent investigations into the nature of matter suggest to us? Is it not that it is certainly not dead or inert? Is it not in its atomic or electronic constitution a veritable whirlpool of activity? Is it not really a centre of force which in the last resort involves the play of consciousness and will? In truth, so far from undermining the foundations of philosophic or poetic thought, the scientific study of matter really strengthens them; for it is teaching us that it is spirit which is the only abiding substance, and that, dull and lifeless as our material world may appear, it is truly a part of a living universe, the fruit of the love of Him who is "the true God and the eternal Life."

If Wordsworth's interpretation of Nature be such as just represented, it is inconceivable that it should be regarded as opposed to the teaching of the Scriptures. Rather does Scripture confirm it on every side. It is now more clear than ever that even the Old Testament, with all its emphasis on the transcendence of God, fully recognises His immanent activity in the world. This is the opinion of Jewish theologians themselves from the mediæval age to our own day. The

¹ *Prose Works*, vol. i. p. 62 (Macmillan).

² *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 32 (Hodder & Stoughton).

heavens and the earth are instinct with percipient power. "Hear, O Heavens, and give ear, O Earth, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." "O Earth, Earth, Earth, hear the word of the Lord." "Day unto day uttereth speech: night unto night showeth knowledge." The chief aim of Psalm civ., for example, is to exhibit the planet on which we exist as teeming with activity. Its greatest objects are full of life and movement, in sympathy with man. The mountains skip like rams in the field. Jordan turns back like a traveller scared by a storm. The mountains and the hills break forth into singing, and all the trees of the field clap their hands. He maketh His messengers winds: His ministers flames of fire.*

When we turn from the Old Testament to the New, we find the same train of thought and feeling maintained. In Paul's letter to the Romans, for example, we find what is very like a reflection of the teaching of Plato. In chapter viii. 19 ff. the Earth is spoken of as a living mother destined to bring a new system into being. "For the eager outlook of the creation watcheth for the revealing of the sons of God. For the creation was subjected to frailty, not of its own choice, but on account of Him who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself also shall be freed from the thralldom of corruption and be led into the freedom of the glory of the children of God. For we know that the whole creation moaneth and suffereth birthpangs together up till now: and not only it, but we ourselves also, having the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves, I say, moan in ourselves, watching for our filial emancipation, the redemption of our body." No language could express more distinctly the perfect sympathy that the Creator has established betwixt "Mother Earth" and her child, man.

Into this feeling Wordsworth entered with all his mind and heart. Living in the days before the theory of evolution had been fully developed, he could not be expected, like Tennyson, to write of Nature as "red in tooth and claw" and yet slowly but surely developing her human lord. But he could never endure calmly the sight of needless sufferings amongst the lower creatures. It was from the depths of a very sensitive spirit that, in the poem of *Hartleap Well*, he said:

"Grey-headed Shepherd, thou hast spoken well:

Small difference lies between thy creed and mine;

This beast not unobserved by Nature fell;

His death was mourned by sympathy divine.

The Being that is in the clouds and air,
 That is in the grass leaves among the groves,
 Maintains a deep and reverential care
 For the unoffending creatures whom He loves.

One lesson, Shepherd, let us two divide,
 Taught both by what she shows and what reveals,
 Never to blend our pleasure or our pride
 With sorrow of the meanest thing that feels."¹

Thus Wordsworth took full cognisance of the sorrow as well as the joy in Nature. The only difference in him from merely naturalistic poets is that he discerned more fully than they the blessing that might be educed from the tragic elements in Nature and human life. This vision came to him because he felt that, to those who love God and obey His call for self-surrender to His purpose of mercy, God makes all things work together for the final victory of good.

With this expression of our confidence in the validity of Wordsworth's thought, we close this study. Matthew Arnold, followed here by Swinburne, held that the great poet's philosophy should be kept separate from his poetry in our estimate of his genius. From this opinion we dissent. We are sure that a philosophic system underlies his poetic work, and we have tried to indicate it. But Wordsworth does not attempt to expand it as a system or to present it in systematic form. The philosophy is the hidden yet living root of which the poetry is the efflorescence. There is no contrariety between poetry and philosophy. If there were, Tennyson's *In Memoriam* would have been discarded. All that can be required of a poet in this connection is that he should retain the distinctively poetic form and only use the system he has in reserve to deepen the expression of his poems, and enhance their power over the mind and heart and conscience. The clusters of grapes which the vine displays are none the less rich, nor the wine they distil the less sweet, that its tendrils are spread over the rocks of the terrace on which it grows. The rocks only exhibit better the life and heat and radiance of the sun that brought the fruit into being to cheer the heart of man.

J. P. LILLEY.

EDINBURGH.

¹ *Works*, vol. ii, p. 135, ll. 161-168.

JOHN BROWNSWORD :
POET AND SCHOOLMASTER AT
STRATFORD-UPON-AVON.

THE REV. EDGAR I. FRIPP.

THE discovery by Mr Richard Savage of the Will and Inventory of John Bretchgirdle, the minister who baptised Shakespeare,¹ has thrown interesting light not only on this hitherto almost unknown clergyman and schoolmaster, but on his pupil and friend, also a schoolmaster, and master of the Stratford School for two and a half years in Shakespeare's childhood—the Latinist poet, John Brownsword.

Apparently he was a native of Northwich or the immediate neighbourhood, and at an early age was one of Bretchgirdle's first scholars at Witton. Bretchgirdle incepted for his Master of Arts degree on the 11th July 1546. On the 11th December following, King Henry VIII. made a grant to Christ Church, Oxford, of the rectory of Great Budworth, including the perpetual curacy of Witton-cum-Twembrook. Bretchgirdle was still on the list of the Christ Church students on the 14th January 1547. Soon afterwards, in 1547, he was presented by his College to the curacy of Witton. The vicar of Great Budworth was then William Hardware. At Witton, "about the third year of the reign of Edward VI."—1549–50—Bretchgirdle obtained a lease for life from Sir Thomas Venables of Kinderton, lord of the manor, of a messuage, a croft and half an acre of land "lying and adjoining the Chapel yard," for his house and school; and entering into the premises, he "peaceably and quietly occupied and enjoyed the same by the space of seven years," during which term he "did upon his own costs and charges newly erect and build upon the premises a Chamber, and also amended and repaired divers other houses and buildings" thereon, at an outlay on his part of £20 and above—say £200 in our pre-war money. The Chapel was then

¹ See HIBBERT JOURNAL, July 1920.

ancient, on high ground overlooking the township "near the bank of the Dane," and communicating with Northwich on the west by an avenue of pollards. Bretchgirdle officiated in the Chapel as a minister of Edwardian convictions, which were not those of Sir Thomas Venables, and added to his slender income by teaching boys, most of whom came from Northwich, a quarter of a mile away. In uniting the function of schoolmaster with that of curate he probably followed the example of his predecessor, the chantry-priest of Witton, Thomas Broomfield, who doubtless received a pension on the dissolution of the chantry in 1547. Broomfield was living at Northwich ten years later, engaged in the more lucrative employment of making salt, tenant of "two-thirds of a *salina*, called a salt-house." Chantry-priests were expected and even enjoined to instruct boys in reading and writing as well as in music, and an educated man would not confine his instruction to these subjects. Under Bretchgirdle, Brownsword became a first-rate Latin scholar.

In 1550 or the beginning of 1551 Hardware died, and on the 25th January Thomas Boswell, an old fellow-student of Bretchgirdle's at Christ Church, was presented to the vicarage of Budworth. He had been admitted to his B.A. on the same day as Bretchgirdle and Sankey (7th April 1544), and he determined with them in 1545. He took his M.A. on the 5th February 1548. Bretchgirdle's seven years of "peaceable and quiet occupation and enjoyment" of his house and land and "Chamber" adjoining the Chapel yard at Witton were years of neighbourhood and doubtless of friendly intercourse with Thomas Boswell. Doubtless both men conformed to the changes under Queen Mary. Sir Thomas Venables was in the ascendant, and his tenant had to bide his time. If Bretchgirdle had not held his tongue he would not have enjoyed a quiet possession until 1557. And then he was disturbed, not by his landlord, but through the generous scheme of an old Northwich boy (a native of Shurlach, a mile or less from the town) to found and endow at Witton a Free Grammar School. On the 26th October 1557 Dominus John Deane, a wealthy old cleric, prebendary of Lincoln and rector of St Bartholomew the Great, Smithfield, signed and sealed a deed making over to twelve trustees property in Chester, Northwich, Peover, and elsewhere "for the good instruction of boys within the township of Witton near Northwich"; and by Michaelmas following a schoolhouse had been erected "in the Name of Jesus," and Statutes had been drawn up and approved, in the devising of which the founder had "the

godly and discreet advice of the learned." Deane was less of a Reformer than Bretchgirdle; he belonged to Colet and King Henry rather than to Calvin and King Edward; he believed in purgatory and prayer for the souls of the dead. But such language as appears in his Statutes describing the old learning is sufficient evidence of his sympathy with Protestant educational ideals and prejudices: "All barbary, all corruption and filthiness, and such abusion *which the Blind World brought in*, I utterly banish and exclude out of this School." He had had enough, he thought, of monkish Latin and monkish morals.

The schoolhouse was a simple thatched edifice, with "lodgings" for the master, built on land adjoining the Chapel yard. The new school was closely associated with the Chapel. The churchwardens were to be overseers with the feoffees; the Statutes were to be read in church before the breaking-up at Easter and Christmas; and the scholars were to attend service on Sunday and Foundation Day ("upon Jesus Day in the afternoon," *i.e.* the 7th August, when probably the first stone of the schoolhouse was laid). The Statutes, which owe a good deal to Colet, are of extraordinary interest. The master was to be a graduate of Oxford or Cambridge, of the age of thirty or more, unmarried, and approved of the Bishop and Schoolmaster of Chester; he was to receive £12 a year and certain small "vails," *i.e.* an admission fee of fourpence from every scholar, and "on the first Thursday after the beginning of School after Christmas of every scholar a penny commonly called a Cock Penny"; he was to give notice openly in the church six months before leaving, or to have six months' notice given to him to leave; he was entitled to thirty days' vacation in the year, in addition to the Easter and Christmas holidays, provided his scholars lost no time in his absence but were exercised at their books, at his charges, until his return; he was entrusted with full power and authority to punish and expel, subject only, if correction done was thought unreasonable, "to the feoffees and overseers for the time being." With regard to the instruction Deane's words are: "As touching in this School what shall be taught of the Master and learned of Scholars it passeth my wit to devise and determine in particular; but in general to speak and somewhat to say my mind, I will they were taught always the good literature both Latin and Greek, and good authors such as have the very Roman eloquence joined with wisdom, especially Christian authors that wrote their wisdom with clean and chaste Latin, either in verse or in prose; for mine intent is by founding of this School specially to increase.

knowledge and worship of God and our Lord Jesus Christ, and good Christian life and manners in the children. And for that intent I will the children learn the *Catechisma*, and then the *Accidence and Grammar* set out by King Henry the Eight, or some other if any can be better for the purpose, to induce children more speedily to Latin speech; and then *Institutum Christiani Homini*s that learned Erasmus made, and then *Copia* of the same Erasmus, *Colloquia Erasmi*, *Ovidius: Metamorphoseos*, Terence, Mantuan, Tully, Horace, Sallust, Virgil and such other as shall be thought most convenient to the purpose unto true Latin speech." Thursdays and Saturdays were to be half-holidays, and the boys were to recreate themselves with bows and arrows, not with bowls, cards, dice, or quoits.¹ The old custom of barring-out was to be observed: "I will that a week before Christenmas and Easter, according to the old custom, the scholars bar and keep forth of the School the Schoolmaster, in such sort as other scholars do in other schools."²

How the new foundation would affect Bretchgirdle we may easily conceive. He was perpetual curate of the township and ministrant in the Chapel. He was a schoolmaster on the spot, who had spent £20 and more on his premises. To fail to recognise continuity between his work and interest and the school of Dominus John Deane is sheer scepticism. Obviously his school became the Free Grammar School of Witton and he was elected its first headmaster. Subsequent events entirely support this supposition. We may go further. It is not unreasonable to believe that Bretchgirdle welcomed the foundation, and was one of "the learned" whose "godly and discreet advice" was employed in the devising of the Statutes. We may believe that the future vicar of Stratford-upon-Avon, whose will included gifts of the *Copia* and other works of Erasmus, Tully's *Offices*, Sallust, Virgil, and Horace, had a hand in drawing-up the curriculum at Witton; and that John Brownsword was trained on the lines of it from about seven years of age to nineteen, and in his last year under Bretchgirdle was his pupil in the new school, heard the Statutes read in church, and promised to be bound by them, so far as they applied to scholars; and afterwards at Stratford as headmaster brought to bear upon William Shakespeare's older contemporaries in the school learning and experience derived from his master at Witton, who was then, for all too brief a period, his next-door neighbour within the Gild precincts.

¹ As recommended by Ascham in *Toxophilus*.

² *Witton Grammar School*, by John Weston, pp. 5 ff.

But Bretchgirdle had hardly removed into the "lodgings" provided for the master at the Free Grammar School of Witton before he lost his neighbour, Thomas Boswell, and Christ Church presented him to the vicarage of Budworth. The presentation, made by the Dean (Richard Marshall) and the Chapter, is dated the 14th November 1558. This was three days before the death of Queen Mary. Elizabeth had succeeded, and Protestant hopes were high when on Sunday the 4th December the curate of Witton was instituted vicar of the mother-parish, which was one of the largest in Cheshire. The bond of this date in the Episcopal Registry bears the signature *per me Johannem Bretchgirdle clericum*.

If Bretchgirdle had known that the change of religion was so near he would probably have neither sought nor accepted the preferment. He resigned the vicarage a year and a half later. But he did not leave Witton. Brownsword says that he was under his tuition for twelve years and twelve lunar months—that is, for a period extending considerably beyond December 1558, even if Bretchgirdle began at Witton immediately after the 14th January 1547. Richard Eaton was presented to Budworth on the 19th May 1560. Bretchgirdle retained, apparently, both his curacy and mastership at Witton until he removed to Stratford in February 1561.

John Brownsword learned to write Latin verse under Bretchgirdle, and addressed to him three poems, one before he left Witton, the second soon after leaving Witton, and the third shortly before Christmas 1560. All three were probably received by Bretchgirdle at Witton.

The first is a school exercise, a hymn with prayer for the master and the scholars. It consists of twenty-one stanzas in the familiar metre of Horace's Ode i. 2. The prayer for the master, beginning at stanza 15, is of considerable biographical interest. It may be translated as follows:

"Be Thou near to my Bretchgirdle, aid him, stretch forth Thine hand to him; that unto Thee continually his mind may be strong and thrive whole in a whole body;

Who, with all painfulness and a biting file, endeavoureth to crucify our brutish manners, with a calm countenance, with learned lips bringing Northwich into a better fashion.

He giveth himself with all his heart to his seven times considered speech, and doth meditate therein both night and day.

He exerciseth faithfully the talent of song entrusted to him, doubling the sum thereof; he committeth not in sloth the Lord's treasure to an unprofitable sepulchre."¹

¹ Matt. xxv. 18.

The petition for the boys, preceded by exhortation, ends the piece:—

“And thou, O youth, whom the soil of Northwich nourisheth,
fear and embrace and venerate from your heart the learned
Master who deserveth of thee excellently well.

O divine Lachesis, draw out their line of life, lengthen the
thread and mindful say, ‘Run on, ye spindles, smoothly
many years!’”

The second poem was written at Poynton in Cheshire,¹ between Stockport and Macclesfield. It contains twenty-six stanzas in the metre of Horace’s Ode i. 6. The beginning is important:—

“Bis sex flammifera concitus orbita
Phœbus proripuit signa per aurea
Cursus, ac toties emicuit vaga
Accensa facie soror;

Nostram dum pietas perpetuo tua
Aurem personuit, castaque pectori
Docti simplicitas et studium tetri
Erroris tenebras fugans.”

I would translate literally:—

“Twice six courses hath the uproused Phœbus raced in flaming
track through the golden signs, and as oft hath his wandering
Sister shone with beaming face;

While thy piety continually hath resounded in my ears, and
the chaste simplicity of thy learned breast, and study
putting to flight the shadows of loathsome error.”

And I understand the author to mean that for twelve whole years and twelve lunar months he has benefited from Bretchgirdle’s teaching, without a break (*perpetuo*)—that is, from early in 1547 to the end of 1559 or the beginning of 1560.² If Brownsword then was ever at Oxford or Cambridge, it was subsequent to this latter date.³

He goes on:—

Others do business in the cruel deep, fugitives from the safety of poverty and home, free from care, or carry war among the nations, commit ambitious crimes, strive anxiously for popular applause; but his Master has the fame the Muses give, which neither envy nor oblivion can take from him. He keeps to

¹ So I venture to interpret *Punctonensis ager*.

² In my article of July 1920 I took *cursus* to mean *months*. I am convinced now that it is *years*, and that the twelve phases of the moon represent a further lunar year. The change helps greatly to fix the dates. It agrees also with *virides annos*. Cf. Hamlet iii, 2, 165 ff., though here the lunar time repeats the solar, not adds to it.

³ Cooper.

the right-hand course, the steadfast path of Astræa in the sky. Faith uncorrupted possesses him and directs his steps, and divine Grace dwells with him as in a temple. Happy, too happy, is he who bravely treads the blandishments of Venus underfoot.

Bretchgirdle remained unmarried, but Brownsword, apparently, was yielding to the *dubios strepitus blandaque munera* of that deceiving goddess. Bretchgirdle is evidently at Witton:

“Happy the boy who submits his tender hands to thy rod, and endures the life of godly warfare, who spends his youthful years [*virides annos*] beneath thy care!”

Such virtues must not be passed over in silence. The writer's pipe has no merit, but Divine Mercy will accept the song, nor will his old teacher decline it.

The twenty-first stanza is autobiographical:—

“Ne qui sim maneat nescius, accipe
Punctonensis ager me tenet, hic rudem
Ætatem instituens, inter aves rudis
Agrestes coridus strepo.”

“That thou remain not ignorant who I am, hear me! Poynton hath me in its keeping; here I beginning raw manhood, among wild birds an untried lark (*κορυδός*) I sing.”

As he is worst of all, though his Master (for which he owes him thanks) has overwhelmed him with praise, that Master is the best of all. In this alone the writer deserves approval—he cultivates and venerates learned men, among whom, in his judgment, his Master occupies a foremost place. Bright and happy will be the day which brings them together in unity, like the dew of Hermon and the sweet ointment on the beard of the priest.¹

The third poem is the longest. From its thirty-one stanzas we learn that Bretchgirdle, than whom none more loved breathes, is still at Witton, the glory of Northwich and the country round (*Norwici patriæ decusque nostræ*), both learning and teaching, happy in the company of the Muses, with grave face poring over Zeno, Aristotle, or Socrates, walking the spacious halls of Solomon or at the shrine of the “bearded Plato” (*colere hispidum Platona*), gathering like a bee of the sweets of antiquity or scanning the page of history, alert and soaring, ever pursuing the Master's tasks from sunrise to evening. After toil Brownsword relieves his mind with poetry. Old days are ancient as the years of Nestor; his eyes fill with tears at the thought of them, though not all the boys enjoyed their books as he did. As lovers long for

¹ Psalm cxxxiii.

the night, so he yearns for his Master's letters. Poverty checks his noble rage, while his hope of bettering himself seems desperate:

"Sic sic ineptus munia dum sequor
Majora nervis, nec pede metior
Me stolidus proprio, inhonorus
Fractis ludibrio relinquo armis."

He asks his friend's support, to whom he sends a volume of verse with the request that he will overlook it and amend it. Christmas approaches, the husbandman has slain his swine, and the hard plowman fares well and dances with fearless feet.

This must have been the Christmas of 1560, for on the 30th January following Brownsword was appointed master of the Free Grammar School of Macclesfield, in succession apparently to John Bolde (elected the 4th January 1554). He is described on his appointment as "now Schoolmaster of Wilmslow," whence we may assume that he went from Poynton to Wilmslow, and at this place, after a few months' service, wrote complaining of his poverty. At Wilmslow, too, he probably composed *In Civilem Mancestrensis Ecclesiæ Discordiam*, 1560. The moment was one of perilous controversy between Catholics and Protestants. Had this particular *discordia* to do with the troubles and failings of the warden of Manchester College, Thomas Herle, a Queen's chaplain later suggested by Archbishop Parker for the see of Bangor as a "learned" and "grave, priestly man," ready to give over "Manchester where he now can have little rest" (12th February 1566)? Young Brownsword drops the pedant in his appeal for unity—

"Quo, quo vesana properatis mente verendi
Sacricolæ?"

"Whither, whither haste ye in unreasoning fury, O reverend ministers?" Bears are not so divided, nor Hircanean tigers. Will Judas never cease to betray Christ? One above the rest totters in brain and goes sick in his feet and knees, who had drunk eloquence from a scholar and drained the cup of his wisdom. It is Rome's doing—

"Hoc, hoc est Latius magna mercede tyrannus
Inventum mendax quodque Cathedra velit."

"This, this is the device which the Latin tyrant with a big bribe, and his lying See, desires."

Religion groans and the motherland is wounded. Let

brethren cease to contend, let hand grasp hand, that Christ's glory may shine and the trumpet of His Word resound!

Two days before Brownsword's appointment to Macclesfield, Bretchgirdle was presented to the vicarage of Stratford. Leaving Witton, he was admitted to his new and difficult charge on the 27th February 1561. Not a word is said in the record of his investiture in the Episcopal Register of his Romanist predecessor, Roger Dyos. The usual *per mortem* or *resignationem* after *vacantis* are omitted. Dyos was not dead and had not resigned. He was not in a legal sense deprived. But with the Romanist steward of the borough, Roger Edgeworth, he had been dismissed by the Corporation, who adopted the simple and effective expedient of withholding his "wages."

The records of Macclesfield School are silent about a break in Brownsword's tenure of office, but from the archives of Warwick and Stratford comes evidence that he left Macclesfield for at least three years. In the account of John Fisher, capital burgess of Warwick, made the 16th December 1565, for the year Michaelmas 1564 to Michaelmas 1565, are the entries: "Brownsword, for the stipend of the Schoolmaster for one quarter ended at Christmas last, £3, 6s. 8d. Humfrey Waring for his pains teaching the School for half a year from Our Lady Day till Michaelmas, £5. Griffin, now Schoolmaster, for his pains teaching the same School from Michaelmas until this next Christmas, £3, 6s. 8d." Brownsword does not appear in the account made in December 1564. He was at Warwick, as at Wilmslow, for a very short period, from Michaelmas 1564 to Our Lady Day (25th March) 1565, receiving one quarter's salary instead of two, no doubt in accordance with the terms of his engagement, which required his fulfilment of a term of years, or forfeiture of three months' pay. He left to become schoolmaster at Stratford, and the Warwick Corporation obtained the services of the curate, Humfrey Waring, for six months pending the appointment of Rafe Griffin, afterwards a Puritan preacher, and Master of the Leicester Hospital in Warwick, and eventually Dean of Lincoln, as Brownsword's successor. On or about the 25th March 1565 John Shakespeare, as Chamberlain of Stratford, on behalf of his Chamber, drove over to bring Brownsword and his wife (he was now married) and their "goods" to the new scene of his labours, and deposited them in their picturesque little house behind the school, adjoining the larger house of his old and loved friend the vicar. On the 1st April, in the presence of the bailiff, Master Richard

Hill, woollen-draper in Wood Street, and the aldermen and principal burgesses, he covenanted to serve them and "the whole inhabitants of the Borough" in their Free School for two years at least for £20 a year and his dwelling-house, diligently applying himself and teaching all such scholars as should come to him.

While Brownsword was at Warwick, Bretchgirdle took legal proceedings against his landlord at Witton. His tenure of the house and croft and half-acre of land adjoining the Chapel yard had been affected by his removal, or partial removal, into the "lodgings" provided for him on the erection of Deane's Schoolhouse in 1558, and then by his departure from Witton for Stratford in February 1561. The latter event, after his fourteen years' residence in the township, covering a period of tragic social and religious upheaval, must have seemed, as it may well have been, a misfortune to the neighbourhood. More than half a year passed before the governors of the school appointed a successor, and only then on receipt of a letter from Deane, dated the 30th August 1561, requiring them in their "contention" to have some regard for the Statutes and, "leaving their affections aside," to choose some "virtuous, learned, and able man." Their choice fell at last, not on Bretchgirdle's successor in the curacy, Henry Birkenhead (who may or may not have applied for the post), but on one Stephen Lambert. Witton now had both a curate and a schoolmaster. The latter, presumably, lived in the Master's "lodgings." Was Bretchgirdle's house and land adjoining the Chapel yard in request for the curate? Sir Thomas Venables may have leased the premises to Bretchgirdle in 1549-50 in the belief that they would always be occupied by the curate, and perhaps resented the fact that Bretchgirdle surrendered neither lease nor premises but kept his "servants" (whatever that may mean) in possession, under terms of which we know nothing save that these servants were responsible for his gelding. On the other hand, Sir Thomas was a Romanist, "not favourable to True Religion,"¹ and Bretchgirdle may have retained both lease and occupation in the interest of his Protestant successor in the curacy. Be that as it may, Sir Thomas got into his hands Bretchgirdle's "deed indented" of the lease, and proceeded "about the Feast of Pentecost" (21st May) 1564 to "enter into the premises, and did then and there take (the) gelding, of the price of 40s., going and depasturing on the premises, and the same horse did impound, detain and

¹ Such he was reported by the Bishop of Chester to the Privy Council in the autumn of 1564.

keep, and by no means would deliver until he died for famine ; and yet not contented, hath and doth daily vex the lessee and his servants, and will not in any wise permit them to occupy " the premises aforesaid. Such was Bretchgirdle's complaint in a bill in Chancery, dated the 12th October 1564, petitioning the Lord Keeper (Sir Nicholas Bacon) that, in so much as he had lost his deed, a writ of *subpœna* might be granted on his behalf summoning Sir Thomas Venables to appear in the court to answer the charges against him. The result is unknown, but that the matter was settled amicably we may perhaps conclude from the bequest by Bretchgirdle in his will of the 20th June 1565 of a book to the son and heir of the defendant—" I give to my godson, Robert Venables, my *Encheiridion* in English and Latin." This was probably the *Encheiridion Militis Christiani* (" Manual of a Christian Knight ") of Erasmus, which was translated into English for the benefit of a Gloucestershire squire, Sir John Walsh of Little Sodbury, not many miles from Stratford-upon-Avon, by no less a master of both languages than William Tyndale.

Brownsword was at Stratford for two years and six months, as we gather from the following entries in the Chamberlains' Accounts :

" 15 Feb. 156 $\frac{7}{8}$ (Michaelmas 1564 to Michaelmas 1565. Made by John Shakespeare).

Item paid to Master Brownsword 2s. Item paid the Schoolmaster £10.

10 Jan. 156 $\frac{7}{8}$ (Michaelmas 1565 to Michaelmas 1567. Made by William Brace).

Item to William a Court for his half year's wages 33s. 4d.

Item paid to Master Higford and Master Brownsword £40."

William a Court was the Protestant successor to Roger Edgeworth in the stewardship. He retired at Lady Day, 1566. Then Master Higford followed. Deducting Higford's " wages " for the three half-years 25th March 1566 to 29th September 1567 (£5) from the £40, we get £35 for Brownsword. This would be for a year and nine months' service, from Michaelmas 1565 to Midsummer 1567. But by the terms of his engagement he had to give three months' teaching without pay on leaving or forfeit £5, and as the £5 does not appear in the Accounts we are warranted in believing that he served until Michaelmas 1567.

It is worth while to note certain local events during his sojourn in the borough. His friend Bretchgirdle died on the 20th June 1565, and was succeeded as vicar by the late schoolmaster, Brownsword's predecessor, William Smart. Smart

was presented by Ambrose, Earl of Warwick, on the 3rd July. John Shakespeare was chosen an alderman on the 4th July by the bailiff and aldermen, all of whom were present except the old Romanist, John Jeffreys, who may have been ill. The same day Gilbert Bradley the glover, John Shakespeare's fellow-craftsman and friend in Henley Street, and Nicholas Barnhurst, an ultra-Protestant woollen-draper in Sheep Street, were elected principal burgesses. All three were sworn on the 12th September, from which day John Shakespeare was "Master Shakespeare," with the status of a "gentleman." On the 4th October Master Shakespeare's ultra-Protestant neighbour in Henley Street, Master John Wheeler, yeoman, was sworn bailiff for the coming twelvemonth. On the 15th February 1566 Master Shakespeare made his final account as chamberlain, on behalf of his friend and "gossip" (as I believe) William Smith of Henley Street, handing over the finances of the borough and the care of its estate, including the continued "reparation" of the Gild premises, to the new chamberlains, Thomas Dickson of the *Swan* in Middle Row, and William Brace, a tailor in Corn Street. While Brownsword was Master, the old Gild kitchen, with its handsome chimney, was removed, and a "solar" or chamber in the roof of the schoolroom (the marks of which may still be seen) was taken down. Old Alderman Jeffreys died in August 1566, in his house, the Shrieve's House, in Sheep Street. "I give my soul to God," he said, "to be in joy with our Blessed Lady and with all the company of Heaven." Protestant neighbours, however, witnessed and "supervised" his will, including Nicholas Barnhurst. That month Queen Elizabeth paid her first visit to Warwickshire, where her favoured Dudleys were now restored to greatness and splendour at Warwick Castle and Kenilworth. She arrived in Coventry on the 17th. Philip Sidney rode over from Shrewsbury, with his Puritan schoolmaster, Thomas Ashton, to join in the welcome, and accompanied his uncles, the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Leicester, in the royal train to Kenilworth (on the 19th) and thence to Warwick, where her Majesty was received with bell-ringing and pageants and magnificent hospitalities. There was a new Countess at the Castle, Earl Ambrose having married Lady Anne Russell, eldest daughter of the Puritan Earl of Bedford, on the 11th November previously. The Earl of Bedford and four other lords were lodged by Master Thomas Fisher at the Priory, and presented by the Corporation with wine and sugar and hoops of filberts and damsons. Stratford men, no doubt, came over in force, and in their Chamberlains'

Account is the entry "for the Queen's carriage 16s."—a contribution from the borough purse towards the expenses of her Majesty's journey as she passed on her way to Woodstock *via* Charlecote, where she halted and knighted Thomas Lucy at his new manor-house.

That was a great day for the Lucys. The new knight was in his thirty-fifth year, with a rich wife and two children, and a tribe of brothers and sisters, some of whom were almost as young as his children. One of his elder brothers was Richard Lucy, who had inherited the manor of Claybrooke in Leicestershire. To Richard Lucy, about the time of the Queen's memorable visit to Charlecote, Brownsword apparently wrote his *Ad Ricardum Lucinum*. He plays on the words *Lux* and *Dies* and *Penna* in a way that unmistakably suggests an act of plagiarism by this gentleman. *Lucinus* is ironical, "Bringer to the Light" being one who endeavoured to darken. A lazy ass once put on the skin of a lion and frightened the flock until his long ears betrayed him. Thus every huckster who imposes on the simple lets out all at last, bringing it into the clear light of day (*in lucem liquidæ dies revelans*). Golden day exposed the tasteless witticisms of the Phrygian tyrant,¹ and the east wind shook the harvest of the talkative barber. Æsop's owl went stately in other birds' plumes with ridiculous satisfaction. Day dawning, the greedy Wiles ran for their garments and moved the winged host (*pennigeræ cohorti*) to laughter. Things counterfeited do not flourish:

"Metiri pede te tuo memento
Pennas proque modo fovere nidi
Hic scriptis scopus est. Vale! tuamque
Sparten quæ obtigit² expolire curans
Esto quod cupis ipse te videri"—

"Remember to measure thyself with thine own foot, and to nurture thy feathers after the fashion of thy nest. This is the aim of my letters. Farewell! and make it thy care to adorn the Sparta which has been assigned to thee.² Be that which thou wouldst appear."

Did the poem give offence? It was hardly calculated to give pleasure at Charlecote.

In September of this year, 1566, a son was born to the poet-schoolmaster, baptised on the 12th, and entered in the register as *Johannes filius Johannis Brownsword* (an interesting variant of the name). A month later, on the 13th October, Master Shakespeare's second son, Gilbert, was baptised. The 13th October was a Sunday; and in accordance with the rubric in the Prayer Book, "that it is most convenient

¹ Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, xi. 146–193.

² Cicero, *Att.* i. 20. 3.

that Baptism should not be ministered but upon Sundays and other holy days when the most number of people may come together, as well for that the congregation there present may testify the receiving of them that be newly baptised into the number of Christ's Church as also because in the Baptism of infants every man present may be put in remembrance of his own profession made to God," the proud alderman, with the sponsors and, it may be, his little son of two and a half years, William, presented himself at the font "either immediately after the last lesson at morning prayer or else immediately after the last lesson at evening prayer," as the vicar, William Smart, "by his discretion" did appoint, and in the face of friends and neighbours had his new babe christened, and named probably after his fellow-craftsman in Henley Street, Gilbert Bradley.

Brownsword's departure from Stratford at Michaelmas 1567 coincides with John Shakespeare's nomination for the bailiwick. Two older men were also nominated. Robert Perrott received sixteen votes, Shakespeare three, Rafe Cawdrey none. The last was only nominated *pro forma*, three names having to go before the lord of the manor (the Earl of Warwick), but eventually he was elected, the other two making excuse—Perrott bad excuse, Shakespeare good.

After his brief masterships at Wilmslow, Macclesfield, Warwick, and Stratford, Brownsword settled down in his second period at Macclesfield, which lasted for more than twenty years and left him invalided and famous at the age of about forty-eight. "Feeling himself by reason of his continual sickness and infirmities unable to accomplish" his charge, he resigned, and on the 3rd April 1588 a successor was appointed. The Register of Buryings for 1589 records, "Master John Brownsword, the famous Schoolmaster de Macclesfield, April 15." A brass plate in the church bears the inscription: "*Joanni Brounswerdo Maclesfeldensi, Ludimagistro, viro pio pariter ac docto, hic sepulto et repulverescenti, Thomas Newton Butlensis, pietatis gratitudinis et officii ergo p[osuit].*"

Alpha poetarum, Coryphæus grammaticorum,
Flos pædagogôn hac sepelitur humo.
Obiit 15° Apr. 1589."

A variant of the distich is published by Newton at the end of his edition of Brownsword's poems, "Pædonomôn phoenix" taking the place of "Flos pædagogôn."

EDGAR I. FRIPP.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

DURING the last few months philosophical science has lost several noted and distinguished men. Wilhelm Wundt, the veteran teacher at Leipzig, passed away on 1st September, at the advanced age of eighty-eight years. Wundt's activity was so varied and comprehensive, and his writings so numerous and bulky, that it is difficult to give in a few words any idea of the work he accomplished. There is scarcely a department of philosophy he left untouched. As a psychologist he was known throughout the world as the pioneer of the experimental method of research that is now so much in vogue, and his laboratory in Leipzig, instituted in 1878, was the first of its kind to be started in any university. The *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, published originally as one volume in 1874, became a massive book of three volumes in the fifth edition of 1902, and is a vast storehouse of facts, largely accumulated in the Leipzig Institute. But Wundt was by no means an advocate of what the Germans call *Psychologismus*. He repudiated the attempt to base either *Erkenntnislehre* or metaphysics upon psychology. His *Logik* (the two volumes of which appeared in 1880 and 1883, and which in later editions was expanded into three volumes) is a valuable contribution to the science, and that part of it which deals with the methodology of the special sciences the most thorough treatment of the subject in existence. His *Ethik* (1886) has been translated into English, though it is far less important, I think, than most of his other books. Wundt's position in the history of philosophical thought will rest mainly upon his *System der Philosophie*, which appeared in 1889. This is a work of distinct originality and significance, covering practically the whole field of metaphysics, in which there is finally presented the thought of a World-will comprising within itself a multiplicity of individual wills as his rendering of the nature of ultimate reality. Wundt was a great and inspiring teacher, who won the esteem and affection of his pupils, and whose kindly interest in their welfare they will cherish as a precious memory. He lived, however, to see his work accomplished and the tasks he had set himself in early years achieved. On the other hand, the untimely death, at the age of sixty-seven, of Alexius Meinong, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Graz, removes from our midst a thinker of the first rank, who would yet have added immensely to the progress of thought. We can, indeed, ill afford to lose Meinong. His

work had the peculiar quality of being almost invariably at the growing point of philosophical inquiry, and it is the work of few men of which that can be said. Even his first monograph, the *Hume-Studien* (in two parts, published in 1877 and 1882 respectively), was an instance of what I mean. It was an extremely acute and penetrative treatment of the theory of relations, just then especially opportune in view of T. H. Green's *Introduction*, published in 1874. A long series of important papers and treatises followed, all of them characterised by the same careful and painstaking investigation, and bearing for the most part upon the theory of knowledge and the more fundamental problems of psychology. Meinong made no attempt to construct an ambitious metaphysical system; but, since Adamson's death in 1902, he was probably the acutest mind in Europe at work upon strictly epistemological lines of research. His treatise *Ueber Annahmen*, published in 1902, broke entirely new ground, and has led to some of the most fruitful discussion of recent times. A considerable number of Meinong's later writings were devoted to what he designated *Gegenstandstheorie*, which he regarded as constituting a specific branch of philosophy, having to do with objects as such and with what can be determined *a priori* about objects. He was led to the task of mapping out what he took to be a new science by discovering that there were certain objects (*Gegenstände*) which might be called "heimatlose Gegenstände," homeless objects—objects, that is to say, which hitherto had belonged to no particular department of science, and the peculiar nature of which had, therefore, escaped notice. For example, the simple sense-qualities, when considered on their own account, are neither physical nor mental; they fall within the province neither of physics nor of psychology. And, moreover, their mode of being is not that mode of being which is properly indicated by the term existence. They form, then, one considerable class of objects to be dealt with by the science described as *Gegenstandstheorie*. During the war Meinong published a large and important book *Ueber Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit*, copies of which have only just reached this country. Alongside of these two great German thinkers, we have also to name an English philosopher, Charles Barnes Upton, who died on 21st November, a few days before reaching the age of eighty-nine years. Mr Upton was Dr Martineau's successor in the Chair of Philosophy at Manchester College, and continued on the staff until his retirement in 1903. His interest lay chiefly in the realm of moral and religious philosophy, and in former years he was a frequent contributor to various journals and periodicals. Occupying in the main the philosophical standpoint of Martineau, Mr Upton was an ardent and acute critic of the Hegelian and allied systems, which seemed to him to terminate in pantheism and to leave no room for individual freedom and responsibility. In the volume of Hibbert Lectures on *The Bases of Religious Belief*, published in 1894, he developed a system of Monadology, very much upon the lines of Lotze. According to this view, the ultimate elements of existence are taken to be individual psychical monads, in all stages of evolution, and formed into a unity by being comprised within the infinite personality of God. On the one side, each monad is indissolubly linked to God as its ground or cause; on the other, it possesses an individuality or selfhood of its own. Thus the universe consists of an ascending series of psychical existents, proceeding from the atoms of the physicist to the soul of man. Mr Upton also wrote the portion of the *Life and Letters*

of James Martineau dealing with Martineau's philosophy, which has since been published separately. By a curious nemesis, he lived for the last twenty years of his life in the old house at Littlemore which was the home of Newman after resigning the vicarage of St Mary's, and where Newman was received into the Church of Rome. To that picturesque abode, Mr Upton's friends and former students were in the habit often of resorting across the hill from Oxford to discuss with him, perhaps walking up and down the paths of the lovely garden, philosophical issues, about which, until infirmities of age rendered it impossible, he was ever eager to converse. His was a nature sweet and modest from the core—one in whom there was no guile.

The first volume of Dr J. M. E. McTaggart's important work on *The Nature of Existence* (Cambridge: University Press, 1921) will call to be reviewed in detail later. At present, I have simply to chronicle its appearance. It is devoted to a consideration of what can be determined as to the characteristics which belong to all that exists, or which belong to Existence as a whole. At the outset of his inquiry, Dr McTaggart has to face the question whether there is anything which is not existent, or whether, on the other hand, the only things which are real are of such a sort that their reality implies their existence. Far too easily, I think, in view, for instance, of the elaborate investigations of Meinong, he reaches the conclusion that there is no reason to hold that there is anything real which is not existent, and that, even if there is any such non-existent reality, its relation to existence is such that, in studying existence, we study the whole of reality. He argues, in reference to the classes of things which have been held to be real yet non-existent, that (a) no reason has ever been given for the reality of propositions except the truth or falsehood of beliefs, and that beliefs, whether true or false, do not involve the reality of non-existent facts (why "facts"?); (b) all characteristics are existent, independently or as elements in others; and (c) possibility is an assertion about the implication of one characteristic by another, and the implication of one characteristic by another is always an existent fact. As regards method, Dr McTaggart recognises that his own method stands much closer to Hegel's than to that of any other philosopher, but he differs from Hegel in not accepting triadic division and the partial falsehood of the lower categories. In the several books of this volume he deals with Substance, Groups, and Determining Correspondence. We are glad to find that a second edition has been called for of Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison's Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920). Professor Pringle-Pattison has added some useful supplementary notes referring to the more important criticisms and discussions to which the first edition of the work gave rise. He explains that his argument presupposes a comprehensive divine experience which is other than, and infinitely more than, that of any finite self, or of all finite selves collectively, if their several contributions could be somehow pieced together. Uniqueness belongs to the very notion of a self or consciousness, so that it is meaningless to speak of one consciousness as "included in another" or of "a Mind which includes all minds." Yet, on the other hand, God means, for philosophy at all events, not simply or primarily the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment. Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love—

these constitute the being of God; and both God and man become in fact bare points of mere existence—impossible abstractions—if we try to separate them from one another and from the structural elements of their common life. In a volume called *Divine Imagining: An Essay on the First Principles of Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1921), Mr Douglas Fawcett re-states, in a short and less controversial form for the ordinary reader, the substance of the view maintained in his book, *The World as Imagination*. The view is that ultimate reality, the Power manifested in phenomena, resembles that phase of human experience which we term imagining. The view is not new. It was set forth and maintained as long ago as 1877 by Frohschammer in his book entitled *Die Phantasie als Grundprinzip des Weltprocesses*; and it does not seem to me that Mr Fawcett handles his theme with anything like the care and thoroughness of Frohschammer. He makes no attempt to inspect the process of imagining as it takes place in ourselves, and thus to ascertain its true nature; he simply asserts that it will remain inexplicable unless regarded as continuing a wider kindred activity in which all phases of human experience, known to the psychologist, take their rise—this wider tract of activity being connected with yet wider tracts such as sustain and create the world. The divine imagining is not personal. That which is manifest in all contents and all finite sentient is not to be conceived as a person, as a finite sentient itself. But it is conscious in a supremely eminent sense. It is aware of all that it conserves and creates. Further, it is not a barely monistic principle after the Indian model. It manifests in the eternally many; and it cannot oblige theologians by vanishing into a single experient. I can only say that all this appears to me to be itself pure phantasy and not reasoned philosophy. The book is not, however, destitute of efforts of reflective thought, though, as a whole, it seems to me disappointing. Professor Bergson's *L'Énergie spirituelle* (already reviewed in these pages) has been translated into English by Professor H. Wildon Carr, under the title of *Mind-Energy* (London: Macmillan, 1920). From the point of view of Bergson's general theory the essay on "Intellectual Effort" is the most important part of the volume. He holds that mental effort consists in a series of actions and reactions between what he calls a scheme and images, although how either a "scheme" or "images" can be supposed to exert activity is not explained, nor how of such activity there comes to be awareness.

A considerable amount of discussion has recently taken place on the theory of relativity. The October number of *Mind* contains the papers on the philosophical aspect of the theory by Professor A. S. Eddington, Dr W. D. Ross, Professor C. D. Broad, and Professor F. A. Lindemann, which were read at the Congress in Oxford in the summer. Philosophically, the most important of these are those by Dr Ross and Professor Broad. The former maintains that the belief in absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion is not a mere prejudice of common sense, but something that necessarily underlies all our thought, and that Einstein's argument which tries to disprove them is assuming them all the same. He thinks that the explanation of the Michelson-Morley and similar results is to be found in some theory not about space and time but about matter or ether, some theory such as that of Lorentz which, though surprising enough, contains nothing that we need have any difficulty in believing. Professor Broad, on the other hand, insists that by substituting everywhere in the

formulae the velocity of one system with respect to another for the velocity of a given system with respect to the ether, absolute motion and the ether have dropped out altogether, and that we are left with equations connecting the measurements of two observers who contemplate the same events. Very much to the point is Professor Broad's protest against supposing that, according to the relativity theory, lengths, time-lapses, etc., are relations between nature and the observer. It would, he urges, be nearer the truth to draw a much sharper distinction between the "observer" in the sense of his body and his scientific instruments and the "observer" in the sense of the observing mind. In the former sense the observer is part of nature, in the latter he is not. And we ought then to say that lengths, time-lapses, etc., are relations between one part of nature and another part of nature, and that it is these relations—or the natural complexes related by them—which the mind of the physicist contemplates, measures, and describes. An extremely interesting lecture given by Professor Einstein himself last May at the University of Leiden has been published, entitled *Aether und Relativitäts-Theorie* (Berlin: Springer, 1920). Einstein here points out that the hypothesis of an ether is in itself in no way irreconcilable with the special theory of relativity; the one thing that has to be avoided is ascribing to the ether a condition of movement. It is true that at first sight the ether hypothesis seems from the standpoint of the special theory to be a barren hypothesis, yet even from that standpoint important considerations can be advanced in its favour. According to the general theory, however, space is regarded as endowed with physical qualities, and space without an ether would be unthinkable, because in such a space not only would there be no propagation of light, but there would be no possibility of the existence of measuring-rods and clocks—that is to say, there would be no spatio-temporal distance in the sense required by physics. Only, to this ether there must not be applied the concept of motion. Mention should be made of the number of *Nature* for 17th February, which is specially devoted to the principle of relativity, and contains important articles by Professor Einstein, Mr Cunningham, Mr J. H. Jeans, Professor Lorentz, Sir Oliver Lodge, Professor Weyl, and others. It is abundantly evident from their articles that the one philosophical theory of space and time with which the relativity theory is utterly incompatible is that of Leibniz.

With the January issue, *Mind* appears under a new editorship. Professor G. F. Stout, who has been the editor since 1892, has resigned his office, and Dr G. E. Moore has succeeded him. Professor Stout stated at the beginning of his undertaking that he should endeavour to make *Mind* an organ for the expression of all that was most original and valuable in current English Philosophy, without predilection for any special school, and the twenty-nine volumes he has been responsible for bear sufficient witness to the faithfulness he has shown to that ideal. May Dr Moore's period of editorship be as long and as fruitful as that of Stout's! The first article in the January number is by the present writer, on "Ward's Psychological Principles." After a survey of the significant part played by Ward's *Encyclopædia* article in the history of the science, a critical examination is attempted of the theory of presentations and of the notion of a presentational continuum. Dr Ward's treatment of feeling and will is also dealt with, and the article concludes with a discussion of the idea of "psychoplasm." The first part of an able article by Professor

Broad on "Alexander's Gifford Lectures" follows. The writer examines Alexander's view of "unqualified" Space-Time, and argues that the distinction of perspectives and sections is not rightly applicable to it. He finds Alexander's account of the way in which space heals the impermanence of time, and time the blankness of space, most difficult to follow, and still more so to believe. "It does look as if space and time were attempting, like the inhabitants of the Scilly Islands, 'to gain a precarious livelihood by taking in each other's washing.'" There is also the first part of an interesting article by Mr F. Chapman Sharp on "Hume's Ethical Theory and its Critics," in which it is contended that, with reference to the source of the moral judgment, Hume saw a fact which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had failed to realise the significance of—the fact, namely, that for a being possessed of "social affections" the discovery of felicitic qualities in conduct must arouse direct satisfaction. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson assert by implication that this satisfaction plays no part in the moral judgment. Hume, on the contrary, not only sees that it cannot be ignored, but believes he can describe and explain through it not indeed all phenomena, yet "the most considerable part" of the phenomena of the moral judgment.

The new volume of the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (N.S., vol. xx.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1920) is chiefly noteworthy on account of Professor James Ward's Presidential Address, entitled, "In the Beginning . . ." The Address is concerned with the question as to the method of philosophy. Professor Ward argues that it is a hopeless attempt to begin from the standpoint which only a completed philosophy would occupy. To advance continuously and to be coherent—that seems to him to be the golden rule. The whole procedure must be tentative, as is always the case with inverse problems. A large part of the Address consists of a criticism of the notion of the Absolute, as used by neo-Hegelian writers. It is maintained that the two ideas of the Absolute as (a) the universe as a whole, and (b) the Individual whose experience is Reality, are not, by these writers, clearly distinguished. Both ideas seem to be merged in a unity. Yet the two ideas cannot be identified: "predicates" seem more appropriate to the one, "contents," in its psychological use, more appropriate to the other. The neo-Hegelians use these terms almost interchangeably, and consequently oscillate between two distinct conceptions of the Absolute. The only solution of the difficulty open to us is the solution we naturally reach by beginning where we are, instead of attempting to begin with a "One above," that is theoretically inaccessible. Then we should view the Absolute as consisting of God and the World in which God is immanent, while still transcending it. Such a concept is a rational ideal; and its use in theoretical philosophy can only be regulative, as Kant contended. Dr G. E. Moore contributes an important paper on "External and Internal Relations." The most essential point in connection with the dogma of internal relations is, he thinks, to see clearly the difference between the proposition (1) that if A has ϕ , and x has not, it follows that x is other than A, and the proposition (2) that if A has ϕ , then from the proposition with regard to any term x that it has not got ϕ , it follows that x is other than A; and to see that the second, which he holds to be false, does *not* follow from the first, which he takes to be true. Mr Morris Ginsberg discusses the question: "Is there a General Will?" He answers the question in the negative. Even though it could be proved that individual wills are rational and therefore aim at a harmonious good,

yet they would not constitute a general will, but merely a joint will for the good. The belief that they do constitute a general will is due to a confusion between content and act. Acts are always individual, and neither the object of will nor the good constitutes an existential part of the individual consciousness. The paper by Miss Beatrice Edgell on "Memory and Conation" is concerned with the question whether the faculty of memory implies the existence of conation as a specific mental function. She compares the ways in which the problem is dealt with by Professor Ward, Dr Semon, and Dr Freud. Dr W. F. Geikie-Cobb writes on "Mysticism, True and False." He defines mysticism as an immediate apprehension of some interior good comparable to the immediate knowledge we have of the objects of the empirical world. Mysticism is an empirical knowledge of, or direct acquaintance with, a presented non-sensuous Good. The volume also contains a symposium on the question: "Is the 'Concrete Universal' the True Type of Universality?" Two of the writers, Professor J. W. Scott and Professor Carr, reply in the affirmative, while the other two, Dr G. E. Moore and the present writer, reply in the negative.

Professor L. T. Hobhouse has just published a valuable volume on *The Rational Good: A Study in the Logic of Practice* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1921). It deals with the basis and end of human action in general, and endeavours to establish the principles of a rational Ethics. Professor Hobhouse contends that the judgment "this is good" is not only the expression of an attitude, but also the assertion of a fact, and the fact which it asserts is a harmony between an experience and a feeling. In describing anything as good we are at once taking up a practical attitude towards it and asserting a harmonious relation of which it is one term. As pertaining to this harmony, that term may legitimately be called good, but the concrete truth involves both terms in the relation. "Good," then, is a harmony of experience and feeling in the generic sense, and any element—feeling or other experience—that enters into this harmony is called good by right of membership. The rational good is (a) throughout consistent, it does not tend to clash with anything else that is reasonably held good; (b) a good that has a universal ground, the end or act or feeling that is good as such must be good wherever and in whomsoever found; and (c) objective, *i.e.* the judgment of the good must not depend on any peculiarity of the individual who forms it. Viewed as feeling, the rational good is happiness; viewed as the object of this feeling, it is the fulfilment of vital capacity as a consistent whole; viewed in both aspects together, it is happiness found in such fulfilment. In two articles on "Principles in Ethics" (*Phil. R.*, Nov. 1920 and Jan. 1921) Professor A. K. Rogers discusses the question in what general form reason can be applied to the ethical life, as a source of principles to guide us in the search for our chief good. His answer is that, since the more positive and individualistic claims of the good are dependent on desire, which varies widely, and innocently, in various men, it is peculiarly in the moral field, constituted by those restraining elements of human nature which issue in the judgment of the moral ought, that most of the constitutive principles of ethics capable of general application have to be looked for. He argues that the first requisite for the successful life is that it should be organised along the lines of a concrete, growing, active interest, determined as far as possible by the bias of one's individual nature, but engineered, as by using

brains it can always be, to bring us into contact on as wide a front as possible with the real world, and to gain as great a significance as possible by the part it is given to play. Mr William Benett's *Freedom and Liberty* (Oxford: University Press, 1920) is rather an elusive book to read. The aim of the first part is, we are informed, purely ethical—to show that, for the purposes of human evolution, each of the two opposites, law, or organic control, and liberty, or life, is of equal importance; that there can be no continued growth of the race as a whole without an equal growth of each of these conflicting principles. The author believes that the universal final end of ethics must be found in religion, and there only. What that final end is, in which of the many competing forms of religion it is to be found, and how it is to be connected with the contradictory judgments of ethics in such a way as to make a complete system, are questions he attempts to answer in the second part of the volume. The final end of action must, he thinks, be placed in another world, beyond the range of experience. The supreme end of Christianity is liberty, but not liberty in this world; the aim of the Church in this world is freedom, or liberty conditioned by law.

I wish to call attention to the very valuable volume of *Collected Scientific Papers*, by the late John Henry Poynting, edited by G. A. Shakespear and Guy Barlow (Cambridge: University Press, 1920). This handsome book consists, of course, principally of Professor Poynting's scientific memoirs and papers on Gravitation, Electricity, Radiation, etc. But it comprises also a considerable number of articles of a general and philosophical character, for Professor Poynting was a man of wide interests, and what he has to say on the fundamental principles of science and upon the questions that lie on the borderland between science and philosophy is most stimulating and suggestive. His Presidential Address to the Mathematical and Physical Section of the British Association in 1899 is really a striking utterance. Biographical and critical notices are contributed by Sir Oliver Lodge, Sir J. J. Thomson, and others; and altogether, the collection is one that will be treasured by all Professor Poynting's many friends.

Miss M. Crane Carroll has written a careful and useful account of "The Principle of Individuality in the Metaphysics of Bernard Bosanquet" in the January number of the *Philosophical Review*. In the same number there is a thoughtful criticism by Mr D. Sommes Robinson of "Dr Whitehead's Theory of Events." The writer complains that while Dr Whitehead speaks of a continuous stream of external nature, which stream is the whole ether of events, he nowhere explains how this continuous stream is connected with the separate perceptual streams.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

REVIEWS.

Space, Time, and Deity. The Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916-1918. By S. Alexander, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester. 2 vols.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1920.—Pp. xvi + 347, xiii + 437.

"I HAVE the conviction, which I cannot here defend, that there is only one matrix from which all qualities arise." So Professor Alexander wrote in a paper which was read to the British Academy in January 1914; and, meanwhile, he has elaborated an imposing metaphysical system which, if the foundations be well and truly laid, would justify the conviction to which he thus gave expression seven years ago. In the long history of human reflection, many attempts have been made to name and to determine the nature of the ultimate ground of things. Matter, Mind, Substance, Force, Thought, Will, Life, Spirit—these and several other descriptive epithets have been employed to denote the one absolute being from which it has been sought to show that the universe has emanated. Has Professor Alexander at length unearthed for us the secret, and succeeded in disclosing in "Space-Time" that which previous explorers, in their various "voyages of discovery," have groped after in vain? Whether he has or no, he has in any case made a most significant contribution to metaphysical science, and no discerning reader of these volumes can fail to be impressed with the striking originality of the view they present or with the subtlety of argument brought to bear in its support.

At the outset, it should be observed that the *method* of philosophy, as the author conceives it, is, like the method of the special sciences, empirical. Philosophy proceeds, that is to say, by description and analysis, and uses, as the special sciences do, hypotheses, which it submits to verification. On the other hand, the *subject-matter* of philosophy is non-empirical; philosophy is concerned with the pervasive or categorical characters of things, as distinguished from their variable features. So that compendiously philosophy may be said to be the experiential or empirical study of the non-empirical or *a priori*, and of such topics, both numerous and important, as arise out of the relation of the empirical to the *a priori*. Accordingly, it is itself one of the sciences, and is distinguished from the others by its special subject-matter and not by its method.

The fundamental principle of the book is that Space-Time is the stuff out of which all existents are made. Regarded as independent, Time and Space are, indeed, abstractions—abstractions legitimate enough for certain scientific purposes, but illegitimate if either is thought to exclude the

other. Apart from Time, Space would not be Space; and, apart from Space, Time would not be Time. Empirically each is found to be a continuum; in isolation neither would be a continuum. Were Time self-subsistent, each "now" would need to be created afresh; and, even then, a series of such "nows" would be a series of discrete units. Were Space self-subsistent, it would be a mere blank, a mere *ὑποδοχή*, without distinctness of parts; and, where there is no distinctness of parts, to speak of continuity is meaningless. In truth, however, Space is a continuum because Time secures its divisibility, and Time is a continuum because Space secures the connection of its parts. The ultimate constituents of Space-Time are not points *per se* nor instants *per se*, but point-instants, or pure events; every point has its date and every instant its place. These ultimate constituents of Space-Time are thus motions, and Space-Time is a system of motions; or, as it might be called, simply Motion. But motion does not involve something which moves; it is anterior to things, which are complexes of motions, and it breaks up of itself into these complexes, which are within it as the single vast entity embracing them all. On the one hand, there are certain pervasive features which characterise, in some form or other, every finite existent generated within the universe of Space-Time. These are the categories—such as being or identity, relation, substance, quantity, causality,—and the empirical modes—such as size, shape, number, motion of various sorts—in which a thing exemplifies the categories are the traditional "primary qualities" (strictly determinations of the thing, and not "qualities"). On the other hand, there are empirical features which only existents of a certain degree of complexity exhibit, qualities in the strict sense, the traditional "secondary qualities" amongst others. These qualities—such as materiality, colour, life, consciousness—form a hierarchy; each emerges, that is to say, in a portion of an existent of the next lower quality. The clue to the relation of the lower qualities of existence to their inferior basis is furnished by the relation of mind to the bodily organism. We find that when physiological processes in certain parts of the living body attain a certain kind or degree of complexity they possess as a matter of fact the quality of mind, and we may take this as exemplifying what holds universally. Life may be said metaphorically to be the mind or soul of a physico-chemical thing; colour to be the mind or soul of the material thing possessing it; materiality to be the mind or soul of the complex of motions from which it emerges. There is, therefore, no such thing as mechanism without that which corresponds to mind being contained within it and animating it. Even bare Space-Time has its soul, which is Time. Moreover, there are qualities—the tertiary qualities or values—which arise from minds entering into relations of a general character with objects and, through social intercourse, with one another. Furthermore, the universe which contains Time as one of its elements and which has produced mind is pregnant with the next higher quality. Beings endowed with this quality would be for us gods or angels, and their quality deity; but beyond them a new empirical quality would loom, which would be for them what deity is for us. There is, then, no actually infinite existent with the quality of deity; but the whole universe is an actually infinite existent with a *nisus* to deity, or which is in travail with deity, and this is the God of the religious consciousness.

Such in bald, meagre outline is the metaphysical theory which Professor

Alexander develops with a wonderful freshness and resoluteness, and with a comprehensive insight into the relations of philosophical and scientific questions. A work of so extensive a range, embracing in some form all the problems of theoretical philosophy, cannot, of course, in any critical survey be dealt with on all its sides. I propose, therefore, to try to place myself at Professor Alexander's standpoint, and to examine, from that point of view, certain portions of the theory which seem to call for criticism.

1. One may admit at once the interdependence of Space and Time, which has, in fact, become current mathematical theory. Space certainly is in its very nature temporal, although whether the converse that Time is *necessarily* spatial is true is not so obvious. But, waiving the latter discussion, I will refer, first of all, to the considerations urged by Professor Alexander to *prove* the interdependence, which appear to me far from convincing.

Space as merely spatial would be, it is maintained, a pure blank, and as such would not be a continuum. But I fail to see, from Professor Alexander's account of the matter, how Time is thought to differentiate the parts of Space. Granted that each point of Space persists through Time, or, if it be preferred, may be occupied by different instants, yet each instant occupies, in that case, the whole of Space (i. p. 81), and there is, therefore, nothing in such occupation to mark off one point of Space from another. No doubt, if by "Time" you mean what is ordinarily meant by occurrences in time, these would provide a means of differentiation. At this stage, however, we are supposed to be concerned with "the region of Space-Time pure and simple, before qualified events, like the fall of a stone or the birth of a flower" (i. p. 78), have emerged. And, so far as I follow the argument, Professor Alexander has not succeeded in showing, in regard to this "skeleton universe," that "Space considered at any moment is of various dates" (i. p. 72).

Time, as merely temporal, would consist, it is urged, simply of perishing instants, and there could be in it no continuity. Again, I have been unable to discover why it should be laid down that Time apart from Space would be of this character. The separation of Time into instants, each of which is sought to be conceived as timeless, is after all a separation which abstracting thought introduces into the experience of Time; and the notion of Time as a mere succession of such instants is clearly a self-contradictory notion (cp. i. p. 45). Whatever else we understand by Time, we certainly do understand by it that which renders possible the happening of events or occurrences; and in an indivisible instant nothing could either happen or genuinely exist. The perplexity arises mainly from the circumstance that we persist in interpreting the complex whole—namely, duration—by using alternately, as though they were distinct from one another, the half-thoughts permanence and succession, either of which, if closely inspected, will be seen to require the other—that is to say, is incomplete in itself. But we are not, on that account, justified in concluding that the reality apprehended is incomplete in itself. To say that Time is not a mere sequence or succession of instants simply because these are related to or held together by some permanent other than themselves, seems to be parallel to saying that states of consciousness do not form a discrete series simply because they are related to or held together by some permanent unity of self-consciousness other than themselves. In each case, there has been taken for granted the very thing that requires to be

proved—namely, that the elements which have been assumed to be discrete really are, or in and for themselves would be, discrete. Professor Alexander recognises that the fundamental experience upon which the perception of Time is based is not so much sequence as duration, but he seems to imply (i. p. 44) that, in respect to the present question, it is a matter of indifference whether we speak of instants or durations, and that, apart from Space, durations would be no less discrete than instants. Yet, is it not manifest that a duration, at any rate, comprises within itself both continuity and succession, and that every duration is, as Whitehead puts it, “extended over” by other durations?

2. While it is strenuously insisted that Space and Time are indissoluble—coequal partners, so to speak, in one concern—yet, at least along certain lines of reflection, a decided priority is accorded to Time. Space, we are told, must be regarded as generated in Time, or by Time, since Time is the source of movement (i. p. 61), although it is immediately added that there is “no new Space to be generated as Time goes on,” but what happens is that within the whole, or any part, of Space there is a continuous redistribution of instants of Time (i. p. 63). Still, it is out of the time-element that the quality mind as well as all lower empirical qualities emerge (ii. p. 44); our minds themselves are but special complexities of Time, while a lower complexity carries the quality life, and a still lower one materiality or colour (ii. p. 69). In short, Time becomes an efficient Agent; it is conceived as the principle of motion and change, the abiding principle of impermanence, that at once creates the movements which constitute things and keeps things in movement (ii. p. 48). Professor Alexander calls this taking Time seriously, and he commends Bergson as perhaps the first philosopher in our day who has taken Time seriously (i. p. 44). It is true that he considers Bergson’s doctrine obscure and tantalising in so far as in it Space is represented as a sort of shadow or foil to Time, rather than coequal (i. p. 150); and maintains that Time could not do its work without Space. But when one finds that, all along the line, Time is regarded by him as the “real creator,” and that Space is imaged as “the trail of Time” (i. p. 61), one is inclined to wonder whether Bergson would not be justified in turning round on his critic and in protesting that, notwithstanding his good resolve, he had not contrived to take Time seriously enough. “Throughout,” Bergson might urge, “it is on your view Time that *does* everything; it is Time that ‘hath cleft a channel for the waterflood, and a way for the lightning of the thunder.’ Surely, then, with a little more persistence, it ought to be possible to show that Time is likewise up to the initial task of generating the Space which it requires for its subsequent operations.”

For most people, however, I imagine the puzzle will be to fathom why this amazing Power, that makes not only for righteousness but for things that eye hath not seen nor ear heard, should be designated either Time or Space-Time. According to the hypothesis, “Space and Time are in truth in their indissoluble union the ultimate reality in its simplest and barest terms” (i. p. 233). But why should it be supposed that there is any peculiar magic in the superlatively simple and bare to drag from the universe its last secret? As might be anticipated, the nearer we approach what is taken to be the primordial condition of things, the more embarrassing become the problems that are forced upon us. Accepting Bergson’s dictum that “movement does not imply something that moves,” Professor

Alexander represents Space-Time itself as constituted of pure motions of which point-instants are the limiting cases. Now, of all Bergson's notions, this notion of pure motion is confessedly the most obscure. Ask a physicist how it strikes him, and he will tell you that he can make nothing of it, but that for him motion has no meaning except in reference to something that moves. And, unfortunately, just at this crucial point, Professor Alexander leaves us to our own devices. One wants him to tell us how pure motion *can be* a stuff, the equivalent of the ancient $\psi\lambda\eta$ (although the ancient $\psi\lambda\eta$ was precisely that which was in itself destitute of motion), and what he does instead is to keep insisting that the fact is so.

One is at a loss, too, to understand how the "single vast entity, Motion" (which is the same thing as Space-Time) is thought to break up of itself, or to differentiate itself, into a system of motions. For it is difficult to see how this problem can be supposed in the least degree to be solved by the argument through which it is sought to show that Time introduces diversity into Space, and Space diversity into Time. Granting, for the moment, that Time is an Agent, yet it is admitted (i. p. 216) that Time "flows uniformly," and the question that needs answering is how from a uniformly flowing Time there result a plurality of pure motions differing from one another in virtue of their velocities (ii. p. 47). The distinction between "sections" and "perspectives" does not help us here. A perspective of Space-Time from a point-instant does not, it is urged, give us a Space in which all the points are simultaneous, but one in which they have different dates, and the whole of Space-Time is a synthesis of these perspectives. But in each of the examples offered of a perspective the events that are differently dated are not "pure events" but definitely "qualified" events (such as waves of sound), and what requires to be shown is that what is true of the latter is true likewise of the former.

3. Professor Alexander, I have already said, employs as a clue to the way in which the various empirical qualities that characterise existent things at their respective levels may be represented the relation which he takes to subsist between the mind and its equivalent bodily or neural basis. Mental process and neural process are, he holds, in truth not two but one. That which as experienced from the inside reveals itself as a conscious process is as experienced from the outside a neural process. "It has to be accepted as an empirical fact that a neural process of a certain level of development possesses the quality of consciousness and is thereby a mental process; and, alternately, a mental process is *also* a vital one of a certain order" (ii. p. 7). When, however, it is said that, in the matrix of all existence, Time performs the same function in respect of Space as mind performs in respect of its bodily equivalent (ii. p. 44), the precise sense in which this is to be understood is not, I think, clear. By "mind," in this context, does Professor Alexander mean "the quality of mentality or consciousness," or does he mean "the substance which has this distinctive quality" (ii. p. 38 n.)? If the former—and, since a secondary quality is said to be the mind or soul of its corresponding vibrations (ii. p. 59), this would seem to be the alternative adopted—the analogy would appear to break down, for there is nothing in such a quality as colour corresponding to the function of Time as the source of movement. If the latter, the analogy would equally appear to break down, for, although Time is indis-

solubly related to Space, and Space to Time, Professor Alexander would not assert that they are one in the sense in which he asserts that mental process and neural process are one.

But let us look at the interpretations of the lower levels of existence to which the clue has led. In the first place, the transition has to be made from point-instants, or pure motions, to ponderable masses, or bodies, that move. "Points," we are told, "do not, of course, move in the system of points, but they change their time-coefficients." Bodies, however, do move in the system of points; "what we ordinarily call motion of a body is the occupation by that body of points which successively become present" (i. p. 61). Now, matter is one of the earlier outgrowths from Space-Time (ii. p. 49); its quality, materiality, has budded out from Space-Time (ii. p. 65); material things are complexes of pure events or motions in various degrees of complexity (ii. p. 45). Very well; but what one vainly seeks to learn is how point-instants, whose points do *not* move in the system of points, are conceived to generate, when in some way they cohere together in groups, existents (electrons, atoms, things, etc.) whose points *do* move in the system of points, and which successively "occupy" different space-times. If that step can be securely taken, Professor Alexander is already a long way on his journey; but if it cannot be, he is held up at the start. In the second place, bearing in mind that the method of philosophy is empirical, one is justified in asking what empirical confirmation can be furnished for the view that material existents are generated in the manner assumed. I suppose that the nearest approach which we know, on a large scale, to the "skeleton universe of Space-Time" would be those vast fields of inter-stellar space which have been thought to be filled by an ether, but which our author would say are full of Time. Has there, however, in the history of human science, been a single instance recorded of what could conceivably be regarded as a new empirical existent, endowed with a specific quality, emerging from this huge realm of Space-Time? Even though "from mere simple motion to matter is a far cry" (ii. p. 53), yet, if the theory is to be rendered empirically plausible, there ought surely to be some indications that material existents do emerge in this way in the regions of Space-Time accessible to the astronomer.

In reference to the so-called "secondary qualities" I would press a consideration of like import. "Secondary qualities are," it is said, "a set of new qualities which movements of a certain order of complexity have taken on, or which emerge from them; and the material movements so complicated can no more be separated from the secondary quality (which is not merely correlated with them but identical with them) than the physiological processes which are also psychical can be what they are in the absence of their conscious quality" (ii. p. 59). But again, mindful of the method of philosophical inquiry, I would point to the fact that not only have we no empirical grounds for asserting that a quality, such as red, is either generated by or identical with a complex of motions occurring in a material thing, but that we are wholly incapable even of conceiving a quality as being generated or coming to be at all. Empirically the quality red presents itself to us as simply not a complex of movements; and there is, in fact, something unintelligible in the idea that it can have been fabricated out of movements utterly heterogeneous to it in nature (cp. ii. p. 139). So long, then, as we remain true to the empirical method, the most we are entitled to affirm is that the quality red is correlated

with a certain complex of movements; we are not entitled to affirm that the one is generated by the other, or still less that the two are identical.

Nor is this all. Professor Alexander is very emphatic in insisting that a sense-quality such as red is a property of the external object, and owes nothing, so far as its being or nature is concerned, either to the mind or to the physiological organ. I, for one, agree with him; only the position seems to me a position that it would be impossible to sustain on the view which the author takes of finite existents. According to that view, mind as a thing is its neural basis with the quality of consciousness, and ultimately the neural complex is a highly complicated system of movements. If, now, a sense-quality, say a colour, is generated by movements in the object, why should not such a sense-quality likewise be generated by movements in the neural substance? For, although "the thing called mind has not in respect of its mentality the lower empirical qualities," yet in respect of its neural basis it has those qualities (ii. p. 71). And, inasmuch as a process of visual apprehension is always a cerebral process, what is there to prevent the latter giving rise to a colour which in the act of cognising would at least play a part comparable to that played by the blue of the blue spectacles to which in one place allusion is made (ii. p. 141)? In that case, the colour actually perceived would not be the colour of the object.

4. The important and interesting chapters that deal with Mind and its operations I must not attempt to discuss. With much that is here set forth I am in agreement. I welcome, for example, the clear and firm statement of the principle that the mind can never be an object to itself in the same sense as physical things are objects to it. But I must limit myself to two points in regard to which I find grave difficulties.

Professor Alexander is especially anxious to make good his position that the cognitive relation so far from being unique is only a special case of the simplest of all relations, the mere togetherness of two terms. It is, he argues, the mental term that is unique, not the relation. But it is apparent, I think, even on his own showing, that the mere compresence of a finite existent with the mind does not account for the mind's consciousness of that object (cp. ii. p. 90). For notoriously a mind is all the while in a relation of togetherness with any number of things without being in the least degree cognisant of them. And it turns out, in fact, that the togetherness must be of such a nature that the one term is not merely a mind but a mind that is enjoying its act of contemplating the object, and the other term is not merely something along with the mental term in Space-Time but "what in relation to that enjoyment is a contemplated object" (ii. p. 87). Moreover, it is expressly laid down that a relation is "the *whole* situation into which its terms enter, in virtue of that relation," and that "every relation is a *transaction* between its terms" (ii. p. 240 *sqq.*). If, then, knowing involves that the one term is an act of contemplating and the other term is something contemplated, how can it be legitimate to refuse to recognise as essentially belonging to the cognitive relation the concrete set of circumstances which that situation comprises? Otherwise, it is hard to understand how *any* relation can be said to be unique, seeing that, according to the theory, they are all "spatio-temporal connections of things" (i. p. 249), and so may equally with the cognitive relation be described as special cases of mere togetherness.

In the treatment of "Appearances," the author makes a useful

distinction between real appearances, mere appearances (due to the presence along with the thing apprehended of other things), and illusory appearances. The real appearances of a thing are interpreted, and I think rightly, as "partial revelations" of that thing (ii. p. 184). But the further contention that a thing is the synthesis of its appearances does not seem to me compatible with that just mentioned. For if these "partial revelations" are themselves taken to be existents which together constitute the complex existent called the "thing," we get into trouble at once. To say, for example, that the varying sizes of a plate, seen at different distances from the eye, are all contained within the real size (ii. p. 194) is tantamount to saying (for the size does not appear in abstraction from the shape, colour, pattern, etc., of the plate) that the real plate is something like a collection of samples of each of the different-sized plates of a dinner-service piled up one inside the other! Only, unhappily, in the synthesis of appearances, while the features that appear would be reduplicated *ad indefinitum*, in constantly shrinking dimensions it is true, the features that do not appear would not be contained at all.

With reference to the so-called tertiary qualities, I must be content with saying that I do not understand how the mind, as Professor Alexander conceives it, can be thought of as endowed with the function of superadding them to the intrinsic qualities of things.

5. "The religious emotion is," writes Professor Alexander, "one part of experience, and an empirical philosophy must include in one form or another the whole of experience" (ii. p. 353). As the culmination, therefore, of his endeavour, he is led to inquire how the religious emotion can be made speculatively intelligible. So far he has represented the universe as exhibiting an emergence in Time of successive levels of finite existences, each with its characteristic empirical quality. Mind or consciousness is the highest of these qualities known to us. But there is a *nisus* in Space-Time which, as it has borne its products forward through matter and life to mind, will bear them forward to some higher level of existence. The next higher empirical quality in the order, a quality which the universe is engaged in evolving, is, it is contended, deity. God is the being that possesses deity, but this quality of deity is not a mere enlargement of mind or spirit; it is something which mere spirit subserves, and to which the conception of spirit as such is altogether inadequate. Spirit, personality, mind—these human characters do, indeed, belong to God, not, however, to his deity but to his "body." God's deity is lodged in a portion of his body, and the body of God is the whole universe. Nevertheless, the infinite God is not an existent individual; were the quality of deity actually attained, there would be instead of one infinite being a multiplicity of finite gods with the divine quality, beyond whom a new empirical quality would be looming into view. The infinite God is, then, purely ideal; God as the world possessing infinite deity is never actual, though his body, the entire universe of Space-Time, is actual. God is the power that makes for deity, and exists only in so far as the whole universe is in process towards the emergence of deity.

Whether the conception thus sketched is adequate for the needs of religious aspiration I will leave undetermined, and simply raise the question whether this leap from finite existents to an infinite, though ideal, being is, on Professor Alexander's premisses, justifiable. Why should God be conceived as the *whole* world possessing deity? If deity

be an empirical quality, as is mind or life or colour, is there more reason why the whole world should be the body of God than that it should be the body of any one of these qualities? Are we, indeed, to suppose that the whole world is the body (say) of mind prior to mind's emergence, but that when it does emerge its body shrinks into a very insignificant portion of that world? And if so, why does the fact of emergence make so tremendous a difference? Assuming that the whole world had at one time a *nisus* towards the birth of mind, it is surely arbitrary to assert that it loses such *nisus* so soon as a certain number of mental lives appear upon the scene. So far from being infinite, the argument would rather lead to the conclusion that God's body, could it ever be formed, would be the most infinitesimal complex of movements possible—a portion (say) of a mental existent that had become complex enough to have the quality of deity, just as our mind is a portion of the organic processes complex enough to have the quality of consciousness.

6. To revert now to the consideration with which we started. The conviction that "there is only one matrix from which all qualities arise" is, I suppose, in some ways a natural conviction; but it may well be doubted whether it is, in any sense, a conviction which philosophy is bound to confirm. That the universe must be conceived as one interconnected system may, I think, be laid down as a cardinal philosophical principle—a principle to which we are driven by various converging lines of reflection. Such a system need not, however, by any means imply that the universe is all of one piece, that everything in it is made out of one stuff. Professor Alexander, it will be observed, works throughout with the conception of development or evolution. And no one would question the legitimacy of that conception as applied to specific spheres of existence—to the growth, for example, of organic forms on this earth, or, if you will, to the gradual formation of the solar system. But if the notion of evolution be transferred from its application to definite regions of reality, and be extended to reality in its entirety, is the procedure not open to precisely those objections which Kant pressed in the *Dialectic* against the transcendent use of conceptions which only have significance *within* the world of experience? To mention merely one of the perplexities to which such a procedure leads, it brings us to an *impasse* before the problem of a first beginning. "Once upon a time" there was an *élan vital*, or a pure unqualified Space-Time, or what not. Yes; but how did that imposing entity itself enter upon the stage, or make for itself a stage? Locke's poor Indian philosopher is avenged; the problem that puzzled him is thus verily upon our hands.

G. DAWES HICKS.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON.

The System of Animate Nature. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St Andrews in the years 1915 and 1916. By Professor J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., LL.D., Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. 2 vols.—Pp. xiv + 347; vi + 340.

PROFESSOR THOMSON'S Gifford Lectures deserve the most enthusiastic welcome and appreciation from all who care for the fruitful co-operation of science and philosophy. They are an excellent example of the kind

of service which science can render to philosophy, and philosophy to science, where their relations are not poisoned by mutual suspicion or depreciation, but where a sympathetic understanding is cultivated, based on a due division of their respective functions. A work like Thomson's refreshes and strengthens one's belief in the "unity of civilisation" on its intellectual side far more effectively even than the collection of essays by diverse authors which F. S. Marvin has brought together under that title. There the unity has to be divined, somewhat precariously, by the well-disposed reader. Here, in Thomson's volumes, he can watch the synthetic, or "synoptic," method actually and successfully at work. Moreover, Thomson's work is singularly opportune at the present juncture, and is sure to exercise a powerful influence on current discussions of the aims and methods of philosophy. As everybody knows, philosophy of recent years has been under severe pressure from enthusiastic advocates of "scientific method." At first the concept of this method was ostensibly framed on chemistry and physics, and thus retained some contacts with empirical facts. But, presently, by a steady regression *via* mathematical physics to pure mathematics and thence to pure formal logic, an ideal of method was elaborated which effectively excluded from the scope of philosophy the domain of empirical facts on the one hand, and the domain of feeling and value on the other. Philosophy was debarred from the interpretation of our actual world as a whole on the specious plea of opening up to it the infinite realm of all "possible" worlds. It is of the utmost value alike for scientists and for philosophers to have in Thomson's pages both the theory and the practice of a scientific method which is the reverse of that of the "logisticians." It is no mere accident that this re-orientation should come to us from a biologist. For in the study of living beings the inquirer is kept closely to the concrete facts of sense, whilst being compelled to recognise at the same time that for their full interpretation he requires concepts which transcend sense-data and their observable relations. The more faithfully he renders the total impression which a lifelong study of the "system of animate nature" makes upon him, the less does he feel able to dispense with such terms as "a will to live," "an insurgent self-assertiveness," "an endeavour after well-being." Such an attitude implies no hostility to detailed physico-chemical analysis. It is hostile only to the widely fashionable claim that a *complete* account of living beings can be given in *exclusively* physico-chemical terms. Nothing that physico-chemical analysis establishes concerning the structure and working of an organism is denied or cancelled. What is denied is only that even the completest account in these terms leaves nothing more to be said. For the dominant character of life, as exhibited in the behaviour of living beings and their commerce with their environment, finds no expression in physico-chemical terms at all. In this sense Thomson is absolutely right in insisting upon the "autonomy" of biology, and the "irreducibility" of its dominant concepts.¹

This problem of scientific method is of such importance that we are justified in dwelling a little longer on Thomson's account of his own method. He has set himself the task of giving a comprehensive survey

¹ Inasmuch as every instance of independent agreement on such a fundamental point as this is of value, I may, perhaps, refer to chs. vi. and vii. of my *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Howe; London: Kegan, Paul & Co.).

of animate nature, as a sort of prolegomena to "a philosophy of Animate Nature," *i.e.* to "a consistent thinking together of what we know and feel about Animate Nature along with what we know and feel about other orders of facts." Two points are fundamental in this programmatic statement. One is the emphasis on feeling as well as knowledge. The other is the thinking together of the facts of life with all other orders of facts. Both points protest against perpetuating in philosophy abstractions which have a relative and provisional usefulness in science. One of these abstractions is the divorce of intellect from feeling. The other is the isolation of groups of facts from their setting in the concrete system of the universe. Let us illustrate both.

(1) "Intellect" and "feeling" are, of course, as such, empty and schematic terms. What we mean by them concretely is better understood when we substitute for them a scientist's theory and a poet's vision of the same object, together with the characteristic and appropriate language in which each expresses the nature of the object as he experiences it. These two visions and languages are different, but not mutually destructive. Rather are they complementary, so that each by itself is impoverished for lack of the characteristic excellence and truth of the other. The poet's feeling and imagination, uninformed by science, degenerate into sentimentalism. The cold clear light of science aids analysis but destroys the sense for the whole. "We get closer to some things through feeling than we do through science. . . . Through feeling we discern what science cannot get into focus" (p. 26). To exclude imaginative sympathy and enjoyment is to close one of the pathways to reality, is to miss a total view of Nature. For "the tendency of feeling is always to see things whole—synoptically" (p. 29). Hence "we cannot, for our life's sake, and for the sake of our philosophical reconstruction, afford to lose in scientific analysis what the poets and artists and lovers of Nature all see. It is intuitively felt, rather than intellectually perceived, the vision of things as totalities, root and all, all in all; neither fancifully, nor mystically, but sympathetically in their wholeness" (p. 32). It is clearly because Thomson is both a lover of Nature and a scientist—and is both passionately—that he inevitably pleads for a philosophical synthesis of these two attitudes. His very terms, "system of nature," "web of life," have a synoptic effect. One is tempted to wonder how far the prevailing fashion of proclaiming the all-sufficiency of physico-chemical concepts in biology is due to the growth of laboratory research with its inevitably artificial conditions and manipulations. It is, at least, noteworthy that field-naturalists, studying living beings in their natural haunts, use without exception "anthropomorphic" language as the only language which is true to the *total* impression they receive from their observations (witness, *e.g.*, the books of W. H. Hudson and many others). All such inquirers, we may be sure, will endorse Thomson's rendering of the spirit and method of their science. We cannot have too many confessions, or have them too emphatic, of how far short an "analytic and formal treatment" falls of "life in its concrete fullness." It is like a breath of fresh air stirring through lifeless formulæ to be told that "we must use our everyday and our red-letter day experience of livingness both in ourselves and in other organisms, wherewith to enliven sympathetically all that biology can give" (p. 102). Critics are wont to say, "Thomson has not a strictly scientific mind." One's first impulse is to reply, "So much the worse for science." But the truer reply is that he

has not a *merely* scientific mind, but a mind which to the power of its science adds the further power of a poet's sympathy and imagination. The result is not unsound science but sounder philosophy. Of the standards of science Thomson is fully aware, but he is also aware of its limits, and refuses to sacrifice all other insights at its altar. He is a lover of Nature, not a lover of an idol of scientific method, and in this lies his superior objectivity. The ordinary "mechanist," afraid of being thought "anthropomorphic" if he uses any but strictly mathematical or physico-chemical terms, is like a man who keeps the door of his room shut and insists that his room is the whole house. Thomson keeps the door open and insists that he can learn something more even about the contents of the scientific room by knowing the rest of the house. In this sense, as he repeatedly urges, the crudely abstract and one-sided view is "bad science." We may add that it is even worse philosophy.

(2) As regards the other type of abstraction—isolation of partial facts or aspects of facts—Thomson is fully aware of its great usefulness in its proper place. Yet he is emphatic, also, on the necessity of not stopping with the results of abstraction, but going on to a synthesis which is not merely additive. Here is a typical passage: "While the sciences are separated off for the sake of clearness, because they pursue different methods, use different tools, and sum up in different kinds of formulæ, they work into one another's hands, and they are simply different modes of one rational inquiry. Their mutual influence is increased, not decreased, when each recognises its abstractness; and the hope of their leading on to a philosophical order is in proportion to the clearness with which it is recognised that a synthesis is not additive" (pp. 35-6). Moreover, within his own biological field, Thomson admirably illustrates this synthetic method by the way in which he brings together all the various problems and lines of investigation which have been developed since Darwin's time, and which so often tend to be divorced from each other in specialised research. Here even the trained biologist may learn much from Thomson's survey. With the matter of these lectures he will be familiar, for no original discoveries or fresh theories are here for the first time communicated; nor are the technical details of research, *e.g.* in Mendelism, more than touched on. But the comprehensiveness of the survey, the focussing, within a single story, of so many different aspects of the problem of life, the attempt to elicit a coherent interpretation—these things will be appreciated as illuminating even by an expert, unless, indeed, he be wholly insensitive to the charms of philosophy. Moreover, Thomson's level-headedness, caution, and delicate aliveness to all the diverse, and often conflicting, suggestions of the evidence may well be held up as models to young students of science. They certainly are a welcome relief from much confident and aggressive dogmatising which has often gone under the name and authority of "science." Thomson's synthetic method is nowhere more successful than when, marshalling the evidence from all sides, he shows some picturesque phrase (like Huxley's description of an organism as "nothing but the constant form of a turmoil of material molecules") to be neither adequate nor accurate; when he warns, with an application to Verworn's "the life-process consists in the metabolism of proteids," against "summing up too simply"; when he reminds us, *à propos* of the evolution-formula, how little we know for certain, how far we still are from a solution of the difficult problem "of accounting for any of the leading

types of organisms or any of the so-called big lifts in evolution" (p. 362). The concepts of an organism as nothing but a physico-chemical machine, of heredity as a form of rigorous determinism, of the struggle for existence as ruthless self-seeking and mutual extermination, of evolution as a "chapter of accidents" without direction or immanent purposiveness—all these he condemns as "fallacious biologisms," causing unnecessary difficulties in theory, and moral confusion in conduct. Both scientists and philosophical students of scientific method may learn much from Thomson's masterly handling of such concepts as heredity, variation, selection. They lose their rigidity and become plastic in his hands as he moulds them to fit the varying conditions to which they have to be applied. Take as an example the admirable thirteenth lecture on "Originative Factors in Evolution." Here, after distinguishing originative from directive factors, variations from modifications, continuous from discontinuous variations, Thomson attacks the problem of the origin of variations. He reviews the evidence for different possible causes of variation: environmental influences on the germ-cells; age-changes or periodic reorganisation processes, comparable to endomixis, in the chromosomes of the germ-cells; rejuvenescence in the young embryo (based on Professor Child's work). Then follow paragraphs on correlation of variations, on temporal variations (*i.e.* changes in tempo, rate, rhythm of metabolic processes), and on the evidence for definite *versus* fortuitous variation, with special reference to the limiting effect of pre-existing structure. A final paragraph suggests that we should look on germ-cells as "individualities that live and multiply, that struggle and combine" (p. 432), and that "the larger mutations, the big novelties, are expressions of the whole organism in its germ-cell phase of being, comparable to experiments in practical life, solutions of problems in intellectual life, or creations in artistic life" (pp. 430-1). This last suggestion is admittedly speculative, but Thomson has earned his right to it by his synthetic survey of the whole range of experimental investigations of the origin of variations.

The general view which Thomson's whole argument expounds is, perhaps, best summed up in the following passage:—"Our survey of the Realm of Organisms as it is affords evidence in support of the following propositions: (1) that living creatures are individualities standing apart from things in general and not exhaustively described in mechanistic terms; (2) that their lives abound in behaviour with a psychical aspect; (3) that there is in Animate Nature a prevalence of orderly systematisation, balance, and smooth working; (4) that there is a pervasive beauty both hidden and revealed; and (5) that a very large proportion of the time and energy at the disposal of organisms is devoted to activities which make not for self-maintenance and self-aggrandisement, but for the continuance and welfare of the race. In fact, we find in Animate Nature far-reaching correspondence to the ideals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—correspondences which may suggest to some a possible line of development for Natural Theology" (p. 317). In support of this view, Volume I., on "The Realm of Organisms as it is," discusses the aims and limits of science (ch. i.), the distinction between living and non-living things (chs. ii., iii.), the problem of mechanism and vitalism (chs. iv., v.), animal behaviour (ch. vi.), the body and mind problem (ch. vii.), the beauty of animate nature (ch. viii.), its "tactics," *i.e.* the correct view of the "struggle for existence" (ch. ix.), and the concepts of adaptiveness and

purposiveness (ch. x.). The general direction of the argument, so far, is towards the conclusion that the higher explains the lower, that the concepts of life, mind, purpose are closely connected, that "individualities with mind, with freedom, with purpose, cannot be accounted for in terms of a ground of reality without mind, without freedom, without purpose" (p. 345). Volume II., on "The Evolution of the Realm of Organisms," deals with the concept of evolution in general (ch. xi.), the great steps in evolution (ch. xii.), variation, selection, heredity (chs. xiii., xiv., xv.), the evolution of mind and mind in evolution (ch. xvi.), nature crowned in man (ch. xvii.); the facts of dysteleology which a balanced view learns to estimate less despairingly (ch. xviii.), and the lessons of evolution for the control of life (ch. xix.). Throughout, Thomson's view of life has affinities with that of Bergson: life is experimental, resourceful, creative, fertile of novelties; "it is like original thinking" (p. 476). But he goes beyond Bergson in recognising a definite *direction* in the behaviour and evolution of living beings—a direction towards well-being. "The true inwardness of heredity is a holding fast of that which is good" (p. 496). Moreover, heredity is not "fatalistic." A bad inheritance can be blocked even on its physical side, and our social heritage provides "ever-widening opportunities for transcending the trammels of protoplasm" (p. 497). Life is controllable, and through mind learns increasingly to control itself. Science enables us "to understand the operative factors, and to put brains into the task of betterment" (p. 618). We can improve our breed, we can improve our environment, we can improve our standard of life in work and play. We have much to learn still in the "Psycho-biology of Joy," in cultivating "the habit of happiness" (p. 623). Fortunately, sound science has glad tidings to bring for the "exhilaration and enthusiasm of thought and will" (*ibid.*). This is the note struck in the remarkable final chapter on *Vis Medicatrix Naturæ* (ch. xx.). The contemplation of Nature helps to heal our minds. It has a "tonic virtue" (p. 640). Unrest and petty cares drop away as we learn to discern its pervasive rationality, come into touch with its power, its order, its beauty, its intricacy, everywhere displayed in the web of life, in growth, in evolution. Without this contact with Nature we are impoverished, with it we are made strong in hope and faith. In three voices does Nature speak to us, according as our relations to her are practical, emotional, and intellectual. They bid us Endeavour, Enjoy, Enquire. Thus the wisdom which is science joins hands with the wisdom which is religion: "Just as there is a science that knows Nature, so there is a religion that knows God" (p. 650).

Thomson's *System of Animate Nature*, it is safe to say, will take high rank among Gifford Lectures. If not as original as Driesch's *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, it is more comprehensive in its survey of the field and more philosophical in its outlook. Not only science and philosophy, but in a broader sense our whole civilisation would be impoverished, if such an attitude towards Nature as Thomson's were not to live on in others and be appreciated by all.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

ARMSTRONG COLLEGE,
NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE.

French Civilisation from its Origins to the Close of the Middle Ages.

By A. L. Guérard.—London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1920.

PROFESSOR GUÉRARD writes with incisive force on what he terms "integral" history. The political history of any country is only a small part of the whole truth. So with literary, artistic, and religious histories. All "special" histories are, of necessity, only partial and fragmentary aspects of the whole course of civilisation, and concentration on any one, uncorrected and unbalanced by a study of the other aspects, over-emphasises that one element, unless and until the supplementary studies of the other factors are taken into the total perspective of the mind. This is clear enough to any outside critic. But the distinction of Professor Guérard is that he, as a historian, recognises the synthetic nature of history and combines it with its necessary analytic function. All the aspects, political, social, artistic, religious, economic, "are but threads woven into the endless tapestry of human experience. *Draw them out, they are meaningless.* They have evolved a Frankenstein monster—Homo Economicus—without traditions, devoid of love, pride, or pity, moved by the single desire of buying in the cheapest market; the progress of science was long hampered by that incubus, which is not yet fully exorcised. . . . True history must be synthetic, or, to use a term of which modern French writers are inordinately fond, it must be 'integral.' It is this all-inclusive study which is called in Germany *Kulturgeschichte*, and in this country [that is, the United States, for Professor Guérard is an American] history of civilisation."

Of course, the specialist at once replies: "Who is enough for these things?" In England we have had the courageous enterprise of Mr H. G. Wells, who has applied this synthetic principle to give form and coherence to an eagle's-eye view of history as a whole. And this may well serve as a turning-point in one form of the treatment of history—viz. that intended for the intelligent, thoughtful man, who is not himself a history specialist. It is evident no one, whether Mr H. G. Wells or Professor Guérard, can be a specialist in every direction of historical study. Nor can any book of three hundred pages be exhaustive. "The field of the historian of civilisation is not politics, art, literature, religion, science, industry, in themselves, but the study of their interaction." Thus the history of civilisation, as Professor Guérard pointedly puts it, "is the clearing-house of sundry sciences rather than a science in itself." But we should be inclined, as indeed Professor Guérard himself more than hints his own sympathies incline him, to regard history as consisting of a philosophy as well as a history, though of course it must not be a philosophy which begins by taking an idea of "diet," "climate," "economic interpretation," "rationalism," or what not, and bringing historical facts into classification under this *a priori* idea-centre. History is a map of life in the past. We get the analysis from the specialists. It is the task of the historian of civilisation to collect the results, interpret them in terms of life as a whole, especially bringing out in his perspective the permanent elements characteristic of humanity, and offering new fullness to the concept of the One and the Many in life.

Professor Guérard's task, then, is to illustrate French civilisation as a part of the whole of civilisation. "If there is a France," says he, "there is a French civilisation, which is nought but Western civilisation refracted

through the French *milieu*." This, surely, is excellent. The author, it may be said, is fortunate in his subject. For he claims, with much force, that French civilisation is "central"; and again, "to ignore France is to court the stigma of provincialism." In other words, the cultural ways and by-ways of France are always, at the best, on or near the highroads of humanism; and the modern highroads of European culture, in any true historical map, will show the humanism of Europe travelling either to or from Paris, just as in the ancient world all roads led to Rome.

In his account of the Middle Ages, Professor Guérard divides his subject into two parts, the Christian Commonwealth and Lay Society. If we consider such movements as the Crusades, feudalism, the growth of the city, *communê*, and crafts, we readily perceive that the underlying principles were European, not provincial, not national, excepting in colour and costume, so to say, of adaptation. The Christian faith, with a spiritual greatness symbolised by the architectural greatness of its cathedrals, was European. The Christian culture in its literature was European. So, too, the movements of the universities and of scholasticism. There are local and provincial differences of emphasis, but there is the impress of organic unity, which, so to say, carries France, England, and other regional divisions in the general current. So, in lay society, the feudal system with its fighting caste, with its development of chivalry, its oppression of the serfs, its development of communal oligarchy, its guilds, and in fact all its institutions, was deep and widespread, and cannot be understood by ordinary isolated national histories. These movements simply do not belong to the national stage, and at least mediæval history must be synthesised as European in its signification and interpretation.

Professor Guérard is able to introduce a suggestiveness, and indeed a picturesqueness, far from common, in what may be regarded as an attractive text-book. Whilst written on mediæval French Civilisation, we seem impelled, without his asking us, to consider the parallel growth and development of English Civilisation, and in the light of his treatment of France we begin to reconstruct in imagination many movements which we have been accustomed to regard as isolated and unrelated. In short, it is a real attempt to see French mediæval life and culture in a synthetic form. "Our study," Professor Guérard strikingly claims, "of French national characteristics will not have been in vain if it enables us to tear off what, after all, is but a mask; if it leads us to realise, under the picturesque differences of language, custom, and fashion, the unity of the human race." This is, in one sense, a new spirit, and in another an ancient spirit; and, however we regard it, it deserves cordial recognition in its application to a concrete historical treatise.

FOSTER WATSON.

FARNBOROUGH, KENT.

John Robinson, Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. By Walter H. Burgess. 8vo.—Pp. xii + 426.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1920.

MR BURGESS, who has for a long time been one of the chief explorers into the history of the Pilgrim Fathers, has in this volume, crowned his

investigations by a masterly study of the leading figure of the Pilgrim movement. Nothing of equal importance has appeared since Joseph Hunter's epoch-making little book on the *Founders of New Plymouth*, which came out in 1854, and for the first time determined the original home of Governor Bradford in the village of Austerfield. It is interesting to note that, seven years before the publication of that book, Hunter had almost given up in despair the problem of finding the English homes of the Pilgrim Fathers. He writes in 1847 as follows, in reply to American inquirers: "It is extremely difficult, even for one who has paid no small attention to the analysis of the English population, to trace any of the persons who formed Mr Robinson's Church and their original domicile in England. Captain Miles Standish may, with confidence, be affirmed to be of the family of Standish of Duxbury in Lancashire. [Some doubt has recently been cast on this.] Governor Bradford is placed, on grounds of probability, on the borders of Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire, but this is nearly all that can be done. When we are told that they were persons 'of the North of England,' the information is too vague to serve as an intimation of the proper course of inquiry." Seven years later, in presenting a copy of his work to his friend (Dean) Burgon, the covering letter, which is in the possession of the reviewer, has a touch of the same pessimism. The writer says: "How difficult it is to discover characteristic facts respecting people who lived only two or three hundred years ago!" One wonders what Hunter (who died on May 15, 1861) would have said if he could have seen the results that have followed from his first tentative inquiries, which have led up to the present splendid volume.

It is curious that John Robinson, who was the leader of the Pilgrim movement, and in every way a man in the front rank in the thought as well as the action of his time, should have been so hard to put in an adequate historical setting. It is Mr Burgess's work that clears up a whole cloud of obscurities, and no one, even of those who have laboured industriously at Pilgrim history, has so many "finds" to his credit. He has discovered, for instance, the birthplace of John Robinson in the little village of Sturton-le-Steeple in Notts, and thinks he may be able to determine the very farmhouse where he was born; he has discovered the church where he was married, and the register of Greasley in Notts shows the entry of the marriage of Master John Robinson and Mistress Bridget White, who are evidently persons out of the common rank. He has published the wills of John Robinson's father and mother, to which we may now add the will of Mistress Bridget Robinson, which Professor Eekhof has discovered at Leyden—a very interesting document. Only the will of John Robinson himself still eludes the investigator; but it may yet be found, either in Leyden or in one of the English probate registries.

Mr Burgess follows his hero from Sturton-le-Steeple to Cambridge, and, *inter alia*, presents us with an important document from the Hatfield library, in which Robinson, as one of the fellows of Corpus Christi, joins in an appeal for permission to elect their own Master at the next vacancy, instead of having one sent them from above. The document is dated in 1602, and contains the earliest known signature of Robinson; others have since come to light in Holland; and it may be noted that the signature which Justin Winsor facsimiled from a volume in the British Museum is no longer to be regarded as authentic. Mr Burgess has done much to restore to Corpus Christi the portrait of one of its greatest men.

It remains for him to do the same thing for Elder Brewster at Peterhouse. From Cambridge Mr Burgess follows Robinson to Norwich, and tells the story of his settlement as a Puritan lecturer at St Andrew's Church, and his subsequent removal as the cords of conformity were steadily tightened. Robinson evidently had a great place in Norwich and drew many to his spiritual teaching, and Mr Burgess has recently shown how this influence was continued after his death by one of his sons, who returned from Leyden to practise medicine in the old city, to continue his father's non-conforming testimony, and to enjoy the companionship of his fellow-student at Leyden, the famous Sir Thomas Browne. So there is another chapter being written for another book. And thus the story of the Pilgrims unfolds, and becomes a spiritual romance of the first order, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. In treating of Robinson's life, teaching, and death at Leyden, much use is made, of necessity, of the researches of the Dexters, father and son; but it may be noted that the Leyden professors, Dr Plooij and Dr Eekhof, have shown that the Leyden archives have still some fresh information to give on the life of the Pilgrims, individually and in community. For John Robinson and his friends were by no means isolated from either the civic or the academic life of the time; they took up their citizenship in many cases, and Robinson himself, as is well known, became the protagonist of the Calvinists in the University in the struggle with the Arminians.

Mr Burgess brings out clearly the position which Robinson and his friends attained in the estimation of the Leyden people, and the co-operation which existed between the leaders of the Dutch Church and the English Pilgrims. Yet he shows with equal clearness that Robinson was an Englishman to the last, who said of the country that he was compelled to leave that, "as we honour it above all the States in the world, so would we thankfully embrace the meanest corner in it, at the extremest conditions of any people in the kingdom"; and Mr Burgess makes the following just remark, upon a recent American work on the Pilgrim Fathers, that "to say, as has recently been said, that it was their own intolerance which drove these pilgrims to Holland is a gross misinterpretation of the facts."

RENDEL HARRIS.

MANCHESTER.

David Urquhart. By Gertrude Robinson.—Oxford: Blackwell, 1920.

To most people who have heard his name, David Urquhart means a fanatical opponent of Russia and of Palmerston, who founded societies among working men to promote his views, and ended by a still more fanatical appeal to Pio Nono, on the eve of the Vatican Council, to arise and re-establish the reign of law in Europe. Miss Robinson gives us the real man, of whom these were some of the more exciting manifestations; and the picture is one that bites deep into the conscience, and is more wholesome now than even in his lifetime, for many of the evils which he combated are stronger still, and some of his remedies, especially an international authority to enforce law and justice, are now being tried with some hope of success.

Chief of a Highland clan, born in 1805, he died at Naples in 1877,

after a life of incessant learning, argument, and agitation. His short time at St John's College, Oxford, seems to have left little impression on his mind, which was first formed by his mother's teaching and afterwards stimulated in its permanent political direction by his visits to the East and his friendship with Turks between the years 1830 and 1837. He was First Secretary in the Embassy at Constantinople in 1835-7, supported personally by William IV., but finally recalled by Palmerston. As an official he was obviously impossible, but the lessons he learnt of personal equality, of the reign of customary law, of the reverence for authority, became part of his gospel for the rest of his life. He learnt to hate and distrust the despotism, the intrigues, and the aggression of Russia. This suspicion of Russia became an obsession with him. He saw Russia everywhere. Russian money supported the Chartists. It was by Russian money and in Russian interests that Mazzini worked to unify Italy. Rome attracted him as the greatest religious counterpoise to Russia. No wonder that, with these extravagances, he failed to convince the mass of his fellow-countrymen. But what he did accomplish, in spite of them, is the most signal triumph of a powerful, disinterested, and indefatigable man. He believed passionately in the reign of law and justice on earth, and he spared no one—least of all himself—in persuading men of the need of this and stripping their souls bare of every pretence, of every excuse, of every vestige of self-love. He claimed to have in perfection "the art of making men hate me," and yet in spite of this he was followed all through his life by bands of devoted adherents who applied his principles to all the international questions of the day. He organised, starting from the Chartists, Associations for the Study of Foreign Affairs, which numbered 150 at their height, and contained between two and three thousand members. These were mostly working men who, under his inspiration, studied Blue Books, solid works on international law, and bombarded the Government with inconvenient questions at every turn. The League of Nations would be in a stronger position than it is, if Urquhart were still with us and inspiring the branches of the League of Nations Union. He denounced the Chinese wars. He distrusted Prussia—next only to Russia—and was strongly on the French side from the opening of the Franco-Prussian War. He recommended Napoleon III. to ignore the Declaration of Paris and to seize German goods and supplies by whatever flag they were protected. He was strong for neutrality in the American Civil War.

His attitude towards Italy and the Papacy in the latter part of his life illustrates both the strongest and the weakest side of his position. Like his friend Le Play, he turned towards the Catholic Church for the re-establishment of law in the world. There was even, among his many activities, an agitation for the popular teaching of the Canon Law. Both men thought that at the root of all social disaster was the want of law between nations, and that social and international justice must go together. Here we shall all agree, and in the League of Nations the first practicable scheme has been adopted which may replace the Canon Law. The League also brings social and industrial justice in touch with international politics by its Industrial Bureau. Here is one of Urquhart's dreams in process of realisation. But we see in the same actions the weaker and impracticable side of his nature when he looks to the Papacy to do these things. He recognised no progress in human affairs. The Middle Ages, being more

like his beloved East, were nearer the ideal. The West had gone back since and shed its humanity and love of law and work in a slough of material indulgence and class warfare.

But the passion and strength of the man shine out through all his extravagances and impossible ideals. He was one of the most stimulating and quite the most honest public man of his day, and even to read of him now in Miss Robinson's enthusiastic pages quickens the intellectual pulse and makes the light of conscience burn clearer. He had fallen out of English political life and thought long before he died. This book does good service in reviving his name and work. It makes him live again with all his magnetic charm, his more than Socratic dialogues, his life-long followers and friends. Whatever we may think of Russia or the Papacy, the world needs still more now than in his day the passion for truth and justice, the instinct of courtesy and respect, the sense of human dignity, of David Urquhart.

F. S. MARVIN.

BERKHAMSTED.

MACMILLAN'S NEW BOOKS

A Life of Bishop Percival. By the Right Rev. WILLIAM TEMPLE, D.D., Bishop of Manchester. 8vo. [Shortly.]

Studies in Christian Philosophy. Being the Boyle Lectures for 1920. By the Rev. WALTER ROBERT MATTHEWS, M.A., B.D., Dean and Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, King's College, London. 8vo. [Immediately.]

The Sadhu: A Study in Mysticism and Practical Religion. By B. H. STREETER, M.A., Hon. D.D. (Edin.), Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, Canon Residentiary of Hereford; and A. J. APPASAMY, B.A. (Madras), M.A. (Harvard). With Portrait. Crown 8vo. 8s. 6d. net.

Dean Inge in the *Evening Standard* says:—"It is one of the most fascinating books that I have read for a long time. I urge my readers to read 'The Sadhu.'"

Essays on the Early History of the Church and Ministry. By Various Writers. Edited by H. B. SWETE, D.D. Second and Revised Edition. 8vo. [Immediately.]

Is Christianity the Final Religion? A Candid Enquiry with the Materials for an Opinion. By the Rev. ALAN COATES BOUQUET, B.D. 8vo. 10s. 6d. net.

The Times.—"It has become obvious that Christian teachers must cease to ignore or deny either the results of critical investigation of the Scriptures or the view of man's origin disclosed by modern science. They must accept conclusions which have become new postulates of thought, and frankly make them the basis of argument. In his clear recognition of this necessity lies the main value of Mr Bouquet's book. . . . The atmosphere of friendly argument which prevades the book makes it attractive."

The Problem of Christian Unity. By Various Writers. A Course of Addresses under the auspices of the Christian Unity Foundation of America. Crown 8vo. 9s. net.

Christianity in its Modern Expression. By GEORGE B. FOSTER, late Professor of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago. Edited by DOUGLAS C. MACINTOSH, Dwight Professor of Theology in Yale University. 8vo. 14s. net.

Bergson and Future Philosophy. An Essay on the Scope of Intelligence. By GEORGE ROSTREVR. Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

The Scotsman.—"In this readable and interesting essay Mr George Rostrevor maintains that, while the doctrine of a special faculty of intuition is doomed to perish, the principle of duration will stand firm as the great gift of Bergson to future philosophy."

The Foundations of Character: Being a Study of the Tendencies of the Emotions and Sentiments. By ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A. Second and Revised Edition. 8vo. 20s. net.

Professor G. Dawes Hicks in the *Hibbert Journal* says:—"No more important contribution to psychological literature has been made within recent years. . . . Especially noteworthy . . . is the masterly treatment of the emotion of sorrow."

Professor Carveth Read in the *British Journal of Psychology* says:—"The Foundations of Character' is one of the most original works that British Psychology has produced. . . . Only upon the ground of experience, by long, patient, profound meditation could work so original and so trustworthily have been accomplished."

Divine Imaging: An Essay on the First Principles of Philosophy. Being a Continuation of the Experiment which took shape first in "The World as Imagination." (No. 2 of "The World as Imagination" Series). By DOUGLAS FAWCETT. Extra Crown 8vo. 15s. net.

The Glasgow Herald.—"Wide learning and profound thinking are here vitalised by spirit and imagination. Mr Fawcett makes us realise that the future of philosophy is a bigger thing than its past."

Professor J. S. MACKENZIE.—" . . . Your theory removes the last vestiges of the old quarrel that Plato spoke about between Poetry and Philosophy; and, I may add, the old quarrel between both of them and Religion. . . . I think it will prove a landmark in philosophical speculation."

MACMILLAN & CO., LTD., LONDON, W.C. 2

FROM Williams & Norgate's List

THE SYSTEM OF ANIMATE NATURE. The Gifford Lectures, 1915-1916. By Professor J. ARTHUR THOMSON, M.A., LL.D.
Two vols. Large 8vo. Cloth. 30s. net.

"Like all the work of this master of prose description, the book is entrancingly written, and forms a happy blend of science and metaphysics."—Prof. BENJAMIN MOORE, in the *Observer*.

THE TEACHING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT ON DIVORCE.
By the Venerable R. H. CHARLES, M.A., D.Litt., D.D., F.B.A.,
Archdeacon of Westminster. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net.

"Has solved the Scripture difficulty and laid the controversy at last to rest."—*Expository Times*.

HISTORY OF SACRAMENT IN RELATION TO THOUGHT AND PROGRESS. By ALICE GARDNER, M.A. Crown Theological Library. Vol. XLIII. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net.

"A readable, scholarly, and religiously attractive contribution to its subject."—*Times Literary Supplement*.

By the German Minister for Reconstruction.

THE NEW SOCIETY. By WALTER RATHENAU. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 6s. net.

"Has an application, not merely to Germany, but to all combatant countries."—*Birmingham Post*.

THE LIFE OF CHARLES HADDON SPURGEON. By the Rev. W. Y. FULLERTON. Illustrated. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 15s. net.

"This volume is the truest estimate of Mr Spurgeon which we have, and is likely to remain so."—*English Churchman*.

THE PREVENTION OF VENEREAL DISEASE. Being the Report of and the Evidence taken by the Special Committee on Venereal Disease. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 21s. net.

"An authorised publication, it demands and will repay the serious attention of all doctors, public health authorities, and religious and social workers."—*Glasgow Herald*.

JOHN ROBINSON: The Pastor of the Pilgrim Fathers. By WALTER H. BURGESS, B.A. Illustrated. Demy 8vo. Half Cloth. 12s. 6d. net.

"Of all the books called forth on this side of the Atlantic by the 'Mayflower' celebrations, this is so far easily the most important."—*Manchester Guardian*.

AN IRISH PEER ON THE CONTINENT (1801-1803). Edited by THOMAS N. SADLEIR, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Illustrated. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

"I think I have seldom gained a more living picture of personalities of the past than in this little book. It is a genuine case of meeting, just as she met, Talleyrand, Angelica Kauffmann, or Lord Bristol."—*Westminster Gazette*.

HANDBOOK OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN FATHERS. By ERNEST LEIGH-BENNETT. Demy 8vo. Cloth. 21s. net.

"This is an exceedingly valuable book."—*Glasgow Herald*.

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE: LONDON

Williams & Norgate

Crown 8vo. Bound. 2s. 6d. net.

THE MAKING OF PERSONALITY

By W. TUDOR JONES, M.A., Ph.D.

"Full of suggestions and practical illustrations which will be found most helpful by parents and teachers. . . ."—*Inquirer*.

3rd Imp. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 2s. 6d. net.

THE TRAINING OF MIND & WILL

By W. TUDOR JONES, M.A., Ph.D.

"Dr Jones has two admirable qualifications for writing a book of this kind. He is learned in the mental sciences, and he is able to express his learning in the simplest terms, enriched with homely examples."—*Education*.

14 Henrietta Street, London, W.C. 2

George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.

The Meaning of Paul for To-Day.

By Professor C. HAROLD DODD. 6s. 6d.

"He writes with a wonderful charm, and marshals his facts and arguments with consummate skill."—*Challenge*.
"We know of no book which has in so concise and scholarly a manner brought the heart out of Paul's gospel."—*Methodist Times*.

The Guidance of Jesus for To-Day.

By CECIL JOHN CADOUX. 7s. 6d.

"It recalls by a shock to the bewildering problem of applied Christianity, and makes us once more suitably uncomfortable. . . . I want everybody to read it."—Canon JAMES ADDERLEY, in the *Church Family Newspaper*.

Pure Thought and the Riddle of the Universe.

By FRANCIS SEDLAK. (Just out.) 18s.

An attempt to restate the whole theme of Hegelian philosophy.

The History of Psychology. Vols. II. and III.

By G. S. BRETT, M.A. (Just out.) 16s. each.

A new volume in the Library of Philosophy.

The Mneme.

By Professor RICHARD SEMON. (Just out.) 18s.
Translated by LOUIS SIMON.

40 Museum Street, London, W.C. 1

JUST PUBLISHED

Demy 8vo.

Cloth.

24s. net.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES, 1919.

THEISM IN MEDIEVAL INDIA

By J. ESTLIN CARPENTER, D.Litt.

From the CONTENTS:—I. The Origins of Theistic Buddhism. II. The Development of Theistic Buddhism. III. Popular Theism. Brahma. IV. Religious Philosophy in the Great Epic. V. The Trimūrti. VI. Philosophy and Religion in Çaivism. VII. Religion and Philosophy in Vaishnavism. VIII. Hinduism and Islam.

* * *

Demy 8vo.

Cloth.

24s. net.

THE HIBBERT LECTURES, 1916.

THE REACTIONS BETWEEN DOGMA AND PHILOSOPHY

Illustrated from the Works of S. THOMAS AQUINAS.

By PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, M.A., Litt.D.

"In every portion of his subject Dr Wicksteed brings an acute intellect to illuminate the obscurities; and while he is fresh and suggestive, his results never seem to be exaggerated."—*Times Literary Supplement*.

WILLIAMS AND NORGATE: LONDON

New Work by Dr James Lindsay

SEVEN THEISTIC PHILOSOPHERS

An Historico-Critical Study. 10s. 6d. net

The Philosophers dealt with in Dr Lindsay's new work have never before been treated by any British writer.

Prof. A. S. PEAKE, D.D., in *Holborn Review* :—"Dr Lindsay's range is wide, alike in philosophy and literature; but he has rendered special service by his exposition of Theism. . . . Much knowledge and criticism are packed into it."

WM. BLACKWOOD & SONS, Edinburgh & London

CRITERION CIGARS

A RARE COMBINATION
OF EXCELLENCE
AND ECONOMY.

Exact Size of Imperial No. 2

Exact Size of Imperial No. 3

Manufactured
from the choicest
leaf, CRITERION
Cigars will appeal to all lovers
of a good Cigar. UNIFORM IN
QUALITY and MODERATE IN PRICE

Samples of
5 for 3/-

In Cedar Wood
Cabinet Boxes
of 25, 50 & 100

C.10

Of all High-Class Tobacconists and Stores.

The 'ARETHUSA' TRAINING SHIP AND THE SHAFTESBURY HOMES

Urgently need £25,000

TO PREVENT CURTAILMENT OF ANY BRANCH OF THE SOCIETY'S WORK.

Patrons—THEIR MAJESTIES THE KING AND QUEEN.

President—H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES.

Chairman and Treasurer—C. E. MALDEN, Esq., M.A.

Chairman of Ship Committee—HOWSON F. DEVITT, Esq.

Joint Secretaries: H. BRISTOW WALLEN and HENRY G. COPELAND.

CHEQUES, &c., SHOULD BE MADE PAYABLE AND SENT TO:

**THE SHAFTESBURY HOMES and 'ARETHUSA' TRAINING SHIP,
164 SHAFTESBURY AVENUE, LONDON, W.C. 2.**

CONTENTS OF NUMBER 76

ARTICLES

	PAGE
Spiritual Life—Civil Rights—Industrial Economy. By Dr RUDOLF STEINER	593
Morals and Religion. By the Baron F. von HÜGEL, Professor J. CHEVALIER, Principal L. P. JACKS, Professor J. A. SMITH, Professor H. WILDON CARR	605
Religion and Culture in Italy. By Professor ERNESTO BUONAIUTI	636
The Letters of William James. By HOWARD V. KNOX	645
Misanthropes in Fact and Fiction. By Sir GEORGE DOUGLAS, Bart.	654
Chaitanya, an Indian St Francis. By the Rev. J. E. CARPENTER, D.D., D.Litt.	666
Neglected Sources of Joy. By W. J. JUPP	679
The Religion of Mother Earth. By Professor J. E. BOODIN	690
Civilisation Criticised at the Source. By Professor JOHN E. M'FADYEN, D.D.	702
Wages according to Family Needs. By ELEANOR RATHBONE	712
Our Illogical World. By THEODORE D. BACON	724
Theological Adventure. By Professor J. W. BUCKHAM	739
Religious Knowledge: A Narrative and a Moral. By HEAD-MASTER	745
SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE. By the Rev. Professor JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.Litt.	751

(Continued on p. vi.)

CONSTABLE BOOKS

SOCIAL DECAY AND REGENERATION

By R. AUSTIN FREEMAN. Introduction by HAVELOCK ELLIS. 18s. net.

"One of the most interesting and informing books we have read lately. . . . An admirable exposition of the restless times we live in."—*Daily News*.

"With remarkable energy and skill he maintains that the power machine is the cause of most of the economic and social distresses of to-day. . . . The strength of the book lies in the wonderfully able presentation of the case against the machines, and the great ingenuity and knowledge shown in the working out of their social reactions."—Prof. JOHN ADAMS, in *British Weekly*.

IMPRESSIONS & COMMENTS (2nd Series.) By HAVELOCK ELLIS.

"Like Remy de Gourmont he has the trick of seeing the most ordinary object from an angle that subtly transforms the whole look of it. Not one of the experiences set down in these pages is trivial. From all Mr Ellis elicits beauty or strangeness."—*Times*.

THE TALE OF TERROR. By EDITH BIRKHEAD. Demy 8vo. 15s. net.

Miss Birkhead gives an account of the growth of English supernatural fiction from "The Castle of Otranto," published in 1767, to the end of the nineteenth century. Her survey covers the literature of the United States, where Hawthorne and Poe made of the treatment of terror in fiction a fine art.

"Her excellent study. . . . Miss Birkhead's survey makes reading nearly as thrilling and certainly as entertaining as might be the pick of those early romances."—*Manchester Guardian*.

ARTHUR COLERIDGE Reminiscences. Edited by J. A. FULLER

MAITLAND. 10s. 6d. net.

"In all that Coleridge says there is a sense of intimate personal relationship, and that kind of dignified humility of admiration which is, perhaps, a condition of true friendship."—*The Outlook*.

"A treasure-house of good stories. . . . His reminiscences are a document which no historian of the social life of England in the latter part of the nineteenth century can afford to neglect."—*Times Literary Supplement*.

VICTOR HUGO By MARY DUCLAUX. Frontispiece. 14s. net.

"His latest biographer has sketched the long, full life of Victor Hugo with rapid sympathy. . . . she has shown us the seamy side of a character whose sublimity was sunken in vanity. . . . Above all, she has not evaded the amorous confusion of his amazing private life."—EDMUND GOSSE, in the *Sunday Times*.

CHARACTER & OPINIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reminiscences of William James and Josiah Royce and academic life in America.

By GEORGE SANTAYANA. 10s. 6d. net.

"One of the most fascinating books imaginable."—*Spectator*.

CONSTABLE & CO. LTD. 12 ORANGE ST. LONDON W.C. 2

CONTENTS OF NUMBER 76—*Continued*

REVIEWS—

	PAGE
CARVETH READ, The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions. By Dr Stanley A. Cook	760
W. H. R. RIVERS, Instinct and the Unconscious : A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-Neuroses. By Professor C. Lloyd Morgan	767
PHILIP H. WICKSTEED, The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy, illustrated from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas. By Professor W. G. de Burgh	770
ADOLF VON HARNACK, Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott. By the Rev. Professor James Moffatt	772
WILLIAM C. BRAITHWAITE, The Second Period of Quakerism. By the Rev. Valentine D. Davis, B.A.	775
V. H. STANTON, The Gospels as Historical Documents. Part III., The Fourth Gospel. By the Rev. Dr J. Estlin Carpenter	777
ARTHUR S. PEAKE, <i>Ed.</i> , A Commentary on the Bible. By the Rev. J. C. Mantripp, M.A.	780
OSWALD SPENGLER, Der Untergang des Abendlandes : Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. By Miss M. D. Petre	786
YANKO LAVRIN, Dostoievsky and his Creation. By William Johnson, M.A.	789
OSCAR D. WATKINS, A History of Penance. By Dr G. G. Coulton	790

[*Editorial Communications should be addressed to the Editor, at Shotover Edge, Headington, Oxford, or, in the case of Reviews, to the Assistant Editor, 9 Cranmer Road, Cambridge. They may also be sent c/o the Publishers. Stamps for return of MSS. should be enclosed.*]

THE WORLD-RELIGION

FOUR VOLUMES BY

GILBERT T. SADLER, M.A., LL.B.

I. "The Inner Meaning of the Four Gospels."

AN exposition of the stories of "Jesus," not as being the history of a Man, but as the gospel of the Divine Saviour, ever awakening, teaching, healing, suffering, and rising in souls.

II. "Behind the New Testament."

THE reason for the standpoint in Vol. I. is here given, indicating pre-Christian Gnosticism, which told of the Primal Man or Logos as the Saviour, crucified into this universe so as to awaken and arise in souls.

III. "The Infinite in the Finite."

A PHILOSOPHICAL exposition of the World Religion foreshadowed in Vols. I. and II., with an examination of modern views on matter, pain, and death. The essential deeper self in and uniting men is the Infinite Life, evolving Himself in men of aspiration.

IV. "The Social Expression of the Spiritual Life."

A DESCRIPTION of the new social Ideal, which the Infinite is evolving in souls, and an indication of how it can be realised, not by State-force, but by a firm yet non-violent "strike" against all exploitation.

PRICE 3s. 6d. net each, postage 4d. ; or 14s. the set of four vols., post paid : from the Publishers, C. W. DANIEL, LTD., Graham House, 3 Tudor Street, London, E.C. 4.

The Blessings of the COAL STOPPAGE

THE CLEANSING SUN- BATH.

HEALTH-GIVING RAYS.

London streets are being cleansed these days in a new way. The absence of smoke has given them a sun-bath of a kind which may react favourably on the public health.

It is well known that bleaching operations are satisfactory in the confinement of certain diseases.

At the present moment London and other great cities are approaching a condition of smokelessness which is allowing the chemical rays of light to pass almost as freely as they pass in the country. People, as was pointed out yesterday, are becoming sunburnt in city streets. More important still, city streets are being cleansed by antiseptic light. It is an interesting fact, and one which gives rise to many speculations.

The Medical Correspondent of the "Times," May 18, 1921

IT needed a coal stoppage to show many of us the advantages which we should gain if no crude smoke-producing coal were burned in our homes and factories.

This ideal is attainable *without a strike*.

If we used our coal as it ought to be used, namely, *not as a fuel, but as a raw material from which fuel can be extracted*, the blessing of abundant and curative sunshine is one which we might permanently retain. By sending our coal to the gas works we obtain cleanly and smokeless fuels—gas and coke—which can serve us for heating, cooking, water-heating, lighting and power, in fact for all purposes, more efficiently than crude coal can do. And, in addition, by adopting this course we preserve for our use all the valuable by-products—drugs, dyes, fertilisers, motor-spirits, etc.—which lie hidden in the untreated coal, the "black diamonds" which are our most valuable national asset.



The British Commercial Gas
Association

30 Grosvenor Gardens, London, S.W. 1

4C14.



Cambridge University Press

The Scientific Papers of the Hon. Henry Cavendish,

F.R.S. From the Published Papers, and the Cavendish Manuscripts in the possession of His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, K.G., F.R.S. In two volumes. Large Royal 8vo. £6 net the two volumes. **Vol I. The Electrical Researches.** Edited by JAMES CLERK MAXWELL, F.R.S., and revised by SIR JOSEPH LARMOR, F.R.S., M.P. With a Portrait of Henry Cavendish and 11 facsimiles. **Vol II. Chemical and Dynamical.** Edited by SIR EDWARD THORPE, F.R.S. With contributions by DR CHARLES CHREE, F.R.S., SIR FRANK WATSON DYSON, F.R.S., SIR ARCHIBALD GEIKIE, O.M., F.R.S., and SIR JOSEPH LARMOR, F.R.S. With 7 plates.

"The two volumes now published may be regarded as the final garnering of the work of one of the greatest of scientific discoverers."—*From the Preface to Vol I.*

"He was a Natural Philosopher of the broadest possible type, who occupied himself in turn with every branch of physical science known in his time, and who impressed the marks of his genius and the extraordinary penetrative force of his intellect on them all."—*From the Preface to Vol II.*

Education and World Citizenship. An Essay towards a Science of Education. By JAMES CLERK MAXWELL GARNETT, C.B.E., M.A., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, General Secretary of the League of Nations Union, late Principal of the Manchester Municipal College of Technology. Royal 8vo. With a coloured diagram. 36s net.

"This book should make a mark upon educational thought and practice in England. It is bold, clarifying, and cogent. . . . In tone and outlook it recalls the *Magna Didactica* of Comenius. . . . It has the same fine qualities of faith, sincerity, and courage."—SIR MICHAEL SADLER in *The Manchester Guardian*.

Moral Values and the Idea of God. The Gifford Lectures, delivered at Aberdeen in 1914-15, by W. R. SORLEY, Litt.D., LL.D. Demy 8vo. **Second edition.** 22s 6d net.

"The book constitutes one of the finest pieces of sustained philosophical argument which I have ever read. . . . From the point of view of pure speculation it is a work of consummate ability—as important a work as has appeared in our time."—DEAN RASHDALI in *The Church Quarterly Review*.

Logic. By W. E. JOHNSON, M.A., Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, Sidgwick Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge. **Part I.** Demy 8vo. 16s net.

CONTENTS.—Introduction. The Proposition. The Primitive Proposition. Compound Propositions. Secondary Propositions and Modality. Negation. The Proper Name and the Article. General Names, Definition and Analysis. Enumerations and Classes. The General Proposition and its Implications. Existential, Subsistent, and Narrative Propositions. The Determinable. The Relation of Identity. Relations or Transitive Adjectives. Laws of Thought.

The Essentials of Mental Measurement. By W. BROWN, M.A., M.D., D.Sc., and G. H. THOMSON, D.Sc., Ph.D. Royal 8vo. 21s net. Cambridge Psychological Library.

"The thesis on 'The Essentials of Mental Measurement,' which Dr Brown submitted for the Doctorate of Science at London University, was published in 1911, and at once gained recognition as a sound and scholarly contribution to psychology on the one hand, and to statistical theory on the other. In preparing this expanded edition of the original work he has secured the collaboration of Dr Thomson, who has added a large amount of new material. It is in this new material that the interest of the present book mainly centres; not because it is more important than the old material, but because it is highly controversial and bears on a vital psychological problem."—*The Times Educational Supplement*.

Studies in Islamic Mysticism. By REYNOLD ALLEYNE NICHOLSON, Litt.D., LL.D., Lecturer in Persian in the University of Cambridge, formerly Fellow of Trinity College. Demy 8vo. 24s net.

"Mysticism is such a vital element in Islam that without some understanding of its ideas and of the forms which they assume we should seek in vain to penetrate below the surface of Mohammedan religious life."—*From the Preface*.

The Epistle to the Hebrews. In the revised version. With introduction and notes. By A. NAIRNE, D.D. Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges. Fcap 8vo. 7s 6d net.

"He must be a specially dull reader who does not find much to hold his interest in this book. It is just the sort of commentary which lads in the upper forms of our modern schools might be expected to read with sustained interest."—*The Times Educational Supplement*.

Fetter Lane, London, E.C. 4: G. F. Clay, Manager

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

SPIRITUAL LIFE—CIVIL RIGHTS— INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY.¹

DR RUDOLF STEINER.

IN the social movement of the present day there is a great deal of talk about social institutions, but very little about social and unsocial human beings. Very little regard is paid to that "social question" which arises when one considers that institutions in a community take their social or anti-social stamp from the people who work them. Persons of a socialistic turn of thought expect to see in the control of the means of production by the community what will satisfy the requirements of a wide range of the people. They take for granted that, under communal control, the co-operation between men will necessarily take a social form as well. They have seen that the industrial system ordered on lines of private capitalism has led to unsocial conditions. They think that, when once this industrial system has disappeared, the anti-social tendencies at work in it will also necessarily be at an end.

Undoubtedly, *along with* the modern private capitalist form of industrial economy there have arisen social evils—evils that embrace the widest range of social life; but is this in any way a proof that they are *a necessary consequence* of this industrial system? Now, an industrial system can, of its own proper nature, effect nothing beyond putting men into situations in life that enable them to produce goods for themselves or for others in a useful, or in a useless, manner. The modern industrial system has brought the means of pro-

¹ A translation of the article by Dr Rudolf Steiner in No. 3 of *Soziale Zukunft*, bi-monthly periodical of the Swiss League for the Threefold Social Order.

duction under the power of individual persons or groups of persons. The achievements of technical science were such that the best use could be got out of them by a concentration of industrial and economic power. So long as this power is employed in the one field—the production of goods alone—its social working is essentially different from what it is when this power oversteps the bounds and trespasses on the other fields of civil rights or spiritual culture. And it is this trespassing on the other fields which, in the course of the last few centuries, has led to those social evils for whose abolition the modern social movement is pressing. He who is in possession of the means of production acquires economic dominion over others. This economic dominion has resulted in his allying himself with the forces to be found in the governments and parliaments through which he could procure other posts of vantage also in society, as against those who were economically dependent on him: posts of vantage which, even in a democratically constituted state, bear in practice the character of rights. Similarly, this economic dominion has led to a monopolising of the life of spiritual culture by those who held economic power.

Now, the simplest thing seems to be to get rid of this economic predominance of individuals, and thereby do away with their predominance in rights and spiritual culture as well. One arrives at this "simplicity" of social conception when one fails to remember that the combination of technical and economic activity which modern life demands necessitates allowing the most fruitful possible expansion to individual initiative and personal worth within the business of economic life. The form which production must take under modern conditions makes this a necessity. The individual cannot make his abilities effective in business if in his work and schemes he is tied down to the will of the community. However dazzling the thought of the individual producing not for himself but for society collectively, yet its justice within certain bounds should not hinder one from also recognising the other truth, that society collectively is incapable of originating economic schemes that permit of being realised through individuals in the manner desirable. Really practical thought, therefore, will not look to find the cure for social ills in a reshaping of social life that would substitute communal production for private management of the means of production. The endeavour should rather be to forestall evils that may spring up along with management by individual initiative and personal worth, without impairing this management itself. This is only possible if the relations of civil

right amongst those engaged in economic industry are not influenced by the interests of industrial and economic life.

It cannot be said that those who manage the business of economic life can, although occupied by economic interests, yet preserve a sound judgment as to relations of right, and that, because their experience and work have made them well acquainted with the requirements of economic life, they therefore will be able to settle best the life also of civil rights that should grow up in the round of economic business. To hold such an opinion is to overlook the fact that out of any special sphere of life man can only develop the interests peculiar to that sphere. Out of the economic sphere he can develop economic interests only. And if out of this sphere he is called on to produce moral and civil interests as well, then these will merely be economic interests in disguise. Genuine moral and civil interests—interests of Rights—can only spring up upon a ground specially devoted to the life of Rights, where the only consideration will be, what the rights of a matter are. Then, when people proceed from considerations of this sort to frame rules of right, the rule thus made will take effect in economic life. It will then not be necessary to place restrictions on the individual in respect to acquiring economic power; for such economic power will only result in his rendering economic services proportionate to his abilities—not in his using it to obtain special rights and privileges in social life.

A similar objection is, that relations of right after all show themselves in people's dealings with one another in business, so that it is quite impossible to conceive of them as something distinct and apart from economic life. Theoretically that is right enough, but it does not necessarily follow that in practice economic interests should be paramount in determining these relations of right. The manager who spiritually directs the business must necessarily occupy a relation of Right towards the manual workers in the same business; but this does not mean that he, *quâ business manager*, is to have a say in determining what that relation is to be. But he will have a say in it, and will throw his economic predominance into the scales if business co-operation and the settlement of relations in Right take place in one common field of administration. Only when Rights are ordered in a field where business considerations cannot in any way come into question, and where business methods can procure no power as against this system of Rights, will the two be able to work together in such a way that men's sense of right will not be injured, nor economic ability be turned

into a curse instead of a blessing for the community as a whole.

When those who are economically powerful are in a position to use their power to wrest privileged rights for themselves, then amongst the economically weak there will grow up a corresponding opposition to these privileges; and this opposition will, as soon as it has grown strong enough, lead to revolutionary disturbances. If the existence of a special province of Rights makes it impossible for such privileged rights to arise, then disturbances of this sort cannot occur. What this special province of Rights does is to give constant orderly scope to those forces which, in its absence, accumulate within men, until at last they vent themselves violently. Whoever wants to avoid revolutions should study to establish an order of society which shall accomplish in the steady flow of time what otherwise will seek accomplishment in one epoch-making moment.

People will say that the social movement of modern times is immediately concerned, not with relations of Right, but with the removal of economic inequalities. To such objection one must reply that the demands stirring within men are in no wise always correctly expressed in the thoughts they consciously form about them. The thoughts thus consciously formed are the outcome of direct experiences; but the demands themselves have their origin in complexes of life that are much deeper-seated, and that are not directly experienced. And if one aims at bringing about conditions of life which can satisfy these demands, one must attempt to get down to these deeper-seated complexes. A consideration of the relations that have come about between industrial economy and civil right shows that the life of civil rights amongst men has come to be dependent on their economic life. Now, if one were to try superficially, by a lop-sided alteration in the forms of economic life, to abolish those economic inequalities that the dependence of rights on economics has brought with it, then in a very short while similar inequalities would inevitably result, supposing the new economic order were again allowed to build up the system of rights after its own fashion. One will never really touch what is working itself up through the social movement to the surface of modern life until one brings about social conditions in which, alongside the claims and interests of the economic life, those of Rights can find realisation and satisfaction on their own independent basis.

It is in a similar manner, again, that one must approach the question of the spiritual life and its bearings on that of

civil rights and of industrial economy. The course of the last few centuries has been such, that the spiritual life has been cultivated under conditions which only to a very limited extent allowed of its exercising an independent influence upon the political life—that of civil rights—or upon industrial economy. One of the most important branches of spiritual culture—the whole manner of education and public instruction—took its shape from the interests of the civil power. According as State-interests required, so the human being was trained and taught; and State-power was reinforced by economic power. If anyone was to develop his capacities as a human being within the existing provisions for education and training, he had to do so on the ground of such economic power as his sphere in life afforded. Accordingly, those spiritual forces that could find scope within the life of political rights or of industrial economy acquired entirely the stamp of this life. Any free spiritual life had to forgo all idea of making itself useful within the sphere of the political state, and could only do so within the industrial economic sphere, in so far as this remained outside the sphere of the political state's activities. In industrial economy, after all, the necessity is obvious for allowing the competent person to find scope—since all fruitful activity in this sphere dies out if left solely under the control of the Incompetent whom circumstances may have endowed with economic power. If, however, the tendency common amongst people of a socialistic turn of thought were carried out, and economic life were administered after the fashion of the political and legal, then the result would be that the culture of the free spiritual life would be forced to withdraw altogether from the public field. But a spiritual life that has to develop apart from civil and economic realities loses touch with life. It is forced to draw its substantial contents from sources that are not in live connection with these realities, and in course of time works this substance up into such a shape as to run on like a sort of animated abstraction alongside the actual realities, without having any useful practical effect upon them. And so two different currents arise in the spiritual life. One of them draws its waters from the life of political rights and the life of economics, and is occupied with the requirements which come up in these from day to day, trying to devise systems by which these requirements can be met—without, however, penetrating to the needs of man's spiritual nature. All it does is to devise external systems and harness men into them, without paying any heed as to what their inner nature has to say to it.

The other current of spiritual life proceeds from the

inward craving for knowledge and from ideals of the will. These it shapes to suit man's inward nature. But knowledge of this latter kind is derived from contemplation : it is not the gist of what has been taught by the experience of practical life. These ideals have arisen from conceptions as to what is true and good and beautiful ; but they have not the strength to shape the practice of life. Consider what conceptions of the mind, what religious ideals, what artistic interests, form the inward life of the shopkeeper, the manufacturer, the government official, outside and apart from his daily practical life ; and then consider what ideas are contained in those activities which find expression in his book-keeping, or for which he is trained by the education and instruction that prepare him for his profession. A gulf lies between the two currents of spiritual life. The gulf has grown all the wider in recent years because that particular mode of conception that in natural science is quite justified has become the standard of man's relation to reality. This mode of conception sets out to acquire knowledge of laws in things and processes that lie beyond the field of human activity and human influences ; so that man is as it were a mere spectator of that which he comprehends in a scheme of natural law. And though in his technical processes he sets these laws of nature working, yet hereby he himself does no more than give occasion for the action of forces which lie outside his own being and nature. The knowledge that he employs in this kind of activity bears a character quite different from his own nature. It reveals to him nothing of what lies in cosmic processes in which his own being is interwoven. For such knowledge as this he needs a conception of the universe that unites in one whole both the world of man and the world outside him.

It is a knowledge such as this for which that modern spiritual science is striving that is directed to anthroposophy. Whilst fully recognising all that the natural science mode of conception means for the progress of modern humanity, anthroposophical science yet sees that all that can be arrived at by the natural science mode of knowledge will never embrace more than the external man. It also recognises the essential nature of the religious conceptions of the world, but is aware that in the course of the new-age evolution these conceptions of the world have become an internal concern of the soul, not applied by men in any way to the reshaping of their external life, which runs on separately alongside.

It is true that, to arrive at such a form of knowledge, spiritual science makes demands upon men to which they are

as yet but little inclined, because in the last few centuries they have grown habituated to carrying on their practical life and their inner soul-life as two separate and distinct departments of their existence. This habit has resulted in the attitude of incredulity that meets every endeavour to make use of spiritual insight in forming an opinion about life's social configuration. People have in mind their past experience of social ideas, that were born of a spiritual culture estranged from life; and when there is any talk of such things, they recall St Simon, Fourier, and others besides. And the opinion people have formed about ideas of this sort is justified, inasmuch as such ideas are the outcome of a tendency of learning which acquires its knowledge not from living experience but from a process of reasoning. And from this people have generalised, and concluded that no kind of spirit is adapted to produce ideas that bear sufficient relation to practical life to admit of being realised. From this general theory come the various views which in their modern form are all more or less traceable to Marx. Those who hold them have no use for ideas as active agents in bringing about satisfactory social conditions. Rather they maintain that the evolution of the actual facts of economic life is tending inevitably to a goal of which such conditions are the result. They are inclined to let practical life take more or less its own course, on the ground that in actual practice ideas are powerless. They have lost faith in the strength of spiritual life. They do not believe that there can be any kind of spiritual life able to overcome the remoteness and unreality which characterise the form of it that has predominated during the last few centuries.

It is a kind of spiritual life such as this, nevertheless, which is pursued by anthroposophical science. The sources from which it seeks to draw are the sources of actual reality itself. Those forces which sway the inmost nature of man are the same forces that are at work in the actual reality outside man. The natural science mode of conception cannot get down to these forces, being engaged in working up an intellectual code of natural law out of the experiences acquired from external facts. Nor are the world-conceptions, founded on a more or less religious basis, any longer at the present day in touch with these forces. They accept their traditions as handed down to them, without penetrating to their fountain-head in the depths of man's being. Spiritual science, however, seeks to get to this fountain-head. It develops methods of knowledge which lead down into those regions of the inner man where the processes external to man find their continua-

tion within man himself. The knowledge that spiritual science has to give presents a reality actually experienced in man's inner self. The ideas that emerge from it are not the outcome of reasoning, but imbued through and through with the forces of actual reality. Hence such ideas are able to carry with them the force of actual reality when they come to give the lines for social aim and purpose. One can well understand that, at the first, a spiritual science such as this should meet with distrust. But such distrust will not last when people come to recognise the essential difference that exists between this spiritual science and the particular current recently developed in science, and which to-day is assumed to be the only one possible. Once people come to recognise the difference, they will cease to believe that one must avoid social ideas when one is bent on the practical shaping of social facts. They will begin to see, instead, that practical social ideas are obtainable only from a spiritual life that can find its way to the roots of human nature. People will clearly see that in modern times social facts have fallen into disorder because people have tried to master them by thoughts which these facts were constantly eluding.

A spiritual conception that penetrates to the essential being of man finds there motives for action which in the ethical sense too are directly good. For the impulse towards evil arises in man only because in his thoughts and sensations he silences the depths of his own nature. Accordingly, social ideas that are arrived at through the sort of spiritual conception here meant must by their very nature be ethical ideas as well. And being drawn, not from thought alone, but from life, they possess the strength to lay hold upon the will and to live on in action. In the light of a true ethical conception, social thought and ethical thought become one. And the life that grows out of such a spiritual conception is intimately linked with every form of activity that man develops in life—even in his practical dealings with the most insignificant matters. So, through this spiritual conception, social instinct, ethical impulse, and practical conduct become interwoven in such a way as to form a unity.

This kind of spirit, however, can thrive only when its growth is completely independent of all authority except such as is derived directly from the spiritual life itself. Legal regulations by the civil state for the nurture of the spirit sap the strength of the forces of spiritual life. Whereas a spiritual life that is left entirely to its own inherent interests and impulses will reach out into everything that man performs in social life. It is frequently objected that mankind would

need to be completely changed before one could ground social behaviour on the ethical impulses. People do not reflect what ethical impulses in men wither away when they are not allowed to grow up from a free spiritual life, but are forced to take the particular turn that the politico-legal structure of society finds necessary for carrying on work in the spheres it has mapped out beforehand. A person brought up and educated under the free spiritual life will certainly, from very initiative, bring with him into his calling very much of the stamp of his own personality. He will not let himself be fitted into the social works like a cog into a machine. But, in the long run, what he thus brings into it will not hamper, but increase, the harmony of the whole. What goes on in each particular part of the communal life will be the outcome of what lives in the spirits of the people at work there.

People whose souls breathe the atmosphere created by a spirit such as this will put life into the institutions needed for practical economic purposes, and in such a way that social needs too will be satisfied. Institutions that people think they can devise to satisfy these social needs will never work socially with men whose inner nature feels itself out of unison with their outward occupation. For institutions of themselves cannot work socially. To work socially requires human beings, socially attuned, working within an ordered system of civil rights created by a living interest in this Rights system, and with an economic life that produces in the most efficient fashion the goods required for actual needs.

If the life of the spirit be a free one, evolved only from those impulses that reside within itself, then civil life will thrive in proportion as people are educated intelligently, from real spiritual experience, in the adjustment of their civil relations and rights. And then, too, economic life will be fruitful in the measure in which men's spiritual nurture has developed their capacity for it.

Every institution that has grown up in men's communal life is originally the result of the Will that dwelt in their aims; and their spiritual life has contributed to its growth. Only when life becomes complicated in form, as it has under the technical methods of production of the modern age, then the Will that dwells in the Thoughts loses touch with the actual social facts. These latter then take their own automatic course. And man withdraws himself in the spirit to a corner apart, and there seeks the spiritual substance to satisfy the needs of his soul.

It is from this mechanical course of affairs, over which

the will of the individual spirit had no control, that those conditions have arisen which the modern social movement aims at changing. It is because the spirit that is at work within the civil life of rights and in the round of industry is no longer one through which the individual spiritual life can find its channel, that the individual sees himself in a social order which gives him, as an individual, no scope civically nor economically.

People who do not clearly see this will always raise an objection to the conception of the body social as an organism consisting of three systems, each to be worked on its own distinct basis—*i.e.* the Spiritual life, the State for the administration of Rights, and the round of Industrial Economy. They will protest that such a differentiation will destroy the necessary unity of communal life. To this one must reply that this unity is destroying itself in the effort to maintain itself intact. The life of rights, that grows up out of economic power, in its actual working undermines this economic power, because it is felt by those economically inferior to be a foreign body within the social organism. That spirit coming to be dominant in civil rights and economic life when these control its workings, condemns the living spirit—that in each individual is working its way up from the soul's depths—to powerlessness in the face of practical life. If, however, the system of civil rights grows up on independent ground out of the sense of right, and if the Will of the individual, that dwells in the spirit, is developed in a free life of the spirit, then the Rights system and Spiritual force and Economic activity all work together to a unity. They will be able to do so when they can develop, each according to its own proper nature, in distinct fields of life. It is just in separation that they will turn to unity; whereas, shaped from an artificial unity, they become estranged.

People of a socialist way of thinking will, many of them, dismiss such a conception as this with the phrase that it is not possible to bring about satisfactory conditions of life through this organic formation of society; that it can only be done through a suitable economic organisation. In so saying they overlook the fact that the men at work in their economic organisation are endowed with wills. If one tells them so, they will smile, for they regard it as self-evident. Yet their thoughts are busy constructing a social edifice in which this "self-evident" fact is left out of account. Their economic organisation is to be controlled by a communal will. But this, after all, must be the resultant of the individual wills of the people united in the organisation. These indi-

vidual wills can never find scope if the communal will is derived entirely from the idea of economic organisation. But the individual wills can expand untrammelled if, alongside the economic province, there is a civil province of Rights, where the standard is set, not by any economic point of view, but by the sense of right alone; and if, alongside both the economic and civil provinces, a free spiritual life can find place, following the impulsion of the spirit alone. Then we shall not have a social order going by clockwork, to which individual wills could never permanently be fitted. Then human beings will find it possible to give their wills a social bent, and to bring them constantly to bear on the shaping of social circumstances. Under the free spiritual life the individual will will acquire its social bent. Under a self-based civil state of Rights, these individual wills, socially attuned, will result in a communal will that works aright. And the individual wills, socially centred, and organised by the independent system of rights, will exert themselves within the round of industrial economy, producing and distributing goods as social needs require.

Most people to-day still lack faith in the possibility of establishing a commonwealth based on individual wills. They have no faith in it, because such a faith cannot come from a spiritual life that has developed in dependence on the life of the State and of industrial economy. The kind of spirit that develops, not in freedom out of the life of the spirit itself, but out of an exterior organisation, simply does not know what the potentialities of the spirit are. It looks round for something to guide and manage it—not knowing how the spirit guides and manages itself, if only it can draw its strength from its own sources. It would like to have a board of management for the spirit as a sort of branch department of the economic and civil organisations, quite regardless of the fact that industrial economy and the system of rights can only live when permeated with the spirit that follows its own leading.

For the reshaping of the social order, goodwill alone is not the only thing needful. It needs also that courage which can be a match for the lack of faith in the spirit's power. A true spiritual conception can inspire this courage; for such a spiritual conception feels able to bring forth ideas that not only serve to give the soul its inward orientation, but which, in their very birth, bring with them the seeds of life's practical configuration. The will to go down into the deep places of the spirit can become a will so strong as to bear a part in everything that man performs.

When one speaks of a spiritual conception having its roots in life, quite a number of people take one to mean the sum-total of those instincts in which a man takes refuge who travels along the familiar rails of life and holds every intervention from spiritual regions to be a piece of cranky idealism. The spiritual conception that is meant here, however, must be confounded neither with that abstract spirituality which is incapable of extending its interests to practical life, nor yet with that spiritual tendency which as good as denies the spirit directly it comes to consider the guiding lines of practical life. Both these modes of conception ignore how the spirit rules in the facts of external life, and therefore feel no real urgency for consciously penetrating its rulings. Yet only such a sense of urgency brings forth that knowledge which sees the social question in its true light. The experiments now being made to solve the social question afford such unsatisfactory results because many people have not yet become able to see what the true gist of the question is. They see this question arise in economic regions, and they look to economic institutions to provide the answer. They think they will find the solution in economic transformations. They fail to recognise that these transformations can only come about through forces that are released from within human nature itself in the uprising of a new spiritual life and life of rights in their own independent domains.

RUDOLF STEINER.

BASLE.

MORALS AND RELIGION.

A SYMPOSIUM.

THE BARON F. VON HÜGEL, PROFESSOR J. CHEVALIER,
PRINCIPAL L. P. JACKS, PROFESSOR J. A. SMITH,
PROFESSOR H. WILDON CARR.

[AN International Congress of Philosophy, under the auspices of the Aristotelian Society, was held in Oxford in September 1920. One of the principal sessions was devoted to the discussion of the relation between Ethics and Religion, under the presidency of the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, M.P. The HIBBERT JOURNAL is permitted to reproduce the written papers, together with an oral contribution by Professor Chevalier.]

I.

By BARON F. VON HÜGEL, Hon. LL.D., St Andrews;
Hon. D.D., Oxford.

1.

I PROPOSE to take Religion here as an apprehension, emotion, volition, life ultimately characterised by its object—as an attitude involving a belief, however inarticulate, in some Superhuman Beings or in One Superhuman Being. I intend to concentrate attention upon certain moral dispositions traceable, more or less, in all deep and delicate thinking and doing, whether such thinkers and doers accept such Religion or reject it, so long at least as a controversial mood does not disturb the simple action and affirmation of their true selves. And I aim at showing how real has been the influence of Religion (taken in the evidential, trans-subjective, realist and personalist sense adopted here) upon the formation of these dispositions; and how irreplaceable, in the long run, is this religious influence for any assured and abiding flourishing of these delightful but difficult, these grandest and humanest of all the human virtues.

I take the restriction of the term Religion to belief (whatever may be its other qualities and its quantity) in some Superhuman Beings or Being, to be the most adequate

interpretation of the great mass of historical and psychological facts and forces concerning Religion, so long as we carefully distinguish these facts and forces from the fancies or wishes, or from the difficulties and scepticisms, of individuals or of times that have been deflected or arrested, in their *naïf* religious instincts, by over-civilisation or the like. It is doubtless tempting, when we are pressed by the very real theoretical difficulties and practical dangers of Theism, to attempt its explanation in the past as essentially Cosmic Emotion or some other Pantheistic feeling or outlook; and to insist, for the present and the future, upon some such emotion or outlook as a sufficiently operative substitute. Religion, as it has flourished in the past across broad stretches of history, and as it still subsists amongst average human beings—Religion, as a sense of the Otherness, the Distinct Reality, the Personalism of God, thus melts away into a vague religiosity fearful of any approach to anthropomorphism however noble. But it is far from easy to succeed in any such attempted reduction of Religion, even simply as concerns its past acts and facts. Certainly Buddhism and Confucianism, the two largest apparent exceptions offered by history, do not, properly analysed, constitute any final refutation of such a realist view of Religion. For Primitive Buddhism appears rather as a grand prelude, an impressive clearing of the stage, for Religion, than as a religion proper; whilst Buddhism, as it has now existed for many centuries, is admittedly penetrated by belief in supernatural beings. And Confucianism seems rather to be an impressively definite, and within its range an extraordinarily efficient, Moral Code than, in its essence and centre, a religion properly so called. Both the intense sense of the mutability and the unsatisfyingness of all contingent life, which saturates Primitive Buddhism, and the tenacious practice of order, laboriousness, fidelity, and honesty within human society, which distinguish Confucianism, are not only great things of their kind: they are also things variously necessary, as stimulations, checks, materials, to Religion. Only they are not Religion proper, not direct parts of Religion itself.

2.

As to the virtues, accepted as precious also by circumspect Agnosticism, virtues which nevertheless appear in reason to involve a Theistic conviction, let us take the following six:—

(1) Unpretentiousness, littleness in one's own eyes: these habits are doubtless approximately present in some of the moods of an Epictetus and a Marcus Aurelius. Yet *creature-*

liness, the sense, not of my littleness amidst a huge World Machine, or World Soul, or World Process, but of my weakness and poverty as measured by perfect Spirit—of the Spirit not myself yet sufficiently like me to humble me whilst sustaining me : this beautifully rich virtue still shines out, in its specifically Theistic colour, in Charles Darwin's touching self-oblivion.

(2) Heroism, the holding out against numbers, suffering, death : this also appears, on an impressive scale, amongst the Stoics and continues to rejoice us all from amongst men of little or no Theistic belief. Yet Heroism of a homely and happy cast, a disposition and a practice which deliberately sacrifices all things earthly with a genial brightness and assurance that all will be well—a death like that of Sir Thomas More : this appears to require, in the long run, a belief in a Personalist Spirit as the Ultimate Reality. I submit that only the unhappy divorce between head and heart, which so many moderns *will* canonise as though ultimate and indeed attractive, can obscure for us the superiority of this genial over that gigantic Heroism.

(3) Interdependence, interaid between man and man, assuredly requires to be extended beyond Kant's two rules of my continuous respectful non-interference with my neighbour's interior life and of my persistent help of him in all external things and needs. For I have, on the contrary, somehow to love my neighbour affectively as well as effectively, and I have to bring light and strength to his interior life. And to do this becomes necessary in exact proportion that it becomes difficult. A *creative* love is here required—a love which loves, not in acknowledgment of an already present lovableness, but in order to render lovable in the future what at present repels love. But where am I to find a motive sufficiently independent of my fellow-creature's actual repulsiveness and sufficiently strong to make me love him, the loveless and unlovable, into lovableness, unless in a love inspired by, and primarily directed to, a Reality at all times *creatively* loving, hence supremely lovable—*i.e.* God ?

(4) Truthfulness : how immense is our need of it, in all art and science and philosophy, in all life and character ! Yet also how difficult and delicate a virtue it is ! A virtue which (however much many a popular enthusiasm may obscure the grim facts) depends, in the long run, for its secure subsistence, upon the worth-while, and upon the conviction of the worth-while, of all this toil and trouble. Suppose all our human values to consist, and to be seen to consist, of but so many passing appearances of world forces which in them-

selves are simply mechanical and material, and will inevitably sink back into what they really are : how and why are men to continue to strive for costly accuracy about such mindless happenings, such trivial disportings? Whereas if we hold our deepest human ideals and aspirations to be in a real relation to the Ultimate Reality—to be occasioned by the same Reality which gives to those ideals both their power and our sense that even they are but approximations : we possess a strong motive for such delicate truthfulness, even if we had only to report how poor and fragmentary is all we have and do and can become.

(5) But concreteness, articulation, richness of experience, thought, conviction, and of the many-levelled world which these our own activities apprehend : how deep is also the thirst for these, in all fully awake and unsophisticated souls ! Not truthfulness, simply as a formal virtue, but valuable realities reached and served by our veracity—this is what we seek. In vain does Haeckel rejoice that we cannot, according to his calculations, escape the admission that mere ice and snow will be the real end of all realities however apparently rich may be their endowment. There will, as long as man continues man on this our planet, exist Charles Darwins nobly to express men's general shrinking from such a dreary outlook and from such barbarian joy. Yet it is plain that the said riches, and a thirst for such riches, are but foolish illusions if there is no abidingness in the higher and highest articulations of reality as apprehended by us. Nor indeed is this thirst, at its deepest, a thirst for sheer Becoming, but, especially in so far as it is specifically religious, it is primarily a thirst for Being—for Being Extant and Realised. The Unmoving *Energeia* of God, the full ocean of His Pure Action, thus affects, and in return is desired by, the feeble river of man's life—a life possessed of so much fretful *activity*, so little fruitfulness and so little peace.

(6) A happiness that is not superficial and a depth that is not morbid : this most precious paradoxical combination only Religion (in the strict sense here adopted) appears to produce, and indeed even merely to perceive, with sufficient vividness and power. For the Suffering Serenity which men have learnt to reverence supremely, springs from the soul's keen perception and peaceful acceptance of its own littleness in contrast, not with more or less abstract laws or problems or with material realities, but with the immense fact of God. The Ideal is here a Self-conscious Real ; the Supreme Real is experienced here in and together with other, the contingent lesser realities, and as the ultimate cause both of the existence

and worth, and of the perennially unsatisfying character, of these same lesser realities. Such a suffering of *expansion* mankind will never for very long cease to reverence and to seek. Yet only a suffering of *contraction*, or, worse still, a deadness to the occasions for either kind of suffering, appear to have any logical place or assured protection in any non-religious scheme of Morals.

3.

The affirmation of an essential interconnection between certain moral ideals and habits, esteemed by the finest moral judges as part of the most precious flowering of the ethical life, and the implications of Religion taken in the strict sense of the word, involves no inquisitorial judgment upon any individual, nor the denial of much ethical goodness, even of goodness not entirely without that most precious religious complexion, amongst souls that might be classed, or that would class themselves, as agnostic or even atheist. For what any one of us men really thinks always differs more or less from what he thinks he thinks. Again, the most earnest Theist is never quite consistent; the true moral flowering of his religious conviction is always more or less determined—it is deflected or arrested—by causes other than his religion at its best. And, perhaps above all, the moral movement imparted to individuals, or even to entire generations, by definite religious convictions usually persists, more or less, for a considerable time after these religious motives have died out. These three widely operative conditions render impossible any mathematically precise proof or detailed application of the interdependence, here contended for, between Religion and Morality. Yet the very recognition of the existence and widespread operation of these obscuring counter-influences leaves us all the more free to conclude to a conviction, substantially identical, on its epistemological side, with the penultimate of the four or five very distinct positions advocated by Kant in that bewildering mosaic work of his—the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Professor Kemp Smith's masterly commentary makes it now comparatively easy to locate, and to press out the implications of, this richest, critically constructive strain of Kant—so in the *Critique*, B, pp. 436, 525, 673, 678, 679. Even here Kant is in part artificial—still a Phenomenalist. But in this, the most constructive of the strains within the limits of his Critical Philosophy, Kant maintains, with great clearness and emphasis, that the "Idea" of the Unconditioned is not just a working hypothesis or useful fiction superadded by the human mind to the

experiences of conditional states or existences—experiences which come about, and are thinkable and stateable, without any necessary operation of the said “Idea.” He here insists that the “Idea” of the Unconditioned is a fundamental condition, a chief producer, of all experience properly human and rational. The notion of the Unconditioned is here found, by a careful analysis of the conditions strictly involved in all such experience, to be a prerequisite powerfully operative within, and absolutely necessary to, the very possibility of the said experience. So especially in *Critique*, B, pp. 678–689. The objective Reality, the Distinctness and Otherness from humanity and all its projections, of the Unconditioned, is here assured within deliberately critical principles. We have here an “Idea” which is not merely a regulative hypothesis, but a genuine intimation and reliable evidence of a more than simply human Reality, of an immensely conditioning, unconditioned Existence. It remains similarly to analyse the Moral experiences and to find that they include as genuinely evidential a presupposition as do the more purely temporal-spatial experiences, and we reach, as a necessary part and parcel of the normal experience of mankind, the objective traces and effects of a Personalist Distinctness and Otherness—a real Personalist God. Thus, even well within strictly Critical principles, we can and do discover the interaction, here advocated, between the *Isness* of Religion, essentially evidential, and the *Oughtness* of Morals, essentially imperative.

II.

(Communication écrite.)

Par J. CHEVALIER, professeur à l'Université de Grenoble.

I. En toutes choses il faut partir des faits.

Or, c'est un fait indéniable que tous les hommes, sans en exclure même les primitifs non développés et ceux des civilisés qui ont été déformés par le milieu et les circonstances, ont la notion, au moins implicite, de choses qui sont à *faire* et, plus encore, de choses *qui sont à ne pas faire*, et cela non pas en raison de leur utilité seule ou de leur nocivité seule, mais parce qu'en elles réside une force qui leur est propre et inhérente, et qui fait qu'elles s'imposent par elles-mêmes. Cette croyance, ou cette règle, immanente aux actions humaines, qui est comme le principe du vouloir, et qui constitue une donnée primitive et immédiate comme le *Cogito*, implique, de

quelque nom qu'on les appelle, la reconnaissance (1°) d'un *idéal*, (2°) d'un *impératif*.

Faisons tout de suite deux remarques, pour écarter des objections courantes et d'ailleurs inévitables.

(1°) Ces notions d'idéal et d'impératif ne se sont explicitées que tardivement, et, aujourd'hui même, elles ne sont explicitées, le plus souvent, que d'une manière incomplète, sinon erronée : en morale, comme en droit, comme en religion, la pratique, à l'origine, a précédé, en règle générale, la connaissance des principes qui la fondent ; elle se justifie souvent par des principes qui ne sont pas ses principes propres ; et, lorsqu'elle a explicité ses principes vrais, elle en dépasse encore la formule.

(2°) La détermination positive de ce qui est à *faire* et de ce qui est à *ne pas faire* est extrêmement variable avec les temps, avec les lieux, et suivant les sociétés : il y aurait à rechercher dans quelle mesure ces variations sont d'ordre moral et dénotent une variation dans le principe, dans quelle mesure elle sont d'ordre économique ou social et ne traduisent (ce qui est plus probablement le cas) qu'une variation dans les applications du principe. Quoi qu'il en soit, il demeure vrai que tous les hommes, s'ils ne logent pas le devoir au même lieu, ont la notion d'un devoir et, par suite, d'une norme qui définit *quid agendum*, *quid non*, et que cette notion subsiste partout reconnaissable, identique à elle-même, et distincte de tout le reste, en dépit des variations des mœurs ou du progrès des connaissances.

Les deux faits signalés ici, et qui sont également indéniables, n'empêchent donc pas que les notions connexes d'*idéal* et d'*impératif* ne se trouvent impliquées, plus ou moins confusément et avec des contenus divers, dans la pratique de tous les hommes, et qu'elles ne doivent être considérées comme des principes constitutifs de l'espèce humaine en tant qu'espèce morale.

II. Or, de ce fait universel il faut rendre compte, comme de tout fait, rationnellement, c'est-à-dire qu'il faut : (1) donner de ce fait la *raison* explicative, qui n'a de valeur scientifique que si elle est la raison réelle ; (2) en donner la *raison propre* et spécifique, car la raison a pour rôle, non de réduire toutes choses à une unité systématique, mais de saisir l'essence individuelle de son objet, et par suite, tout en restant toujours une et d'accord avec elle-même, de se diversifier avec le réel (*cf.* Pascal, *Pensées*, éd. Brunschvieg, 116).

Efforçons-nous d'appliquer ce critère à la question considérée.

Il est évident que tous les points de vue sur la question se ramènent à deux et à deux seuls : (a) ou bien cette notion (à la fois théorique et pratique, principe de pensée et principe d'action) d'un idéal impératif est un *fétiche*, un produit ou un *concept* de l'esprit humain,—esprit individuel, esprit collectif, ou Moi impersonnel, etc. (b) Ou bien c'est, au sens platonicien, une *idée*, l'appréhension ou le contact d'une réalité supra-sensible et supra-conceptuelle, que l'esprit ne *fait* pas, mais qu'il *voit*, ou constate, fût-ce même d'une manière médiate et imparfaite. Dans le premier cas, l'idéal est une illusion : il est du type hallucination. Dans le second cas, l'idéal est une réalité : il est du type perception.

Il s'agit donc de déterminer quelle est, de ces deux explications, celle qui fournit la raison réelle et la raison propre du fait dont nous avons à rendre compte.

III. Toutes les théories du positivisme moral se rangent sous la première catégorie. D'après ces théories, qui ont été formulées pour la première fois avec précision par les sophistes grecs, le droit, ou plus exactement ce que nous dénommons droit, n'est qu'une convention ; le bien, ou plus exactement ce que nous dénommons bien, n'est qu'une idole fabriquée par l'homme et devant laquelle il se prosterne ensuite, comme devant une puissance mystérieuse. Et, pour "expliquer" ce pouvoir mystérieux du bien, ainsi que le caractère impératif dont il est doué ou que les hommes lui attribuent, on a été généralement amené à considérer le "bien" comme une production de l'esprit collectif, c'est-à-dire d'un inconscient, et le sentiment d' "obligation" comme la résultante d'une habitude héréditaire, c'est-à-dire encore d'un inconscient, ce qui permettrait de rendre compte, et de l'autorité que le bien exerce sur l'individu, et de l'objectivité qu'il revêt à l'égard de l'individu : dans cette théorie, d'ailleurs, l'*autorité* morale, ou l'obligation, n'est qu'une *contrainte*, et l'*objectivité* de l'idée morale, comme celle de l'hallucination, est une objectivité, non pas réelle, mais *factice*.

Par là, on n'*explique* pas le fait moral : on le *réduit*.

(1) L'idéal, qui nous apparaît tout à la fois comme un fait et comme une valeur, n'est plus qu'un fait : on pourra encore parler, en ce sens, d'idéals, mais tous ces idéals ayant même valeur ne sont plus, à proprement parler, idéal, norme, devoir être. Si tout est vrai, rien n'est vrai. Si tout est idéal (l'allemand comme le français), rien n'est idéal.

(2) De là suit immédiatement que le caractère impératif d'un tel idéal ne tient pas à son essence propre ou à sa valeur intrinsèque, mais à une détermination extrinsèque, à un décret, par exemple, de l'esprit collectif, qui l'érige en contrainte. L'idéal ne s'impose pas : il est imposé. Ou, plus exactement, l'idéal est *chose imposée*, et rien de plus.

Il est extrêmement difficile de réfuter une telle thèse, comme celle qui réduit la perception à l'hallucination, puisqu'une telle thèse, en niant l'existence d'une réalité extérieure à l'esprit humain (le monde des corps dans un cas, un monde de valeurs dans l'autre), pose comme postulat la négation même du principe qui permet seul de la réfuter, et qu'elle peut toujours arguer, contre le réalisme, du fait que toutes choses ne nous sont accessibles que par l'esprit.

Mais, sans entrer dans la discussion de cette théorie, au fond de laquelle on trouve nombre de confusions graves ou de principes arbitraires reçus sans critique,—comme l'assimilation de l'*essence* à l'*origine*, prétendue telle, ou encore la réduction du *développement* à une *évolution* mécanique du même au même,—il est très important, sinon décisif, de mettre en vedette le postulat initial d'où elle procède : et ce postulat n'est rien de moins que la négation de la morale ; car celui qui réduit l'idéal et l'obligation à des notions hétérogènes, et étrangères à la morale, comme est la contrainte, nie du même coup la *caractéristique* de la morale. On voit alors nettement à quoi l'on a affaire. De telles théories doivent être appelées "science des mœurs" ou "sociologie," mais non pas "morale." C'est par un abus de langage qu'on les dénomme telles : c'est par un décret métaphysique arbitraire qu'on érige un simple indicatif en impératif, le fait en droit, et les mœurs ou l'opinion collective en idéal. Toute théorie de la morale qui en détruit la caractéristique est condamnée par le fait même, en tant que théorie morale.

IV. Si la morale n'est pas une *fabrication humaine*, reste qu'elle soit l'*expression*, d'ailleurs *humaine*, donc relative, d'une *réalité supra-humaine*, et, en quelque manière, absolue. Dès lors, l'idéal obligatoire, caractéristique de la morale, est à traiter comme un irréductible. L'idéal est vraiment un idéal, c'est-à-dire une réalité qui nous dépasse, qui nous est, en un sens, intérieure, puisqu'elle est le type même que nous avons à réaliser, et, en un autre sens, extérieure et supérieure, puisque nous ne l'avons pas faite, qu'elle ne dépend pas de nous, mais que nous dépendons d'elle. Et cet idéal est

vraiment obligatoire, non par l'effet d'une contrainte extérieure ou d'une nécessité intérieure, mais par sa seule vertu, et parce qu'il est comme le principe qui règle le bon usage de notre liberté.

Or, *la morale*, ainsi comprise, *implique une métaphysique* : l'adhésion de la volonté à un idéal implique et présuppose l'adhésion de l'esprit à la réalité de cet idéal. Sous une autre forme, *affirmer le bien à faire, c'est affirmer le bien existant, c'est-à-dire Dieu.*

V. Mais, ici, il faut préciser. Laquelle de ces deux affirmations fonde l'autre ? (Je ne dis pas "précède" l'autre : car le problème psychologique est hors de cause, pour les raisons indiquées plus haut, § I., 1°.)

Kant dit : c'est la morale qui fonde la métaphysique.— Position dangereuse, parce qu'elle substitue à l'être un vouloir être ; position illusoire et intenable, car le devoir n'est le devoir que si le Bien existe. Faire de l'existence du Bien une simple exigence de la raison pratique, et refuser à la raison spéculative d'en rien connaître faute d'une intuition qui y corresponde, c'est compromettre irrémédiablement l'affirmation du Bien ou du devoir, car l'homme ne saurait couper sa raison en deux, et il n'admettra jamais d'une manière durable l'empire d'un idéal que sa raison propre ne reconnaîtrait pas. L'impératif ne fonde pas l'idéal : c'est l'idéal qui commande. Je dois, parce que c'est bien.

C'est donc la métaphysique qui fonde la morale. Le Bien est premier en soi et dans nos idées. C'est parce que le Bien existe que le devoir s'impose. Il n'y a que Dieu qui puisse commander à ma conscience : sa loi seule est *vénérable* (on se plie à la force, mais on ne la vénère pas) ; sa loi seule est *efficace* (des autres lois on se débarrasse à dès qu'on le pourra) ; sa loi seule est donc *morale*.

VI. Mais cette loi ne résulte pas d'un *décret arbitraire* de quelque puissance souveraine. S'il en était ainsi, la loi s'imposerait à l'homme du dehors ; et, d'autre part, nous ne pourrions la connaître que par une *révélation* de la volonté souveraine, en sorte que la morale se fonderait sur la religion (non, à vrai dire, sur la religion naturelle, qui est absolument rationnelle, mais uniquement sur une religion positive).

Cette loi est la loi même de notre nature, nature raisonnable, qui naît développable mais non développée, et qui doit se développer selon son type : ainsi, la loi nous oblige sans nous contraindre, et nous ne sommes vraiment libres qu'en lui obéissant. D'autre part, *le Bien, qui la fonde, n'est que l'essence de la raison divine, dont notre raison participe* : l'homme est une idée de Dieu, que Dieu, sans doute, choisit en

toute liberté, et qu'il réalise en toute indépendance (d'où la contingence de l'être, résultant du *fait* de la création) ; mais ce choix et cette réalisation sont conformes à un ordre *rationnel*, fondé dans l'*essence* divine, et connu par l'*intelligence* divine : c'est cet ordre qui s'exprime dans le type que doit réaliser l'être humain ; c'est de cet ordre que dépend la loi qui le régit et dont Dieu même ne saurait l'exempter (d'où la nécessité de la loi pour le type, et par suite pour tous les individus de ce type qui seront réalisés). Dès lors, la loi morale est connaissable par la *raison*, s'appuyant sur les *faits*. Il y a une morale naturelle, qui est tout entière rationnelle et qui ne se fonde pas sur une religion positive, toute religion positive devant au contraire se fonder sur elle, car toute révélation suppose préalablement la connaissance rationnelle du Dieu véritable, d'où découle l'existence de la loi morale et des sanctions que cette loi implique.

VII. *La métaphysique seule assure à la morale sa réalité, donc son autonomie : il n'y a de morale indépendante qu'une morale métaphysique.*

Il faut dire de la morale ce que Leibniz, après Descartes, écrit de la géométrie : " Toute réalité doit être fondée dans quelque chose d'existant. Il est vrai qu'un athée peut être géomètre. Mais s'il n'y avait point de Dieu, il n'y aurait point d'objet de la géométrie " (*Théodicée*, § 184, cf. Descartes, *Réponses aux Secondes et aux Sixièmes Objections*, Adam-Tannery, ix. 111 et 230).

Et cette métaphysique, qui est de toutes les connaissances la plus *positive* parce que la plus *réelle*, qui est la simple affirmation rationnelle dépouillée de ses préjugés, et non pas du tout quelque système théorique d'où l'on déduirait arbitrairement un système pratique, permet seule, bien loin de les contrarier, l'*unité* et l'*unanimité* des hommes. Seule elle leur enseigne le vrai usage de la raison. Seule elle fonde le juste et le droit. Et sa méconnaissance serait, pour notre civilisation, le prélude d'un cataclysme irrémédiable.

III.

By Principal L. P. JACKS.

I DOUBT if we can discuss the relation of Religion to Ethics without betraying the fact that our interest in the discussion is pragmatic. Our object is not merely to explain or justify the Moral Ideal or Law, but to explain or justify it in a way that will promote its realisation. Our Will as well as our

Reason is concerned in the inquiry. Do we not feel that any theory of Morals must needs be inadequate unless it reinforces the *motive* for leading the moral life? Is not that motive present even when we deal with the otherwise unanswerable question, "Why should I be moral?" Is not the desire consciously or unconsciously present to contribute something, not merely to making morality intelligible, but also to making it actual? Was there ever a moral theory of one kind or another put forward the author of which could not be understood as saying, "By thinking as I do about morality you will become more moral"—more "moral," of course, in his sense of the term?

But it is when we are discussing the relation of Religion to Ethics that this pragmatic bias becomes most evident. We are discussing motives throughout. Suppose that our present discussion were to lead us to some conclusion which obviously weakened the motives to a good life? Should we not feel that such a conclusion must be revised? Contrariwise, if our conclusion took a form which gave us new motives to morality or strengthened those which already exist, should we not have in that a *prima facie* proof, at least, that our discussion had moved in the right direction? I know of no other kind of inquiry in which the pragmatic bias is quite so *evident*, though possibly it is present in all.

For my own part, I have no hesitation in confessing that my search for moral *truth* is coincident with my search for moral *power*. Here we are finding truth to whatever extent we are finding power, and *vice versa*. Equally we are in error so far as any conclusions we may reach leave the Right less urgent or the Good less attractive. My interest in the present inquiry lies in the hope that by connecting Religion with Ethics (or by disconnecting it) a new motive may be liberated, or an old motive strengthened, which may cause somebody, conceivably myself, to embark with increased energy on the moral life. In this I am not claiming exceptional righteousness, but describing what I believe to be the moving force which has originated our present discussion and perhaps the proceedings of the Congress as a whole. Except as believing that our proceedings will make a difference, and a difference for the better, we should hardly be here at all, and certainly we should not be interested in the relation of Religion to morality.

If, therefore, it can be shown that the alliance of Religion with morality strengthens the moral will, we should have a good reason for believing that the alliance is philosophically sound. If, on the other hand, it can be shown that morality

would be more generally practised and men lead better lives on the basis of a purely naturalistic ethic, then the alliance would have to be dissolved and philosophy would have to acquiesce in the dissolution. How could philosophy maintain the alliance in face of the proof that morality had better prospects without it? Or, to put the matter somewhat more precisely: my own belief that naturalistic ethic breaks down on the question of power, that it yields no adequate motive for the good life, is to me a sufficient reason, apart from many others that might be named, for rejecting that theory. On the other hand, my belief that Religion creates motives which are strong enough to overcome the enormous difficulties involved in living the good life, even in its simpler forms, and adequate to maintain that continuous improvement of the Moral Ideal which is the alternative to its deterioration, is only another form of my belief that the alliance of the two rests upon a philosophical basis.

I feel the more assured in making these statements because they have the concurrence explicit or implicit of my two predecessors. Baron von Hügel has no hesitation in appealing to the motive power of belief in a personal God, and finds in this motive power a strong presumptive proof of the real existence of the Being by belief in whom it is generated. The moral value of this belief as a transforming dynamic he exhibits in detail, showing how, under its influence, common virtues are raised, extended, and in a manner glorified. And Professor Chevalier is clearly turning his face in the same direction when in the highly significant concluding sentence of his paper he points to the moral catastrophe awaiting civilisation if the alliance between Religion and Ethics be dissolved. Both writers do indeed present us with a metaphysic in support of the moral plea; and Professor Chevalier expressly states that this metaphysic is the foundation of morality. And yet one may be permitted to ask: Is it not precisely *because* the metaphysic in question provides a foundation for morality that he is able to accept it as true? Would a metaphysic which had everything else in its favour but this, that it yielded no motive for the good life, that it offered no effective opposition to anti-moral forces, that it gave no basis for duty—would not such a metaphysic stand condemned without further examination? Professor Chevalier's concluding sentence indicates the way in which he would answer these questions; and Baron von Hügel's answer is no less clear.

Whenever we embark on the study of morality without

interest in its applications I cannot but think that it is not morality we are studying. Morality does not arise till the point of application is reached. The idea, steadfastly encouraged in some quarters, that the business of the moralist is confined to the study of principles, somebody else being left to apply them and provide the motives for their application, is responsible not only for the general futility of ethical studies as carried on in the schools, but for a grave neglect of the very formidable conditions with which moral teaching has to deal—the two things, indeed, being closely related. The effect of a moral theory launched upon the world is next to nothing unless the application of it can be reinforced by powerful motives. The good life, as Aristotle pointed out, is a very difficult affair; difficult even when it goes no further than conformity to existing conventions. But when the good life demands that existing standards must be transcended, how can this be effected without an immense liberation of power? Mere information as to why men should do right has no effect against their natural tendencies to do wrong—it is no match for the difficulties that beset the good life. The “*meliora*” are not made more cogent by being made scientific, nor the “*deteriora*” less seductive. Immoral science can be more than a match for moral, and often the effect of giving morality a “scientific” form is to show how easily morality can be circumvented. We should be much nearer the truth if, instead of treating morality as an article for which there is a popular demand, we were to regard it as something which all men would avoid if they could, and avoid all the more when science has made it grimly precise.

For this reason the work of the moral teacher would be hopeless were it not that morality is capable of extension to a much wider field where the will is brought into contact with an overmastering force, which can only be vaguely characterised, but is perhaps best indicated by the word “love.” Without this moral systems never advance beyond the stage where they are correctly described as missions to the converted. In and by themselves they are utterly inadequate to the task of making a bad man good, or even to that of making a good man better. There is much to be said on behalf of theologians like Paley, who found sanctions for morality in the theory of eternal rewards and punishments. They took a true measure of the difficulties which beset the good life, and may be given credit for having done their best to produce a motive adequate to overcome them. The fear of hell or the hope of heaven is not indeed a motive to which I should myself feel justified in appealing.

But until some motive of equal or greater power is in the field, the problem of morality remains unsolved to those whose interest in it is pragmatic—the interest, namely, of getting the Good not merely understood but *realised*, the Right not merely placed on a scientific basis but *done*.

No statement of the Moral end will satisfy which does not liberate, or perhaps create, motives adequate to its attainment. The *reasons* of morality must be at the same time efficient causes of it. If, for example, the best that could be said for morality is that it promotes the secular happiness (or other interests) of mankind, while the question still remains open as to whether the secular happiness of mankind is *worth* the effort its promotion involves, or indeed worth promoting at all, then the moral problem, as I conceive it, is not solved.

Morality must have a cosmic motive or, philosophically, it has none. We belong to the universe, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; and it cannot be our duty to make the interests of mankind the supreme object of endeavour if the universe of which we are parts sets us the example of indifference to those interests or of hostility to them. The moral agent needs to know that Reality, or the Universe, is on his side in this matter: on his side not merely in the sense that it gives him a blind and unconscious support, in the course of evolution or otherwise, but that it regards him with sympathy and approval, that it responds to his loyalty, and is as truly determined not to betray him as he to be faithful to it. For goodness is essentially a co-operative enterprise between man and the world in which he lives, and could never be sustained for long in an environment whose innermost nature was devoid of the spirit and the motives which sustain the good man in his work. The Universe must needs be moral towards us in the same sense that we are moral towards it. Without this assurance of spiritual reciprocity the underlying motive of our moral interests is lacking. So far as Religion can give this assurance it has a vital connection with Ethic.

On this ground I would express the relationship of Ethic to Religion in terms of wider compass than those of either Baron von Hügel or Professor Chevalier. Within these wider terms there is room for the views of both writers; but it seems to me that in narrowing their form of expression at a certain point, which I will mention presently, they lay themselves open to effective reprisals from the other side. According to Professor Chevalier, in particular, man is an idea of God, he participates in the divine reason, and the law of right

is the law of his own reasonable nature. If this be so, it is difficult to understand how it comes to pass that man ever interprets his own nature otherwise, as unquestionably he often does. How could an idea of God so far mistake its own nature as to suppose itself a product of the slime? Professor Chevalier's mode of stating the relationship of man and God seems to carry over so much of the Divine inerrancy to the human side as to leave the existence of any false philosophy of morals an unintelligible fact.

The point at which I find both Professor Chevalier and Baron von Hügel difficult to follow is the point at which they identify the Moral Reality exclusively with God. I follow them in so far as they argue that our moral experience introduces us to a real *world* which, though intimately related to the world of sense perceptions and temporal events, is not to be understood in terms of anything that has happened, or ever will happen, to the human race on this planet. Our moral experience is in fact one of the many points of contact, perhaps the chief, between these two related worlds. And that, it seems to me, is all we need to say in order to give morality the deeper significance that both writers assign to it. I agree that if we regard morality as the will of a personal Being, not imposed upon us, but expressing itself in our nature and as our nature, we should have in such a belief an actual source of moral power which would lift the virtues to much higher levels than they would attain on a naturalistic interpretation of their meaning. But when Baron von Hügel goes further, and identifies the religion which can produce this effect with belief in a personal God, he appeals indeed to a religious experience which is deeply impressive but not involved in the logic of his argument. So long as we have reason to believe that the universe is really *worth* the highest we can offer it in the way of self-devotion and cheerful service, we have a motive adequate to all the virtues the Baron describes. Is the object of religion a divine Universe in which the Divine Person is immanent, or is it the Divine Person apart from the Universe? If it is the first, the connection of Religion and Ethics is much clearer than it would be in the alternative.

For my own part, I find it hard, with the Baron, to believe that the world is really worth what it seems to demand of me unless its demands are the expression of the personal and creative love of a single Being; but I do not think that either of us is entitled to press this as the only form which belief in an ultimately worthy universe must take. If, for example, the ultimate reality should present itself not

as a personal God, in the Baron's sense of the term, but as an immortal society¹ to which we belong or may belong, as a "heavenly city" of which we are or may become the citizens, as the Communion of Saints of Christian Theology, as the Beloved Community of Professor Royce, which not only asks our loyalty but is absolutely loyal to every one of its members—if, I say, any one of these beliefs were substituted, I cannot see why the resulting motives should fall short in moral power of those which the Baron ascribes to belief in a personal God. Nor can I see why these alternative beliefs should be less efficacious in averting the catastrophe of civilisation than the form of Theism presented by Professor Chevalier. All of them are modes of interpreting the universe—"the whole creation"—in terms of spiritual reciprocity between loving souls—the conception in which Ethics and Religion coalesce.

IV.

By Professor J. A. SMITH.

THE subject originally proposed for this symposium was, if I remember rightly, the relation between Morals and Metaphysics. Accident, perhaps working to our advantage, has given it the form of the problem of the relation between Morals and Religion. It may be that the difference is not so great as might at first appear. For in the present discussion, as often, Metaphysics and Religion, without being identified, are taken, I think, to differ from Morals in much the same respect. Both exceed or transcend Morals by containing an element of belief which *prima facie* at least Morals does not (or need not). Morals or Morality, so we often seem to be told, has a being and value of its own, which may be called subjective or pragmatical (or more simply practical). The sort of experience which we call moral is what it is and has the value which it has whether or no the extra-beliefs of Metaphysics or Religion are well grounded. In this sense or in this degree Morality may be said to have an absolute being and value. And certainly here I am not concerned to dispute this *prima facie* absolute validity of the moral experience.

This experience is to my mind characterised, or (better) constituted, by the permeation of it throughout by the sense of obligation—we may say "unconditional obligation," though the adjective adds nothing to what the substantive already

¹ I may refer in this connection to Dr Felix Adler's recently published book, *An Ethical Philosophy of Life*.

contains. So taken, the experience guarantees its own validity and worth. But even so that validity and worth may be (so we are told) no more than subjective, personal, human, etc. And the question at issue is whether or no it bears, when duly considered, testimony beyond itself, and, if so, to what in the way of extra-subjective, or what I may call circum-subjective, fact. What does the moral experience in virtue of its specific and intrinsic nature justify us in believing as to its meta-ethical environment or surrounding universe? For myself, I cannot doubt that to the character of its environment—and so to that of *the* Universe—it is a speaking and credible witness, and that its evidence goes at least as far as Principal Jacks claims that it does. On its word we rightly believe—we may even say we know—that the Universe is such a moral community as he desires and believes it to be. Apart from such an environment, our private or subjective moral experience would be without the substantiality and worth which we are here agreed to ascribe to them. So much by way of Metaphysics is, on my view, guaranteed to us with all the certainty we can in reason demand. Of such a universe, thus assured, we can without disabling unbelief or doubt endeavour to make ourselves ever more and more loyal and worthy citizens. For many that basis of belief has often proved enough; with less the springs of moral action have tended to dry up. And I agree with Principal Jacks that “so long as we have reason to believe [and I contend that we have such reason] that the universe is really *worth* the highest we can offer in the way of self-devotion and cheerful service, we have a motive to all the virtues” which deserve the name of moral—a sufficient motive to do all that Duty requires of us.

But, clearly, in maintaining that for Morality this is enough we—he and I—stand rather alone. There are those who feel convinced that the existence and undisputed worth of the moral experience on deeper examination of its nature carries us further, and so carrying us opens out to us sources of greater light and more quickening inspiration. There is in it revealed to us further detail in the constitution of the Universe in which Morality lives. The Universe, so we may or must believe, is not merely a community of moral agents, but a community of a particular type. It is no Republic or Aristocracy, it is a Monarchy—nay, more, it is a Monarchy of a determinate kind. The moral community, which the moral experience as it is in us demands—and demanding guarantees,—is one in which the spirit of Morality is not merely diffused and operative throughout, but is also concentrated in a personal repre-

sentative from whose will that spirit flows because in Him it is first and completely actualised. In an old phrase adapted, the moral order, which is the environment in which our moral experiences alone have being and value, exists both in the general and in the army—both as “the personal and creative love of a single and personal Being” and also in the form of a “spiritual reciprocity between loving souls”—or (again to use technical terms) both transcendently and immanently in the moral, which is *the*, Universe.

What I would urge is that what the history of thought on this great issue shows is that, so far as we keep to inferences drawn from the special and intrinsic nature of moral experience as it is in us, we are not warranted in this conclusion—that the arguments in its favour have failed to carry conviction. Reflection on the nature of that experience, while warranting such a metaphysics of itself as satisfies Principal Jacks and myself, does not establish, while of course it does not exclude, what I may briefly call the Monarchic conclusion.

But this does not mean that that conclusion might not be otherwise established. There may be other experiences of ours which justify the conclusion, and, if I am right, what we have before us is an argument so based. It is an argument not from Morality but from Religion itself as another and different experience of ours—from *its* existence in, and worth for, us. And, briefly, what I find absent in Morality as such and present in Religion as such is the element of what may be compendiously called Worship. The spirit of loyalty to the moral community or universe is possible to the full without in any way or degree involving this: wherever the latter is found it introduces into experience a novel ingredient of value. Conscientiousness or dutifulness at its highest is not Religion, and may exist and do its work where the distinctive spirit of Religion is absent (though where it also is present conscientiousness is doubtless enhanced and strengthened). The question, therefore, is what conclusions as to circum-jacent fact are warranted by the existence, worth, and power of the spirit of Worship as it is here and now in us and shows that worth and power. What does it tell us as to the presence in the Universe of something answering to that essentially outflowing spirit? Can we regard the moral universe revealed to us in and by our moral experience as being or within itself containing an adequate and sufficient object of our worship? Must the object demanded by and for our worship transcend our moral universe; or is it enough that it should be the spirit immanent in it, creating and sustaining it through the reciprocal interaction of its members? And,

above all and in particular, is it necessary that, in order to justify—to render rational—our whole experience as we understand and value it, that spirit must, besides permeating the whole impersonal or supra-personal Universe, also be concentrated in some personal Being?

At present this question seems to me to be answered according to differences of personal (*i.e.* private) experience or of personal valuations of such experience. I have no desire to minimise the measure of general agreement, but as yet it appears to me to fall far short of universal consent, even among those who have strenuously bent their powers to consideration of the matter. The alternative between Immanence and Transcendence still remains even to the most thoughtful an open one; to decide finally for either is only possible at a plain sacrifice of something the value of which cannot be disputed. What the world waits for is some solution which will harmonise the claims of the one and the other without derogation from either. That such a solution is possible to thought seems a necessary corollary of faith in the rationality of the Universe, but it is idle to expect that when, or if, it comes it will be in the shape of some final formula which can be written down or transmitted unchanged to future generations. For myself, I propound no such formula, and offer not a solution but a programme to others and myself for continued reflection.

The conclusion here accepted is not one of unceasing oscillation between two opposed extremes or of an eternally suspended decision between incompatible alternatives. What it does preclude is the expectation of any actual closure of the debate. It looks for the solution rather in its continuance, the ever-renewed statement, transformation, and restatement of an issue at once “as old as the hills” and as fresh as the dawn. Morality is progress or nothing, and only in a theory of it which is essentially progressive can its nature be understood or expressed. And the same is true of Religion and its theory or understanding; the ever-present object of Religion, which is also the object of its theory or theorising, is an actuality which incessantly enacts or “inactionates” itself,

“Which decomposes but to recompose,
Becomes my universe that feels, and knows,”

and that not “in face” or appearance only, or merely “for us,” but in itself, and to the deepest recesses of its own being, the *βάθην Θεοῦ*.

V.

By H. WILDON CARR.

I BEGIN by explaining briefly why, having arranged this symposium with no intention of being included in it, I am now taking part. The main reason is that I cannot refuse to respond to a direct appeal to do so from my friend Baron von Hügel, who points out to me that the immanentist position, which he knows that I hold, and in particular reference to which at my request he designed his argument, is not represented, and without it the symposium is one-sided and incomplete. The three papers which are before me in print as I write, differ from one another on important points, and each emphasises a particular side of the problem, but they are variations on a theme rather than antagonistic views of the problem of *Morals and Religion*. In responding to Baron von Hügel's request and writing this paper, I do not do so merely in order to give to the discussion the piquancy of opposition. The problem of the relation of *Morals and Religion* is not one that needs enlivening by introducing an *advocatus diaboli*. Nothing of the kind is suggested or intended. It was, indeed (and this is my subsidiary reason for taking part), because on reading the three papers I felt disappointment in the absence from the symposium of any presentation of the non-transcendentalist view, that I gladly responded.

I disagree with each of the three papers, but my disagreement is not concerned with particular points or with their application: it is more profound. I disagree with the basis of the relation of *Morals and Religion* which all three appear to me to accept. Before I set forth my own view, I will state therefore my chief negative attitude towards the position of each.

I admire and I am attracted by the way in which Baron von Hügel conceives Religion as being primarily the consciousness of a personal relation to a personal God. I feel the attraction because to me also intersubjective intercourse is the expression of the reality of spirit. Religion, in my view, also may be expressed as the knowledge and love of God, but—and this is my point of divergence—my concept of God does not involve a belief, articulate or inarticulate, in superhuman beings or in one superhuman being, whether or not such beings or being exist. On the other hand, my religion is certainly not cosmic emotion. So far as I have anything that seems to answer to cosmic emotion in my experience, it does not warm me to enthusiasm: it rather makes me shiver.

To pass from Religion to Morals, it seems to me that the six virtues enumerated by Baron von Hügel, if they be, and then in so far as they are, irrational from the standpoint of simple human nature, are not made rational by theistic conviction. I deny that moral or virtuous actions, whether or not they be irrational judged by any chosen criterion, are, in any universal sense, non-natural. By this I do not mean merely that all moral actions are human actions, but that the human actions classified as altruistic, quite as much as the human actions classified as egoistic, have their source or ground in human nature.

In regard to Baron von Hügel's synthesis of "isness" and "oughtness," in following Kant he is following the true philosophic lead, but I think that he mistakes the direction, perhaps because he finds the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "bewildering mosaic work." As to the particular argument in his concluding paragraph, namely, that the moral experiences are "evidential" of the "isness" or existence of a "presupposition," I think it is a misinterpretation of Kant and (for criticism of Kant is not relevant) metaphysically unsound.

I admire in Professor Chevalier the clearness and skill with which he has stated his thesis, but I find myself less in sympathy with his view-point than with that of Baron von Hügel. His argument strikes me as altogether too simple: it does not grip me at any point. He disarms the reader with an appeal to facts, but then fixes on the facts a metaphysics which enables him, with surprisingly few steps, to rise from morality to Religion, from Religion to the theistic postulate. His argument may be very effective against the positivists, whom he seems to have chiefly in mind, but it does not touch the idealist position, and indeed it does not affect anyone unless he admits the reduction of all cognitions to two types—perceptions (which for Professor Chevalier imply things existing to be discerned) and hallucinations (which apparently with him imply fictions or meaningless constructions of the mind). He has no place for a philosophy which sees even in perceptions a constructive activity.

To Principal Jacks' position I am sorry to say I find myself not merely unsympathetic but distinctly antipathetic. At the risk of shocking my friends, I must protest that, so far as my theory of Religion and Morals is concerned, I have not the slightest interest in promoting the realisation of any moral idea or moral law. Apart from what he describes as pragmatism, and so far as Principal Jacks has developed a theory of his own, it is hardly more than a variant on the

theistic argument—a plea for non-insistence on the personality of God and for benevolent recognition of various pluralistic substitutes.

I may sum up my negative attitude, therefore, towards all three positions as being the denial that the fact of morality, or the moral law, or the categorical imperative, is evidential of a transcendent existence, articulate or inarticulate. Against and opposed to this view, I hold that the insight which philosophy gives us when we reflect on the nature of our theoretical and practical reason, itself raises, or at least may raise, us to the highest plane of religious experience. We have no need to cling to æsthetic imagery, or borrow from artistic representation, and we have no need to construct concepts of a non-sensuous personality, in order to interpret morality or to enforce it. All such attempts represent failures, however much the objective beliefs of religion approximate to philosophy. Philosophy alone can claim success.

I take my stand with those philosophers who conceive God as an absolute, which cannot, even for thought, not exist, because it is affirmed in the act of thinking itself. I need not elaborate the well-known ontological argument: I need only indicate it. What I must do, however, is to indicate my application of it. The God in whom I live and move and have my being cannot conceivably stand in a transcendent relation to me. He must be immanent in me. Why? Because the whole philosophical force of the argument implies it. There is an alternative—a transcendent creator, who has formed me as the potter fashions the clay,—but such alternative has no advantage whatever over the hypothesis of naturalism. There are really only two alternatives. The fundamental reality of the universe is either mind or matter. If I choose the metaphysical theory of naturalism, then I have simply to assume that the objective, discrete, material universe is in itself what it purports to be in the aspect it presents to me, and that the life in it, including my own, is an adjective of its simple substance. The outcome of this metaphysics in religious theory is agnosticism. If anyone takes comfort in it, well and good; but, if he be a philosopher, we can only wonder that he is so easily satisfied. Essentially the same objection applies to the transcendent theory of God; it only interprets existence by positing an existence, which it claims that the facts presuppose for their interpretation, but which, if it exists, itself calls for interpretation.

I conceive the absolute as life, essential and fundamental

activity, activity which is not adjective but substance. From life we can deduce matter, because matter is a diminution of life. Also matter can take the aspect of a reality independent of life, because we can take abstract and partial views of our activity from our standpoint of acting centre of activity. To continue the metaphysical argument, however, would be to risk condensing it to the point of unintelligibility, so I will simply say, that when I reflect on the reality of my own life, I find its ultimate principle to be spirit, not matter. Spirit is the continuity of a duration, not the continuity of an extension, and, however obstinately matter confronts me as an alien existence, its reality is always partial and abstract, while the reality of spirit is concrete and universal. What, then, is my relation to God? I reply that it is clear to me, when I reflect on my own life and its expression in actions, that the force which is there finding expression is not adventitious, not an apparition, not imposed from without, for the plain and evident reason that what is acting in the present is the whole of the past. The reality of my life is its history, which does not begin with my birth as an individual. My life is not continuous (in the precise mathematical meaning of the term) with past and present generations of living beings, but it is one and continuous with the acting principle which has been and is expressing itself in those generations. The universal spirit finding expression always and everywhere is God.

What can I know of this universal spirit? I can by studying the modes of my own spiritual activity discover what is universal and concrete as distinct from what is particular and abstract. Let me go back for a moment to Professor Chevalier's standpoint. Do I find myself, from the beginning of my conscious activity, thinking and acting, possessed already of a simple criterion by which I can at once distinguish my perceptions from my hallucinations? I maintain against Professor Chevalier, and against all who hold that knowing is essentially and primarily discerning and discriminating what already exists to be discerned and discriminated, that the criterion is a fiction and the existence postulated a pure assumption; and in philosophy the fiction is an obstacle and the assumption gratuitous and detrimental. They turn the eyes of the mind away from the facts. No conceivable power in material objects of influencing minds, and no conceivable contrivances for the passive reception by minds through sense-organs of these influences, can account for images. The very beginning of our conscious life is dependent on the imagery which expresses our intuitions.

These images are the product of the mind's æsthetic activity, they are objects of the mind and simply have no independent existence. They are determined in their form, not by something spatially present, but by the continuity of the evolution which has created the mode of our activity and the form of our actions. How then do these images become distinguished into perceptions and (to retain Professor Chevalier's term) hallucinations? I reply that this is effected by a mental activity, this time a logical as distinct from an æsthetic activity. It is these two distinct stages, this twofold degree of activity, which constitutes knowing. And the essential difference between the two moments of this activity is that the product of the first is a particular, of the second a universal. This theoretical activity of mind is knowing. Knowing in the human mode is the condition of acting.

But knowing is not only the condition of acting: it reveals to us in its principle the nature of our practical activity. This is the crucial point in ethical theory. To distinguish moral or virtuous actions as altruistic from individual and selfish actions as egoistic, is to me completely paralleled by the distinction just criticised of cognitions into hallucinations and perceptions. It is a fundamentally false principle. Our practical activity has in the very nature of the fact that it is the expression of our images and concepts in action, or their continuation in action, a twofold degree constituting two distinct moments in the activity. All actions are in their first intention economic, the expression of individual and particular needs. Without this economical basis there could be no ethical actions. But our practical activity is not exhausted in economical actions. Moral actions are the universal form which our practical activity takes, not on account of some supernatural goodness imposed on us or bestowed on us, but on account of the living force immanent in our nature. Ethical actions presuppose economical actions which condition them, just as concepts presuppose images as their condition, and to suppose that we transcend our practical nature when we perform virtuous actions is to me as absurd as to suppose we transcend our intellectual nature when we form concepts.

Lastly, let me indicate briefly the relation of the moral theory to the religious theory. It is just because as individual acting centres mirroring the universe and ordering our lives within the restricted range which evolution has determined for us and to which it has fitted us, we are conscious that we are not discrete self-subsistent entities, but the expression of an active principle, immanent in us, yet

overflowing our individual boundaries in time and space, that our actions must assume this twofold degree, marking the two moments of the practical activity, the economical or individual, and the ethical or universal. Because the universal spirit is immanent in the individual creature, it follows that the actions which are primarily individual will complete themselves as universal.

The religion I reject, then, is that which claims to be higher than philosophy in the possession of a transcendent principle—the personality of God. My argument is not intended to disprove the personality of God, but to contest the claim of religion that it thereby can, and philosophy cannot, interpret the moral law. Religion for me is not an attitude of belief : it is philosophy. It is not a vague pantheism which calls Nature, God. It is the negation of matter as an ultimate principle, and the affirmation of mind. God is universal spirit, identical with and immanent in every form of life and consciousness.

VI.

EXPOSÉ ORAL fait par M. J. CHEVALIER à la séance
du dimanche, 26 septembre.

LA question que je me suis posée est la suivante : les grandes idées morales pour lesquelles vous et nous avons lutté ensemble, et qui sont l'apanage de nos sociétés occidentales—idées de vérité, de justice, de liberté, affirmation des droits des personnes morales, individus ou nations,—ces idées ont-elles, oui ou non, une valeur métaphysique, c'est-à-dire réelle, la métaphysique n'étant autre chose que l'affirmation rationnelle d'une réalité supra-sensible ? A cette question ma réponse a été positive. On m'a reproché d'être trop simple et trop clair : mais j'avoue que, même après nos discussions sur la théorie de la relativité, je ne suis nullement convaincu que la simplicité soit une marque de fausseté, ni qu'elle prouve rien contre le vrai ; tout au contraire, je crois qu'une idée, si profonde soit-elle, que l'on maîtrise parfaitement, est toujours susceptible d'être exprimée sous une forme simple. On m'a reproché aussi d'être vieux jeu, d'être treizième siècle : ce reproche me touche assez peu, car je ne recherche pas la nouveauté, mais la vérité ; et que sont, au surplus, la plupart des idées nouvelles, sinon de vieilles vérités qu'on avait oubliées ?

Le Principal Jacks me demande si j'attache à la question que je me suis posée un intérêt pratique ? Assurément :

si non je ne me la serais pas posée. Et en effet il ne suffit pas de proclamer les idées morales ; il faut en préparer la réalisation. Or il en coûte aux individus comme aux nations de réaliser la justice, car cette réalisation exige un perpétuel *sacrifice* de nos intérêts sensibles et immédiats à un idéal supérieur : dans ce sacrifice réside l'essence de la moralité. La question se ramène donc à ceci : au nom de quel principe exigerez-vous des individus, des nations, et d'abord de vous-même, un tel sacrifice ? Notons-le bien : ce qui est *principe* dans l'ordre spéculatif est *motif* dans l'ordre pratique. Or le motif ne sera *efficace* que si le principe est *réel*. On ne se sacrifie pas d'une manière durable pour une illusion.

La question que nous nous posons est donc une question vitale pour l'avenir de notre civilisation morale, une question d'une immense portée pratique autant que spéculative, et en présence de laquelle ni l'indifférence ni la neutralité ne sont de mise. Il faut parier, comme dit Pascal : vous êtes embarqués. Mais il faut tâcher de *parier pour le vrai* avec la confiance que le vrai c'est le bon et l'utile.

Je cherche le vrai avec ma raison. Je ne prétends nullement, comme on a semblé me le reprocher, vous apporter une solution toute faite, ou vous imposer dogmatiquement une formule : je vous propose une *méthode*. Cette méthode consiste comme en physique,¹ à partir des faits,² puis à tâcher d'en rendre compte rationnellement. Nous avons assez à faire pour connaître le monde tel qu'il est, sans chercher à le reconstruire !

Or, le fait, la donnée initiale d'où je pars, et dont il faut rendre compte, c'est le sens de l'obligation. Ce sens, qui est présent chez tous les hommes, et qui commande leur pratique, bien qu'il s'explicite le plus souvent tardivement et incomplètement,³ implique les deux notions corrélatives de bien et d'impératif, c'est-à-dire de quelque chose qui est supérieur à l'homme et qui s'impose à lui, de quelque chose qui lie

¹ J'imite le physicien : je ne calque pas sa méthode. Si tout est un, tout est divers, et la raison doit se plier à la diversité du réel. Tout ce que je veux dire, c'est que le philosophe devra se comporter à l'égard de la réalité morale comme le physicien se comporte à l'égard de la réalité physique.

² Je dis : partir des faits ; je ne dis pas nécessairement : s'enfermer dans les faits. Il est fort possible, au contraire, que les faits m'incitent à les dépasser. Je dois suivre docilement l'expérience.

³ De quelque nom qu'on l'appelle, ai-je dit, tous les hommes ont la notion de choses à *faire* et de choses à *ne pas faire*. C'est ce que les Latins exprimaient sous la forme *quid agendum, quid non*, ce gérondif ne comportant d'ailleurs à l'origine aucune idée *explicite* d'obligation, et signifiant à peu près ceci : "Telle chose se fait, telle chose ne se fait pas."

l'individu, mais de telle manière qu'en lui obéissant il se met en règle avec un ordre supérieur : en un mot, la croyance en un monde de valeurs libératrices.

Etant bien établi que cette notion d'obligation, de devoir être, de valeur, existe comme un fait dans la nature humaine, on peut—et c'est ici le nœud de mon argumentation—expliquer ce fait de deux manières et de deux manières seulement : ou bien c'est un "concept" fabriqué par l'esprit, ou bien c'est une "idée" au sens platonicien, c'est-à-dire une réalité que voit l'œil de l'âme, et qu'il ne fait pas. Dans le premier cas, cette notion est du type *hallucination* ; dans le second cas, elle est du type *perception*. Le Prof. Wildon Carr m'objecte qu'une telle vue est simpliste, qu'elle méconnaît le travail de l'esprit dans la perception, qu'en fait il n'y a partout et toujours que des images, produit de l'activité de l'esprit.¹ Je sais fort bien que la perception n'est pas toute objective, ni l'hallucination (en règle générale) toute subjective ; je ne méconnaissais nullement le travail de l'esprit dans la perception : mais je prétends et j'affirme que ce travail s'opère sur la donnée de la sensation, que je n'ai pas faite, qui s'impose à moi et me résiste, et qui me met immédiatement en rapport avec l'extérieur.² Je n'ignore pas davantage que l'on passe de l'hallucination à la perception, comme du vivant élémentaire à l'homme, ou du mouvement à l'idée, par une suite de gradations insensibles ; mais je maintiens que, sous cette continuité en surface, il y a quelque part une coupure en profondeur, en sorte qu'on a, à gauche la brute, à droite l'animal raisonnable, à gauche le corps, à droite l'esprit : il me suffit de renvoyer, sur ce dernier point, aux admirables travaux de M. Bergson. Pareillement, ici, c'est-à-dire dans le cas de l'hallucination ou du rêve, l'objet est fait par nous ; là, c'est-à-dire dans le cas de la perception fondée sur la donnée immédiate de la sensation, l'objet nous fait.

Je puis donc légitimement poser le problème en ces termes, sans être taxé de simplisme. Et je le pose ainsi :—*L'idée de Dieu est un fait. Cette idée est-elle un rêve ? est-elle une réalité ? En d'autres termes, l'homme a-t-il fait Dieu ? Dieu a-t-il fait l'homme ?*

¹ Dans cette affirmation on reconnaît sans peine la marque de l'idéalisme hegelien, qui a exercé en Angleterre, et particulièrement à Oxford depuis Th. H. Green, une influence prépondérante, que je considère, avec mon ami le Baron de Hügel, comme une influence néfaste.

² Don Quichotte, lorsqu'il attaque les moulins à vent, se fait illusion sur la nature de l'objet : mais, que cet objet existe, c'est indubitable, puisqu'il le jette par terre, d'une "rude chute."

La première solution est celle du positivisme. M. Wildon Carr me demande : Que faites-vous de l'idéalisme ? Je le range avec le positivisme, et je le rejette pareillement. Et, en effet, l'idéalisme fait de Dieu une idée, ou mieux un *concept*, de l'homme. Or, ce faisant, il supprime les données du problème. (1°) L'obligation est constituée par un couple antinomique : nécessité plus liberté. Si vous faites procéder l'obligation du moi, vous supprimez la nécessité. Si, pour en expliquer le caractère auctoritatif, vous la faites procéder d'un inconscient, vous supprimez la liberté. Dans un cas, nous ferons tout ce que nous voudrions ; dans l'autre, nous serons esclaves. (2°) L'obligation, ou le devoir être, suppose l'existence d'une valeur, donc d'une norme absolue. Mais, dans la théorie idéaliste comme dans le positivisme, toutes les valeurs sont faites par l'homme. Or c'est un fait qu'il y a dans l'humanité des valeurs différentes : ce que nous appelons justice, de ce côté du Rhin, est appelé, de l'autre, injustice ou faiblesse : et, dans notre pays même, que de divergences en ce qui concerne, par exemple, la morale sexuelle ou la constitution de la famille ! Comment départager entre ces "valeurs," si vous n'avez pas de norme supérieure, absolue, qui les juge ? Sans cette norme, tous les "idéals" se valent, celui de Bismarck comme celui de la Belgique ou de l'Alsace, l'injuste comme le juste.

La solution idéaliste est donc inacceptable. *Le fait moral n'est pas fait par moi* : voilà ma première conclusion. Elle suscite une nouvelle question : ce fait moral, quel est-il ? sur quoi se fonde-t-il ? Kant et les partisans de la morale indépendante répondent : il se suffit à lui-même. Mais leur "idéal" n'est qu'un résidu de Dieu, et il n'a de sens que par Dieu. Kant, pour le sauvegarder, a dû arriver à Dieu : il a fait comme ce muletier espagnol qui, pour soulager sa monture, mit la selle sur sa tête ; Kant ne s'est pas allégé de Dieu, mais il l'a mis en l'air. En réalité, il ne faut pas dire : "tu dois parce que tu dois," formule dangereuse qui peut légitimer tous les ordres et toutes les obéissances ; il faut dire : "tu dois parce que c'est bien." Il y a dans la personne, comme l'a marqué M. Clement Webb dans son beau livre sur la Personnalité en Dieu et dans l'homme, une *autonomie* et une *hétéronomie* qui ne peuvent s'expliquer que par une *théonomie*.

J'arrive donc à cette seconde conclusion, que le principe et la base de la morale, c'est l'idée du bien, c'est Dieu même. A la solution idéaliste, irrecevable, je substitue la solution *réaliste*, seule conforme aux faits. L'homme est une idée de Dieu, que Dieu choisit et réalise en toute indépendance,

mais conformément à un ordre rationnel, fondé dans l'essence divine, connu par l'intelligence divine, et que ma raison peut connaître dans la mesure où elle participe à la raison divine.

J'affirme donc que Dieu peut être connu et établi par la raison. M. Wildon Carr prétend que la raison humaine établit l'immanence seule de Dieu, à l'exclusion de la transcendance, et que telle est la portée de l'argument ontologique. Il n'en est rien : car l'idée de Dieu, d'après l'ontologisme cartésien, est en nous un effet, qui ne peut s'expliquer que par l'existence d'un Être infini, donc transcendant. Pas plus que le Professeur J. A. Smith, je ne suis disposé à sacrifier la transcendance à l'immanence, ou l'immanence à la transcendance : l'une et l'autre sont vraies de Dieu, quoique en des sens différents.

Ce Dieu est le fondement de la morale, et il n'y en a pas d'autre. On nous propose comme alternatives l'univers, ou encore (Principal Jacks) la "beloved community" de Royce. Mais l'univers n'est pas digne de mon adoration, ni de mes sacrifices. Et cette société des esprits, quelle est-elle ? l'humanité actuelle ? Je ne suis disposé à vénérer ni les Boches, ni les Bolchevistes ; je ne suis pas même prêt à adorer les Français. L'humanité future ? c'est un pur possible, qui, à supposer même qu'il se réalise dans un lointain avenir, ne donnera pas satisfaction à mes tendances les plus profondes ni ne récompensera les sacrifices que j'aurai faits pour elle. Reste que ce soit une société réellement immortelle de personnes réellement immortelles : mais ceci suppose Dieu personnel ; s'il n'y a pas de personnalité en Dieu, il n'y en a pas davantage en l'homme. Or la croyance en l'immortalité personnelle, la croyance au Dieu personnel, est une croyance vitale pour l'humanité. Supprimez cette croyance, et vous faites de ce monde un champ clos où s'affronteront les intérêts et les passions, et où triomphera nécessairement le plus fort, chacun n'ayant qu'un but, qui est *to make the best of this world*.

Or m'adresse une dernière objection. Si l'homme est une idée de Dieu, me dit le Principal Jacks, comment se fait-il qu'il ne participe point à l'inerrance divine ? Il y devrait participer s'il était une émanation de Dieu, comme le veut le panthéisme ; mais l'homme n'est pas une émanation de Dieu, il est une créature de Dieu, douée de raison, développable mais non développée, et de volonté, faillible : ces conditions de sa grandeur sont aussi la cause de sa faiblesse ; l'homme *doit* accomplir le bien, mais il *peut* ne pas l'accomplir : c'est le cas de la plupart ; mais, en dépit du préjugé égalitaire, ce

n'est pas dans la masse qu'il faut chercher ce qu'est l'homme, mais dans le saint, qui réalise le type de l'homme.

Je conclus. La base de l'édifice, c'est la métaphysique, ou l'affirmation rationnelle de Dieu, c'est-à-dire d'un ordre moral fondé sur un Etre transcendant et immanent, personnel, auteur et garant de ma personnalité immortelle, à laquelle il commande sans la contraindre. Sur cette base s'édifie la morale, connaissance et pratique de bien : la morale n'est autonome et indépendante que si elle est reconnue comme réelle, donc fondée sur la métaphysique. Quant aux religions positives, elles ne fondent pas la morale, elles se fondent sur elle : la question en ce qui les concerne demeure donc ouverte ; elle relève surtout de l'histoire.¹

Il faut s'y résigner : si la croyance en Dieu est vaine, la morale n'est qu'une illusion. Or là-contre proteste ma raison, avec ma nature. Et nul argument de philosophe ne pourra prévaloir contre cette affirmation et contre cette exigence.

¹ Monsieur Belot, inspecteur général de l'Instruction Publique, n'ayant pu remettre son rapport en temps voulu, me fit après coup cette objection, que la religion naturelle ou métaphysique dont je parle n'existe nulle part comme telle, et qu'il n'y a partout que des religions positives. Cette juste remarque n'empêche point ma thèse de demeurer entière. Il s'agit de savoir si Dieu et l'immortalité sont objet de connaissance rationnelle, et peuvent être, à l'école, objet d'enseignement rationnel, non-confessionnel. A cela je réponds : oui. Si on le nie, en prétextant que Dieu et l'immortalité sont contestés, je ferai remarquer qu'il en est de même du devoir, de la gravitation universelle, et de l'existence même du monde extérieur. Il faut donc choisir, et j'affirme qu'un tel choix est rationnel. Ces distinctions une fois faites, nous devons reconnaître, si nous consultons l'expérience et l'histoire, qu'une morale purement rationnelle ne suffit pas, en règle générale, à l'homme, et qu'elle appelle pratiquement, sinon absolument, une morale religieuse positive. Mais ces distinctions préalables sont d'une importance capitale : car mes adversaires, englobant la religion naturelle dans la religion positive, et confondant l'une avec l'autre, risquent de dépasser toujours la mesure, soit à gauche, en les niant ensemble, soit—il se pourrait—à droite, en les affirmant ensemble comme inséparables et indiscernables. *In medio stat veritas.*

RELIGION AND CULTURE IN ITALY.¹

PROFESSOR ERNESTO BUONAIUTI,

The Royal University, Rome.

A CAREFUL and learned English student of the comparative History of Religions, Louis Henry Jordan, has more than once reverted to the unhappy position which the critico-religious disciplines have for long years occupied in the scheme of studies of the Italian Universities. There is no need to repeat, or even to summarise, what he has already said in works so generally known; yet rightly to comprehend the present situation we must needs touch upon the conditions imposed upon theological studies by the legislation that regulated the educational system of Italy when first she attained her national unity. Only so can we interpret the actual movement in studies concerned with religion in the Italy of to-day; and, above all, only so can we adequately realise the intensity to which the demand for such studies must have risen before it could break a way through the fierce hostility and inveterate suspicion by which it was confronted.

Amongst the most signal and characteristic movements in the mentality of the nineteenth century must be written down the passing of the study of religion into the light of the lay world. From a strictly dogmatic domain, avowedly controlled by apologetic purposes and with a constant view to confessional polemics, the studies that concern religion have been brought under influences which are vigilantly critical and impartial, but which realise their function of evoking as well as illuminating the most marked and the most sensitive aspect of the evolution of the human spirit. Under this transit of theological and religious studies from the dogmatic teaching of the theological seminary to the unconfessional and disinterested treatment of the academic lecture-room, Italy has conformed only too closely to the course which her strongly marked intellectual traditions might have enabled

¹ Translated by P. H. Wicksteed, Litt.D.

us to predict. In the region of theology, as in other zones of her spiritual and mental life, Italy in the nineteenth century laboured under baneful repercussions from the unhappy fate that compelled her to fight her way to political unity through the opposing forces of a theocratic power which, on its side, could not take the field without suppressing and sterilising the latent possibilities of development in the religious tradition of the country and race, and to which, on the other side, it was impossible to make the smallest concession without danger of irreparably compromising the resurrection of Italy as a nation. In result, the action of the governing classes, no less than the flow of public opinion, as to all measures and problems that bore upon the religious life and its development, vacillated and halted, with woeful effect on the Christian spirit of the masses, throughout the successive crises of political conflicts in the nineteenth century.

On the one hand our diocesan seminaries—too numerous to command competent teaching staffs even for the limited tasks imposed on them—envisaged the study of the Biblical Revelation and of Ecclesiastical History (the “Scripture” and “Tradition” postulated by the Council of Trent as the two sources of Scriptural Truth) solely as an inexhaustible arsenal from which to draw corroborations of ecclesiastical dogma; whereas for the Universities we must go back to the celebrated “Legge Casati” of 13th November 1859. This Act laid down the permanent regulations of public instruction in Piedmont, and became the Magna Carta of the Italian schools likewise from the 20th September 1870 onwards. Now this Act, while officially recognising the Catholic confessional teaching in the schools, at the same time contemplated the establishment of theological faculties in the Universities. It was in this special connection that articles 49 and 51 defined the five faculties of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, physical mathematical and natural science, philosophy and letters. Eight subjects were assigned to theology: introduction to the Bible, holy Scripture, ecclesiastical history, introduction to theology, systematic theology, the Sacraments, moral theology, and homiletics.

In March 1861, on the proclamation of the kingdom of Italy, the “Legge Casati,” with unessential revisions, automatically embraced the new provinces that came under the kingdom of Savoy. The report presented by Senator C. Matteucci on the 15th June 1861, on the reorganisation of the Higher Education, recommended that the theological faculties should be preserved, “so that nothing should be lacking to the complete cycle of studies,” and in order that

visible expression should be given "to the respect due to an aspect of spiritual activity which, if it has not been rewarded by assured and imperishable conquests like those of celestial mechanics, nevertheless represents the sublimest aspirations permitted to our intellect beyond the confines of human science." And accordingly theological faculties were officially established at the Universities of Turin, Modena, Pisa, Palermo, Catania, Messina, Genoa, Cagliari, and Sassari, with complete programmes modelled on the usage of the theological seminaries.

It is a patent fact that the institution of these theological courses at the Universities constituted a duplication of functions as costly as it was futile. The Government failed in practice to draw the clerical aspirants into the theological lecture-rooms of the Universities; for the ecclesiastical authorities could never consent to hand over the formation of the Catholic priesthood to a lay power, to which they could in no case have allowed a monopoly, and which in this case they regarded with obstinate distrust and suspicion that left no room to hope for delicately adjusted terms of agreement. And on the other hand it is easy to see why the cultivated lay public felt not the slightest interest in courses of lectures that expressly excluded an impartially historical and objective treatment of the phenomena of religion and of their influence on the ethico-social development of humanity. It was therefore vain to hope that the University lecture-rooms, left empty by the clerics, would be filled by lay students.

After long hesitation and elaborate discussions, a measure was proposed on the 10th April 1870 by the Minister Cesare Correnti, and enacted at Rome in the May of 1872, suppressing the theological faculties in the Royal Universities of Italy, but at the same time proposing "that the subjects taught by these faculties, so far as they were of general interest, historical, philological, or philosophical, should be assigned to the faculties of Letters and Philosophy at the discretion of the Higher Council of Public Instruction." Such a clause, purporting to make some scanty amends for the obvious impoverishment of the University programmes by the withdrawal of theology from the curriculum, fulfilled only too well its manifest destiny of becoming as good as a dead letter. Obvious Parliamentary exigencies secured to the Hon. Philippo Abigente (who had served on the committee appointed to report on Correnti's proposal) in the occupation of his Chair of Ecclesiastical History at Naples, and accordingly he held it till 1876. But another twelve years had to pass before historico-religious studies could acquire established rights

of citizenship in the academic halls of Italy. It was in 1885 that Minister Coppino appointed Raffaele Mariano Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the Royal University of Naples. A year afterwards he transferred Baldassarre Labanca from the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Pisa to that of the History of Religions at Rome. Mariano resigned the Chair, in which he cannot be said to have met with any pronounced success, in 1904; and Labanca, after getting leave in 1888 to change his subject to the History of Christianity, died in 1918, leaving no great heritage either of students or of works behind him. The Chair of Ecclesiastical History at Naples is now filled by Luigi Salvatorelli, and that of the History of Christianity at Rome by Ernesto Buonaiuti. Authorised lecturers on the History of Religions are now attached to the Universities of Rome (Nicola Turchi), Florence (Umberto Fracassini), Milan (Uberto Pestalozza), and Bologna (Raffaele Petazzoni).

This brief account of the conditions under which theological studies have laboured during recent decades in the Italian Universities makes it easy enough to understand why the stir of religious life and thought that has recently risen in Italy has been wholly independent both in origin and character of academic influences. We may go further, and may say that it rose in the first instance amongst the Catholic clergy as a direct and practical means of stimulating and sustaining a genuinely religious revival by lightening Catholicism of that burden of theological presuppositions and reactionary prejudices which have weighed upon it ever since the Council of Trent. Rising in the ranks of the Catholic clergy, where it broke itself against the invincible opposition of hierarchical authority, the movement overflowed into certain strata of the wider world, raising many a wave of sympathy and assent. But it has never lost its original inspiration, and still—nay, now more than in the recent past—the progressive spread of historico-religious studies stands for a potent revival of idealism and of Christian aspirations which promises to make its salutary power felt within a few generations in a complete reorganisation, conceptual and disciplinary, of Roman Catholicism.

We need not dwell on certain isolated contributions of Italian scholars, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, to the progress of religious studies, though a high value must be attached to such works as those of the great orientalist, Ignazio Guidi, of world-wide reputation, the accomplished hebraist, David Castelli, and above all the versatile and acute Alesandro Chiapelli, a true pioneer in Italy in the treatment of the History of Christianity. But it is the opening of the

twentieth century that marks the rise in Italy of a genuine and widespread interest in those critico-religious researches which had already been carried so far in England and Germany. It was in the very year of 1900 that Salvatore Minocchi, a young ecclesiastic of wide philological scholarship, who had studied under the Jesuits at Rome, began the publication in Florence of a periodical entitled *Studi Religiosi*. His purpose was to infiltrate into the antiquated curricula of our ecclesiastical seminaries some tincture of the critical spirit and the habits of impartial investigation which are now universally recognised as necessary in theological no less than in all other studies. The opportuneness of the attempt was conclusively demonstrated by the marked success, beyond all expectation, of the periodical. The younger clergy recognised it at once as interpreting their eager desire to enter for good and all into contact with the religious culture of other lands, and they were greedy for its ministration to their intense longing to see the methods and tendencies of their theological schools rejuvenated. For seven years the *Studi Religiosi* held the field. Its programme was eclectic, and embraced essays towards a new religious apologetic, as well as Old and New Testament Criticism; and it rallied into a body all the hitherto isolated students in the ranks of the Italian clergy who had experienced in their own persons the renovating power of the application of the historico-scientific method to the phenomena of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. After breaking ground by invaluable propagandist work, this review gave place to others which had meanwhile arisen with the hope of fighting the good fight with still greater fervour and more insistent pressure. Amongst these was the *Rivista Storico-critica delle Scienze Teologiche*, edited from Rome by the present writer and Professor Nicola Turchi. The title and the place of publication sufficiently indicate the boldness, not to say the audacity, of its aim. It was neither more nor less than gradually to secure, under the ægis of the highest ecclesiastical approval, the acclimatisation in the world of theological culture of the positive orientations and methods of historical research. The adhesion of the younger Italian clergy was immediate and enthusiastic. The *Rivista* secured more than a thousand subscribers in its first year, and the numbers steadily grew through all the period of its publication. But such a rapid maturing of a scholarly consciousness in the Italian clergy could not be regarded with apathetic indifference by the representatives and patrons of the old system, under whose malign influence the theological science of Roman Catholicism had been so miserably withered and

paralysed. Against all who cultivated critical research in the field of religion, and against the organs of their unwearied propaganda, there soon arose a fierce opposition that took form especially under the impulse of the Jesuits. The higher personnel of Catholicism was only too completely won over by the tremors of these sensitive vestals of a sacred flame that was threatened with a total loss of its fuel; and in the course of 1907 and 1908 the tender growth of the new religious studies in Italy was blighted by a series of official condemnations culminating in the famous encyclical "Pascendi Domini Gregis," drawn up in the most impressive and dictatorial style of the Curia. Under pretext of danger from a "subversive Modernism"—that serviceable spectre that existed only in the heated imagination of the Pontifical draftsmen—violent anathema and persecuting decree followed in quick succession against everything that represented an aspiration towards a more loyal recognition of the results obtained by objective researches in the domain of religious experience, as the necessary condition of reaching a harmony on a higher plane between science and faith. Ecclesiastics judged guilty of active participation in the movement of thought, or even of betraying any sympathies in that direction, were inhumanly deprived of their livings, stripped of their functions, and banished to remote country cures where it would be materially impossible for them to keep in touch with the progress of study. Since it could no longer summon the stake and the rack to its aid, the Inquisition continued to discharge its functions by solitary confinement and the threat of starvation.

Even yet, after a dozen years, the progress of theological enlightenment lies under the paralysis into which the "Pascendi" flung it. One after another the periodicals that had been established in Italy for the spread and development of critical religious erudition have disappeared under the exterminating fury of the hurricane. The *Rivista di Scienze Teologiche* tried a series of prudential concessions, in the hope of pursuing its mission amid the acute difficulties of the moment; but it was expressly and formally condemned by the supreme tribunal of the Holy Office, and together with its other editorial efforts consecrated to the same purposes were smitten in like manner. Other Reviews, that tried to make salvage of the inheritance and keep the programme alive, had but an ephemeral existence, as was but natural in the face of the implacable hostility of the ecclesiastical powers.

And yet it was in the very entanglements and mortifications imposed by the opposition of Vatican officialdom to all studies relating to religion that these same studies found the

occasion and the stimulus for a wider dissemination of their postulates and methods. The trail of desolation that the encyclical "Pascendi" and the consequential ecclesiastical acts of administration left behind them proclaimed aloud that the vital growth of the spirit of exact study of religion and its historic manifestations was impossible so long as it remained confined exclusively to ecclesiastical circles, and fell under an unyielding authority against which there was no appeal, and which commanded the amplest means and resources of suppression and oppression. The champions of the diffusion of religious studies in Italy from 1905 to 1910 could not flatter themselves with so much as a hope of established conquests unless they could reach circles in the world of lay thought and of the free scholarship over which the Congregations had long shown that they were powerless. And to this world of academic culture and unpledged investigation they turned with a zeal undismayed by the obvious difficulties of their mission. And we are able now to proclaim that their patient renunciations and stubborn persistence have finally succeeded in securing the entry of theological studies into spheres of research and intellectual life that are safe from the bludgeons of an inquisitorial authority.

Within the last two months the present writer has been struck by the Supreme Congregation of the Sacred Office with the sentence of excommunication, not so much, one may suppose, on account of certain heresies supposed to lurk in his essays on Pauline criticism as because, in his University teaching and his steady co-operation in the *Trimestrial Review of Philosophical and Religious Studies*, recently established by the distinguished Professor Bonnucci, he has gained access to a more grateful and fertile soil on which to acclimatise historico-religious studies in the world of the higher culture of Italy. And in truth it is no longer possible to deny the rapid and accelerating growth of interest in these studies, in the Italy of to-day, in those strata of studious youth which the enmity of the Jesuits cannot hurt, and in whom the best hopes for the spiritual future of our country lie. In the matter of historico-religious culture it can be boldly asserted that Italy is now passing through a stage of development full of the richest promise. It is a veritable springtime, ethical and mental, from which we may look to see, ere long, results of far-reaching beneficence. The most significant symptom of this rebirth is the formation in the Universities of "circles" formed with the object of furthering by every means the spread of historico-religious studies.

These circles have been formed in the principal Universities of the kingdom (Rome, Bologna, Padua, Naples, Pavia), and their activity, even in this initial stage of their existence, has already produced noteworthy results. Very special notice is deserved by the circles of Rome and of Bologna, which have already organised courses of lectures designed to illustrate typical manifestations in the history of humanity of the religious spirit, have offered prizes for competition amongst beginners in these studies, and are striving to give some collective guidance and organisation to our movement. A brilliant future smiles upon us from the enthusiasm, the harmony, and the solid industry which permeate these circles.

The outcome of the considerations now suggested points to the expectation of noteworthy transformations in the whole tendency and drift of the collective religious experience and religious tradition under which the people of Italy have hitherto been brought up.

It was at a time when historico-religious studies had already attained a wide and vigorous development in other lands that the movement we have examined rose and rapidly extended amongst us Italians, in a country where the Christian tradition, after centuries of theological elaboration, had fallen into the extreme of rigid and uncompromising dogmatism. These conditions determine special characteristics which may help us to foresee the probable results of the movement of thought in Italy that is focussed on the consideration of the permanent facts of religion and their historical differentiations.

Before all else we must note that it is no mere intellectual curiosity that at this moment urges the youth of our Universities to fix their eager attention upon the religious problem with an enthusiasm so rich in its promise. In this period of hard-beset transition, all that carries the semblance of a barren intellectual indulgence and has no direct bearing on life and its actual demands goes by the board, and is regarded with more or less complete indifference. The spirit pants for some systematising of values by which we can press forward with firm and reinspired steps, after the terrible parenthesis through which European civilisation has passed, towards a future less dark and volcanic. In the religious studies which are so rapidly invading the best centres of our national culture, anxious minds, unless I am much mistaken, are seeking before everything an answer to the most relentless questionings of their inner life as to whether it is or is not

possible to track through history, with the clue of religious and Christian tradition, the elements and the means of a rebirth into spiritual health and power.

When we consider the far-reaching implications of this problem, which assuredly underlies and guides the spread of scholarly research into religious history and philosophy amongst us, and when we contemplate the stupendous issues that are ultimately involved, we can well understand, and from a certain point of view even sympathise with, the keen alarm which has moved the supreme authorities of Catholicism to oppose the dykes of their anathemas and ostracisms against the waves. But how can a historical tradition that is really convinced of the legitimacy of its existence and its constitution have cause to dread, as if with a foregone conclusion, the inspection of its title-deeds, to the point of choking off by anticipation every suggestion that looks that way? It is altogether premature to attempt to define the precise consequences that the spread of religious studies in Italy may have for the rigid and coherent organism of Catholic thought and discipline; but most assuredly its effect will not be confined to the academic world, but will react upon the religious consciousness and Christian dispositions of the masses. Yet before condemning in block a movement which is supported by a demand of the contemporary conscience that can neither be hushed nor resisted, the Catholic authorities should surely have asked themselves whether the attack they dread is not directed against a special dogmatic formulation of historical Christianity rather than against its inmost and imperishable essence. Does he who, instead of discussing the objections urged against his own ideas, launches anathemas against them, really give proof thereby of his courage and sense of intellectual security?

In any case, an open rupture has now taken place. On the one side stand the representatives of research in matters pertaining to religion, and the advocates of a transformed apologetic. On the other, the supreme direction of Catholic society. The curtain rises on a drama which cannot fail to arrest the strained attention of all who feel the importance of religion, and the value of its many-sided bearing upon the development of the whole spiritual life of man.

ERNESTO BUONAIUTI.

ROME, THE ROYAL UNIVERSITY,
March 1921.

THE LETTERS OF WILLIAM JAMES.¹

HOWARD V. KNOX.

WHATEVER estimate the reader may perchance have already formed of William James's critical and constructive work in philosophy, he may rest assured that in these *Letters* he will find nothing but pure delight. It is not too much to say that their quality would suffice, in the absence of any other output, to ensure for the writer a literary reputation of the highest order. And even for the serious student of philosophy the exclusion from these volumes of all letters that are, in the words of the preface, "wholly technical or polemic," is perhaps not quite so regrettable as might appear at first sight. In the first place, James seems always to have felt that such philosophical truths as were intrinsically incapable of conveyance in non-technical form must also be intrinsically of but slight importance for human guidance. In the second place, the key to his philosophic theories is to be found precisely in that deep interest in human individuality which informs his correspondence.

James's intellectual outlook was dominated by the conception of the individual mind as the inexhaustible fount of adventurous possibility, rather than by that residual abstraction, "the" human mind "in general." His unique achievement, in fact, as a psychologist, was to provide a critical antidote for that subtle poison of naturalistic fatalism which every psychological system before him seemed by the very law of its nature doomed to distil. For psychology, modelling itself on physical science, conceived its business to be that of *discounting* individual differences by the discovery of general formulas of behaviour. Always physical science depends on the assumption, not that certain things are exactly alike, but that their individual differences may for certain

¹ Edited by his son, Henry James, in two vols., Longmans, Green & Co., 1920, price 42s. net.

purposes be *neglected*. "Uniformity" is its watchword, as successful prediction is the measure of its truth. So far, therefore, as psychology aspires to be in this sense "scientific," it has abstracted *ab initio*, not only from the individuality of the individual, but also from the particularity of his particular acts. Where we ourselves, however, as conscious individuals are concerned, the strictly human interest begins precisely where "scientific" generalisation leaves off. And, moreover, the uniformities which science "discovers" are, from the subjective or psychological point of view, products of our own selective activity. All scientific truths are also human inventions. Thus, on the one hand, psychological study involves a revaluation of the nature of "Universals"; and, on the other, individuality is the everlasting surd which in the end eludes the most cunning formulas that the most scientific psychology can devise.

Such, in briefest outline, is the philosophy of personality that already finds expression in James's great *Principles of Psychology*. Though it may not forthwith establish the reality of freedom, at any rate it completely outflanks all the stock arguments in favour of psychological "necessity." Essentially it protests against a severance of "will" from "intelligence," which destroys the intelligibility of both: against the assumption that "everything not imposed upon a willless and non-coöperant intellect must count as false"; a view which James rightly regards as "a preposterous principle which no human being follows in real life."¹ And by recognising that the impersonal standpoint of science *abstracts from* personality without disposing of it, it breaks down that hard-and-fast barrier between the "subjective" and the "objective" which is the final source of nihilistic scepticism.

Whatever else may be said for the pluralistic philosophy which thus exalts "the importance of the individual," its vigorous humanism undoubtedly forms an admirable basis for human intercourse. It explains also that gift of sympathetic dissent which saved James from ever converting an opponent into an enemy. The fighting spirit that he so highly prized consorted in his own mind with the warmest welcome to every form of intellectual experiment. The world of fact seemed to him to afford that spirit ample scope; and the world of academic opinion was too full of it already. As a bit of self-revelation, perhaps the most interesting letter in the collection is one written to Mrs James in 1878:—

¹ *Letters*, ii. p. 356.

"I have often thought that the best way to define a man's character would be to seek out the particular mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: '*This* is the real me!' And afterwards, considering the circumstances in which the man is placed, and noting how some of them are fitted to evoke this attitude, whilst others do not call for it, an outside observer may be able to prophesy where the man may fail, where succeed, where be happy and where miserable. Now, as well as I can describe it, this characteristic attitude in me always involves an element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were, and trusting outward things to perform their part so as to make it a full harmony, but without any *guaranty* that they will. Make it a *guaranty*—and the attitude immediately becomes to my consciousness stagnant and stingless. Take away the *guaranty*, and I feel (provided I am *überhaupt* in vigorous condition) a sort of deep enthusiastic bliss, of bitter willingness to do and suffer anything, which translates itself physically by a kind of stinging pain inside my breast-bone (don't smile at this—it is to me an essential element of the whole thing!)—and which, although it is a mere mood or emotion to which I can give no form in words, authenticates itself to me as the deepest principle of all active and theoretic determination which I possess" (i. pp. 199–200).

Though James never committed himself *totidem verbis* to any formal definition of philosophy, he seems to have regarded its proper task as that of undoing the abstraction by which science, in the narrower sense, *depersonalises* reality. For philosophy, as for religion, the question is precisely—James would surely not have banned the colloquialism—"Where do *we* come in?" Philosophy is, to use his actual words, "the reflection of man on his relations with the universe."¹ To assume, as a necessary preliminary to "disinterested" inquiry, that human intelligence must be *functionally inert*—that the "Whole," of which we form part, is in no wise affected by our conscious attitude thereto—to assume this was not more repugnant to James's moral idiosyncrasy than to his critical sense. It is an attempt to apply to "reality" *plus* ourselves a logical postulate which really has no meaning except as applied to "reality" *minus*

¹ Quoted in *Letters*, i. p. 191.

ourselves. Incidentally, it indicates an ambiguity inherent in all such terms as "Whole," "Reality," "Universe," as commonly used in philosophic disputation.

It is always assumed that it can make no logical difference whether or not the philosopher conceives himself as included in the "Universe" or "Whole." But it is surely obvious that if he excludes himself in contemplating his "universe," the latter *ipso facto* cannot possibly be *all-inclusive*: while if he includes himself, he puts his "universe" under a logical obligation to *react*, in one way or another, to his personality; and its impersonality is thus given up in principle. It is by no means easy to think a reality to which our personal interests and beliefs really make *no* difference. If, however, reality should chance to be ultimately such as to sanction an absolute dichotomy into the thinker and his universe, then the thinker must be as independent of his universe as his universe is of him. He cannot therefore surrender his individuality to it, even if he would. Nor again can such a "universe," even if it is in itself a real "whole," be the whole of reality. For a "universe" to which we are *strictly impartial* is, as we have seen, only a partial universe.

The conclusion emerges, then, that the "Universe" may be *either* completely rigid and "systematic" or all-inclusive and plastic: but it cannot possibly be *both* all-inclusive and absolutely rigid. A "Logic," therefore, which proceeds on the postulates (a) that because the universe is all-inclusive it must be systematic, (b) that because it is systematic it must be rigid, (c) that because it is rigid it must therefore be indifferent to human interests, would appear to be a tissue of incompatible postulates rather than an exemplar of pure rationality.

It is a mistake, therefore, to conceive James's *Will to Believe* as a revolt against logic, and as a defence of irrationalism. Its main object was to shake the complacency of those who plainly saw no *logical* difficulty in the assumption that man's proper attitude to the "Universe" is that of a "disinterested" spectator. Writing to a dissentient friend in 1896, James says: "I still await criticism of my *Auseinandersetzung* of the *logical situation* of man's mind *gegenüber* the Universe, in respect to the risks it runs" (ii. p. 50). And in 1904, in a good-humoured protest against a brother-philosopher's "duplicate of my own theses in the 'Will to Believe' essay (which should have been called by the less unlucky title the *Right to Believe*) in the guise of an *alternative and substitute* for my doctrine," he says:—

"My essay hedged the licence to indulge in private over-beliefs with so many restrictions and signboards of danger, that the outlet was narrow enough. It made of tolerance the essence of the situation; it defined the permissible cases; it treated the faith-attitude as a necessity for individuals, because the total 'evidence,' which only the race can draw, *has to include their experiments among its data*.¹ It tended to show only that faith could not be absolutely *vetoed*, as certain champions of 'science' (Clifford, Huxley, etc.) had claimed it ought to be" (ii. p. 207).

That the intellectual tolerance which James not only preached but practised was consistent with intensity of personal conviction, and even with much warmth of feeling, is well shown in a letter to a common friend concerning Santayana's *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (published in 1900).

"The great event in my life recently has been the reading of Santayana's book. Although I absolutely reject the platonism of it, I have literally squealed with delight at the imperturbable perfection with which the position is laid down on page after page; and grunted with delight at such a thickening-up of our Harvard atmosphere. . . . I now understand Santayana, the man. I never understood him before. But what a perfection of rottenness in a philosophy! I don't think I ever knew the anti-realistic view to be propounded with so impudently superior an air. It is refreshing to see a representative of moribund Latinity rise up and administer such reproof to us barbarians in the hour of our triumph. . . . Nevertheless, how fantastic a philosophy!—as if the 'world of values' *were* independent of existence. It is only as *being*, that one thing is better than another. . . . Moreover, when you come down to the facts, what do your harmonious and integral ideal systems prove to be? in the concrete? Always things burst by the growing content of experience. Dramatic unities; laws of versification; ecclesiastical systems; scholastic doctrines. Bah! Give me Walt Whitman and Browning ten times over, much as the perverse ugliness of the latter at times irritates me, and intensely as I have enjoyed Santayana's attack. The barbarians are in the line of mental growth, and those who do insist

¹ Italics mine.

that the ideal and the real are dynamically continuous are those by whom the world is to be saved. But I'm nevertheless delighted that the other view, always existing in the world, should at last have found so splendidly impertinent an expression among ourselves. I have meant to write to Santayana; but on second thoughts, and to save myself, I will just ask you to send him this" (ii. pp. 122-123).

A philosopher who postulates "dynamic continuity" between the ideal and the real will never wholly part company with "common-sense," though James is very far from appealing to it as an oracle. Writing in 1903 (*æt.* 61), he says:—

"I have got my mind working on the infernal old problem of mind and brain, and how to construct the world out of pure experience, and I feel foiled again and inwardly sick with the fever. But I verily believe that it is only work that makes one sick in that way that has any chance of breaking old shells and getting a step ahead. It is a sort of madness, however, when it is on you. The total result is to make me admire 'common-sense' as having done by far the biggest stroke of genius ever made in philosophy when it reduced the chaos of crude experience to order by its luminous *Denkmittel* of the stable 'thing,' and its dualism of thought and matter" (ii. p. 198).

And again, writing to another friend a few days later, he says:—

"I am convinced that the desire to formulate truths is a virulent disease. It has contracted an alliance lately in me with a feverish personal ambition, which I never had before, and which I recognise as an unholy thing in such a connection. I actually dread to die until I have settled the Universe's hash in one more book, which shall be *epochmachend* at last, and a title of honour to my children! Childish idiot!—as if formulas about the Universe could ruffle its majesty, and as if the common-sense world and its duties were not eternally the really real!" (ii. p. 199).

The following, almost casual, remark is illuminating in regard to James's refusal to admit "abstract truth" as the highest achievement of the human mind:—

"It strikes me that no good will ever come to Art

as such from the analytic study of *Æsthetics*—harm, rather, if the abstractions could in any way be made the basis of practice. We should get stark things done on system with all the intangible personal *je ne sçais qu'au* left out. The difference between the first- and second-best things in art absolutely seems to escape verbal definition—it is a matter of a hair, a shade, an inward quiver of some kind—yet what miles away in point of preciousness! Absolutely the same verbal formula applies to the supreme success and to the thing that just misses it, and yet verbal formulas are all that your aesthetics will give" (ii. p. 87).

The letters dealing with the Gifford Lectures on *Varieties of Religious Experience* (delivered in 1900 and 1902) will be turned to eagerly for the light that they throw on James's aims in this now famous work :—

"The problem I have set myself," he says in an intimate letter, written while struggling against ill-health in the preparation of the lectures, "is a hard one : *first*, to defend (against all the prejudices of my 'class') 'experience' against 'philosophy' as being the real backbone of the world's religious life—I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning ; and, *second*, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself most invincibly do believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, and in which I shall fail ; but to attempt it is *my* religious act" (ii. p. 127).

In another letter, written while the lectures were in progress, he briefly summarises his position :—

"In these lectures the ground I am taking is this : The mother-sea and fountain-head of all religions lie in the mystical experiences of the individual, taking the word mystical in a very wide sense. All theologies and all ecclesiasticisms are secondary growths superimposed ; and the experiences make such flexible combinations with the intellectual prepossessions of their subjects, that one may almost say that they have no proper *intellectual* deliverance of their own, but belong to a region deeper, and more vital and practical, than that

which the intellect inhabits. For this they are also indestructible by intellectual arguments and criticisms."

For the immediate religious experience James proceeds to suggest the following very wide *interpretation* :—

"I attach the mystical or religious consciousness to the possession of an extended subliminal self, with a thin partition through which messages make irruption. We are thus made convincingly aware of the presence of a sphere of life larger and more powerful than our usual consciousness, with which the latter is nevertheless continuous. . . . The farther margin of the subliminal field being unknown, it can be treated as by Transcendental Idealism, as an Absolute mind with a part of which we coalesce, or by Christian theology, as a distinct deity acting on us. Something, not our immediate self, does act on our life !" (ii. pp. 149–150).

Again, writing in 1904, he says :—

"I have frankly to confess that my *Varieties* carried 'theory' as far as I could then carry it, and that I can carry it no farther to-day. I can't see clearly over that edge. Yet I am sure that tracks have got to be made there. I think that the fixed point with me is the conviction that our 'rational' consciousness touches but a portion of the real universe, and that our life is fed by the 'mystical' region as well. I have no mystical experience of my own, but just enough of the germ of mysticism in me to recognise the region from which their voice comes when I hear it" (ii. p. 210).

To the end James felt that—

"The real crux is when you come to define objectively the ideals to which feeling reacts. 'God is a Spirit'—*darauf geht es an*—on the last available definition of the term Spirit. It may be very abstract" (ii. p. 218).

Before quitting the *Varieties*, it is of special interest to note that at any rate the account of the "sick soul" is based on direct personal experience. James admitted to a correspondent in 1904 : "The document p. 160 is my own case—acute neurasthenic attack with phobia. I naturally disguised the *provenance* !" ¹

The extracts we have given are of course but fragmentary

¹ *La philosophie de William James*, by H. Flournoy, p. 149 n. The passage alluded to is reproduced in *Letters*, ii. p. 145 f.

samples, and in themselves give no hint of the varied interest of these intensely human *Letters*. The impressions of people, of novels, of places, are literary cameos which are none the less of the most finished kind for being so obviously spontaneous. One final quotation I cannot resist (ii. p. 216):—

“ Make much of dear old Höffding, who is a good pluralist and irrationalist. I took to him immensely, and so did everybody. Lecturing to my class, he told against the Absolutists an anecdote of an ‘ American ’ child who asked his mother if God made the world in six days. ‘ Yes.’—‘ The whole of it ? ’—‘ Yes.’—‘ Then it is all finished, all done ? ’—‘ Yes.’—‘ Then in what business now is God ? ’ If he tells it in Oxford you must reply : ‘ Sitting for his portrait to Royce, Bradley, and Taylor.’ ”

HOWARD V. KNOX.

OXFORD.

MISANTHROPE IN FACT AND FICTION.

SIR GEORGE DOUGLAS, BART.

I SUPPOSE that the Complete Misanthrope—the man who consistently professes and practises misanthropy—can never have been other than an exceedingly rare type, or the framework of society could scarcely have held together. At the present period of the world's history, and among men not admittedly of unsound mind, the type is probably extinct, though occasional acts which can only be described as misanthropical are not even now altogether difficult to discover. For example, I am acquainted with a man who, in the recent period of scarcity, deliberately allowed a crop of corn to go to ruin rather than reap and sell it at the current price. I am glad to add that he was duly dealt with by the authorities, who exacted a heavy fine. A second misanthropic character, who lived before my time but still survives in local tradition, was vicar of a moorland parish not far from the Border, and was wont to indulge his anti-social proclivity by firing stray shots from a duck-gun at chance passers-by. I have not heard that he ever actually killed anyone, whence perhaps one may conclude that, being not without a certain moderation in his fanaticism, he was content to pepper or to scare them. In more recent days, the seigneur of a certain rocky islet in the Channel is said to have developed a like dilettantism in regard to those who landed unauthorised on his demesne. Moving with the times, he used a rifle, and, with the same fine regard for human life as the parson of Elsdon, was almost always content to let the lead splash on the rock a yard or so from the intruder. These two instances might seem to favour an assumption that outlying districts are conducive to the breeding of misanthropy. But perhaps the truth is that it is in such places that the disease attracts most attention and is best remembered. For the cases of misanthropy, or misanthropic madness, brought to light by the newspapers are generally

those of town-dwellers—tragic castaways, who, with swarming life surrounding them, have acted on some obscure impulse to anticipate the tomb, and eat their hearts out through long years of self-sought isolation. I knew, or at least had set eyes on, one of these. He lived in a village, and, having been cruelly humiliated in love when quite a young man, he had rashly sworn an oath that the sun should never shine on him again. And this vow he actually kept, for more than forty years, until his death. In the earlier days of his serving this self-imposed life sentence, he allowed himself to go out-of-doors after sundown, and even to exchange speech with the neighbours. But misanthropy grew upon him fast, and thus he was confined first to the house, and then to a bed, where he could turn his face to the wall, where he was waited on hand and foot by a female relative. It was at this period that, being myself a boy, I most improperly (as I now see) forced my way into his cottage. I refrain from attempting to describe the sad sight that met my eyes. Enough to say that I have never quite forgotten it, and that I had gone but two paces over the threshold ere I repented of my rudeness. As he lay in his box-bed, the poor fellow's hands were held out, as if to ward off or shut out something that was hateful to him, whilst a hideous roar issued from his chest. I fled, but not before a vision of locks and claws which bore the growth of years had imprinted itself upon the retina. This miserable man lived on for many years, and I have heard that when at last he died, a special coffin had to be constructed to fit the shape into which he had grown. His was probably a case in which misanthropy had passed into dementia.

Repellent as it may be, there is abundant evidence that misanthropy has again and again proved an attractive theme to men of the highest genius—Shakespeare, Molière, and Scott having each devoted a work to the study of it, whilst Byron and Swift went further by illustrating it in their own lives. Here, then, are rich materials, the comparative study of which ought surely to help us to a clearer understanding of an obscure mental state; and, as the fine French proverb has it, “to understand is to excuse”—to excuse, and, incidentally, where danger exists, to be warned against that danger. We must, however, be on our guard against confounding misanthropy proper—that is, the hatred or avoidance of mankind—with the somewhat analogous states of mind produced by mere melancholy or mere pessimism, both of which present subsidiary features or symptoms common to themselves and to misanthropy.

So long ago, then, as the middle of the second century of our era, Lucian of Samosata, writing in the tone of a highly civilised and highly sceptical age, had made Timon the Misanthrope the subject of a lively burlesque. Later writers are, however, unanimous in treating the theme seriously, not to say tragically, and it is in their footsteps that we must follow. Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens*, produced in the year 1608, is pronounced by experts to be a composite work, of which nearly one-half may be attributed to George Wilkins, Cyril Tourneur, or some other inferior writer, and certainly its lax structure and crabbed diction would reflect little credit on Shakespeare. As a study of the psychology of a misanthrope, the play is the reverse of subtle. The keynote is sounded in the following gibe, addressed to Timon by the cynic Apemantus: "The middle of humanity thou never knewest, but the extremity of both ends."¹ And true it is that from the extreme of confiding generosity Timon passes at one step to the extreme of virulent misanthropy. Surely there is here some want of balance or gradation, notwithstanding that the faithful steward, Flavius, would lay the blame elsewhere:—

"What viler thing upon the earth than friends
Who can bring noblest minds to basest ends?"²

From a remark of the poet,³ however, we are led to surmise that Timon's lack of ballast must be attributed to youth and inexperience. Nor is it idly that Alcibiades applies to him the epithet of "noble." Nobility of nature he possessed, though scarcely that of character—scarcely that nobility which can resist dire strain, and, nobler still perhaps, forgive grave injury. Timon has yet to learn life's lesson of long-suffering. And so the spectacle which he affords is rather that of a broken-hearted boy than of a good man meeting with misfortune. The predominance of slaves and sycophants among the subordinate characters, and the absence of feminine interest save of a very ugly and very episodic kind, combine to make the play one of the least attractive of those in which Shakespeare had a hand. Yet it has fine passages, too, and the experiment of re-staging it would be well worth trying—the more so that it is comparatively free from those difficulties and subtleties whose interpretation is apt to overweight all but the greatest actors.

¹ Act iv. Scene 3.

² Act iv. Scene 3.

³ He speaks of the "infinite flatteries that follow youth and opulency" (Act v. Scene 1).

Among Molière's plays, *Le Misanthrope* occupies a very different position from that occupied by *Timon* among Shakespeare's—indeed, a consensus of critics might well be expected to pronounce it his grandest work. Its hero or protagonist, the misanthrope Alceste, is at once ideally noble and essentially human—one whom revolted idealism has driven to misanthropy. The spirit of the world in which he lives—its deplorable triviality, insincerity, and scurrility—raise his gorge. Nor, in inveighing against it, is he inclined to weigh his words.¹ He is high-minded, and yet uncompromising, uncompliant, a vehement railer. He has an Achilles' heel of his own, and the fine ardour of his nature turns to his own detriment. For the same intensity which he brings to bear on decrying human frailty inspires his passion for Célimène—for Célimène, the bewitching young widow, who herself embodies so large a share of the very things he rails against. At the first Célimène is inclined to return his love; only, her inclination, unlike his, is kept well in hand. Hence she gains the tantalising attraction possessed by coolness and comparative indifference in the eyes of those who themselves are at the boiling-point. The subsequent intrigue, or entanglement, of the play is perhaps not very strong; but in depth of human significance, as also in brilliance of writing, this comedy is without a rival. Molière had the courage necessary to give it an unhappy ending—where an Alceste was involved, the only ending that could possibly be true to art. And, whilst exposing the thorniness of misanthropy, he has also done full justice to the moral grandeur to which that wild passion may occasionally rise.

Sir Walter Scott's misanthrope, suggested as he was by an actual original, is a much less august figure. Indeed, *The Black Dwarf*, for all its admirable local and historic picturesque, remains somewhat of an illustration of the structural *naïveté* of early romantic fiction, whose canon required that somebody must always turn out to be somebody else. The misshapen creature beheld by Hobbie Elliot on the moor, at work upon his Cyclopean task, appears in one respect unique, for he does good that evil may come. Hear his own avowal to Earnscliff: "If I cannot send disease into families and murrain among the herds, can I attain the same end so well as by prolonging the lives of those who can serve the purpose of destruction as effectually?—If Alice of Bower had died in winter, would young Ruthwin have been slain for her love the last spring?—Who thought of penning their

¹ He avows his intention "de rompre en visière à tout le genre humain," to ride full tilt against humanity (Act i. Scene 1).

cattle beneath the tower when the Red Reiver of Westburn-flat was deemed to be on his deathbed?—My draughts, my skill, recovered him. And, now, who dare leave his herd upon the lea without a watch, or go to bed without unchaining the sleuth-hound?"¹ But notwithstanding this sinister profession, and the great curses which he utters, the heart of Elshender the Recluse has a soft spot in it. Nay, indeed, as he has been goaded into misanthropy by disappointment and the recoil from a rash act of his own, so he now finds it so hard to live up to his calling, that it takes all the envy aroused by contrasting his own contorted limbs with the straight ones of the ruffian Græme to enable him to "wrestle down his feelings of rebellious humanity."² In the Black Dwarf, in fact, misanthropy is little better than a masquerade, or a mood of violence persisted in, in his own despite, against his better nature. Yet this is a form of the malady which is by no means uncommon, though not commonly destined to the happy ending which turns Scott's hero into a species of god from the machine. As to David Ritchie, the model from whom the dwarf was drawn, Scott seems to have closely copied his deformities and the embittered sense of his own hideousness which drove him to the wilderness.³ Hints of a mind in strong contrast with a deformed exterior may also have been borrowed from that original, who is known to have been a loving cultivator of flowers and a reader of good books. Reality was, however, as it so often is, more poignant than romance; for, far from being a noble in disguise, David Ritchie had had to face grinding poverty in addition to his other griefs. And, though we are not now concerned with locality, perhaps I may here be permitted to observe that Scott, whose topography is generally artistically rather than actually true, has, for his own purposes, seen fit to transfer the dwarf's hermitage from the Vale of Manor to Liddesdale—or, in other words, from the inner to the outer verge of the Middle Marches.

It may be that, strictly speaking, I am scarcely justified in including the brain-sick musician of Shelley's *Julian and Maddalo* among types of misanthropy. He is rather a man at odds with society, and he expressly disclaims community of sentiment with the "perverted beings," who, as he says,

"think to find
In scorn and hate a medicine for the mind
Which scorn or hate has wounded."

¹ Chapter iv.

² Chapter vi.

³ Robert Chambers's *Illustrations of the Author of Waverley*, p. 77.

Here, as elsewhere, however, extremes meet, so that certain symptoms of an unbalanced or undisciplined philanthropy are scarcely distinguishable from the symptoms of a directly opposite passion. We may gather from this tormented being's wild soliloquy that he had started in life with much of Shelley's own belief in the perfectibility of man through the powers of the human mind, and that the shipwreck of these aspirations has combined with more personal misfortune to drive him mad.

As Maddalo (or Byron) points out,

" he seemed hurt,
Even as a man with his peculiar wrong,
To hear but of the oppression of the strong,
Of those absurd deceits (I think with you)¹
In some respects, you know) which carry through
The excellent impostors of this earth,
When they outface detection."

He (the distraught captive) also reveals how "loathed scorn and outrage unrelenting" are the reward of those who take the love of mankind as their vocation. So, although a hater of the existing social order rather than of men, this inspired bedlamite may perhaps be regarded as a variety of the type misanthrope, in whose characteristics of self-made misery and impassioned railing he so largely participates.

Returning to prose literature, Charles Reade's masterpiece, *The Cloister and the Hearth*, may probably be said to divide with Gustave Flaubert's *Salammbô* the distinction of being the finest example in fiction of successful resuscitation of a bygone age. Doubtless Swinburne even overpraised it; but then Swinburne's praise of Reade derived added weight, as his praise of Charlotte Brontë had already done, from the ill-will which he cherished to George Eliot. For the passage referred to takes the form of a comparison of Reade's study of mid-fifteenth century life with that incorporated in *Romola*. Students of the touching history of Gerard's faithful love will recall the crisis when, on receiving news of Margaret's death, his better self seems to die within him. Says his biographer, "A dark cloud fell on a noble mind. His pure and unrivalled love had been his polar star. It was quenched, and he drifted on the gloomy sea of no hope. Nor was he a prey to despair alone, but to exasperation at all his self-denial, fortitude, perils, virtue, wasted and worse than wasted. . . ."² In this mood he seeks, but does not find,

¹ That is, with Julian (Shelley).

² Chapter lxxv.

distraction or relief in vice. Then the hot fit of despair passing off and the cold fit succeeding to it, "this miserable young man spurned his gay companions and all the world. He wandered alone. He drank wine alone to stupefy himself and paralyse a moment the dark foes to man that preyed upon his soul." And thence he enters upon something much resembling the dire soul-state of deliberate Satanism, in which the victim's hand is against all the world and evil is his good. But against this morbid condition, as against an all but mortal sickness, the fundamental sanity of the man reacts and rescues him. Following Gerard, in one of the later novels of Charles Reade's contemporary, Wilkie Collins, there is a twifformed and half-crazy creature, by name Miserrimus Dexter, in whom one might well expect to diagnose the tabes of misanthropy. But on re-reading the book, I find nothing more distinctively misanthropic than may be traced in any cunning and unscrupulous nature.

Having now observed a variety of agencies at work in the creation of the misanthropes of romance—as, bitter disillusionment in Timon, moral indignation in Alceste, the sweet of life turned sour in the Venetian, and the destruction of life's hopes in Gerard,—let us return to the misanthropes of real life, choosing our examples now no longer among men of rudimentary mental organisation, but among the world's most powerful minds.

The misanthropy of Byron's earlier utterances, then, may be not unjustly described as the perverse pose of a spoiled and wilful boy. Beauty, rank, genius, fortune, have been showered upon him; well, then, he will sulk and pout and gloom because something else—he scarce knows what—has been withheld. Nothing shall make him happy, nothing wean him from his grief! It is a frame of mind which he perhaps copied from Chateaubriand, perhaps shared with him—an attitude which, when observed in the young, all but the most austere of critics will regard with easy indulgence. After all, why not? We ourselves might well be thankful for a tithe's tithe of his dower. But we know that men are variously made. In justice to Byron, too, it must be acknowledged that, in one of the later stanzas of his first canto,¹ he expressly repudiates misanthropy as a motive of Childe Harold's brooding isolation, preferring to regard this as a symptom of the melancholy of a sated voluptuary. Excepting Timon in the play, however, few have openly avowed themselves misanthropes, and Shelley's keen-eyed analysis was at variance with the self-analysis of his friend. "He is a

¹ No. lxxxiv.

person of the most consummate genius . . .," he writes, "but it is his weakness to be proud: he derives from a comparison of his own extraordinary mind with the dwarfish intellects that surround him an intense apprehension of the nothingness of human life. . . . His ambition preys upon itself for want of objects which it can consider worthy of exertion." If this is not the authentic misanthropy, it might, at least, pass for that passion. It is true that Shelley continues: "I say that Maddalo is proud because I can find no other word to express the concentrated and impatient feelings which consume him; but it is on his own hopes and affections only that he seems to trample, for in social life no human being can be more gentle, patient, and unassuming."¹ The conception of the misanthrope as one who rails and girds against his kind, and does society all the harm he can, is, however, somewhat primitive. In a higher stage of development, as I hope to show, he will reserve his misanthropy for home consumption. Meanwhile, as regards Byron, his early pose was surely inspired by prescience. For by the time the third canto of his rhymed itinerary was begun,² as a man ruined in estate, deserted by his wife and ostracised by society, he had abundant grounds for indulging the most genuine misanthropy.

If there was something of Timon in Byron, Jonathan Swift was perhaps more nearly related to Alceste. Among writers of the highest distinction, Swift stands alone in this—that his glance was directed exclusively to the seamy side of human existence. So, where others equally gifted had seen life in terms or colours of beauty and nobility, his vision of the world was congenitally jaundiced or distorted. With him the filthy Yahoo and the ghastly Struldbrugg took the place, I won't say of the poetic creations of a Spenser or a Shakespeare, but of the good, honest, imperfect humanity to be met with in the pages of an Addison or a Goldsmith. Again, the study of Swift's writings is apt to impress the student with a conviction that the writer's powers were vastly greater than his performance—that the mind which could impose itself alike upon the courtiers of Queen Anne and the Dublin mob, as his did, had in it more than goes to the inaugurating of a political movement or the inditing of a political pamphlet no matter how forcible,—nay, more than goes to the writing of a *Battle of the Books*, a *Tale of a Tub*, or even a *Gulliver's Travels*. And it must be remembered that, to the world at large, Swift is author of the book last

¹ Introduction to *Julian and Maddalo*.

² That is, in 1816—seven years later.

named, and of nothing more, unless it be of a few such mere literary diversions as the *Polite Conversations* and the *Memoirs of P. P.* But, willing as we may be to credit him with power to do more than he either achieved or attempted in literature, there is absolutely no evidence that he had it in him to see life otherwise than very partially, or that Beauty, the cynosure of all other poets, had for him any positive existence. In all this he is certainly far removed from Molière's misanthrope. It is in their overmastering moral indignation that they concur; and here, though his bitterness often degenerates into virulence and obscenity, as Alceste never does, Swift bears away the palm and does it by sheer force of intellect. Neither Milton nor Dante was a better hater than he was; whilst the hatred of those two great minds has always its proper artistic relief in their writings, and fills no more, or not much more, than its due space in their respective cosmogonies. It is true that in Swift's collected writings, too, hatred has its relief; only it is a relief that is obscure, disproportionately small, and apt to be overlooked—namely, that of the profound affection expressed in the "little language" and the *Letters to Stella*. For as Byron loved his boyhood's friends, the Clares, Dorsets, Wingfields, and others, with a love passing that of women, so did Swift love his foster-sister. And this love is the redeeming offset to a misanthropy which was to that of Byron as starless midnight is to twilight. Moreover, in Swift, misanthropy, complicated probably by incipient insanity, was exasperated by a tragic self-hatred—as is evidenced by his reported recitation, when his birthday came round, of the frightful text: "Let the day perish wherein I was born, and the night in which it was said, There is a man child conceived."

A far less formidable—indeed, a perfectly innocuous—type of misanthrope was the French poet, Alfred de Vigny, whose misanthropy confined itself to avoidance of his fellow-creatures and recoiled from denouncing or waging war on them. The history of Vigny's mental development is peculiar and interesting. After serving as an officer in the army, and winning great literary successes with his tragedy of *Chatterton*, an impassioned plea for the rights of genius, his tales of military life, which include a touching sketch of that great-hearted sailor, Admiral Collingwood,¹ his historical novel of *Cinq Mars*, and, not least, his poems, he somehow or other—that is all one can say!—came to conceive a distaste

¹ See "La Canne de Jone."

for social life. So he withdrew from the world, to shut himself up in what he figuratively calls his *tour d'ivoire*—a species of spiritual hermitage designed for austere contemplation, whence he could hold humanity at arm's length, whilst nursing his dream free from distraction, and living his life as one unspotted by the surrounding dust and turmoil. His was a lofty, if a melancholy, isolation or abstraction, which, by the way, would sometimes lead him into strange extremes—as, for instance, when he professed to be unable to recall the maiden-name of the English lady he had married, or replied to a candid friend who had found fault with a speech of his at the French Academy, as being too long, “I am not tired”¹—a reply which was scarcely so final, or so complete a self-justification, as he apparently meant it to be! What is distinctive, however, in De Vigny's case is this,—that his misanthropy was benevolent, if, indeed, such a contradiction in terms may be allowed. In other words, whilst repudiating contemporary life and asking nothing of his contemporaries but to be left alone, he continued to be animated by goodwill towards them and was eager to serve them when it lay in his power.

A second blameless and amiable misanthropist, also a Frenchman, was Etienne de Sénancour, whose name has been familiarised to English readers by Matthew Arnold's poems on the novel of *Obermann*. A certain high austerity of temperament which they shared brought Arnold into sympathy with Sénancour, whom, none the less, he grievously misjudged. For Arnold seeks to extenuate Obermann's infirmity of purpose by setting him down as the typical child of an age of doubt. As a matter of fact, Obermann's creator—being born in 1770, living on until 1846, and publishing his best-known work in 1804—lived and wrought through an age of hope and of belief in itself such as his country had not previously witnessed and has scarcely witnessed since. The truth is, not that Sénancour or Obermann (one is justified in using the names interchangeably) was depressed by the spirit of his age, but that, being anti-social, he resisted it—was as little influenced by it as a modern man could be, and hence, at the very moment when the millennium was proclaiming in Paris, was concentrating his own thoughts on the eternal snows and on a little task of manual labour. Certainly George Sand was much nearer the mark than Arnold when she spoke of Obermann as the embodiment of “moral elevation without genius,” of morbid sensibility phenom-

¹ “Pourtant, je ne suis pas fatigué.”

ally isolated through the lack of will to act.¹ Isolation amid the noblest scenery earth can show is a form of self-indulgence which may well appeal to many who are guiltless of more questionable kinds of misanthropy. Yet, as time goes on, and the spirit of collectivism becomes more dominant, even this may come to be regarded with more than mere disfavour. In literature, Obermann represents the blameless victim of misfortune seeking sanctuary before the shrine of Nature, just as Manfred represents the burdened soul addressing itself to the same quest. And it was probably Obermann's freedom from the specious trappings of romance that led the essentially unromantic Arnold to claim him as affinity, and to prefer his soul-outpourings before those of any more picturesque Werther or René of them all.

We have now made some attempt to analyse the misanthropy not only of fictitious characters, and of ordinary individuals such as the vicar of Elsdon, the half-mythic seigneur of —, and the Border peasant, but also of men of great mental powers and remarkable endowments, such as Swift, Byron, Vigny, and Sénancour. And, in so doing, we shall have observed that instead of being a fixed and constant passion as is sometimes supposed, misanthropy is susceptible of great variations and indeed varies (as it is bound to do) with the individual character. It may be final as in Timon or a passing phase as in Gerard, ghastly and formidable as in Swift, or associated with mildness and benevolence as in the inmate of the Ivory Tower. But it has, I think, one feature that is general, namely, that it is passive rather than active, and partakes much more largely of the nature of a malady than of that of a state of war against society. That, in all cases save those where it is complicated by latent insanity, the malady may be cured or palliated, and the state of war resolved by peace, may be devoutly and reasonably hoped. And, in fact, it might plausibly be argued that it is as much of a duty in the moral world to extend the hand of fellowship to a misanthrope as it might be, in the physical world, to throw a rope to a drowning man. In the one case we should be saving a fellow-creature from the waters, and in the other we should at least be endeavouring to save him from himself. Unless associated with a high degree of tact and delicacy of perception, such striving would no doubt be worse than useless. But, as misanthropes would appear to be disappearing from the world, no Humane Society for their benefit is ever

¹ "Obermann signifie l'élévation morale sans génie, la sensibilité malade monstrueusement isolée en l'absence d'une volonté avide d'action." (Preface to *Obermann*, p. 3.)

likely to be founded, nor are the individual efforts specified above likely often to be called into play. As a last word, it is surely to the credit of womankind that the annals of the sex supply few or no examples of misanthropy even in an imperfect form. The niece of the younger Pitt, Lady Hester Stanhope, she who turned her back on the most interesting society her country had to offer in order to live with a few Arab servants in the desert, might, however, come under the category ; whilst from fiction I can advance no better instance than the dark and evil and self-tormenting Miss Wade of Dickens's *Little Dorrit*.¹

GEORGE DOUGLAS.

SPRINGWOOD PARK, KELSO.

¹ See especially her confession, chapter xxi., beginning, "I have the misfortune of not being a fool."

CHAITANYA, AN INDIAN ST FRANCIS.

THE REV. J. E. CARPENTER, D.D., D.LITT.

THE religious life of India at the end of the fifteenth century A.D. was extraordinarily complex. For more than two thousand years, since the days of Gotama the Buddha (500 B.C.), the great tradition in the possession of the Brāhmans had maintained its sway. Without any central authority such as the Roman Papacy exercised in medieval Europe, the Brāhmans had long carried their culture through the whole peninsula, and interpenetrated the life of the various races which made up its immense population. The authority of the Vedas, the duties of caste, the recognition of the Law of the Deed (Karma) as the governing power of the human lot—these were all invested with age-long sanctity. For the ordinary householder the *Path of Works*, of family piety, study of the Veda, the appropriate sacrifices, the demands of charity, the moral virtues of truthfulness, chastity, forgiveness, goodwill, pilgrimages to sacred places, would provide a safe-conduct to happiness hereafter. Many of the ancient gods, indeed, had faded out of sight. The world was under the sovereignty of the Holy Three, Brahmā, Vishnu, and Çiva, of whom the poet sang (probably in the fifth century A.D.)—

“ In these three persons the one God was shown,
Each first in place, each last, not one alone ;
Of Brahma, Vishnu, Civa, each may be
First, second, third, among the Blessed Three.” ¹

Temples to Vishnu and Çiva covered the land. Many of them were of great wealth and splendour. Endowments were provided for a huge staff of temple servants, besides the necessary priests. There were dancing-masters and musicians, drummers, singers, accountants, parasol-bearers, lamplighters, watermen, potters, washermen, barbers, astrologers, carpen-

¹ Kaledāsa, “ Epic of the War-god,” tr. Griffith.

ters, goldsmiths, gardeners, "and others"—a motley multitude of dependants, indeed. A theological school might be attached, with incomes for the Brāhman teachers, and aids for poor scholars, or there might be provision for the aged, the infirm, or the blind. Kings would enter the scales and weigh themselves against gold for their donations, in hope of securing the welfare of parents and laying up merit for themselves. As the functions of the Holy Three in the perpetual cosmic rhythm—creation, preservation, and dissolution—might all be ascribed to each, the temple dedications which began with one name might end with another.

Brahma, indeed, appears but rarely. Yet he could be commemorated as "the Supreme, the Cause of the production, stability, and destruction of the Three Worlds, the True, without end and without beginning, who consists of knowledge alone, One, the Abode of Immortality." Behind this visible scene of constant change lay the hidden Being whence it issued, and into which it would in due time return. There, veiled in mystery, was "the True of the True," or "the Real of the Real," and to apprehend it was the object of the *Path of Knowledge*. It was not easy to tread. It implied long and severe discipline. He who aspired to pursue it must withdraw from the world, conquer all appetites and passions, practise unceasing self-control, master all bodily emotions, and subdue all inner temptations to pride and arrogance. Then through the great illusion of self-consciousness and its myriad objects in the fields of sense, the vision of the ultimate Unity would gradually grow clearer and clearer to his thought; he would realise his identity with the source of all existence; he would be able to repeat the words of ancient Scripture, "That art Thou," and "I am Brahma"; he would be released from all the restraints of Karma; and would pass at death into eternal union with the Brahman who is for ever Being, Intelligence, and Bliss.

To set forth this goal of insight was the task of philosophy, and from the days of Çankara (800 A.D.) it had been pursued with untiring zeal both by the disciples of his own religious order and by a succession of teachers founding themselves on the same ancient texts, but interpreting them differently, and creating their own diverse schools. Çankara was traditionally a worshipper of Çiva, Rāmānuja (1100 A.D.) of Vishnu. The two deities were the chief objects of popular devotion. Each could be represented as infinite, supreme, eternal. Yet they could be viewed in union as two aspects of one personality, under the joint names of Hari-Hara (Vishnu-Çiva), and even set side by side on right and left in one body. Each is

really all the other gods, and a Çaiva theologian of comprehensive sympathy could include the Buddha and the Jain "Conqueror" in the one person of the Deity.¹ The Vaishnava had the advantage of the doctrine of Vishnu's "Descents"; in his wondrous Boar-form he had lifted the earth out of the primeval waters through love for the world; and for the benefit of erring humanity he had appeared as Krishna. Here was a God of grace, who deigned to save his worshippers from sin and the suffering and sorrow which it entailed. To approach him with lowly homage and responsive love was a third way, open to all believers, the *Path of bhakti*, or adoring Devotion.

The story of Krishna had been told and retold many times before the fifteenth century. He is the speaker in the classic of Hindu piety, the Bhagavad Gītā, or "the Lord's Song," in the great Epic, the Mahābhārata. There he declares: "Whenever *Dharma* (Religion or Law) fails and *Adharma* (Irreligion or Lawlessness) uprises, then do I bring myself to bodied birth. To guard the righteous, to destroy evil-doers, to establish Religion, I come into birth age after age." The legend of Krishna associated him with a district now known as Braj, extending along both banks of the river Jumna some forty-two miles west of the city of Mathurā. There were the scenes of his youth and adolescence; there he had engaged in those mysterious sports with the cowherdesses which religious poets had for centuries interpreted as the adventures of the soul with God.² This was the holy land of Krishna. The wealth of the temples at Mathurā had attracted the Mohammedan conqueror, and in his ninth invasion Mahmud of Ghazni (1017 A.D.) gave it up to plunder for twenty days. Its numerous sanctuaries were destroyed; five great images of pure gold, richly jewelled, with ruby eyes, and a hundred camel-loads of smaller statues, mostly of silver, were carried off; and at the end of the fifteenth century the Sultan Sikandar Lodi (1488-1516) could only find stone images to give to butchers for meat-weights. But the stream of pious song had still flowed on. The famous Bhāgavata Purāna, which in its 18,000 verses retold the story of Krishna at great length, was translated into Bengali in the fifteenth century (1473-1480); and the hymns of Chandi Dās,

¹ *Epigraphia Indica*, i. p. 150, A.D. 1001-2. A fiercer devotee boasts of having "drunk up the Buddhist ocean, and been a god of death to the Jains," *ibid.*, p. 44.

² For instance, in the poem of Jayadeva (twelfth century), translated by Sir Edwin Arnold under the title "The Indian Song of Songs." Its heroine is Rādhā.

celebrating the "union of spirit," were so free from sectarian tincture that some of them have been adopted with slight changes for use in the services of the modern Bengal Brahma Samāj.¹

The religion of Devotion in the hands of the philosophers might have its formal side. They sought to provide it with both psychological and scriptural justification, and strove to systematise the culture of emotional piety. The foundation was laid in elaborate ethical disciplines for the subjugation of ill-regulated thoughts. By association with holy men indifference to the world must be assiduously cultivated, and religious feeling induced. Then out of simple acts of praise and prayer, out of meditation and remembrance, the higher forms of devotion will lift the soul into the lowly ministration of a servant, the gentle behaviour of a friend, the complete dedication of the spirit to God. These activities of the inner life were independent of caste. The Brāhman Rāmānanda (probably in the fourteenth century) broke down this limitation. All worshippers of Vishnu, he proclaimed, or of his incarnation Rāma, might practise a common devotion, and eat together. "Let no man," said he, "ask a man's caste or sect. Whoever adores God, he is God's own." So he gathered a little group of followers, twelve or thirteen in number, including a barber, a Brāhman, a despised leather-worker, a Rajput, a woman, and they went through North India, preaching and singing on their way. Still do peasants chant Rāmānanda's hymns; for the teacher abandoned the Sanskrit of the schools and used the dialects of Hindī. Among his disciples a persistent tradition included the greatest of Hindu mystics, Ćūdra by birth, and brought up by a Mohammedan weaver at Benares, himself of the same trade, the weaver Kabir. The disciples of the Prophet had much in common with the higher Hinduism. Both religions had their lower modes of devout practice, their ascetics and their saints, their sacred places and their pilgrimages. But above these rose the repudiation of idolatry, the rejection of the ritual of sacrifice, the declaration of the worthlessness of caste. Was it possible to unite or to transcend them both? "Kabir is the child of Allah and Rām," sang the young weaver; Hindu and Turk were pots of the same clay; Allah and Rāma were but different names. As he looked out upon the world he saw it held by the cords of God's love; he felt the swing of the ocean of joy swaying to and fro; he heard a mighty sound break forth in song. North India was ready for a new message. Was there anyone who could deliver it?

¹ Sen, *History of Bengali Language and Literature*, p. 134.

His younger contemporary Nānak (1469-1538) sought to accomplish it in the north-west, and his successors created the church-nation of the Sikhs. Another answer came from the east through the impassioned preacher of the divine love, known by his religious name as Chaitanya (1485-1534).

His father, Jagannath Miçra, Brāhman by caste, had come to Navadvīpa (the modern Nadiā, at the head of the Gangetic delta) to complete his education. The city was famous for its school of Logic, which attracted students from all parts of India. Chaitanya's earliest biographer (born 1507) noted the passion for debate with which even a boy would challenge a veteran professor to discussion. There Jagannath Miçra married and made his home. Eight daughters were born to him, who all died in infancy, and two sons. The elder was to be married when he was sixteen, but on the eve of his wedding-day he disappeared in the night, and afterwards took the vows of a wandering mendicant. The younger boy, known by the pet name of Nimai, was only five years old. The anxious mother, Çachī, dreading the possible result of a religious education, kept the boy from school. The natural result followed. He mixed with bad companions, pilfered houses and orchards, and teased even the little girls as well as the pious elders who came to bathe in the river. He would step in refuse which no Brāhman would touch, and when his parents remonstrated, he asked how he was to know the difference between clean and unclean, since he was not allowed to study, adding significantly that he recognised no difference between them : "all things are alike to me." It was small wonder that the neighbours at last protested, and Nimai was sent to school. There he made rapid progress, and shot ahead of his companions, himself writing an early commentary on Sanskrit grammar ; but his pertness in discussion with venerable teachers did not make him beloved. Still, his brilliance as a scholar secured him pupils from all quarters when he himself opened a school at twenty, and when a year or two later, after his father's death, he visited the seats of Sanskrit learning in Eastern Bengal, he found his own commentaries taught and his name widely known. Another sorrow awaited his return. The young wife to whom he had been married had died of snake-bite. To comfort his mother, and provide for the due continuance of the family and its rites, he took a second wife, the daughter of a famous scholar of the city.

But his mind was now ill at ease. The mirth of his youth was hushed, and the ardour with which he had embraced the life of student and teacher had died away. The double loss

of father and wife had brought home to him the uncertainty of life, and new sources of emotion were opened in his soul. An aged saint named Īçvara Purī had often sought out the clever youth in earlier days, and striven to awaken within him the life of faith and the practice of devotion. But Nimai had perversely striven to convict him of some grammatical inaccuracy, and the old man had at last sadly ceased to try to convert him. Deeper experiences now awaited him. What was, after all, the meaning of existence? He searched his own heart and found no answer. The repute of a scholar, the respect of his pupils, satisfied him no more. Traditional usage supplied an immediate outlet for his unrest; he would go to the great sanctuary which Vishnu had wrested from the Buddha centuries before at Gayā, and there make the appropriate offerings for his father's spirit. It was characteristic of Hindu family life that he should only go when the permission of his mother had been first obtained.

Burdened in spirit, unable to share the gaiety of his companions, he visited Īçvara Purī on the way, and threw himself weeping at his feet. Deeply moved by the old man's kindness, he gathered up some of the dust of the city and wrapped it as sacred in his dress. He walked as in a trance, hardly able to join in the talk of his fellow-travellers. At length they reached the famous sanctuary, whose precincts were crowded with pilgrims like himself. There were the footprints of the Deity as he had placed his feet in conquest on the demon Gayāsura, and the priests chanted—

“These feet, O pilgrims, lead to heaven—
Take ye refuge in them!
There is no other way for man's salvation.”

The court resounded with the acclamations of the faithful. The air was laden with the scent of flowers piled on the lotus-feet. The fountains of tears were unlocked in Nimai's breast. He could not restrain his emotion, and fell into an ecstasy. His companions led him away, and as he returned to consciousness he bade them leave him; he was no longer fit for this world, he must seek Krishna, his Lord and the Lord of the Universe. The hour of his destiny had struck at last.

Brought home to his friends, he could not speak of what he had seen. When he attempted to relate the vision, he could only weep. To the physicians summoned by his distracted mother he declared that he had no malady to be cured by medicine. The pupils of his school heard only of the love of God instead of the conjugations of the verb; he read verses from the Scriptures, and the tears flowed again.

He carried the burdens of the old and infirm ; he washed their clothes ; he performed all kinds of menial services which no Brāhman should have undertaken ; he met remonstrances by saying, " While I serve you, I see God. These little acts are holy to me." Such conduct was enhanced not only by his caste and his attainments, but by a certain radiant beauty in his person. Unlike the Italian *poverello*, he was tall, with a shining countenance compared again and again by his biographers to a fair moon, and long black hair which hung down to his waist behind. As he chanted the name of God, disciples began to gather round him ; inspired by his example, they too performed acts of charity. The barriers of caste were broken down ; a pious Chandāla (or outcaste), said Nimai, who loved God was superior to all Brāhmans of the official type. The little band of the faithful continued to increase as distinguished scholars joined it. They met in the garden of Nimai's house or that of the Pandit Crīvāsa. They read together the Bhāgavata Purāna ; in the fulness of their joy they performed dramas on the scenes of Krishna's legend ; with song and dance they marched through the streets, and the hostile orthodox complained to the Mohammedan magistrate that these processions disturbed their nightly rest. The Kāzi forbade their continuance. But the next night Nimai boldly led his followers to the Kāzi's door, and he was delighted with their enthusiasm. A drunken Brāhman, member of the police, one day flung a brick at one of the company, a religious mendicant named Nityānanda. His forehead bled profusely. " Strike me again, if you like," said the injured disciple, " but chant Krishna's name." The assailant and his confederate were converted and reformed.

Among a people accustomed to see in eminent superiority the signs of divine presence, it was soon noised abroad that the Deity had appeared in Nimai's person. At Kānchanagara, close to the city of Burdwān, there lived a blacksmith named Govinda Dās. Vexed with a quarrelsome wife, on hearing of Nimai's fame he resolved to join him. As he approached Navadvīpa, Nimai and some companions came down to bathe. His appearance excited the blacksmith's deepest reverence, and he sought to devote himself to the service of this divine being ; he fell at his feet and washed them with his tears.¹ Nimai gently raised him and took him to his house. No true worshipper of Vishnu would admit flesh, fish, or even eggs into his diet. The family ate from

¹ The " diary " afterwards composed by Govinda Dās is among the earliest authorities for Chaitanya's ministry. See the *Calcutta Review*, vol. x. (1898).

the food that had first been offered to the Deity, and Nimai, instead of leaving him to take his meals from the fragments with the servants, fed him from his own plate. No clearer proof could be given of his breach with the tradition of his caste.

Meanwhile new plans ripened in the young leader's mind. Living in comfort as a householder, he could not devote himself wholly to his heavenly Lord. Beyond Navadvīpa lay the vast multitudes who needed the gospel of the love of God; the burden of human apathy and guilt laid its weight upon him; and the impulse grew within him to adopt the homeless life, and go forth to preach the faith revealed to him at Gayā. He was twenty-four when he announced to his followers that he would abandon the world and take the vows of a religious mendicant. Mother and wife and friends pleaded in vain. "My heart," said he, "feels deep pangs for the sinners of the world." So one night he stole away from home, leaving his mother gazing after him in the dark, accompanied only by Govinda Dās. At Kātvā, distant a day's journey, crowds assembled on his arrival, and he preached on the dangers of worldliness and the need of the love of God. On the third day he took the vows of a Sannyāsin, his long tresses were shorn away, and he set forth on the wanderer's life, pledged to sleep on the bare ground. At his initiation he received the new religious name of Krishna Chaitanya.

He first made his way with his faithful attendant to Purī, on the coast of Orissa. There stood the famous temple of Vishnu under the name of Jagan-Nātha, "Lord of the World." Ever since its completion in 1198 men of every caste had been allowed to eat the holy food together. The cooking arrangements were in the hands of a low aboriginal tribe known as Shavaras (or Suars), and Govinda Dās, who confesses that he was a "prince of gluttons," revelled in the curries and cakes and confectioneries which accompanied the daily diet. Chaitanya had been followed from place to place by disciples from Navadvīpa. They arrived (according to the legend of Krishna Dās¹) soon after Chaitanya himself, who had entered the temple and fallen before the image of the god in a rapture of devotion. He had been removed to the house of one of the most learned teachers of the time named Sarbabhauma, a professor of the Illusion philosophy of

¹ He was born in 1496, and so was ten or eleven years younger than his hero, but his poem was only composed in his old age in nine years, 1573-82, when the legend had grown considerably. See the translation of the second of his three books by Professor J. Sarkar, Calcutta (1913).

Çankara. For seven days Chaitanya listened to him in silence. Then the young mendicant took up the argument against the error by which the creature imagined "I am one with the Creator," and Sarbabhauma was finally converted. "Logic," he confessed, "had made me hard like an ingot of iron. Thou hast melted me." Three months passed quickly and disciples multiplied, when Chaitanya prepared to start on a missionary journey to the south, and amid the tears of those who were left behind set out with Govinda Dās for his sole attendant.

It was an enterprise of no little risk. At first the way through Orissa was easy. From village to village the rumour of his preaching spread, and when he came to the seat of the governor of the Godāvari district, Rāma Rāy, a Çūdra by birth but a worshipper of Vishnu and a distinguished poet, the royal minister prostrated himself before him. Singing the hymns of Jayadeva, Chandi Dās and Vidyāpati, Chaitanya went upon his way. Keenly sensitive to the presence of God, he found in Nature a kind of perpetual sacrament. A flower, a cloud, the light upon the ripple of the sea, filled him with joy. He embraced a high-caste Brāhman, smitten with leprosy, who would pick up the maggots that fell from his sores and replace them, and the tormented body became sound. He gave sight to a blind man who had been warned in a dream of his advent, and in the rapture of restoration died at his feet. He disputed with Buddhists and won over the learning of the monks to the service of Vishnu. The Pandits of monism yielded to the arguments which his modesty could not withhold. Men of all classes felt his charm. The sovereign of Travancore wept and danced with him. A Brāhman who had received him into his cottage, so poor that he had no seat for him, on his wife's advice offered him his head, laying a tulasī leaf (dedicated to Vishnu) at his feet. The divine honour drew from the guest a severe rebuke, but Chaitanya raised the reverent couple from the ground, proclaiming fervently the name of God. He bathed in sacred rivers, he worshipped in Çiva shrines. Whatever form or emblem had acquired sanctity served to remind him of the object of his love. This was the result of his immense sympathy with the several modes of a devotion which had aided others to approach the Deity. For him there was but one object of adoration, known under different names as Brahman, Paramātman (Supreme Soul), and others, and manifested in varying conditions. He might beat the philosophers in argument, but what gave him power over the common heart was his impassioned religious consciousness,

his vivid sense of the constant grace of God feeding his own spirit, his conviction that the whole world was the scene of the divine Love.

From Cape Comorin Chaitanya pursued his way to the north-west on the same mission. He had had experience of its trials. In traversing a forest where he and his companion had to subsist for a fortnight on roots and fruits, he once lay senseless in Govinda's arms after three days without food. He was only rescued on another occasion from a similar plight by a robber leader—himself a Brāhman—who sent Govinda food before it was too late, and then attached himself to Chaitanya till he died at Baroda, and Chaitanya begged the means for his funeral. The temple harlots at Jijuri, who had become a public pest, were reclaimed; their leader gave away her wealth, and with the name of Hari on her lips became a mendicant. At Dwarka, one of the most holy places in India, famous as Krishna's city, on the peninsula of Kathiāwār, the priests gave a grand entertainment in his honour, and with his own hand Chaitanya distributed the food consecrated to Vishnu among the deaf and dumb, the blind and lame. After twenty months, in which he had traversed some four thousand miles on foot, he returned to Purī, welcomed with eager joy by the disciples.

For two years the Master seems to have remained at Purī. Visitors from Bengal constantly came to listen to his teaching, and the service of the Lord of the World partly engaged his time. The religious tradition of India laid no duty of labour on the mendicant, and Chaitanya drew up no Rule for his followers. But he taught them to cleanse the sanctuary and its courts, and himself gathered the largest share of dust. Practising the strictest austerity himself—he sent Govinda home for having kept part of his Master's dinner in store for the next day,—a bottle of perfume brought by an admirer was immediately broken, and the contents poured upon the ground—he nevertheless was full of gaiety with his companions. When he went into a garden “the trees and creepers blossomed at his sight, the bee and the blackbird sang, the zephyr blew.” He danced under each tree, or bade one of the others dance while he sang. Or he acted the feats of Krishna in the water—he was still young,—sporting with his devotees and splashing them, or making one of his most trusted friends float and bear him up as the mighty serpent Çesha bore up Vishnu on the deep. Out of these realistic pastimes which gave relief to his constant emotion came the resolve to visit the actual scenes of the Krishna story. Wherever he halted on the way to

Mathurā crowds gathered round him and joined in the sacred dance. He bathed at the consecrated ghats on the banks of the Jumna, and was escorted through the woods to all the localities of the holy legend. Nature rejoiced at his advent, and was full of harmony. The cows and the deer came round him and licked his limbs. The trees and creepers shed honey like tears. Branches laden with flowers and fruit bowed to his feet. Peacocks strutted before him, parrots flew on to his hand and recited the praises of Krishna. He climbed the sacred hill, entered the sacred cave, lingered beneath immemorial trees, bathed in hallowed pools, visited ancient shrines, danced, wept, repeated verses, laughed and sang, and finally, at the place of Krishna's sports, fainted away in love.

He never left Purī again. But, under the influence of his visit to Vrindāvana, he made it the centre for the extension of his teaching in the north-west. Two of his most eminent converts, the wealthy ministers of the Sultan of Bengal, were settled there, and under his direction devoted themselves to austerities, and produced a long series of Sanskrit compositions. At the sanctuary of the Lord of the World he resumed his teaching, founded largely on the Bhāgavata Purāna; but he wrote nothing, and with his metaphysic we are not concerned. His real power lay in his impassioned conviction that the whole scene of human existence was bathed in God's love. That was no illusion, and the response which it called forth from the worshipper begot a feeling of individuality which nothing could shake. Each soul, however degraded, was worth something to God, and must be won to his service. God did not love a mere transitory modification of himself. He loved a being who could love him in return eternally.

In the ecstasies of Chaitanya's emotion he did not forget that the love of God demanded of the disciple a lofty ethical ideal. He must practise unceasingly such virtues as compassion, truth, charity, humility, and other graces of the gentle spirit, and the root of these was faith in Krishna's name. That alone, he told an inquirer, "washes away all sins." No limit was placed upon its efficacy. When he sent out his two first and chief disciples to preach in Bengal, he bade them "Teach the lesson of faith in Krishna to all men, down to the Chandālas, freely preach the lesson of devotion and love." One of these, Nityānanda, received 1200 Buddhist monks and 1300 nuns (so it was reckoned) into the Vaishnava fold, and his sympathy with the outcaste gained him the name of the "Friend of the fallen." The

Mohammedan was as welcome as the Hindu. So ardent was the pity for suffering humanity which he awakened, that one of his followers threw himself at his feet with the prayer: "My heart breaks to see the sorrows of mankind. Lay thou their sins upon my head, so that thou mayest remove the earthly pangs of all other beings." "Krishna," Chaitanya is said confidently to have replied, "fulfils whatever his servants ask for. You have prayed for the salvation of all the creatures of the universe. They shall all be delivered without suffering for their sins. The task is not too much for Krishna, who is omnipotent. Why should he make you alone undergo their chastisements?" In such glowing trust the philosophic ideal of absorption into the Deity found no sympathy or support. Love claimed the privilege of perpetual service beneath the heavenly will, and declared that even hell, where love could still rise from the midst of pain, were preferable to extinction in the very bosom of God.

Chaitanya spent the last eighteen years of his life at Purī. His death, in 1534, is enveloped by the legends in mystery. Worn out with emotion, he passed suddenly away. Again and again in his career the belief that Krishna had appeared in him had found not only widespread credence but open expression to him. At Navadvīpa he had peremptorily silenced the praises of his disciples. To his friend the Prime Minister of Orissa he said, "I am a man, and I have taken the ascetic's vow. In body and mind, in speech, and in all my dealings, I must be spotless." At Benares he cried, "O God, O God, I am a despicable creature! It is a sin to regard any creature as Vishnu." But the age-long instinct of Hinduism would have its way. The sovereign of Orissa, who had been one of his followers, was not satisfied till he had set up his statue in his own capital.¹ The cultus of the saint was soon associated with that of Vishnu, and in his classical work on Orissa Sir W. W. Hunter recorded that he found 300 of such joint temples in Purī itself, and 500 more in the district. A long series of theologians and poets celebrated the glories of Vishnu-Krishna, and the numerous biographies of Chaitanya were followed by the lives of other Vaishnava saints. Still to this day do religious preceptors pass from village to village in Orissa chanting Chaitanya's name in the evening cool, and expounding the sacred books. The religion of Vishnu-Krishna, as he taught it, was open to men and women of every caste and of every race and creed.

¹ This has been recently recovered by Mr Nagendranāth Vasu, *Archæolog. Survey of Mayurabhanja*, i. (1911), p. c.

The offering of love needed no priestly sanction, and the grace of God was in no man's keeping. The doctrine of successive incarnations brought the Deity into the midst of human life, and gave it an ineffable value when God thus pledged himself to its deliverance from the dangers of worldliness and sin. How far the old traditions may retain their force in the midst of the new energies stirred by the impact of Western thought it is impossible at present to foresee. But beneath the unrest on the surface there is still reason to believe that the ideals of charity, gentleness, and sympathy, cherished for so many centuries, cannot be completely stifled by the persistence of the caste-system, or driven by European influence from the common heart.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

OXFORD.

NEGLECTED SOURCES OF JOY.

W. J. JUPP.

ONLY as a record of vital human experience would the words that follow claim or expect the interest of any reader. He who writes them is trying to make them tell something of an inward spiritual enlargement that was too good to keep to himself: the desire to share it with others was stronger than the desire to cherish it in lonely peace and thankfulness. There is probably nothing new in what he has to tell, unless it be granted that any freshly and vitally realised experience may have the quality of newness, as the dew of morning or the laughter of a child has. It has come to him unsought, breaking in through the clouds of human sorrow and distress that have darkened the world so long—clouds that may seem at times too dense ever to be dispelled again by the sunlight of wisdom and reasonable love.

Such an experience, granted to one in time of old age, when such disastrous happenings as those that still afflict the nations are apt to be overwhelmingly depressing, may possibly have a significance for others not unlike to that which it has for the writer himself. If so, it will afford some compensation to the reader, should that which he reads appear to be in no wise original or remarkable.

It should be added that in what is here spoken of as “sources of *joy*” is meant something very different from sources of *pleasure*. Joy is that deeper and more abiding good which depends not on outward conditions or the satisfaction of bodily desires and needs, though it should be in no wise disdainful of these. It is that which suffices the inmost necessities and aspirations of our true being; it is that which comes of a profound consciousness of the reconciling and harmonising spirit of life itself, and, as such, may include much sorrow and suffering, transforming them into powerful ministries of good.

"Be our joy three parts pain," yet is it still joy, sometimes greater and more sufficing by reason of the pain.

I.

Reading yet once more the *Prelude* of Wordsworth, during the past summer days, I was aware, before coming to the end of the Second Book, of an unusual and altogether wholesome kind of joy taking possession of the mind. It was something quite other than the delight which the poem itself offers to the reader, and which may be greater at every perusal. It was more intimate and affecting—as if one were permitted to share in all that wealth of a boy's happiness of which the first two books have so much to tell. The joy that Wordsworth knew in those early years seemed to live again in his reader's heart. The tale of school-time adventures and exploits, of lonely musings by lake or stream, in woodland places or on rocky hillsides, of sport and pastime with other boys, opened a fountain of gladness within, almost as if the experience had been one's own.

The emotions thus aroused were doubtless more keenly felt as memory recalled the reader's own restricted and somewhat unlovely childhood, in contrast with that which the poem commemorates, and also by reason of the oppressive world-sadness under which we are called to live to-day. The radiance that illumined earth and sky for Wordsworth's early years seemed to pierce the clouds that darken all the ways for us, and shed a light, as he would say, "like sunshine o'er green fields." For Wordsworth himself had seen most woeful happenings in the world since those glad boyhood years, and before he wrote the poem that opens with a record of those years. What he suffered in early manhood, by reason of the follies and miseries of mankind—so like in many ways to those that afflict us to-day—of this he has much to record a little further on. He had suffered, despaired, lost faith and vision and the power to keep himself in touch with Nature and in fellowship with Man. But he had lived through that dismal time, had mastered his despair and found a stronger and more steadfast faith by which to order his life and fulfil its earlier promise. "The heavy and the weary weight of all this unintelligible world" was "lightened," and he could turn back to the beautiful bright days of boyhood and sing of them in gladness and thankfulness of heart, and cause them to live again, through imaginative sympathy, in the mind and life of an old man, to-day.

Reflecting on this afterwards, it seemed that I had been drinking at one of the neglected fountains of quite real and sufficing joy, and I was led to think of others like unto it and of some not like it, yet equally well worth while resorting to in times of need. I began to recall some of the more ancient records that tell of joyous occasions in human experience and awaken in the mind associations of deep and pure delight. I thought of Socrates on the banks of the Ilissus stream when, with Phædrus, he was about to discourse of love, through the hours of a long summer day: how, for once, this man of the city and its many-sided life felt and yielded himself to the enchantment of a world outside the city—how he rejoiced in the sweetness and loveliness of that world. “By Heré, a fair resting-place, full of summer sounds and scents. Here is this lofty and spreading plane-tree and the agnus castus high and clustering, in the fullest bloom and greatest fragrance; and the stream that flows beneath the plane-tree is deliciously cool to the feet. And how delightful is the breeze—so very sweet; and there is a sound in the air, shrill and summerlike, that makes answer to the chorus of the cicadæ. But the greatest charm of all is the grass, like a pillow gently sloping to the head. My dear Phædrus, you have been an admirable guide!”

Who on reading that, in receptive mood, could fail to rejoice with this town-loving dialectician as, forgetting for a while the grave matters they have come hither to discuss, he surrenders himself to the influences of the hour and place and talks as a poet might of rural sights and sounds? And if the doubt arise in one's mind whether Socrates ever really felt and talked thus, and we say that it was Plato, the master-dramatist in dialogue, who drew those honeyed words from his master's lips, then it shall be with Plato that we rejoice; for not even he could have written thus if he had not himself been captured and enchanted by some such vision of delight. And it matters not *who* it was that knew such joy on a summer's day, long years ago; we can be glad with him to-day, and by such gladness add to the sum of that “treasure in heaven” which consists so largely in unselfish fellowship with the happiness of others.

Then memory, leaping a few centuries, recalled that great passage of the *Confessions*, where Augustine tries to tell in words something of the transport of joy granted to him and his mother, a little while before her death. It cannot be quoted here in full, and to quote fragments of it would be mutilation, and to attempt an abbreviation of it, in one's own words, would be a kind of sacrilege. It must be read in its brief

completeness—the tenth chapter of the ninth book, and read with a mind neither credulous nor critical as to the theological forms of expression: then hardly will any sensitive soul fail to rejoice with that mother and son, as they mount to the heights of spiritual vision and realise the glory of what the son calls “the eternal life of the saints.” As he tries to imagine this moment of rapture *prolonged*—rendered permanent and abiding—his words falter, become involved and confused; the sentences break off unfinished and start afresh, until, at last, his wistful dream-like thought finds utterance: “Just now we reached out, and with one flash of insight touched the Eternal Wisdom that abides above all: suppose this to endure, and all other far inferior modes of vision taken away; and suppose this alone remained to ravish the beholder, and absorb him, and plunge him in mystic joy, might not eternal life be like this moment of comprehension for which we sighed? Is not this the meaning of ‘Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord’?”

Whatever our estimate of the character of Augustine and of the effect of his teaching and example on the Church, through many succeeding centuries, we yet must be glad with him and Monica in their ecstasy of spiritual joy. That one who had passed through such years of profligate vice, of misery, shame and penitence, of struggle after truth and holiness, could come to know a blessedness so great and bring to the mother who had suffered so much through him a supreme recompense in her last days—this is one of those splendours of human experience that may shine for us amid the blackest shadows of time. It sheds a more than earthly light on the darkness and misery of sin. It brings to the mind a sense of an amazing power in *goodness* to triumph over the basest forms of ill and give to the soul that has suffered over its sin a more than earthly joy. It seems to bid us dare repeat, though with bated breath, the supreme beatitude, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,” as our whole inward being reacts and responds to the joy of two passionate human souls, realised there in Ostia so many years ago.

Again leaping the centuries, the recovering power of memory brought to mind that wondrous morning when Dante and Virgil, emerging from the mouth of hell, found themselves on the lowest slope of the purgatorial mount. Though here we are no longer in the region of history but of poetic imagination, it is nevertheless with vital human experience that we are in touch. For Dante must have lived through those scenes

of misery and of redemption with as keen a sense of their reality as Augustine tells of in his *Confessions*. We pass, indeed, from what we call actual, to passionately, imagined experience; but which is the more intensely realised it were hard to say. We are told that the people of Verona, passing Dante in the streets, would say, "There is the man that has seen Hell." They might as truly have said, "There is the man that has seen Heaven," but that life, for him, had so indelibly engraved upon his features the gloom of the one and almost effaced the glory of the other.

But it was not the rapture of his vision of the Rose of Paradise and of the "Light Intellectual full of Love" that memory recalled; it was the sweet human happiness of that first hour on the Mount of Purgatory when the awful journey through the Inferno was ended. Doubtless it is more easy, when reading those arresting lines that describe the coming of dawn—"Dolce color d'oriental zaffiro"—to feel the charm of their poetry than to realise the joy that must have filled the poet's mind in those first moments of deliverance. How great that joy no words could express. For has he not come to that region of hope, albeit of suffering still, where the human spirit is made pure *through suffering*, and worthy to ascend into Paradise?

"Sweet hue of oriental sapphire that was gathering on the clear forehead of the sky, pure even to the first circle,

To mine eyes restored delight, soon as I issued forth from the dead air which had afflicted eyes and heart."

The relief that came as he respired that "breath of morn" which "the dawn was vanquishing," and beheld the "fair planet that hearteneth to love making the whole East to laugh"—the recompense of hope that followed so closely on the night of misery and despair,—we should need the poet's own gift of imagination to recover these and enter into the fullness of his joy. Yet one almost dares the assertion that it has been worth while to journey with Dante through the grim and ghastly regions of the Inferno in order to step forth with him into a world so fair, so radiant with its promise of redeeming grace. And the mind surrenders itself to the consoling thought that it may be thus in relation to all the evil and misery our race has known. The good to which it is possible to attain, however painfully, through and beyond transgression and all that comes of it, may prove well worth the cost, in the final issue of the divine purpose in every human life.

And note how that which follows immediately on the

emergence from hell's vast gloom ministers to the poet's joy. For now, obedient to Cato's instruction, Virgil bathes his hands in the dew of "the sweet grass," and washes from Dante's "tear-stained cheeks" the grime of the infernal regions, then girds him with the "smooth rush" which, it may be, symbolises that humility of spirit without which no ascent of the purifying mount is possible.

Cleansed and girded thus from without, the inward vision is made ready to perceive the greater wonders of that calm, bright dawn. "Low in the West o'er the ocean-floor" he beholds "a light coming o'er the sea so swiftly, that no flight is equal to its motion." It is the light of the white wings of the angel who is wafting to the shore a hundred souls, fresh from the scenes of earth. "See," says Virgil, "how he has them heavenward turned, plying the air with his eternal plumes." As the prow of the vessel touches the strand the Angel makes to them "the sign of Holy Cross, whereat they all flung them on the strand, and quick as he came he went his way." From among the hundred souls one draws forward to embrace Dante, "with great affection." It is his friend Casella, a musician of Florence who in other days had set to music some of Dante's songs. And to give him pleasure Casella sings one of these—the canzone that begins, "Amor che nella mente mi ragiona": "Love that in my mind discourseth to me." The joy of those who hear that song transcends all other feelings in that hour. "My master and I and that people who were with him seemed so glad as if to aught else the mind of no one of them gave heed." And the reader becomes one with them in their gladness, as if he too had left the realms of darkness and were ready to ascend with them the heavenward way.

But now sternly on their enraptured listening break the words of Cato: "What is this, ye laggard spirits? What negligence, what tarrying is this? Haste to the mount and strip you of the slough, that lets not God be manifest to you." So from that joy which was but for the passing hour they are summoned, as we all are, to take the upward way that leads to greater and more abiding joys—to the vision of the Eternal Light kindled by the Eternal Love.

It is a far cry from the passionate fervours of the *Divine Comedy* to those little "Ballads of the Soul" sung by the Indian poet of our own time, Rabindranath Tagore. Yet even so, regardless of intervening years, did memory transport the mind, recalling some of the Bengali "Song Offerings" that the poet himself has translated for English readers in his

Gitangali. And I found myself rejoicing with him in the best-remembered of these, one only of which I will quote here.

"When I go from hence let this be my passing word, that what I have seen is unsurpassable.

"I have tasted the hidden honey of this lotus flower that expands on the ocean of light, and thus am I blessed—let this be my passing word.

"In this playhouse of infinite forms I have had my play and here have I caught sight of him that is formless.

"My whole body and my limbs have thrilled with his touch who is beyond touch; and if the end comes here, let it come—let this be my passing word."

To read or call to mind any one of these great glad things of literature, or any of a thousand others like them, and to feel not only the truth or beauty or sweetness that may find expression thus, but to feel also the joy that must have surged, or established itself, in the writer's heart as he brought such glorious words together—this surely is to apprehend and to realise one of those pure unselfish delights that enrich life for us and leave no after regrets or sorrow. And I have thought that it would be well to resort more frequently to such fountains of happiness, which keep fresh and green some fair oases amid the sands of the desert of human shame and sin and misery.

II.

Then there are those times of real and sufficing joy which *we ourselves* have known in former years and which memory can make to live again in the spirit, albeit impossible of repetition in actual present experience. I cannot believe in that gloomy doctrine of the poet who said that "A sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things." Wherefore should we mourn because of bygone days of gladness that look so bright against the clouds of trouble and distress that may overshadow us now? Why not rejoice and be grateful to have known them in the past? Why not encourage those blissful memories to revive within us and shed their light upon the darker ways we needs must travel for a while? *Great days of fellowship* with those who are no longer within our reach—perchance no longer here upon the earth, in the body, to behold with us the light of day, to share with us the wonder and the beauty of the world. *Great days of solitude*, that was not *loneliness*, among the hills or in woodland places where the mystery of outward things became a revelation of the invisible, or in quiet fields where just to be alive with the earth and air and sky was sheer unmitigated

well-being. *Great days of excitement*, when we felt with others the enthusiasm of some high cause, or enjoyed alone the luxury of thinking out successfully some hitherto baffling problem, or gaining by a flash of insight a glimpse of truth that so long had eluded the soul's best vision. Or, it may be, just the recollection of bright youthful hours when exuberant spirits made life seem an exultant romping and this earth a playhouse of marvels and of mirth.

We may recall such favoured hours, in vacant or pensive or distressful mood, even in a time of exceeding great sorrow, and they shall recover for us some measure of their own delightfulness; they shall rise again out of the oblivious past and enjoy a new life in present thought and feeling, alleviating thus whatever is painful or untoward in actual experience now. Simply to be glad and thankful to have known such genuine happiness may serve to renew its ardour, its gracious and beneficent delight.

III.

Then there is that pure contemplative quality of joy which comes of sympathy with the happiness of other living beings that share with us the common everyday life of the world. Whatever our own individual experience chance to be, a morning rarely dawns on which we may not know the luxury of thinking about some of our kinsfolk or friends or neighbours *with whom it is well*, on whom we know the sun rises beneficently and life at its core is wholesome and good. If it happens to be wholesome and good for ourselves also, it becomes increasingly so as we think of them: if it is bitter and baneful for ourselves, the generous outflowing sympathy with them relieves the strain of its wretchedness and sheds a kindly light on the gloomier paths we needs must tread just now.

And however grievous may be the goings-on of the world, some fresh saddening records of which the morning paper is pretty sure to bring, we may be certain that to a vast number of living beings, unknown to us, the day will bring a measure of real happiness—that they will see the light and breathe the air and pursue their avocations in gladness of heart. Whatever the “utilitarians” of the last century may have meant by their formula “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”—surely a very ambiguous phrase, as Dr Wicksteed has shown, though it suggested well enough the aim of their reforming zeal—we may say that Nature herself provides for the happiness of a *very great* number. It is reasonable to

believe and to hope that almost every day that dawns upon the earth means happiness to a far greater number of living creatures than those to whom it means the opposite. I suppose that young life always exceeds, numerically, older life on this planet. Children outnumber adults all over the world, or nearly so; and children are wonderful makers or winners or inheritors of joy, in face of all the well-meant, but often unwise, attempts of their elders to curtail their activities and restrain the sometimes inconvenient overflow of their spirits. Repressed, rebuked, punished, denied so many innocent but troublesome proclivities for getting pleasure out of life, their buoyant temperaments, their incorrigible light-heartedness, will generally find for them a way to some fountain of delight, and they will contrive to be happy under conditions that to older folk would often mean dreariness or discontent. We may be glad with these, if we care to be—if we choose to think of them sympathetically. They will brighten the world for us every day, if we will let them.

And then there are all the non-human creatures that have part with us in the life of the world; with these, too, it is open to us to be humanly glad through fellowship of humane feeling and goodwill. For in the main they are a joyous folk, these innumerable living beings that inhabit the earth and air and waters. There is, of course, plenty of suffering among them; and that inevitable destiny which we call death awaits them all; life, too, for most is a very brief span—with some, only a few hours or even moments, as we count time. Nevertheless, to intimate and sympathetic observers, something akin to what we know as happiness prevails in the vast majority of earth-born creatures, unvexed by thought or the sense of imperfection and the mystery of good and evil in the world. And death, for them, is unsuspected till it comes, and oftenest it comes swiftly and with a minimum of pain. Fear of the stronger that prey upon the weaker, and especially fear of man, afflicts many of them, at times; but it passes swiftly and, when past, is soon forgotten by those who escape, and they go on with the pastime of the day or fall into the dreamless sleep of night. Hence, watching them at their innocent instinctive pursuits—birds careering in the air or flitting in the hedgerow, cattle grazing in the meadows, gnats dancing in the warm evening twilight, even flowers open to the sun at mid-day—we may freely enter into the joy of these, almost as if it were our own; sometimes we may feel as Coleridge makes his *Ancient Mariner* feel when gazing from that dreadful ship on the living forms that glide in the waveless ocean whereon

he is becalmed. For love has now awakened in his heart, purging away its arid and self-centred thoughts and calling forth sympathy with other and happier beings. "By the light of the moon he beholdeth God's creatures of the great calm."

"Beyond the shadow of the ship
I watched the water-snakes :
They moved in tracks of shining white,
And when they reared, the elfish light
Fell off in hoary flakes.

"Within the shadow of the ship
I watched their rich attire :
Blue glossy green and velvet black,
They coiled and swam ; and every track
Was a flash of golden fire.

"O happy living things ! no tongue
Their beauty might declare.
A spring of love gushed from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware !
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware."

In these and other diverse ways it is open to us to rejoice with those that have rejoiced and with those that do rejoice and with those that shall rejoice, as well as (an equally noble privilege) to weep with those that weep.

IV.

Finally, there is the joy to which imagination invites when, leaping the narrow confines of the present, it unfolds a vision of the brighter, holier time that yet shall be upon the earth. It is given us to conceive and to cherish a fair ideal of good, to the realisation of which the human race has been slowly making its way through the long ages. The "ascending effort" by which man has advanced from his low estate, striving upwards to a life of nobler activities, kindlier manners, wiser purposes of fellowship and reasonable love—that effort, however frustrated, resisted, even, as it would often seem, utterly defeated for the time, has never been really and finally overcome or extinguished. It may be arising now, in fuller strength and more strenuous purpose, out of the chaos and confusion into which the horrors of these late years have plunged so many peoples, submerging so many hopes.

It is not a form of self-delusion to imagine thus, and to find joy in the vision of our ideal. To conceive a nobler future for mankind and to live in that future for a while is

not another way of burying one's head in the sand when pursued by the storm of man's latest follies and disasters. It would surely be deliberate pessimism to believe that this to which the human race has thus far attained is the highest and best to which it is destined to attain, or to which it shall prove itself able to attain. The present form of civilisation cannot be the most beautiful and wise—or the least ugly and irrational—which the race has the wit to achieve. And is it not ridiculous to suppose that the ideals which great souls, from Plato onwards, have cherished, were nought but idle day-dreams because they have not yet been realised in actual life? It is not merely pleasing and consoling to allow the imagination to image for us, not perhaps some sure “far-off divine event,” but a more and more wisely ordered State, a more and more beautiful world of human activity and service, and to rejoice in the vision of a time which others shall know and which, though we shall not know it here, some little work or impulse of ours may help to make possible upon earth; it is entirely *rational*, in the light of all that evolution reveals to us of progress from lower to higher forms of life, to reach forward in thought and feeling towards finer and diviner issues of the great unfolding process. While memory invites us to be glad with those who have rejoiced in other and bygone times, hope may justly invite us to be glad with those who shall live to see a world where love, guided by reason and crowned with beauty, reigns supreme, with just enough hatred, ugliness, and irrationality to give zest to action and afford occasions to the pessimist for brooding on the evils of an imperfect world!

I wrote the word “finally” just now, yet not forgetting the greatest and perhaps most neglected source of joy that is open to us under all conditions of life in a changing world. It is a sense of the Unity of all existence in the invisible and eternal order, the consciousness that we and all the other creatures are at one in that Unity, that in the last significance of things nothing is lost, nothing is denied its rightful place, its true fulfilment—that the harmony of the whole secures the ultimate well-being of every part. But the experience of this is beyond words, for it transcends our thinking and leaves the effort of our logical understanding lagging far behind. It is the reality of highest emotion, of deepest insight, of purest love. It is the peace that passeth understanding, the joy that is its own source and its own sufficing.

W. J. JUPP.

THE RELIGION OF MOTHER EARTH.

JOHN E. BOODIN,

Professor of Philosophy, Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota.

WE are told in ancient story about a mighty giant who received fresh energy every time he touched mother earth. But Hercules conquered him by strangling him in the air. The human soul likewise receives fresh energy from contact with the world of concrete reality, but it has long been well-nigh strangled by an abstract intellect which holds it in the air, away from the source of our being. For we are children of mother earth more truly than we are children of our biological parents. We never leave her womb. We are always part of her circulation. We are sustained by her substance. We breathe her energy. We are old as she because in us are the traces, the Karma, of her entire past. We are young as she, for in us she opens her eyes in wonder to gaze upon a novel world. We are the architecture of her genius and experimentation through countless ages. In us she would fain lift her head above the stream of passing change and come to realisation of the beauty and meaning of the world. In us she strives to maintain herself at the high vantage-point of conscious self-direction against the forces that would level all into primeval chaos. For ages she prepared herself unconsciously, controlled by a cosmic order which we can see only dimly and in retrospect, for this nobler vocation. She captured the necessary elements and brought them within her control. She stored the sunbeams in her recesses. She prepared the proper proportion of elements and the proper conditions that she might in due time, nurtured and fecundated by cosmic energies, give birth to life. With life as a magic agent she was able to remake herself and to carry on the experimentation for higher forms of life until she could mirror herself in consciousness, see the creative bent of her genius and create, if not more intelligently, at least more economically. After

striving for ages to establish, first, types of physical environments, then types of organic structures, she has more lately striven to express herself in types of ideas; and the survival conditions have become no longer merely those of brute might but of spiritual selection—sometimes rank, sometimes more expressive, but working by vastly more economic tools and more rapid experiments than organic creativeness. Thus she has been able to objectify in us—compounded of dust and wind and sunshine—the futile strife and blindness of the past and to seek a better way. This and much more mother earth has accomplished, and in this we share as her offspring.

The human mind, in its attempt to understand its world, has invented strange dualisms and then become the victim of its own abstractions. In its childhood it was prone to ascribe a life like its own to things about it. Later it invented a world of doubles, a ghost world, which seemed to dominate the seen world. How it came to create this ghost world is a problem lost in the hoary past. Whatever its origin, the ghost conception has haunted man for ages and haunts us still. It is at the basis of a great deal of our religious and philosophic thinking. It has led to a strange separation between this world and the fairyland of imagination. It has made this world seem mechanical and dead, and has made us seek our values in some remote realm created by fancy to suit our wishes. In fervent mystical moods it has led to a derealising of this world as at best a veil or sign of some other reality. By our abstraction we have thus made two worlds, and separated them the whole distance of earth and heaven. But while our imagination has created another world for the values which we seek, we have degraded the earth more and more, little recking that all the while we have our roots in the soil and that the values which we have falsely abstracted and transposed to an imaginary world of their own are the florescence of our own humble earth. In its creative process we must find God and heaven, if we find them anywhere. Both the materialists and the theologians talk as though soul and intelligence blew in somehow by accident into this world. They do not realise that human nature is the expression of nature; and that whatever is noble and beautiful in us is nature's recreating itself in us.

Man's bondage to the ghosts of the past is a subtle one and not easily broken. It is not merely the popular idea of doubles which are just like our bodily self, which flit away at death and live somewhere else in the land of fulfilled wishes; but the ghost idea may be magnified and purified into an ideal being, still like ourselves, but infinitely enlarged in

power and wisdom. It may take on the transcendental form of personifying the universe into one vast inclusive ego, the fulfilled wish of its maker. This flatters man. In his egotistical conceit he would fain worship himself, especially when he can do so in the guise of himself infinitely enlarged. But after all it is our conceit which makes us think of the supreme reality as a double of ourselves, even though it be our complete and satisfied self. We are still moving in a ghost world, even though it is more refined and abstract than that of our more honest and simple-minded forebears. The most blighting ghost of all is that of materialism. For proud though the materialist is of his idol of mechanism, it is after all but the ghost, the double of its maker. It is but the reading of his mechanical habits of mind, his callousness to all finer values, his philistinism, in short, into the objective universe. In his consummate egotism the materialist assumes that the only order of the universe comes from his little brain! And where did his brain come from? But we cannot atomise the universe into dead abstractions and make a living whole out of it. And our ideals, our striving, our creativeness are part of the universe even more truly than our routine and mechanism, though the latter have their place.

It is a horrible tragedy that man should have accepted the theory of blind chance and of might as the philosophy of the universe. But this fits the tiger nature in man. We hug the illusion of self-preservation, forgetting that only by losing ourselves can we find ourselves. Our blindness and warfare are part indeed of the elemental struggle of forces in their externality. It is the path nature has travelled; but while a necessary discipline for the development of a hardy race, it is a wasteful process. And so mother earth developed the altruistic instincts—love for others, care for others, co-operation with others. Instead of the old order in which individual might prevails, it is an order in which the bond of love and loyalty prevails. And since this bond can exist only where there is fair play and helpfulness, it means that love and justice are more powerful than hate and brute might. There is an order in things which strives dimly and painfully for expression—the order of atonement. And only in this direction is life. We live such a little while. What a pity to waste this little in strife. Mother earth is caught in struggle, in internecine strife, but what she craves deep in her unconscious heart, and especially when she awakens, is harmony, redemption from her blindness, union. And so she begets man. But mother earth, when she wakens at times to consciousness of herself in man, cannot be said to be

altogether pleased with her offspring—man, the most predatory of all animals, who has robbed the earth of so much beautiful life to satisfy his rapacity and vanity, and who even preys upon his own kind. Now and then, however, in choice individuals the earth realises in a prophetic way the longing for harmony, in the forgiveness and sacrifice of a Jesus of Nazareth—not in a Nietzsche who would maintain the illusion of egoism and strife, but in the true saints, those who have a passion for charity and atonement, who give themselves, all their riches of heart and genius that life may become more harmonious, who feel the order in the universe and strive earnestly in thought and deed to make it conscious and real. It is they who must be the leaven of a new society, if a new society there is to be—a fairer earth. For the meek shall inherit the earth. To them we must build the temples, not to the rapacious tiger-men whom the world deems successful. Worldly success is bought at such infinite cost—the cost of soul. There must be the spirit of sacrifice, of help-live, which the world cannot understand, if the earth is to attain to its truer life. So long as the victor despoils the vanquished, and the vanquished hates the victor, it matters not so much who is the prey or who is the tiger, the vicious circle goes on. We need the courage, not so much of fighting—that is easy—but of forgiveness. In this direction, in the end, lies the law of economy as well as of happiness. No longer in division and strife but in union, in creative synthesis, must our salvation be sought.

The dualism which has made a fairyland out of our ideals and left this earth dead and Godless must be broken down. The material and spiritual are not two separate worlds. The spiritual is the recreation of the material into new unities, wider and higher syntheses. The seeming deadness of much of our earth is due to the separation of forces. A material element is but energy hide-bound with habit, pent up for future liberation. What mighty stores of energy are condensed in the humblest portion of matter can be seen in the light and heat of radium. How wonderful is the solvency of life compounds! What stores of energy they liberate and synthesise. And what shall we say of the spiritual relations of friendship and love? They disclose the potency of our earth in the choicest and purest ways. Spirituality is the distilled, purified union of nature's energies in the most complex relations. Materiality is but inertia, particularity, separateness, isolation, externality. And so a materialistic man is a man with few and narrow wants, self-interested, self-centred. The spiritual man responds to

myriad tones. His windows are open to the light in all directions. He is social and universal in his interests. Deadness is abstractness, separation. It is in creative union that there is life and spirituality. It is the striving of our mother earth and the universe to accomplish such union. Thus nature creates life as a new fact—a miracle even in its lowliest form. The humblest bit of life is infinitely superior in workmanship to gold and diamonds. We must learn to value life more and brute things less. And life is communion, not isolation. Isolation, whether in the inorganic, organic, or spiritual stage, is barren. It is in communion that there is fruitfulness. Hence we must strive for larger and more complex communion. In rare moments nature becomes conscious of this striving for union—in the warm kiss of love, where dust, wonderfully-fashioned dust, meets dust and lingers in fond embrace; in the chaste bond of friendship; in the communion of saints. It is the attraction of spirit for spirit, for spirit is earth divinely organised and realising its own richness. Not earth and spirit, but earth realising itself as spirit in the creative communion of choice souls with each other and the genius of the universe. It is the striving of nature, the push of its order, to reach spiritual creativeness, to liberate itself from the limitations of next to next in space and time and to attain unity of life. This can be reached only in spiritual appreciation and communion—in love, in friendship, in art. And art is but the architect of nature working with more delicate tools, conscious of the drift of nature.

If we are dust, dust looking into the eyes of dust for a moment in seeming separateness, only to blend soon in the common melting-pot again, why not make the brief moments as significant and beautiful as possible—bringing to light in each other the hidden resources of love and appreciation? Dust is beautiful in its creative synthesis—beautiful in the sunset, beautiful in the glory of spring, but most beautiful in the divine communion of human souls. It is then that we feel most truly the creative potentiality of dust, our kinship with the harmony and tragedy of the universe. We must learn to realise life in common, not ourselves, in order to live ourselves. We must learn to live as part of a whole if we would be individuals. Individuality must be precipitated and purified in social emotion, social thought, social co-operation and sacrifice in order to redeem itself, even as the servant of Jehovah gives his life a ransom for many. There is ample room for asceticism in any life worth while—the denial of the present for the wholeness of the

future, of the individual for the wholeness of the group, of the group for the wholeness of humanity. Only through self-denial can the higher values of life win fruition. Flesh has its claims too, but it is part of a larger whole which flesh cannot see. At best life is partial in our imperfect world. We must strive to realise the higher partiality as against the lower when the two conflict, as they often do in this imperfect existence. But we must not forget that the end of life is not partiality but atonement, union, communion.

We must turn from the ghost religion of the past, with its anthropomorphic background, to a more real basis, the basis in the evolution of our earth. We must know the tree by its fruits and the creative potency of nature by what it produces. We cannot discover the secret of life in the slime of the sea. We must discover it in creative synthesis; and the more complex synthesis is more truly expressive of the genius of the whole and its incarnation in the finite than the simpler. True religion is such a creative synthesis. If we had a living religion, a vital faith, instead of a ghost of the past, what a difference it would make. We repeat words, but the life, if they ever had life, has passed out of them. The old paradises and infernos have moved to limbo. It would be well to begin all over again. A sincere nature-worship were better than no worship, and thus we might liberate ourselves from the slavery to words. If we should worship mother earth genuinely, we might get hold of reality at any rate. For the earth is our mother. We are dust of its dust. In the spring, after the long northern winter, the earth clothes herself in a garment of green grass and leaves and flowers—a garment of wondrous beauty. Just so, in the ages, the earth clothes herself with human society, with institutions and science and art—in short, with civilisation. For we and our civilisation are but the development of the earth's crust in creative response to the forces of the universe. The earth is not dead. In its creative union with the universe it glows like the Holy Grail. It is mother earth that looks with myriad eyes at myriad stars, that produces symphonies and listens to them with myriad ears. It is mother earth that spins the invisible threads of human relations and weaves them into various patterns. It is mother earth that wakens in us to reflection and creative construction. We remain part of her throughout. It is not nature and man, but man the last experiment of nature. She holds us up in the sunlight for a moment and then reclaims us to her bosom. We are motes in the sun, walking flowers whispering joys and

sorrows to each other, ants crawling at the bottom of the atmosphere, building our miniature abodes. All the while we are part of the earth's control, of the law of her evolution, drawing our life-blood from her until our little span is complete.

We should love mother earth, for it is but a fragment of her that loves in us. It is she that reveals her nature in the bond of love, in friendship, in all striving for truth and beauty. The family with its parental instinct and filial response is her creation. So is the bond of the community, the bond of nationality, the striving for larger human unity. We fight each other in our blindness, not realising that we partake in one creative essence. Oh, how the earth has struggled to attain this moment of living in us, looking at herself through us, waking in us, creating in us. And why should we fear death? It is but earth reclaiming its own. It is but being clasped closer to her mother heart. We are of her, we are earth. I that speak am earth, and you that listen are earth—earth in myriad unique creations, but we are children of the same mother. If she claims us, if she undoes the work of her brief blossoming in us, it is because she has her race to run. She cannot tarry. She is impelled by a still larger destiny. Surely the earth is divine, and in her travail and birth is revealed a glimpse of the larger life.

If mother earth might speak through us its parts and organs, she might say: "It is my genius that reveals itself in the story of evolution. I create species. I press on to life in myriad individuals. Love's sweet mystery is my mystery. I strive for union and atonement. The holy bond of friendship is my bond. I love in myriad hearts. Mother love is my love. The romance of youth is my romance. When love mourns the death of dear ones, it is I that mourn. I clothe myself in flowers. I fill the world with my fragrance and I shape organs to enjoy the fragrance. I love beauty and I create organs to contemplate and create beauty. I sing in the song of birds, expressing my joy and anxiety, calling to my mate to fulfil love's obligation that the bird song may go on. I am the waving cornfields and the cattle on a thousand hills. Mine is the music of flowing waters, the hush at dawn, the low drowsy hum at eventide, mine is the majesty of the mountains and the tranquillity of the plains, the sweet fragrance of lilacs after rain, the pulsing days of spring-tide and the sad beauty of autumn. The floating clouds and the rainbow are mine. I gaze at the vast immensities of the starry spaces and feel humble

in my lowliness. I gaze into my own being and am over-awed by the dimly felt law of my own history. I carry the yesterdays in my frame, the striving and hurry of to-day, and the promise of the future. And I am man, to profit and to enjoy, to praise and to condemn. His conscience is my awakening. His sense of beauty is my harmony with myself and the universe. I created his sense organs and his mind, in unconsciousness, not knowing my own genius, that I might enjoy sunset and evening star.

"But I am more than myself. My genius is but the expression of the genius of the universe. I am sun dust, part of the energy of the sun, evolved from the same nebula, life of its life. It is the sun which impregnates me in his shower of golden light. I was incubated by his energies in the vast ages. I am held safely in his embracing arms in my perilous journey among the stars. I grow and develop because of the nurturing energy of the sun. Therefore I thank and praise the benignant author of life and beauty. But the sun too is star dust, part of the drift of the cosmos, part of the starry heaven that inspires me with its sublimity. And I am akin to these larger energies. The history of cosmic dust lives in me. I have been present in the rise and decadence of worlds, in the everlasting harmony and tragedy of the spheres. When the glorious sun, my foster-parent, is a burned-out cinder, moving sightless in the dark spaces, waiting to be recharged with new energy, I shall follow him somehow in his death and resurrection. I am not self-sufficient. I am part of the larger destiny. I live only as part of the rhythm of a still larger order. I have my flowering period, and then I too must die, at least for a season. In my conscious moments I sometimes mourn my death, for I too would fain live. But I submit in confidence to the larger Providence. I am the vessel of the great Potter. I am more, I am His child. I am the work of the Genius of the whole expressing Himself in every part. And He loves me with an infinite love, of which the love I show is but a fragment. To this love I trust myself and mine, as I travel the unknown spaces, in the infinite flight of the æons."

Yes, we do not understand, but somehow we are part of a creative destiny, reaching backward and forward to infinity—a destiny that reveals itself, though dimly, in our striving, in our love, our thought, our appreciation. We are the fruition of a process that stretches back to star dust. We are material in the hands of the Genius of the universe for a still larger destiny that we cannot see in the everlasting rhythm of worlds. Nothing happens but what somehow

counts in the creative architecture of things. We fail and fall by the way, yet redeeming grace fashions us anew and eliminates our failures in the larger pattern. The pangs of pain, of failure, in this mortal lot, are the birth-throes of transition to better things. We are separated for a time by the indifference of space and by our blindness which particularises and isolates us. But in us is the longing for unity. We are impelled by a hidden instinct to reunion with the parts of the larger heart of the universe. We are hurrying to the consummation of the drama—tragedy because we cannot see beyond our failures, comedy when our little systems are revealed in a new and wider plot which in turn is but a curtain-raiser to a new drama.

This is not a religion of nature in the sense of levelling all to the less-developed stages of nature—brute and matter. It is in the upper creative reaches that the meaning and goal of the universe, the genius of a divine creativeness, is foreshadowed. When the earth becomes conscious in us of its order and law, of the cosmic trend, there is much to criticise, much to eliminate from the jungle of life and the elements as they are thrown together by the sea drift. We cannot worship the whole of things as a mere collection. We must discern and feel the genius of the whole. There must be ideal direction and synthesis. And so we have art and morality and religion—earth's noblest creations. We must eliminate sin which is isolation, blindness to the larger whole. We must select in our appreciation, our striving. And so we worship the finite. Not all is good or beautiful, at least to usward.

Realism and idealism both have their place. Idealism is the flowering of the pain and stress of life. It is the compensation for our sense of failure. To us the completer union is something beyond, in the creative bosom of the future. We must build our air-castles to keep the spirit of effort and hope alive. There is ever the beckoning of the unknown, the spires rising heavenward out of the tragedy of the soul. The mistake of idealism has been that it has erected an artificial heaven of values, apart from this world, while it has made this world sordid and mean. Hence the eternal hiatus, the failure to bring the two worlds together, and the consequent tragedy of life. So we must have realism to balance our idealism. We must learn that the true air-castles of the spirit, of our nobler striving, are the manifestation of nature, the adumbration of its meaning, produced by the cosmos even as the sunset and the rainbow—not something apart from it. They are the artesian pres-

sure of the genius of the whole in human nature, behind even as before, seeking realisation in the finite process and in finite centres. Mourn not because the moments of this constellation of dust are brief. Say not that it is all in vain because we must die and the earth too must die, for some æons at least until she is resurrected again from her slumber in the larger Providence of the universe. Flowers too have a brief time to bloom. Is it in vain that flowers bloom because they must die? We were not brought here in vain. The Genius of the universe will see to it that nothing perishes which has permanent worth. And to stand for a moment on Pisgah, to see and feel the beauty of the world, is this not worth while?

There is in us, however, the impulse for immortality. There is the consciousness of the unfinished task, of the larger creative destiny. We cannot see our place in the infinite future. But we must work in faith for the promise. We must have faith that the creative Providence which has led us hitherto with infinite care and pain is not playing an idle game, cannot be permanently defeated in its striving. Whatever may be our finite place, we must pray and have confidence that what is best shall come to pass. A great deal of our hope for immortality has had its root in our vanity and egotism. We have built our future upon our pride in personality, our pride in class and race. We have erected false distinctions of values. We create the gulf of separation between sinner and saint, because we cannot see the good in the sinner nor the sins of the saint. We erect our measure of value, based upon our limitations, and expect the universe to respect it. We egotistically pride ourselves on our saintliness or welter in our sins, forgetting that in the struggle for life it is often our self-satisfied saints who make sinners out of the rest. But we are all miserable sinners and potential saints—imperfect beings, half-men. Man in his vanity personifies what seems to him good and calls it God. And in like manner he personifies what seems to him evil and calls it devil. He completes his wishes in imagination and calls the result heaven. He objectifies his pain and frustration and calls the result hell. But our measure of values is relative to our ignorance and imperfection. In the democracy of dust, sinner and saint lie down together—the sinner often more sinned against than sinning, the true saint more conscious of failure than of consummation. But mother earth heals the scars and starts the experiment anew. The real measure of achievement in this life is the capacity for forgiveness. Salvation is an infinite process. And we shall

share in this process constructively in the measure that we share in the infinite love. It is not for us, creatures of a moment, to prejudge the outcome of an infinite experiment, but it is for us to help as we may in the process of atonement. If we so do, our errors and conceits, our blindness of race, our false centrism of self and group shall be purified as by fire. We shall discover our real kinship in the life of the whole.

It is a matter of note that in the flux of human opinion, the fundamental values of life change but little. Our ancestors thought in ghost terms, we think in cosmic terms, but the Sermon on the Mount remains. One thing is certain, it detracts nothing from the higher values, which the race has discovered by infinite travail, to regard them as indigenous to our earth. Dante's world has vanished in the light of human knowledge, we must find a new home for the values he strove to express. But in the new setting the fundamental values remain, even as a diamond may be set in gold or platinum. They become only more real to us when we can see them as part of a cosmic Providence. The forms change, but the substance, the meaning, the drift remains, though deriving new significance when seen in a new setting. Future generations must again formulate the meaning of life in their own way. It holds throughout that the new wine must have new bottles. Some people mourn over their outworn creeds and their defunct institutions as Jonah mourned over his gourd. They forget that redemption is the important thing—the seizing upon the divine life in the process of the ages and creating it into new forms, more germane and satisfying to the human spirit.

We need a religion that we can use in our complex life. The cry for salvation was never deeper than in a society which has lost touch with the past but failed to discover the future. We are nervous and fret our lives away. We are tired and haggard, with taut nerves and drawn faces, old before our time. We need a religion that shall quiet our nerves and calm our spirit in order that we may draw fresh strength from the infinite reservoir of energy. We are absorbed in ourselves and our narrow group interests and miss the refreshment of companionship. We need atonement, a larger sympathy with man and the universe. We are young and ambitious, but know not the way. We need new insight and faith to reorganise a shattered society. We love—and fear lest the dream prove a nightmare. In all the conditions of life we need a new rapport with the redeeming love of the universe. We need communion with the larger life, the security of the everlasting, the hope of the ever-

creative ; we need the love that links men together in deeper co-operation and appreciation. We need a religion that enables us to live and not merely to get ; or our doing and fretting are in vain. We need the consciousness of the creative spirit of the ages.

Jesus remains for us the choicest incarnation of the genius of mother earth and the order of the universe. His significance does not depend upon an outworn ghost conception of the world, which on the contrary has too often hardened men's hearts against his real spirit. That spirit is one of union, atonement, creativeness. Wherever it becomes active, it dissolves age-long distinctions between men and makes them into a community. It establishes a new rapport with the universe. It is a spirit of renunciation of our narrow centrism that the larger creative life may be realised, of renunciation of our paltry immediate interests that a larger future, a better humanity, a better earth may be created. It means the creative incarnation of divinity, not merely in individuals but in society, in social individuals—in the small intimate unities and in ever larger enveloping unities—though this incarnation must necessarily come in despised minorities through which the higher light must break whether in church or industry. It makes for creative wholeness of life, as broad as humanity, yea as expansive as the cosmos.

We presumptuously make definitions of God as though He were a creature of dictionaries, as though His essence could be packed away into snug little formulas of our own making. We have too long insisted on making God in our own likeness, a magnified ghost of our own ego. God is too vast for our limited imagination, too rich for our abstract thought. His is the creative genius of the ages—the genius of an infinite cosmos. How can we presume to fathom Him ? But we feel that His essence is incarnate somehow, however imperfectly, in all holy bonds, in all sincere loyalty to the best, in all regeneration toward a higher and more perfect order. If we are true to our noblest insight, if we strive creatively for larger unity, we shall in a measure live Him even if we cannot understand Him. "Live in me, create in me," says the larger life. "I am the vine, ye are the branches. Without me, ye can do nothing. Co-operate in free and loyal creativeness for the whole, and the universe is yours."

J. E. BOODIN.

CIVILISATION CRITICISED AT THE SOURCE :

A STUDY OF GENESIS I.-XI.

PROFESSOR JOHN E. M'FADYEN, D.D.,

Glasgow College.

WHAT have we in Genesis i.-xi. ? Clearly not history. Of a period that on the face of it is prehistoric, no history is possible. No one was present at the Creation, no one witnessed the Temptation and the Fall ; nor does the writer anywhere claim to have had those facts supernaturally communicated to him, even granting that such a claim could be accepted. To any, if there now be any, who maintain that in these narratives we have history in the ordinary acceptation of that word, the final answer must be the challenge of the Almighty to Job, " Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth ? " What we have in these narratives is not history, but ideas woven through material furnished by ancient mythology and tradition : we have in them a philosophy of life, or rather—as " philosophy " is a term somewhat inapplicable to Old Testament thought—reflections on life.

Now this utilisation of history or quasi-history as the vehicle of ideas is a regular feature of Hebrew historical narrative. What we have in it is always a combination of facts and ideas (or, in later times, theories or dogmas) in which the idea (or dogma) becomes increasingly more important than the fact. In this connection the place of the Book of Jonah among *the prophets* is significant. The book tells a story ; but its appearance among the prophets immediately suggests that the proper way to treat it is not as a record of historic fact, but as a revelation of the prophetic mind—above all, of the universal love of God, which abhorred and transcended national boundaries. The thing of importance in it is not the element which links it with history, but with prophecy—that is, with the great illuminating and emancipating *ideas* for which the prophets pled.

This principle, so undeniable in Jonah, dominates all Hebrew historical writing. The story is never told for its own sake, but always to illustrate an idea or to point a moral ; and, as the years go on, the moral becomes more and more deliberately pointed, and the idea becomes hardened into a dogma which not seldom rides roughshod through the fact. This process can be admirably illustrated from the Books of Judges, Kings, and Chronicles. The Book of Judges simply revels in fact—the old book, that is, of heroic tales, before they were set in an “instructive” framework by later editors, piously eager to read their contemporaries a much-needed lesson on the meaning of history from the chequered pages of the sombre past. When these hortatory passages, like ii. 6–iii. 6, are withdrawn, which really voice the urgency of later preachers and thinkers as they strive to stimulate the conscience of their contemporaries by their religious interpretation of the past, we are left with tales which will live for ever—of Deborah, for example, of Gideon, Jephthah, Samson. Even these early tales are not without their deliberately reflective note : the story of Abimelech ends thus : “ Thus God requited the wickedness of Abimelech, which he did unto his father, in slaying his seventy brethren ; and all the wickedness of the men of Shechem did he requite upon their heads ” (ix. 56 *f.*). But such comment is rare. The facts are lovingly recorded, and they speak for themselves. To the writer or writers of the Book of Kings, however, the facts are less interesting than the ideas which they can be made to illustrate. The writer who can dispose of two brilliant and highly important reigns of about half a century each in fourteen verses (2 Kings xiv. 23–xv. 7) is clearly interested in something other than the bare facts of history. This growing indifference to fact and emphasis upon idea or dogma reaches its climax in the Chronicler, who frequently modifies and sometimes contradicts the statements of the earlier sources in the interest of the view of the world for which he is pleading. All this goes to show that Hebrew historical writing is never merely narrative ; it is also reflective, the reflective element becoming increasingly prominent as time wore on, and tending, in the end, to degenerate into an attitude to fact which was little more than mechanical. There is and there can be no such thing as disinterested history in the Old Testament. Men whose supreme interest was God could no more ignore that interest when they wrote as historians than when they spoke as prophets. Their history, like their prophecy, was a religious interpretation of life.

When, therefore, we approach Genesis i.-xi.—that is, the story of the world before the distinctively Hebrew story begins—we have to remember, first, that we have in these chapters just such an interpretation; and secondly, that if that interpretation turns out to be profound, it is likely to be relatively late. Now two ideas of massive proportion stand out from among the mythological material in which they are embedded. One is the unity of the race, the other is the order of nature. The unity of the race is implied by the Creation story, and it is elaborated in the table of nations in chapter x. The Creation story, whether that of chapter i. ascribed to the priestly writer known as P, or that of chapter ii., which comes from the Jahwist prophetic writer known as J, is the story of the creation not of the Hebrew people, but of *man*, humanity. That may seem a simple point, but in reality its implications are immensely important; for by such a thought tribalism is implicitly transcended, humanity is conceived as ultimately and essentially one, and universalism is here in embryo. The other thought of the order of nature is expressed in the sublimely simple words: “While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night shall not cease” (viii. 22). It is there—such is the implication of the context,—in the regular flow and movement of the universe, that the presence, the power, the love, the fidelity of God are most surely seen. Now the greatness of this thought lies in its implicit and perhaps unconscious opposition to that emphasis upon miraculous interference, as a special proof of the presence of God, which characterises so many narratives of the Old Testament. We have only to think, for example, of such a story as Gideon’s fleece (Judges vi. 36–40) to realise how immeasurably superior in religious insight are the grave and noble words of Genesis. It has now to be noted that both these ideas to which we have referred are prophetic ideas—ideas, that is, which place the writer on the level of the literary prophets. The first idea of the unity of the race underlies the opening chapters of Amos (i. and ii.), with its vista of the nations as all amenable to one moral law. The second idea is implicit throughout prophecy. With the curious and highly interesting exception of Isaiah’s offer of a sign to Ahaz “either from the depths of Sheol or in the height above” (Isa. vii. 11), the prophets lay no stress upon miracle whatever. Though no men ever more earnestly sought to impress upon their audiences their own urgent sense of the inescapable presence and will of God, they deal all the time with historical and moral magnitudes. Whatever

primitive material—and there is much—may lie embedded in the opening chapters of Genesis, the strength, ease, and simplicity with which those two great ideas are enunciated lead us to believe that the men who moulded that material were profound and generous thinkers, own brothers to the great prophets of the eighth century, and but little, if at all, earlier than they.

Let us look now more particularly at the interpretation of life presented, by implication, in these chapters. The writer has courageously faced the facts, and he finds life to be a grim and perpetual struggle: without this there can be no bread, without bread there can be no life at all. “Thorns and thistles shall the earth bring forth unto thee: in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread” (iii. 18 f.). Behind this word, as behind the words of our Lord in the parable, lies experience of the stony and stubborn Palestinian soil; but the truth of its criticism of life goes far beyond its original and local application. One might almost hear an undertone of pessimism in it: indeed, the writer has been called the father of Ecclesiastes. There are at least two utterances of J which recall to our minds the later protagonist of pessimism: this one about the stubborn soil which wearies the body and all but breaks the heart—a passage which reflects a mood very much like that of Ecclesiastes when he said, “That which is crooked”—and everything is crooked—“cannot be made straight” (i. 15). Life is hard, the world is crooked, and only the smug or untravelled soul can pronounce it very good. Professor Macdonald, in the recently published *Studia Semitica et Orientalia*¹ (p. 121), says: “There is distinct humour in the picture of the farmer labouring with the recalcitrant soil which produces everything but what he wants.” But, if this is to be described as humour, it is surely humour of the grimmest kind. To the man who wrote that passage, and who had perhaps himself struggled with the niggard soil till beads of sweat stood out upon his brow, life was a terrible and tremendous thing; and many who know nothing of the soil know enough of other struggles to feel the poignant truth of his criticism. The other point in which the writer recalls Ecclesiastes is in his view of woman. It was she who led astray—she who, weaker and more easily dazzled by a seductive appeal and an alluring promise, involved man’s life in misery untold. Who, with this story in mind, does not instantly think of the

¹ By Seven Members of Glasgow University Oriental Society (MacLehose, Jackson & Co., Glasgow).

famous and bitter words: "A thing that I find to be more bitter than death is woman: for she is a veritable net, with her heart of snares and her hands of fetters. The man who enjoys the favour of God escapes her, but the sinner is caught by her. One man among a thousand have I found; but a woman among all those have I not found" (Eccles. vii. 26, 28)? For all these resemblances the Jahwist and Ecclesiastes are by no means kindred spirits, except in so far as they both resolutely face facts. But the Jahwist differs from Ecclesiastes above all in this, that though to him the facts of life, like the soil, are stubborn, yet he keeps his temper—he is not bitter—and he keeps his faith. When the later pious accretions to Ecclesiastes, which blunt the edge of his incisive challenges of the world-order, are withdrawn (*cf.* iii. 17, viii. 12 *f.*), he stands forth as an uncompromising pessimist: whereas the pessimism of the Jahwist is mitigated by a broader and serener outlook upon the facts.

A further point, however, is worthy of notice. While the words in Genesis iii. 17–19 are a criticism of human life in general, they are more particularly, if not a farmer's criticism of life, at any rate a criticism of the farmer's life. It is he who wrestles very literally with the "accursed" ground, he who knows most about the struggle with the thorns and thistles which brings out the sweat upon his brow. The cultivable land is accursed, and the toil expended upon it is a judgment. Of course there is another strain of thought in the Old Testament to which God is Himself the great Farmer, who puts into the hearts of men the laws that govern the processes of agriculture (Isa. xxviii. 23–29). But the Jahwist represents the more primitive conception; and it only begins to be understood when we remember that Canaan, the cultivated land, with its advanced civilisation and its sensuous Baal-worship, was felt by certain groups of very strict Jahweh worshippers to be a sort of wicked antithesis to the austere simplicities and unadorned Jahweh-worship of the desert, where the Hebrews may be said, under Moses, to have begun their distinctive national life. It is permissible, then, to hear in this tale, which accounts the cultivable land as accursed, an undertone of protest against the whole way of life and civilisation associated with that land. Doubtless this interpretation is not inevitable, but it is possible; and at any rate the note of protest becomes more audible as we move through the succeeding chapters.

An echo of it comes from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The story is slightly complicated by the presence of two trees—both magic trees,—and the *raison*

d'être of both is to explain the origin of death. The one tree is the tree of life: that is, the tree whose fruit will confer immortal life on the being or beings who may contrive to partake of it; and death comes from the failure to eat of this tree, the road to which is for ever guarded by cherubs and a flaming sword. The other is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and death comes from disobedience to the voice of God, who had forbidden His creatures to eat of it. The first story is naïve and external, the second is more profound: for though it, too, makes use of very primitive forms of thought, such as that God is jealous of man (iii. 22), it fully understands that disobedience is the way of death. But what is the forbidden fruit that grows on this tree with the strange long name? The intense ethical temper of the Bible inclines us to suppose that by "the knowledge of good and evil" must be meant moral knowledge, that knowledge of the distinction between what is morally good and evil which becomes so luridly clear when we have fallen before temptation. But "good and evil" does not inevitably mean this. It is a Hebrew phrase used to cover all the ground in question, just as we might say in English, "He said nothing—good, bad, or indifferent," without using these words with any moral connotation at all. When Zephaniah (i. 12) describes the easy-going plutocrats of his time as saying in their heart, "Jehovah will not do good, neither will He do evil," he just means that they imagine Jehovah will do nothing at all. Practically good and evil in such connections mean simply everything, anything: and that this is the meaning in the Genesis passage becomes highly probable when we consider the words attributed in iii. 22 to Jahweh: "Behold, the man is become as one of us"—that is, as one of the supernatural Beings of whom Jahweh is chief,—"to know good and evil." This is most naturally interpreted of knowledge generally, and not specifically of moral knowledge. Omniscience is the prerogative of the godhead, and the man who aspires to it is guilty of a vaulting ambition which will place him for ever among the gods, unless his career is cut short by death. Is it over-subtle to detect in this aspect of the story a protest against knowledge as a dangerous and wicked thing, and a protest, by implication, against a civilisation to which an ever-accumulating knowledge is indispensable? Is there not here audible the voice of one who was content with life in its simple and rudimentary forms, and who was only too conscious of the perils of a refined and scientific civilisation?

This seems to be borne out by the story of Cain and Abel.

Abel, we are told, was a keeper of sheep, but Cain was a tiller of the ground. "Now Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering to Jahweh, and Abel also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And Jahweh had respect to Abel and to his offering, but to Cain and to his offering he had not respect" (iv. 2-4). Why did He respect the one and not the other? Here again the temptation is to put too much moral meaning into the story. In the discussion already referred to (p. 122), Professor Macdonald remarks: "Neither Cain nor Abel, in virtue of their occupation, was God-pleasing. Abel was a shepherd, but that was not why he was accepted, for it is the shepherd's life into which Cain is driven away and in which he will be hidden from the face of the LORD. Cain was a farmer, but that was not why he was rejected, for his punishment was to be sent away from the cultivated soil. The true position as to the pleasing of God is given in verse 6: it depends on the attitude of each man towards sin, which is always lying in wait and seeking to control him." Similarly the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (xi. 4) asserts that it was *by faith* that Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, though there is not the remotest hint of this in the original story. It hardly seems natural or reasonable to read into the simple statement that Jahweh respected Abel's sacrifice, but not Cain's, what we *later* learn (in verses 6 and 7) about Cain's attitude to sin: we have to explain Jahweh's preference for Abel's sacrifice and His rejection of Cain's at the point where these respective statements stand. And in reality nothing is simpler. "Abel was a keeper of the sheep, and Jahweh had respect unto Abel and to his offering," simply because—since the context states no other motive—he was a keeper of sheep. Again, "Cain was a tiller of the ground, and unto Cain and to his offering Jahweh had not respect," simply because—since the context states no other motive—he was a tiller of the ground. In other words, the passage is written from the point of view of the shepherd, and it expresses that antagonism between the pastoral and the agricultural, between Jahweh-worship and Baal-worship, or more broadly between simplicity and civilisation, which runs through so much of the earlier history and literature of the Old Testament. Yet it has to be carefully noted that, though the writer loves the shepherd and the sheep and regards the fruit of the ground as no fit offering for Jahweh—in this, perhaps, continuing the view of the previous chapter that the cultivable ground was accursed (iii. 17),—his ideal is not exactly the nomadic. The

fate to which Cain is doomed shows that nomadism is a curse. The nomadic and the pastoral are not entirely coextensive. Abel is not far from the cultivated land, for the brothers are near enough to quarrel : but neither is he in "the great and terrible wilderness," for to be doomed to roam there is a penalty and a judgment. Literary criticism assigns the passage to a writer in Judah : with such an origin agree the contents, which idealise the life of the shepherd on the edge of the wilderness. We may think of the writer as akin both in habitat and in soul to Amos. He, too, was a shepherd on the Judæan hills, not far from the desert ; and he, too, shows the same scorn of the cruel Cain-like civilisation associated with the settled land. In the nature of the case Amos's criticism is more explicit, and it is directed with peculiar vehemence against the cities, particularly against the luxurious "palaces," which the prophet fiercely threatens with the devouring flames (i. 4, 7, etc.). It is essentially a moral criticism, and not simply an attack upon civilisation as such. All the same, it is a shepherd's criticism : he "hates the palaces"—as he declares that his God does (vi. 8)—not only because their crimes have harried his soul, but because he knows that the safe and happy life, with which God is well pleased, is beside the tent and among the sheep. His message is the unfolding of the idea which lies in Genesis in embryo. Even a century and a half after Amos, and not long before the fall of Judah, this idea is still sturdily represented by the clan known as the Rechabites, who dwelt all their days in tents, not only drinking no wine, but building no houses, sowing no seed, and planting no vineyard (Jer. xxxv. 7-10) ; and in this they no doubt carry on the strictest and oldest tradition of the life befitting true worshippers of Jahweh.

The story of Cain is merged in that of his inventive descendants ; and in the figures of Jubal and Tubal-cain, the father of music and the forger of bronze and iron instruments, the definite features of civilisation, its amenities and its instruments, begin to emerge ; and, by a juxtaposition which can hardly be unintentional, this is immediately followed by Lamech's cruel song of vengeance (iv. 23 f.), which breathes "a savage exultation in the fresh power of vengeance which all the novel instruments have placed in their inventors' hands :—

'A man who but struck me, I slew,
And a youth who but bruised me.
If Cain shall be seven times avenged,
Then seventy-seven times shall be Lamech.'

How weird is this; how terrible! The first results of civilisation are to equip hatred and render revenge more deadly. And all the more weird is this little fragment, that out of those far-off days it seems to mock us with some grotesque reflection of our own time. Civilisation finding its apotheosis in enormous armaments; wealth and prosperity leading people to an arrogant clamour for war." These truly prophetic words of Sir George Adam Smith (*Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*, p. 97) were not written during the war, but twenty-two years ago, and they help us to feel how profound and subtle is the criticism of civilisation that underlies those simple-seeming documents of the olden time.

The climax of this criticism is reached in the story of the building of the city and the tower of Babel (Gen. xi.), which has been described as "an untouched piece of folk-lore." In its naïve account of the origin of the various languages spoken by men and of the distribution of peoples over the surface of the earth, and in its picture of Jahweh's jealousy of men and His fear of human ambitions, it is doubtless a thoroughly primitive tale: it is "untouched," if you like. But it is untouched because it did not require to be touched: it already expressed, just as it stood, the mature mind of the redactor on the wickedness, the arrogance, the perils of the city, and, in general, of the civilisation with which cities are bound up. It is an implicit criticism, and, as such, falls into line with most of the other tales in Genesis i.-xi.—the criticism of a mind of great intellectual and moral maturity, which believed that the interests of morality and religion were safest where life was simplest.

Throughout the Bible the tent and the city are in frequent contrast. Some of its writers stand for the one, some for the other. Isaiah believed in the city and in its ultimate redemption: he looked hopefully forward to the day when Jerusalem could be truthfully called the Righteous City, the Faithful Town (i. 26); and to that same city, purged of its uncleanness and worshipping a supremely holy God with a new heart and according to a minutely regulated ceremonial, Ezekiel gave the name Jahweh-shammah, "Jahweh is there"—*there*, in such a city (xlvi. 35). And John comforts his heart with a vision of the new Jerusalem, the holy city whose wall had twelve foundations, descending out of heaven from God (Rev. xxi. 2, 14). In a trenchant antithesis the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews thus extols the faith of Abraham as he wandered about in the land that was not yet his own: "Dwelling in tents, he looked for a city" (xi. 9 f.).

To such thinkers the tent was the symbol of fragility and impermanence, the city of strength and stability: "he looked for the city *which hath the foundations*." Abraham looked for the city: that is precisely what the writer of Genesis i.-xi. does not do. He feared the city, he attacked it in the story of Babel as the apotheosis of an arrogant godlessness. Solomon in all the glory of his palace and temple and far-flung trade and commerce meant no more to him than to Jesus. Glory of that kind was resented by the austerer Hebrew genius, to which the simplest meadow flower was incomparably more glorious. Solomon had inaugurated in Jerusalem a reign of materialism, oppression, profligacy, and idolatry, and such things may well have seemed inseparable from city life. The Jahwist shuddered to see the arrogant and baleful splendours of Babylon reproduced within the land of promise. He loved the quiet places among the tents and the sheep on the edge of the wilderness, and the God he worships is not the great Builder and Maker of the City with Foundations, but the Shepherd whose haunts are among the green pastures and the waters of rest.

JOHN E. M'FADYEN.

GLASGOW.

WAGES ACCORDING TO FAMILY NEEDS.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

WHILE employers, wage-earners, and consumers are disputing together about the causes of high prices—the employers shouting, “Produce more”; the wage-earners, “Give us the control of industry”; the consumers, “Stop profiteering,”—all of them steadily ignore a factor in the case which is untouched by any of their remedies, though it is compatible with all of them. All the combatants are agreed, at least verbally, that a decent standard of life must be secured to the workers, and it is habitually taken for granted rather than argued that in the case of male workers this means a standard that would enable a man to maintain a wife and family, the average family being usually (though incorrectly) estimated at three children. For example, in the recent official Court of Enquiry into the Wages and Conditions of Dock Labour, this principle was accepted without dispute by employers, port authorities, and workmen, and (says the Report) “no attempt was made to object to the typical standard of family just mentioned” (*i.e.* the five-member family). The only question in dispute was whether the sum necessary for the maintenance of such a family, and for obtaining for them “not only subsistence, but the comforts and decencies which are promotive of better habits,” should be fixed at £6, as claimed by the workmen, or at £3, 13s. 6d., as contended on behalf of the employers. The sum ultimately fixed was a compromise between the two views, and the award has naturally been followed by demands for increased wages in trades that consider themselves more skilled, and have certainly in the past had a higher standard of life than dockers. Similarly, Mr Rowntree, in his *Needs of Human Labour*, bases his calculations as to the minimum wage that should be paid to all adult male labour on the primary needs of a five-member family.

On the other hand, the researches of Mr Rowntree himself, of Dr A. L. Bowley, and other sociologists show that, in

the pre-war period at least, a proportion of working-class families, varying from one-fifth to one-seventeenth according to the town studied, not only failed to reach this flat-rate standard, but were in receipt of incomes which sunk them below the level of "primary poverty," *i.e.* poverty not due to misconduct or extravagance or to temporary causes such as unemployment, sickness, etc., but to the sheer inadequacy of the man's wage to meet the elementary needs of himself and those actually dependent on him.

Still more depressing, however, than these studies of actual conditions are Dr Bowley's calculations as to the limits of our national income and what can, at best, be done out of it to raise the standard of life among the wage-earners. In his pamphlet on *The Division of the Product of Industry* (Clarendon Press, 2s. 6d.), this eminent statistician, whose impartiality is, I think, recognised, calculates that in 1914 the aggregate income of residents of the United Kingdom derived from home sources was from 2999 to 2010 millions, and that of this 60 per cent. was in the hands of persons with a total annual income of below £160. He proceeds to consider a possible redistribution of the remaining 40 per cent., or 742 millions; and, after assuming that all salaries above £160 were cut down to that figure and deducting these reduced incomes, the earned incomes of farmers, and the income of endowed charities, he estimates that 550 millions represents "an outside estimate of surplus and unearned income that could conceivably be regarded as a target by extreme Socialists." But, as "out of this sum the great part of national savings are made, and a large part of national expenses are met," he concludes that only from 200 to 250 millions are left which could conceivably be transferred from the pockets of the well-to-do to those of wage-earners. He calculates that this sum would have little more than sufficed to bring up the wages of adult men and women to the minimum of 35s. 3d. for a man and 20s. for a woman, which Mr Rowntree, in his *Needs of Human Labour*, estimates as necessary.

These are pre-war figures, but no one, I think, will argue that the real wealth of the country has increased since then. Its nominal value has increased, and the allocation of the product of industry between wages, profits, etc., may have altered, but the real value of the amount available for distribution is certainly not greater than before.

It is true of course that there is nothing fixed or final about this amount, and each of the interests concerned has its own theory as to how it might be increased. Imagine,

however, that the nation has swallowed all three patent medicines pressed on it by the rival vendors: that it has quickened production, achieved by the best method (whatever that may be) of controlling industry, and suppressed profiteering, unearned incomes, and every other form of exploitation. Still, surely, it will remain true that the divisible pool will not be a limitless one and that, given an expanding population, its pressure upon the means of subsistence will be severe. There will be, to put it mildly, no margin for waste.

The present crisis of depression and unemployment is bringing home the hard facts of the case even to those who care nothing for statistics. The time is therefore peculiarly ripe for a closer examination of our wages system, with a view to seeing whether we are making the best use of that part of national wealth which is or conceivably might be allocated to wages.

How far does the theory that the minimum flat rate for men's wages should be based on the needs of a five-member family correspond with the facts? The Census figures of 1911 do not, as published, anywhere state exactly what proportion of men wage-earners are actually responsible for the maintenance of a five-member family, neither more nor less. But it is possible to arrive at a sufficiently accurate estimate from the studies by sample, in Dr Bowley's *Livelihood and Poverty*, of the actual conditions in the working-class areas of certain typical industrial towns, supplemented by a study by sample of the Census sheets (1911) for other industrial towns. The result shows:—

(1) That the supposed "normal" or "average" family of man, wife, and three dependent children under 14, is really one of the smallest groupings, representing only 8·8 per cent.

(2) That the proportion of men wage-earners over 20 with any dependent children at all is only 48·3 per cent.; while of the remaining 51·7 per cent., 27 per cent. are bachelors or childless widowers, and 24·7 per cent. married couples without dependent children.

(3) On the other hand, nearly 10 per cent. have more than three wholly dependent children.¹

¹ I am indebted for the working out of these figures to the London School of Economics. The towns surveyed were Reading (1912), Northampton, Warrington, Staveley (1913), Bolton (1914)—by Dr Bowley: sample of one-tenth. Also from the Census sheets, 1911, sample of one-fiftieth: Bethnal Green, Shoreditch, Stepney, Bristol, Leeds, Bradford, and Newcastle-on-Tyne. The number of samples taken was 9785, representing a population of 448,000.

It is plain from these figures that the five-member family wage standard, though based ostensibly on human needs, involves in fact an ignoring of the real extent of those needs in the vast majority of households. It means at the one end a considerable stinting of large families; at the other, the expenditure of vast sums in surplus payments to bachelors, childless couples, and couples whose children have passed the age of dependency. From the point of view of the large family, this result is plainly unsatisfactory. It is only figures that can be averaged, not human beings. The mother who, following the advice of pulpit and Press, has brought into the world a hungry brood of six will derive scant satisfaction from the knowledge that her bachelor brother is drawing a handsome surplus for his personal pleasures, and that if an average were struck between his wage and that of her husband, the resultant sum would be just sufficient for the needs of both households. The studies in Dr Bowley's *Livelihood and Poverty* show that in fact the greatest cause of "primary poverty" is the inadequacy of the wage to meet the needs of families with a large number of dependent children. In estimating the social importance of this fact, it must be remembered that privation endured by growing children and child-bearing women is likely to have specially injurious effects, and, further, that the number of families affected by this cause is much greater than the number suffering from it at any one period, since many have passed through it or will pass through it during the years of maximum dependence. A novel called *The Under World*, by James Welsh, the Lanarkshire miner, gives a vivid picture of the whole cycle of married life in the worker's home—the beginning in comparative prosperity, when the income gives just margin enough for modest comfort; the gradually tightening pressure as one child after another is born; then the expansion again as child after child takes its place in the ranks of wage-earners: too late, however, to undo the warping and embittering effects of privation borne just during the years when constitution and character are taking their shape.

From the point of view of the bachelor and the couple without dependents, the system no doubt works fairly well. It is sometimes said that youth is the natural time for enjoyment, and that if a young man has rather more to spend than is strictly necessary, Society need not grudge it him. But if Dr Bowley's figures are even approximately correct, it is plain that the bachelor's surplus is paid at the cost of seriously lowering the achievable standard of family well-

being and retarding the process of turning a C3 into an A1 population. Further, this result is a permanent one, since, however much the proportion of national wealth available for wages may be augmented in future, it will always remain true that the more of it goes into the pockets of childless people, the less will remain for children.

We are justified in asking whether Society derives any compensating advantage from the surplus paid it at such a price. Professor Alfred Marshall reckons that in unskilled and casual labour the average age at which a man attains his full wage-earning capacity is between 18 and 25; in skilled occupations between 25 and 30. If this is true, it follows that most men are earning or could be earning as much as they will ever earn for several years before they marry. This gives them the opportunity, if they choose to take it, for laying by a sum sufficient to furnish their future homes. But unfortunately for the weakness of human nature, the system of hire purchase has been invented to make such forethought unnecessary, and the widespread use made of this extravagant method of house plenishing is shown by the enormous number of claims made during the war upon the Civil Liabilities Department of the Treasury for grants on account of hire-purchase furniture. A young man's money in every class of society is apt to be "light come, light go," and the chief social effect of the bachelor's surplus is that just at the age when habits take their strongest hold it encourages the formation of habits of personal expenditure at a level which can only be maintained after marriage at the expense of wives and children. It would be edifying, if it were possible, to discover the amount of domestic infelicity due to this cause. In addition to the marriages which it has marred or wrecked, one would have to reckon the number of marriages postponed, of expenditure diverted from the maintenance of wives and children to that of prostitutes, and of industry diverted from the production of necessities to that of luxuries.

Another relevant question is the effect of the bachelor's surplus on his efficiency as a producer. During the autumn coal dispute it was noticeable that the arguments mainly responsible for the obduracy of both sides were, on the side of the miners, that it was impossible for miners adequately to maintain their wives and children on the existing wage; on the side of the mine-owners, that previous increases in the rate of wages had been followed by lessened production due to a slackening of effort and short time. There is nothing incompatible in the two arguments, and both were probably

justified by the facts. The miners guilty of short time were not, it may be safely assumed, the men with families to support, but the young single men and the elderly married men who had several sons contributing to the upkeep of the household.

Marvellous indeed is the power of custom to blind men's eyes to the most glaring anomalies ! If it were not for this force, it would scarcely have been necessary to expend so many pages in demonstrating that, regarded as a method of distributing national wealth, a wage system which first proceeds on the entirely false hypothesis that every man is the head of a household, and, secondly, ignores altogether the varying size of households, is neither economical nor just. Imagine for a moment that the same principle had been adopted by the Food Controller during the war, when the problem was one of distributing not wealth but food. Suppose that he had proceeded on the assumption that every man over 20 was responsible for the maintenance of a household of five persons and every woman over 20 for her own maintenance, and had distributed his food-cards accordingly. Would public opinion have tolerated for a moment so gross an absurdity ?

Most recent enquirers into questions of wages seem uneasily conscious that there is something unsatisfactory in the present system. For example, the Report of the Dockers' Court of Enquiry, while recommending a flat rate based on the five-member standard, alludes casually to the differing needs of married and single men and says, "If the bachelor case could have been separately treated, probably no one would have seen any objection in principle to doing so." But it goes on to argue that to pay married men more than bachelors would be plainly impracticable, because "the cheaper labour would tend to have the better chance of the job, and the ranks of the unemployed would be more and more filled by the very men whose needs were the greatest, namely those with dependents." Mr Rowntree makes an equally casual allusion to the desirability of differentiation, but dismisses it as impossible for the same reason. He does indeed suggest a way of meeting the needs of the large family by proposing a payment out of State funds on behalf of each child in excess of three. But he does not explain how, if Dr Bowley's figures as to the limitation of national income are correct, the money can be spared for this.

It is a mistake to be too easily beaten by what Napoleon called "that stupid word 'Impossible.' " The practical

problem before us is to find a means of adjusting the wages or incomes of individual households to individual needs, without giving employers any inducement to prefer single men and without of course prejudicing the freedom of the individual to receive remuneration for his labour proportionate to its value to his employer and the community. To the statesmen of New South Wales belongs the credit of devising a solution which departs as little as possible from the present system of making each industry responsible for its own costs of production, including its wages bill. Their solution is not the only one, nor, in the opinion of the writer, is it the one that should ultimately be adopted. But it is probably the only one that comes for the time being within the sphere of practical politics, and it shall therefore be first described.

The circumstances which led to the proposal were as follows:—Under recent legislation, the New South Wales Board of Trade is required to declare annually what should be the minimum wage for men and women workers on the basis of the current cost of living. The State Arbitration Court has then to fix the wages for each industry under its jurisdiction on the basis of this declaration. The rate first fixed for males was £3, calculated on the need of the five-member family. The following year it rose to £3, 17s., involving an additional cost of nearly twelve millions. It was reckoned that this would lead to a rise of 20 per cent. in the cost of living, presaging another rise in wages the following year. Finding themselves faced with an interminable “race between wages and prices,” and threatened in addition with a paralysis of industry and growth of unemployment, the Government set themselves to devise a method of economising, by grading wages according to the family responsibilities of the worker, without giving the employer an inducement to prefer single men. The result of their reflection is embodied in the Maintenance of Children Bill, 1919, which passed the Legislative Assembly, but was rejected by the Legislative Council, so is not yet law.¹ The Bill begins by declaring that henceforth the minimum wage for male employees shall be based on the needs of a man and wife. The wages of women employees are not alluded to, but presumably are regulated as before on the basis of individual subsistence. The Bill then proceeds to make provision for the needs of the children as follows: the Board of Trade is required to determine

¹ A new Bill has just been introduced by the Labour Government, but it differs from the old in proposing the payment of family allowances only on behalf of children in excess of two (June 1921).

annually the cost of a child's maintenance and to ascertain the number of children of employed persons (excluding domestic servants and agricultural workers), children of male and female employees being reckoned separately.

The sum necessary to maintain the children of male employees and the sum necessary to maintain the children of female employees having been thus ascertained, every employer is required to pay his share of both sums, calculated according to the number of his employees, male and also female, into one central State fund called the Maintenance of Children Fund. The employer has to make this payment on behalf of all his employees, whether married or single. Out of the pool thus formed, an allowance is paid on behalf of every dependent child of an employee, the payments being made monthly to the mother of the child, or, if she is dead, to the acting female guardian.

The Government report on the financial provisions of the Bill estimates that the average number of children per male employee of 20 years and upwards is one, and that the effect of the Bill would be to reduce the extra cost in wages entailed by the previously proposed flat-rate increase of 17s. per week per male employee, from nearly 12 millions to nearly $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions—a saving of 46 per cent. Thus, at one bold stroke, the Bill proposes to relieve the industry of New South Wales from a burden that threatens to crush it, to secure to every wage-earner an income at least adequate to the minimum needs of his family, whatever its size, and to ensure that the money necessary for the children shall be paid to the mother as the person immediately concerned with their welfare.

That the temporary failure of the Bill to pass into law has not discredited the principle on which it is based in the eyes of Australian statesmen may be judged by the fact that, according to a brief report appearing in the British Press on 24th November 1920, the Federal Government is contemplating the introduction of a similar proposal into the Federal Parliament. The following is the text of the telegram which appeared on that date :—

“MELBOURNE, TUESDAY.

“The recommendations of the Federal Basis Wages Commission, providing for a minimum wage, are based on the assumption that a man has a wife and three children. In the House of Representatives, Mr Hughes said the basic wage rested on the principle that a man's wage must enable him to live in comfort, and the findings

of the Commission required the Government's serious consideration. The President of the Chamber of Manufacturers is of opinion that if the report is adopted it will create an impossible industrial position.

"In a later speech Mr Hughes said he rejected absolutely and unreservedly the proposal to pay £5, 16s. 6d. a week to all persons, as to do so would be ruinous to the country. Such a wage could not be paid, because the wealth produced did not allow of it. The Federal Government, he said, was considering an alternative basic wage scheme under which employers would pay a basic wage of £4 a week and 10s. for each child. In this way they would raise £28,000,000 for the endowment of children, the Commonwealth then paying mothers 12s. a week for each child under 14. This scheme would reduce the burden on industry by £66,000,000 per annum."

Thus "endowment of motherhood," which has usually been criticised when proposed in this country as a Utopian project impossible to contemplate seriously because of its financial extravagance, is in Australia about to be introduced on the ground of its necessity as a measure of national economy!

The New South Wales scheme has certain obvious defects, due probably to the reluctance of its promoters to increase the divergence from established practice by pushing their principles to the logical conclusion. For example, they have succeeded in showing that the needs of the family can be provided for without giving the employer any inducement to prefer single men as a cheaper form of labour. But they have not dealt with the other half of the same problem: How the powers of women as producers can be utilised to their full extent, without giving the employer any inducement to prefer them to men as a cheaper form of labour. Their scheme bases the minimum wage for women on the subsistence of one individual and that of men on the subsistence of two individuals, and the contribution rate paid by the employer into the children's pool on behalf of his female employees is calculated on the cost of maintenance of those children who are the dependents of female employees. These being mainly widows' children, their number will be obviously small in comparison to that of the children of male employees, and the contribution rate will be relatively low. Thus the competition between men and women workers will be still unfair competition in the eyes of the

male trade unionist, with the result that he will continue his present practice of in every way limiting and retarding the employment of women. This is bad for women and bad for the community, which stands to gain ultimately by making use of the productive powers of all its citizens. Again, the plan of basing male wages on family subsistence level and female wages on individual subsistence level, or—as is in fact the case in this country owing to the large number of female pocket-money wage-earners—on a level considerably below individual subsistence, has a curious result which has passed, so far as I know, quite unnoticed by economists. It makes the cost of rearing future generations a burden on those particular industries which employ chiefly men's labour, while those industries employing principally women and young persons escape bearing their fair share. Thus the cost of production of textile goods, tobacco, confectionery, etc., is lightened at the expense of great staple industries such as transport, mining, and agriculture. This is surely undesirable. The remedy is simple, and its logic irrefutable. If it is true that the single man, like the married, has usually at the back of him a woman who sets him free to give his whole energies to the work of production by attending to his physical needs (cooking, washing, mending, and generally making a home for him), the same is or ought to be true of every woman producer. She, too, cannot give her best to her employer if she is trying to be a home-maker as well as a producer. Further, the total number of non-producers in the community, exclusive of children under 14, is approximately $12\frac{1}{2}$ millions (Census, 1911), and this falls little short of the total number of adult producers of both sexes. Hence there is no injustice and no waste to the community involved in requiring that every adult producer, irrespective of sex, shall bear on his or her back the burden of a non-producer and should be enabled to support it by receiving a wage equivalent to the needs of two. Thus the New South Wales scheme should be simplified by basing the wages of men and women on the same standard and by reckoning the dependent children of male and female employees together instead of separately, obliging the employer to pay his *per capita* contribution according to the number of his employees irrespective of sex or marriage.

But even this amended scheme would leave certain anomalies unredressed. There are some industries in which the cost of labour bulks large in proportion to the cost of materials, and other industries in which the proportion is the

other way. Why should an industry of the latter kind pay a lesser share of the cost of rearing future generations than an industry of the former kind? Yet that is inevitable under the New South Wales scheme or any adaptation of it which makes the support of children, however indirectly, an adjunct to the wages bill. Again, any such system inevitably leaves out of account the maintenance of children who are total orphans or dependents of widows who are not wage-earners, and whose domestic responsibilities make it impossible or undesirable for them to become wage-earners. Society must provide somehow for such children.

The best way of making a clean cut out of all these difficulties is to face boldly the fact that the maintenance of children is a matter that concerns the whole community, producers and non-producers, men and women, married and single. Then why should it not be borne by the whole community, in proportion to the ability of each to contribute? In a word, the logical outcome of the New South Wales scheme is a scheme for the national endowment of childhood. The idea is one that has often been advocated in this country, usually in the form of proposals for the national endowment of maternity and childhood. The most fully elaborated scheme of the kind is to be found in a little book entitled *Equal Pay and the Family*, produced in 1918, by a small Research Committee of men and women.¹ The most general, and superficially the most cogent, argument against such schemes has been the financial argument: "Could the country bear the strain?" In view of the facts and figures that have been set forward in these articles, the question surely should rather be: "Can the country afford to continue the present financially extravagant and socially ineffective method of providing for the rearing of children through the wages of individual fathers?" The case against this method may be briefly recapitulated as follows:—

1. Nearly 52 per cent. of men wage-earners have no dependent children.
- About 29 per cent. have less than three dependent children.
- About 10 per cent. have more than three dependent children.

Therefore, the payment to all men of a minimum wage

¹ To be obtained from the National Union of Equal Citizenship, 62 Oxford Street—price 1s. The joint authors are K. D. Courtney, H. N. Brailsford, Eleanor F. Rathbone, A. Maude Royden, Mary Stocks, Elinor Burns, Emile Burns.

based on the physical needs of the supposed "average family" of five persons would involve in effect the payment of a surplus beyond subsistence level to 81 per cent. of the workers.

It would mean further that 10 per cent. of working-class families would at any one time be in receipt of an income insufficient for bare maintenance, and that a far larger percentage of families than this would pass through a period of acute privation during the years of maximum dependency, *i.e.* at a time when such privation is specially injurious to the race.

2. But as a matter of fact, according to the researches of Mr Rowntree and Dr Bowley, the percentage of men workers who are paid less than the suggested minimum family wage is so large that they could only be brought up to such a wage by means of a drastic measure of expropriation of the upper and middle classes.

3. Even if public opinion were ripe, which at present it obviously is not, for expropriation on such a large scale, the level of comfort that would be obtained for the mass of the workers would be deplorably low, being merely that of "minimum physical subsistence."

4. An enlightened community should therefore cast about for some other means of raising the general level of family life and domestic comfort, whether as a substitute for or as an addition to the expropriation of the well-to-do. It will find such a means ready to its hand in a redistribution of that portion of national wealth which is allocated to the payment of wages, giving less of it to bachelors and childless persons and more of it to families with children. This can be carried out on the lines of the New South Wales scheme, without giving employers any inducement to prefer single men. Alternatively, the same effect can be produced by a scheme of universal national endowment of childhood.

Those who reject these conclusions should be prepared to say where they are faulty, and to suggest a better way of solving the dilemma which now confronts the nation: How can the just demand of the workers for a higher standard of life be satisfied without so raising the costs of production as to lead to a paralysis of industry? It is becoming increasingly obvious that failure to find an answer to this dilemma will sooner or later mean revolution.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LONDON.

OUR ILLOGICAL WORLD.

THEODORE D. BACON,

Salem, Mass.

THE whole process of science may fairly be compared to the unravelling of a snarl. The scientist keeps on pulling out as much as he can of one or more of the threads, undoing such tangles as his method permits without letting go of the end or ends which he holds. But the remaining snarl, and the knots, he simply pushes farther on. By this means we get a vast amount of useful thread; but the principal knots have not been untied. They may have been simplified and brought to light; but it is possible that at the same time they have been drawn somewhat tighter.

These knots are passed on to the philosopher and metaphysician. It is for him to untangle them; but he has never quite succeeded to the general satisfaction. His work is analogous to that of the scientist, but has a somewhat broader scope. Instead of taking hold of a single thread and endeavouring to unravel it, he takes hold of the whole tangled web and strives to straighten it out, to point out that what seem like mere tangles are in reality beautifully arranged designs, to give reasons which shall explain why the world is as it is. He does succeed, in fact, in clearing up a great part of the web; but, after all, the greatest and most important knots still remain, though he may succeed more or less in covering them up.

The curious and significant fact is that whereas in science there has been clear and definite progress, a vast amount of general agreement, with disputed points only on the outer fringes of our learning, no such clear line of advance can be pointed out in philosophy. Doubtless many important points have been cleared up, or forgotten, as no longer belonging to the domain of philosophy; but in general the philosophers are still divided into various schools, whose leaders represent such different types of thought

that it is often difficult to say wherein they agree or disagree. They seem not so much to contradict one another as to move on different planes of thought, so that they hardly come in contact. It is as if one of them grasped the web of life from one corner and proceeded to straighten it out after one fashion, leaving the various knots and tangles as far away as possible, while another did the same from a different corner. Each produces a pattern which explains many things, and so impresses us as true. But the patterns are so different that we find it hard to choose between them, while to try to combine them is to incur execration from all sides as an eclectic. It must be confessed that the eclectic result is never very clear or satisfactory.

The most fundamental antagonism appears to be between those, on the one hand, who take hold of the material, objective warp of life and try to straighten out the web of life by making the spiritual, subjective woof conform to the warp; and those, on the other hand, who reverse the process. Take Herbert Spencer and Thomas Hill Green for examples. Each produced a fine pattern, but neither could succeed in making the web lie quite flat, or come out quite straight.

And yet, this is due to no lack of capacity on the part of the philosophers as compared with the scientists. Science can produce no greater names than Plato or Kant. And when some eminent scientist like Haeckel undertakes to show the philosophers how to do it, instead of producing the simple and clear demonstration which he had supposed himself to have achieved, he is very likely to be laughed out of court, as one who is not competent to discuss the topics he has taken up. Evidently it isn't as easy as it looks.

As a *reductio ad absurdum* we have the Christian Scientists. Above all, they claim to be metaphysicians. They gain a certain point of view which enables them to see life after a more joyful and sometimes more healthful manner, for the time being at least, and with the utmost aplomb they proceed to deny the most obvious knots and tangles. Their logomachy makes one think of a metaphysician gone mad. Yet from an idealistic point of view it is not so easy to refute their fundamental propositions.

These metaphysical knots and tangles are familiar enough, but it is of importance for our discussion to mention some of them. There are, for instance, the problems of error, of good and evil, of fate and free-will, of relative and absolute, of subjective and objective, of mind and matter, of the world and the individual, and, finally, the problem of

change. These all more or less include one another, but the most evidently all-inclusive, and hence most fundamental, is the problem of change.

Science has two great branches, each of which has its own special attitude toward this question of change. Mathematics, and its psychological brother logic, constitute the deductive sciences, logic being merely the generalisation of the process of thought followed in mathematics, geometry giving the typical form. These sciences are all static. Their fundamental proposition is the equation, two and two equals four, and the like. This applies even to the higher mathematics. Their results may always be reduced to equational form, implying that we have to do with results that are always the same, without possible change.

The inductive sciences, on the other hand, are dynamic, or at least deal with dynamic relations. They aim to describe change, or at least phases of change. But it is well known that the general tendency of inductive science is to reduce the more complicated to the simpler, the psychological to the biological, the biological to the chemical, and the chemical to the physical. This has come about through no direct intention, but simply in obedience to the fundamental process of all science, and of all philosophy as well, which consists in perpetually asking Why?—and striving to find the answer. Newton's question concerning the apple and Watt's concerning the lid of the tea-kettle are typical of the whole process. The whole problem of science, as of philosophy, is to answer the question why the world is as it is.

There is, however, one further step to which science is also being urged, namely, to translate its physics into mathematics. We all know how nearly astronomical physics seems to approach this goal. If the process should ever become complete, we can imagine the whole world expressed as a single mathematical formula, which would take, as all such formulas do, the form of an equation. This idea has in fact been set forth by various eminent scientists as the logical outcome of all science.

But here we encounter a grave difficulty. We have passed in imagination from a dynamic to a static conception of the world. An equation betokens equilibrium. Our world has ceased to move.

It is worthy of note, however, that the application of pure mathematics to physical problems has always been attended by remarkable difficulties. The accuracy of astronomical observations and calculations is proverbial,

but there is very frequently to be observed a discrepancy between observation and calculation slightly greater than can be ascribed to the personal equation. The world seems to be very nearly right, but not quite.

The fact that we are thus brought up against a difficulty is not surprising. The progress of science has been beset by new difficulties arising out of new discoveries. It has been well said that every great discovery raises more questions than it settles. We have seen this to be the case with Einstein. Older examples are, for instance: "If Moses didn't write the Pentateuch, who did?" ; or, "If God didn't create the world in six days, who did, and when, and how?"

If we turn to the philosophers, and ask what they have to tell us concerning change, we have evidently a great task before us if we attempt to formulate all the various answers. But a summary sufficient for our purpose may not be impossible within very narrow limits. Of Heraclitus, the ancient philosopher who taught that all things flow, we must make separate mention. If his doctrine could have been developed, it might have been of great importance; but it is significant that it remained dormant down to our own day. We may perhaps see in the teaching of Bergson a revival of the Heraclitean doctrine. Under the Bergsonian form further consideration must be given to it later. But before doing so, we must consider the course of philosophic thought between these two who stand, one at the beginning and the other at the end of its development.

Of the materialists it is only necessary to point out that their various systems reduce themselves to a problem in physics, and so come to the same result as all physical solutions—an unchangeable equation.

But it is with the idealists that we are chiefly concerned, and it is noticeable that all great philosophers have been in some sort idealists. The others, however great in their day, are ere long forgotten. But no very intimate acquaintance with the works of the idealists is needed to show that the conflict between being and becoming is the rock upon which they all make shipwreck.

The idealist is akin to the mystic. He sees the world as in a vision, as a world of harmony and completeness, such as Plato's world of ideas. Like the mystic, he feels that oneness with the Infinite which is the very heart of mysticism. The world which he sees is the real, the true. Its perfection is the assurance of its truth. He strives to make his vision known to the world, but falls foul of brute fact. He strives to show that brute fact is not truth, is not truly

real or really true, but only a foreshadowing, a partial emerging as it were, of the truth. As he tries to explain himself he becomes involved in difficulties from which there is no escape but by some literal *tour de force*, some appeal to a *deus ex machina*, who, by some illogical act, shall bring the ideal into relation with the real. The greatness of the vision remains for those who have eyes to see; but the conflict of the truth as the idealist sees it with stubborn fact, as it undeniably presents itself, still leaves his work unconvincing. It is the difficulty of the mathematician and the physicist vastly increased. One may be charmed by the Platonic conception of matter gradually becoming real as it takes on the form of the idea, but one can hardly be convinced by it.

But, it will be said, this belongs only to ancient philosophy. Not so. The same difficulty may be found in Descartes, with his doctrine of continuous creation; in Spinoza, with his *natura naturans* and *naturata*; and in Leibniz, with his monads. But our most typical example is Hegel. The efforts of a mind of vast power to explain how pure being, which is equal to zero, can after all transform itself into something, moves us with admiration and pity, or with impatience and disgust, according to our mood. We may admire the profundity of the thought, and yet it surely cannot be said that he has made our ideas on the subject any clearer. We shall hardly be doing him an injustice if we say that his treatment of the subject reduces itself to a gigantic myth, and that his only real contribution has been to emphasise the insolubility of the question.

Coming to men of our own time, we find Josiah Royce, who asks of us, if we are not satisfied with the world as it is, that we make one to suit ourselves. It is all very well to construct for ourselves such an ideal world. We can, it may be, convince ourselves that such a world is true; but if we put the question "Will such a world go?" the answer becomes inevitably, if reluctantly, "No." An ideal world is inevitably an unchanging world.

For the pragmatist the case is different. He makes no assumption concerning the logical completeness of the world, and hence escapes this pitfall. He does not attempt to give us a complete view of the world. To revert to our image of the web, his effort is rather to say, "Here, see, I have cleared up this tangle by my method, do you go ahead, and see if you cannot clear up more in a similar way." This is not to say that pragmatism is true; but this one great difficulty is avoided.

This difficulty is no accident. It has been the business of philosophy to explain as best it can why the world is as it is. It has been of necessity rationalistic, since its business is to give reasons.

But the world can never be completely rationalised. If we could ever give a good reason why the world is as it is, we could never give any good reason why it should be different. If it were a completely logical world at any moment, it would be utterly illogical to change it. Or, to put it still another way, if it is right as it is, it would be wrong to change it.

No scientific or rationalistic system can ever explain change, the most certain of all facts, and the most fundamental of all riddles of the universe. There must always remain something inexplicable and mysterious at the heart of all science and all philosophy.

The thought has been repeated in slightly varying form in order to give it all possible emphasis. It is the main point of this essay. It apparently admits of no further direct proof, in the sense of argument, since it is itself an argument, which, as I take it, brings the whole matter down to self-contradiction.

But the position has evidently very wide implications, to a consideration of which the remainder of this article will be devoted. It is in its practical application that we must find its value and the confirmation of its truth.

In the first place, we are not forced by this position to the conclusion that this is an utterly irrational world. We can still say that two and two make four, provided four things can be found that are exactly alike. But, so far as I am aware, no such four have ever been discovered. This illustrates the whole idea. Our mathematics apply only approximately to the world in which we live. The approximation may be exact enough for all practical purposes; but, when we seek to apply our calculations to conditions far beyond our experience, the apparently insignificant difference may cease to be insignificant, may, in fact, become of supreme importance. And logic, which is a generalising of the mathematical procedure, partakes of the same limitations.

The title of this article is "Our Illogical World," and there is significance in both adjectives. There is a limitation to the capacity of our logic to interpret it. It is evident that there is a vast, in a sense an unlimited, field for reason to clear up. But always there will lie something beyond its reach. We can immensely widen our horizon; but it is

only the greater on that account. Sooner or later we come to the "flaming walls of the world."

Nor does our thesis involve by any means the idea that there is no fundamental intelligence, if we may so call it, at the back of the world. Language fails us, and thought as well, when we try to conceive of some life, some consciousness, so transcending our reason as to harmonise that which we cannot. But it is intolerable to us to believe that this world of ours is run at loose ends. There must be some all-encompassing reality in which we live, and move, and have our being. But between that conception and that of a Supreme Reason, like our own, only greater and more perfect, there is a vast difference. The one reduces to an unchangeable logical proposition or mathematical formula. The other gives us an ever-living God, too great indeed to be fathomed by our understanding; but whom we can know, even though we cannot comprehend.

It is here that the inadequacy, or incompleteness, of Bergson's conception of Creative Evolution shows itself. Granting the course of development as he has described it, what have we? There has never been a beginning, but at the earliest moment of which we can conceive, a moment theoretically calculable in years, there was neither mind nor matter—just life. This life in its blind groping evolved both mind and matter, creating them by its reaching out for it knew not what. There is no plan, life in its groping finds many blind alleys; but its most successful outreachings have been the most highly developed vegetable organisms, the wonders of animal instinct, and the human intellect, the last, though by no means complete, far surpassing the other lines of development. The human mind can make plans: life as a whole has no plan. Apparently then the human mind, for all its limitations, surpasses the whole life, of which it forms so incomplete a part.

Such a conclusion is not merely illogical, it is intolerable. That life, of which our own is but a narrowly limited part, cannot be the blind groping thing that Bergson depicts. It must in every respect be more than we. Granted that the course of development has been very much as Bergson describes it, there must be something more, which is not altogether blind and groping. But would not such a something more be in contradiction to the whole conception of Bergson? It may be so. Whichever way we turn, we come sooner or later to contradictions. It is just that which we have seen to be the conclusion of all our logic. What we have to do is to test to the best of our ability that which

offers, and to hold fast that which approves itself as true, notwithstanding the inevitable contradictions. This much we can say: that while to our logic the contradiction is unavoidable, we do not feel it as a practical contradiction in our experience. Perhaps the fourth dimension, of which the mathematicians tell us, may furnish an analogy. Have we not equal right to suggest some fourth spiritual dimension, wherein these contradictions shall find their solution?

When we come to consider, what right have we to assume that this world of ours must be completely comprehensible to our intelligence? Is not such an assumption, in fact, unconscious but arrogant dogmatism? We would have but a smile of pity or contempt if we could look into the mind of an ant or a bee, or the highest kind of animal intelligence other than human, and see there any such conception. What right have we to arrogate to ourselves this supreme understanding? Is not the recent dominance of this assumption the outcome of the marvellous advances secured within the past few generations by the scientific method, even as earlier instances were the result of other outbursts of intellectual achievement? And have we not here another instance, all unconscious though it be, where vaulting ambition o'erleaps itself?

Our minds, and our logic, as the pragmatists have pointed out, have been developed for practical purposes, apparently for the mere necessity of survival. That they must reach to the total comprehension of the world is an assumption that we have no right to make. As a matter of fact, we need not go far to find their limitations. We have only to draw a square with a diagonal across it. Knowing the length of the sides, not all the calculations in the world will enable us to determine exactly the length of the diagonal. The same is equally true, of course, of the diameter and circumference of a circle. If we cannot solve such simple little problems, right before our face and eyes, is it surprising that we should find our minds to fail us before these vaster problems?

Or take another instance. By strict mathematical calculation we can prove that one is equal to zero. I mention this separately because the various calculations used always involve the use of zero or infinity as a function. This has a very suggestive application, to which we shall return later.

Our confidence in our logic is based on the fact that it works. When it fails, for all its strictness, is it not an indication that it is not some particular of our logic, but the fundamental limitation of our minds that may account for it?

For us then, and our understanding, there must ever be in the world, as James puts it, "something wild, something gamey as a hawk's wing." I mention this expression because it immediately suggests the question whether our main thesis is not merely a restatement of pragmatism. Undoubtedly this phrase does go to the heart of the subject, and my indebtedness to James and to Bergson is great. But, so far as I am aware, James has nowhere undertaken to establish the principle involved. No direct argument is offered, and the suggestion is always put forward in a tentative way.

In a somewhat similar way Bergson, throughout his *Creative Evolution*, seems frequently to be on the edge of establishing this point, but always turns aside to some related question. I would not underrate my indebtedness to the pragmatists; but it is important to point out that the truth of the main proposition is not dependent on the correctness of pragmatist contentions. The endeavour has been to establish it by carrying out rationalistic premises to their logical conclusions.

This conception of the world may seem to the scientist an intolerable one, since it robs him of the certainty on which science is supposed to depend. But for actual human beings, including scientists, it is so far from being intolerable that it is the absolutely scientific conception on the contrary that is intolerable, while to this other our natures respond. It is this other, in fact, which we unconsciously assume to be true in by far the larger part of our everyday life. We demand, indeed, with ever greater insistence the widest extension of science; but if this could be pushed to completion, we should have a purely mechanical universe, with consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon, just a looker-on in the game. Such a world as that would be intolerable indeed, as well as in contradiction to the immediate data of consciousness.

Even if we abandon materialistic automatism, and seek refuge in the highest type of theistic rationalism, we are still subject to similar difficulties. Fundamentally, rationalism implies that the world is entirely explicable in terms of human reason. Such a world is inevitably deterministic: otherwise it would not be rational. Hence it becomes morally indifferent. We still have a machine as before, the only difference being that the mind counts as a cog in it, instead of being a merely helpless spectator. Fortunately such a machine could no more get started than the other.

The belief in a morally indifferent world, in which the lowest and vilest is just as serviceable, and as necessary, as

the noblest, is repugnant to human nature. It cannot persist. Without committing ourselves to pragmatism as a whole, it is surely doubtful whether a belief which men cannot endure, and which is certain therefore never to be generally held, can have very strong claims to be true. Only because of its fortunate imperfections does what passes for rationalism maintain itself.

We ask, and rightly, why we should follow reason, or science, when it leads to contradiction, and to the annihilation of gifts of consciousness which have quite as strong a hold on us as our reasons—namely, our affections, our sense of the beautiful and of right and wrong.

As a matter of fact, the consequences to science of our conception are not so disastrous as it might seem. So far as practical applications are concerned, there would be nothing to change. In all such work the results are approximations and probabilities only. The approximations are often so close to exactness that we stand amazed, and the probabilities are so overwhelming that it seems useless to claim anything less than absolute truth for them. But when we are told that even so well tried and tested a theory as that of gravitation is only approximately true, we are put on our guard. It is not the actual achievements of science that will suffer, but only the unguarded and unverified speculations which have been put forth by certain scientists, carried away by over-confidence, and the resulting dogmatism.

It is this dogmatism, mostly unconscious, which has given rise in scientific circles to discussion whether psychology was to be recognised as a science. Physical scientists have been inclined to refuse the title of science to such inquiries, on the ground that their results can at best only give probabilities. To this certain writers have attempted to reply by establishing absolute laws in history and economics. "Scientific socialism" and "economic determinism" are the outstanding examples. But this is the wrong road. The world is not a machine, though it uses machinery. If it had been a machine, it would never have started going. It is in the other direction that we must go, if we would vindicate the psychological sciences. There are uncertainties in them. The laws they establish are not absolute. But neither are the physical laws. They come nearer to it because they deal only with dead things, or with living beings as if they were dead; but they are not absolute. The only absolute laws, if any, are the laws of mathematics, and they are merely laws of the human mind. They cannot be applied to matter absolutely.

The higher we rise in the scale of being, the less accurate must be our approximations, but the more valuable may be our results, since they draw nearer to actual life. Every form of investigation has a right to the name of science to which the scientific method may fruitfully be applied. There is even a science of poetry, though science will not make a poet. The same principle holds good as to ethics and religion.

It is because of this merely relative validity of "natural law" that we refuse to be convinced that the world is running down like a watch. It is something more than a watch, or any other machine.

But scientific dogmatism has more important consequences. The purely scientific man, like the purely economic man, is a fiction; but we all know the one-sided effect of excessive devotion to the purely scientific aspects of life, the drying-up of the affections and the æsthetic sense, and the acquirement of a more or less cold-blooded superiority toward those who take such things seriously. As was said some years ago, such a man "would botanise on his mother's grave." The blighting effect of eighteenth-century rationalism is also familiar.

But there are still more fatal developments of the spirit of scientific dogmatism than these. It is not altogether fanciful to regard it as one of the important factors in German Kultur and in Bolshevism. The idea of Kultur is the development of the individual as a cog in a machine. The individual is of little importance except as a specially adapted cog. Germany claimed the most perfectly fashioned cogs, and the most perfectly organised machine. Others must go to the scrap-heap. This conception largely accounts for her onslaught, her ruthlessness, and her downfall.

The leaders of Bolshevism pin their faith to economic determinism. It is the gospel according to Karl Marx, more or less correctly interpreted. The ruthlessness of Lenin is largely determined thereby. He is the Robespierre of the Russian revolution.

Different as the two are, Bolshevism and Kultur both conceive of the individual as a mere cog, and treat him accordingly. It is after this fashion that he must be treated if he is nothing more. If this were a purely logical world, something of the sort must follow. But, if the world is nothing but a clatter of machinery, would God we were dead!

We want the widest possible extension of science; but we demand also a moral and æsthetic world, in which the struggle for righteousness and beauty shall be a real struggle, where our efforts count.

How much the idea of effort has to do with morality is familiar enough. We may not be quite so familiar with it in relation to art. The most obvious illustration is the discord in music. In itself unbeautiful, it is essential to any considerable achievement in beauty. Without it we have no sense of effort, no reaching out toward something higher; and we have to fall back on the mere thumping of a drum, or perpetual repetitions of the major chord.

A second familiar fact, whose significance is not quite so obvious, is the superiority of hand-made to machine-made works of art. Photographs and prints are of real value, artistically as well as for mechanical purposes, but they do not compare in æsthetic value with the work that shows the direct touch of the artist's hand. It is the human touch, and the slight imperfection that avoids the mechanical, that gives the added value. Where some great difficulty is mastered there is an added value for those able to appreciate the difference.

A third illustration is from the statement of an eminent sculptor that the success of his work was due to the fact that he never composed any of his figures with exact anatomical correctness. While one part of the figure was in repose, another was always just beginning some movement. It was this very slight distortion that gave life to his work. Similar avoidance of mechanical correctness gave life and beauty to the Greek temples.

Freedom, effort, conflict, and the joy that flows from them—human nature demands these as insistently as the extension of science.

Another deep human need is of the mysterious; and the conflict between the rational and the preter-rational, whether instinctive, æsthetic, or religious, is of the very essence of mystery.

And from this same conflict comes the satisfaction of a contrasting, but very real, human need—humour. A machine-made world has room for neither. In that case it not only fails to meet human needs—it fails also to give an account of the world as it is.

So much, then, for the correspondence between a world with something wild in it and the needs of human life.

But it is rather with the theological and religious than with the strictly philosophical implications of my theme that I am chiefly concerned. How does it affect our attitude toward the religious life? Profoundly and helpfully. Only a brief outline of the results can be presented.

In the first place, it confirms our faith in our own freedom

by making rationalistic determinism impossible. And with this comes the possibility of a new and real idealism—an idealism, that is, which regards the ideal as a factor in the transformation of the real. In a deterministic world idealism is but a mockery. We may gain by it a closer insight into the outcome of the world, but we cannot change it by a hair's breadth. With liberty, on the other hand, there comes possibility. Our effort may and does count. And the influence of moral effort may be vast in comparison to its apparent force. How puny, as compared to the forces round about them, appeared the influence exerted by Jesus or by Paul, or by most of the great moral and religious leaders of the world! Yet it can hardly be denied that these influences have changed the course of the world's history.

On the other hand, we must give up the idea that progress and improvement are automatic, and independent of moral effort. This has been one of the deadly comforting effects of rationalism, or intellectualism, as it is now more commonly called, on the religious life especially of the more liberal and cultivated classes. If all is coming right in the end, what's the use of effort? If the progress of mankind onward and upward for ever is absolutely determined, why worry?

We have no such assurance. It is a possibility. It can be made a reality; but not without our effort and co-operation. The peace that passeth understanding must not be allowed to become quietism.

In the second place, the absolute unity of the Godhead becomes a logically impossible conception. Absolute Unitarianism is but a form of monism—theistic, but rationalistic, determinism. We must have a God who lies back of all things; such a God is a "primitive datum of consciousness." As previously set forth, a world at loose ends is intolerable to us. But such a God is not enough, as the history of the world abundantly indicates. Just as soon as men have come to conceive of a God great enough to be the God of the whole world, they have felt the need of some divine being to mediate between them and the supreme God. We see it clearly among the Jews, who, with their exalted conception of Jehovah, found refuge, first in angels and then in the personification of the divine Wisdom, which, translated into the Logos doctrine, finally issued in the Christian conception of the Christ-God.

This same need is present with us now. A God who makes peace and creates evil, who calmly watches such a catastrophe as the recent war and its consequences, as if it were nothing but a battle of kites and crows, is neither in-

tellectually nor morally satisfying. We need something to account for the moral and spiritual life as we see it displayed above all in the man of Nazareth. If that is not divine, nothing is. And yet that divineness consists not in omnipotence and quietude, but in moral effort and conflict. There we see a divine spirit working in men to overcome the evil in the world and establish righteousness and peace. Such a living God we not only need profoundly, we actually see him working in the hearts of living men. He is a real and present, working God. But the incapacities of our minds make it impossible for us to harmonise completely this divine and human God with that other conception of the life that is in all, and over all, and through all. It is a mystery, the profoundest mystery of the world.

It is this sense of our incapacity to comprehend and harmonise the various aspects of the divine life which underlies the doctrine of the Trinity, as I have previously tried to point out.¹ In its form it is antiquated past all recovery; but in its assertion of the mystery of the Godhead, and of a Christ-like God working in the hearts of men, it presents a conception which may be but dimly apprehended by its adherents, but which nevertheless holds them with a tenacity which Unitarianism, so apparently clear and rational, has never to any considerable extent been able to overcome.

This recognition of the fundamental mystery of the world, surpassing our comprehension, gives high dignity to faith, reverence, and humility—qualities whose value has been in danger of being lost sight of in the dazzling triumph of scientific achievement.

The Higher Criticism has done a noble work in true scientific fashion; but in its accomplishment it has necessarily overthrown much that was held sacred. Ultimately it must prove an aid to faith; but for the present, by doing away with the conception held by many generations of how God worked in the world, it has unavoidably given an impetus to the idea, or feeling, that the only divine activity, if any, in the world is like that of some great machine. At the same time the achievements of physical and biological science have seemed to be on the point of success in reducing the whole world in its development to the simple working of just such a machine. The mystery and poetry of life seemed about to disappear as illusions of imperfect understanding. Small wonder, then, that these essential qualities of high manhood should suffer.

¹ "Practical Aspects of the Doctrine of the Trinity," *American Journal of Theology*, October 1912.

Toward certain great questions we are led to an attitude of reverent agnosticism. We do not attempt to determine what God can or cannot do. That algebraic problem whereby we were brought to absurdity by using infinity as a factor presents a helpful analogy. Theology has pursued similar calculations. Calvinism is one outstanding example.

But this does not by any means leave us without a religion to live by.

There is hardly, however, a single theological conception that is not more or less affected by this conception of the world. As to the outcome of the whole world process, we can see progress in the past, and we have an assurance that is something less than absolute certainty for the future. Victory for righteousness, liberty, and truth is not automatic. It depends on the co-operation of the human and the divine. Otherwise where were the liberty or the righteousness? In this illogical world, in which we live, we labour neither alone, nor in vain. Is not this the kind of world we need?

THEODORE D. BACON.

THEOLOGICAL ADVENTURE.

PROFESSOR JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM,

Berkeley, California.

I BELONG to that supposedly extinct species of ornithosaurians, the theologians—a belated and much modified survivor. Once we dominated the earth, and as we flew through the sky on mighty pinion all living creatures trembled. But that was long ago. Many eras have passed, and as the literary palæontologists dig through the overlying strata and come upon the remains of our supposed ancestors, they are struck, not always with awe, but sometimes with revulsion and sometimes, I fear, with something akin to merriment.

Having been born into an age which regards our race as antediluvian wastage, it concerns us to discover, if possible, whether all early theologians were ornithosaurians, or if, perchance, only a branch of our family took this abortive direction. May not the main line have been in the upward path of the ascent of humanity, and even have contributed to its progress? To ascertain this it is necessary to look back into our lineage, so far as it can be traced, to see what manner of being the theologian originally was, and why this tradition has become attached to him. One recalls that Plato has been called “the father of theology,” and in the Dialogues he finds much that the realist might sniff at as antique transcendentalism, but he finds also a great deal that is singularly living and human; so much so, that this hoary thinker still has a hold upon the modern mind such as the latest popular author can hardly presume to rival. Jeremiah was another of our earlier progenitors, standing forth from among his countrymen to proclaim that God is the God not of his own people only but of all peoples. Contemplating him, one cannot but conclude that he did as much to serve the progress of humanity as any man of his time. Then there was Paul, arch-speculator and mystic, a fiery brand of communicative ardour, a veritable

human dynamo, yet tender as a child, the hymnist of love. If to be human means to be the antithesis of Paul—let me be an ornithosaurian with him! Augustine is another ancestor, belonging to both divisions of the tribe before the great schism—a man steeped in the slime of Roman iniquity, yet rising victorious out of it; surely a great human, and one who honours his kin. And yet there is plainly to be detected in him—appearing in his later career—a strain which is anti-human, a dogmatism and ecclesiasticism which one would like to think defunct. One finds the same repellent qualities in that otherwise vivid embodiment of the best human instincts, Martin Luther, after he assumed the role of ecclesiastical manager; and they are still more pronounced in the terrifying reformer John Calvin. Yes, here surely we are in an alien theologic age, amid strange distortions and fearful portents and an atmosphere of elemental gloom. And after Calvin we are obliged to recognise a large company of theologians, not only in the Church of Rome but in Protestantism as well, who have given to our race an aspect of deformity and inhumanity. Yet to select these as the typical theologians is surely as great a blunder as it would be to make the astrologers and alchemists the typical scientists.

On the whole, then, one reaches the comforting conclusion that, although there is in our ancestry a fossiliferous strain, whose antediluvian characteristics have given occasion to the assumption that our family belongs to the non-human abnormalities, nevertheless our true ancestry is in the direct line of human progress. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the tendency among us to revert to the abnormal, to become dehumanised and fossiliferous. Even we of the present day may well live in some degree of apprehension lest we yield to this fatal tendency. For this reason ("I speak as a fool") we need to do our utmost to keep human. We should have a care not to cut our connection with Nature or with human nature. We should resolve not to permit ourselves to become physical mummies any sooner than necessary. To this end we ought not to neglect any living bond of contact between flesh and spirit. *Exercise*, for example. What kind of exercise befits a theologian? That might well be a topic for a questionnaire. The gymnasium is too mechanical, tennis too strenuous, and golf too slow, even for a theologian. An admirable thesis for the doctorate of divinity might be presented upon the proposition that the foreordained form of exercise for the theologian is *walking*. Of this human and holy form of recreation he may well be an ardent devotee.

It seems made for the delectation of our order. The true theologian loves to walk, whether in good company or alone. He knows the joys of the open road and of the sequestered pathway. To Milton's *Il Penseroso* prayer it is his to add : And may my due feet never fail to walk the hallowed woodland trail ! If fellowship with Nature keeps one normal, he need but to resort to her and have no fear of fossilisation. The love of beauty grows upon him—if he is a Platonist—with years that bring the philosophic mind. Nor is Art by any means alien from theology. If music can deter one from theological treason, stratagem, and spoils, we may rejoice, passively at least, in that gracious preventative. As for the sense of humour—an admirable thing in theologian—we may well covet and cherish it, though not necessarily by lingering over the comic supplement, or the pages of *Punch* or *Life*. For there is abundance of amusement in life—even that of a theologian—if his eyes are occasionally opened. Nor need theology necessarily rob one of the love of human fellowship—in home, and church, and that modern substitute for the monastery, the club.

All of these humanising instincts we of palæozoic repute doubtless need to cultivate with all diligence. For unquestionably theology is an absorbing if not a fossilising pursuit. It leads to preoccupation and absent-mindedness. It does not entirely gibe with everyday efficiency. It is said of a distinguished English theologian that with every new academic degree he received he lost one of his senses—a costly exchange. Socrates is reputed to have paused in his steps, absorbed in thought, for twenty-four hours. Few of us have attained a fraction of that record ; but who can afford to run the risk of letting an idea slip through his mind and escape into the wastes of oblivion while he concentrates his mind upon the details of getting to some particular point in space ? The disparity is too great. There are times—long times—when the devotee of theology must be alone. He loves his friends, but he sometimes loves them best *in absentia*. A well-known biblical scholar tells of a visit he once paid to another scholar who was just completing an important work of exegesis. The latter during the conversation told him that he often entered with peculiar vividness of feeling into the lines :

“ Peace, perfect peace, with loved ones far away ! ”

The theologian must have his share—a large one—of solitude. And he must have his books—shelvesful of them. “ Bookish,” they call us, and we cannot well deny it. If to be “ bookish ” is an inhuman thing, how depraved most of us

theologians are! For my part, I confess to a rapacious, insatiable—must I call it idolatrous?—love of books. I love the very *sight*, the very *feel*, the very *idea* of a book, books of all sizes and shapes and subjects, from ponderous theological folios to pocket editions of the poets—everything, pretty much, except best sellers. Yet, who says that this is not a *human* instinct? For what are books—real books—but the best thoughts of the best men? Authors live again in their books, they are their resurrection bodies. And to live with them is to become more sympathetic and human. One need not be a devotee of Walt Whitman to recognise that he wrote many lines that lie close to the heart of life—among them these:

“Camerado, this is no book :
Who touches this touches a man.”

It is not *books* that dehumanise us, but *dead* books—books that never lived.

And yet, with these pitfalls fully acknowledged and these confessions frankly made, it behoves the theologian to maintain, as against the common notion, that in spite of its fossiliferous representatives and its benumbing by-products—which after all are common to all absorbing pursuits—theology is nevertheless a most essential, a most fascinating, a most human study, no defunct and dreary discipline but of vital interest and concern. Instead of being a dryas dust obsolescence, it is an ever fresh field for *spiritual adventure*. It is a quest of reality, the pursuit of a “flying goal.” It is time for an autobiography entitled “The Adventures of a Theologian.” It is a false idea of adventure which locates it in the outer world alone. The real adventures are not on earth or sea or air, but in the mind and heart. The enterprise of truth-discovery, of finding one’s way through the enfolding mist and darkness to firm land—could anything be more absorbing, more adventurous, more worth while, more full of risk? There is as much risk, sitting in one’s study surrounded by the books that pretend to chart the boundless ocean of ultimate truth, and fail, while his mind launches out into the deep, as there is on board a submarine-chaser or an Arctic-explorer. Do not the “magic casements” of his study “open on the foam of perilous seas”? Many a soul voyaging through strange seas of thought alone has been lost on these wastes of water; and more than one launching out, fearless and hopeful, has found treasure and lands that far outshine “the wealth of Ormus and of Ind.” One thinks of Jesus in the wilderness; of Augustine, tempest, becalmed, but finally harboured; of Frederick Robertson reduced to the

bare mast, "It must be right to do right"; and of many another, all tempest-tossed but at length reaching the haven.

"Remote from life" is the judgment passed on theology by those who think life means the kind of existence exploited in the cheap moving-picture show. Theology is remote from that type of living, but not remote from the life that touches central realities, or the life that launches out into the deep, the life of spiritual adventure and advance. Have not we humans lived on this singularly stern and disillusioning planet long enough to learn that reality does not consist of butterfly beatifications and parlour gossip; nor of matter and muscle, blood and iron, submarines and *Wille zum Macht*; nor of what Hawthorne called "stocks and bonds and other solid unrealities"? "Twenty minutes of reality" such as was described by a modern mystic in *The Atlantic Monthly*,¹ in which one penetrates to the heart of beauty and feels the throb of elemental joy, is worth cycles of the Cathay of ordinary outward fortune and success.

"But theology is so ancient, so entrenched, so thoroughly anchored and overhauled: what chance is there for adventure here?" The query is a natural, yet an unreasonable one. Other sciences are old, but none so old that there is not room for advance. Theology is no exception. One might almost say that theology offers the widest field of discovery and progress. Not that its hoary, tested, fundamental truths are to be left behind—but rather to be *rediscovered* again and again. It is like Chesterton's rediscovery of England. There is pure and inexhaustible significance and joy in the rediscovery of the cardinal truths of the inner life, as each of us makes it for himself. Such truths are new every morning and fresh every evening. They are like the springs that flow by the wayside, as fresh and sweet to the newcomer as to the last. The fact that others have found these truths before us, and that we find them by their aid, adds to, rather than detracts from, the wealth of their freshness and wonder. Each separate mind finds something by itself, and of its very own, in finding the brave and beautiful old truths that have kept humanity from reverting to the life of the saurians. The Gospel becomes "*my* Gospel," the law *my* law, the truth *my* truth, to every adventurous spirit.

Nor is this all. Theology offers an unbounded field for the discovery of genuinely *new* truth, truth beyond that which is now known, which does not invalidate present truth but passes beyond it. In other words, theology is an inherently

¹ March 1917.

progressive science. Let not the guardians of orthodoxy hold up holy hands of horror at this contention. "Once delivered to the saints"—yes, but not *once for all*, nor every last item. The heavens were once given to the astronomer. No other starry system can be expected than was once delivered to the Chaldean star-gazers and their fellows in other lands. Yet astronomy has been finding out more about the heavens ever since, and the end is not yet. It is so with the truth of the spiritual world. Theology should become more intensive and more extensive continually—profounder in its insights, wider in its visions, progressive always.

There is a credal and a supercredal theology, an intuitive and a speculative theology, and each furnishes its own kind of treasure to the seeking soul. Speculation, to be sure, should learn to keep true to the facts, just as in the other sciences. It should not run wild, as it has too often done in the past. It should be centred but not tethered, free but not lost, full-sailed but not rudderless.

"Here are our thoughts, voyagers' thoughts,
Here not the land, firm land, alone appears,
The sky o'erarches here, we feel the undulating deck beneath our feet,
We feel the long pulsation, ebb and flow of endless motion,
The tones of unseen mystery, the vague and vast suggestion of the
briny world

The boundless vista and the horizon far and dim are all here,"¹

"There shall be *news*"—to apply William James' exultant cry to a science in which he little dreamt of advance—"news" in this wide province of human interest, old and new, news which shall make the humdrum sensations of the newspapers seem weary, flat, stale, and unprofitable. For here, in the highest realm of human thought and experience, is an unbounded field of ever-fresh intellectual and spiritual progress.

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM.

BERKELEY, CAL.

¹ Whitman: "In Cabin'd Ships at Sea."

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE :

A NARRATIVE AND A MORAL.

HEADMASTER.

At the end of the autumn term I sprang a Religious Knowledge examination paper on the whole school. Old boys and young boys all took the same questions. They had no time for preparation, and they had to answer as much as they could in one hour. The following are the questions :—

1. What is meant by—

- (a) I believe in God the Father :
- (b) I believe in Jesus Christ :
- (c) I believe in the life everlasting ?

2. Write a few lines to show what you understand by each of these : Prayer, Worship, Sacraments, Sin, Salvation, the Inward Light, Christ's purpose in telling the story of the Prodigal Son, the work of Christ in bringing men to God.

3. What do you understand by the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ ? (For instance, a poet addressing Jesus says, "Thou seemest human and divine.")

4. What is the Bible ? What are the things of permanent value in the Bible ? Name six historical books in the Old Testament ; name six books of the Prophets in the Old Testament ; name the writers of the four Gospels ; name six groups of people to whom Paul wrote Epistles.

5. Give a definition of Religion. Sketch the life of a religious man as you suggest it might be lived during the next week (living, say, in the town where you live).

Obviously the paper is difficult even for older boys : it was certain that there would be large numbers of errors, but

it seemed advisable to give boys the opportunity of showing some knowledge (and ignorance) of the contents of the Bible, and the opportunity of expressing in their own words the meaning conveyed to them by such words and phrases as religion, sin, prayer, I believe in God the Father. The result shows extraordinary ignorance, manifold crudities, and much that is full of thoughtfulness.

Let me quote some marks of ignorance :—

Historical books of the Old Testament include Solomon, Bartholomew, Timothy, Jesse, Samson, Juda, Psalms.

The books of the Prophets include Job, Jobe, Joebe, Psalms, Nathaniel, Ishmael, Elijah, Elisha, Ahab, Judas, Amalaki.

The writers of the four Gospels were generally given correctly : one said the writer of the four was St Paul : another, St Luke : James wrote one Gospel.

The number of groups to whom Paul wrote Epistles is legion. Apart from those included in the canon of Scripture these are given : Pharisees, Jews, Gentiles, Mohammedans, Greeks, heathens, Sadducees, Nazarenes, Herodians, Galileans, Amalakites, Damascans, Macedonians, Gallipeans, Cilesians.

Fifth Form boys add Assyrians, Israelites, Goloshians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Philistines ; and a member of the Sixth adds Theodocians.

Crudities.

A religious man ought to always have clean thoughts in his mind and never blaspheme. He should not be a miser, but spend his money on charities.

Jesus was human in form, but very holy inside.

Jesus came to the earth as a man and lived and behaved as a man, but he went back to Heaven more of an angel.

Jesus Christ did his daily work, but when he was tempted to leave off a bit earlier or put putty in joints he had a good strong mind, and could overcome the baser thoughts.

The Inward Light means the light that keeps you merry and alive. If you had no Inward Light you would be sulky and dull.

The Bible is a collection of short stories. They were nearly always written by popular and well-known men.

A member of the Sixth Form who is reading Science

says : The Bible is a collection of books compiled by order of Henry VIII. in 1611, after the Hampton Court Conference.

Mr Cook was a very religious man. On Sunday he went to Church morning and evening. In the week-days he did natural history, botany. He took his son round the woods and went long tramps, stopping at any bush or tree he did not recognise at a glance. . . . Three times every month he went into town to see how his business was getting on.

Some Answers containing a Certain Amount of Promise.

Fourth Form.

What is meant by " I believe in God the Father " is that you believe in God the Father of all mankind and feel that you can speak to him as you would to your real father, and know that you will be heard.

The Inward Light in a man is the Spirit of God which, when once shining brightly, cannot be concealed. It is the best thing a man can have.

Sin is doing wrong. Salvation is being saved from sin.

Christ's purpose in telling the story of the Prodigal Son was to show people that it was not wise to dash into life without any aim.

Prayer is a silent talk with God.

Fifth Form.

I believe in an unseen being, whom we call God, dwelling in each of us as a Father of all, making all men brothers.

I do not believe in God as a Father, but as Love and Humanity. He is not a King, but a Thought, which helps me to live as straight a life as I am able. I do not believe in life everlasting. The only part of you which lives for ever is the thought of you in other people's minds. If you live a good life then you will live for ever in other people's memories.

I believe in God the Father ; that is, that there is a God who is the Father of each individual human being on this earth ; a Father who really cares just as much for one individual as for another ; a Father who is interested in everyone and everything they do ; a

Father who is hurt when we do wrong; and a Father in whom we ought to trust. I believe in life everlasting. I believe that when we die we do not cease to live, but we live a more perfect life. Life never ends, for when we finish this one we start a more glorious one. Death is not the sunset but the sunrise of our lives.

Prayer is the communion of man with God the Father. Sin is the letting of the lower self gain power over the higher in thought and action. The Inward Light has no ending; it brightens and deepens as the knowledge of God in a man grows and his ideals become higher and higher.

In all physical affairs Christ was quite human. The Divinity comes in when his character is considered.

The things of permanent value in the Bible are numerous. (1) A masterpiece in English literature. (2) God's dealings with men. (3) The life and teaching of Christ. (4) Instruction to Christians.

Sixth Form.

Christ's purpose in telling the parable of the Prodigal Son was to give his hearers an idea of what a human father can forgive when his son truly repents, and to leave it to their imaginations to think how much more a Divine Power could forgive transgression.

The last question was often badly answered. There were far too many answers without thought, giving a conventional notion of religion, *e.g.*:—

A religious man spends most of his time thinking about God and Christ. A religious man living in S. would get up early in the morning and go to Church and pray to God for nearly an hour: he would take the Communion Service, and after that read religious books.

On the other hand, there were answers like these:—

Upper Fifth.

A man who takes his part in the education work of his town and tries to make it possible for all the children in the worst part of the town to have a better education and physical training, is doing the work of Christ and is therefore doing religious work.

Sixth Form.

By worship I do not understand just going to Church or religious services, and praising God by word of mouth, and listening to long, serious, and generally uninteresting sermons on reconstruction, etc. That is not my idea of worship—something easily accomplished—something ritualistic—something performed every Sunday. My idea of worship is entirely different—something really hard and difficult to perform, namely, trying to do the thing God would have me to do in ordinary everyday life.

Evidently these boys held Dr Caird's view of religion, though they would have expressed it in less felicitous language: "A man's real religion, whatever his verbal creed, is his attitude of mind and will to that which he thinks highest and most real in life."

I finished examining the papers with the feeling expressed by one boy at the foot of his answers: "*N.B.*—It is absolutely impossible to answer this paper in one hour: it needs a lifetime."

The examination was on religious knowledge, and I make no suggestion that religious knowledge can take the place of religious experience. The Faith which is essential to Christianity, it has been said, is a much deeper thing than an intellectual acceptance of certain ideas or doctrines. "It is not only a belief in truth (cognitive) but a surrender to truth (volitional)." A christianity of experience is greater than a christianity of notions. But the knowledge is needed if there is to be a sturdy christianity built on a solid foundation. The boy is shy about his religion, but Public School boys have shown recently that many are groping after religious experience and religious knowledge. Many want to "get at" God and serve Him, a God of reason and will and love, a God who shares life with them and belongs to all mankind. Before the war many Public School boys were profoundly dissatisfied with the conditions of life prevailing in England, and were determined to undertake some national service for love of country: they saw the curse of softness and apathy, of mercenary sloth and national indifference, and the blessing of "love for something or other, be it love for family, humanity, or God." The author of *The Upton Letters* was not dreaming in a realm cut off from reality when he wrote: "Most boys have in various degrees a religious sense. That is to say, that they have moments when they are conscious of the Fatherhood of God, of redemption from sin, of the

indwelling of a Holy Spirit. They have moments when they see all that they might be and are not—moments when they would rather be pure than impure, unselfish rather than self-absorbed, kind rather than unkind, brave rather than cowardly; moments when they perceive, however dimly, that happiness lies in activity and kindness, and when they would give much never to have stained their conscience with evil.”

It is our privilege as it is our duty to co-operate with parents in ministering to those moments, helping to give an intellectual basis.

First of all, we can teach the Bible constructively and reasonably, and in invoking its authority we are bound to show the vigorous use of reason and conscience.

Secondly, parents and masters can stimulate older boys to think about the meaning of personality; the personality of A and B; personality in general; characteristics of personality such as reason, will, and love; a definition of personality as “self-realisation plus a keen perception of other individualities.” Then will come thoughts about the personality of Jesus Christ and of God.

Thirdly, we can accustom boys in considering the idea of God to think of an immanent God rather than a transcendental God, that is, to think of an indwelling God. It is not difficult for them to think of a thought or idea dwelling in every man: it is not difficult for them to get the habit of thinking of an indwelling God. “Know ye not that ye are a temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?”

Fourthly, we can strive for the ideal set out by the Master of Wellington College: “But all these scripture lessons, chapel services, and confirmation preparation will be powerless to produce a Christian education, if they be not held together by every lesson and by the whole life of the School. Industry and obedience, truthfulness and fidelity to duty, unselfishness and thoroughness, must form the soil without which no religious plant can grow; and these are taught and learnt in the struggle with Latin prose, or mathematics, or French grammar, or scientific formulæ; as well as in the cricket field, on the football ground, in the give and take, the pains and the pleasures of daily life.”

HEADMASTER.

SURVEY OF RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.D., D.LITT.

IN an article suggested by Ferdinand Morel's monograph upon Dionysius the Areopagite, M. Emile Lombard discusses the relations between mysticism and introversion (*Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, 1920, pp. 279-307), with special reference to religious psychology. He takes "introversion" to mean the centripetal tendencies of mystical neurosis, quoting Morel's analysis of the Areopagite's mind as characterised by the two symptoms of intellectual asceticism and reverie, and rightly protesting that "introversion," in the sense of self-absorption, is not an equivalent for the mystical experience. He points out the defects of the Areopagite's mysticism, especially its idea of access to God being reserved for an obscure intuition, and also of a semi-Oriental nostalgia of the divine element. This deviation from Christian practice, however, failed to maintain itself "against the apostolic tradition which subordinates ecstasy to life and the prestige of charismata to the demands of love." A protest is entered on behalf of Dionysius by Professor John Howley in *Psychology and Mystical Experience* (Kegan Paul). The first part of the book deals with the psychological phenomena of conversion and retreats, the second with what the author loosely calls "Introversion." He asserts that "those who see in the *Mystica Theologica* of Dionysius mere neo-Platonism are mainly scholars who see only the negative process in Christian mystical experience and who fail to see in the Christian mystic the positive element." His analytic criticism is keen; the book is a proof of the interest with which scholars in the Roman Church follow contemporary investigations into mystical philosophy. But he has to admit the moral dangers of passivity or contemplative absorption which M. Lombard has noted. Spiritists, faith healers, Christian Scientists, and New Thought folk, he agrees, "look to find the Beyond, and they find themselves, to their own destruction." This dangerous type of quietism is attributed, it is true, to "certain non-Catholic circles in England," but the mystical movement can hardly be divided up ecclesiastically.¹ Baron von

¹ A better discussion is that of Mr R. H. Thouless in *Theology* (February), pp. 67-79.

Hügel's paper on "Christianity and the Supernatural" (*Constructive Quarterly*, December 1920) is an address to young Oxford, which pleasantly describes the main features and functions of what the writer considers to be Christian supernaturalism. He admits that "noble, truly supernatural devotedness" is by no means confined to the Roman Church, but naturally cites his instances from that communion. In speaking about celibacy he curtly mentions "subtle explainers away of the renunciation, visible as well as invisible, preached and practised broadcast by the central figures of the Synoptic Gospels." But it is seldom that rhetoric clashes with historical fact, in this delightful and intimate address. Theologically there is much more to be found about true mystical Christianity in Bishop Temple's *Fellowship with God* (Macmillan). It is a volume of sermons, but the sermons generally probe the mind, and four of them especially, those on "The Essence of Idolatry," "The Spirit and the World," "Otherworldliness," and "The Philosophy of the Incarnation," contain excellent material for a sound view of the subject. "Mystics think they touch the divine," said Father Tyrrell, "when they have only blurred the human form in a cloud of words." It is specially grateful to find sermons which teach, without frothy eloquence, and teach the core of true inwardness in Christianity. Bishop Temple's sermons have this quality. His book on *The Universality of Christ* (Student Christian Movement) has little that is new to readers of his other works, but it puts briefly some salient aspects of Christianity. The opening chapter on the use and abuse of the comparative method has a much-needed warning against facile tolerance. He has "quite deliberately revived," in his account of the individual human Jesus, "in substance a part, at least, of the contention of Nestorius, in the belief that a more adequate psychology can, without any disastrous theological consequences, do justice to those aspects of truth by which he was specially impressed." Professor H. R. Mackintosh's trenchant essay upon "Christianity and Absolute Idealism" (*Church Quarterly Review*, April) concludes that Christianity cannot afford to ally itself with any theory of speculative metaphysics like absolutism, since the latter (a) involves the claim that ultimate truth belongs to philosophy, not to religion; (b) involves a theory of God as the all-inclusive Unity which fails to satisfy the religious instinct; and (c) tends to dissolve human individuality. Mr A. C. Bouquet's volume, *Is Christianity the Final Religion?* (Macmillan), approaches such questions rather from the angle of an interest in writers like Troeltsch. The book is described as "a candid enquiry, with the materials for an opinion." It is written in full view of modern speculation about possible substitutes for Christianity and proposals for its restatement, like those of Mr Clutton Brock and Mr H. G. Wells. Mr Bouquet puts the case for a personalistic interpretation of the universe, and lays stress upon the broad racial appeal of Christianity as such an interpretation, rather than upon its adequacy as a religion for the needs of men. He is alive to the need of restatement, and offers suggestions with a view to this, mainly prompted by Troeltsch's arguments, holding that Christianity is "in essence the common

world religion of the future, for whose triumph and dominance we must all work." The book will bring before many readers problems which are of vital, contemporary importance; it is both candid and stimulating. Mr G. Clive Binyon's *The Christian Faith and the Social Revolution* (S.P.C.K.) recognises the same need for restating Christianity, but proposes that this should be in terms of socialism. By "revolution" the author explains that he means a radical change of principle. Socialism, as he reads it, contains a moral idealism which is fundamentally Christian and ought to be recovered by the modern Church. The five chapters of the book deal largely with the Old Testament, for Mr Binyon believes that "the social idealism of the Law and the Prophets is a permanent and essential element in the Christian faith." With this he groups the "Communist" experiment in the primitive Jerusalem Church, and infers that fresh light will be thrown on Christian life and theology by an assimilation of socialist ideals.

The most remarkable contribution to Old Testament theology is the edition of "Job" in the International Critical Commentary, by the late Dr Driver and by Professor G. B. Gray. Dr Driver had laid the basis for this edition in an exhaustive set of philological notes; these, with the commentary upon eight or nine chapters, have been supplemented and edited by Dr Gray, who writes the introduction to the whole work. One admirable feature is the printing of the translation at the head of each page. This adds greatly to the ease and profit of reading the book. Dr Gray argues that no proof for a Babylonian source of Job has been made out, that the text of the third cycle of speeches (chaps. xxv.-xxviii.) has been mutilated, that chaps. xxxii.-xxxvii. did not form part of the original book but were composed by a different author, and that xl. 6-xlii. 1 were later additions. Job was written, he thinks, in the fifth century B.C., and aimed "not at solving the entire problem of suffering, but at vindicating God and the latent worth of human nature against certain conclusions drawn from a partial observation of life." The scholarship of the commentary is, naturally, first-rate; "Driver and Gray" will be a name in the criticism of the book, and the immense pains which have been spent upon its production will be certain of grateful recognition. Professor König's paper upon "The Problem of Suffering in the Light of the Book of Job" (*Expository Times*, May) assumes that the book of Job does offer a theory of suffering; indeed, that it regards suffering as "intended partly as a means of strengthening against faithlessness in the battle of life; partly as a punishment of the sins of which men are guilty; partly as a means of purifying individuals and nations; and finally as" part of the order of a universe which, even in its relatively small element of suffering and evil, yet shows a wise and good Creator.

Professor Welch's articles on Jeremiah in *The Expositor* for February and April argue ably that the prophet was conscious from the first of a message to the world which asserted absolute moral standards. The glory and the tragedy of the prophet's career lie in this, that his conception of religion as a matter between God and the penitent

soul leads him to sit "a little loose to Judaism," and to regard the temple and sacrifices as at best secondary elements. Dr Welch's argument is based on some acute criticism of the Hebrew text, and it offers independent views of the prophetic material, which are maintained against critics like Cornill, Duhm, and Peake. Jeremiah does not furnish any texts for Professor Burney's volume on *The Gospel in the Old Testament* (T. & T. Clark), which contains twenty sermons of definite, up-to-date teaching, mainly from the Prophets and the Psalter. Some of them are marked by the recent war. But the author's contention is larger than any local or temporary issue; he argues that "the Old Testament story points forward to Christ, who draws together in His single person its different spiritual ideals, and fulfils beyond all human expectation their highest possibilities." There are passages of sound historical and psychological insight in this book. In *The Expositor* (March, pp. 217-238) Professor T. H. Robinson discusses particularly the element of ecstasy in the Old Testament prophets, arguing that the majority of their extant oracles are transcripts of ecstatic visions, and that it was the ecstatic trance which arrested the attention of the prophet's contemporaries and prepared the way for their recognition of his message. This ecstatic element, he points out, is specially prominent in Ezekiel, whose symbolical actions are characteristic of the ecstatic state. These symbols of Ezekiel form the subject of a careful exegetical and psychological study which R. P. D. Buzy concludes in the April number of the *Revue Biblique*; his pages are a fresh contribution to the subject, and written with characteristic lucidity.

Dr W. O. E. Oesterley's *Immortality and the Unseen World* (S.P.C.K.) is a study in Old Testament religion which starts from the postulate that two different beliefs are reflected in the Old Testament, one the popular belief about Sheol as a dim, gloomy sphere, the other an official, higher belief; the former led to ancestor-worship and a cult of the dead in general, the latter confined Jahweh's interest, and therefore the interest of believers, to the living. The method involves a study of the folk-lore of the Hebrews, including necromancy and demonology. Dr Oesterley explains the significance of these for the popular belief, and concludes by indicating the rise of a real belief in immortality, after the exile. The zenith of the belief he finds, not in Isaiah xxvi. 19, nor even in Dan. xii. 2, but in Pss. lxxiii. and cxxxix., i.e. in the conviction of God's omnipresence and of His justice. The argument is vividly illustrated. Dr Oesterley invests the subject with real interest, and succeeds in showing the strange subsoil upon which the conviction of immortality ultimately grew up, within Judaism. One of his theories is that the Genesis-stories of creation and the fall presuppose immortality as the normal state of man, the abnormal thing being death. The evolution of this paradisaical myth is traced at length by A. Causse in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (1920, pp. 289-315). His paper on "Le jardin d'Elohim et la source de vie" shows how the myth became eschatological, as time passed, the dream and hope of bliss in terms of an Oriental oasis with the tree and the water as symbols of vitality. M. Causse also writes a

bright appreciation of the Jewish wisdom in the *Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses* (pp. 45-60); he notes its good qualities, and also its defects, including a lack of "la foi mystique et l'élan pour action," and an indifference to the messianic hope. In *Gregorianum* (January, pp. 117-121), the organ of the Roman Jesuits, A. Parenti explains Eccles. iii. 21 as an allusion to the Essene view that the human soul flew upward after death, and denies that the verse refers to the immortality of the soul. In *Rivista Trimestrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi* (1921, pp. 46-66) B. Motzo opens a study of the book of Wisdom by emphasising its dependence upon Enoch (xc. -civ.), and by dating it A.D. 39-40, when the hardships of the Jews under the Romans raised with particular acuteness the problem of providence.

In a pamphlet upon *The Old Testament Conception of Atonement fulfilled by Christ* (Oxford University Press), Professor Burney disputes Dr Rashdall's recent views of the Atonement, argues that "his conception of sacrifice is radically incorrect," and develops the view that Jesus consciously enacted the rôle of the Servant of Jahweh more than once. A general and popular volume, *Can We Know Jesus?* (Robert Scott), has been written by Mr Henry Wallace. It faces the difficulties felt by many to-day about Jesus and the Gospels, discusses His ruling ideas, and offers a suggestive estimate of His person and career. There is room for such a work, and the pages of this book show competence as well as insight. Professor C. H. Turner's inaugural lecture on *The Study of the New Testament* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press) has a number of acute remarks, and a number of surprising opinions. Among the latter is the cheerful confidence that the North Galatian theory has been finally "swept from the field," that Hebrews was written to induce Jerusalemite Christians "to jettison their traditions and their patriotism," and that "things strangled" did not belong to the original text of the decree in Acts xv. There is more likelihood in his remark that "in the lower or textual criticism all the new discoveries, all the new researches, point in the one direction of an increased value to be set upon the 'Western' text," and that W and D, the two oldest of the "Western" Greek MSS., are probably to be localised in Egypt. In connection with this problem of the versions, some recent work upon the Vulgate version deserves mention. Mr J. M. Harden has published a cheap, convenient, and scholarly *Dictionary of the Vulgate New Testament* (S.P.C.K.), based upon Dr H. J. White's text. H. J. Vogels has written *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der lateinischen Apokalypse-Uebersetzung* (Düsseldorf, 1920), full of valuable suggestions about the pre-Hieronymian Latin versions in Africa and in Europe. Also, the publication last year of the Pauline epistles in Mr Horner's *Coptic Version of the New Testament* (Clarendon Press) gives Professor Leipoldt the opportunity, in *The Church Quarterly Review* (April, pp. 33-68), of paying a handsome tribute to this "master-work." Leipoldt's authority as a Coptic expert lends weight to his opinions upon the characteristics of the version. He considers that it hardly "can have originated later than the third century," and points out some of its important data for the exegesis and textual

criticism of the New Testament. Thus, "a sign of the exactness with which the Sahidic translates is to be found in Matt. xvi. 18. To translate the Sahidic text exactly the rendering must be chosen: 'But I also say to thee, Thou art Peter.' The meaning is: first, God gives Peter a revelation, then also Jesus tells Peter something. The Sahidic renders the text faithfully." As for the canon, Professor Leipoldt considers it likely "that the Revelation at the beginning formed an undisputed part of the Sahidic Bible. Did it remain so? In Egypt Greek criticism found less matter for attack in the Revelation than elsewhere. Perhaps, because here the authority of Athanasius regulated the questions of the canon. Perhaps, also, because in Egypt the interest in the world to come was greater than elsewhere." As for the old Syriac version of the Gospels, Lagrange has now finished his survey (*Revue Biblique*, xxix. 332 f., xxx. 11 f.), which differs from the estimate of Professor Burkitt. Lagrange attaches weight to the evidence of W, the Freer manuscript, as corroborating, by its Western characteristics, the theory that "the old Syriac version saw the light on the circumference of the Syrian world, in some monastery" in or near Egypt, about the period of Eusebius of Cæsarea. He attributes, for example, its harmonising elements not so much to the influence of Tatian as to the Greek manuscript, of Egyptian provenance, which it followed.

As for the inner criticism of the Gospels, there is comparatively little of importance to be chronicled. Professor Turner's lecture contains some acute criticism of the agreement of Matthew and Luke as against Mark, and he confesses, "I feel increasingly the difficulty of bringing the whole of the [Fourth] Gospel into relationship with the fisherman of Galilee, and take refuge provisionally in the hypothesis that John of Ephesus, the beloved disciple, was a youthful follower of our Lord at Jerusalem, to whom His Jerusalem ministry would have been specially familiar." He concludes with some textual conjectures of interest, e.g. that *καρπός* is a primitive error for *καιρός* in Mark iv. 29, and that *ἐθαμβοῦντο* in Mark x. 32 should be *ἐθαμβεῖτο*. In Mark xvi. 1 he argues that D k are correct in omitting the names of the holy women who brought spices. Even if this were so, it would not remove Joanna from the gospel narrative, since Luke xxiv. 10 preserves her name. And this is important for a theory in *The Contemporary Review* (March), proposed by Mr W. W. Holdsworth, who follows up a suggestion by Dr Sanday and some other scholars that Joanna the wife of Herod's steward was Luke's authority for some special traditions in the Third Gospel. Mr Holdsworth's theory is that sections like i.-ii., iii. 1-2, 12-38, iv. 16-30, v. 1-11, vii. 11-17, 36-50, viii. 1-3, ix. 51-xviii. 14, xix. 1-27, xxii. 14-34, xxiii.-xxiv. form a continuous document composed by Joanna, instead of being partly due to a common source for Matthew and Luke or to oral tradition handed down, as Harnack thought, by the daughters of Philip. Mr T. H. Weir's *Variants in the Gospel Reports* (Paisley: Alexander Gardner) is the contribution of an Aramaic expert to the problem of the New Testament text; it contains some original suggestions by way of proving that "many of the variants of the Greek

texts disappear when turned back into the original Hebrew or Aramaic out of which they sprang." Thus he explains the addition of "new" to "tomb" in John xix. 41 and Matt. xxvii. 60, or to "covenant" in Luke xxii. 20, by the fact that in Aramaic the word for "one" or "a" closely resembles the word for "new." Some of the conjectures are more curious and ingenious than convincing, and Mr Weir handicaps his case by assuming that the Synoptic Gospels go back to a common Hebrew original. But the book has material which deserves careful study. Professor R. H. Kennett's *The Last Supper* (Cambridge: W. Heffer) properly points out that the words of Jesus about His body and blood could not be taken or meant literally; Jesus meant the disciples to regard Him as their passover lamb on this occasion, since He had come to help them by His teaching and by the example of His death, to trust in God who could do for them what He had done for their fathers long ago. Dr Kennett argues that neither in the Old Testament nor in the New is there any consciousness of "covenant-making through participation in a mystic life"—however that may have lain at the origin of the rite in ancient days. It is a clear, candid little book. But the interpretation of Luke xxii. 15 as an unfulfilled desire is doubtful; and in any case it is not absolutely essential to the hypothesis propounded. Dr R. H. Charles, in *The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce* (Williams & Norgate), is vigorous and definite. The New Testament exegesis is more drastic than impressive; that Mark x. 2-12 has been tampered with, that Matt. xix. 1-9 does not depend upon it, and that 1 Cor. vii. 11a is an interpolation by "some scribe who misunderstood wholly the words of Christ as quoted by the apostle"—these and other positions are questionable. But upon them Dr Charles reaches to the conclusion that the New Testament does not forbid remarriage after divorce to the innocent party. Experts will require to pronounce upon the evidence from Jewish sources, which sounds shaky to an outsider. But Dr Charles is provocative and stimulating, at any rate, and his book is a considered challenge to ordinary issues of the subject.¹

In the light of the Delphi inscription Professor Bacon (*Harvard Theological Review*, April) reopens the vexed problem of the chronology in Acts. By persisting in identifying Paul's second visit to Jerusalem with Gal. ii. 1-10 he makes out that the Crucifixion took place in 29, Paul's conversion in 38, the Jerusalem Council in 48, and Paul's arrest at Jerusalem in 55. Professor A. M. Pope, in *The Expositor* (May), proposes a new theory of the origin of Romans. Chaps. i.-xi. are taken as the reproduction of Paul's speech at the council of Jerusalem; chaps. xii.-xiv. present "the substance of the decrees in a homily upon Christian conduct in general"; chap. xv., written some years later, is a covering letter to the Christians at Rome; and chap. xvi. is a letter of recommendation given to Phebe, "who was probably on his way to Ephesus." This theory largely

¹ Dr Mingana (*Interpreter*, January) shows that the Eastern (Syrian) Church regarded marriage simply as a natural human means of propagating the species, and therefore that anything which hindered cohabitation for this end was considered sufficient reason for breaking the tie.

depends upon the assumption of an early date for Galatians, however, as if the latter epistle were written on Paul's journey to Jerusalem. Such a theory is explicitly set aside by Professor Burton in his recent edition of Galatians in the International Critical Commentary (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark). This edition is perhaps the largest in existence on the epistle, with over 600 pages to the six chapters of the text. But 160 pages are devoted to an appendix which contains linguistic material for the New Testament in general, and here as well as in the commentary proper Professor Burton has catered richly for the student. He accepts Zahn's restatement of the South Galatian theory, identifying the meeting of Gal. ii. with Acts xv., and pointing out that the former passage implies clearly "not that Peter and Paul were in sharp antagonism to one another, representatives of opposing factions, but that, while they did not altogether agree in their conceptions of religious truth, and while Peter lacked the steadiness of vision necessary to make him stand firmly for the more liberal view, yet neither he nor James directly opposed Paul's view, or his claim to be an apostle of Christ." The notes show careful, thorough work. The linguistic data are displayed with an accuracy which is far from common, and the exegesis is most deliberate. Almost simultaneously an entire number of the *Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift* (i. 3, 1920) is devoted to a couple of articles upon the problems of Gal. i.-ii. Lyder Brun (pp. 1-52), like Professor Burton, agrees that Gal. ii. 1-10 and Acts xv. 1-35 are two different accounts of the same episode, and incidentally that Titus was not circumcised (Gal. ii. 3). His article goes into minute details of exegesis, and emerges with a series of conclusions which are becoming fairly recognised to-day by those who decline to take speculative views of Acts xv. Anton Fridrichsen's article (pp. 53-76) is an equally careful study of Paul's defence in Gal. i. He argues that there must have been a party in the Palestinian Church who favoured emancipation from the law, and that Paul's self-defence is unintelligible apart from the criticism brought against him that his gospel of freedom was not original but derivative. The interesting hypothesis is that Paul is defending not only his apostolic authority against the charge of an unauthorised commission, but the originality of his gospel-message. Fridrichsen suggests that this "free" party included adherents of Stephen, perhaps men like Philip and Mnason; anyhow, he argues that we must not assume the Jerusalem or Palestinian Church to have been composed entirely of strict Pharisaic Christians. One of Professor Burton's novelties is the denial that τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου means for Paul the spirits or angels connected with the heavenly bodies; he returns to the older view that the phrase implies no more than rudimentary or elementary religious principles, that is, he agrees with Tertullian rather than with Justin Martyr on this point. The question has recently been debated in the *Biblische Zeitschrift*; but to judge from Kurze's note (*ibid.*, 1921, pp. 335-337), Professor Steinmann has not been able to convince everyone that τὰ στοιχεῖα must denote elemental spirits in Paul's vocabulary. Father Philip Coghlan has published a compact,

popular life of *St Paul* (Burns, Oates), which gives an outline of the apostle's life and letters. He regards it "as deplorable that so few of our laity at the present day have even a tolerable acquaintance with" the apostle's writings.

In *The Princeton Theological Review* (January, pp. 64-95) Mr E. M. Wilson contends that the allusion to oil in James v. 14-15 is not medicinal, oil neither here nor in Mark vi. 13 being a panacea, but symbolical; the reference is to powers of miraculous healing temporarily possessed by the Church. M. Frank Olivier, in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1920, pp. 237 f.), makes out a good case for ἐκτυρωθήσεται in 2 Peter iii. 10. His article is an admirable study, full of knowledge and ingenuity. The textual point is small, but in proposing the conjecture the writer brings forward a quantity of really illustrative material for the whole epistle. The same is true of H. Delehayé's paper in the *Analecta Bollandiana* (1921, pp. 20-49) upon the evolution of the term μάρτυς. A discussion upon this term has been going on in German periodicals, and Delehayé's contribution is more than verbal. He rather underrates the "red" significance of the term in Apoc. ii. 13, and in Acts xxii. 20. It is as likely that these saints were called "martyrs" because they were killed, as that they were killed because they were "martyrs" in the sense of witnesses.¹ The one does not exclude the other, at any rate. However, the "red" meaning does appear in the Church of Smyrna's letter on the death of Polykarp, and the distinction between "martyr" and "confessor" in the letter from the Churches of Lyons and Vienne. Delehayé rejects Geffcken's theory that μάρτυς acquired philosophical associations, and also Holl's view that μάρτυς, originally an apostolic title, passed over to those who by their heroic death carried on the apostolic witness to Christ, because at their death they "saw" the supernatural world and the Lord Himself. "Toutes les recherches de ces derniers temps nous semblent viciées par cette supposition que μάρτυς, aboutissant à signifier l'homme qui donne sa vie pour la foi chrétienne, n'a pas cessé, au cours de son évolution, d'avoir le sens générique de témoin."

JAMES MOFFATT.

¹ Delehayé's view is that of Dr I. T. Beckwith, however, in his excellent recent commentary on the Apocalypse. Dr Charles takes the opposite view.

REVIEWS.

The Origin of Man and of his Superstitions. By Carveth Read, M.A.
Cambridge : University Press, 1920.—Pp. 350.

FOR many years the distinguished Lecturer on Comparative Psychology in University College, London, has pursued his inquiries into the descent of man, the development from the animal to the human mind, and the origin and significance of magic and animism. The fruits of his researches are now presented in a volume which is throughout stimulating and suggestive even where one cannot agree with his conclusions. He has treated his subject as one of mental development, and his analysis is a distinct contribution to the effort to dissect the mind of men who, psychologically speaking, are not so far removed from ourselves as we may wish to think. The technical importance of such a book is obvious, and the author of *The Metaphysics of Nature* (1905) and *Natural and Social Morals* (1909) is well equipped for the treatment of the questions to which he has addressed himself. But it is no less obvious that the subject has a more practical interest. At an age vividly conscious of change and instability, the patient study of human development cannot ignore the practical and often impatient and even fanatical efforts to further this development. Although a student of human origins may be, as the author himself asserts, under no obligation to predict the future (p. 342), most of us are so affected by our notions of origins that our views of the past and of the future almost invariably influence each other. Moreover, Professor Carveth Read is led to conclusions which are not only pessimistic, but are inextricably bound up with his theories of the past and his general method of inquiry. A scientific study of mental development cannot in any case be indifferent to current conditions ; and the more one is impressed by anxious or even desperate attempts to shape the immediate future of humanity, the more keenly must one examine theories of man's origin and the development of what the author is pleased to call man's "superstitions."

Professor Read urges that "the human race has descended from some ape-like stock by a series of changes which began and, until recently, were maintained by the practice of hunting in pack for animal food, instead of being content with the fruits and other nutritious products of the tropical forest" (p. v). He works out

his hypothesis, which is not entirely a new one, fully and with special reference to the behaviour and habits of the pack. Here he finds the essentials of simple human society: co-operation and competition, sympathy and an elementary morality, and even germinal ideas of property rights (pp. 44, 56). In the hunting-pack are also the incentives to intelligence and knowledge; and since, in the animal kingdom outside man, mind and body constitute a single organism, we cannot cut off our mental history from our physical descent (p. 33). There is a certain ability even among animals (p. 40 *seq.*), and the pre-human mind depended upon skill, and not merely upon instinct or imitation (pp. 10 and 48). In addition to this, life in the hunting-pack entails some difference of personality between leaders and followers (p. 21), and we are warned that, as regards savages, "current speculations about fashion, imitation, tradition, crowd-psychology, are in danger of exaggeration, and overlook the patent facts of individualism" (p. 35). With perfect justice Professor Read agrees that the savage has a certain independence of judgment (p. 86), and a considerable measure of individuality (p. 281). Accordingly, whether we work from the hunting-pack to primitive settled society, or from the latter back to the life of the higher animals, there is no impassable gap between the psychological characteristics of the higher animals and those of man. Professor Read insists upon the prevalence of "common-sense," which may even be said to be found among the higher brutes (p. 327). The essential difference appears when, in place of common-sense limited to present conditions and everyday routine, men are swayed by imagination, by beliefs of emotional origin and unchecked by common-sense and logic, which typically "misrepresent the order of nature and the effective population of the world" (p. 67). Though false and unverifiable, being due entirely to the imagination, the beliefs are apt to be inextricably blended with supreme common-sense, skill, and intelligence (*cf.* p. 124). They have been useful: "illusory" beliefs preserved order and cohesion, and, "perverse as it may seem, imaginations utterly false have had their share in promoting 'progress'" (pp. 69 *seq.*). In effect, Professor Read's conclusion is virtually that of Sir James Frazer, who, in *Psyche's Task*, described at length the influence of "superstition" on the growth of beneficial social institutions.

Common-sense, magic, and animism are the competing categories in the interpretation of the world (p. 110); and while magic, in spite of its crudity, rests upon some idea of uniformity of causation, animism, on the other hand, introduces arbitrary agencies. Professor Read, however, cuts the knots by relying upon the view that dreams were the chief cause of the belief in spirits, although he justly notes the really important fact that not all dreams are regarded as significant (pp. 156, 159). But he passes in a singularly facile manner from the belief in ghosts to the worship of the ancestors of chiefs or heroes, some of whom became gods and the main source of the authority of the chiefs or kings descended from them (pp. 69, 145). He is on much safer ground, however, when he shows how the prevalence and importance of Shamanism depended upon the absence of chiefs (p. 218),

and how conceptions of the spirit-world are throughout affected by social and political organisation (p. 183). Here, indeed, there is room for really solid work, and it is instructive to observe that he considers that animism is rapidly losing ground in civilisations of our modern type (*ib.*), but in the sequel is filled with gloomy forebodings touching the future of our own civilisation (pp. 342 *seq.*).

It is also instructive to observe that, as might be expected, totemism fits with difficulty into Professor Read's scheme, and that he considers that its importance for religion has been exaggerated (pp. 293 and 325). Magic and animism "seem to spring up in primitive minds by psychological necessity . . . but the case of totemism is different" (p. 297). To this, however, it can be replied that totemism may be illustrated *mutatis mutandis* by the "Teddy-bear" stage of child-growth. Moreover, it is typically pre-anthropomorphic; and, since the animal is treated by totemist and child alike as in some sense personal, the theory of the development of human personality is involved. As a matter of fact, a sort of totemism, or rather of animal symbolism, sometimes appears to be an escape from an inadequate or unsatisfying anthropomorphism, and the problem really involves conceptions of personality which Professor Read has left untouched. None the less, it is significant that he points out that a totem needs the alliance of a hero to anthropomorphise it (p. 321), and that the spirit animal-guardian of the American Indians is a "noble sort of mysticism" (p. 324). The fact is that totemism is a veritable system wherein the totem in some measure functions like the god of anthropomorphic religion; and this sub-anthropomorphic cult is not explained by the easy assumption that it originated in the animal or plant-names conferred upon groups. To suppose that totemism arose from a belief in the "magical or spiritual connection between men and animals of the same name" (p. 310), once more, merely cuts the knot.

An essential part of Professor Read's theory is that the useful "illusory" beliefs, "superstitions," and so forth, served to give elders "enough prestige to preserve tradition and custom when the leader of the hunt was no longer conspicuous in authority. A magic-working gerontocracy was the second form of society; and the third form was governed by a wizard-king or a priest-king, or by a king supported by wizards or priests" (p. vi). When, in some way, the organisation of the primitive hunting-pack weakened, "it was through belief in magic that some sort of leadership and subordination were re-established" (p. 253). As for religion, it arose "with the differentiation of superior beings—heroic, ancestral, or other gods—from common ghosts" (p. 184). Yet, on the other hand, since Professor Read recognises pack-leaders and men of individuality even among primitive peoples, there were surely superior "ghosts" from the first; and since magic involves a magician, who may be "sorcerer" or "priest" (*cf.* p. 254), men of conspicuous personality would surely date from the beginning of magic. It is difficult to see how, on the author's own showing, religion is "very probably" of later growth than magic (p. 197). He rightly regards the two as antithetical (p. 221), but it is

very difficult to understand how "at some stage after the rise of animism" religious practices could be "added" to the magical, and that at this stage "there is no sense of opposition between magic and religion" (p. 195). One cannot but view all this theorising upon the absolute development of thought with utter scepticism. After all, the fundamental difficulties are quite clearly recognised by Professor Read himself. Social degeneration is not uncommon (p. 304); there may be a retrogression from animism to magic (p. 175), or a retrogradation (pp. 189 *seq.* and 203); "the spiritualising of magic and the despiritualising of religion are both real processes of evolution" (p. 207). The spell becomes a prayer or once was one, and the sorcerer and the priest change rôles (p. 254). This being so, in the world of thought we have to build upon data derived from all stages; and the study of mental development in the race has not yet become scientific because it has sought to form some single, simple, and absolute evolution based upon an *a priori* selection of appropriate data, and cannot distinguish between the child-like and the child-ish, between childhood and senility in the history of particular beliefs and practices.

Professor Read is at pains to insist upon the benefits that have emerged from man's superstitious and imaginary beliefs. A balance of good may be found (p. 268). Natural selection favoured the superstitions within certain limits (p. 70, *cf.* p. vi), and Nature has *not* spared the "folly, horror, and iniquity which take up so much space in the retrospect of human life" (p. 292). In these circumstances his pessimistic outlook for the future is surely ill founded. On his own standpoint, if we consider what natural selection has achieved, surely we may trust it to look after the future? Perhaps we have become too acutely conscious of human vicissitudes, but this will hardly affect the fact that it will be as potent in the future as in the past. Or can man interfere with Nature as the superstitious savage thought he could? Really, we need further light upon Professor Read's conception of man's place in Nature, since others, no doubt, will view natural selection as a *Deus ex machina*, as much a deity as any of the anthropomorphic agencies whereby the savage explained phenomena. When the savage says "a spirit did it," he saves himself further trouble (p. 340). We must be excused if we suspect that to a future age natural selection, instinct, and some other handy terms will be regarded very much as we regard the demons and spirits of our less scientific brethren. For these, too, were an explanation of some phenomena.

Professor Read leaves off at the very point where the real problems of to-day begin. It does not avail to reiterate "illusions," "superstitions," and the rest, when Vaihinger has illustrated almost *ad nauseam* the widespread use of fictions, and all that their use implies. What matters it if the lapsing beliefs are "noble and venerable," if they are false (p. 343)? Are they, as Polybius said, merely to keep the multitude in check by "mysterious terrors and scenic effects"?¹

¹ Glover, *Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, p. 4, who refers to similar sentiments from Critias, Diodorus Siculus, and others.

We recall the Bolshevik watch-word that religion is an opiate ; and there can be little doubt that the—entirely *bona-fide*—conviction that human institutions have been based upon irrational and superstitious beliefs has done and is still doing untold harm. As honest men we must face the truth ; but is this rationalising method the true one ? When Professor Read is dismayed at the “levity” with which “imagination-beliefs” are dropped or accepted “upon no evidence either way, from mere shallowness of soul” (p. 343), one cannot but feel that the “levity” lies on the side of the superficial criticism which thus handles men and women doubtless quite as sincere and *bona-fide* as ourselves. To talk of “shallowness of soul” is as unmethodical as to declare every difficult text corrupt and every awkward statement the work of an ignorant or lying historian. The fact is that there is a standpoint which does as little justice to religion and religious experience as the old theology did to the rationalist outside the pale. This may be human nature, but it is not science. No theory of mental development dare ignore the present varieties of belief ; and not only must a synthesis do decent justice to the religious, but Professor Read’s is only one of several others. That is to say, the problem is not only to understand the origin of man and of his “superstitious” and other beliefs, but more especially to understand the modern differing and conflicting theories, syntheses, and the like, which reflect various religious, rationalistic, and other standpoints.

Here again the author helps us. The sciences, as they grow, constitute their own apperceptive mass, by which all relevant beliefs are tested (pp. 338 *seq.*). There may also be an animistic apperceptive mass (p. 340). And while the wizard has his own strange body of knowledge (p. 276), a man’s suggestibility or contra-suggestibility “depends upon the extent, quality, and integration of his apperceptive masses, and upon the facility with which they come into action” (p. 275). Habits of thought change (p. 282) ; and they change in the history of both individuals and peoples. Hence, in view of the progression and retrogression in the entire evolutionary process we clearly need something far more objective than the particular standpoint of an individual, a people, or an age. A standpoint that is merely positivist or scientific is not, as such, scientific ; and although science is doubtless moved by “curiosity as to the truth” (p. 223), the practical difficulty is that science, like theology, may be so satisfied with the truth it has found that it may refuse to move forward. The scientific spirit is as different from the content of any science or the opinions of a particular scientist, as is the religious spirit from the content of a religion. The best synthesis of mental development, if it is to be of scientific rather than of biographical importance, must allow for the development of “apperceptive masses.” As it is, one feels that Professor Read’s analyses are too static. The science of one age is the nonsense of another, even as magic and religion, though antithetical, can be easily confused one with the other. But he treats the development as that of absolute growths—science and magic, for example, as differentiating from common-sense (p. 327). His many excellent analyses are static, and

apply to given situations and standards of judgment (*e.g.* self-deception, exploitation, disillusion), and his method is comparative rather than historical and strictly evolutionary.

Professor Read well points out that "all improvements in science, art, industry, and humbug are made by individuals," and that every self-conscious profession or group can have anti-social tendencies (pp. 256 *seq.*). This is, of course, quite generally true; and not only do "all tribes, even the lowest, produce relatively eminent men" (p. 343), but an absolutely undifferentiated social group is inconceivable. Equally inconceivable is an absolutely undifferential stock of ideas; and one must object to the principle that ideas are differentiated from a confused matrix (p. 233), partly because we are not entitled to reify a merely logical analysis, and partly because the word "confused" merely expresses our inability to understand that which, after all, is actually unknown to us. There could be no group before the individual (*cf.* p. 35)—it is obvious that the first *human* being was a *socius*—and in actual experience we are always getting back to ever simpler systems, until at length our concepts and definitions fail us. This is manifestly the case with religion, ethics, science, and art, which, so far from appearing "suddenly," so to say, must have existed before we recognise them on the basis of our definitions; and I cannot see that anything but confusion can arise if we allow that science is earlier than magic (pp. 335 and 337), when the meaning is that the tendency which characterises science appears to be earlier than that which distinguishes magic.

Magic as the antithesis of religion logically arose when religion first arose, and this depends upon our definition of religion, which, if we are not careful, we may stretch until it is no longer serviceable for current conditions. In the world of thought, as in that of organisms, it becomes as necessary to distinguish related concepts or stages in their history as it is to sever Hipparion and Equus; and the problem of actual origins becomes primarily one of logical conditions. This is already half recognised. On the one hand, we *actually* find among primitives a fairly complex mentality (pp. 99 *seq.*, *cf.* 311), and intricate collective practices that simulate design (p. 318): clearly, we cannot assume that primitive man was inferior in psychophysical equipment to the animal. On the other hand, when it comes to a logical theory of development, Professor Read proceeds on the assumption that the simplest ideas are earliest (p. 112); he looks for notions "simpler than and antecedent to magic" (p. 316), and, starting with animism as "a primitive and necessary illusion," he finds certain specified consequences "reasonable" (p. 151). The problem was, out of an enormous stock of comparable data to form some gamut, and it may fairly be urged that he has not heeded his own warnings as to the use of the comparative method (p. 304). The mythologies of old seem to be replaced by a logistic cosmology—there is at least an instructive parallel—and we may complain that insufficient attention has been paid to the actual vicissitudes of magic and religion, such as the student of mental development can find in the age-long history of Eastern thought. There we are no doubt far

above the level of primitive thought ; but we have typical processes and developments which, *mutatis mutandis*, help us to understand the simpler and remoter changes, to grasp the nature of the problem before us, and to avoid certain evident errors of method. Nor have I observed any reference to the important inductive studies on the "material culture and social institutions of the simpler peoples" by Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg.¹

No doubt the ape-pack is the most suggestive starting-point for Professor Read's inquiries, but a sounder induction would have to take in both the lower organisms, on the one hand, and, on the other, the theists, to whom his reiteration of imagination, illusion, and superstition tends to become meaningless. He has his own standpoint or apperceptive mass, but it does not enable us to follow his most vital theories. He has some preconception of nature, natural causation, and the like, but he does not help us to understand how the concept of the supernatural (the supersensuous, etc. etc.) ever arose. He does, indeed, suggest that, from dreams of the dead, the "hyper-physical . . . gradually becomes supernatural" (p. 157); but as we have processes of spiritualisation and of despiritualisation in the evolutionary process, he does not really explain how one is absolutely prior to the other. We know that the savage has some conception of the marvellous (p. 259): there is (a) the abnormal form of the normal, or the unusual form of the usual (*e.g.* a bow that shoots much further than any other), and there is (b) the normal abnormal (*e.g.* a rifle-shot or a binocular, which is merely a piece of magic similar to what any Shaman could do). From certain standpoints the miraculous and the supernatural are intelligible and fall within the sphere of the natural, whereas from others the natural and supernatural are antithetical. In the latter case the supernatural tends to be some "plus," or some unknown or unknowable x outside the bracket containing "the utmost possibilities of the results of human knowledge."² The rival views of the "natural" have no common ground, and Professor Read's standpoint is based upon an analysis which excludes the supernatural (in all its forms), but has to explain it. If one does not adopt his standpoint, one must press forward to another, which will do better justice to the present conflicting views. This will undoubtedly demand other presuppositions than those upon which he consciously and unconsciously relies ; and new and better concepts and principles will be as necessary for a more scientific interpretation of the data of religion and magic as new gods and spirits have been called for in the history of religion, in the interpretation of experience itself. Careful and cautious readers will learn much from this stimulating and thought-provoking book, but in common with another recent and important contribution to the history of religion (M.

¹ *London School of Economics and Political Science* (ed. W. P. Reeves): "Sociology," No. 3.

² So, Sir Ray Lankester, in H. S. R. Elliot, *Modern Science* (1912), pp. xi seq. We are not told whether the formula is $x + (a + b + \dots)^n$ or $x(a + b + \dots)^n$. In view of the relation between the religious and non-religious aspects of life and thought, the latter is the formula that theism might accept, although the argument evidently implies the former.

Loisy's elaborate treatise on the history of sacrifice), it only too clearly illustrates the bankruptcy of positivist or rationalistic methods.

STANLEY A. COOK.

GONVILLE AND CAIUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

Instinct and the Unconscious: A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-Neuroses. By W. H. R. Rivers, M.D., D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., Fellow and Praelector in Natural Sciences, St John's College, Cambridge.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920.—Pp. viii + 252.

THIS book should receive a cordial welcome, for it deals ably and clearly with a difficult problem which is to-day a living issue. Dr Rivers' standpoint is that Freud's psychology of the unconscious provides a consistent working hypothesis to aid us in our attempts to discover the rôle of unconscious experience in the production of disease. But though "it is noteworthy that the due recognition of the unconscious . . . should have come from those whose business it is to deal with the morbid aspect of the human mind," still, as Freud himself insisted, we are thus helped to realise the important part which the unconscious (in some sense) plays in normal life. There is, of course, no hard and fast line between the normal and the abnormal; none the less they may be broadly distinguished. In other Journals the more specialised treatment of the psycho-neuroses will receive the consideration they deserve. Here we must be content to indicate the author's attitude in face of the broader problems of biology and psychology.

The sub-title of the book is: "A Contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-Neuroses." Dr Rivers says at the outset that his "purpose is to bring functional disorders of the mind and nervous system into relation with the concepts concerning their normal mode of working, which are held by the biologist and the physiologist." Later on, however, biological interpretation is differentiated from that which is psychological. "If we were able," he says, "to analyse every case of behaviour, whether human or animal, into its innate and acquired elements, we should be little, if at all, nearer the solution of the psychological as opposed to the biological problem." And, in accepting its innate character as the distinguishing mark of instinct, he adds that this character is "biological rather than psychological."

What then is mind with which psychology "as opposed to" biology deals? One asks this question with a view to eliciting the standpoint of the author. In a well-known passage Berkeley distinguished what is in mind by way of attribute from that which is in mind by way of idea. The word "experience" often covers both; but what is in mind by way of attribute is experiencing on the part of a subject, and what is said to be in mind by way of idea is the objective "content" (in one sense of this word)—sense-data, images, memories, concepts, and so forth. Professor Alexander terms all that is experienced in any of these ways "non-mental." For him the mind exists only in attribute, attitude, or act. Dr Rivers includes in mind those objective data for mind which Professor Alexander calls non-mental. This may be regarded as a distinguishing feature of Freudian (as it was of Herbartian) doctrine. Whether we take the "complex" under the wider meaning advocated by Dr Bernard Hart, or

in the more restricted sense which Dr Rivers thinks more convenient, its constitutive content is in large measure unremembered memories—at any rate memories unremembered by us. One could wish that so careful a writer as Dr Rivers had given us some further assistance in understanding just how such unremembered memories live, move, and have their being. And when we are told that heredity is “only the name we have adopted for ancestral experience” (who, by the way, are “we”?), the meaning apparently is that this implies the retention, somehow and somewhere, of the unremembered memories of our forebears.

On this view the unconscious retains that which has been experienced, individually or perhaps also racially. In a discussion of the unconscious one would have welcomed a definition of consciousness which is thus “served with a negative prefix”; but one has to rub on without one. In any case, according to Dr Rivers’ usage, in so far as the term “unconscious” applies to experience (presumably in the *-ed* sense) it is limited to such experience as is not capable of being brought into the field of consciousness by any of the ordinary processes of memory or association, but can only be recalled under certain special conditions, such as sleep, hypnotism, the method of free association, and certain pathological states. Its content “is made up, in the first place, of the feelings and affects which normally form the conscious aspect of instinctive reactions and tendencies, and, in the second place, of sensory and intellectual elements which have been associated with these instinctive and affective reactions and tendencies. It is thus suggested that . . . the unconscious is a store-house of experience associated with instinctive reactions.”

The word “instinctive” is one which an author feels free to use, with or without definition, in such wise as shall be most convenient for his purpose in hand. It is quite commonly used in contradistinction to “reflective”; and perhaps nine times out of ten this is its meaning in popular speech. Many biologists use it in a rather technical sense to denote modes of observable behaviour, including attitudes, the “form” of which is inherited or unlearned, and the occurrence of which is accompanied by a specific mode of experiencing. In this sense instinctive behaviour is distinguished from that which is intelligent, as involving *also* (not of course only) factors due to individual acquisition, and, psychologically, re-presentative qualification of experience. Now, in the adult life of vertebrate animals these two components in behaviour and in experience are in blended union. Hence the word “instinctive” is often used when the instinctive factor is held to predominate. Furthermore, that which is instinctive, in both the above senses, is often defined in terms of its outcome when this outcome is not definitely foreseen as an end in view. On this basis we have instinctive factors (*a*) in individual preservation, (*b*) in race-maintenance and the rearing of offspring, and (*c*) in social development. An instinctive act (with or without some added intelligence) is here defined not as what it is but as that which it is good for—*i.e.* in terms of utility.

In human life it is extraordinarily difficult to distinguish under analysis the instinctive and intelligent factors; and, in that life, an added factor, that of reflective thought, becomes increasingly important. Dr Rivers is wise, therefore, in regarding the definition founded on more restricted biological observations, say in bird life, as too narrow for his purpose, and in including under instinctive modes of action all those the form of which is determined otherwise than by reflective thought. Perhaps four-

fifths of herd-action is instinctive in this sense; but in this proportion is not instinctive, under the more restricted biological usage of the word, since it is acquired through nurture, founded of course on inherited nature. The like applies to what Freud includes under "sexual," and to the instances adduced by Dr Rivers under the "manipulative" section of his "danger instincts."

The stress thus falls on behaviour. With respect to the character of response Dr Rivers assigns to the physiological "all or none" principle (according to which, as with gunpowder, there is either "explosion" or not) a rôle of prime importance. His treatment, and the analogy he draws to "protopathic" and "epicritic" sensibility, are suggestive and full of interest, though some will think that he strains the application of this "all or none" principle, taken strictly, to the breaking point. In any case one would suppose that, in his special field (and beyond it), the "this or that" principle, no less physiological, is of far greater service. Certain modes of behaviour are mutually incompatible, *e.g.* fight or flight with an attitude of immobility. The salient point then is that what we observe is either one or the other, but not a muddle-up of both. Hence arises what is probably the biological foundation of "conflict." A male bird cannot at the same moment act "socially" and repel the advances of others; but he can, and does, within ten minutes illustrate "alternation" between this and that, and some sort of "dissociation" of one from the other. Dr Rivers in many passages shows that he has this clue in mind. By following it up further—bird life is full of examples—he may extend his biological interpretation of abnormal cases in man.

When he speaks of "suppression" (which he does well to distinguish from intentional, or "witting," attempts at "repression") as instinctive, is he not extending the use of this word in a manner that needs further justification? What is suppressed is, seemingly, unconscious experience. By some "mechanism" (might not this oft-recurring word be defined for the sake of the uninitiated?) memories are rendered unremembered. We have thus a transition from the damping down of this or that *response in behaviour* to the suppression of this or that *set of experiences*. Are the two processes *in pari materia*?

But enough has been said to show, however imperfectly, the range and interest of this work. One would welcome further light on the place of emotion in its relation to biological interpretation; for this is left rather vague. To revert, however, to what is the main issue: if perchance one may think that the Freudian doctrine is accepted on grounds that are a little too naively pragmatic, this is perhaps due to the original sin of "orthodox" psychology. The attitude often assumed, one to which even Dr Rivers sometimes seems to approach, is something of this kind: "Now does it not look very much *as if* there were a storehouse of forgotten experience? By the method of free association I have even now recaptured one of these memories. What say you to that? Does it not show that there *must be* such a storehouse? Is not my hypothesis verified?" In this workaday world, however, it is not a question of "must be" but of "is" or "is not." Opinions no doubt may differ. But as Huxley once said to an unworthy pupil: "Always fight shy of *As-if*. She is prolific mother to a whole brood of *Must-bes* which are the bane of science and philosophy."

C. LLOYD MORGAN.

The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy, illustrated from the Works of St Thomas Aquinas. By Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A., Litt.D. Hibbert Lectures, Second Series, October to December 1916.—Williams & Norgate, 1920.—Pp. xxvi + 669.

THE Hibbert Trustees did wisely in sanctioning Mr Wicksteed's choice of a subject for the lectures in 1916. While scholars of other nations, such as the Catholics whom the present Cardinal Mercier gathered round him at Louvain and the members of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes at Paris, have laboured for a generation past on the philosophy of the Middle Age, English students, outside the pale of the Roman Church, have even yet hardly awakened to its true significance. They still stride with seven-league boots over the fifteen centuries that part the Neo-Platonists from Descartes, content to echo Hegel's verdict that "no one can be expected to know the philosophy of the Middle Age at first hand, for it is as comprehensive and voluminous as it is barren and ill-expressed." Its volume is assuredly immense; but the Latinity of Anselm or Aquinas, if not Ciceronian, proves an admirable instrument for the expression of reasoned argument, and the thinking embodied in it, far from being sterile, comprises one of the most impressive attempts in the history of philosophy to effect a synthesis (or, as Mr Wicksteed would prefer to say, a formal alliance) between the dictates of reason and those of revealed religion. The aim of all the mediæval thinkers, whether Arab, Jew, or Christian, was to do justice to the respective claims of man's religious and intellectual experience. The problem is a living one to-day, and we may well be grateful to Mr Wicksteed for his lucid and scholarly exposition of Aquinas' effort towards its solution.

Aquinas was nothing if not systematic, and it is impossible to discuss the reactions between dogma and philosophy in his writings without touching at every step on the speculative foundations of his system. To furnish an exposition of these general principles and of their bearings on detailed questions of theology is the chief purpose and merit of these lectures. While they constitute an admirable introduction to the study of Aquinas, they will also be consulted with interest and profit by the practised scholar. The opening lecture is historical and prefatory, showing how in the early thirteenth century the *Corpus Theologicum*, based on Scripture as interpreted by ecclesiastical authority, was confronted for the first time with the newly discovered *Corpus Philosophicum* of Aristotle. Aristotle's teaching, especially as expounded by Averroës, conflicted in vital points (*e.g.* the eternity of the world and the mortality of the human soul) with Christian dogma, and Aquinas set himself boldly to achieve the needed reconciliation. In the second lecture is discussed Aquinas' *a priori* argument for the necessity of a revelation for man's progressive attainment of the goal marked out for him by his nature, the vision of God in Paradise; in the third, his vindication of the Christian revelation and his doctrine of faith as the assent of the intellect to the command of the will. The four following lectures are devoted to the content of the synthesis, viz. the leading tenets of natural and revealed theology (Lecture IV.), Aquinas' psychology in relation to man's ultimate destiny and his mediation between Aristotle's teaching that the soul is the form of the body and the belief in its substantiality and immortality (Lectures V., VI.), and the fusion in Aquinas' moral theory of Aristotelian and Christian ethics (Lecture VII.). The concluding lecture (VIII.), after a notice of the

imaginative side of Aquinas' genius, gives us Mr Wicksteed's final judgment on the value of his proffered reconciliation. It is rather an accommodation between two rival powers than a coherent synthesis; for the higher truths and the higher virtues alike transcend the capacity of human nature and require, not merely for their realisation but for their initial reception, "a spiritual *epigenesis*," a continual outpouring of supernatural grace. The notes appended to each lecture will prove of peculiar service to the student. They fill nearly half the volume and contain abundant quotations and a detailed commentary on points of special difficulty. We would indicate particularly the two *Excursus* on Aquinas' theory of intellect and will and on the *Visio Dei*, and the illuminating discussions on the *principia individuantia*, on the distinction of the passive, possible, and active intellect, and on the thorny problem of sensible and intelligible *species*.

The topic last mentioned is of special philosophical interest, for it raises the question how far the nucleus of the Cartesian theory of representative perception is traceable in Aquinas. As regards the *species sensibiles*, Mr Wicksteed makes it clear (pp. 403 ff., 622 ff.) that these are instrumental machinery, and that for Aquinas the direct object of sense-perception is not the *species* but the real external thing. He is less convincing when he interprets the *species intelligibilis* as "the direct object of intellectual contemplation" (pp. 622 ff.). In the tractate *De intellectu et intelligibili* (cited by Hauréau) we find that the *species intelligibilis* is treated on a par with the *species sensibilis* as the *medium quo* and distinguished from (a) the *res intellecta*, which is *extra intellectum*, and (b) the *conceptio intellectus*, i.e. the formed concept which is the product of the process to which the *species intelligibilis* is instrumental (compare *Quodl.* vii., art. 1). This *conceptio* is identical with the *verbum interius*, defined in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (iv. 11) as *id quod intellectus in se ipso concipit de re intellecta*. The same doctrine is clearly formulated in the treatise *De unitate intellectus* (c. 9) as against the Averroist inference from *unum intellectum* to *unus intellectus*. Two minds can apprehend one universal concept, because each apprehends it by means of a different *species*. The whole question bristles with difficulties, but we are inclined to question Mr Wicksteed's table on p. 622, where he identifies the conceived quiddity with the *species*, and to hold that for Aquinas the concept is one thing, the *species* another. We cannot discuss here the allied problem of the distinction of conceptual and real knowledge, except to note that Mr Wicksteed seems disposed to regard mathematical knowledge as purely conceptual. The issue is a contested one and Mr Wicksteed can adduce Mr Bertrand Russell in support of his view; yet if Kant achieved anything he surely showed that analytic knowledge (though its ghost still haunted him) was a chimera and that the mathematician cannot move a step without a perceptual construction. The "active intellect," to speak in Aquinas' language, functions not merely by way of abstraction, but as forming "synthetic *a priori*" judgments. The same partiality towards conceptualism is apparent when Mr Wicksteed (p. 11) interprets Aristotle as holding that "the world of abstractions and ideals . . . is a conceptual world . . . not existing in itself apart from things, but existing for the mind in things." "For the mind" is surely misleading. Aristotle held that the forms existed in things not merely for the abstracting intellect, but as real constituents, as the energising principles of their actuality.

To return to the larger issue. We have seen that Mr Wicksteed, for all his sympathy with the spirit of Mediæval Christianity and his recognition of Aquinas' intellectual integrity, leaves us under no illusion as to the shortcomings of the attempted mediation. We readily admit that in many points of detail, such as the scriptural basis of dogma (Lecture III.) and the appalling doctrine of hell (Lecture IV.), Aquinas has failed to prove his case. But, on the question of principle, has he not made good his contention that reason itself points to its own limits and justifies on its own showing the claim of faith? Five centuries after Aquinas' death, Kant rested his assurance of the supreme realities, not on reasoned inference but on a moral faith, a habit of the will, analogous to that habit by which, in Aquinas' system, religious faith is engendered in the soul. We have been told, and not only by Catholic theologians, that the issue before the world to-day is between the philosophy of Aquinas and that of Kant. We cannot accept the statement, for each age must create its own philosophy, and no past inheritance can satisfy the living desire of the human mind. Yet it is not too much to say that the problems of God, freedom, and immortality, which formed for Kant and still form the central interest of reason, first received their due meed of recognition at the hands of the great thinkers of the Middle Age. The volume before us amply serves to bring this home. Mr Wicksteed judged rightly to devote a large portion of his lectures to the question of human personality and the nature and destiny of the soul. His illuminating and convincing discussion of this and kindred problems of enduring interest entitle him to the gratitude of all serious students of philosophy.

W. G. DE BURGH.

READING.

Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott: Eine Monographie zur Geschichte der Grundlegung der katholischen Kirche. Von Adolf von Harnack.—Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1921.—Pp. xv+357.

HARNACK has touched Marcion more than once in his published work, specially in the *Dogmengeschichte* and in the *Altchristliche Litteratur*. It appears that as far back as 1870 he won a University prize for an essay on Marcion as criticised by Tertullian. Not a page of this youthful essay has been reprinted here, but the subject is the same; here at the age of seventy Harnack returns to the topic, to write a large, exhaustive monograph of over 600 pages in the *Texte und Untersuchungen*. "Non solum quid videas sed quemadmodum, refert," says Seneca somewhere. It is a tag which applies aptly to a subject like Marcion. The facts and data are there; hardly any fresh evidence has turned up, except the Marcionite prologues, recently; but what tells is the historical vision, and Harnack's mature, independent judgment makes this monograph a book to reckon with.

He begins by drawing an outline (pp. 1-19) of the religious situation, as Marcion found it, with tendencies towards a resolution of Christianity into a syncretistic religion or a religious philosophy. What Marcion did was to restate it as a simple, saving message. And yet a message about a paradoxical God! For "while all Christians of that age knew they were strangers upon earth, Marcion

corrected this belief into, 'God is the stranger.'" The redeeming God enters a strange world, through Jesus Christ—a world with which He has no vital connection, and for which He had no responsibility. Marcion's line was thus neither Catholic nor Gnostic, though it had affinities with both systems. He excluded æons and all the rest of it from his religion, but also all tradition and Old Testament sanctions.

The few facts of his life are (pp. 20–27) his birth, about A.D. 85, at Sinope; his excommunication by his father, probably on account of his heretical views; his visits to Asia Minor and Rome; his break with the Roman Church; and his propaganda before the middle of the second century—strictly speaking, in July of A.D. 144. Before he died, some ten or fifteen years later, the success of his movement was wide and deep, with its passionate emphasis on the superiority of Gospel to Law, of merciful love to punitive justice (pp. 27–32), on the free, gracious character of a God who could not act as He did if He had been in any such relation to poor humanity as the Old Testament, with its idea of a creative God, represented. Marcion's positive basis, therefore, implied a criticism of the New Testament, which restored it to its original, evangelical shape, and purged it from Judaism. He set himself, as Harnack shows (pp. 32–68), to give the Church, or his Church, a new Bible, consisting of Luke's Gospel in what he held to be its original shape, and a genuine edition of Paul's Epistles. This he followed up with a book of his own, "The Antitheses" (pp. 68–135), which must have disappeared early. Harnack then describes his Christian views in general (pp. 135–181), the working of his Church (pp. 181–190), and the history of his Church (pp. 191–230). The monograph closes with a sketch of his importance for the origin of the Catholic Church (pp. 230–247), and an estimate of his contributions to religious thought (pp. 247–265). The large appendix contains critical reconstructions of his "Apostolikon" and "Gospel," with some notes upon his critics and followers in the early Church. Unluckily, there is no index at all. Even a full table of contents does not make up for this defect.

The fruitful part of the monograph is its estimate of Marcion's religion. He was, says Harnack, a biblical theologian; "his Christianity represented itself as exclusively a book-religion. He was the first in Christendom to rest upon two collections of books; only, they did not hang together, the one abjured the other." He detested allegory in exegesis, though it is doubtful if he was always true to his principle. And this was bound up with his view of the Old Testament prophecies, which he tended to regard, with Jews, as more or less literally fulfilled, or at any rate as irrelevant to the spiritual ends of Jesus Christ. The Church clung to its Messianic interpretation, and required for that an allegorical exegesis which Marcion rejected. He regarded the Old Testament as predicting a purely human Messiah, who would fulfil a militant rôle for Jews alone. This was sad, poor stuff for the Catholic Church, but what better could be got by means of an anti-allegorical exegesis of the Old Testament? Very little, even by a moderate scholar like

Justin, who was as un-allegorical as a spiritual interpreter then could well be.

Indeed, Marcion's attitude towards the Old Testament is a puzzle. He could not carry through his radical judgment on its contents. Some of it, he allowed, was written for our instruction; there were stories, like those of Abraham and Solomon, which had a meaning for Christians; indeed, Jesus even fulfilled some of it, for he was the true Paschal Lamb, and his resurrection fulfilled the saying, "Death is swallowed up in victory." How then could a book containing such fragments or elements of truth be the work of the inferior Creator-God who was opposed to the good God and Father of Jesus? Were these elements secretly interpolated beforehand by this good God? Or did the Creator-God unwittingly cause things to be written which really applied to the good God? Harnack rejects the former hypothesis as "extremely difficult"; the latter he regards as unavoidable, though it introduces a certain inconsequence. But is any hypothesis necessary? Logical as Marcion may have been, his exploiting of a preconceived idea about the Old Testament was certain to find itself in difficulties. I doubt whether we are justified in attributing subtle theories to him at this point, or at any other. It is not the only inconsistency in his vivid grasp of what he regarded as vital Christianity.

The services involuntarily rendered to the Church by Marcion were manifold. He probably started the idea of an ordered and authoritative New Testament; he raised the problem of Old Testament exegesis in a sharp form; and he recalled men to the paramount significance of Jesus Christ, as well as to the identity between the teaching of Jesus and the teaching of Paul. Personally he must have been a man of high character, intense and one-sided in mind, but bent upon having a religion all Christian.

An interesting section is devoted to modern tendencies of a Marcionite kind, especially to reactions against an undue appreciation of the Old Testament. He calls attention to the striking parallels with Marcionitism, for example, in Thomas Morgan the Deist's work. Blake offers, however, an almost better parallel. It is no wonder that students of Blake have sometimes noted his "Marcionite" sympathies. Marcion would not indeed have said that "Art is Christianity," but he would have sympathised with the man who wrote about the Decalogue:

"O Christians, Christians, tell me why
You rear it on your altars high!"

Harnack even overhears in Tolstoy and Gorky echoes of Marcionite stress upon pity as the sole attitude to sin, as well as of pan-Christism. Yet he at once admits that this modern reproduction is inferior. "In the history of the Church and of the philosophy of religion, the Marcionite gospel has hardly ever been repeated; as a rule, at any rate, it has been a sign of religious indifference and of lazy dependence on tradition, not the result of a deeper and richer experience. A Marcionite sheet-lightning pervades all Church history and all

the history of dogma from Augustine onwards—from Augustine whose feeling for grace and freedom, in its theoretical expression, may be read in a Marcionite sense without much difficulty. But at most it is sheet-lightning and no more" (pp. 263–264).

Naturally the monograph deals with the textual criticism of the New Testament. Harnack sets out his proof, for example, that Marcion's "Apostolikon" lay before Tertullian in a Latin version, and incidentally argues that Marcion and Ambrosiaster alone preserve the true reading and sense of 1 Cor. xiv. 33–34 by their omission of *ὁ θεός* in verse 33. That is, instead of transposing 33b–36 to the end of verse 40, we are told to read: "the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets, for they are spirit not of disorder but of peace, as in all churches of the saints." This, however, does not seem particularly apt, and no real explanation is offered of the insertion of *ὁ θεός*.

However, details apart, this is a rich and comprehensive monograph, which does full justice to Marcion's remarkable ability, and collects an extraordinary amount of relevant material.

JAMES MOFFATT.

GLASGOW.

The Second Period of Quakerism. By William C. Braithwaite, B.A., LL.B., President of the Woodbrooke Settlement. With Introduction by Rufus M. Jones, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy, Haverford College, U.S.A.—Macmillan & Co., 1919.—Pp. xlviii + 668.

THIS and an earlier volume on *The Beginnings of Quakerism* (1912), which Mr Braithwaite has contributed to the "Rowntree Series," take rank among the most valuable of recent additions to the history of religion in this country. There are also included in the series two volumes of studies of other forms of mystical religion, by Dr Rufus Jones, the editor, and one on *The Quakers in the American Colonies* (1911). A promised volume on *The Later Stage of Quakerism*, by the editor, to complete the series, is shortly to appear. The whole work is dedicated to the memory of John Wilhelm Rowntree, who had projected such a history of Quakerism, but was cut off in the brilliant promise of his early manhood in 1905. He was one of a remarkable group of men and women, through whom in the last thirty years fresh vision and a new and fuller measure of spiritual effectiveness have come to the Society of Friends.

"Quaker history, with its wealth of trustworthy data," Mr Braithwaite said at the end of his first volume, "becomes a thing of singular interest, if only for the light it throws upon some of the obscure but profoundly important changes that turned prophetic into Catholic Christianity. For amid manifold flux and reflux Friends have maintained prophetic religion as the controlling force in their part of the Church, and have again and again resisted the encroachment of priestly elements. They have, indeed, passed through long periods of traditionalism and institutional rigidity and intellectual poverty, but the living voice of the Spirit has never been wholly silent among them." And, as marking the distinctively prophetic character of the movement, he quoted on an earlier page these words

of his friend, Wilhelm Rowntree: "The conception of the inwardness of the Kingdom faithfully interpreted, cut at the root of all the shams, all mere conventionalities, all religion by proxy, all unbrotherliness, all injustice, all artificial limitations. Interpreted with sincerity, it worked itself out into a practical gospel, a spiritual and social order transcending all contemporary ideals in its realisation of lofty purity and loving fellowship."

Such is the character of the movement, the history of which during the first seventy years of its course Mr Braithwaite has told. His limit is the year 1725, the rest of the history, both in this country and in America and elsewhere, being left for the final volume of the series. The story of the "Beginnings" covers the heroic period of the birth and astonishing progress of the movement, under the inspiration of George Fox and other of the "First Publishers of Truth," down to 1660; the second volume, with less of the surprise and fascination of the earlier record, but still with a sustained interest, tells of the persecution of the Restoration period and the subsequent consolidation of the Society of Friends. The record is clear and impartial, of how the great wave of progress was checked, and the people, who might, as it seemed, have swept like a renovating tide of the Spirit over the whole land, settled down into a tolerated and recognised religious community, with a distinctive message indeed, and yet only as one among several of the smaller Nonconformist bodies of the country. The contrast is marked by the difference between the two dominating personalities of George Fox and George Whitehead: Fox, the man of quickening and commanding spiritual power, "a new and heavenly-minded man," as William Penn described him; and Whitehead, in Mr Braithwaite's phrase, "the embodiment of worthy and drab respectability, devoid of genius and of little humour, but industrious and politic," who brought to the Society which Fox had organised a "cautious and pedestrian guidance," out of which no "fresh adventures or inspired new enthusiasms" were likely to arise. Fox died in 1691, Penn in 1713, and Whitehead in 1723. Thus the latter part of the great leader's life and the whole career of the other two fall within the period of Mr Braithwaite's second volume; and there is one other name of great significance for the future promise of the Society, belonging entirely to this period, that of John Bellers, who died in 1725, "the first of a long line of Quaker philanthropists, and the pioneer of modern Christian Socialism," noted by Karl Marx as "a veritable phenomenon in the history of political economy." The account of his remarkable and original experiments, making for social betterment, is one of the most interesting passages in the book.

The opening chapters, dealing with the splendid constancy of Friends under persecution, and their decisive stand for religious liberty, include a full account of William Penn, and incidentally recall the notable trial of Penn and William Meade at the Old Bailey in 1670, when the courage of Edward Bushell, the foreman, successfully vindicated the independence of juries, in face of the brow-beating lawlessness of the magistrate, and finally secured a judgment of the Supreme Court to that effect. There follows a narrative of the organisation of the Society in what is called the "Period of Expression," with a chapter on the Formulation of Faith, in which the classic Apology of Robert Barclay holds the chief place. Dr Rufus Jones, in his Introduction, offers a valuable comment on Barclay's doctrine of human nature, which accepted the current dualism of the time

to the influence of which in after years he attributes in some measure the quietism which came to be the prevalent attitude among Friends. With this view Mr Braithwaite clearly agrees, and concludes his own deeply interesting treatment of the Apology with an eloquent affirmation of what he holds to be the truer conception of human nature and its relation to the Divine.

The year 1666 may be taken as the turning-point in the history. In September of that year Fox was released from the worst of his many imprisonments, in Scarborough Castle. "I was so weak with lying about three years in cruel and hard imprisonments," he records in his Journal, "my joints and my body were so benumbed that I could hardly get on my horse"; but nothing could daunt his spirit, and he had made his way by November to London, only to find the city in ashes after the Great Fire. He found also the body of Friends, as Mr Braithwaite relates, "bruised by persecution, and weakened by the dividing Perrot spirit." "The first need was to re-invigorate the desolated Church," and to this task Fox at once addressed himself. He would not rest, but travelled incessantly throughout the country, establishing the discipline of Monthly Meetings, and in due course the complete organisation of the Society as a whole. His aim was to draw Friends together in a truer fellowship "in the Spirit," to deepen the power of their testimony to the Truth and give it freer way in the world; but as the organisation was perfected there were inevitable protests against the imposition of authority, and there was loss as well as gain through the curtailment of individual freedom. The problems thus presented must be of serious concern to all who have the interest of spiritual religion at heart, and the opportunity for such consideration afforded by Mr Braithwaite's work is not least among our reasons for gratitude to him. Dr Rufus Jones touches on the same point in the Introduction, where he says: "With all its limitations, this Society, organised in the Restoration period, against the protests of the pure idealists, has proved to be the most impressive experiment in Christian history of a group-mysticism, a religious body practising corporate silence as the basis of worship and maintaining a fundamental faith in Spirit-guided ministry." Both as regards organisation of Church fellowship and the true basis of united spiritual worship there is much to be learnt from the Society of Friends, but there are also questions we must ask of them and the experience of their history. Our questions we shall hope to be able to ask with fuller satisfaction when the final volume of this masterly series is in our hands.

V. D. DAVIS.

BOURNEMOUTH.

The Gospels as Historical Documents. Part III., The Fourth Gospel.
By Vincent Henry Stanton, D.D.—Cambridge, 1920.

IN this volume the Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge completes the work of which the first part was published in 1903, and the second in 1909. Official duties often compelled the writer to lay aside his investigations for months together; time was lost in recovering the threads which had been dropped; the exploration of the vast mass of controversial literature imposed a heavy burden on the faithful scholar—what student in these last difficult years will not sympathise with

such an apology, and congratulate the author on the fulfilment of the purpose with which he started?

After the endeavour in Part I. to determine the place of the Gospel in the literature of the second century, this concluding volume deals chiefly with its internal characteristics. A brief survey of the course of criticism in the first chapter (where the citation of Dr Sanday as a defender of the apostolic authorship should surely have been followed by a notice of his final admission that he was "probably wrong") leads to an examination of the structure of the Gospel and the question of its integrity. A discussion of its relation to the Apocalypse and the Epistles follows. The evidence for attributing the Gospel to John the son of Zebedee is then examined with reference on the one hand to the statement in the Syriac Martyrology, the prediction in Mark x. 39, the absence of early defence of the Gospel's authenticity, and on the other to the internal evidence of the Gospel itself. This opens the way for a presentation of the environment in which the Gospel was produced; and the work concludes with a comparison of it with the Synoptics, limited, however, almost entirely to their narratives.

The tone of the inquiry is throughout calm and temperate. Only here and there does some adventurous critic like Professor B. W. Bacon disturb the author's equanimity. Differences of view there must be upon a hundred disputed points, but the book leaves the impression of a sincere and laborious effort to face difficulties and (with large use of "probably" and "may have been") to overcome them. The constant tendency to minimise differences cannot, however, be altogether restrained. Thus in the discussion of the Apocalypse, for which, of course, the external attestation of apostolic authorship is far stronger than for the Gospel, Dr Stanton is very anxious to retain the substance of the visions as seen by the son of Zebedee. Yet he cannot ignore the inconsistencies and breaches of continuity which the book exhibits. These are conveniently put down to an editor, and the Domitian date is accepted for the time of composition. Still the visions must be assigned to the Apostle, though the book itself styles the author a Prophet. But what amount of editorial redaction can justify the ascription of the substance of Rev. xii. and John xiv. to the same mind, or even refer the seven letters to the Churches to the same pen as 1 John?

The hypothesis of an editor plays a large part in this volume. It replaces the claim to actual Johannine composition, and enables the author to vindicate the authority of the teaching, while occasionally surrendering the historical accuracy of the narrative. Dr Stanton rejects all theories of actual partition such as those of Wendt, Spitta, or Wellhausen, but he is not afraid to make suggestions of his own. Thus the confusions of chapter vi., and its apparent dislocation of passages in v. and vii., lead to the surmise (p. 69) that chapter vi. or part of it may have been interpolated in the original Gospel, and we are told afterwards, with reference to the discourse on the "bread of life," that "the probability is that the Evangelist would not care to be exact about the precise occasion on which each thing was spoken" (p. 239). Yet if the Evangelist was thus indifferent about the facts, what guarantee is there of his exactness about the words? Between the Synoptic and the Johannine account of the expulsion of the temple-traffickers it is impossible to choose (p. 235), but respect for the earlier version begets the conclusion that "Mark is entitled to preference as a historical witness." The differences in the time-sequence of the last

days in Jerusalem "may have been due to the Evangelist's own imagination and reasoning." He "may have represented Mary as anointing the feet not the head because he felt certain that she would choose to do that which betokened the most profound reverence." Dr Stanton has made up his mind that the Evangelist did not know Luke. But why did Mary wipe Jesus' feet with her hair? Was that also an act of the most profound reverence?

The reader who compares John xii. 3 with Luke vii. 38, 46 has little doubt of the reason, though it is of course possible to argue that the dependence is not literary, but part of a common tradition. Clear contradiction in the accounts of the date of the Last Supper is frankly recognised. The picture of the betrayal in Gethsemane extorts the frank admission that "it cannot be claimed that these features come from one who was present" (p. 259). One item of evidence concerning the Evangelist's view of the synchronism of Jesus' death with the offering of the Paschal lambs in the temple is curiously ignored. Dr Stanton rejects the suggestion that Jesus was thus presented as the true "Passover" on the ground that he did not draw attention in some way to the coincidence. But this is precisely what he does do. Why were not the legs of Jesus broken on the cross like those of the two malefactors? Unless (with Bousset) xix. 36 is rejected, the identification of Jesus with the Lamb is effected by a reference to the Pentateuchal regulations, Ex. xii. 46, Num. ix. 12.

Very interesting and significant is Dr Stanton's discussion of the relation of the Prologue to the rest of the Gospel, pp. 166-179, perhaps the most original part of his book. Starting from Harnack's well-known essay, he accepts his main conclusion concerning the absence of the Logos doctrine from the body of the work without adopting his reason for it. He dwells on the omission of the Evangelist to employ the term in his own reflections or in the statement of his object in producing a fresh version of the sacred story. He notes the total disappearance of all reference to the cosmical functions of the Incarnate Logos. In the allusions to Christ's resumption of a prior state of existence which he had laid aside for his earthly life it is impossible to suppose that he had resigned his mediating energy between God and the universe. The conception of transcendent Sonship is not founded on the Logos. It is part of Dr Stanton's limited interest in the Old Testament and his inadequate estimate of the variety of elements in contemporary Judaism that he makes no attempt to connect the presentation of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God (xx. 31), with the attributes of Life and Light in God Himself. In the list of quotations on p. 153 these themes are ignored. The relation of the Gospel to Paulinism is set aside; and while the author glances with reserve at the Hermetic literature as well as Philo, he passes wholly by the Odes of Solomon. The conclusion of the whole matter is that "in the Prologue and the remainder of the Gospel we have the history of the Evangelist's thought in inverse order." When the Logos conception, "which he had recently acquired," was prefixed to the Gospel, "he did not alter the subject matter which had gradually taken shape in his mind, or even in part perhaps had been written down, at an earlier stage of his career" (p. 178 f.). The Logos Christology has thus no apostolic sanction.

A few *incuriæ* appear occasionally in Dr Stanton's pages. Stoicism, which is pantheistic on p. 193, is "an atheistic system" (p. 165), a

peremptory dismissal of Cleanthes, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. On p. 139 ἐκεῖνος (xix. 35) is strangely designated a preposition! "The words attributed to the Baptist at xiii. 25, where he denies that 'I am'" (p. 176), are not to be found anywhere in the sense demanded by our author, for the only occurrence (in xi. 21) has no absolute significance, but refers immediately to the question, "Art thou Elijah?" By what strange confusion the Baptist is introduced at the Last Supper, we cannot conjecture.—Dr Stanton's work deserves sincere recognition as an honest attempt to state facts and meet difficulties. If hypothesis and conjecture play a large part in the solutions, the cause is to be found in our admitted ignorance of the conditions under which the Gospel was produced. The traditional view of its apostolic origin is now cautiously but decisively abandoned. Large play is allowed to the editor's activity. He was not himself necessarily a hearer of all that he reproduces. He collects traditions from a group. It remains to be seen how long it will take for criticism which rejects so many pseudo-historical statements as the result of imagination to see in much of the discourses a similar exercise of the dramatic faculty working upon the faith of the Church.

J. ESTLIN CARPENTER.

OXFORD.

A Commentary on the Bible. Edited by Arthur S. Peake, M.A., D.D., with the assistance for the New Testament of A. J. Grieve, M.A., D.D.—London: T. C. & E. C. Jack, Ltd., 1919.—Pp. xxi+1014.

THIS Commentary is intended primarily for the use of educated laymen. It provides in attractive style "the generally accepted results of Biblical Criticism, Interpretation, History, and Theology." Dean Inge in his *Outspoken Essays* says:

"We lament that the working man takes but little interest in Christianity, and rack our brains to discover what we have done to discredit our religion in his eyes. The truth is that Christianity, as a dogmatic and ecclesiastical system, is unintelligible without a considerable knowledge of the conditions under which it took shape. But what are the ancient Hebrews, and the Greeks, and Romans to the working man? He is simply cut off from the means of reading intelligently any book of the Bible, or from understanding how the institution called the Catholic Church, and its offshoots, came to exist. As our staple education becomes more 'modern' and less literary, the custodians of organised religion will find their difficulties increased."

There is truth in this. Some of the institutions will need to be transformed. Yet, if this volume is mastered by those who influence current thinking, the Bible will cease to be unintelligible. It is the most ambitious attempt that has yet been made to bring the new knowledge before the general public. But the materials it provides, and especially its suggestions in the bibliographies and in many notes, are invaluable to those whose interest in the Bible is more special than that of the educated layman. The value is the greater because a deliberate attempt is made to deal with the Scriptures apart from the accretions of sentiment, superstition, and sacerdotalism that have blurred their meaning through many generations. There is no attempt to explain the Lord's brothers in a non-natural sense; the cult of fasting communion is not accepted as primitive; the prefix "Saint" is dropped from the traditional titles of the

New Testament books. In a communication to the contributors Dr Peake says :

"Where one of the great difficulties with which teachers of the Bible have to contend is the sense of unreality that invests so much of the Biblical history, the use of reverential epithets tends to interpose a veil between the modern reader and faces already too dim. The vivid sense of actual history, the realisation that apostles and evangelists were men of flesh and blood like our own, which it is a main purpose of the Commentary to give, is likely to be somewhat blunted by bringing into our interpretation of the record the attitude of a later age."

A special feature of this volume is the series of articles on subjects that bear upon the serious study of the Bible. Of the Old Testament series, dealing with interpretation of thought, literary form, geography, history, language, religion, social and industrial customs, and chronology, nothing can be said here further than that these are of an invariably high order. There are, however, three articles in the New Testament series that reveal the more extended background against which the books of the Bible must be interpreted to-day. Professor F. J. Haverfield writes on "The Roman Empire in the First Century"; Mr Claude G. Montefiore, on "Contemporary Jewish Religion"; Professor Gilbert Murray, on "Pagan Religion at the Coming of Christianity." The names of the writers of these articles are as significant in a Commentary on the Bible as are the subjects. Other articles introductory to or illustrative of the New Testament writings deal with the language, canon, text and textual criticism, the literature, history, religion, organisation, and chronology. No attempt is made to arrange the books chronologically; in the Old Testament the order of the English Bible is followed; in the New Testament Mark is placed before Matthew, and Colossians and Philemon are taken with Ephesians; these articles, however, give the necessary data for a chronological arrangement, so far as this is possible. Where so much is provided it seems preposterous to ask for more. But there is room for some more detailed treatment of the Johannine group of writings, especially in view of Professor B. W. Bacon's theory that these are the product of a Pauline school of writers in Ephesus. The Apocrypha, also, in connection with both the Old and New Testaments, deserve more recognition than they get. Perhaps this is to ask that the Commentary should become a Bible Dictionary; but the Editor has gone so far in this direction that he alone is responsible for inciting the desire for extension.

Because of the restricted knowledge of the results reached by Biblical scholars, it is necessary, perhaps, that so large a portion of the Commentary (nearly 600 pages) should be given up to the Old Testament. The larger bulk of the literature may seem to demand this, and much that attaches itself to Old Testament interpretation can be utilised for the New Testament; yet when a larger knowledge of the Old Testament obtains a different treatment will be possible. Some of the commentaries on the Old Testament books can then be expressed in very few paragraphs. All that is necessary will be to fasten upon what contributed to the forces that were converging to one point; what has become obsolete can be left. If Christianity is the gathering up of the thoughts of humanity in their entirety, if Christ is the light of every man coming into the world, then in a larger sense than ever the meaning of Scripture must be shown to centre in Him, or to possess little value. In the Commentary of the future the New Testament will have first place, and interest in the Old

Testament will flow from the idea and ideals to which Christianity has served itself heir by means of that history of God's dealings with a chosen people. In addition, something will be needed, after the manner of Professor Gilbert Murray's article, with reference to other peoples by whom God's grace became a gift to the world. Some advance is made in this direction, but this is a goal still far away. In the near future it may become possible to take it for granted that the Pentateuch had some other author or authors than Moses. The prevalence of the tradition of his authorship makes it necessary to go into the subject at some length. Dr Estlin Carpenter points out that the analysis of the Pentateuch is not primarily linguistic. There are other grounds—inconsistencies in the statement of facts, divergences in the presentation of the events and institutions of the Mosaic age, and incongruities in legislative enactments—that make against the theory of a single author. But it is true that the linguistic differences point towards the solution of the problem, and this test can in many cases be safely applied. The composite authorship is shown to make plain many crooked places in the narrative. The interest of *Genesis* persists. Its affinities in the creation stories with Babylonian tradition do not detract from its value. There is a clearness in its record of the origin of things that counts. It affords a starting-point. Many are repelled by the critical attitude towards Old Testament history because it offers nothing concrete in place of what it takes away. This is not the method of this Commentary. Much would be gained for clearness of perception in reading these narratives if the idea of theological argument were set aside. It is neither the standpoint of the Psalms, nor of Paul, nor of modern thought that *Genesis* represents. Yet, if the date of the book be late, theology cannot be altogether absent.

The commentaries on the separate books are necessarily condensed. Yet the large page, small type, double columns, and the use of abbreviations make it possible to present a wealth of materials within small space. About 650 pages are taken up by these. The text of the R.V. is taken as the basis, but this is not printed. Generally the paragraph, and not the verse or phrase, is taken as the unit for comment. This has value far greater than what appears at first. There may be astonishment that some familiar texts do not occupy so large a place as they have done in our eclectic use of the Scriptures. But this is a vital element in the educative value of the Commentary. What the writers have to declare as their conception of God's will, and not some literary tag, or even some glorious phrase that kindles emotion or imagination, is of first and greater moment.

There is no uniformity in the methods of the various commentators. Sometimes there is little more than a paraphrase of the text. This is not written in detraction. In many cases the paraphrase is most illuminating. This is notably so in the contribution on John's Gospel. The attempt is made to discriminate between the record of historical fact and the evidences of reflection upon the facts that indicate the later views of the author's own times. With the paraphrase, in other cases, there are notes elucidating difficult idioms or phrases. There is a great variety in the character of the notes. This could not be avoided. Yet there is a sense of incongruity when, after an attempt to interpret what is of vital value, there follows the attempt to prove that the purpose of writing made it necessary that the writer should invent his facts, and then to pass to another method in which geographical information is prominent, and yet another in which a genial acceptance of a barbarous conception of life is

outstanding. For the most part the commentaries are excellent. That on *Numbers*, one of the most difficult books, is one of the best. In the commentary on *Kings* no attempt is made to minimise ugly facts or to make matters of questionable morality seem religious, or even respectable. Other motives, generally those connected with primitive magic, are suggested. No doubt this is the only possible explanation that can be substantiated. Dr Peake, in his intercalated notes, goes back again and again to folk-lore parallels and illustrations. What most impresses a reader is the humility of learning these pages reveal. The Commentary aims at being critical and not definitely devotional, yet there is nothing of "grammatical terrorism" from beginning to end. Very seldom are the original languages quoted; where they are, the text is given in English characters.

In a composite work an equal level of excellence is not to be expected. Each contributor has had liberty within the limits imposed by the plan of the book. This involved the possibility of diverse pronouncements on disputed points. In some cases there is more of the processes of Biblical scholarship in evidence than there is of results. This is all to the good. To face, in contact with the documents and the evidence, the problem of the early Pauline history as related in *Galatians* and in *Acts*, or the larger problem of the prominence of the Cross in Paul's letters in contrast with the prominence of the Resurrection in his preaching recorded in *Acts*, or the origin of the Johannine literature, brings home the reality of difficulties that are often treated with impatience or even petulance. "Great things have always appeared simple to those who know comparatively little about them." Only the student knows the industry that is necessary for understanding what the Scriptures teach. The work in general is sound in principle, simple in expression, and scholarly in treatment. Facts are frankly accepted. No apology is made that these do not always harmonise with the ideas of persons or institutions that tradition has made current. Here and there a touch of humour emerges—a quality very rare in a Commentary. One instance may be given, Jacob's Blessing (which is not Jacob's at all, but belongs to the period of the Kings) on Judah, whose land has vines "so numerous and luxuriant that the stems are used for tethering animals, and the wine for washing clothes, and the eyes are dull with heavy drinking." Dr Peake adds: "Happy land! the writer means, where drink is so plentiful." Some exceptions must be taken. The commentary on *Judges* is coloured by too close contact with the late war. This is a defect. The problem of the book is not faced. The position, "Whatever is, is right," is taken for granted. In the introduction a section on "The School of War" describes the wars of Israel as wars of defence. This is only half the truth when the attackers were what remained of the recently dispossessed. The whole section is too uncritical to be really valuable. To bring *Judges* up to date is to put it out of date. Interpreted in terms of the war, it becomes stale and unprofitable. *Judges* must be regarded as a record coloured by the ideals of its own times, and it is the business of a commentator to keep this clearly before him. The connection of the Jewish Passover, in the commentary on *Exodus*, with Anglican use in the communion of Christians and with Kikuyu, tends to make it sectional. And the reference to Jethro as bishop suggests what is false. This is a fashion in exposition that has caused too much trouble to be tolerated in a serious contribution to the scientific interpretation of the Scriptures. The commentary on *Joshua* takes an extremely advanced

position. In a few cases there is special pleading. The facts are manipulated in order to illustrate a theory. This evokes the Editor's dissent in the case of *Esther* and *Lamentations*. It is a pity that commentaries in such a volume as this should be made a means of propaganda for a peculiar opinion. That is out of place where the intention is to impart knowledge, and not merely to arouse curiosity or cause irritation. Professor J. H. Moulton states his view concerning the Epistle of James very decisively, and then appeals to its contents for evidence that his view is feasible. This is a different matter. His description of James as "an open letter" is illuminating, and worth pages of what has sometimes passed as commentating. There is a reference to George Eliot in *Galatians* that would have been better left out. When no more can be said, it is a pity that so little should be said. The danger is that the little should be seized upon in order to denounce, without sufficient knowledge. Another reference to a "scrap of paper" is irrelevant.

The commentaries on the Gospels are of excellent quality. Mr H. G. Wood, on *Mark*, is brilliant. There is much that is reminiscent of Dr T. R. Glover's breezy treatment of the gospel materials in his *Jesus of History*, especially in his recognition of humour in Jesus. But Mr Wood has other qualities of his own, and his power of penetrating into the heart of the narrative and presenting its meaning in challenging manner is used most successfully. There is an instance in his comment on the rejection of Jesus at Nazareth. "Want of faith surprised Him. This is significant. It shows how natural trust in God seemed to Jesus." There are many beautiful and illuminating phrases of this character. This goes to prove that modern views do not of necessity blur spiritual vision. Dr Grieve, also, has made notable contributions on *Matthew* and *Luke*. Affinities with other current literature are brought out. This points to a new significance that gathers about world-history and its meaning for Christianity. The attitude to miracles is revealing. It is disconcerting for the unprepared to stumble upon detached notes that adumbrate a view that has not been developed. Yet there is this to remember. The miracles are seldom used as the basis of teaching to-day, unless it is by way of illustration. Perhaps this is their right use, a reversion to the original use.

The concluding sentence of Professor J. V. Bartlet's contribution on "The Religious Background of the New Testament Writings" needs amplification. "The Apostolic age was, above all things, the age of the Spirit; and the New Testament writings must be read in the light of this fact." Such a statement must be received with reserve. To accept it as sufficient is to separate the subsequent development and progress of Christianity from its beginnings, and this is not helpful. It also makes it necessary to interpret the Apostolic history by what is exceptional.

The work of Dr Peake must have more definite mention. In addition to the articles on "The Development of the Old Testament Literature," "The Prophetic Literature," "The Chronology of the Old Testament," "The Poetical and Wisdom Literature," "The Prophetic Literature," "Organisation, Church Meetings, Discipline, Social and Ethical Problems," and "The Pauline Epistles," he has written the commentaries on *Genesis*, *Isaiah* i.-xxxix, *Jonah*, and *1 Corinthians*. His learning, lucidity, and resourcefulness in literary allusion (in his case literature has an exceedingly wide connotation) combine to make these contributions of outstanding importance. The commentary on *Jonah*, compressed into three pages, is

a gem of the first order. This "purely imaginative" story lives as a protest against the dark and stubborn temper of Israel, and the like temper of unbelief in all times. Beyond this, Dr Peake has kept a firm grasp on all that the Commentary contains. Scattered through its pages are notes within brackets with his initials, calling attention to alternative views of debatable subjects and other information that has become available. In the Old Testament it is significant that many of these notes refer to folk-lore. Dr Peake expresses regret that use could not be made of Sir James Frazer's *Folk-lore in the Old Testament*. Dr Grieve is responsible for some additional notes in the New Testament section.

It is not to be supposed that all the conclusions arrived at in this Commentary, even where the authorities are agreed, will stand. The problem of the sources of the Gospels is far from settled. The "Two-Document Hypothesis" is accepted here; but, although Canon B. H. Streeter states that the "Oral Tradition Theory" "is now abandoned by nearly all scholars," there are some scholars who still look longingly towards it. There is a harmony of opinion concerning the Pauline Epistles. With the exception of the Pastorals, which probably are "some of Paul's notes to his fellow-workers . . . expanded by later writers into the Church manuals we now possess," these are taken as genuine writings of the Apostle. Yet it cannot be claimed that there is any finality in this Commentary. Its excellences (more than its defects) make it possible to move more rapidly towards a general consensus of the relative values of the Scriptural books. Much spade-work remains to be done. On many points more light is needed; on some the light may never shine. The work of criticism on the Old Testament, so far as it finds expression in this volume, has vindicated itself in most respects. There is still impatience at the process of dividing the early books and assigning the various portions to their sources. But this impatience will pass as the truth gets home. The Bible itself encourages the unfettered search for truth, so far as search with such an instrument as human intelligence can be unfettered. Principal Jacks in a recent sermon at Oxford said that the search for truth brought men up against God, and made them realise that He is greater than they. This brought bafflement, and some became agnostic. Others knew, however, that the secret of God is alone worth while, and they aspired notwithstanding bafflement. The new setting of the Old Testament brings us into contact with those of long ago who were thus "baffled to fight better." And the book can no longer be relegated to the category of old, far-off, forgotten things. Even the history that manipulates facts for the sake of a cause, such as we meet in *Chronicles*, testifies to a spirit in man that attaches itself to God in days that are dark, without counting the cost. The problem of the writer of *Chronicles* is that of Philo in a later age. He regards the Law (particularly what the Pentateuch contains) as vital. All that does not conform to this must of necessity be wrong. Thus he is free to alter records that are not in harmony with that Law, although in doing so he creates another problem, which remains insoluble until the key is found. *Chronicles* is a picture of what ought to be and would be if the Law of Moses were accepted and kept.

Only a few of the many topics dealt with in the volume before us have been touched upon. One matter of practical importance must be mentioned. In days when many babble about Reunion of the Churches, it is well to point out that the Churches are at one in such a book as this. Indeed, there is a unity that goes beyond the organised Churches. Anglican,

Unitarian, Congregationalist, Methodist, Presbyterian are together as teachers of the true Catholic Church—a prophecy of what will be when men everywhere care less for current fashions and strive most for principles. As understanding of the Scriptures grows, especially understanding of their affinities with all that the world has discovered in the realms of intellect, emotion, and spiritual aspiration, we shall witness that oneness in Christ that fathoms His thought, and finds expression as His highest ambition for His people, and through them for the world and God.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

COALVILLE, LEICESTER.

Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte. By Oswald Spengler.—München: Oskar Beck, 1920.

THIS is a formidable piece of reading, and it will be a matter of regret if its size and literary characteristics hinder it from exciting the interest it deserves. The half might, perhaps, be better than the whole; but we have only the whole, and cannot afford to neglect it as a contribution to philosophic thought, whatever the ultimate verdict on it may be. Its faults are those of much modern German writing, with its tendency to evade a definition by the use of a word, and to carry the reader through all the perplexities of the writer's own mind in the process of discovery and formulation. There is also a tendency to overlook the work of other minds on a kindred subject, which was certainly not the fault of Germans like Schopenhauer, but may sometimes be charged to the count of modern Germans, along with the corresponding naïve belief in the absolute newness of all they are saying.

To turn, however, to the more profitable consideration of the substance and significance of the work. The main characteristics of Dr Spengler's philosophy are relativity and fatalism: the relativity of the race and the individual to the respective *Kultur*, and of the *Kultur* to the Life or *Seelentum* of which it is the expression; fatalism, or an acceptance of individual and social destiny, as the resulting ethical creed.

In the process of human history there is no continuity of evolution, but a series of separate growths. "*Humanity is an empty word*; it has no history of its own. In place of that history we have the aspect of a multiplicity of vast Kulturs, each Kultur being the expression of a Soul; a Soul that springs from the ever-productive womb of a living Nature, the Nature that existed for Goethe, not for Newton. This primitive soul is dumb and inorganic; in the Kultur it finds form and expression. In the life of each Kultur we behold the same process as in all natural life—birth, growth, prime and decay; this process being as inevitable as in the life of a plant. Each Kultur has its own art, its own mathematics, its own natural science, its own philosophy or religion, and in these it finds its act and expression. "*We have at last recognised that Arts are organisms which hold their appointed place in the greater organism of the Kultur*" (p. 379).

The last stage of each Kultur is Civilisation, of which doubt, questioning, and self-consciousness are the moral characteristics; cosmopolitanism, the political characteristic; atheism or "*the expression of an exhausted spirituality*," the religious characteristic. "*Early artists are the masters of Form, late ones are its slaves. . . . In the days of Rembrandt and Bach the phenomenon with which we are familiar, of the task destroying the man, would*

be unthinkable" (p. 393). "*Kultur and Civilisation are as the living body of a spiritual entity, and its dried mummy*" (p. 488).

We can compare the stage of life of one Kultur with its corresponding stage in another, we can establish analogies, but there is no passage from one into another; they are the *denial*, not the origin or product, of each other. The individuals and races of one Kultur are totally unable to appropriate, or exercise, or develop, or even criticise, the arts and sciences and religion of another Kultur; these individuals and races can have no inward understanding of them; their life and capacity are of another order. In the Renaissance there was an illusive attempt on the part of minds essentially Gothic to produce art of a Hellenic character; but the movement was one of opposition to existing life, and was carried out in virtue of the very life it endeavoured to oppose. Michael Angelo, for instance, strove to be "an artist of the Renaissance, but failed"; his was a "Gothic struggle, though with Renaissance types and traditions."

We are introduced by Dr Spengler to three dominating Kulturs: the Ancient, or Hellenic; the Indian, or Magic; the Gothic, or Faustian, or Western. The characteristics of Ancient culture, imprinted on its mathematics as on its art, on its science as on its religion, are clearness, immediacy, nearness, all that pertains to the direct expression of the body; no sense of distance, whether of time or space; no hint of atmosphere and environment; Euclidean mathematics, plastic art, religious polytheism. Greek tragedy is of pose and attitude, not of action. Indian culture (to which much less study is devoted) deals with the problem of good and evil, God and Devil; its mathematics are algebraic; its art is of the unearthly; its religion, of good and bad spirits. The characteristics of Gothic culture are its sense of personality and will and effort; its perception of space, of distance, of environment, of atmosphere. Its mathematics treat number as a function, not as a limit; its art is of painting and perspective, of music and harmony; its religion is one of eternity and immensity. Its tragedy is of will and action and effort; of the individual at war with vast, unexplored forces. Greek culture died off into Stoicism and Epicureanism; Indian, into Buddhism; Western culture is now dying off in Industrialism, Mechanism, and Socialism.

These themes are elaborated through many pages, and it is impossible to give adequate account of them in a short space. There are passages of high poetical insight, and phrases of mystical truth and beauty. We may note, specially, the treatment of Impressionism, as the final artistic expression of the Western soul, with its sense of immensity and of that shadowy environment into which the individual is at last absorbed (pp. 384-389). Again, we may note the treatment of the relation of mathematics to art and life. "*Mathematics are an art; a great mathematician is an artist and a visionary . . . the mathematics of the beautiful and the beauty of the mathematical can no longer be sundered*" (p. 383). Then we have his insistent and beautiful treatment of Rembrandtesque painting.

Altogether the character description of art and science and religion in their relation to each Kultur is surely, in many respects, admirable. But when we come to the question of the ultimate acceptance of the entire thesis, in which ultimate acceptance Dr Spengler firmly believes, some hesitation is justifiable. It is for scholars and specialists in history and science to apprise some of his statements and theories, and it is probable that many will have to suffer a process of reduction at their hands. There

is an obvious neglect of some of the best modern work in his treatment of certain philosophical and historic subjects, a neglect not justifiable in a work so markedly critical in character. Thus there are pages which cry out for some reference to the works of M. Bergson, and receive it not; for some discussion of the "Philosophy of Action," as set forth by M. Maurice Blondel and Père L. Laberthonnière, which discussion is lacking. He speaks often of the Mystery religions of Greece, but makes no mention of important modern work on the subject, such as, *e.g.*, the treatises of Professor A. Loisy. On all these matters we must leave him in the hands of the expert in each subject, and must confine our attention to his philosophy in its general aspect; to its leading theories of relativity and fatalism, as applied to human life.

If we accept those theories, as he tells us we must all eventually do, then we have done with any fundamental relation of man to the entire human race, for all men are enclosed, almost as in a prison, in their own Kultur, and cannot reach out of it in living sympathy with any other. Then we have also done with any universal truth or religion; for whereas every Kultur is religious, there is no religion that embraces all Kulturs. There is no true mission in life; there is no self-determination of individual or country or age. There is no direct relation of the individual to the Eternal; he is but a subordinate factor to his own inevitable Kultur. The path of achievement is in acceptance of this fact, not in creativeness or opposition. *Provincialism is non-acceptance of our fate.* The element of the unknown, the undefined possibilities of futurity, in virtue of which men have ever dared their highest and best, are eliminated. No more dreams of a happier world to which our efforts will have contributed; no faith in a Kingdom of God upon earth, in a brotherhood of nations, in a future, here or elsewhere, in which we shall all share. The word *humanity* is an illusion: the word Kultur has usurped its place. And our lesson would seem to be the more bitter because our Western Kultur is on the decline, a decline which is as inevitable as its approaching extinction. Owing to the development of our historic sense we are left with the last solemn privilege of assisting at our own deathbed, of making our will and testament in favour of succeeding Kulturs, as the Western soul, *weary of striving, sinks back into its home* (p. 615).

The theme would be indeed overwhelming, a nightmare of Copenicanism, did it not contain, unknown to the author, its own correctives—first of all in a vein of absurdity and exaggeration which betrays itself from time to time, and next in deductions which can evidently be made from the very theses set forth. As to these self-contained Kulturs, can it possibly be said that each one would have run an identical course had the others never existed? Could our Western culture be what it is if it had not succeeded to Greek culture? Dr Spengler himself would not say so. But, in that case, how are we to measure off the stages of birth and death—to say how much of the past still survives, or how much the death of one Kultur is affected by the birth of another? Then is it possible so to eliminate the influence of reaction? Is it not obvious, throughout history, that one extreme begets its opposite? And does not this imply a common and general direction, in virtue of which humanity seeks its rhythm, and works back from each extreme to balance and harmony? Why, again, does the "crowd" not understand the "artist," if the latter merely expresses the Kultur to which all belong? Then our author allows that there are stages in the growth of the individual mind which correspond to the various

Kulturs he sets before us: there is a Greek stage of perception, a magic stage, and so on. Does not this clearly indicate the fact that all these phases of intellectual life have a common root in human nature as such? Yet if this be so, we at once recover the unity of mankind, and the unity of man's life and evolution on earth. Lastly, what is this *Seelentum* of which every Kultur is the life and expression? Is it not something fundamental to all these manifestations, something greater than they, something that lives on even while it dies in them? Yet if this be so—and according to the thesis itself it must be so—then we are in presence of something more vital and abiding than any Kultur; something that cannot be measured by our historic computations; something greater than our fate. In it we have at once the Unknown of philosophy, the Infinite of faith. In it we have something to which we can look through the prison windows of our Kultur; towards which we can strive with a hope which its bonds cannot fetter. In it we have that in which, once more, all mankind are united; in which past, present, and future have one meaning and end. The burden of the inevitable, the fatalism of the Kultur creed are lifted; we have recovered our Infinite, and One, and Unknown, and with that our faith and our hope. In spite of the birth and death of the Kultur, the struggles of humanity recover their eternal value; what has never been may yet be; and the brotherhood of mankind is restored. M. D. PETRE.

LONDON.

Dostoevsky and his Creation. By Yanko Lavrin.—London :
W. Collins, Sons & Co., 1920.

THE present fashion in literature is psycho-analysis. In the English novel this is, to a great extent, of an artificial nature, and largely the product of a superficial study of text-books, which in some cases are themselves of a decidedly unhealthy nature. In the Russian novel, however, it is more natural, more interesting, and of a much deeper quality than in the English, and, we may also add, than in the French novel. The best-known Russian writer of this type is Dostoevsky, and the reason is not far to seek: what he wrote, he had experienced.

The present book is of especial interest, for two reasons: firstly, because the author is a Slav who has lived for some years in Russia, where he was on the staff of the *Novoe Vremya*; secondly, because it is a really sound psycho-critical study of the chief characters of Dostoevsky's works.

Mr Lavrin starts off with a brief biographical sketch of Dostoevsky, which immediately places the reader in the right frame of mind for a serious, but nevertheless fascinating, study of the subject. This is followed by an essay showing the relationship between Dostoevsky and modern art, in the course of which the author defines the difference between realism and actuality: the latter being a surface view, the former a far deeper aspect of life, and the one displayed by Dostoevsky in his writings.

Next we get a chapter on Dostoevsky as a psychologist, in which our critic says: "It is characteristic of Dostoevsky that he concerns himself mainly with that transient area of our consciousness where the irrational passes over into the rational, the unconscious into the conscious, the 'fantastic' into the real. He is supreme master only on that shifting border where nothing is determined, fixed, and firm; where all contradictions exist side by side."

From this we pass to what is probably the most interesting section of the book, the chapter on "The Struggle for an Absolute Value," where we find Dostoevsky asking himself: Is there a God? If not, then man's existence is meaningless, and he must either end it or accept his own will as the absolute law. Here it is that we see, through the medium of Dostoevsky's characters, the case put for and against the God-idea. As his creation Kirillov says: "If God exists, all is His will, and from His will I cannot escape"; while Karamazov thinks: "Since there is anyway no God, the new man may well become Man-God, even if he is the only one in the whole world; and, promoted to his new position, he may lightly overstep all the barriers of the old morality, of the old slave-man, if necessary. . . . 'All things are lawful,' and that is the end of it." Thus he placed his actions at the sole command of his desires; or, as Mr Lavrin puts it, "he came to the logical conclusion that without God every possibility of such a standard (*i.e.* the absolute standard of good and evil) must be replaced by casual values, based either on the power of external authority or on the caprices of self-will." There is always a dilemma.

Nor was the superman in any better position. His Raskolnikov killed the old woman, and could never forgive her: for, in his imagination, she sits and laughs at him; and, in our critic's words, "her laughter is the laughter of the 'beyond good and evil' at the daring superman who falls into the net of his own self-will, and cannot find a way out of it."

So Dostoevsky's characters perspiringly struggle in darkness, in an always vain attempt to attain light; even as Dostoevsky himself strove to reach that harmony he so greatly desired but never obtained. His mental life was, indeed, a tragedy; but he faced it heroically. We have much to learn from him, however, and, as Mr Lavrin says, "in all revolutions and reforms hitherto there have been only quantitative improvements." Dostoevsky believed that earth is awaiting a spiritual revolution, which will open a new path and offer a new basis for the future of mankind.

WILLIAM JOHNSON.

NOTTINGHAM.

A History of Penance. By Oscar D. Watkins, M.A. 2 vols.—
London: Longmans, 1920.

ALL readers of this book will acknowledge its value; but different readers will find very different values in it. Mr Watkins has given a very full catena of the original texts relating to canonical penance from the New Testament down to A.D. 450, and a less exhaustive, but quite sufficiently complete, catena from thence to 1215. Each group of texts is followed by a detailed exposition in which the original is generally translated in full. Having brought us thus, step by step, down to 450, the author pauses to take a bird's-eye view of those centuries in chapter ix., his first "review chapter." Another "review chapter" (xv.) sums up the centuries from 450 to 1215, and concludes the book. The index is rather scanty; but each volume contains so full a table of contents, and such frequent running marginal summaries, that this defect is scarcely felt. The Greek accents are not always correct; but, considering the mass of quotations, misprints are comparatively few and trifling. The author speaks modestly of the work as having occupied "his available time for a good many

years," and the public has to thank him for having spent his time so well. His book will supply a mine of information to students of this subject.

It is when we turn from his collections to his comments and generalisations that the greatest differences of opinion will unfold themselves among his readers. Many will approach the subject with the sympathy awakened by a practice which claims immemorial antiquity and direct institution from Christ—*semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*. Others will trace in it the tentative steps of an infant Church left by Christ to learn almost as much from its own failures as from its successes—constantly shifting its policy (as common sense dictates) with shifting circumstances—and finally adopting doctrines and practices which show far more traces of compromise between the hoped-for and the possible, than of direct initial inspiration or a steady march towards a clear-seen goal. Both, however, owe an equal debt to Mr Watkins's collections.

It may be well to give a concrete instance. In 1287, Bishop Quivil of Exeter found in his diocese a prejudice against the sacrament of extreme unction. There was a belief abroad that, if the person thus anointed should chance to recover, he would live the rest of his life under certain serious disabilities—that he would be cut off from flesh-eating and from conjugal relations, and would be forbidden ever to go barefoot: "wherefore," writes the Bishop in his synodal decrees, "they can scarce be induced to take this sacrament even *in extremis*." A generation earlier, we get the same evidence from South Germany, on the authority of Brother Berthold v. Regensburg, whom Roger Bacon extolled as the greatest preacher of his day. Embedded in the mass of later medieval superstitions and abuses, these two notices lose half their significance; we stumble across them, recognise the probability that they are pagan survivals in some form, and pass on. But our hasty guess was wrong: these are fossils not of paganism but of an earlier papacy which is already strange and forgotten in the century of Aquinas and Dante. About the year 390, Pope Siricius had in fact decreed such disabilities for all reconciled penitents. As Mr Watkins puts it (p. 412): "This section reveals a development of the penitential system which has not yet come under notice. Penance involves grave disabilities in the whole remaining term of life when the penance is done and the person restored to communion. No penitent may undertake military service. No penitent is to be found at the games of the circus. No penitent may after penance marry. No married penitents may after penance resume the cohabitation of marriage. The severity of these restrictions is startling. At the beginning of the fourth century in the Roman Church under Marcellus and Eusebius the imposing of penance at all had involved a grave conflict of parties, which had resulted in riot and bloodshed. At the end of the century penance is not only an established observance for certain grave sins, but it involves these almost savage privations, even when the penance is finished, and the penitent restored." Those thirteenth-century superstitions come no more into Mr Watkins's purview than Siricius's decree came into that of Quivil or Berthold; but, when once we put them together, their significance is obvious.


If with this passage we compare our author's other evidence on the same subject (pp. 482, 752), we are led to further reflections which it is difficult to reconcile with his general conclusions. He sees clearly, in detail, the anomalies and contradictions which marked this penitential system from the very first. He looks upon the earliest "binding and

loosing" by the bishop (later, by the priest) as a parallel grace to that of baptism, and seems only imperfectly to realise the difficulty thus imported (pp. 466-7). Baptism not only needed no bishop or priest, but, even to the present day, the Roman Catholic Church decides that a woman, or even a pagan, may baptize a child into Christianity. Again, when we are told that the "binding and loosing will be ratified in heaven," yet "this need not foreclose the final judgment of the Lord," though there is no contradiction in terms, yet it is difficult to reconcile the two statements in any sense which would essentially differentiate the power of the Catholic priest from that of a Quaker; the second seems to qualify binding and loosing into a mere matter of degree (pp. vii-viii). Thirdly, the astounding uncertainty which meets us on the very threshold, as to the true reading or interpretation of the "apostolic decree," needs a good deal more explanation than Mr Watkins seems to realise (p. 11). He shirks nothing consciously; repeatedly he points out the contradictions in theory and practice: "a remarkable variety of practice . . . a discipline of startling severity . . . a fulness of relaxation hardly less startling"; "this [contrast] is remarkable"; "considerable hesitation was expressed in the Church"; "curious half-way utterances"; "the Western Churches displayed a rigidity unknown in the East" (pp. 478, 481, 751-2). He frankly admits the complete failure of the ancient system of public penance (pp. 752-3). But this raises no deeper doubts in his mind, and he ends in a tone of gratulation (p. 771): "So greatly varied is the practice of the Church in the first twelve centuries of Christianity. It was to mortal men that the commission of the Lord had been conveyed; and it was in the human exercise of the commission that all this varied experience found place. The Catholic student will expect that the bishops and priests of the Church have not been left without the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the adaptation of their ministry to the varying needs of countries, times, and men's manners." Others, reviewing the same facts, might conclude less optimistically. If we could persuade a visitor from another planet to study (say) the rise and progress of the Society of Friends and this learned History of Penance; if we besought him to decide for us which was of mere human invention, and which was inspired directly by the teaching of God Almighty, would he indeed give a clear verdict for the Catholic institution? For it must be remembered that Mr Watkins's survey takes no notice, in virtue of his natural limitations, of the many abuses which, as collected by Dr H. C. Lea, carry the modern reader back into so strange an ecclesiastical atmosphere.

G. G. COULTON.

GREAT SHELFORD, CAMBRIDGE.





BL
1
H5
v.19

The Hibbert journal

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

